Before the Minnesota Public Utilities Commission<br>State of Minnesota

In the Matter of the Application of Northern States Power Company for Authority to Increase Rates for Electric Service in Minnesota

Docket No. E002/GR-20-723
Exhibit (DWD-1)

## Rate of Return

November 2, 2020

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## I. INTRODUCTION AND PURPOSE

Q. Please state your name, affiliation, and business address.
A. My name is Dylan W. D'Ascendis. I am employed by ScottMadden, Inc. as Director. My business address is 3000 Atrium Way, Suite 241, Mount Laurel, NJ 08054.
Q. On whose behalf are you submitting this testimony?
A. I am submitting this direct testimony (referred to throughout as my Direct Testimony) before the Minnesota Public Utilities Commission (Commission) on behalf of Northern States Power, a Minnesota corporation (NSPM or the Company).
Q. Please summarize your professional experience and educational background.
A. I have offered expert testimony on behalf of investor-owned utilities before over 20 state regulatory commissions in the United States, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), the Alberta Utility Commission, and one American Arbitration Association panel on issues including, but not limited to, common equity cost rate, rate of return, valuation, capital structure, class cost of service, and rate design.

On behalf of the American Gas Association (AGA), I calculate the AGA Gas Index, which serves as the benchmark against which the performance of the American Gas Index Fund (AGIF) is measured on a monthly basis. The AGA Gas Index and AGIF are a market capitalization weighted index and mutual
fund, respectively, comprised of the common stocks of the publicly traded corporate members of the AGA.

I am a member of the Society of Utility and Regulatory Financial Analysts (SURFA). In 2011, I was awarded the professional designation "Certified Rate of Return Analyst" by SURFA, which is based on education, experience, and the successful completion of a comprehensive written examination.

I am also a member of the National Association of Certified Valuation Analysts (NACVA) and was awarded the professional designation "Certified Valuation Analyst" by NACVA in 2015.

I am a graduate of the University of Pennsylvania, where I received a Bachelor of Arts degree in Economic History. I have also received a Master of Business Administration with high honors and concentrations in Finance and International Business from Rutgers University.

The details of my educational background and expert witness appearances are shown in Appendix A.

## Q. What is the purpose of your Direct Testimony?

A. The purpose of my testimony is to present evidence on behalf of the Company and recommend the appropriate return on common equity (ROE) to be used in setting rates in this proceeding. My testimony first provides a summary of financial theory and regulatory principles pertinent to the development of the recommended cost of capital. I then: (1) evaluate the Company's proposed
capital structure; and (2) present evidence and analysis on the appropriate ROE on its Minnesota jurisdictional rate base. My testimony concludes with a discussion of the current capital market environment and how it influences cost of capital issues in this proceeding.
Q. HAVE YOU PREPARED SCHEDULES IN SUPPORT OF YOUR RECOMMENDATION?
A. Yes. I have prepared Exhibit__(DWD-1), which contains Schedules 1 through 9 , and were prepared by me or under my direction.

## II. SUMMARY

## Q. Please summarize your recommended ROE.

A. My recommended ROE of $10.20 \%$ is summarized on page 2 of Exhibit__(DWD-1), Schedule 1. In determining my recommendation, I assessed the market-based common equity cost rates of companies of relatively similar, but not necessarily identical, risk to the Company. Using companies of relatively comparable risk as proxies is consistent with the principles of fair rate of return established in the Hope ${ }^{1}$ and Bluefield ${ }^{1}$ decisions, which I discuss further in Section III, below. Of course, no proxy group can be identical in risk to any single company. Consequently, there must be an evaluation of relative risk between the Company and the proxy group to determine if it is appropriate to adjust the proxy group's indicated rate of return.

1 Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944) (Hope).
2 Bluefield Water Works Improvement Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 262 U.S. 679 (1922) (Bluefield).

My recommendation results from applying and considering several cost of common equity models, specifically the Constant Growth and Two Growth forms of the Discounted Cash Flow model (DCF), the Risk Premium Model (RPM), and the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), to the market data of the Utility Proxy Group whose selection criteria will be discussed below. In addition, I applied these same models to a Non-Price Regulated Proxy Group. The results derived from these analyses are as follows:

Table 1
Summary of Common Equity Cost Rates ${ }^{3}$

| Discounted Cash Flow Model | $8.72 \%$ |
| :--- | :---: |
| Risk Premium Model | $10.43 \%$ |
| Capital Asset Pricing Model | $12.14 \%$ |
| Cost of Equity Models Applied to Comparable <br> Risk, Non-Price Regulated Companies | $\underline{12.03 \%}$ |
| Indicated Range of Common Equity Cost <br> Rates Before Adjustments | $9.77 \%-10.83 \%$ |
| Size Adjustment | $0.05 \%$ |
| Credit Risk Adjustment | $-0.12 \%$ |
| Flotation Cost Adjustment | $0.15 \%$ |
| Indicated Range of Common Equity Cost <br> Rates after Adjustment | $\underline{9.85 \%-10.91 \%}$ |
| Recommended Cost of Common Equity | $\underline{10.20 \%}$ |

The indicated range of common equity cost rates applicable to the Utility Proxy Group is between $9.77 \%$ and $10.83 \%$ before any Company-specific adjustments. ${ }^{4}$ I then adjusted the indicated common equity cost rate upward by $0.05 \%$ to reflect the Company's smaller relative size and downward by $0.12 \%$ to account for a less risky bond rating, as compared to the Utility Proxy Group. I also adjusted the indicated common equity cost rate upward by $0.15 \%$ to account for flotation costs. ${ }^{5}$ These adjustments resulted in a Company-specific indicated range of common equity cost rates between $9.85 \%$ and $10.91 \%$. Given the Utility Proxy Group and Company-specific ranges of common equity cost rates, my recommended ROE for the Company is $10.20 \%$.

## Q. Please summarize the Company's proposed capital structure.

A. The Company is proposing projected capital structures which include a $52.50 \%$ common equity ratio. That common equity ratio is consistent with the Company's historical equity ratios, the equity ratios maintained by the Utility Proxy Group and their operating subsidiary companies.
Q. How is the remainder of your Direct Testimony organized?
A. The remainder of my Direct Testimony is organized as follows:

- Section III - Provides a summary of financial theory and regulatory principles pertinent to the development of the Cost of Capital;
- Section IV - Explains the proposed capital structure;
- Section V - Explains my selection of the Utility Proxy Group used to develop my Cost of Common Equity analytical results;
- Section VI - Describes the analyses on which my Cost of Common Equity recommendation is based;
- Section VII - Summarizes my common equity cost rate before adjustments to reflect Company-specific factors;
- Section VIII - Explains my adjustments to my common equity cost rate before to reflect Company-specific factors;
- Section IX - Provides an overview of the current capital market environment; and
- Section X - Presents my conclusions.


## III. GENERAL PRINCIPLES

Q. What principles have you considered in arriving at your RECOMMENDATIONS?
A. In unregulated industries, marketplace competition is the principal determinant of the price of products or services. For regulated public utilities, regulation must act as a substitute for marketplace competition. Assuring that the utility can fulfill its obligations to the public, while providing safe and reliable service at all times, requires a level of earnings sufficient to maintain the integrity of presently invested capital. Sufficient earnings also permit the attraction of needed new capital at a reasonable cost, for which the utility must compete with other firms of comparable risk, consistent with the fair rate of return standards established by the U.S. Supreme Court in the previously cited Hope and Bluefield cases.

The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the fair rate of return standards in Hope, when it stated:

> The rate-making process under the Act, i.e., the fixing of 'just and reasonable' rates, involves a balancing of the investor and the consumer interests. Thus we stated in the Natural Gas Pipeline Co. case that 'regulation does not insure that the business shall produce net revenues.' 315 U.S. at page 590,62 S.Ct. at page 745 . But such considerations aside, the investor interest has a legitimate concern with the financial integrity of the company whose rates are being regulated. From the investor or company point of view it is important that there be enough revenue not only for operating expenses but also for the capital costs of the business. These include service on the debt and dividends on the stock. Cf. Chicago \& Grand Trunk R. Co. v. Wellman, 143 U.S. $339,345,34612$ S.Ct. 400,402 . By that standard the return to the equity owner should be commensurate with returns on investments in other enterprises having corresponding risks. That return, moreover, should be sufficient to assure confidence in the financial integrity of the enterprise, so as to maintain its credit and to attract capital. ${ }^{6}$

In summary, the U.S. Supreme Court has found a return that is adequate to attract capital at reasonable terms enables the utility to provide service while maintaining its financial integrity. As discussed above, and in keeping with established regulatory standards, that return should be commensurate with the returns expected elsewhere for investments of equivalent risk. The Commission's decision in this proceeding, therefore, should provide the Company with the opportunity to earn a return that is: (1) adequate to attract capital at reasonable cost and terms; (2) sufficient to ensure their financial
integrity; and (3) commensurate with returns on investments in enterprises having corresponding risks.

Lastly, the required return for a regulated public utility is established on a stand-alone basis, i.e., for the utility operating company at issue in a rate case. Parent entities, like other investors, have capital constraints and must look at the attractiveness of the expected risk-adjusted return of each investment alternative in their capital budgeting process. That is, utility holding companies that own many utility operating companies have choices as to where they will invest their capital within the holding company family. Therefore, the opportunity cost concept applies regardless of the source of the funding, public funding or corporate funding.

When funding is provided by a parent entity, the return still must be sufficient to provide an incentive to allocate equity capital to the subsidiary or business unit rather than other internal or external investment opportunities. That is, the regulated subsidiary must compete for capital with all the parent company's affiliates, and with other, similarly situated utility companies. In that regard, investors value corporate entities on a sum-of-the-parts basis and expect each division within the parent company to provide an appropriate risk-adjusted return.

It therefore is important that the authorized ROE reflects the risks and prospects of the utility's operations and supports the utility's financial integrity from a stand-alone perspective as measured by their combined business and financial risks. Consequently, the ROE authorized in this proceeding should
be sufficient to support the operational (i.e., business risk) and financing (i.e., financial risk) of the Company's Minnesota utility operations on a stand-alone basis.
Q. WITHIN THAT BROAD FRAMEWORK, HOW IS THE COST OF CAPITAL ESTIMATED IN REGULATORY PROCEEDINGS?
A. Regulated utilities primarily use common stock and long-term debt to finance their permanent property, plant, and equipment (i.e., rate base). The fair rate of return for a regulated utility is based on its WACC, in which, as noted earlier, the costs of the individual sources of capital are weighted by their respective book values.

The cost of capital is the return investors require to make an investment in a firm. Investors will provide funds to a firm only if the return that they expect is equal to, or greater than, the return that they require to accept the risk of providing funds to the firm.

The cost of capital (that is, the combination of the costs of debt and equity) is based on the economic principle of "opportunity costs." Investing in any asset (whether debt or equity securities) represents a forgone opportunity to invest in alternative assets. For any investment to be sensible, its expected return must be at least equal to the return expected on alternative, comparable risk investment opportunities. Because investments with like risks should offer similar returns, the opportunity cost of an investment should equal the return available on an investment of comparable risk.

Whereas the cost of debt is contractually defined and can be directly observed as the interest rate or yield on debt securities, the cost of equity must be estimated based on market data and various financial models. Because the cost of equity is premised on opportunity costs, the models used to determine it are typically applied to a group of "comparable" or "proxy" companies.

In the end, the estimated cost of capital should reflect the return that investors require in light of the subject company's business and financial risks, and the returns available on comparable investments.
Q. In view of the comparable risk standard, have you reviewed authorized returns for other vertically integrated electric UTILITIES?
A. Yes, I have. An overarching principle in determining a fair rate of return is to ensure that the Company is allowed the ability to earn a return commensurate to that earned by other enterprises with similar risks. In that regard, the Commission should keep in mind that the Company competes for capital with all companies with comparable risk, including other operating subsidiaries of Xcel Energy's (XEI). Therefore, two high level checks on the reasonableness of a return on equity result are to examine the returns being allowed to the parent company utility operations in other jurisdictions and the returns being authorized to other utilities across the country. While such comparisons are admittedly imperfect and may reflect somewhat dated regulatory determinations, they can still inform the overall reasonableness of the Commission's consideration.

NSPM's 9.06\% authorized return in Minnesota is the lowest among XEI's regulated utility operating subsidiaries. ${ }^{7}$

Table 2
Xcel Energy Vertically Integrated Electric Authorized Returns ${ }^{8}$

| Company | Jurisdiction | Date | Authorized <br> ROE |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :---: |
| Southwestern Public Service Co. | Texas | $8 / 27 / 2020$ | $9.45 \%$ |
| Southwestern Public Service Co. | New Mexico | $5 / 20 / 2020$ | $9.45 \%$ |
| Public Service Co. of CO | Colorado | $2 / 11 / 2020$ | $9.30 \%$ |
| Northern States Power - MN | Minnesota | $\mathbf{9 / 2 9 / 2 0 1 9}$ | $\mathbf{9 . 0 6 \%}$ |
| Northern States Power - WI | Wisconsin | $9 / 4 / 2019$ | $10.00 \%$ |
| Northern States Power - MN | North Dakota | $2 / 26 / 2014$ | $9.75 \%$ |
| Northern States Power - MN | South Dakota | $6 / 19 / 2012$ | $9.25 \%$ |

In addition, As shown in Charts 1 and 2, below, recently authorized returns for vertically integrated electric utilities in Minnesota have been among the lowest in the country and in the Upper Midwest region.

