SPECIAL REPORT

Preventing and countering violent extremism in Africa
The role of the mining sector

Lisa Sharland, Tim Grice and Sara Zeiger

Methodology

This report draws on a series of meetings and field interviews conducted by Lisa Sharland and Tim Grice in the case-study countries of Burkina Faso, Ghana and Kenya in June and July 2017 with mining company officials, security consultants, academics, non-government organisations, government officials and other stakeholders. It also draws on interviews conducted by Lisa Sharland and Tim Grice in Perth, Australia, in May 2017 with representatives from mining companies operating in Burkina Faso, Ghana, Mali and Kenya, which were supplemented by follow-up conversations with Australian Government officials in Canberra and remotely with mining companies throughout the project, as well as discussions at Africa Down Under 2017 and the Hedayah International CVE Conference 2017. This field research was supplemented with extensive desktop research on the project topic led by Sara Zeiger, in conjunction with the other authors.

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FOREWORD

The former UN Secretary-General's Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism emphasised the need for a 'whole of society' response to a growing threat to peace and security, sustainable development, human rights and the rule of law, and humanitarian action. The 2016 Global Terrorism Index, published by another Australian-based think tank, the Institute for Economics and Peace, confirmed that the global economic impact of violent extremism was at least US$90 billion.

Engaging the private sector as part of this concerted effort is critical. Some companies can inadvertently stoke the resentment that may radicalise people to violent extremism in the first place. More positively, many have unrivalled access to local communities, where they need a 'social licence to operate' and where efforts to prevent violent extremism need to start. Through creating jobs, the private sector can help address one of the underlying causes of radicalisation, while its funding and expertise can help scale up the impact of preventive efforts.

Critical though this is, and intuitive though the vested interest may be, it has so far proved very difficult to engage the private sector meaningfully in efforts to prevent and counter violent extremism (P/CVE). In some cases, this is because violent extremism is simply too politically sensitive for corporate boardrooms, in others there's a feeling that the P/CVE agenda has become highly politicised, and in still others the challenge is that this is still a nascent field of enquiry, with no firm evidence base or results chain. Ironically, private sector engagement would help address all those problems by casting the challenge in a business rather than political mould, providing more neutral leadership on the agenda, and developing the business tools needed to equip P/CVE efforts.

In at least three ways, this report is an essential step forward in overcoming the obstacles to engaging the private sector in global P/CVE efforts. First, it lays out more clearly and convincingly than I have ever seen before the 'business case' for P/CVE: without it, companies are losing talent, market share, money and credibility. This is especially true of the mining sector and other extractives, but applies also to other sectors, from agriculture and fisheries to transport and tourism. Second, for the particular case of the mining sector, it articulates the multiple ways that the sector impacts on and is impacted by the risk of violent extremism; this analytical framework will help governments and the private sector understand their respective roles and responsibilities. Third, it itemises specific areas where the private sector can contribute, very importantly beyond simply financing P/CVE efforts.

The global effort to prevent violent extremism can't succeed without the private sector. This report explains why, and how to incorporate this essential partner.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Terrorism and violent extremism remain significant threats to international peace and security. Although few countries have been immune, Africa has been particularly susceptible. Weak institutions, porous borders, inadequately trained or ill-equipped security forces, historical grievances and a lack of economic opportunities have created conditions for extremist ideologies to grow and persist in parts of the continent.

To date, most counterterrorism efforts have been security and intelligence led, with an emphasis on military and kinetic strategies to 'defeat' terrorism. Over the past decade in particular, global efforts have also focused on strategies for preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE), particularly on the role of international institutions, governments, regional organisations and communities. While several international frameworks for counterterrorism, for example the UN Secretary-General's Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism, have recognised the important role of the private sector in prevention measures, there's been little research and analysis exploring the specificity and mechanisms of private sector involvement. This report by ASPI, in cooperation with Hedayah, uses a case study of the mining sector in Africa to examine how the private sector does and can engage in P/CVE efforts.

As the second-largest continent, Africa is richly endowed with mineral reserves: it's estimated to hold 30% of the world's mineral resources.[1] African nations with significant mining activity rely heavily on the sector for fiscal revenue. Given the size of the continent, much of which hasn't been comprehensively explored for mineral reserves, the footprint of the mining sector in Africa is positioned to grow. At the same time, mining projects in Africa have been targets for violent extremist groups and are negatively influenced by the security situation in their countries of operation. Mining companies may be operating in geographically remote locations, be viewed as foreign (or often 'Western') actors, be engaged in cross-border supply chains, and provide a gateway for illicit financial flows, particularly in countries that lack consistent governance and political stability.

Mining projects also have the potential to both exacerbate and mitigate some of the known drivers of violent extremism. For instance, mining companies can act as catalysts for economic growth and community resilience by providing employment and supply-chain opportunities for local businesses, investing in social and economic infrastructure, engaging communities in an inclusive manner from the earliest stages of mining projects, and working with community organisations to support trainee and entrepreneurship programs. Fiscal revenues from mining projects also provide the opportunity for prudential investments in critical infrastructure and essential services. On the other hand, the environmental and social impacts of mining can disrupt the livelihoods of local communities, displace local peoples and aggravate grievances over land rights—all of which can exacerbate the drivers of violent extremism in areas where there are communities at risk of recruitment and radicalisation.

For mining companies, some risk-management strategies are already in place: the mining sector has supported the development of international standards and good practice frameworks for human rights, good governance, stakeholder engagement and corporate social responsibility (CSR) to help to reduce social risk and enhance opportunities for inclusive development. However, when it comes to the role of the private sector in P/CVE, a more targeted approach is required.

This report draws on a combination of desktop and field research covering four case-study countries in Africa—Burkina Faso, Ghana, Kenya and Mali—to identify the intersections between the mining sector and the drivers of violent extremism in sub-Saharan Africa. While the report is not comprehensive in covering all potential areas of intersection, it offers a starting point for a conversation between relevant parties on how the mining sector may play a role in P/CVE in Africa.

The following recommendations are offered to strengthen the role of the mining sector in global P/CVE efforts, primarily in areas at risk from violent extremism.

Recommendations to the mining sector

1. **Develop a global good practice framework for the mining sector's role in efforts to prevent and counter violent extremism.** The framework should identify potential risks and opportunities across the life cycle and value chain of mining projects, along with specific approaches to engaging with governments and communities on P/CVE. Focus should be given to hard and soft security; community engagement; CSR programs; human resources policies; mining rights and land management; interactions between formal and informal mining; environmental management; and mine-closure impacts. This framework may also be a resource for the wider extractive sector and inform broader private sector engagement on P/CVE.

2. **Define the roles, responsibilities, expectations and limits of the mining sector for how to engage in P/CVE activities.** As host governments and foreign governments will increasingly be interested in how the private sector may be involved in P/CVE efforts, particularly in Africa, it is advisable that the mining sector defines the ways in which mining companies *can engage and are willing to engage in P/CVE.*

Recommendations to mining companies

3. **Incorporate a conflict analysis and risk assessment for violent extremism as part of the broader social impact assessment before the approval of mining projects.** In alignment with 'do no harm' principles, this is critical to identifying and managing the potential risks posed to the people and assets of mining companies; understanding the ways in which project activities may exacerbate pre-existing conflicts, grievances or extremist threats in local communities; and ensuring that security approaches and CSR programs contribute where possible to broader efforts to prevent and mitigate the drivers of violent extremism.

4. **Apply a 'P/CVE lens' prior to the approval of a mining project and throughout the mining life cycle.** Social management and investment plans should consider the way in which the mining value chain exacerbates or ameliorates the risks of violent extremism in areas affected by mining, including the ways in which approaches to security, compensation, employment, supply chains, CSR and community engagement programs affect vulnerable groups and marginalised groups. Note that this P/CVE assessment isn't simply the application of a good CSR program, as it requires a risk management plan that mitigates the impacts of mining activities on the local drivers of radicalisation and recruitment to violent extremism and a CSR program that either directly reduces the drivers or at the very least does no harm to P/CVE efforts.

5. **Embed P/CVE into existing training and internal processes for mining company community relations, security and human resources personnel.** This may include broader training on local and national P/CVE efforts, assessments of the local drivers of violent extremism as they relate to the mining value chain, approaches to identifying potentially 'at risk' groups or individuals, and human rights and conflict resolution skills and frameworks.

6. **Assess the options for engaging directly in government or community P/CVE programs aimed at strengthening community resilience.** Mining companies can leverage many of their resources to effectively support P/CVE programs (for instance, to incorporate 'returnees' from conflicts into CSR programs or to support community-led efforts to undermine violent extremist narratives). Mining companies will need to assess the needs of the community, as well as the benefits and potential risks of directly supporting P/CVE programs in the local context of their mining projects and how their CSR programs might fit into that context.

7. **Engage with processes to develop national and regional frameworks for P/CVE and explore partnerships with host governments, other private sector actors and other stakeholders.** Where relevant and mutually beneficial, a dialogue between mining companies and stakeholders responsible for regional and national P/CVE plans can provide opportunities to share lessons and develop collective approaches. Again, it is important here that mining companies are able to articulate their own roles, responsibilities and limitations when it comes to engagement with national and regional frameworks for P/CVE.

8. **Engage with regional and international organisations in order to identify potential partnerships with local community-level initiatives to strengthen resilience against violent extremism.** Organisations such as Hedayah, the Global Community Engagement Resilience Fund (GCERF), the UN Development Programme (UNDP), the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and many others already have networks of community organisations and individuals that can support private sector P/CVE efforts.

Recommendations to host governments

9. **For counterterrorism and CVE departments and agencies: engage with mining companies as part of efforts to develop national (and local) P/CVE strategies.** Governments should ensure that mining companies are included in regular stakeholder consultations as part of the development and review of P/CVE plans. This should also include opportunities for private sector companies to share successes and challenges as they relate to the way general CSR programs have contributed to community resilience, as well as any specific P/CVE strategies that are being implemented unilaterally or in partnership with local stakeholders.

10. **For mining departments and agencies: ensure that there's transparency about mining governance regimes and the share of royalties and economic investment being provided to the national government and local communities.** Benefits-sharing arrangements should also ensure that a balance is struck between the national and local distribution of royalties and other economic benefits. Achieving a balance between local and national distribution is critical to ensuring that the economic benefits of extraction are felt at the local level, thereby minimising grievances and feelings of marginalisation.

11. **For mining departments and agencies: consider establishing a liaison officer or focal point to advise on issues related to P/CVE in mining ministries, mining departments, or both.** The officer or focal point would be an important conduit between the mining department and other government agencies working on P/CVE programs, as well as providing an entry point for advice to mining companies on how they should consider managing their approach to P/CVE.

Recommendations to local community organisations

12. **Assess the opportunities and risks posed by collaborating with mining companies to support efforts to develop community resilience against violent extremism.** Mining companies are both potential sources of sponsorship and potential partners for local community organisations focused on P/CVE. Collective approaches between community organisations and mining companies in areas such as education, vocational training, entrepreneurship, supply-chain development, community sports, cultural development and agriculture can reduce the risk factors for violent extremism in local communities affected by mining.

13. **Communicate the communities' needs for P/CVE efforts and building community resilience with the mining sector.** Ensuring that mining sector actors and mining companies understand community priorities for P/CVE and inclusive development provides a strong foundation for partnerships to reduce the risk factors for violent extremism in mining regions.

INTRODUCTION

Terrorism and violent extremism remain significant threats to international peace and security, and few countries have been immune to their effects. Factors such as weak institutions, porous borders, poorly trained and equipped security forces, historical grievances and an overall lack of economic opportunity have created favourable environments for extremist ideologies to grow in parts of the African continent. Violent extremist groups, such as Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Boko Haram and al-Shabaab, have seized on these opportunities and subsequently contributed to insecurity across the Sahel, the Lake Chad basin and the Horn of Africa.

The nature of extremist ideologies means that many extremist groups often target specific segments of the population. Students, youth and women have been victims of recent attacks in Nigeria and Kenya, as demonstrated by the Boko Haram kidnapping of the Chibok schoolgirls in Nigeria in April 2014 and the al-Shabaab attack on students at Garissa University College in Kenya in April 2015. Terrorists also have a history of targeting foreign (often 'Western') interests on the continent, from the US embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 through to more recent attacks on establishments frequented by foreigners, such as the Radisson Blu hotel in Bamako in November 2015, the Le Campement in Bamako in June 2017, the Splendid Hotel in Ouagadougou in January 2016 and, a Turkish café in Ouagadougou in August 2017.

Efforts by the international community and regional efforts to address terrorism and violent extremism have evolved significantly over the last decade. Focusing solely on military and securitised responses has been shown to have limited effect in addressing the threat. Approaches have therefore started to shift to focus on some of the root causes through longer term prevention efforts, resulting in the emergence of programs aimed at preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE). To date, most efforts to counter violent extremism and build resilience have focused heavily on the role of international institutions, governments, regional organisations and communities.