[^0]U.S. Vertically Integrated Electric Authorized ROEs ${ }^{9}$


## Chart 2

Upper Midwest Vertically Integrated Electric Authorized ROEs ${ }^{10}$


[^1]10 Ibid.

Although I recognize that the Commission is not beholden to set the authorized return for the Company based on returns available to utilities in other jurisdictions, that data provides a relevant benchmark against which to assess the Company's currently authorized return of $9.06 \%$. For example, NSPM is at a competitive disadvantage relative to XEI's other operating subsidiaries because the Company's authorized return in Minnesota is lower than that of XEI's other operating subsidiaries.

## A. Business Risk

Q. PLEASE DEFINE BUSINESS RISK AND EXPLAIN WHY IT IS IMPORTANT FOR DETERMINING A FAIR RATE OF RETURN.
A. The investor-required return on common equity reflects investors' assessment of the total investment risk of the subject firm. Total investment risk is often discussed in the context of business and financial risk.

Business risk reflects the uncertainty associated with owning a company's common stock without the company's use of debt and/or preferred stock financing. One way of considering the distinction between business and financial risk is to view the former as the uncertainty of the expected earned return on common equity, assuming the firm is financed with no debt.

Examples of business risks generally faced by utilities include, but are not limited to, the regulatory environment, mandatory environmental compliance requirements, customer mix and concentration of customers, service territory economic growth, market demand, risks and uncertainties of supply, operations, capital intensity, size, the degree of operating leverage, emerging
technologies including distributed energy resources, the vagaries of weather, and the like, all of which have a direct bearing on earnings.

Although analysts, including rating agencies, may categorize business risks individually, as a practical matter, such risks are interrelated and not wholly distinct from one another. When determining an appropriate return on common equity, the relevant issue is where investors see the subject company in relation to other similarly situated utility companies (i.e., the Utility Proxy Group). To the extent investors view a company as being exposed to higher risk, the required return will increase, and vice versa.

For regulated utilities, business risks are both long-term and near-term in nature. Whereas near-term business risks are reflected in year-to-year variability in earnings and cash flow brought about by economic or regulatory factors, long-term business risks reflect the prospect of an impaired ability of investors to obtain both a fair rate of return on, and return of, their capital. Moreover, because utilities accept the obligation to provide safe, adequate and reliable service at all times (in exchange for a reasonable opportunity to earn a fair return on their investment), they generally do not have the option to delay, defer, or reject capital investments. Because those investments are capital-intensive, utilities generally do not have the option to avoid raising external funds. The obligation to serve and the corresponding need to access capital is even more acute during periods of capital market distress.

Because utilities invest in long-lived assets, long-term business risks are of paramount concern to equity investors. That is, the risk of not recovering the
return on their investment extends far into the future. The timing and nature of events that may lead to losses, however, also are uncertain and, consequently, those risks and their implications for the required return on equity tend to be difficult to quantify. Regulatory commissions (like investors who commit their capital) must review a variety of quantitative and qualitative data and apply their reasoned judgment to determine how long-term risks weigh in their assessment of the market-required return on common equity.

## B. Financial Risk

Q. PLEASE DEFINE FINANCIAL RISK AND EXPLAIN WHY IT IS IMPORTANT IN DETERMINING A FAIR RATE OF RETURN.
A. Financial risk is the additional risk created by the introduction of debt and preferred stock into the capital structure. The higher the proportion of debt and preferred stock in the capital structure, the higher the financial risk to common equity owners (i.e., failure to receive dividends due to default or other covenants). Therefore, consistent with the basic financial principle of risk and return, common equity investors require higher returns as compensation for bearing higher financial risk.
Q. CAN BOND AND CREDIT RATINGS BE A PROXY FOR A FIRM'S COMBINED BUSINESS AND FINANCIAL RISKS TO EQUITY OWNERS (I.E. INVESTMENT RISK)?
A. Yes, similar bond ratings/issuer credit ratings reflect, and are representative of, similar combined business and financial risks (i.e., total risk) faced by bond investors. ${ }^{11}$ Although specific business or financial risks may differ between by numerical rating gradations, e.g., within the A category, a Moody's rating can be A1, A2 and A3.
companies, the same bond/credit rating indicates that the combined risks are roughly similar from a debtholder perspective. The caveat is that these debtholder risk measures do not translate directly to risks for common equity.

## IV. NSPM AND THE UTILITY PROXY GROUP

## Q. Why is it necessary to develop a proxy group when estimating the

 ROE FOR THE COMPANY?A. Because the Company is not publicly traded and does not have publicly traded equity securities, it is necessary to develop groups of publicly traded, comparable companies to serve as "proxies" for the Company. In addition to the analytical necessity of doing so, the use of proxy companies is consistent with the Hope, and Bluefield comparable risk standards, as discussed above. I have selected two proxy groups that, in my view, are fundamentally riskcomparable to the Company: A Utility Proxy Group and a Non-Price Regulated Proxy Group, which is comparable in total risk to the Utility Proxy Group. ${ }^{12}$

Even when proxy groups are carefully selected, it is common for analytical results to vary from company to company. Despite the care taken to ensure comparability, because no two companies are identical, market expectations regarding future risks and prospects will vary within the proxy group. It therefore is common for analytical results to reflect a seemingly wide range, even for a group of similarly situated companies. At issue is how to estimate the ROE from within that range. That determination will be best informed
by employing a variety of sound analyses and necessarily must consider the sort of quantitative and qualitative information discussed throughout my Direct Testimony. Additionally, a relative risk analysis between the Company and the Utility Proxy Group must be made to determine whether or not explicit Company-specific adjustments need to be made to the Utility Proxy Group indicated results.

My analyses are based on the Utility Proxy Group, containing U.S. electric utilities. As discussed earlier, utilities must compete for capital with other companies with commensurate risk (including non-utilities) and, to do so, must be provided the opportunity to earn a fair and reasonable return. Consequently, it is appropriate to consider the Utility Proxy Group's market data in determining the Company's ROE.

## Q. Please summarize the Company's Operations.

A. NSPM is a vertically integrated electric and natural gas utility that provides electric generation, transmission, and distribution service, as well as natural gas distribution service to approximately $1,500,000$ retail electric customers and 525,000 natural gas customers in North Dakota, Minnesota, and South Dakota. ${ }^{13}$ The Company has long-term issuer ratings of A2 from Moody's Investor Services (Moody's) and A- from Standard and Poor (S\&P). ${ }^{14}$ The Company is not publicly-traded as it is an operating subsidiary of Xcel Energy Inc. (XEI or the Parent). XEI is publicly-traded under ticker symbol XEL.

[^2]Page 1 of Exhibit__(DWD-1), Schedule 2 contains comparative capitalization and financial statistics for the Company for the years 2015 to 2019. ${ }^{15}$ During the five-year period ending 2019, the historically achieved average earnings rate on book common equity for the Company averaged $8.29 \%$. The average common equity ratio based on total permanent capital (excluding short-term debt) was $52.59 \%$, and the average dividend payout ratio was $94.56 \%$.

Total debt to earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization for the years 2015 to 2019 ranges between 3.16 and 3.97 times, with an average of 3.53 times. Funds from operations to total debt range from $20.69 \%$ to $28.13 \%$, with an average of $25.72 \%$.
Q. Please explain how you chose the companies in the Utility Proxy Group.
A. Because the Cost of Equity is a comparative exercise, my objective in developing a proxy group was to select companies that are comparable to the Company. Because the Company is a $100 \%$ rate regulated vertically integrated electric utility, I applied the following criteria to select my Utility Proxy Group:
(i) They were included in the Eastern, Central, or Western Electric Utility Group of Value Line Investment Survey (Standard Edition)(Value Line);
(ii) They have $70 \%$ or greater of fiscal year 2019 total operating income derived from, and $70 \%$ or greater of fiscal year 2019 total assets attributable to, regulated electric operations;
(iii) They are vertically integrated (i.e., utilities that own and operate regulated generation, transmission, and distribution assets);
(iv) At the time of preparation of this testimony, they had not publicly announced that they were involved in any major merger or acquisition activity (i.e., one publicly-traded utility merging with or acquiring another) or any other major development;
(v) They have not cut or omitted their common dividends during the five years ended 2019 or through the time of preparation of this testimony;
(vi) They have Value Line and Bloomberg Professional Services (Bloomberg) adjusted Betas;
(vii) They have positive Value Line five-year dividends per share (DPS) growth rate projections; and
(viii) They have Value Line, Zacks, or Yahoo! Finance consensus five-year earnings per share (EPS) growth rate projections. The following 15 companies met these criteria:

Table 3
Utility Proxy Group Companies

| Company Name | Ticker Symbol |
| :--- | :---: |
| ALLETE, Inc. | ALE |
| Alliant Energy Corporation | LNT |
| Ameren Corporation | AEE |
| Duke Energy Corporation | DUK |
| Edison International | EIX |
| Entergy Corporation | ETR |
| Evergy, Inc. | EVRG |
| IDACORP, Inc. | NWA |
| NorthWestern Corporation | OGE |
| OGE Energy Corporation | OTTR |
| Otter Tail Corporation | PNW |
| Pinnacle West Capital Corporation | PNM |
| PNM Resources, Inc. | POR |
| Portland General Electric Co. | XEL |
| Xcel Energy, Inc. |  |

Q. Please summarize the Utility Proxy Group’s historical CAPITALIZATION AND FINANCIAL STATISTICS.
A. Page 2 of Exhibit___(DWD-1), Schedule 2 contains comparative capitalization and financial statistics for the Utility Proxy Group for the years 2015 to 2019.

During the five-year period ending 2019, the historically achieved average earnings rate on book common equity for the group averaged $8.54 \%$, the average common equity ratio based on total permanent capital (excluding short-term debt) was $48.49 \%$, and the average dividend payout ratio was 61.41\%.

Total debt to earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization for the years 2015 to 2019 ranges between 4.02 and 5.28 times, with an average of 4.63 times. Funds from operations to total debt range from $15.23 \%$ to $23.09 \%$, with an average of $19.49 \%$. Given those capitalization and financial statistics, I conclude the Utility Proxy Group is generally comparable to the Company.

## V. CAPITAL STRUCTURE

Q. How does the capital structure affect the rate of return?
A. As discussed above, there are two general categories of risk: business risk and financial risk. The capital structure relates to a company's financial risk, which represents the risk that a company may not have adequate cash flows to meet its financial obligations, and is a function of the percentage of debt (or financial leverage) in its capital structure. In that regard, as the percentage of debt in the capital structure increases, so do the fixed obligations for the repayment of that debt. Consequently, as the degree of financial leverage increases, the risk of financial distress (i.e., financial risk) also increases. ${ }^{16}$ In essence, even if two firms face the same business risks, a company with meaningfully higher levels of debt in its capital structure is likely to have a higher cost of both debt and equity. Since the capital structure can affect the subject company's overall level of risk, it is an important consideration in establishing a just and reasonable rate of return.
Q. IS THERE SUPPORT FOR THE PROPOSITION THAT THE CAPITAL STRUCTURE IS A

KEY CONSIDERATION IN ESTABLISHING AN APPROPRIATE RATE OF RETURN?
A. Yes. The Supreme Court and various utility commissions have long recognized the role of capital structure in the development of a just and reasonable rate of return for a regulated utility. In particular, a utility's leverage, or debt ratio, has been explicitly recognized as an important element in determining a just and reasonable rate of return:

> Although the determination of whether bonds or stocks should be issued is for management, the matter of debt ratio is not exclusively within its province. Debt ratio substantially affects the manner and cost of obtaining new capital. It is therefore an important factor in the rate of return and must necessarily be considered by and come within the authority of the body charged by law with the duty of fixing a just and reasonable rate of return. ${ }^{17}$

Perhaps ultimate authority for balancing the issues of cost and financial integrity is found in the Supreme Court's statement in Hope:

The rate-making process under the Act, i.e., the fixing of "just and reasonable' rates, involves a balancing of the investor and the consumer interests. ${ }^{18}$

And as the U.S. Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit found in Communications Satellite Corp. et. al. v. FCC:

The equity investor's stake is made less secure as the company's debt rises, but the consumer rate-payer's is

17 New England Telephone \& Telegraph Co. v. State, 98 N.H. 211, 97 A.2d 213, (1953), citing New England Tel. \& Tel. Co. v. Department of Pub. Util., (Mass.) 327 Mass. 81, 97 N.E. 2d 509, 514; Petitions of New England Tel. \& Tel. Co. 116 Vt. 480, 80 A2d 671, at 6. Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S., at 603 (1944).
alleviated. ${ }^{19}$

That is, the U.S. Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit found that because there is a relationship between the capital structure and the cost of equity, investor and consumer interests must be balanced. Consequently, the principles of fairness and reasonableness with respect to the allowed rate of return and capital structure are considered at both the federal and state levels.
Q. PLEASE SUMMARIZE THE COMPONENTS OF THE COMPANY'S RECOMMENDED CAPITAL STRUCTURE AND WACC.
A. The Company's proposed test year capital structure includes long-term debt, short-term debt, and common equity. The Company's proposed revenue requirement for the test year reflects a WACC of $7.35 \%{ }^{20}$
Q. Does the Company have a separate capital structure that is RECOGNIZED BY INVESTORS?
A. Yes. The Company is a separate corporate entity that has its own capital structure and issues its own debt with the Securities and Exchange Commission.
Q. WHY IS IT IMPORTANT THAT THE COMPANY'S ACTUAL CAPITAL STRUCTURE BE AUTHORIZED FOR THE COMPANY IN THIS PROCEEDING?
A. As a preliminary matter, the Company's actual capital structure is known and measurable, and is within a reasonable range from the perspective of the

[^3]20

Utility Proxy Group companies. ${ }^{21}$ The use of an operating subsidiary's actual capital structure is consistent with the FERC's precedent, under which they use the applicant's capital structure, where possible. ${ }^{22}$ In particular, the FERC will use the utility operating company's capital structure if it meets three criteria: (1) it issues its own debt without guarantees; (2) it has its own bond rating; and (3) it has a capital structure within the range of capital structures approved by the commission. ${ }^{23}$ The Company meets all of these criteria.

Importantly, in order to provide safe, reliable, and affordable service to its customers, the Company must meet the needs and serve the interests of its various stakeholders, including customers, shareholders, and bondholders. The interests of these stakeholder groups are aligned when the Company maintains a healthy balance sheet, strong credit ratings, and a supportive regulatory environment, ensuring it has access to capital on reasonable terms in order to make necessary investments.

Safe and reliable service cannot be maintained at a reasonable cost if utilities do not have the financial flexibility and strength to access competitive financing markets on reasonable terms. The authorization of a capital structure that understates the Company's actual common equity will weaken the financial condition of its operations and adversely impact the Company's ability to address expenses and investment, to the detriment of customers and shareholders. Safe and reliable service for customers cannot be sustained over

[^4]the long term if the interests of shareholders and bondholders are minimized such that the public interest is not optimized.

Consequently, the Company's existing capital structure should be used to set rates in this proceeding.
Q. How does the Company's requested test year capital structure COMPARE WITH THE THEIR RECENT CAPITAL STRUCTURES?
A. The requested test year capital structure is highly consistent with NSPM's historical capital structures. As shown on Exhibit___(DWD-1), Schedule 2, page 1, the common equity ratios for years 2015 through 2019 range from $51.85 \%$ to $52.07 \%$, averaging $51.98 \%$.
Q. How does NSPM's actual common equity ratio of 52.50\% compare with the common equity ratios maintained by the Utility Proxy Group?
A. In order to assess the reasonableness of the Company's requested ratemaking common equity ratio, I reviewed the actual common equity ratios maintained by the comparable companies within the Utility Proxy Group. ${ }^{24}$ The Company's requested ratemaking common equity ratio of $52.50 \%$ is reasonable and consistent with the range of common equity ratios maintained by the Utility Proxy Group. As shown on pages 3 and 4 of Exhibit___(DWD1), Schedule 2, common equity ratios of the utilities range from $35.73 \%$ to $58.04 \%$ for fiscal year 2019. The Company's actual capital structure demonstrates both the reasonableness of using it to set rates and the

Company's relative financial health. Setting the capital structure as requested by the Company will continue to support the long-term financial health of the Company for the benefit of all of its stakeholders, including its customers.

I also considered Value Line's projected capital structures for the Utility Proxy Group for 2023-2025. That analysis shows a range of projected common equity ratios between $39.00 \%$ and $59.00 \%$.

In addition to comparing the Company's ratemaking common equity ratio with common equity ratios currently and expected to be maintained by the Utility Proxy Group (i.e., at the holding company level), I also compared the Company's ratemaking common equity ratio with the equity ratios maintained by the operating subsidiaries of the Utility Proxy Group companies. As shown on page 5 of Exhibit___(DWD-1), Schedule 2, common equity ratios of the operating utility subsidiaries of the Utility Proxy Group range from $45.23 \%$ to $65.22 \%$ for fiscal year 2019.
Q. IS THE COMPANY'S PROPOSED EQUITY RATIO OF $52.50 \%$ APPROPRIATE FOR ratemaking purposes given the range of the Utility Proxy Group?
A. Yes, it is. The Company's proposed equity ratio of $52.50 \%$ is appropriate for ratemaking purposes in the current proceeding because it is the actual equity ratio of NSPM, and it is well within industry norms.

## VI. COMMON EQUITY COST RATE MODELS

Q. Is IT IMPORTANT THAT COST OF COMMON EQUITY MODELS BE MARKETBASED?
A. Yes. As discussed previously, regulated public utilities, like the Company, must compete for equity in capital markets along with all other companies with commensurate risk, including non-utilities. The cost of common equity is thus determined based on equity market expectations for the returns of those companies. If an individual investor is choosing to invest their capital among companies with comparable risk, they will choose the company providing a higher return over a company providing a lower return.
Q. ARE THE COST OF COMMON EQUITY MODELS YOU USE MARKET-BASED MODELS?
A. Yes. The DCF model is market-based in that market prices are used in developing the dividend yield component of the model. The RPM and CAPM are also market-based in that the bond/issuer ratings and expected bond yields/risk-free rate used in the application of the RPM and CAPM reflect the market's assessment of bond/credit risk. In addition, the use of the Beta coefficient to determine the equity risk premium also reflects the market's assessment of market/systematic risk, as Beta coefficients are derived from regression analyses of market prices. Moreover, market prices are used in the development of the monthly returns and equity risk premiums used in the Predictive Risk Premium Model (PRPM). Selection criteria for the Non-Price Regulated Proxy Group are based on regression analyses of market prices and reflect the market's assessment of total risk.
Q. WHAT ANALYTICAL APPROACHES DID YOU USE TO DETERMINE THE Company's ROE?
A. As discussed earlier, I have relied on the DCF model, the RPM, and the CAPM, which I apply to the Utility Proxy Group described above. I also applied these same models to a Non-Price Regulated Proxy Group described later in this section.

I rely on these models because reasonable investors use a variety of tools and do not rely exclusively on a single source of information or single model. Moreover, the models on which I rely focus on different aspects of return requirements, and provide different insights to investors' views of risk and return. The DCF model, for example, estimates the investor-required return assuming a constant expected dividend yield and growth rate in perpetuity, while Risk Premium-based methods (i.e., the RPM and CAPM approaches) provide the ability to reflect investors' views of risk, future market returns, and the relationship between interest rates and the Cost of Equity. Just as the use of market data for the Utility Proxy Group adds the reliability necessary to inform expert judgment in arriving at a recommended common equity cost rate, the use of multiple generally accepted common equity cost rate models also adds reliability and accuracy when arriving at a recommended common equity cost rate.

## A. Discounted Cash Flow Model

Q. Please describe the DCF model generally.
A. The theory underlying the DCF model is that the present value of an expected future stream of net cash flows during the investment holding period can be
determined by discounting those cash flows at the cost of capital, or the investors' capitalization rate. DCF theory indicates that an investor buys a stock for an expected total return rate, which is derived from the cash flows received from dividends and market price appreciation. Mathematically, the expected dividend yield on market price plus a growth rate equals the capitalization rate; i.e., the total common equity return rate expected by investors, as shown in Equation [1] below:

$$
K_{e}=\left(D_{0}(1+g)\right) / P+g
$$

## where:

$K_{e}=$ the required Return on Equity;
$D_{0}=$ the annualized Dividend Per Share;
$P=$ the current stock price; and
$g=$ the growth rate.
Q. Which versions of the DCF model did you use?
A. I used the single-stage Constant Growth DCF model and the Two Growth DCF model in my analyses.
Q. Please describe the dividend yield you used in applying the CONSTANT GROWTH DCF MODEL.
A. The unadjusted dividend yields are based on the proxy companies' dividends as of August 31, 2020, divided by the average closing market price for the 60 trading days ended August 31, 2020. ${ }^{25}$
Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN YOUR ADJUSTMENT TO THE DIVIDEND YIELD.
A. Because dividends are paid periodically (e.g. quarterly), as opposed to continuously (daily), an adjustment must be made to the dividend yield. This is often referred to as the discrete, or the Gordon Periodic, version of the DCF model.

DCF theory calls for using the full growth rate, or $\mathrm{D}_{1}$, in calculating the model's dividend yield component. Since the companies in the Utility Proxy Group increase their quarterly dividends at various times during the year, a conservative assumption is to reflect one-half the annual dividend growth rate rather than the full growth rate in the dividend yield component, or $\mathrm{D}_{1 / 2}$. Because the dividend should be representative of the next 12 -month period, this adjustment is a conservative approach that does not overstate the dividend yield. Therefore, the actual average dividend yields in Column 1, page 1 of Exhibit__(DWD-1), Schedule 3 have been adjusted upward to reflect one-half the average projected growth rate shown in Column 6 .
Q. Please explain the basis for the growth rates you apply in your CONSTANT GROWTH DCF MODEL.
A. Investors with more limited resources than institutional investors are likely to rely on widely available financial information services, such as Value Line, Zacks, and Yahoo! Finance. Investors realize that analysts have significant insight into the dynamics of the industries and individual companies they analyze, as well as companies' abilities to effectively manage the effects of changing laws and regulations, and ever-changing economic and market
conditions. For these reasons, I used analysts' five-year forecasts of EPS growth in my DCF analysis.

Over the long run, there can be no growth in DPS without growth in EPS. Security analysts' earnings expectations have a more significant influence on market prices than dividend expectations. Thus, using projected earnings growth rates in a DCF analysis provides a better match between investors' market price appreciation expectations and the growth rate component of the DCF.
Q. Please summarize the constant growth DCF model results.
A. As shown on page 1 of Exhibit___(DWD-1), Schedule 3, the application of the Constant Growth DCF model to the Utility Proxy Group results in a wide range of indicated ROEs from $5.96 \%$ to $10.75 \%$. The mean of those results is $8.58 \%$, the median result is $8.66 \%$, and the average of the two is $8.62 \%$. In arriving at a conclusion of the indicated common equity cost rate for the Utility Proxy Group implied by the Constant Growth DCF model, I relied on an average of the mean and the median results (i.e., $8.62 \%$ ) of the DCF. By doing so, I have considered the DCF results for each company without giving undue weight to outliers on either the high or the low side.
Q. Did you consider any other Constant Growth DCF model results?
A. No, I did not. However, consistent with the Commission's past practice of considering proxy groups which exclude companies whose DCF results do not pass the test of reasonableness, ${ }^{26}$ I calculated the average and median

[^5] Company for Authority to Increase Rates for Electric Service in the State of Minnesota, August 16, 2016, at
result of the Constant Growth DCF model excluding proxy companies with results below $7.00 \%$. ${ }^{27}$ Because I did not include the DCF results excluding proxy company results below $7.00 \%$ in my calculation of the indicated common equity cost rate for the Utility Proxy Group, the $8.62 \%$ average noted above represents a conservative measure of the Utility Proxy Group's ROE.

## Q. Please describe your use of the Two Growth DCF approach in your

 ANALYSES.A. I also considered the results of the Two Growth DCF approach. Whereas the Constant Growth DCF method assumes a single, Constant Growth rate in perpetuity, the Two Growth DCF approach allows for a near-term growth estimate (the first stage) followed by a long-term "terminal" period growth estimate. This Two Growth approach can moderate the effects of substantially high or low growth rate estimates that may be influenced by nearterm events and may not reflect the subject company's expected long-term growth rate. This approach is consistent with the method adopted by the Commission in several prior proceedings and may be applied when the mean growth rate of a particular company is considered unusually high or low relative to the proxy group. In this case, I applied the Two Growth DCF approach to four Utility Proxy Group companies with mean growth rates more than one standard deviation below the overall Utility Proxy Group mean growth rate, and three Utility Proxy Group companies with mean growth rates more than one standard deviation above the overall Utility Proxy Group mean growth rate. The remaining eight Utility Proxy Group companies' growth
11.

27
See, Column 8, page 1 of Exhibit $\qquad$ (DWD-1), Schedule 3.
rates were within one standard deviation of the mean Utility Proxy Group growth rate.
Q. Please explain the basis for the growth rates your apply to the Utility Proxy Group in your Two Growth DCF model.
A. If the proxy group company's growth rate fell within the one standard deviation of the mean growth rate of the Utility Proxy Group, that company would have the same growth rate and same indicated ROE in both the Constant Growth and Two Growth DCF models. If the company's growth rate fell outside of one standard deviation of the Utility Proxy Group mean growth rate, I applied those growth rates only to the first five years of the Two Growth DCF analysis. For the second stage (that is, the terminal period of the Two Growth DCF analysis), I used the mean growth rate of all Utility Proxy Group companies with growth rates within one standard deviation of the overall mean growth rate.
Q. Please summarize the Two Growth DCF model results.
A. As shown on page 2 of Exhibit___(DWD-1), Schedule 3, for the Utility Proxy Group, the application of the Two Growth DCF model to the Utility Proxy Group resulted in indicated ROEs from $7.91 \%$ to $9.85 \%$. The mean result of applying the Two Growth DCF model is $8.86 \%$, the median result is $8.76 \%$, and the average of the two is $8.81 \%$. In arriving at a conclusion for the Two Growth DCF-indicated common equity cost rate for the Utility Proxy Group, I relied on an average of the mean and the median results of the DCF.
Q. Please summarize the indicated roe using the DCF model.
A. I averaged the results of the Constant Growth DCF model (8.62\%) and Two Growth DCF model (8.81\%) to determine the indicated ROE using the DCF model, which is $8.72 \%$.