While several international frameworks for counterterrorism, such as the UN Secretary-General's Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism, have recognised the important role of the private sector in prevention measures, there's been little research and analysis exploring the specificity and mechanisms of the private sector's involvement in P/CVE work.[2] This report by ASPI, in cooperation with Hedayah, addresses the gap in research by using a case study of the mining sector in Africa to examine how the private sector does and can engage in P/CVE efforts.

Africa's considerable mineral resource wealth, combined with the limited development of the domestic extractives sector on the continent, has made it an attractive investment option for foreign mining companies. At the same time, security concerns and instability caused by the growth and spread of violent extremism can have an impact on the decisions by companies to invest in or continue their operations on the continent. For example, the attack on the Radisson Blu hotel in Bamako in 2015 was a turning point for some mining companies in Mali, which chose to revise their approaches to security as a consequence.[3] Several foreign extractives companies operating in Africa have also been the target of recent attacks by terrorist groups. Militants took hostages and killed workers at the In Amenas gas plant operated by BP and the Norwegian oil company Statoil in eastern Algeria in January 2013. AQIM launched rocket attacks on another facility owned by the same companies in southern Algeria in March 2016 (prompting the companies to withdraw their employees).[4] Mining companies are increasingly concerned about the risk of attacks and kidnappings of their employees,[5] especially in a region where holding Western employees for ransom has been

a relatively successful part of terrorism funding plans.[6] When such attacks occur, they may have a disruptive impact on employees, operations, financial returns for foreign investors and fiscal revenues for host governments, not to mention the local community and people's livelihoods.

The investment and operational decisions and actions of mining companies have a significant impact on political, social, environmental and economic conditions in their areas of operations, including on many of the identified drivers and factors that create an environment conducive to violent extremism or resilience to it. While the arrival of a mining company in a region signals employment opportunities and potential economic benefits to the state and local communities, such investments often raise high expectations among the local populace. Those expectations can give rise to local grievances, particularly where specific groups feel that they have missed out on economic opportunities or have had their livelihoods disrupted.

Alternatively, where mining companies are more proactive in their approach to managing social risks and opportunities from the outset of their operations, they have the potential to mitigate some of the factors that may contribute to violent extremism. In some cases, mining companies are already directly and indirectly contributing to P/CVE efforts by engaging with local communities and establishing employment and livelihood programs, even though such activities are not 'badged' or even conceived as P/CVE programs. However, there's been little detailed analysis of the potential risks and opportunities that such programs may present when it comes to comprehensive efforts to address the threat of violent extremism.

This report explores the type of role that the private sector, and in particular the mining sector, could have in P/CVE. It draws on a combination of desktop and field research focused on four case-study countries—Burkina Faso, Ghana, Kenya and Mali—in order to identify the link between the mining sector and potential drivers of and structural factors in violent extremism in parts of sub-Saharan Africa.[7] First, the report examines recent developments in P/CVE work. Second, it considers the role of the mining sector in Africa as a private sector stakeholder in those efforts and examines the impact of security concerns on investment decisions by mining companies and on their operational approaches to security. Third, it explores the correlation between the drivers of violent extremism and the different activities undertaken throughout a mining project's life cycle in order to identify potential risks and opportunities. Fourth, it examines the role of the mining sector in actions to address violent extremism, identifying preliminary lessons and best practices from the research. Finally, it provides recommendations for mining companies, the industry, governments and communities on approaches to engage mining companies in P/CVE efforts.

VIOLENT EXTREMISM: ADDRESSING THE THREAT

There is not one broadly accepted definition of violent extremism or terrorism. As the UN Secretary-General's Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism notes, '[v]iolent extremism is a diverse phenomenon, without clear definition.'[8] Yet it's important to establish a working definition for the purposes of this report and the following analysis, particularly so that the report's recommendations can be operationalised by all sectors involved. Since the Australian mining sector is one of the most influential in the African context, this report draws on the Australian Government's definition, which states that violent extremism is 'the use or support of violence to achieve ideological, religious or political goals'.[9]

To put it simply: for those working in the field of P/CVE, the methodology used is to define in the local context what have been described in a USAID report as 'push' or 'pull' factors leading individuals or groups to radicalisation or recruitment, and designing interventions to reduce or downplay one or more of those factors. P/CVE can also refer to resilience-building measures or skills that protect against push and pull factors. Push factors are generally structural, environmental, cultural or political conditions that create an environment in which violent extremism and its ideology can thrive. Pull factors are social and economic incentives to become a violent extremist.

However, there are differing views about the value of defining push and pull factors. For example, James Khalil and Martine Zeuthen argue that they are 'overly simplistic and somewhat ambiguous', suggesting an approach 'that distinguishes between structural motivators, individual incentives, and enabling factors' instead.[10] In James Khalil and Martine Zeuthen's framework, 'structural motivators' refers more to the conditions and environment surrounding violent extremism, 'individual incentives' refers to the rewards and sense of purpose gained by participating in violence or violent extremism, and 'enabling factors' refers to catalysing processes of radicalisation, recruitment, or both, such as mentors, charismatic leaders or online forums.

Notably, there have been several debates on the conceptual differences between preventing and countering violent extremism (PVE versus CVE), which aren't explored in depth in this report. Generally, this distinction refers to the distance from initial radicalisation to participation in a violent extremist act. 'PVE' is focused more on resilience-building measures and large-scale strategies to reduce 'conditions conducive' to violent extremism, according to Pillar 1 of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy. 'CVE' generally refers to interventions at a localised level that tend to involve individuals further along the radicalisation pathway, and may also include interventions that take into consideration 'enabling factors', such as charismatic leaders or the persuasive recruitment strategies of violent extremist groups.

While it isn't necessary to further elaborate on this debate in this report, we use the definition put forward by Anne Aly and Sara Zeiger, which holds that P/CVE includes:

> … strategic, non-coercive counterterrorism programs and policies including those involving education and broad-based community engagement; more targeted narrative/messaging programs and counter-recruitment strategies; disengagement and … intervention programs for individuals engaging in radicalization; as well as de-radicalization, disengagement and rehabilitation programs for former violent extremist offenders.[11]

Using this definition, this report also recognises that broad-based community engagement may include efforts to reduce unemployment, increase economic opportunities or provide alternatives to economic incentives that terrorist groups may offer. That is, the opportunities identified in this report and the recommendations for the private sector's role involve the full spectrum of P/CVE activities, programs and policies. Moreover, in order to ensure that the recommendations are contextualised, this report also considers some interventions outside the scope of P/CVE, within more general security frameworks but related to the drivers of radicalisation in the context of the private sector in Africa.

The international context of P/CVE and the private sector

Efforts to address the threat of violent extremism globally have come into focus in recent years, spurred by vicious, high-profile attacks mounted by groups such as Daesh,[12] al-Qaeda, Boko Haram and al-Shabaab. Social media has increased the threat posed by such groups, which have been able to radicalise individuals, inspiring 'foreign terrorist fighters' to travel to conflict zones such as Iraq, Syria and Somalia and others to mount 'lone-wolf' or small-cell attacks in their countries of residence, including in Australia, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Spain, Turkey, Tunisia and the UK.

The international community attempted to address this threat through a series of multilateral forums drawing on the UN's evolving counterterrorism architecture. For example, the UN Secretary-General's Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism (December 2015) officially raised the status of PVE to the level of the UN.[13] Along with other sectors, such as the education and technology sectors, the plan of action also makes specific reference to the role of the private sector, notably in developing national action plans for PVE, its role in public–private partnerships for funding, and its role in creating jobs and other employment opportunities.

However, other international bodies were focused on prevention work long before the UN PVE Plan of Action was released. The Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF), officially launched in September 2011, shares good practices and lessons learned in its Countering Violent Extremism Working Group, which is co-chaired by the UK and the United Arab Emirates.[14] The GCTF has also produced a number of framework documents related to P/CVE, including the *Ankara Memorandum on Good Practices for a Multi-Sectoral Approach to CVE*[15] and the *Abu Dhabi Memorandum on Good Practices for Education and Countering Violent Extremism.*[16] These documents emphasise the role of the private sector as a key partner in P/CVE, although they don't say specifically what that role might be. Several GCTF institutions have implemented the good practices outlined in these framework documents to better engage the private sector. For example, Hedayah hosted a Global CVE Communications Exposition in December 2014 to bring policymakers, governments and practitioners together with technology, communications and marketing experts from the private sector to enhance efforts to counter-message against extremism.[17] Moreover, the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund, which also emerged from the GCTF, is a public–private partnership 'to support local, community-level initiatives aimed at strengthening resilience against violent extremist agendas', with considerable scope to engage private sector partners in initiatives to build community resilience.[18]

Efforts to prevent violent extremism are also linked to wider conflict prevention and sustainable development initiatives. Sustainable Development Goal 16 focuses on the promotion of just, peaceful and inclusive societies, overlapping directly with many PVE approaches. The UN Development Programme has consequently developed a global framework for 'Preventing Violent Extremism through Inclusive Development and Promotion of Tolerance and Respect for Diversity', which focuses on the importance of development approaches. In February 2016, recognising this link, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development updated its guidance on eligible Official Development Assistance (ODA) activities to include certain activities for the purpose of preventing violent extremism. This has been somewhat controversial: some development and humanitarian organisations have expressed concern that it leads to the increasing securitisation of development programming.[19] Nevertheless, it has provided more comprehensive and wide-ranging scope for governments to invest in PVE programs that meet development objectives.

At the national level, several countries have developed their own national action plans on PVE, as mandated by the UN Secretary-General's PVE Plan of Action. Nigeria, Kenya and Somalia are among the African countries that have developed national action plans. In the Kenyan plan, there's specific reference to the significant PVE role of the private sector, including private security, private education, information technology and media companies.[20] The Kenyan strategy also makes specific reference to engaging with corporate social responsibility programs. Similarly, the Somali national strategy defines the private sector as 'local business owners and foreign investors' and articulates the key role that the private sector can play in community-level activities such as grassroots initiatives and communications activities.[21]

At the regional level, the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD) has developed a plan and is encouraging East African governments to do the same.[22] Similarly, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)[23] has developed the Counter-terrorism Strategy and Implementation Plan, which includes some prevention and reintegration elements.[24] And there are examples of CVE plans at the local level in Kenya, where Kwale County launched its Plan for Countering Violent Extremism in February 2017.[25] However, even though the Kwale plan acknowledges the strengths of private sector leaders in addressing violent extremism, it includes no specific plans to engage or work with the private sector.

The security context in West Africa and the Horn of Africa

The security situation in Africa is as diverse and complex as the continent itself. For the purposes of this report, since the case studies and field work draw on research from Burkina Faso, Ghana, Mali and Kenya, we focus on West Africa (primarily on threats posed by AQIM and its affiliates) and East Africa and the Horn of Africa (primarily on threats posed by al-Shabaab). In order to identify potential P/CVE interventions against these threats, and specifically how those P/CVE interventions may relate to mining communities, it is important to delve deeper into contextualised country case studies, including the main factors leading to radicalisation and recruitment as well as potential sources of resilience (see Table 1, opposite). This assessment of drivers of radicalisation and sources of resilience is based on a review of the existing academic literature and baseline studies, as well as interviews conducted through the primary research for this report.