## B. The Risk Premium Model

Q. Please describe the theoretical basis of the RPM.
A. The RPM is based on the fundamental financial principle of risk and return; namely, that investors require greater returns for bearing greater risk. The RPM recognizes that common equity capital has greater investment risk than debt capital, as common equity shareholders are behind debt holders in any claim on a company's assets and earnings. As a result, investors require higher returns from common stocks than from bonds to compensate them for bearing the additional risk.

While it is possible to directly observe bond returns and yields, investors' required common equity returns cannot be directly determined or observed. According to RPM theory, one can estimate a common equity risk premium over bonds (either historically or prospectively), and use that premium to derive a cost rate of common equity. The cost of common equity equals the expected cost rate for long-term debt capital, plus a risk premium over that cost rate, to compensate common shareholders for the added risk of being unsecured and last-in-line for any claim on the corporation's assets and earnings upon liquidation.
Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN HOW YOU DERIVED YOUR INDICATED COST OF COMMON EQUITY BASED ON THE RPM.
A. To derive my indicated cost of common equity under the RPM, I used two risk premium methods. The first method was the Predictive Risk Premium Model (PRPM) and the second method was a risk premium model using a total market approach. The PRPM estimates the risk-return relationship directly, while the total market approach indirectly derives a risk premium by using known metrics as a proxy for risk.

## i. Predictive Risk Premium Model

## Q. Please explain the PRPM.

A. The PRPM, published in the Journal of Regulatory Economics, ${ }^{28}$ was developed from the work of Robert F. Engle, who shared the Nobel Prize in Economics in 2003 "for methods of analyzing economic time series with time-varying volatility" or ARCH. ${ }^{29}$ Engle found that volatility changes over time and is related from one period to the next, especially in financial markets. Engle discovered that volatility of prices and returns clusters over time and is therefore highly predictable and can be used to predict future levels of risk and risk premiums. That is, historical volatility can be used to predict future volatility, which then can be translated to a predicted equity risk premium.

The PRPM estimates the risk-return relationship directly, as the predicted equity risk premium is generated by predicting volatility or risk. The PRPM is not based on an estimate of investor behavior, but rather on an evaluation of

28 Pauline M. Ahern, Frank J. Hanley and Richard A. Michelfelder, Ph.D. A New Approach for Estimating the Equity Risk Premium for Public Utilities, The Journal of Regulatory Economics (December 2011), 40:261-278. Autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity; See also, www.nobelprize.org.
the results of that behavior (i.e., the variance of historical equity risk premiums).

The inputs to the model are the historical returns on the common shares of each Utility Proxy Group company minus the historical monthly yield on longterm U.S. Treasury securities through August 2020. Using a generalized form of ARCH, known as GARCH, I calculated each Utility Proxy Group company's projected equity risk premium using Eviews ${ }^{\ominus}$ statistical software. When the GARCH model is applied to the historical return data, it produces a predicted GARCH variance series ${ }^{30}$ and a GARCH coefficient. ${ }^{31}$ Multiplying the predicted monthly variance by the GARCH coefficient and then annualizing $\mathrm{it}^{32}$ produces the predicted annual equity risk premium. I then added the forecasted 30 -year U.S. Treasury bond yield of $2.05 \%{ }^{33}$ to each company's PRPM-derived equity risk premium to arrive at an indicated cost of common equity. The 30 -year U.S. Treasury bond yield is a consensus forecast derived from Blue Chip Financial Services (Blue Chip). ${ }^{34}$ The mean PRPM indicated common equity cost rate for the Utility Proxy Group is $10.15 \%$, the median is $10.02 \%$, and the average of the two is $10.09 \%$. Consistent with my reliance on the average of the median and mean results of the DCF models, I relied on the average of the mean and median results of the Utility Proxy Group PRPM to calculate a cost of common equity rate of $10.09 \%$.
Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE YOUR SELECTION OF A RISK-FREE RATE OF RETURN.
A. As shown in Exhibit___(DWD-1), Schedules 4 and 5, the risk-free rate adopted for applications of the RPM and CAPM is $2.05 \%$. This risk-free rate is based on the average of the Blue Chip consensus forecast of the expected yields on 30-year U.S. Treasury bonds for the six quarters ending with the fourth calendar quarter of 2021, and long-term projections for the years 2022 to 2026 and 2027 to 2031 .
Q. Why do you use the projected 30-yEar Treasury yield in your ANALYSES?
A. The yield on long-term U.S. Treasury bonds is almost risk-free and its term is consistent with the long-term cost of capital to public utilities measured by the yields on Moody's A-rated public utility bonds; the long-term investment horizon inherent in utilities' common stocks; and the long-term life of the jurisdictional rate base to which the allowed fair rate of return (i.e., cost of capital) will be applied. In contrast, short-term U.S. Treasury yields are more volatile and largely a function of Federal Reserve monetary policy.

More specifically, the term of the risk-free rate used for cost of capital purposes should match the life (or duration) of the underlying investment (i.e., perpetuity). As noted by Morningstar:

The traditional thinking regarding the time horizon of the chosen Treasury security is that it should match the time horizon of whatever is being valued. When valuing a business that is being treated as a going concern, the appropriate Treasury yield should be that of a long-term Treasury bond. Note that the horizon is a function of the investment, not the investor. If an investor plans to hold
stock in a company for only five years, the yield on a five-year Treasury note would not be appropriate since the company will continue to exist beyond those five years. ${ }^{35}$

Morin also confirms this when he states:
[b]ecause common stock is a long-term investment and because the cash flows to investors in the form of dividends last indefinitely, the yield on very long-term government bonds, namely, the yield on 30-year Treasury bonds, is the best measure of the risk-free rate for use in the CAPM (footnote omitted)... The expected common stock return is based on long-term cash flows, regardless of an individual's holding time period. ${ }^{36}$

Pratt and Grabowski recommend a similar approach to selecting the risk-free rate: " $[\mathrm{i}] \mathrm{n}$ theory, when determining the risk-free rate and the matching ERP you should be matching the risk-free security and the ERP with the period in which the investment cash flows are expected. ${ }^{י 37}$ Similarly, a 2004 paper titled Applying The Capital Asset Pricing Model by Robert Harris reviews current practices for application of the CAPM and, when summarizing best current practices, concludes " $[t]$ he risk-free rate should match the tenor of the cash flows being valued." ${ }^{38}$

As a practical matter, equity securities represent a perpetual claim on cash flows; 30-year Treasury bonds are the longest-maturity securities available to approximate that perpetual claim. The average life of NSPM's utility plant is 28 years based on the composite depreciation rate of the components of its

35 Morningstar, Inc., 2013 Ibbotson Stocks, Bonds, Bills and Inflation Valuation Yearbook, at 44. 36 Morin, at 151.
37 Shannon Pratt and Roger Grabowski, Cost of Capital: Applications and Examples, 3rd Ed. (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley \& Sons, Inc., 2008), at 92. "ERP" is the Equity Risk Premium. Paper cited with permission of author.
utility plant. ${ }^{39}$ Thus, the use of a 30-year Treasury bond yield is a more appropriate risk-free rate as it more accurately reflects the life of the assets it finances.

## ii. Total Market Approach Risk Premium Model

Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN THE TOTAL MARKET APPROACH RPM.
A. The total market approach RPM adds a prospective public utility bond yield to an average of: 1) an equity risk premium that is derived from a Beta-adjusted total market equity risk premium, 2) an equity risk premium based on the $\mathrm{S} \& \mathrm{P}$ Utilities Index, and 3) an equity risk premium based on authorized ROEs for electric utilities.
Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN HOW YOU DETERMINED THE EXPECTED BOND YIELD, applicable to the Utility Proxy Group.
A. The first step in the total market approach RPM analysis is to determine the expected bond yield. Because both ratemaking and the cost of capital, including the common equity cost rate, are prospective in nature, a prospective yield on similarly-rated long-term debt is essential. Because I am unaware of any publication that provides forecasted public utility bond yields, I relied on a consensus forecast of about 50 economists of the expected yield on Aaarated corporate bonds for the six calendar quarters ending with the fourth calendar quarter of 2021, and Blue Chip's long-term projections for 2022 to 2026, and 2027 to 2031. As shown on line 1, page 3 of Exhibit___(DWD-1), Schedule 4, the average expected yield on Moody's Aaa-rated corporate bonds is $2.98 \%$.

Because that $2.98 \%$ estimate represents a corporate bond yield, and not a utility specific bond yield, I adjusted the expected Aaa-rated corporate bond yield to an equivalent A2-rated public utility bond yield. That resulted in an upward adjustment of $0.58 \%$, which represents a recent spread between Aaarated corporate bonds and A2-rated public utility bonds. ${ }^{40}$ Adding that recent $0.58 \%$ spread to the expected Aaa-rated corporate bond yield of $2.98 \%$ results in an expected A2-rated public utility bond yield of $3.56 \%$.

I then reviewed the average credit rating for the Utility Proxy Group from Moody's to determine if an adjustment to the estimated A2-rated public utility bond was necessary. Since the Utility Proxy Group's average Moody's longterm issuer rating is A3, another adjustment to the expected A2-rated public utility bond is needed to reflect the difference in bond ratings. An upward adjustment of $0.12 \%$, which represents one-third of a recent spread between A2-rated and Baa2-rated public utility bond yields, is necessary to make the A2 prospective bond yield applicable to an A3-rated public utility bond. ${ }^{41}$ Adding the $0.12 \%$ to the $3.56 \%$ prospective A2-rated public utility bond yield results in a $3.68 \%$ expected bond yield applicable to the Utility Proxy Group.

41 As shown on line 4 and explained in note 3, page 3 of Exhibit___(DWD-1), Schedule 4. Moody's does not provide public utility bond yields for A3-rated bonds. As such, it was necessary to estimate the difference between A2-rated and A3-rated public utility bonds. Because there are three steps between Baa2 and A2 (Baa2 to Baa1, Baa1 to A3, and A3 to A2) I assumed an adjustment of one-third of the difference between the A2-rated and Baa2-rated public utility bond yield was appropriate.

## Summary of the Calculation of the Utility Proxy Group Projected Bond Yield ${ }^{42}$

| Prospective Yield on Moody's Aaa-Rated <br> Corporate Bonds (Blue Chip) | $2.98 \%$ |
| :--- | :---: |
| Adjustment to Reflect Yield Spread Between <br> Moody's Aaa-Rated Corporate Bonds and <br> Moody's A2-Rated Utility Bonds | $0.58 \%$ |
| Adjustment to Reflect the Utility Proxy Group's <br> Average Moody's Bond Rating of A3 | $\underline{0.12 \%}$ |
| Prospective Bond Yield Applicable to the <br> Utility Proxy Group | $\underline{\underline{3.68 \%}}$ |

To develop the total market approach RPM estimate of the appropriate return on equity, this prospective bond yield is then added to the average of the three different equity risk premiums, which I now discuss, in turn.

## a. Beta Coefficient Derived Equity Risk Premium

Q. Please explain how the Beta-Derived equity risk premium is DETERMINED.
A. The components of the Beta-derived risk premium model are: 1) an expected market equity risk premium over corporate bonds, and 2) the Beta coefficient. The derivation of the Beta-derived equity risk premium that I applied to the Utility Proxy Group is shown on lines 1 through 9, page 8 of Exhibit___(DWD-1), Schedule 4. The total Beta-derived equity risk premium I applied is based on an average of three historical market data-based equity risk premiums, two Value Line-based equity risk premiums, and a Bloombergbased equity risk premium. Each of these is described below.
Q. HOW DID YOUR DERIVE A MARKET EQUITY RISK PREMIUM BASED ON LONGTERM HISTORICAL DATA?
A. To derive an historical market equity risk premium, I used the most recent holding period returns for the large company common stocks from the Stocks, Bonds, Bills, and Inflation (SBBI) Yearbook 2020 (SBBI - 2020) ${ }^{43}$ less the average historical yield on Moody's Aaa/Aa-rated corporate bonds for the period 1928 to 2019. Using holding period returns over a very long time is appropriate because it is consistent with the long-term investment horizon presumed by investing in a going concern, i.e., a company expected to operate in perpetuity.

SBBI's long-term arithmetic mean monthly total return rate on large company common stocks was $11.83 \%$ and the long-term arithmetic mean monthly yield on Moody's Aaa/Aa-rated corporate bonds was $6.05 \% .{ }^{44}$ As shown on line 1, page 8 of Exhibit___(DWD-1), Schedule 4, subtracting the mean monthly bond yield from the total return on large company stocks results in a longterm historical equity risk premium of $5.78 \%$.