Table 1: Potential drivers of violent extremism and examples of existing sources of resilience

Country	Examples of potential drivers of violent extremism	Examples of existing sources of resilience
Burkina Faso	• Lack of government accountability[26] • Socioeconomic disadvantage: poverty, unemployment, poor access to food, water and housing • Gap between economic expectations and available opportunities • Political instability after ousting of President Campoare (2015) and coup attempt against acting President Kafando • Loss of artisanal (informal) mining as a livelihood due to mining companies entering the country (including illegal foreign miners)[27]	• High levels of trust in the military and police: 72% of Burkinabes express trust in the police, and 73% express trust in the military (the third-highest rates in Africa)[28] • Inter-religious dialogue and tolerance are widespread[29] • Informal community structures in villages: mediators such as *griots* (musicians, village storytellers) defuse conflict through literary lessons, and *forgerons* (metalworkers) hold symbolic power and authority over conflict • Informal mechanisms of social cohesion, such as joking relationships to diffuse tension (referred to as *la parentée à plaisanterie*[30])
Mali	• Youth unemployment, poverty, and difficulty meeting basic needs[31] • 'Land grabs' by government[32] • Need to protect family, community, property and income-generating activities[33] • Pull of 'flashy' propaganda of religious figures rather than religious doctrine or ideology[34] • Land ownership issues (largely undocumented).	• Cultural and religious history for Timbuktians: AQIM and the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa implemented strict sharia and destroyed historic monuments[35] • Sufism: some Sufi preachers have focused their attention on countering the radicalising rhetoric of extremist groups in Mali,[36] enabling socially marginalised youth to find jobs and a purpose through engagement with Islamic associations (for example, Sheikh Sufi Bilal of Bamako)[37] • Relatively high trust in and support for security forces (82% trust level), despite ongoing attacks[38]
Ghana	• Unemployment and poverty • Promise of cash and a luxurious life, especially to university students: this was particularly the case for Muhammad Alema, a Ghanaian who joined ISIS[39] • Discrepancies between predominantly Christian south and Muslim north[40] • Youth exclusion and youth bulge • Transition towards urbanisation/migration, combined with the need to hold onto ethnic and cultural identity[41] • Politicisation of Sufi-supporters versus non-Sufi-supporters among Muslims[42] • Risk of radicalisation is currently low, but potential drivers are present.	• Existence and work of National Peace Council • Competition between main Muslim groups (Al-tijaniyya Movement, Ahlussunna Waljama'a and Ahmadiyya Movement) facilitates diversity of Islamic thought • Pride in democratic history and a tradition of tolerance • Civil society's ability to express grievances and accountability • Diversity between religious groups and general inter-religious tolerance

Country	Examples of potential drivers of violent extremism	Examples of existing sources of resilience
Kenya	• High unemployment and low access to education, housing and health services[43] • Perceptions of social and economic marginalisation between neighbourhoods (often exploited by al-Shabaab recruiters)[44] • Opportunities in al-Shabaab to start a career[45] • Personal appeal of radical preachers[46] • Lack of effective mosque structure, combined with calls to action by domestic supporters of al-Shabaab, including the Pumwani Riyadha Mosque and Muslim Youth Center near Eastleigh (operating overtly between 2008 and 2012)[47] • Youth restlessness[48] • Adventure and sense of belonging as part of joining al-Shabaab[49] • Lack of parent or father figure and heavy association of peer groups (friends) with violent extremism[50] • Perceptions of aggressive actions by security forces, corruption among government officials, or both[51] • Perceived marginalisation and historical injustices/ profiling against Kenyans with Somali backgrounds[52]	• Inter-group relationships and civic engagement, government and community relations, and intergenerational relations: for example, in Maajengo Pumwani there's a strong sense of cross-religious community relations, often including intermarried families[53] • Engaging with the informal economy potentially capitalises on youth's entrepreneurship and creativity • Youth culture through film, poetry, music, radio and theatre

Overview: West Africa

In West Africa (particularly in the countries chosen as case studies), the primary threat has been AQIM, which was founded in resistance to the Algerian Government. In a relationship with the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat, AQIM has operated throughout West Africa since 2007. It has conducted recent attacks in Mali (November 2015), Burkina Faso (January 2016) and Cote d'Ivoire (March 2016), and one report links it to more than 100 attacks in West Africa in 2016 (most of them in Mali).[54] Moreover, countries that have previously been considered generally safe by most Western governments, such as Burkina Faso, have now been the sites of attacks on 'soft' targets, such as hotels and tourist sites, that have had impacts on both security and tourism income.

Boko Haram isn't operational in the three West African countries chosen for this report, although the group has had a significant security impact on Nigeria and the surrounding countries. While this report makes little direct reference to Boko Haram, one could argue that many of the recommendations made here can also be applicable in Nigeria and in other countries where the group operates.

Other terrorist groups

Other notable terrorist groups in Burkina Faso, Ghana and Mali in addition to AQIM include the following:

• **Ansar Dine** ('Movement of Defenders of the Faith') has been operating in Mali since November 2011 and comprises mainly Malians (Tuareg and Berber Arabs), some of whom fought for Muammar Gadaffi in Libya.

• **Al-Mourabitoun** ('The Sentinels') operates in Burkina Faso, Mali, Algeria, Libya and Niger, and is a merger of two AQIM splinter groups, the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa and the al-Mulathamun Battalion. Notably, al-Mourabitoun claimed responsibility for the November 2015 attack in Bamako on the Radisson Blu hotel as well as a hotel siege in Sevare in early 2015.

- The **Macina Liberation Front** also claimed responsibility for the November 2015 attacks in Bamako, Mali, alongside al-Mourabitoun and AQIM. It seeks an ethnically Fulani Islamic state in southern Mali and northern Burkina Faso.

- **Daesh** and its affiliates in West Africa remain a considerable challenge. Beyond the pledge of allegiance to Daesh by Boko Haram in March 2015, North Africa (Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia) and Mauritania have become safe havens for training, networks and weapons to support Daesh and its cause. The Mali-based leader of al-Mourabitoun, Au Walid al-Sahrawi, supposedly pledged allegiance to Daesh in May 2015, although the allegiance was swiftly overturned by the Shura Council of al-Mourabitoun, and Mokhtar Belmokhtar, who swore allegiance to al-Qaeda, was declared emir.[55]

Note that the main terrorist groups operating in Mali announced a 'merger' of their efforts under the leader of Ansar Dine, Iyad Ag-Ghali, in March 2017.[56]

Overview: East Africa and the Horn of Africa

In East Africa and the Horn of Africa, the Somalia-based terrorist group al-Shabaab remains the primary terrorist threat, planning and launching attacks and suicide bombings in Somalia, Kenya, Ethiopia, Uganda and Djibouti. According to the Global Terrorism Database managed by the University of Maryland, there have been more 2,600 incidents related to al-Shabaab since 2007.[57] The security situation in East Africa has gained attention once again since the October 2017 truck bomb attack in Mogadishu in which at least 300 people were killed, serving as a reminder that al-Shabaab has not disappeared.[58] While still focused on striking targets outside Somalia, particularly in countries contributing troops to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), al-Shabaab mainly attempts to delegitimise the Federal Government of Somalia through assassinations and suicide bombings. While the main recruits are Somalis and Kenyans, al-Shabaab recruitment is also a concern for Western countries with large Somali communities, such as the US, Denmark and Australia.[59] Regional and national conflicts, such as instability in Ethiopia or disputed elections in Kenya, can also create potential recruitment grounds for al-Shabaab, which capitalises on perceived or real power vacuums.

Country-based drivers of radicalisation

As any P/CVE activity should begin with an assessment of the local drivers of radicalisation in the countries or localities of interest, Table 1 outlines some of the main drivers of radicalisation and sources of resilience for the four case-study countries—Burkina Faso, Mali, Kenya and Ghana. A thorough analysis of the different factors relating to radicalisation and recruitment in each country is outside the scope of this report, as is any new detailed analysis of empirical evidence on drivers. Nonetheless, a review of existing research on the four countries revealed a number of factors, which varied among the four, that are relevant to violent extremism. Note that in Ghana and Burkina Faso instances of radicalisation among the local population are relatively few compared to instances in some neighbouring countries in West Africa (although radicalisation is growing in Burkina Faso), whereas in Mali and Kenya the levels of radicalisation tend to be much higher. Still, the argument can be made that prevention is all the more critical in countries such as Burkina Faso and Ghana, and that measures should also be taken to ensure that the violence isn't exacerbated by the private sector.

The role of the private sector in P/CVE

In P/CVE, most of the conceptualisation of the role of the private sector is specifically related to social media companies and their policies for content takedown. Both governments and the general public are also putting pressure on social media giants to be accountable for the spread of violent extremist propaganda and messages on their platforms.[60] Technology companies that can develop ways to better identify content online and detect potential violent extremists earlier on in the process of radicalisation have also been a priority for P/CVE and broader counterterrorism efforts.[61] Communications companies have been brought into the fold to help develop

better marketing strategies for counter-narrative and alternative narrative campaigns.[62] These types of companies have a significant role to play in P/CVE efforts. However, there has been less focus to date on the role that the wider private sector may have in P/CVE.

There are a number of potential risks for private sector companies considering whether to engage directly in P/CVE efforts. Eric Rosand and Alistair Miller list several reasons why the broader private sector is reluctant to enter the P/CVE space:

- seeing the subject as too politically sensitive
- being potentially linked to government programs that may stigmatise communities (and consumers)
- not being interested in long-term projects that may take years to produce results
- competing global issues, such as sustainable development and environmental issues, that dilute the funds available for private sector investment.[63]

However, as Amy Cunningham and Khalid Koser point out, the private sector needs to be engaged 'because at times their actions may inadvertently stoke violent extremist reactions or contribute to recruitment'.[64] In other words, some private sector entities might not be able to choose whether or not they engage in P/CVE efforts. Because of geographical location, the scale economic disruption or the level of engagement with the local community, some private sector actors are already influencing factors that drive violent extremism, although they may not realise it. It is important that this is analysed further not only to identify potential unknown risks, but also to identify opportunities to harness private sector companies in P/CVE efforts. As is indicated in the next section, the mining sector, as a significant investor and operator in Africa, provides a useful case study.

THE MINING SECTOR: AN INVESTED STAKEHOLDER IN P/CVE

African nations with significant mining activity rely heavily on the sector for fiscal revenue. Given the size of the continent, much of which has not been explored for mineral reserves, the footprint of the mining sector is positioned to grow. The nature and types of activities undertaken by mining companies mean that the sector as a whole has a vested interest in P/CVE.

First, the mining sector has a set of structural characteristics that may directly affect some of the drivers of violent extremism in its areas of operations.

Second, mining companies are operating in areas where there's significant violent extremist activity, from West Africa and the Sahel across to the Horn of Africa. Consequently, they have a direct interest in efforts to improve the security of their operations, personnel and investments on the ground. Moreover, mining companies can't rely on hard security measures alone, and there are significant risks for doing so—including risks of becoming a 'hard' target for crime and terrorism, and risks associated with breaking community trust and the 'social licence to operate'.

Mining structural characteristics affecting drivers of violent extremism

The mining sector has structural characteristics that are particularly relevant to global P/CVE efforts. As conceived here, the mining sector includes:

- both high-value minerals, such as gold, copper, silver and diamonds, and lower value minerals that are often extracted through small quarry operations, such as granite, basalt and non-precious gemstones
- mining projects across the full project life cycle, from exploration to closure
- mining operations of all sizes, from artisanal and small-scale mining to large-scale mining operations
- both formal and informal mining[65]
- the full supply chain, including the mining engineering, technology and services sector and the various actors that regulate and observe the sector, including the state and civil society organisations.

The sectoral characteristics that result from these various types of mining projects, supply chains and actors have important links to global P/CVE efforts (see Figure 1).

Figure 1: Mining structural characteristics affecting violent extremism

First, mining projects aren't spread randomly across the landscape. Although mining companies assess a wide range of political, fiscal and sovereign risks when making investment decisions, 'geological determinism' dictates the possible locations of mining projects. Projects in Africa are increasingly located in geopolitically challenging locations characterised by political instability, uncertain regulatory regimes, high levels of insecurity, crime and, in many cases, the threat of violent extremism.

Second, not only are mining companies present in geopolitically challenging regions, they are often operating at scale in those locations. The mining sector is typically segregated into majors, mid-tiers and juniors (usually exploration companies). Major and mid-tier companies, in particular, tend to invest in large-scale mining projects that require high levels of capitalisation to fund significant investments in mining infrastructure, as well as ancillary support infrastructure for power generation, telecommunications, camps and logistics. This high level of investment attracts a mining 'industrial complex' and political economy that have the potential to penetrate deeply into local economies and cause significant disruption to communities. Compared to many other sectors, therefore, the scale at which the mining sector operates magnifies its potential to affect the socioeconomic development of an area.

Third, the significant ecological footprint of mineral extraction is also relevant to P/CVE. The mining sector's business model is by its nature disruptive to ecologies and peoples, particularly in the immediate impact-areas of extraction. Open-cut, underground and subsurface mining depletes or degrades (or both) natural capital and ecosystem services.[66] The environmental footprint of the mining sector is also characterised by environmental disasters across almost all of the Earth's continents.[67] Even industry-leading mining practices that mitigate negative environmental impacts through environmental management strategies—such as selective clearing, responsible tailings management, energy-efficient power generation and progressive rehabilitation—are still depleting a non-renewable resource.[68] These environmental impacts have a significant effect on the livelihoods of local communities and potential impacts on water sources, air quality, landscapes, visual amenity, agriculture and food security. If not managed properly, the environmental impacts of mining can also displace local people and exacerbate perceptions of economic marginalisation and grievances over land rights.

Fourth, the sector also has the potential to produce profound social and economic impacts in local communities and host countries. With the mining sector's net-negative impacts on natural capital, the 'decision to extract' is typically based on an assumed enhancement of financial, social, political or manufactured capital that will accrue to individuals, institutions and investors (see box below). For instance, mining projects have the potential to provide their host countries with substantial fiscal revenues—financial flows to the state such as royalties, taxes and levies.[69] In addition, potentially positive social–economic impacts from mining projects can include direct and indirect employment, procurements of goods and services, improved infrastructure, human capital development, strengthening of local institutions and CSR programs in areas such as health, education and agriculture. These impacts tend to be felt most acutely in least developed and developing nations, where the mining industry is often a leading source of economic opportunity. However, fiscal revenues and other economic impacts don't automatically articulate into broad-based, sustainable forms of development; in fact, the literature on the 'resource curse' suggests that extractive sectors often exist in isolation from the rest of the economy, crowding out other sectors that may be better suited for pro-poor growth, such as manufacturing or agriculture.[70] Caution is also warranted when evaluating the social impacts of the mining industry, as fatalities, human rights abuses, industrial relations issues, cultural heritage loss, social conflict and general angst over the distribution of benefits are common in the sector.

Types of capital

'Capital' is a stock of something of value that can be enhanced or depleted. It occurs in the following forms:

- Natural capital—the stocks and flows of environmentally provided assets (ecosystem services), such as soil, agricultural resources, mineral reserves, air, water, wetlands and all living things
- Intellectual capital—the collective knowledge of the individuals in an organisation or society
- Social capital—social networks and trust; social rules, norms and obligations; and the reciprocity arrangements embedded in social relations and social structures
- Human capital—levels of knowledge and skill; informal and formal education; the health and nutrition of individuals; people's motivations and aptitudes
- Cultural and spiritual capital—the way people know the world and their place in it; the extent to which local culture, values, traditions, language and religion promote or hinder wellbeing, social inclusion and social development
- Political capital—the existence and effective functioning of society's governance mechanisms, including its governance institutions, as well as the standards, rules and regulations that they apply
- Financial capital—the financial resources available to society's institutions, groups and individuals
- Physical capital—the stock of equipment, physical plant (for example, factories), infrastructure (such as roads, airports, hospitals, schools) and other productive resources owned by individuals, the business sector or the whole nation, as well as the management systems needed to make them work.

Adapted from various sources including Frank Vanclay, Ana Maria Esteves, Ilse Aucamp, Daniel M. Franks, *Social Impact Assessment: Guidance for assessing and managing the social impacts of projects*, International Association for Impact Assessment, April 2015, online.

Finally, the mining sector's business model has historically been susceptible to bribery, corruption and illicit financial flows. The significant amount of capital involved in mining investments has yielded cases of bribery of state officials,[71] and there's some evidence to suggest that mining areas become more corrupt after mines open.[72] Some corruption also exists in the awarding of exploration and mining leases from the state to individuals or mining companies—a legislative process that's also open to state capture. Due to the high level of complexity in the production process and the revenue-generating potential of the industry and cross-border supply chains, the mining sector is also particularly susceptible to illicit flows of money or capital that's illegally earned, transferred or used.[73] Such illicit financial flows are often linked to organised crime and terrorist groups, as in illegal gold mining in Colombia[74] and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.[75] An extreme example of the potential negative effects on mining–community relations is evidenced by the recent investigation by the Brazilian Federal Public Prosecutor's

Office into the alleged brutal murders of previously uncontactable Amazonian tribes by gold miners in Javari Valley in August 2017.[76] Cases of crime, bribery, corruption and illicit flows from the mining sector can undermine confidence in both mining companies and state institutions and governance.

Many of the structural characteristics that make the mining sector relevant to global P/CVE efforts have already been recognised by mining companies, governments, multilateral organisations and civil society organisations as sector-wide social and environmental performance challenges—or what some have labelled a 'broken business model'.[77] In response, a sector-level movement has emerged to advance a more 'sustainable'[78] form of mining that creates 'shared value'[79] through 'corporate social responsibility'[80] and 'good governance'.[81] A major catalyst for these efforts was an increasing awareness of the role of multinational corporations operating in developing countries, particularly in Africa, where regulation, regulatory enforcement, or both, were viewed as inadequate.

Although concepts such as 'sustainability' and 'corporate social responsibility' in mining have attracted criticism,[82] the multitude of institutions, initiatives and management practices that has emerged since the late 1990s has resulted in demonstrable improvements in the social and environmental performance of the mining sector. Those efforts have included the introduction of various international policies and standards,[83] as well as a suite of tools and frameworks that assess the expected and eventual impacts of extractive projects at the site, subnational, national and transnational levels.[84] This work has also produced important standards to address concerns about human rights and security, such as the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights.[85] The mining sector has also engaged in discussions on the implementation of the UN Sustainable Development Goals, recognising that mining, through its structural characteristics, can support the realisation of the goals in its capacity as a private sector actor.[86]

In the absence of a globally enforceable governance framework, this collection of international standards and initiatives has filled some of the regulatory gaps that exist between the countries where many multinational corporations are headquartered and the developing countries where they often operate. When thinking about the role that the mining sector can play in P/CVE, this broader governance, management and reporting framework provides a relevant entry point. These regulatory initiatives also have the potential to inform and complement efforts by the mining sector on P/CVE.

Approaches to security

The mining sector also has an obvious and direct interest in P/CVE. Just like other private sector investors, mining companies prefer to invest in countries that are stable and peaceful and have good mining governance and practices. However, many of the mineral-rich areas in Africa are in countries that have been significantly affected by terrorism and violent extremism (Figure 2, opposite).

Concerns about instability in a country can influence whether companies decide to invest in large projects, including mining projects. For example, security concerns were cited as one of the reasons why Kenya lost out to Tanzania on a project by Total to route its oil to port via a pipeline in 2016.[87] While in that case it was an infrastructure project and there were alternatives available to Total, alternative investments aren't often available in the mining sector. Certain types of minerals are available only in particular locations, so the company has to assess whether the risks are acceptable and can be mitigated as part of its investment strategy.[88]

The security requirements of a mining operation can vary during different stages of the project. During the exploration phases, risks may be relatively low, as fewer people and assets are involved and the level of investment is generally lower. Risks tend to increase once site design and mine construction begin. The level of activity and number of people employed often increase during the construction phase of a mining project. Risks are often heightened during the operations phase because of the greater investment in assets and infrastructure, the number of people employed, the potential value of the mineral being extracted and transported, and perhaps the use of hazardous substances during mining. In Ghana, for example, the mining sector is the largest importer of explosives.[89] This makes mines potential targets for criminal and terrorist networks wishing to acquire high-grade

Figure 2: Mining Exploration Budget by Country in Africa and Terrorism

The data for the total percentage of Africa's exploration budget share for 2016 is provided by S&P Global Market Intelligence. It captures the percentage of mining exploration in Africa by country, based on S&P Global Market Intelligence criteria (e.g. excludes oil and gas, iron ore, coal, aluminum, and other industrial minerals). The data on the impact of terrorism draws on the Institute for Economics and Peace Global Terrorism Index 2016.

explosives. One mining company operating in Mali expressed concerns that not only explosives but chemicals such as cyanide (which were used as part of mining operations) were also a target for theft.[90] This makes the physical security of mine sites all the more important to prevent theft or intrusion by trespassers.

Decisions made by a mining company about its approach to security can positively or negatively influence local people's perceptions of the company and the broader mining sector. Two decision-making areas have the potential to directly affect the drivers of violent extremism: the level and perception of physical (perimeter) security, including the extent to which the company engages with the government on security issues, and the means used to source information about potential security threats. Both of these security issues can adversely affect mine security by fuelling and contributing to local grievances in the longer term.

Physical security measures

The approach taken to secure the perimeter of a mining concession depends largely on the phase of the project and the level of security threats. Security measures can include any combination of perimeter fencing, security checkpoints, surveillance cameras, and unarmed and armed personnel. The more perimeter security measures in place, the less accessible the site. This may influence how the local community perceives and views the mining company. For those who have lost land, suffered from the environmental impacts of a mining operation or failed to secure a job, 'fortress' security approaches may contribute to perceptions that the company is inaccessible and unwilling to engage in the community from which it is extracting natural resources. While such measures may be necessary to ensure the security of the site, mining companies need to recognise that this may affect how they're perceived in the community.

For some exploration companies, this has meant that they have avoided 'hard' security approaches that require a compound or fencing and instead rely on soft security approaches that emphasise building trust with the local people and establishing information networks for protection.[91] In Burkina Faso, for example, one exploration company had no fencing on its campsites, allowing members of the community to enter sites as needed to maintain community gardens. This arrangement not only allowed the community and mining employees to benefit from the gardens, but also provided for an ongoing dialogue between employees of the mining company and the community.[92] This approach was possible because of the phase of the activities in the mining cycle and the local context and location in southern Burkina Faso, where the security threat was considerably lower than in the north of the country.

More efforts will be needed to ensure transparency and accessible mechanisms for the community to contact the mining company and discuss any concerns. Technology has some potential to assist this: aerial drones are already being used by some companies to patrol their concessions and monitor what activity is taking place.[93] Where possible, mining companies can use the technological advances available to them to maintain a high level of security while also reducing the perception that their sites are over-guarded. However, the use of technology isn't necessarily a replacement for community engagement mechanisms.

Importantly, the use of government security agencies and private security companies can present unique challenges. If those guarding the site commit abuses or are hostile towards the local population, that has a damaging impact on relations with the community that's similar to the impact of abuses committed by state security forces. Nonetheless, unarmed private security options that provide opportunities for local employment and rely on local knowledge can provide a win–win for companies and communities. In the field research for this report, we found evidence that some mining companies are taking this approach to regulate the entry of personnel into sites.

Mining companies that engage the services of government security personnel need to be mindful of the reputation of the military and police in the eyes of the local population. If there's evidence or a history of security forces committing human rights abuses or being aggressive, that will present a risk for the mining company's reputation, including how it's perceived in the local community.[94] For example, perceptions of aggressive actions by security

forces and police in Kenya have been cited as a driver of radicalisation,[95] so the mining sector utilising government security forces to protect its premises risks exacerbating those grievances against the mining companies. Directly contracting government security personnel may also create a risk of a perception of undue influence.

In some cases, however, that may be the only option. For example, some companies operating in Burkina Faso have contracted with the Burkinabe police to provide security, as there are restrictions on arming private security. Due to an increase in security threats, the government is now looking at allowing private security to be properly armed.[96] Nonetheless, in Ghana, there have been efforts to establish more transparency in engaging government security across the sector. One mining company has a memorandum of understanding with the military through an arrangement with the Chamber of Mines.[97] This type of transparency has become particularly important in Ghana recently, leading the ministry to publish the names of companies benefiting from government security because of concerns that the military was involved in protecting illegal mining taking place on a site.[98]

Adherence to the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights is likely to minimise some of the potential risks associated with engaging private and government security personnel to protect a project. The principles provide a guide to mining companies on how to maintain the safety and security of their operations in a manner that respects human rights. The principles outline important considerations that need to be factored into a risk assessment, from the viability of the company's operations to 'the promotion and protection of human rights'. Companies drawing on the principles and follow-up initiatives (such as the Model Clauses for Agreements between Government Security Forces and Companies with Respect to Security and Human Rights) are likely to mitigate risks to their own reputation within the community.

Human security, intelligence and information networks

Aside from physical security, another critical aspect of security for mining companies is information drawn from individuals and networks. The core element to this approach to mining security is building trust with the community affected by the mining operations. This is likely to be shaped by the level of acceptance within the local community for the mining company and its operation, or what is commonly referred to as its 'social licence to operate'. As one mining official noted during our interviews, security is also about diplomacy.[99] The information provided through information networks is provided in two ways: mining companies can obtain crucial community information that may protect them from localised security threats, and they can informally share information with community members to help to ensure that communities near the mine have a vested interest in protecting their businesses. One mining executive told us that this 'coffee-pot diplomacy' with the local population was essential.[100] Security is less likely to be a concern if a mining company is able to get the local community on side, as the community is then part of the company's protection network.[101] If a company is engaging effectively with the nearby community, is listening to the community's needs and is perceived to be supporting it, that will greatly strengthen the company's security because the community will be an invested stakeholder in maintaining the protection of that company. It may also enable the company to receive information about issues of concern or potential security threats.

Several companies rely on information provided by communities near the mine site that they support to provide advice and early warning about threats. Many can't afford a heavy security footprint and so are increasingly relying on virtual security managers.[102] Similarly, some companies are relying on the development of applications that crowdsource information from other mining companies and operators to identify threats in their region. In some cases, if the resources are available, this information is being supplemented by open-source research by analysts and experts on the region, making it accessible to operators on the ground so that the operators can understand the types of risks that they may encounter. In other words, the private sector is developing a comprehensive picture of the security situation, sometimes in areas where there's a lack of government information. These networks are being drawn on by mining companies to supplement their own security and to make decisions about their operations, but they also provide a picture of the violent extremist threat on the ground.