I used the arithmetic mean monthly total return rates for the large company stocks and yields (income returns) for the Moody's Aaa/Aa corporate bonds, because they are appropriate for the purpose of estimating the cost of capital as noted in SBBI - 2020. ${ }^{45}$ Using the arithmetic mean return rates and yields is appropriate because historical total returns and equity risk premiums
provide insight into the variance and standard deviation of returns needed by investors in estimating future risk when making a current investment. If investors relied on the geometric mean of historical equity risk premiums, they would have no insight into the potential variance of future returns, because the geometric mean relates the change over many periods to a constant rate of change, thereby obviating the year-to-year fluctuations, or variance, which is critical to risk analysis.
Q. Please explain the derivation of the regression-based market EQUITY RISK PREMIUM.
A. To derive the regression-based market equity risk premium of $9.39 \%$ shown on line 2, page 8 of Exhibit___(DWD-1), Schedule 4, I used the same monthly annualized total returns on large company common stocks relative to the monthly annualized yields on Moody's Aaa/Aa-rated corporate bonds as mentioned above. I modeled the relationship between interest rates and the market equity risk premium using the observed monthly market equity risk premium as the dependent variable, and the monthly yield on Moody's Aaa/Aa-rated corporate bonds as the independent variable. I then used a linear Ordinary Least Squares ("OLS") regression, in which the market equity risk premium is expressed as a function of the Moody's Aaa/Aa-rated corporate bonds yield:

$$
\mathrm{RP}=\alpha+\beta\left(\mathrm{R}_{\text {Ааа/ } / \text { Aa }}\right)
$$

Q. Please explain the derivation of the PrPM equity risk premium.
A. I used the same PRPM approach described above to the PRPM equity risk premium. The inputs to the model are the historical monthly returns on large
company common stocks minus the monthly yields on Moody's Aaa/Aa-rated corporate bonds during the period from January 1928 through August 2020. ${ }^{46}$ Using the previously discussed generalized form of ARCH, known as GARCH, the projected equity risk premium is determined using Eviews ${ }^{\ominus}$ statistical software. The resulting PRPM predicted a market equity risk premium of $9.62 \% .{ }^{47}$
Q. Please explain the derivation of a projected equity risk premium based on V alue Line data for your RPM analysis.
A. As noted above, because both ratemaking and the cost of capital are prospective, a prospective market equity risk premium is needed. The derivation of the forecasted or prospective market equity risk premium can be found in note 4, page 9 of Exhibit___(DWD-1), Schedule 4. Consistent with my calculation of the dividend yield component in my DCF analysis, this prospective market equity risk premium is derived from an average of the three- to five-year median market price appreciation potential by Value Line for the 13 weeks ended September 4, 2020, plus an average of the median estimated dividend yield for the common stocks of the 1,700 firms covered in Value Line. ${ }^{48}$

The average median expected price appreciation is $58 \%$, which translates to a $12.12 \%$ annual appreciation, and, when added to the average of Value Line's median expected dividend yields of $2.33 \%$, equates to a forecasted annual total return rate on the market of $14.45 \%$. The forecasted Moody's Aaa-rated

46 Data from January 1926 to December 2019 is from SBBI - 2020. Data from January 2020 to August 2020 is from Bloomberg.
47 Shown on line 3, page 8 of Exhibit___(DWD-1), Schedule 4.
48 As explained in detail in note 1, page 2 of Exhibit___(DWD-1), Schedule 4.
corporate bond yield of $2.98 \%$ is deducted from the total market return of $14.45 \%$, resulting in an equity risk premium of $11.47 \%$, as shown on line 4 , page 8 of Exhibit__(DWD-1), Schedule 4.
Q. Please explain the derivation of an equity risk premium based on THE S\&P 500 COMPANIES.
A. Using data from Value Line, I calculated an expected total return on the S\&P 500 companies using expected dividend yields and long-term growth estimates as a proxy for capital appreciation. The expected total return for the S\&P 500 is $13.83 \%$. Subtracting the prospective yield on Moody's Aaa-rated corporate bonds of $2.98 \%$ results in a $10.85 \%$ projected equity risk premium.
Q. Please explain the derivation of an equity risk premium based on Bloomberg data.
A. Using data from Bloomberg, I calculated an expected total return on the S\&P 500 using expected dividend yields and long-term growth estimates as a proxy for capital appreciation, identical to the method described above. The expected total return for the $\mathrm{S} \& \mathrm{P} 500$ is $13.78 \%$. Subtracting the prospective yield on Moody's Aaa-rated corporate bonds of $2.98 \%$ results in a $10.80 \%$ projected equity risk premium.
Q. What is your conclusion of a Beta-Derived equity risk premium for USE IN YOUR RPM ANALYSIS?
A. I gave equal weight to all six equity risk premiums based on each source historical, Value Line, and Bloomberg - in arriving at a $9.65 \%$ equity risk premium.

Table 5
Summary of the Calculation of the Equity Risk Premium Using Total Market Returns ${ }^{49}$

| Historical Spread Between Total Returns of <br> Large Stocks and Aaa and Aa-Rated Corporate <br> Bond Yields (1928-2019) | $5.78 \%$ |
| :--- | :---: |
| Regression Analysis on Historical Data | $9.39 \%$ |
| PRPM Analysis on Historical Data | $9.62 \%$ |
| Prospective Equity Risk Premium using Total <br>  <br> Index less Projected Aaa Corporate Bond <br> Yields | $11.47 \%$ |
| Prospective Equity Risk Premium using <br> Measures of Capital Appreciation and Income <br> Returns from Value Line for the S\&P 500 less <br> Projected Aaa Corporate Bond Yields | $10.85 \%$ |
| Prospective Equity Risk Premium using <br> Measures of Capital Appreciation and Income <br> Returns from Bloomberg Professional <br> Services for the S\&P 500 less Projected Aaa <br> Corporate Bond Yields | $\underline{10.80 \%}$ |
| Average |  |

$\qquad$ (DWD-1), Schedule 4.

Beta coefficient by the market equity risk premium of $9.65 \%$ results in a Betaadjusted equity risk premium for the Utility Proxy Group of $9.07 \%$.

## b. S\&P Utility Index Derived Equity Risk Premium

Q. HOW DID YOUR DERIVE THE EQUITY RISK PREMIUM BASED ON THE S\&P Utility Index and Moody's A-Rated public utility bonds?
A. I estimated three equity risk premiums based on S\&P Utility Index holding period returns, and two equity risk premiums based on the expected returns of the S\&P Utilities Index, using Value Line and Bloomberg data, respectively. Turning first to the S\&P Utility Index holding period returns, I derived a longterm monthly arithmetic mean equity risk premium between the S\&P Utility Index total returns of $10.74 \%$ and monthly Moody's A-rated public utility bond yields of $6.53 \%$ from 1928 to 2019 to arrive at an equity risk premium of $4.21 \% .{ }^{50}$ I then used the same historical data to derive an equity risk premium of $6.83 \%$ based on a regression of the monthly equity risk premiums. The final S\&P Utility Index holding period equity risk premium involved applying the PRPM using the historical monthly equity risk premiums from January 1928 to August 2020 to arrive at a PRPM-derived equity risk premium of $5.53 \%$ for the S\&P Utility Index.

I then derived expected total returns on the S\&P Utilities Index of $10.36 \%$ and $11.45 \%$ using data from Value Line and Bloomberg, respectively, and subtracted the prospective Moody's A2-rated public utility bond yield of $3.56 \%{ }^{51}$, which resulted in equity risk premiums of $6.80 \%$ and $7.89 \%$, respectively. As with the market equity risk premiums, I averaged each risk

[^6]
premium based on each source (i.e., historical, Value Line, and Bloomberg) to arrive at my utility-specific equity risk premium of $6.25 \%$.

## c. Authorized Return Derived Equity Risk Premium

Q. How do you derive an equity risk premium of 5.92\% based on AUTHORIZED ROES FOR ELECTRIC UTILITIES?
A. The equity risk premium of $5.92 \%$ shown on line 3 , page 7 of Exhibit__(DWD-1), Schedule 4 is the result of a regression analysis based on regulatory awarded ROEs related to the yields on Moody's A-rated public utility bonds. That analysis is shown on page 13 of Exhibit___(DWD-1),

Schedule 4. Page 13 of Exhibit__(DWD-1), Schedule 4 contains the graphical results of a regression analysis of 1,168 rate cases for electric utilities which were fully litigated during the period from January 1, 1980 through August 31, 2020. It shows the implicit equity risk premium relative to the yields on A2-rated public utility bonds immediately prior to the issuance of each regulatory decision. That is, the analysis considers the relationship between authorized returns and prevailing public utility bond yields at the time of the decision.

It is readily discernible that there is an inverse relationship between the yield on A2-rated public utility bonds and equity risk premiums. In other words, as interest rates decline, the equity risk premium rises and vice versa, a result consistent with financial literature on the subject. ${ }^{53}$ I used the regression results to estimate the equity risk premium applicable to the projected yield on Moody's A2-rated public utility bonds. Given the expected A2-rated utility bond yield of $3.56 \%$, it can be calculated that the indicated equity risk premium applicable to that bond yield is $5.80 \%$, which is shown on line 3, page 7 of Exhibit___(DWD-1), Schedule 4.
Q. What is your conclusion of an equity risk premium for use in your TOTAL MARKET APPROACH RPM ANALYSIS?
A. The equity risk premium I apply to the Utility Proxy Group is $7.08 \%$, which is the average of the Beta-adjusted equity risk premiums for the Utility Proxy

53 See, e.g., Robert S. Harris and Felicia C. Marston, The Market Riske Premium: Expectational Estimates Using Analysts' Forecasts, Journal of Applied Finance, Vol. 11, No. 1, 2001, at 11-12; Eugene F. Brigham, Dilip K. Shome, and Steve R. Vinson, The Risk Premium Approach to Measuring a Utility's Cost of Equity, Financial Management, Spring 1985, at 33-45.

Group, the S\&P Utilities Index, and the authorized return utility equity risk premiums of $9.07 \%, 6.25 \%$, and $5.92 \%$, respectively. ${ }^{54}$
Q. What is the indicated RPM Common equity cost rate based on the TOTAL MARKET APPROACH?
A. As shown on line 7, page 3 of Exhibit $\qquad$ (DWD-1), Schedule 4 and shown on Table 7, below, I calculated a common equity cost rate of $10.76 \%$ for the Utility Proxy Group based on the total market approach RPM.

## Table 7

Summary of the Total Market Return Risk Premium Model ${ }^{55}$

| Prospective Moody's A3-Rated Utility Bond <br> Applicable to the Utility Proxy Group | $3.68 \%$ |
| :--- | ---: |
| Prospective Equity Risk Premium | $\underline{7.08 \%}$ |
| Indicated Cost of Common Equity | $\underline{\underline{10.76 \%}}$ |

Q. What are the results of your application of the Prpm and the TOTAL MARKET APPROACH RPM?
A. As shown on page 1 of Exhibit__(DWD-1), Schedule 4, the indicated RPMderived common equity cost rate is $10.43 \%$, which gives equal weight to the PRPM $(10.09 \%)$ and the adjusted-market approach results ( $10.76 \%$ ).

[^7]
## C. The Capital Asset Pricing Model

Q. Please explain the theoretical basis of the CAPM.
A. CAPM theory defines risk as the co-variability of a security's returns with the market's returns as measured by the Beta coefficient ( $\beta$ ). A Beta coefficient less than 1.0 indicates lower variability than the market as a whole, while a Beta coefficient greater than 1.0 indicates greater variability than the market.

The CAPM assumes that all non-market or unsystematic risk can be eliminated through diversification. The risk that cannot be eliminated through diversification is called market, or systematic, risk. In addition, the CAPM presumes that investors only require compensation for systematic risk, which is the result of macroeconomic and other events that affect the returns on all assets. The model is applied by adding a risk-free rate of return to a market risk premium, which is adjusted proportionately to reflect the systematic risk of the individual security relative to the total market as measured by the Beta coefficient. The traditional CAPM model is expressed as:

$$
\begin{aligned}
& R_{s} \quad=\quad R_{f}+\beta\left(R_{m}-R_{f}\right) \\
& \text { Where: } \quad \mathrm{R}_{\mathrm{s}}=\text { Return rate on the common stock } \\
& \mathrm{R}_{\mathrm{f}}=\text { Risk-free rate of return } \\
& \mathrm{R}_{\mathrm{m}}=\text { Return rate on the market as a whole } \\
& \beta=\text { Adjusted Beta coefficient (volatility of the } \\
& \text { security relative to the market as a whole) }
\end{aligned}
$$

Numerous tests of the traditional CAPM have measured the extent to which security returns and Beta coefficients are related as predicted by the CAPM, confirming its validity. The empirical CAPM (ECAPM) reflects the reality that while the results of these tests support the notion that the Beta coefficient is related to security returns, the empirical Security Market Line (SML)
described by the CAPM formula is not as steeply sloped as the predicted SML. ${ }^{56}$

In their work on the CAPM, Fama and French clearly state regarding Figure 2, below, that " $[t]$ he returns on the low beta portfolios are too high, and the returns on the high beta portfolios are too low., ${ }^{57}$

## Figure 2 htpp//pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/pdfplus/10.125//0855330042162430

Average Annualized Monthly Return versus Beta for Value Weight Portfolios Formed on Prior Beta, 1928-2003


In addition, Morin observes that while the results of these tests support the notion that Beta is related to security returns, the empirical SML described by the CAPM formula is not as steeply sloped as the predicted SML. Morin states:

With few exceptions, the empirical studies agree that ... lowbeta securities earn returns somewhat higher than the CAPM