Many of these developments suggest that there's further potential for wider cooperation among mining companies on broader initiatives that may improve security and address some of the drivers of violent extremism. For example, in Cote d'Ivoire, discussions about establishing an 'arms buy-back' scheme are underway with the Ministry of Defence and Ministry of the Interior.[103] It's intended that the initiative will reduce the availability of small arms in the country, limiting a potential enabling factor for violent extremism while also addressing a source of insecurity. Such collaborative initiatives between mining companies and governments could be explored in other countries in order to tackle other sources of insecurity that may act as enablers for violent extremists.

THE CONNECTION BETWEEN MINING AND DRIVERS OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM

Mining companies are well aware of the potential implications that security concerns such as terrorism and violent extremism may have for their decisions to invest or on the management of their operations. Reducing and mitigating external threats to company assets and people and maintaining 'business continuity' safeguards the corporate interests of the industry. Despite this, and as our research found, there's much less understanding of the impact that mining may have on exacerbating or reducing violent extremism. There's extensive analysis of the importance of the mining sector engaging in sustainable development, establishing good environmental practices, managing community grievances and conflict mitigation.[104] However, this analysis has yet to include a thorough examination of how mining may exacerbate or mitigate the risk factors for violent extremism. This section sets out to analyse how actions by the mining sector can exacerbate or mitigate some drivers of violent extremism (summarised in Table 2).

In Africa, mining projects ranging from exploration projects through to operating mines are present in places where there's a high threat of terrorism. Mining companies operate in close proximity to violent extremist groups in countries in the Sahel, the Lake Chad basin and the Horn of Africa. Many of those locations are remote, with limited government services and few other foreigners. In many cases, local populations are impoverished or rely largely on land tenure and subsistence farming. There may be localised conflicts as a consequence of historical grievances or injustices. In these environments, mining companies arrive as foreign entities or 'outsiders', often with attachments to political elites or government, and at all times with the potential to influence the socioeconomic, political and cultural landscapes. In most cases, social, economic and political entanglements make it impossible for mining companies to avoid influencing the dynamics that affect violent extremism.

Although there's been substantial analysis of the factors that drive individuals to join violent extremist groups, there are differing views on how to approach that analysis when attempting to develop P/CVE programs and reduce the risk. In this section, we draw on a series of factors generally identified as 'drivers' or 'push factors' for our analysis of the connection between mining and violent extremism. Most of the drivers can also be referred to as 'structural motivators', as identified by Khalil and Zeuthen. They include such factors as unmet social and economic needs (including unemployment), marginalisation and discrimination (inequality), poor governance and regulation of the mining sector, collective grievances and conflict (histories of hostility between identity groups) and violations of human rights and the rule of law (repression). Many of potential drivers vary throughout the life cycle of a mine. It should be noted that this report doesn't analyse the individual motivators in depth, given that such analysis requires further empirical evidence and research, which was beyond the scope of this report.

Unmet social and economic needs

Although absolute poverty isn't a sufficient condition for violent extremism, unmet social and economic needs and perceptions of relative wealth can act as push factors. When global and local capital is invested in mining exploration and development projects in African countries, there's a significant risk that the social and economic expectations of local actors won't be met. When unmet expectations lead to feelings of marginalisation, they contribute to push factors; when unmet expectations are incorporated into the recruitment narratives of extremist groups, they may also contribute to the pull factors.

Frustrated expectations and relative deprivation

The unmet expectations of local populations are a foundational social–economic issue in mining-affected communities in countries such as Mali, Burkina Faso, Ghana and Kenya. They often arise during mineral exploration and project development. The exploration and feasibility stage of a project can be characterised by irregular announcements of great future wealth, followed by long periods (sometimes years) of nothing happening 'on the ground'. For mining companies, extended time lags throughout the exploration and project development cycle are a perfectly normal, business-as-usual reality. For host governments and communities, the long time horizon of the mining process can create mistrust in exploration and mining companies and frustration over perceived promises that are not kept.

Another kind of expectation problem comes after a project is approved, when more substantive economic benefits are delivered. When discussing the value of a mining project with stakeholders or in the media, mining companies and governments tend to refer to the total value of the mineral reserves (and in some cases resources) or to forecast export sales. Although such announcements can make for good short-term politics and corporate relations, they risk creating an expectation about financial benefits that may accrue to national and local stakeholders.

At the local level, where mining takes place, these broader narratives of mining-led development collide with the often pronounced and immediate development needs of local communities, resulting in a significant gap between community expectations and actual or perceived development. In Mali, Burkina Faso, Ghana and Kenya, expectation gaps and perceptions of 'missing out' are based on employment and procurement opportunities, and the distribution of royalties and other economic dividends, such as land rentals. Resettlement packages are another problem: some communities expressed the desire to be resettled by the mining company, even though they weren't living on (and didn't own) land that was affected by mining. Another expectation gap observed in all four countries relates to the CSR programs run by mining companies. For example, at one mining project in Ghana, a mining company has worked with local community groups to build a classroom for a school and a health clinic for a local community. Although the community appreciates those efforts, it expects the company to continue to invest in similar infrastructure projects to address critical gaps in education and health infrastructure in the area.[105] This responsibility is now perceived to rest with the mining company, rather than the government—but is unfortunately not sustainable in the long term.

Land rights and displaced people

In most parts of Africa, land is inextricably linked to livelihoods, identity, culture and history. For the rural poor, land is a safety net that provides essential food, water and shelter. The question of who owns land and natural resources remains a major source of contest. In post-colonial Kenya, Burkina Faso, Ghana and Mali, surface land is 'owned' under customary and community tenure systems.[106] Subsurface land, including the minerals beneath the ground, is the property of the state. As in other regions, such as the Pacific and Latin America, this legal framework for land and mineral ownership cedes mineral rights to the state for the benefit of all citizens, while maintaining surface ownership rights for customary or traditional owners.

Given that land tenure is controlled through community landownership systems in most parts of Africa, it's critical that regulators and mining companies alike identify:

- who, exactly, has the right to approve access to land under traditional land tenure systems
- what consultation process should be used to ensure that traditional owners are fully consulted and informed of their rights in a land negotiation process
- how much compensation should be offered to traditional owners for mining access rights.

Failure to ask and answer these questions can exacerbate old or create new conflicts over land, both of which can lead to violent conflict.

For instance, in Kenya, minerals are classified under the Constitution as public land and therefore belong to all the citizens of Kenya. The law requires that holders of prospecting and mining titles gain consent from local communities, owners and occupiers of land, as well as national and regional government agencies.[107] Licensees are also obligated to offer adequate compensation for damages, obstructions and other inconveniences to owners and occupiers of the land. Problematically, the legislation is unclear about exactly who constitutes 'local communities, owners and occupiers of land' and what constitutes 'adequate compensation'. This has led to situations in which historical conflicts over land ownership have become modern conflicts between landowners and mining companies.

A related issue is the resettlement of people with an interest in land subject to exploration and mining leases. There are well-established standards and good practice frameworks for resettlement within the mining sector, such as the International Finance Corporation's performance standard for land acquisition and involuntary resettlement.[108] These frameworks were used as the basis for a major resettlement program at a mining project in Ghana, where more than 200 family groups were relocated to a new area of land to provide vacant possession of lease land. The resettlement package included a new house with land title, reticulated power and water for each family and a livelihood program. The resettled community had significant input into the resettlement action plan. The mining company had also received requests from people who didn't have an interest in land required for mining purposes for a 'resettlement package', suggesting perhaps that people were generally satisfied with the resettlement program.[109] However, there are still ongoing grievances associated with the resettlement program, including grievances about community governance models and individual grievances about access to livelihood programs.

The fundamental issue for mining companies and government regulators is that the management of land rights in the mining sector in Africa is a flashpoint issue that can exacerbate the risks of conflict and violent extremism. This is particularly the case when customary groups are alienated from traditional lands, inadequate compensation is paid to customary landowners, or inadequate consultation takes place with local landowners in the negotiation of mineral rights. For example, in Mali, the need to protect land and livelihoods (which may include livestock farming or illegal activities such as drug trafficking) is a key factor in people joining violent extremists, indicating that a lack of appropriate legal jurisdiction on land rights could lead to further radicalisation and recruitment to armed groups.[110]

Mining companies and regulators can minimise land-related grievances through:

- the recognition of customary landowner rights in mining and land legislation
- strict enforcement of international standards on human rights, indigenous peoples, resettlement, and free, prior and informed consent
- the negotiation of adequate compensation and benefits packages that recognise the land rights of traditional and customary owners
- ongoing recognition by mining companies that they are 'guests' on the land.[111]

Uneven employment and supply-chain opportunities

One of the problems faced by the mining sector is the high level of public expectation that mining will generate employment and opportunities to supply goods and services in the mining supply chain. Over the past decade, in particular, the mining sector has come to frame national and local participation in employment and supply-chain opportunities under the rubric of 'local content'. Based on the examples observed in the four case-study countries, local content in the mining sector presents both opportunities and risks for violent extremism.

Large-scale mining tends to follow an economic pattern in which the sector contributes significantly to foreign direct investment totals (reflecting the significant levels of capital required for modern mining operations) and export totals. However, formal employment generated by the mining sector tends to be a small proportion of national employment, even when multipliers are added for indirect employment. And the ratio between high levels of capital expenditure and relatively low labour requirements is likely to widen as the mining sector moves further towards automated technologies, which has caused some to argue the need for reassessing the shared-value paradigm.[112]

A related risk is the disparate incomes that can be generated by the mining sector. By employing a small number of well-paid, well-qualified people, the mining sector creates enclaves of well-paid employees in developing African economies. The problem here is that one of the push factors for violent extremism isn't absolute poverty ('severe deprivation of basic human needs'[113]) but relative poverty (compared to others in the country or location). For instance, research on potential drivers of radicalisation in Burkina Faso indicates that a gap between employment expectations and realities (of unemployment) may also be a factor contributing to potential violent extremism or radicalisation.[114]

A similar dynamic is in play in the sourcing of goods and services for mining operations. Mining companies source goods and services that are the cheapest and most reliable in the market. At one level, a quality- and price-based procurement strategy is the best thing for both the company and the host government, as it maximises profits and therefore government tax and royalty returns. If, however, goods and services are overwhelmingly sourced from outside the country, or even from a few preferred suppliers, the lack of local content in the supply chain can exacerbate community risks by reinforcing the enclave nature of the development.

Mining companies can seek to address local content risks in employment and supply chains in many ways. First, employment and procurement practices can be designed to minimise the risks of creating enclave economies. For example, companies could provide capacity-building and training programs to local suppliers so that the locals are able to provide goods and services to mines. Mining companies could also invest in long-term training programs that make it more likely that employees can be sourced from the local community. Other strategies observed in our field research included vocational training for non-mining-related skills (such as agriculture); entrepreneur programs for local youth that encourage local businesses relevant to the mining industry; financial support for local education and training institutions; and investments in non-mining projects that create employment. In most cases, it's about 'creating value' in the community.[115] Many of these initiatives are currently part of mining companies' approaches to CSR (see box below).

Corporate social responsibility

One opportunity for economic and social development is through CSR programs, which typically take the form of direct investment by mining companies into community projects in areas such as health, education, agriculture and human capital development. Unlike in other jurisdictions where significant investments for community projects are mandated into statutory compensation agreements, CSR programs in the four case-study countries are usually financed by voluntary contributions made by mining companies.

For example, an exploration company operating in Burkina Faso has constructed a classroom for a local high school and works with a nearby community on a small agriculture project that supplies food to the exploration camp. In Kenya, a mining company is investing in agriculture and livestock programs for local families. In Ghana, one of the mining companies visited is working closely with local chiefdoms to implement infrastructure projects for health, education, water and sanitation. CSR programs such as these are common among mining companies in Africa and elsewhere.

Key success factors for CSR programs in the case-study countries have been integration with local government planning processes and the empowerment of local groups during project selection and implementation.

We noted that several mining companies preferred to avoid using the term 'corporate social responsibility', as in their view it suggested that it was an obligation, rather than a core business function.[116]

Structural inequality: marginalisation and discrimination

Violent extremist narratives are more likely to have appeal where one or more groups in society are marginalised or discriminated against. The UN Secretary-General's Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism recognises that a combination of factors, such as scarce resources and monopolistic behaviour by one group in the political and economic sectors, can increase 'the potential for intercommunal tensions, gender inequality, marginalization, alienation and discrimination'.[117]

Expatriate versus national versus local

One area of perceived discrimination frequently identified in our research related to the employment practices of and distribution of economic benefits by mining companies. There were also concerns that the mine didn't benefit locals as much as other nationals and expatriates (this issue was often referred to as 'local content'). Attachment to land means that local people tend to feel they should be the ones to benefit directly from the economic opportunities arising from extraction, particularly if their livelihoods have been disrupted by the project. Yet our research in Burkina Faso, Ghana and Kenya shows that it's more likely that expatriates and nationals from major cities will fill most of the senior roles in the mining company, while local people will be more likely to be employed in unskilled roles. For example, of the total workforce of a mining company in Ghana (the biggest company in the region), 98% of employees are Ghanaian, but only 35% are from the local area.[118] Despite concerted efforts by the company to train local people for certain roles (such as manual labour and unarmed security), the total number of employment opportunities available to local people is constrained by current levels of education and skills.