[^8]would predict, and high-beta securities earn less than predicted. ${ }^{58}$

Therefore, the empirical evidence suggests that the expected return on a security is related to its risk by the following approximation:

$$
\mathrm{K}=\mathrm{R}_{\mathrm{F}}+\mathrm{x}\left(\mathrm{R}_{\mathrm{M}}-\mathrm{R}_{\mathrm{F}}\right)+(1-\mathrm{x}) \beta\left(\mathrm{R}_{\mathrm{M}}-\mathrm{R}_{\mathrm{F}}\right)
$$

where x is a fraction to be determined empirically. The value of x that best explains the observed relationship [is] Return $=0.0829+0.0520 \beta$ is between 0.25 and 0.30 . If $\mathrm{x}=0.25$, the equation becomes:

$$
\mathrm{K}=\mathrm{R}_{\mathrm{F}}+0.25\left(\mathrm{R}_{\mathrm{M}}-\mathrm{R}_{\mathrm{F}}\right)+0.75 \beta\left(\mathrm{R}_{\mathrm{M}}-\mathrm{R}_{\mathrm{F}}\right)^{59}
$$

Fama and French provide similar support for the ECAPM when they state:
The early tests firmly reject the Sharpe-Lintner version of the CAPM. There is a positive relation between beta and average return, but it is too 'flat.'... The regressions consistently find that the intercept is greater than the average risk-free rate... and the coefficient on beta is less than the average excess market return... This is true in the early tests... as well as in more recent cross-section regressions tests, like Fama and French (1992). ${ }^{60}$

Finally, Fama and French further note:
Confirming earlier evidence, the relation between beta and average return for the ten portfolios is much flatter than the Sharpe-Linter CAPM predicts. The returns on low beta portfolios are too high, and the returns on the high beta portfolios are too low. For example, the predicted return on the portfolio with the lowest beta is 8.3 percent per year; the

[^9]actual return as 11.1 percent. The predicted return on the portfolio with the $t$ beta is 16.8 percent per year; the actual is 13.7 percent. ${ }^{61}$

Clearly, the justification from Morin, Fama, and French, along with their reviews of other academic research on the CAPM, validate the use of the ECAPM. In view of theory and practical research, I have applied both the traditional CAPM and the ECAPM to the companies in the Utility Proxy Group and averaged the results.
Q. What Beta coefficients did you use in your CAPM analysis?
A. For the Beta coefficients in my CAPM analysis, I considered two sources: Value Line and Bloomberg Professional Services. While both of those services adjust their calculated (or "raw") Beta coefficients to reflect the tendency of the Beta coefficient to regress to the market mean of 1.00 , Value Line calculates the Beta coefficient over a five-year period, while Bloomberg calculates it over a two-year period.
Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE YOUR SELECTION OF A RISK-FREE RATE OF RETURN.
A. As discussed previously, the risk-free rate adopted for both applications of the CAPM is $2.05 \%$. This risk-free rate is based on the average of the Blue Chip consensus forecast of the expected yields on 30-year U.S. Treasury bonds for the six quarters ending with the fourth calendar quarter of 2021, and longterm projections for the years 2022 to 2026 and 2027 to 2031.
Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN THE ESTIMATION OF THE EXPECTED RISK PREMIUM FOR THE MARKET USED IN YOUR CAPM ANALYSES.
A. The basis of the market risk premium is explained in detail in note 1 on Exhibit__(DWD-1), Schedule 5. As discussed above, the market risk premium is derived from an average of three historical data-based market risk premiums, two Value Line data-based market risk premiums, and one Bloomberg data-based market risk premium.

The long-term income return on U.S. Government securities of $5.09 \%$ was deducted from the SBBI - 2020 monthly historical total market return of $12.10 \%$, which results in an historical market equity risk premium of $7.01 \% .{ }^{62}$ I applied a linear OLS regression to the monthly annualized historical returns on the S\&P 500 relative to historical yields on long-term U.S. Government securities from SBBI-2020. That regression analysis yielded a market equity risk premium of $10.24 \%$. The PRPM market equity risk premium is $10.73 \%$, and is derived using the PRPM relative to the yields on long-term U.S. Treasury securities from January 1926 through August 2020.

The Value Line-derived forecasted total market equity risk premium is derived by deducting the forecasted risk-free rate of $2.05 \%$, discussed above, from the Value Line projected total annual market return of $14.45 \%$, resulting in a forecasted total market equity risk premium of $12.40 \%$. The S\&P 500 projected market equity risk premium using Value Line data is derived by subtracting the projected risk-free rate of $2.05 \%$ from the projected total
return of the S\&P 500 of $13.83 \%$. The resulting market equity risk premium is $11.78 \%$.

The S\&P 500 projected market equity risk premium using Bloomberg data is derived by subtracting the projected risk-free rate of $2.05 \%$ from the projected total return of the S\&P 500 of $13.78 \%$. The resulting market equity risk premium is $11.73 \%$. These six measures, when averaged, result in an average total market equity risk premium of $10.65 \%$.

Table 8

## Summary of the Calculation of the Market Risk Premium for Use in the CAPM $^{63}$

| Historical Spread Between Total Returns of <br> Large Stocks and Long-Term Government <br> Bond Yields (1926 - 2019) | $7.01 \%$ |
| :--- | :---: |
| Regression Analysis on Historical Data | $10.24 \%$ |
| PRPM Analysis on Historical Data | $10.73 \%$ |
| Prospective Equity Risk Premium Using Total <br>  <br> Index Less Projected 30-Year Treasury Bond <br> Yields | $12.40 \%$ |
| Prospective Equity Risk Premium Using <br> Measures of Capital Appreciation and Income <br> Returns from Value Line for the S\&P 500 Less <br> Projected 30-Year Treasury Bond Yields | $11.78 \%$ |
| Prospective Equity Risk Premium using <br> Measures of Capital Appreciation and Income <br> Returns from Bloomberg Professional <br> Services for the S\&P 500 less Projected 30- <br> Year Treasury Bond Yields | $\underline{11.73 \%}$ |
| Average | $\underline{10.65 \%}$ |

Q. What are the results of your application of the traditional and empirical CAPM to the Utility Proxy Group?
A. As shown on page 1 of Exhibit___(DWD-1), Schedule 5, the mean result of my CAPM/ECAPM analyses is $12.32 \%$, the median is $11.95 \%$, and the average of the two is $12.14 \%$. Consistent with my reliance on the average of mean and median DCF results discussed above, the indicated common equity cost rate using the CAPM/ECAPM is $12.14 \%$.

## D. Common Equity Cost Rates for a Proxy Group of Domestic, Non-Price Regulated Companies Based on the DCF, RPM, and CAPM

Q. Why do you also consider a proxy group of domestic, non-price REGULATED COMPANIES?
A. Although I am not an attorney, my interpretation of the Hope and Bluefield cases is that they did not specify that comparable risk companies had to be utilities. Since the purpose of rate regulation is to be a substitute for marketplace competition, non-price regulated firms operating in the competitive marketplace make an excellent proxy if they are comparable in total risk to the Utility Proxy Group being used to estimate the cost of common equity. The selection of such domestic, non-price regulated competitive firms theoretically and empirically results in a proxy group which is comparable in total risk to the Utility Proxy Group, since all of these companies compete for capital in the exact same markets.
Q. How Did you select non-price regulated companies that are comparable in total risk to the Utility Proxy Group?
A. In order to select a proxy group of domestic, non-price regulated companies similar in total risk to the Utility Proxy Group, I relied on the Beta coefficients and related statistics derived from Value Line regression analyses of weekly market prices over the most recent 260 weeks (i.e., five years). These selection criteria resulted in a proxy group of 47 domestic, non-price regulated firms comparable in total risk to the Utility Proxy Group. Total risk is the sum of non-diversifiable market risk and diversifiable company-specific risks. The criteria used in selecting the domestic, non-price regulated firms was:
(i) They must be covered by V alue Line (Standard Edition);
(ii) They must be domestic, non-price regulated companies, i.e., not utilities;
(iii) Their Beta coefficients must lie within plus or minus two standard deviations of the average unadjusted Beta coefficients of the Utility Proxy Group; and
(iv) The residual standard errors of the Value Line regressions which gave rise to the unadjusted Beta coefficients must lie within plus or minus two standard deviations of the average residual standard error of the Utility Proxy Group.

Beta coefficients measure market, or systematic, risk, which is not diversifiable. The residual standard errors of the regressions measure each firm's company-specific, diversifiable risk. Companies that have similar Beta coefficients and similar residual standard errors resulting from the same regression analyses have similar total investment risk.
Q. Have you prepared a schedule which shows the data from which YOU SELECTED THE 47 DOMESTIC, NON-PRICE REGULATED COMPANIES THAT are comparable in total risk to the Utility Proxy Group?
A. Yes, the basis of my selection and both proxy groups' regression statistics are shown in Exhibit___(DWD-1), Schedule 6.
Q. Did you calculate common equity cost rates using the DCF model, RPM, and CAPM for the Non-Price Regulated Proxy Group?
A. Yes. Because the DCF model, RPM, and CAPM have been applied in an identical manner as described above, I will not repeat the details of the
rationale and application of each model. One exception is in the application of the RPM, where I did not use public utility-specific equity risk premiums, nor did I apply the PRPM to the individual non-price regulated companies.

Pages 2 and 3 of Exhibit__(DWD-1), Schedule 7 applies the Constant Growth and Two Growth DCF models to the Non-Price Regulated Proxy Group. As shown, the indicated common equity cost rates are $11.95 \%$ and $11.87 \%$, respectively, averaging $11.91 \%$.

Pages 4 through 6 of Exhibit___(DWD-1), Schedule 7 contain the data and calculations that support the $12.68 \%$ RPM common equity cost rate. As shown on line 1, page 3 of Exhibit__(DWD-1), Schedule 7, the consensus prospective yield on Moody's Baa-rated corporate bonds for the six quarters ending in the fourth quarter of 2021, and for the years 2022 to 2026 and 2027 to 2031 , is $4.10 \% .{ }^{64}$ Since the Non-Price Regulated Proxy Group has an average Moody's long-term issuer rating of Baa1, a downward adjustment of $0.20 \%$ to the projected Baa2 rated corporate bond yield is necessary to reflect the difference in ratings which results in a projected Baa1-rated corporate bond yield of $3.90 \%$.

When the Beta-adjusted risk premium of $8.78 \%{ }^{65}$ relative to the Non-Price Regulated Proxy Group is added to the prospective A3-rated corporate bond yield of $3.90 \%$, the indicated RPM common equity cost rate is $12.68 \%$.

[^10]Page 6 of Exhibit___(DWD-1), Schedule 7 contains the inputs and calculations that support my indicated CAPM/ECAPM common equity cost rate of $11.83 \%$.
Q. How is the cost rate of common equity based on the Non-Price Regulated Proxy Group comparable in total risk to the Utility Proxy Group?
A. As shown on page 1 of Exhibit___(DWD-1), Schedule 7, the results of the common equity models applied to the Non-Price Regulated Proxy Group -which is comparable in total risk to the Utility Proxy Group -- are as follows: $11.91 \%$ (DCF), $12.68 \%$ (RPM), and $11.83 \%$ (CAPM). The average of the mean and median of these models is $12.03 \%$, which I used as the indicated common equity cost rates for the Non-Price Regulated Proxy Group.

## VII. CONCLUSION OF COMMON EQUITY COST ANALYTICAL RESULTS BEFORE ADJUSTMENTS

Q. BaSEd on your analyses, what is the indicated common equity cost RATE BEFORE ADJUSTMENTS?
A. By applying multiple cost of common equity models to the Utility Proxy Group and the Non-Price Regulated Proxy Group, the indicated range of common equity cost rates attributable to the Utility Proxy Group before any relative risk adjustments is between $9.73 \%$ and $10.83 \%$. I used multiple cost of common equity models as primary tools in arriving at my recommended common equity cost rate, because each of these models is theoretically sound and available to investors and because no single model is so inherently precise that it can be relied on to the exclusion of other theoretically sound models.

Using multiple models adds reliability to the estimated common equity cost rate, with the prudence of using multiple cost of common equity models supported in both the financial literature and regulatory precedent.

Based on these common equity cost results, I conclude that a range of common equity cost rates between $9.77 \%$ and $10.83 \%$ is reasonable and appropriate before any adjustments for relative risk differences between the Company and the Utility Proxy Group are made. The bottom of the indicated range (i.e., $9.77 \%$ ) was calculated by averaging the average of all model results $(10.83 \%)$ with the lowest model result $(8.72 \%)$, and the top of the indicated range is the approximate average of all model results. I have chosen this indicated range of common equity cost rates applicable to the Utility Proxy Group as a conservative estimate of the required return on equity.
Q. WhY Did you use the midpoint between your average model result and your lowest model result as the bottom of your indicated REASONABLE RANGE BEFORE ADJUSTMENT?
A. As explained in detail in Section IX below, the COVID-19 pandemic has created turmoil in the markets. Key takeaways include:

- The full impact and duration of the COVID-19 pandemic are unknown, and outcomes are still highly uncertain;
- This uncertainty increases volatility. Volatility increases the chances of investment losses. As a result, investors flee to bonds to limit their investment losses, which is known as "the flight to safety." Increased levels of bond purchases increase their price, and drive down their yields, i.e., interest rates. Because of this, the current low-interest rate environment is due to increased
volatility in the market, and not a steady lowering of the cost of debt over time; and
- The same increased market volatility that caused investors' "flight to safety" also created a situation where utilities are traded similar to the S\&P 500. These correlated returns of utility stocks and market indices increase Beta coefficients (a measure of risk), and by extension, investor-required returns.