Effective communication and management of expectations, along with investment in local education and vocational training programs, have the potential to reduce the risks of perceived marginalisation of the local community in these contexts. This also ensures that locals can see others moving forward in their careers with education and training support. National-level initiatives supported by government, universities and the mining sector can also help develop a local cadre of extractive professionals, such as geologists, metallurgists and mining engineers.

However, even if mining companies are consciously engaged in efforts to increase local employment, they may still run into problems when determining who is classified as a 'local' for the purposes of employment and other economic opportunities. Announcements of the construction of a mine can prompt the in-migration of communities into the area in anticipation of economic opportunities, or to mining lease areas in anticipation of potential compensation packages.[119] When applying for jobs or supply-chain opportunities reserved for local people, newly arrived migrants may attempt to claim that they're 'local' by emphasising cultural or kinship connections to people and place, thereby exacerbating tensions among the community.

Claims that some local groups should benefit from the economic opportunities created by the mining project in proportion to other criteria, such as their degree of geographical proximity or connections to land, are also common. In one example in Kenya, a mining company has attempted to address this issue by putting in place a 'fencing' system, in consultation with the Kenyan Government and the local community. The system prioritised people residing in the immediate impact area of the mine for employment.[120] This example is particularly relevant, because perceptions of income inequality between 'local-locals' and Kenyan nationals from the capital is one of the grievances exploited by al-Shabaab in its recruitment narrative.[121] However, even with this local content hiring policy in place, there were still some perceptions in the local community that people aren't receiving adequate opportunities or access to mine-derived benefits, including employment, and that certain groups were being marginalised.

Ethnic and religious groups

Broader issues and concerns also emerged about mining reinforcing existing structural inequality in society and the potential impact this had on youth, women and certain ethnic and religious groups. For example, in the coastal region of Kenya, those in Christian communities are more likely to have received more comprehensive formal education than their counterparts in local Muslim communities.[122] Several people interviewed in the region noted that Muslim communities feel marginalised by this dynamic between access to education and employment.[123] It's worth noting that the employment practices of mining companies aren't the only factor contributing to this perception. In the coastal region of Kenya, for instance, the same problem was reported in the tourism industry and among security forces, which consisted of many 'up-country' nationals. Nevertheless, it is important to recognise that mining companies' employment practices are one of the many factors contributing to this perceived marginalisation and discrimination.

Engaging youth

Similarly, youth in mine-affected communities may feel discriminated against as a consequence of the disruption caused by mining companies. In many cases, land in the community is owned through community tenure systems, by older men, or a combination of the two. Whereas youth may have previously had access to mine-affected lands for livelihood opportunities such as agricultural activities, housing or commercial ventures, the same access might not be afforded as part of the compensation and benefits streams paid by mining companies to local groups in compensation for those lands.

There's also a risk that consultation processes for mining approval and ongoing project activities don't sufficiently engage and empower youth, which can add to feelings of marginalisation. This makes it essential that community engagement mechanisms incorporate a specific role for youth representation that's inclusive, accessible and structured to engage substantively with all groups in the community. It also places a premium on the importance of community engagement programs that work with youth, particularly those that provide opportunities for skill and livelihood development. A mine may be in place for decades, so engaging young people in vocational and employment opportunities in the mine is a good long-term investment for the company.

Furthermore, young people are particularly susceptible to the narratives of violent extremist groups and radicalisation, so efforts to ensure that they feel less marginalised and are given opportunities as a result of mining can help counter some of the push factors for violent extremism. The international community has recognised the important role of the private sector in efforts to provide employment as part of broader efforts to sustain peace.[124]

Women and gender considerations

Another area of structural inequality that mining companies may inadvertently contribute to is the role of women in the community, whether through employment, business contracts, compensation practices or community consultation mechanisms. In all these instances, it's highly likely that women will be under-represented (if they're represented at all).

For example, education levels and cultural views may mean that women are much more likely to miss out on the potential economic benefits from a mine. Appropriately designed and well-canvassed CSR programs that help to keep girls in school and provide them with vocational training can go some way to addressing the education gap. Similarly, although several mining companies noted that they have mechanisms in place to ensure that women are represented in community consultation mechanisms, there are still reports of women not being consulted when there are discussions about access to land and compensation packages, and many women don't have access to land titles. Such concerns may be particularly significant where women are widowed when their husbands are killed as foreign fighters—a situation that's common in the coastal region of Kenya.

There was evidence that mining companies were aware of this gender disparity when it came to employment, and many pointed to their efforts to increase the number of female employees. However, some dated attitudes emerged in our research, such as the suggestion that women weren't physically capable of engaging in mining and were therefore employed only in so-called 'traditional' roles, such as in administrative, hospitality and janitorial services. Furthermore, conditions on the ground don't always take into account gender considerations, meaning that women can't get appropriate field experience to progress in their mining careers. To compound the matter, many of the negative social and environmental impacts of mining, such as impacts on water sources, social disruption and gender-based violence, also fall most heavily on women.

A focus on the protection and empowerment of marginalised and vulnerable groups is a critical consideration for mining companies seeking to manage the impact of their operations on violent extremism. It's also important that the policies and approaches of government regulators and stakeholders protect human rights and empower vulnerable groups. Initiatives such as the establishment of a youth and gender officer in the Kenyan Ministry of Mines are examples of good practice in this area, but there's much more room for strengthening the legislative and regulatory framework for the protection and empowerment of vulnerable groups in Africa's mining sector.[125]

Poor governance and regulation of the mining sector

Violent extremists are known to take advantage of poorly governed areas as safe havens to develop their networks and plan their activities. The remoteness of many mine sites in parts of Africa, such as in Mali and Burkina Faso, makes them particularly susceptible to security risks resulting from the activities of such groups.

In many cases, ineffective governance extends to the regulation of the large-scale mining sector, including a lack of transparency in the awarding of mining concessions and the provision of royalties. This lack of effective governance typically also extends to the artisanal and small-scale mining sector, where illegal mining—often supported by criminal networks that provide a financial foundation and network for violent extremist groups—divests the state of mineral reserves and potential fiscal revenues.

Extractive governance and royalties

Effective extractive governance is critical if the mining sector is to contribute to reducing some of the social and economic push factors for violent extremism. Key pillars for a governance framework in the mining sector include the establishment of a clear national vision and development strategy for mining, a robust legislative regime for the promotion and regulation of the sector, and a well-resourced and capable regulatory body that can manage and monitor the activities of the industry.

One particularly important aspect of a mining governance framework is the management of fiscal revenues, which present a significant opportunity for governments to increase and stabilise revenue for national budgets, to reinvest mine-derived state revenue into vital infrastructure and public services, and in so doing to reduce some of the social and economic push factors for violent extremism. There's certainly evidence that mineral rents have contributed substantially to state revenues in African countries with a significant mining footprint.[126] However, mine-derived revenues that are poorly managed, or invested in projects with minimal public return, can lead to citizens' loss of confidence in the state.

Further, even when mining revenues are returned to general state revenue, it's difficult for citizens to assess where those contributions are spent. In this regard, the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) is a significant step forward in the reporting of revenue from mining companies to the state.[127] EITI (which is operating in all four case-study countries) can help to manage fiscal risks by ensuring that all companies operating in a country and all government agencies receiving mining-related revenues publicly disclose those payments and revenues. EITI also includes the disclosure of transfers of mining-sector revenues from national to subnational governments, as well as the disclosure of 'social' payments made by companies to host communities. However, EITI doesn't report on government expenditure of mine-derived funds, which makes it difficult for local stakeholders to assess the

broader development impact of mining revenues. More effective reporting and transparency by governments on how mine-derived revenue is reinvested in key infrastructure and service projects would help to strengthen the link between the sector and broader development outcomes.

In many African countries, governments attempt to address the risk of poor management of revenues by instituting revenue-sharing arrangements in which a certain percentage of royalties, taxes, or both, are returned to the region from which they are generated. In Ghana, local communities from mining regions are lobbying the state government for a greater percentage of royalties. One way that mining companies attempt to address this risk is by advocating for a greater share of royalties for local governments (as was also observed in Kenya); another is through their own socioeconomic expenditures in local communities (as was observed in all the case-study countries). The effective management and distribution of mine-derived revenues at the national and local levels is thus a key mechanism through which pull factors for violent extremism can be reduced.

Regulation of artisanal and small-scale mining

Artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) is often poorly governed or regulated (if at all) in countries across the continent. There's no one definition of ASM, but it's generally considered to be mining by individuals, groups or communities, sometimes in an informal manner, and is often poverty driven. ASM be may be restricted to nationals of the country in which it takes place, as it has been previously in Ghana, and to non-mechanised means of mining. Where there are known minerals in Africa that can be extracted by small-scale miners, there's a good chance that some form of ASM is taking place.

Few countries in Africa have effective governance regimes in place to regulate ASM, so the benefits derived from it aren't being shared with the wider population. A major part of the governance challenge is that in many parts of Africa, including Ghana, Mali, Burkina Faso and Kenya, a large proportion of ASM activities are illegal and are therefore occurring outside existing regulatory frameworks.

Without effective environmental regulation and enforcement, ASM often has significant negative impacts on the environment and the livelihoods of surrounding communities. For example, many ASM practices to mine gold involve the use of toxic chemicals such as mercury and cyanide, which can leach into landscapes and waterways. In Ghana, there's evidence that informal and illegal ASM, referred to as *galamsey*, has contributed to a high level of pollution in the country's waterways.[128] Similarly, in Burkina Faso, where it's estimated that up to 1 million people (referred to as *orpailleurs* in francophone West Africa) rely on the informal mining sector, the chemicals being used by miners are fuelling long-term health problems, particularly among children, who are a significant part of the labour force.[129]

The informal economy that emerges from ASM or illegal mining may also fuel corruption and criminal networks, exacerbating grievances in the local community. Other negative impacts of ASM include unsafe work practices that result in high numbers of injuries and fatalities, gender-based violence, and conflicts and disputes with mining companies that have legal concessions, as well as with other illegal miners.

Importantly, however, ASM is inextricably linked to efforts to escape poverty. It provides livelihood opportunities for workers directly engaged in the mining and for often extensive support networks of local businesses and suppliers. It also employs more people than large-scale mining.[130] For example, Ghana's ASM sector provides direct employment for approximately 1 million people, supports around 4.5 million more in related industries,[131] and is estimated to contribute about one-third of total mining production in Ghana.[132] Therefore, any efforts by the government to ban the practice or regulate it are likely to disrupt local economies and the livelihoods of groups in the population that are already exploited and impoverished, fuelling local grievances. This challenge is well understood by the Government of Ghana, which has placed a moratorium on both formal and informal ASM while it reviews the legislative and management framework for the sector.[133] The moratorium has created significant tension between local communities and security personnel, resulting in the lynching of a soldier attempting to enforce the moratorium.[134] Similarly, there have been concerns about the corruption of security personnel entrusted with enforcing the moratorium, and suggestions that the illegal mining sector in the country has been connected to criminal networks, as well as to some political parties.[135]

Efforts to address or further regulate the informal mining sector without considering the implications for the livelihoods of those engaged in the sector are likely to fuel local grievances and feelings of marginalisation. As the African Union's *African mining vision* states, there's a need to take a broad approach focused on the 'development of diversified and alternative livelihoods'.[136] Extensive and inclusive consultation with the various stakeholders on reforms to the legislation in an effort to provide alternative livelihoods and protect human rights will be critical in mitigating some of these grievances.

Collective grievances and unresolved conflicts

Collective grievances (real or perceived) can be used by political and community leaders to create powerful narratives about the impact of mining projects, sometimes in a way that exacerbates tensions in the local community by focusing on themes of oppression or foreign intervention.[137] Such narratives may be drawn upon or exploited by violent extremists 'to fuel the thirst for revenge against oppressors'.[138]

Grievances and conflict have been a constant feature of mining projects in Africa. They have often escalated to violent and fatal conflicts, such as the Marikana massacre in South Africa in 2012. In Ghana, a manager working for AngloGold Ashanti was killed in 2016 during a riot among illegal miners at the company's Obuasi mine. In Kenya, an internationally renowned geologist and gemstone miner was attacked and killed in what is believed to have been a dispute over mining rights. Although not directly associated with extremist groups, such attacks illustrate the ways in which grievances can escalate into violence and fatal confrontations between police, mine employees and local communities.

This escalation process was illustrated in an influential study of company–community conflict that reviewed a sample of 50 conflict cases in the extractive sector, 18% of which were in sub-Saharan Africa.[139] Although environmental issues were the most common 'proximate' cause of conflict, the most common 'underlying' causes were socioeconomic issues (particularly the distribution of project benefits), changes to local culture and customs, and the quality of ongoing processes for consultation and communication related to the project. In addition to the negative social consequences of company–community conflict outlined by the study, conflict also creates a vulnerability to violent extremism in mining communities. By taking a proactive approach to grievance and conflict management, including through measures such as ongoing monitoring and assessment of social impacts, grievance mechanism processes and training for community relations and security staff in conflict management and human-rights-based approaches, mining companies can actively manage the risk that project-related grievances will exacerbate the risk factors for violent extremism in local communities.

In some cases, mining companies, as foreign entities, may be catalysts for national resentment. Mining in Africa has often been closely associated with colonial and neo-colonial power, so local communities in post-colonial African countries may still associate mining companies with outside interests. Local politicians can also use a mining company as an easy target and use its presence as a tool to gather support in local elections. This has been evident in the coastal region in southern Kenya, where the presence of a mining company has been referred to as a contributor to some of the local grievances in the region, despite the company's extensive engagement in a range of community projects and initiatives.[140]

In the context of local and national politics, mining companies may also be perceived to have disproportionate access to and influence on the political 'elites' in society due to the companies' size and economic influence.[141] Most people in local communities have only limited access to their local politicians, let alone those at the national level. Furthermore, politicians may be seen to benefit directly from the presence of the mining company. In the case of one of the companies in our research, it was well known in the local community that a senior political figure's spouse was employed at the mine in a senior role.[142] Even though the employee may have been the person best qualified for the job, this resulted in the perception that the political elites were benefiting when many locals didn't have jobs at the mine, exacerbating grievances within the community.

There's a risk that the development of national CVE programs may come into conflict with the presence of foreign companies if narratives are not managed carefully. For example, the second priority listed in Kenya's National CVE Plan is to 'promote patriotism for Kenya's nationhood'. If exploited politically, the presence of a foreign mining company could be pointed to as an example of how Kenya's nationhood isn't being promoted but instead is being manipulated by foreign or 'Western' interests. Such narratives have been used by other African countries to completely and suddenly change their mining governance regimes, often to the detriment of the national economy.[143] While we don't suggest that national identity should not be identified as a way to foster inclusiveness, this highlights the importance of national governments working closely with their local counterparts to incorporate the benefits of foreign and local investment in mining operations. Governments and officials should be aware of the potential to exacerbate grievances and conflict in the community in relation to mining companies, particularly in contexts in which there are significant enabling factors and individual incentives for violent extremism.

Violation of human rights and the rule of law

Heavy-handed and aggressive actions by security forces and repressive actions by governments can corrupt the faith of the local population in state institutions and may consequently make violent extremism seem more appealing. Even more so, when government security forces are engaged in protecting mining operations or enforcing mining moratoriums in a manner that's viewed as unjust or repressive, those actions may spur individuals and groups to seek other means of recourse, such as engaging with violent extremism, particularly in contexts in which other risk factors for violent extremism are present. For mining companies, engagement with the Voluntary Principles on Human Rights and Security may mitigate some of these risks, although that will also largely depend on the conduct of the host government.

Foreign mining companies face several challenges in this context. If a mining company is perceived to be working closely with the government or, alternatively, to be relying on government security forces to enforce the rule of law, it may be perceived as a government partner. If the security forces have a reputation for human rights abuses, that's likely to fuel resentment against the company in the local community. Similarly, if the company employs private security personnel who have a reputation for repressive conduct or abusive behaviour, that will also drive a wedge between the company and the community, exacerbating any existing local grievances. It's therefore critical that all personnel engaged by the company are trained in human rights law.

In addition to human rights abuses resulting from security operations, other potential human rights abuses that can result from the activities of mining companies include violations of the rights of indigenous peoples and labour rights. For example, there have been many high-profile instances in which mining companies have been found to engage in poor mining practices that have risked the lives of workers and members of the local community. Aside from such practices potentially being a violation of human rights, they're also likely to catalyse resentment against the mining company as an outside entity and undermine its social licence to operate. This is likely to be worsened in a situation in which the government distances itself from the mining company.

Table 2: Examples of actions by mining sector that may exacerbate or mitigate some drivers of violent extremism

Driver of violent extremism	Exacerbated by	Mitigated by
Unmet socioeconomic needs	Miscommunicating employment opportunities	Running clear and transparent employment programs; developing livelihood programs; running effective and sustainable CSR programs
	Talking up mineral reserves and expected economic benefits	Communicating directly with the local community about expected benefits to the area in order to manage expectations
	Displacing people from land without informed and free consent or compensation	Recognising the land rights of customary and traditional owners; providing adequate compensation and resettlement programs; ensuring that such programs are transparent and that eligibility criteria are clearly communicated
	Procuring goods and services from outside the region due to cost-effectiveness or lack of local suppliers; creating 'economic enclaves'	Identifying opportunities to develop local markets and supply chains through investment in capacity-building and training programs; using those markets and supply chains where possible
Marginalisation and discrimination	Misidentifying 'who' is local and affected by the mine project; lack of 'local content'	Establishing inclusive and representative consultation mechanisms with local communities; identifying how different populations may be affected; developing options to invest in social and economic development
	Allowing disparities in employment and economic benefits to particular ethnic or religious groups	Engaging with local community leaders to identify targeted education, training and potential employment programs for groups that are disproportionately affected
	Ignoring disaffected youth in the community when developing compensation packages and employment programs	Engaging youth in community engagement mechanisms; ensuring that CSR includes investment in youth-related programs, including education, vocational training, entrepreneurship, sports and culture
	Failing to assess gender perspectives and integrate needs of women into compensation packages or employment programs	Consulting women in the community; integrating gender perspectives as part of project planning; considering the appointment of a gender adviser or gender focal point in the mining company and the mining ministry
Poor governance and regulation of the mining sector	Failing to provide good governance or transparency for mining royalties and taxation benefits; managing mine-derived benefits poorly	Using clear and transparent mining governance frameworks; communicating details of mining revenues
	Imposing little or no regulation on artisanal, small-scale or informal mining	Assessing the informal mining sector to identify possible reforms; assessing disruption to livelihoods and potential mitigation schemes to address the consequences; consistently enforcing the law
Collective grievances and unresolved conflicts	Mismanaging project-related grievances	Including conflict and grievance analysis as part of social impact assessment; proactively managing grievances throughout the mine's life cycle; ensuring that relevant staff are trained in conflict management and human-rights-based approaches
	Having close associations or working relationship with politicians, officials and 'political elites'	Ensuring clear corporate reporting and transparency on all employment and CSR programs

Violation of human rights and the rule of law	Employing private security personnel who commit human rights abuses	Ensuring that all security personnel have been trained in human rights; removing personnel who commit violations
	Contracting or relying on government security personnel who may be associated with repressive governments	Mitigating potential risks; engaging with government about expectations and the need to uphold human rights and the rule of law; applying the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights
	Ignoring the human rights and health and safety of employees through poor work practices	Ensuring strict compliance with health and safety requirements and human rights obligations; providing appropriate compensation schemes for injured workers

Individual incentives and enabling factors

Mining can have both a positive and a negative impact on many of the factors that have been identified as drivers of violent extremism. Those factors, which are generally referred to as 'push' factors, are widespread in many countries but don't necessarily result in violent extremism. Research in a wide range of contexts has shown that 'pull' factors—individual incentives or conditions that catalyse individuals to join extremist groups—must be present for violent extremism to result. Pull factors can include:

> … access to material incentives, social status, adventure, self-esteem, personal empowerment and a sense of belonging, as well as 'the presence of radical institutions or venues, service provision by extremist groups, and extremist involvement in illegal economic activity.'[144]

Some pull factors operate in close physical proximity to the individual (such as the presence of radical groups or social networks); others work remotely, such as appealing narratives delivered through online platforms and technology (a trend that has resulted in Western foreign fighters travelling to the Middle East).

We've examined some of the common pull factors—or what Khalil and Zeuthen categorize as 'enabling factors' and 'individual incentives'—in order to assess whether the mining sector has any potential to influence these factors in the areas where mining companies operate.

Many of the factors that enable violent extremism are present in countries in Africa that have significant mineral reserves and mining investment. The lack of state presence and the large poorly governed spaces in parts of the continent—such as the north of Mali and Burkina Faso—enable violent extremist entities to operate, often with limited detection. This allows extremist groups to instil fear in the local population and grow their networks, presenting a direct challenge for many mining companies in West Africa. Limited state resources in remote areas of West Africa also present a challenge to CVE efforts in the region. Although mining companies can have only an indirect impact on state resources (generally through fiscal revenue and occasionally through direct capacity-building programs), their presence in a remote area may serve as a limited bulwark against the influence of violent extremist groups by offering alternative livelihoods to segments of the community. However, if social and environmental performance is managed poorly, there's also a risk that the presence of a mining company may be a catalyst exacerbating local grievances.

Weapons such as small arms and even heavier armaments are available across the Sahel, including in Mali and Burkina Faso, mainly as a consequence of the civil breakdown in Libya. Millions of small arms have also flooded Ghana and Cote d'Ivoire, largely as a consequence of decades of civil war in the region. This means that violent extremists are likely to have easy access to small arms. Many forms of mining also require the use of explosives that are imported into the country. If the supply chains for these materials aren't regulated effectively, or the explosives aren't securely stored at mining operations, their presence and availability make it easier for violent extremists to steal them and utilise them to develop improvised explosive devices—a potential enabling factor. Efforts by

governments, regional organisations and the private sector to reduce the availability of small arms and ensure that there are stricter regulations on the use and availability of explosive materials will reduce some of these risks.

Violent extremists can exploit many of the grievances that are blamed on the presence of a mining operation, such as a lack of job opportunities or the loss of livelihoods. For example, in the coastal region in Kenya, al-Shabaab is known to offer material incentives to recruit new members. The offer of money or a livelihood may ameliorate many of the problems faced by those who have failed to benefit from a mining company's presence in the area.[145] The mining company can't do anything to change statements by al-Shabaab, but it may be in a position to influence a counter-narrative. It's to the benefit of the mining company to ensure that the narratives provided by violent extremists are less appealing.

Part of the challenge for mining companies is that their operations have an impact not only on tangible aspects of local livelihoods and whether individuals have jobs, but also on people's hopes for the future and on the way people perceive or think of themselves in society—their 'social status'. This may explain why the Kwale County Plan for Countering Violent Extremism (in the coastal region of Kenya) notes the 'search for affirmative identity' as a potential 'pull factor' in the region.[146] In other words, individuals are seeking opportunities to validate their role in the community and wider society.

It's difficult for a mining company to restore a lost feeling of empowerment and belonging by simply providing jobs or indirect employment. However, effective CSR programs that focus on empowerment opportunities may negate some of these factors and generate hope among potentially 'at risk' individuals in the community. In one of the case-study countries, there was evidence of a mining company engaging with a community organisation that was delivering a youth entrepreneurship program to equip young people with the skills needed to pursue their own business opportunities. Such programs can ensure that youth are aware of future opportunities that could be available to them, providing them with a sense of purpose in their local community and hope for the future.

P/CVE: WHAT ROLE FOR THE MINING SECTOR?

There's considerable scope for the mining sector to work with governments and other stakeholders in P/CVE efforts. Although the private sector generally has different aims from government (to obtain financial benefit for investors and shareholders), both actors share interests in strengthening community resilience, supporting economic growth and improving overall security. And such efforts are also likely to result in a more beneficial operational context for the mine and allow the mining company to reach its profit goals and targets. There has been some hesitancy within the private sector about engaging in direct efforts to support P/CVE activities, in part due to many of the potential risks. Mining companies may also not be preferred partners of governments or communities if they are unlikely to sustain their commitment over several years, as a sudden withdrawal of support may result in more harm than good.

This section offers some suggestions for mining companies to strengthen their engagement in P/CVE, both through indirect means and through direct engagement in P/CVE programs.

Strengthening resilience to violent extremism throughout the mining life cycle

Mining companies are already indirectly engaged in a range of economic, social and business activities that may exacerbate or mitigate drivers of violent extremism, particularly the commonly identified push factors. However, due to a lack of analysis and wider understanding, there's no standard approach or guidance for companies to draw on to ensure that they're contributing to efforts to strengthen resilience against violent extremism. Even if companies determine that they don't want to directly engage in efforts that have been badged as 'PVE' or 'CVE', they should consider some general principles to ensure that they aren't detracting from P/CVE efforts in the communities in which their mines operate.