While the current volatility and uncertainty could justify a higher return on equity, my recommendation to use the lower end of the range of my results for my Utility Proxy Group reasonable range is designed to provide a conservative estimate of the Company's required return.

## VIII. ADJUSTMENTS TO THE COMMON EQUITY COST RATE

## A. Size Adjustment

Q. Does the Company's smaller size relative to the Utility Proxy Group Companies increase its business risk?
A. Yes. As a preliminary matter, because I have developed my cost of common equity recommendation for the Company's Minnesota operations based on market data applied to the Utility Proxy Group of risk-comparable companies, in order to assess the Company's risk associated with its relative small size of its Minnesota operations, it is necessary to compare the Company's Minnesota-jurisdictional size relative to the Utility Proxy Group. The Company's smaller size relative to the Utility Proxy Group companies indicates greater relative business risk for the Company because, all else being equal, size has a material bearing on risk.

Size affects business risk because smaller companies generally are less able to cope with significant events that affect sales, revenues and earnings. For example, smaller companies face more risk exposure to business cycles and economic conditions, both nationally and locally. Additionally, the loss of revenues from a few larger customers would have a greater effect on a small company than on a bigger company with a larger, more diverse, customer base. This is true for utilities, as well as for non-regulated companies.

As further evidence that smaller firms are riskier, investors generally demand greater returns from smaller firms to compensate for less marketability and liquidity of their securities. Duff \& Phelps' 2020 Valuation Handbook - U.S. Guide to Cost of Capital (D\&P - 2020) discusses the nature of the small-size phenomenon, providing an indication of the magnitude of the size premium based on several measures of size. In discussing "Size as a Predictor of Equity Returns," D\&P - 2020 states:

> The size effect is based on the empirical observation that companies of smaller size are associated with greater risk and, therefore, have greater cost of capital [sic]. The "size" of a company is one of the most important risk elements to consider when developing cost of equity capital estimates for use in valuing a business simply because size has been shown to be a predictor of equity returns. In other words, there is a significant (negative) relationship between size and historical equity returns - as size decreases, returns tend to increase, and vice versa. (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original)

Furthermore, in "The Capital Asset Pricing Model: Theory and Evidence," Fama and French note size is indeed a risk factor which must be reflected when estimating the cost of common equity. On page 14, they note:
. . . the higher average returns on small stocks and high book-to-market stocks reflect unidentified state variables that produce undiversifiable risks (covariances) in returns not captured in the market return and are priced separately from market betas. ${ }^{67}$

Based on this evidence, Fama and French proposed their three-factor model which includes a size variable in recognition of the effect size has on the cost of common equity.

Also, it is a basic financial principle that the use of funds invested, and not the source of funds, is what gives rise to the risk of any investment. ${ }^{68}$ Eugene Brigham, a well-known authority, states:

> A number of researchers have observed that portfolios of small-firms (sic) have earned consistently higher average returns than those of large-firm stocks; this is called the "small-firm effect." On the surface, it would seem to be advantageous to the small firms to provide average returns in a stock market that are higher than those of larger firms. In reality, it is bad news for the small firm; what the small-firm effect means is that the capital market demands higher returns on stocks of small firms than on otherwise similar stocks of the large firms. (emphasis added) ${ }^{69}$

[^11]Consistent with the financial principle of risk and return discussed above, increased relative risk due to small size must be considered in the allowed rate of return on common equity. Therefore, the Commission's authorization of a cost rate of common equity in this proceeding must appropriately reflect the unique risks of the Company, including its small relative size to the Utility Proxy Group, which is justified and supported above by evidence in the financial literature.
Q. Earlier you explained that credit ratings can act as a proxy for a FIRM's COMBINED business and financial risks to equity owners. Do Rating agencies account for company size in their bond ratings?
A. No. Neither S\&P nor Moody's have minimum company size requirements for any given rating level. This means, all else equal, a relative size analysis must be conducted for equity investments in companies with similar bond ratings.
Q. Is there a way to quantify a relative risk adjustment due to the Company's small size when compared to the Utility Proxy Group?
A. Yes. The Company has greater relative risk than the average utility in the Utility Proxy Group because of its smaller size, as measured by an estimated market capitalization of common equity for the Company's Minnesota operations.

Table 9

## Size as Measured by Market Capitalization for NSPM's Electric Operations and the Utility Proxy Group

|  | Market <br> Capitalization* <br> (\$ Millions) | Times <br> Greater than <br> The <br> Company |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| NSPM MN Jurisdictional | $\$ 10,362$ |  |
| Utility Proxy Group | $\$ 14,144$ | 1.4 x |
| *From page 1 of Exhibit___(DWD-1), Schedule 8. |  |  |

The Company's estimated market capitalization for its Minnesota operations was $\$ 10,362$ million as of August 31, 2020, compared with the market capitalization of the average company in the Utility Proxy Group of $\$ 14,144$ million as of August 31, 2020. The average company in the Utility Proxy Group has a market capitalization 1.4 times the size of the Company's estimated Minnesota-based market capitalization.

As a result, it is necessary to upwardly adjust the indicated range of common equity cost rates attributable to the Utility Proxy Group to reflect the Company's greater risk due to their smaller relative size. The determination is based on the size premiums for portfolios of the New York Stock Exchange, American Stock Exchange, and NASDAQ listed companies ranked by deciles for the 1926 to 2019 period. ${ }^{70}$ The average size premium for the Utility Proxy Group with a market capitalization of $\$ 14,144$ million falls in the $2^{\text {nd }}$ decile, while the Company's estimated market capitalization of $\$ 10,362$ million places it in the $3^{\text {rd }}$ decile. The size premium spread between the $2^{\text {nd }}$ decile and the
$3^{\text {rd }}$ decile is $0.23 \% .^{71}$ Even though a $0.23 \%$ upward size adjustment is indicated, I applied a size premium of $0.05 \%$ to the Company's indicated common equity cost rate in order to be conservative.
Q. Since the Company is part of a larger company, why is the size of XEI NOT MORE APPROPRIATE TO USE WHEN DETERMINING THE SIZE ADJUSTMENT?
A. The return derived in this proceeding will not apply to XEI's operations as a whole, but only to the Company's Minnesota operations. XEI is the sum of its constituent parts, including those constituent parts' ROEs. Potential investors in the Parent are aware that it is a combination of operations in each state, and that each state's operations experience the operating risks specific to their jurisdiction. The market's expectation of XEI's return is commensurate with the realities of the Company's composite operations in each of the states in which it operates.
Q. Should the company be compared with other operating electric utilities in Minnesota to determine any adjustment to the proxy Group-DERIVED ROE?
A. No, it shouldn't. Since the indicated ROE is determined using the market data of the Utility Proxy Group, any type of adjustment to the indicated ROE must reflect relative differences between the Company and the Utility Proxy Group. Since this is the case, the relative size of other Minnesota utilities is not relevant to determining the ROE for the Company.

## B. Credit Risk Adjustment

Q. Please discuss your proposed credit risk adjustment.
A. NSPM's long-term issuer ratings are A2 and A- from Moody's Investors Services and S\&P, respectively, which are slightly less risky than the average long-term issuer ratings for the Utility Proxy Group of A3 and BBB+, respectively. ${ }^{72}$ Hence, a downward credit risk adjustment is necessary to reflect the higher credit rating, i.e., A2, of the Company relative to the A3 average Moody's bond rating of the Utility Proxy Group. ${ }^{73}$

An indication of the magnitude of the necessary downward adjustment to reflect the lower credit risk inherent in an A2 bond rating is one-third of a recent three-month average spread between Moody's Baa and A-rated public utility bond yields of $0.35 \%$, shown on page 4 of Exhibit__(DWD-1), Schedule 4, or $0.12 \% .^{74}$

## C. Flotation Costs

## Q. What are flotation costs?

A. Flotation costs are those costs associated with the sale of new issuances of common stock. They include market pressure and the mandatory unavoidable costs of issuance (e.g., underwriting fees and out-of-pocket costs for printing, legal, registration, etc.). For every dollar raised through debt or equity offerings, the Company receives less than one full dollar in financing.
$740.17 \%=0.50 \%$ * (1/3). Moody's does not provide public utility bond yields for A3-rated bonds. As such, it was necessary to estimate the difference between A2-rated and A3-rated public utility bonds. Because there are three steps between Baa2 and A2 (Baa2 to Baa1, Baa1 to A3, and A3 to A2) I assumed an adjustment of one-third of the difference between the A2-rated and Baa2-rated public utility bond yield was appropriate.
Q. Why is IT IMPORTANT TO RECOGNIZE FLOTATION COSTS IN THE ALLOWED COMMON EQUITY COST RATE?
A. It is important because there is no other mechanism in the ratemaking paradigm through which such costs can be recognized and recovered. Because these costs are real, necessary, and legitimate, recovery of these costs should be permitted. As noted by Dr. Roger Morin:

The costs of issuing these securities are just as real as operating and maintenance expenses or costs incurred to build utility plants, and fair regulatory treatment must permit recovery of these costs....

The simple fact of the matter is that common equity capital is not free....[Flotation costs] must be recovered through a rate of return adjustment. ${ }^{75}$
Q. Do The common equity cost rate models you have used already REFLECT INVESTORS' ANTICIPATION OF FLOTATION COSTS?
A. No. All of these models assume no transaction costs. The literature is quite clear that these costs are not reflected in the market prices paid for common stocks. For example, Brigham and Daves confirm this and provide the methodology utilized to calculate the flotation adjustment. ${ }^{76}$ In addition, Morin confirms the need for such an adjustment even when no new equity issuance is imminent. ${ }^{77}$ Consequently, it is proper to include a flotation cost adjustment when using cost of common equity models to estimate the common equity cost rate.

[^12]Q. How Did your calculate the flotation cost allowance?
A. I modified the DCF calculation to provide a dividend yield that would reimburse investors for issuance costs in accordance with the method cited in literature by Brigham and Daves, as well as by Morin. The flotation cost adjustment recognizes the actual costs of issuing equity that were incurred by XEI in its equity issuances during fiscal years 2010, 2018, and 2019. Based on the issuance costs shown in Schedule 21 of Ms. Sarah W. Soong's direct testimony, an adjustment of $0.15 \%$ is required to reflect the flotation costs applicable to the Utility Proxy Group. ${ }^{78}$
Q. WHAT IS THE INDICATED COST OF COMMON EQUITY AFTER YOUR COMPANYSPECIFIC ADJUSTMENTS?
A. Applying the $0.05 \%$ size adjustment, the $-0.12 \%$ credit risk adjustment, and the $0.15 \%$ flotation cost adjustment to the indicated range of common equity cost rates between $9.77 \%$ and $10.83 \%$ results in a Company-specific range of common equity rates between $9.85 \%$ and $10.91 \%$. In consideration of both of these indicated ranges, I recommend an ROE of $10.20 \%$ for NSPM in this proceeding.

## IX. CAPITAL MARKET CONDITIONS

Q. Do economic conditions influence the required Cost of Capital AND REQUIRED RETURN ON COMMON EQUITY?
A. Yes. The models used to estimate the Cost of Equity are meant to reflect, and therefore are influenced by, current and expected capital market conditions.

Therefore, it is important to assess the reasonableness of any financial model's results in the context of observable market data.
Q. Please summarize the recent capital market environment.
A. It is well recognized that there have been dramatic shifts in the capital markets brought about by COVID-19. The Federal Reserve and the U.S. government have implemented multiple policies to address the financial market and economic instability.

Although government and central bank actions have stabilized the capital markets somewhat, as explained in more detail below, volatility (and, therefore, risk) remains elevated for the utility sector, which has important implications on the ROE.
Q. How do significant and abrupt increases in volatility affect INTEREST RATES?
A. Significant and abrupt increases in volatility tend to be associated with declines in Treasury yields. That relationship makes intuitive sense; as volatility (i.e., risk) increases, investors will seek to avoid a capital loss by investing in Treasury securities in a "flight to safety." Because Treasury yields are inversely related to Treasury bond prices, as investors bid up the prices of bonds, they bid down the yields. As Chart 3 below demonstrates, decreases in the 30 -year Treasury yield are coincident with significant increases in the VIX. ${ }^{79}$ In those instances, the fall in yields does not reflect a reduction in required returns, it

79 The VIX is a calculation designed to produce a measure of constant, 30 -day expected volatility of the U.S. stock market, derived from real-time, mid-quote prices of S\&P 500 Index call and put options. Source: www.cboe.com/vix.
reflects an increase in risk aversion and, therefore, an increase in required equity returns.

Chart 3
30-Year Treasury Yields vs. VIX ${ }^{80}$

Q. Has market volatility increased in recent months?
A. Yes, it has. A visible and widely reported measure of expected volatility is the VIX. Because volatility is a measure of risk, increases in the VIX, or in its volatility, are a broad indicator of expected increases in market risk. That is, if the level of the VIX was 15.00, it would be interpreted as an expected standard deviation in annual market returns of $15.00 \%$ over the coming 30 days. Since 1990, the VIX has averaged about 19.39, which is consistent with the long-term standard deviation on annual market returns as reported by Duff \& Phelps. ${ }^{81}$ From February 1, 2020 to August 31, 2020, the VIX

[^13]averaged 33.24 , or more than $71.00 \%$ above its long term average. ${ }^{82}$ In other words, since the COVID-19 pandemic began, market volatility has been, on average, $71.00 \%$ higher than the market's long-term average volatility.
Q. Is mARKET VOLATILITY EXPECTED TO REMAIN ELEVATED IN THE NEAR TERM?
A. Yes. One means of assessing market expectations regarding the future level of volatility is to review CBOE's "Term Structure of Volatility", which is described by CBOE as:

The implied volatility term structure observed in SPX options markets is analogous to the term structure of interest rates observed in fixed income markets. Similar to the calculation of forward rates of interest, it is possible to observe the option market's expectation of future market volatility through use of the SPX implied volatility term structure. ${ }^{83}$

As shown in Table 10, the implied volatility is expected to remain approximately $50 \%$ above historical volatility ${ }^{84}$ until at least December 2021.