First, engagement with the community must include mechanisms for **empowered and inclusive decision-making**. Based on our interviews with stakeholders and community members in the case-study countries, one important link between CSR programs and the prevention of community discontent (and ultimately the risk of violent extremism) is the extent to which local actors are empowered to make decisions about the CSR programs that are delivered in their communities. If one of the drivers for violent extremism is the desire of disempowered people to act powerfully, paternal governance models for CSR programs—in which mining companies decide unilaterally which projects will be prioritised and how they will be implemented—are unlikely to build a sense of community empowerment. Rather, it's critical that mining companies participate in multistakeholder partnerships with governments and local communities when selecting, designing and implementing CSR programs. Companies should also seek to identify existing sources of community resilience to ensure that such processes are context specific.

Second, from the earliest phases of any potential mining project, it will be critical for the company to **manage expectations**. It's important to educate local stakeholders about the mining life cycle, including how long it can take for a project to get off the ground and at what point employment, contracting and other economic opportunities will be available. It can be tempting for companies to expedite regulatory approvals or land access agreements by

'talking up' the economic potential of a project. While a bullish framing of stakeholder benefits might make local stakeholders more amenable to approving mining projects in the short term, a company's ongoing social licence to operate can be the longer term casualty when exaggerated economic benefits fail to materialise. To create more realistic stakeholder expectations at the national and local levels, mining companies should provide accurate ranges of possible economic benefits based on forecasts for production, labour demand and supply-chain requirements, even if that means longer delays in the approval of exploration and mining permits. In the words of one mining executive, you need to 'do what you say'.[147]

Third, mining companies and governments need to ensure **transparency** about mining revenues, including those benefits that accrue to national and local governments. In the words of a senior Kenyan Government official, you need to 'show how wealth is actually built' to help counter extremism.[148] This aligns with the *African mining vision*, which outlines a 'transparent, equitable and optimal exploitation of mineral resources to underpin broad-based sustainable growth and socio-economic development'.[149] Transparency is an important mechanism to address perceived marginalisation and discrimination, which may foster violent extremism. It is critical that governments ensure that there's clear transparency about mining governance regimes and the share of royalties and economic investment being provided to the national government and local communities. Achieving a balance between local and national distribution is critical to ensure that the economic benefits of extraction are felt at the local level, thereby minimising grievances and feelings of marginalisation.

As outlined above, CSR programs also have significant potential to reduce some of the socioeconomic push factors for violent extremism, and may even have an inoculation effect on some factors. In fact, Kenya's National Strategy on Countering Violent Extremism notes that CSR programs are an important part of private sector engagement on CVE.[150] Mining companies participate in CSR programs with a wide variety of motivations, including improving their social licence to operate, managing social risk, enhancing corporate reputation and 'offsetting' the environmental impacts of mining—or, as some have argued, to counterbalance socially irresponsible behaviour. Whatever the motivation, effectively scoped and managed CSR programs can address some of the unmet socioeconomic needs in the local community, as well as perceived grievances. However, without further assessment of the local drivers of violent extremism or sources of existing community resilience, a mining company won't be able to assess whether its approach to CSR is contributing positively to efforts to reduce violent extremism.

If a mining company wants to ensure that its CSR program does no harm to existing P/CVE efforts (as a minimum) or even contributes positively to those efforts (which is a win–win for the community and the company), then it should apply a 'P/CVE lens' to its activities. This could include considering the ways in which the mining value chain exacerbates or ameliorates the risks of violent extremism in mining-affected areas, including approaches to compensation, employment, supply chains, and CSR and community engagement programs. A particular focus should be on the way in which those programs incorporate marginalised groups and vulnerable groups, such as women and youth, and create opportunities for inclusive economic growth.

Whereas CSR programs are targeted at addressing the economic, social and environmental impact of mining operations, P/CVE approaches are aimed to addressing the conditions that may push individuals to radicalise or consequently join extremist groups. While there's significant overlap, these distinctions require engagement with a different range of actors. In the case of P/CVE approaches, companies also need to be engaging government authorities at the national and local levels on their approach to P/CVE programs. Similarly, mining ministries and government departments need to be leading the way in engaging with their counterparts in other parts of government to identify potential opportunities for mining companies to engage.

Areas of action and a potential direct role for the mining sector

As a first step in enhancing the role of mining companies in CVE, there needs to be an attempt to define the potential roles and limitations of the mining sector in P/CVE efforts. In many cases, certain aspects of P/CVE engagement will need to be led by the government. For instance, approaches to identify people who have become radicalised and to intervene where they pose a security risk to the community will be led by government law enforcement and security agencies. Similarly, government will have the lead in efforts to develop national P/CVE plans.

Nevertheless, in some areas there's considerable scope and options for a mining company to engage directly in support of P/CVE efforts. For example, a company may find itself operating in an environment where there are opportunities to engage directly to support returnees in rehabilitation and reintegration programs. This has been the case in Kenya, where an amnesty program has resulted in many individuals returning from Somalia to the coastal region. Some of those returnees have benefited from a poultry agricultural program, which they can use to grow a micro-agriculture business.[151] In another example from one of the countries visited for this project, a mining company is partnering with a civil society group to run business training and awareness programs for youth in the local area as part of efforts to prevent violent extremism.[152]

In situations where mining projects are operating in areas known for radicalisation and recruitment, or where mining companies are engaging directly in community P/CVE programs, the companies should consider embedding P/CVE into existing internal processes and training for community relations, security and human resources personnel. This might include training on local and national P/CVE efforts, local drivers of violent extremism, and approaches to identifying potentially at-risk groups or individuals in the community.

To comprehensively strengthen the approach of a mining project to P/CVE, several further strategies can be implemented. From the outset of a mining project, the mining company should consider incorporating a conflict and violent extremism risk assessment before the approval of the project. This is critical to managing the potential risks posed to the people and assets of the company, understanding the ways in which project activities might exacerbate pre-existing conflicts, grievances or extremist threats in local communities, and ensuring that security approaches and CSR programs contribute where possible to broader efforts to mitigate the drivers of violent extremism. It may be that an assessment identifies a relatively low risk of conflict and violent extremism. Nonetheless, such an analysis would still be useful as a means of identifying an appropriate course of action to support existing sources of community resilience and ensure that consideration is given to conflict prevention initiatives and efforts to sustain peace, thereby enhancing the mining company's 'social licence to operate'.[153]

Mining companies can similarly draw on a range of frameworks and examples of plans of action to identify potential areas where they may be well placed to engage in P/CVE efforts. The UN Secretary-General's Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism identifies seven areas of action for member states to consider in developing their plans of action, which in our assessment also provide opportunities for the mining sector to lend direct support to P/CVE programs. They include areas of action such as education, skill development and employment facilitation; empowering youth; engaging communities; and gender equality and empowering women.[154] Examples of existing and potential mining-sector engagement are detailed in Table 3. Many of these approaches are likely to overlap with existing CSR programs.

Table 3: Examples of existing and potential mining sector engagement to support activities related to P/CVE programs

Area of action	Opportunities for the mining sector
Education, skill development and employment facilitation	• Fund the development of infrastructure for schools • Offer scholarships and bursaries to local youth • Support technical and vocational training
Empowering youth	• Support community organisations that develop and support youth entrepreneurship • Engage youth in consultative committees and representative bodies involving the mining company and the community • Establish mentoring programs and offer opportunities for leadership • Identify sources of local resilience for youth and build on them (e.g. in Kenya, building on skills in the informal economy and the culture)
Engaging communities	• Leverage community and civil society engagement to support a discourse on the drivers of violent extremism • Foster community cohesiveness with support to arts, culture and sports programs
Gender equality and empowering women	• Ensure that programs for education, technical and vocational training, and mentoring include women from the local community • Engage women in consultative committees and representative bodies involving the mining company and the community • Integrate a gender perspective into CSR programs in the local area to ensure that the needs of women and men are addressed

There's considerable scope for national governments and regional and international organisations to work with private sector entities, such as mining companies, to strengthen resilience against violent extremism. The UN Secretary-General's Plan of Action encourages countries to develop plans of action in a multidisciplinary manner in consultation with a range of actors, including the private sector, and suggests that national action plans set aside funding to 'promote public–private partnerships, where applicable'. This is one of many reasons why governments should seek to engage with the mining sector on P/CVE. Such engagement will provide an opportunity for mining companies to better understand the government's approach. Similarly, mining companies may be able to report back on initiatives that they're engaged in to share lessons on successes and challenges as they relate to efforts to contribute to community resilience through CSR programs, as well as any specific P/CVE strategies that are being implemented unilaterally or in partnership with local stakeholders. Mining departments or ministries might also consider establishing a dedicated officer or focal point for CVE; such an officer could liaise with other government departments on the issue and provide an entry point for mining companies to seek advice on their approaches to P/CVE.

We note that, in some cases, a mining company may assess that engaging with the national government on a national strategy for P/CVE may reduce trust in the company in the local community. In such cases, it may be more effective if the mining company bypasses direct government engagement and works directly on the community level. Organisations such as Hedayah, the Global Community Engagement Resilience Fund, the UN Development Programme, the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, the West Africa Network for Peacebuilding, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, and many others already have networks of community organisations and individuals that can support private sector P/CVE efforts.

All of these issues and options for engagement need to be considered by a mining company when it considers whether and how to engage directly on P/CVE. Local community organisations similarly need to consider the opportunities and risks posed by collaborating with mining companies in these initiatives. A mining company

can be a potential source of sponsorship and a partner to collectively deliver programs, but it may also present a potential risk to P/CVE work if its activities are perceived to be exacerbating grievances in the local community. Local community organisations also need to ensure that mining sector actors and mining companies understand community priorities for P/CVE.

To ensure a more comprehensive sector-wide approach, the mining sector should work with partners and stakeholders to develop a good practice framework for its role in P/CVE efforts. The framework could identify potential risks and opportunities across the life cycle and value chain of mining projects, and include specific approaches to engaging with governments and communities on P/CVE. It may also be a resource for the wider extractives sector and inform broader private sector engagement on P/CVE.

CONCLUSION

The mining sector can play a more significant role in P/CVE in Africa. This report shows that the intersection between the operations of mining companies and the drivers of violent extremism is a starting point for the stakeholders engaged in and affected by mining projects—the mining sector, mining companies, host governments and local community organisations—to consider how they might contribute and cooperate to strengthen the role of the mining sector in P/CVE.

While the impact of mining projects on local communities can aggravate existing local grievances and result in unmet socioeconomic expectations, potentially contributing to some of the push factors and issues that drive people into violent extremism, mining companies also undertake many activities that mitigate those effects through their community engagement activities and CSR programs. Mining company initiatives that generate employment for local communities affected by mining operations, invest in local supply chains, provide livelihood programs in agriculture, education and vocational training, and provide opportunities and hope to locals can act as an important bulwark against the messaging and narratives of violent extremists.

However, as our examination of the case-study countries of Burkina Faso, Ghana, Mali and Kenya found, most of these initiatives are by-products of existing approaches and business practices governing compensation, resettlement, employment and CSR programs. This means that there's been little assessment of how these activities may exacerbate or mitigate the drivers of violent extremism. For the mining sector, engaging in P/CVE activities means more than simply implementing good CSR programs. There's a need for mining companies to adopt a more targeted approach to understand the ways in which project activities may exacerbate pre-existing conflicts, grievances or extremist threats in local communities; and ensure that mining-related activities contribute where possible to broader P/CVE efforts.

If the mining sector and, by extension, the wider private sector are to engage effectively in P/CVE efforts, there needs to be more established and comprehensive frameworks for that engagement. It's also important that private sector entities set their terms for doing so, as they don't lead in these efforts—that responsibility falls to governments. Nevertheless, private sector companies can have a substantial role in facilitating and supporting engagement in P/CVE activities.

In the case of the mining sector in Africa, engaging more directly in P/CVE efforts can provide a 'win–win' for the mining company and the local community. In countries that are currently facing high levels of violent extremism, mining companies can be valuable partners, given their long-term interests as stakeholders on the continent. And, even in countries that aren't currently under significant threat from violent extremism, engaging the mining sector in efforts to apply a P/CVE approach will contribute to wider efforts aimed at sustaining peace and preventing conflict.

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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AQIM   Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb

ASM   artisanal and small-scale mining

CSR   corporate social responsibility

CVE   countering violent extremism

EITI   Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative

GCTF   Global Counterterrorism Forum

P/CVE   preventing and countering violent extremism

PVE   preventing violent extremism

UN   United Nations

Preventing and countering violent extremism in Africa
The role of the mining sector

"The global effort to prevent violent extremism can't succeed without the private sector. This report explains why, and how to incorporate this essential partner."

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