84 The long-term average price of VIX is approximately 19.00, which is similar to the long-term standard deviation of market returns.

Table 10
CBOE Term Structure of Volatility ${ }^{85}$

| Date | Projected <br> VIX |
| :---: | :---: |
| September 2020 | 24.43 |
| October 2020 | 27.66 |
| November 2020 | 31.38 |
| December 2020 | 32.29 |
| January 2021 | 32.40 |
| February 2021 | 31.41 |
| March 2021 | 33.04 |
| June 2021 | 32.88 |
| September 2021 | 34.58 |
| December 2021 | 30.93 |

As discussed above, investors reacted to the increase in market uncertainty associated with COVID-19 by moving away from equity securities (including utilities) to Treasury securities, pushing down long-term Treasury yields. Both long-term Treasury and utility bond yields have been extremely volatile, as shown on Charts 4 and 5, below, as seen in its Coefficient of Variation (CoV): ${ }^{86}$

## Chart 4

Coefficient of Variation in 30-Year Treasury Yields ${ }^{87}$


## Chart 5

Coefficient of Variation in A-Rated Public Utility Bonds ${ }^{88}$


In view of all of the above, current levels of interest rates are the result of a volatility-driven "flight to safety" on the part of investors, which indicates increased risk aversion, and thus, an increased investor-required return.
Q. In addition to affecting treasury bonds, how else does increased MARKET VOLATILITY AFFECT A UTILITY INVESTOR'S REQUIRED RETURN?
A. Increased market volatility increases both utility stock volatility and those stocks' correlation to the overall market. Increases in both measures would likewise increase the required return for utility investors.
Q. Have the relationships between utilities and market indices CHANGED DUE TO THE CURRENT VOLATILE MARKET CONDITIONS?
A. Yes, they have. To determine the relationships between utilities and market indices, I have calculated the correlation coefficients of the price changes of several groups of utilities relative to the S\&P 500 and the Dow Jones Industrial Average ("DJIA") from February 1, 2020 to August 31, 2020. Specifically, I calculated correlation coefficients for the following relationships:

- The price changes of the S\&P 500 relative to the price changes of the Utility Proxy Group;
- The price changes of the S\&P 500 relative to the price changes of the Dow Jones Utility Average ("DJU");
- The price changes of the S\&P 500 relative to the price changes of the Utilities Select SPDR ("XLU");
- The price changes of the DJIA relative to the price changes of Utility Proxy Group;
- The price changes of the DJIA relative to the price changes of
the DJU; and
- The price changes of the DJIA relative to the price changes of the XLU.

Table 11 provides the results of the calculations:

## Calculation of Correlation Coefficients for Utility Groups Relative to

 Market Indices from February 2020 through August $2020^{89}$| Group | S\&P 500 | DJIA |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| Utility Proxy Group | $84.90 \%$ | $84.08 \%$ |
| DJU | $84.42 \%$ | $83.45 \%$ |
| XLU | $84.74 \%$ | $83.39 \%$ |

As shown on Table 11, utility stocks have been trading in tandem with market indices during the current market dislocation. The behavior of utility stocks to move in tandem with the market during periods of extreme volatility is not limited to the current period. During the Great Recession (December 2007 to June 2009), correlations between these same groups were similar, as shown on Table 12, below:

## Table 12

Calculation of Correlation Coefficients for Utility Groups Relative to Market Indices from December 2007 to June 200990

| Group | S\&P 500 | DJIA |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| Utility Proxy Group | $80.31 \%$ | $81.56 \%$ |
| DJU | $81.57 \%$ | $82.13 \%$ |
| XLU | $78.36 \%$ | $78.59 \%$ |

That increasing correlation is not surprising. As Morningstar recently explained, during volatile markets there often is little distinction in returns across assets or portfolios. That is, "correlations go to 1. ." ${ }^{11}$ When that happens, utility stocks lose their "defensive" quality.
Q. What do stronger correlations between utility stocks and the MARKET IMPLY FOR THE INVESTOR-REQUIRED RETURN?
A. A direct consequence of stronger correlations is higher Beta coefficients. As shown in Chart 6 below, as the Coronavirus threat became apparent, the twoyear ${ }^{92}$ and five-year ${ }^{93}$ correlation coefficients between the price changes in the S\&P 500 and price changes in the Utility Proxy Group from February 2020 through August 2020 increased dramatically. As shown on Chart 6, the correlation coefficients increased from approximately 0.15 to approximately 0.70 (two-year horizon) and from approximately 0.19 to approximately 0.52 (five-year horizon).

[^14]
## Chart 6

## Two-Year and Five-Year Correlation Coefficients for the Utility Proxy Group Relative to the S\&P 500 ${ }^{94}$



The increase in volatility (i.e., risk), as explained above, in combination with the increased correlation between the Utility Proxy Group and market indices ultimately leads to higher Beta coefficients. In short, during a period of heightened and possibly prolonged market uncertainty, observable market information makes clear that utility investors now face greater risks and require higher returns.

## X. CONCLUSION

## Q. What is you recommended ROE For the Company?

A. Given the discussion above and the results from the analyses, I recommend that an ROE of $10.20 \%$ is appropriate for the Company at this time.

1 Q. In YOUR OPINION, IS YOUR PROPOSED ROE OF 10.20\% FAIR AND REASONABLE TO NSPM AND ITS CUSTOMERS?
A. Yes, it is.
Q. In your opinion, is NSPM's proposed capital structure fair and REASONABLE?
A. Yes, it is.
Q. Does this concludes your Direct Testimony?
A. Yes, it does.

## Appendix A - Resume \& Testimony Listing of: <br> Dylan W. D'Ascendis, CRRA, CVA <br> Director

## Summary

Dylan is an experienced consultant and a Certified Rate of Return Analyst (CRRA) and Certified Valuation Analyst (CVA). He has served as a consultant for investor-owned and municipal utilities and authorities for 12 years. Dylan has extensive experience in rate of return analyses, class cost of service, rate design, and valuation for regulated public utilities. He has testified as an expert witness in the subjects of rate of return, cost of service, rate design, and valuation before 23 regulatory commissions in the U.S., one Canadian province, and an American Arbitration Association panel.

He also maintains the benchmark index against which the Hennessy Gas Utility Mutual Fund performance is measured.

## Areas of Specialization

| Regulation and Rates | Financial Modeling | Rate of Return |  |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Utilities | Valuation | Cost of Service |  |
| Mutual Fund Benchmarking | Regulatory Strategy | Rate Design |  |
| Capital Market Risk | Rate Case Support |  |  |

## Recent Expert Testimony Submission/Appearances

## Jurisdiction

- Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities
- New Jersey Board of Public Utilities
- Hawaii Public Utilities Commission
- South Carolina Public Service Commission
- American Arbitration Association


## Topic

Rate of Return
Rate of Return
Cost of Service, Rate Design
Return on Common Equity Valuation

## Recent Assignments

- Provided expert testimony on the cost of capital for ratemaking purposes before numerous state utility regulatory agencies
- Maintains the benchmark index against which the Hennessy Gas Utility Mutual Fund performance is measured
- Sponsored valuation testimony for a large municipal water company in front of an American Arbitration Association Board to justify the reasonability of their lease payments to the City
- Co-authored a valuation report on behalf of a large investor-owned utility company in response to a new state regulation which allowed the appraised value of acquired assets into rate base


## Recent Publications and Speeches

- Co-Author of: "Decoupling, Risk Impacts and the Cost of Capital", co-authored with Richard A. Michelfelder, Ph.D., Rutgers University and Pauline M. Ahern. The Electricity Journal, March, 2020.
- Co-Author of: "Decoupling Impact and Public Utility Conservation Investment", co-authored with Richard A. Michelfelder, Ph.D., Rutgers University and Pauline M. Ahern. Energy Policy Journal, 130 (2019), 311-319.
- "Establishing Alternative Proxy Groups", before the Society of Utility and Regulatory Financial Analysts: 51st Financial Forum, April 4, 2019, New Orleans, LA.
- "Past is Prologue: Future Test Year", Presentation before the National Association of Water Companies 2017 Southeast Water Infrastructure Summit, May 2, 2017, Savannah, GA.
- Co-author of: "Comparative Evaluation of the Predictive Risk Premium Model ${ }^{\text {TM }}$, the Discounted Cash Flow Model and the Capital Asset Pricing Model", co-authored with Richard A. Michelfelder, Ph.D., Rutgers University, Pauline M. Ahern, and Frank J. Hanley, The Electricity Journal, May, 2013.
- "Decoupling: Impact on the Risk and Cost of Common Equity of Public Utility Stocks", before the Society of Utility and Regulatory Financial Analysts: 45th Financial Forum, April 17-18, 2013, Indianapolis, IN.

| Sponsor | Date | CASE/APPLICANT | Docket No. | Subject |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Regulatory Commission of Alaska |  |  |  |  |
| Alaska Power Company | 09/20 | Alaska Power Company; Goat Lake Hydro, Inc.; BBL Hydro, Inc. | Tariff Nos. TA886-2; TA6-521; TA4-573 | Capital Structure |
| Alaska Power Company | 07/16 | Alaska Power Company | Docket No. TA857-2 | Rate of Return |
| Alberta Utilities Commission |  |  |  |  |
| AltaLink, L.P., and EPCOR Distribution \& Transmission, Inc. | 01/20 | AltaLink, L.P., and EPCOR Distribution \& Transmission, Inc. | 2021 Generic Cost of Capital, Proceeding ID. 24110 | Rate of Return |
| Arizona Corporation Commission |  |  |  |  |
| EPCOR Water Arizona, Inc. | 06/20 | EPCOR Water Arizona, Inc. | Docket No. WS-01303A-200177 | Rate of Return |
| Arizona Water Company | 12/19 | Arizona Water Company - Western Group | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { Docket No. W-01445A-19- } \\ & 0278 \end{aligned}$ | Rate of Return |
| Arizona Water Company | 08/18 | Arizona Water Company - Northern Group | Docket No. W-01445A-180164 | Rate of Return |
| Colorado Public Utilities Commission |  |  |  |  |
| Summit Utilities, Inc. | 04/18 | Colorado Natural Gas Company | Docket No. 18AL-0305G | Rate of Return |
| Atmos Energy Corporation | 06/17 | Atmos Energy Corporation | Docket No. 17AL-0429G | Rate of Return |
| Delaware Public Service Commission |  |  |  |  |
| Tidewater Utilities, Inc. | 11/13 | Tidewater Utilities, Inc. | Docket No. 13-466 | Capital Structure |
| Public Service Commission of the District of Columbia |  |  |  |  |
| Washington Gas Light Company | 09/20 | Washington Gas Light Company | Formal Case No. 1162 | Rate of Return |
| Florida Public Service Commission |  |  |  |  |
| Peoples Gas System | 09/20 | Peoples Gas System | Docket No. 20200051-GU | Rate of Return |
| Utilities, Inc. of Florida | 06/20 | Utilities, Inc. of Florida | Docket No. 20200139-WS | Rate of Return |
| Hawaii Public Utilities Commission |  |  |  |  |
| Lanai Water Company, Inc. | 12/19 | Lanai Water Company, Inc. | Docket No. 2019-0386 | Cost of Service / Rate Design |
| Manele Water Resources, LLC | 08/19 | Manele Water Resources, LLC | Docket No. 2019-0311 | Cost of Service / Rate Design |
| Kaupulehu Water Company | 02/18 | Kaupulehu Water Company | Docket No. 2016-0363 | Rate of Return |
| Aqua Engineers, LLC | 05/17 | Puhi Sewer \& Water Company | Docket No. 2017-0118 | Cost of Service / Rate Design |
| Hawaii Resources, Inc. | 09/16 | Laie Water Company | Docket No. 2016-0229 | Cost of Service / Rate Design |
| Illinois Commerce Commission |  |  |  |  |
| Ameren Illinois Company d/b/a Ameren Illinois | 07/20 | Ameren Illinois Company d/b/a Ameren Illinois | Docket No. 20-0308 | Return on Equity |
| Utility Services of Illinois, Inc. | 11/17 | Utility Services of Illinois, Inc. | Docket No. 17-1106 | Cost of Service / Rate Design |
| Aqua Illinois, Inc. | 04/17 | Aqua llinois, Inc. | Docket No. 17-0259 | Rate of Return |
| Utility Services of Illinois, Inc. | 04/15 | Utility Services of Illinois, Inc. | Docket No. 14-0741 | Rate of Return |
| Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission |  |  |  |  |


| SPONSOR | Date | CASE/APPLICANT | Docket No. | SubJect |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Aqua Indiana, Inc. | 03/16 | Aqua Indiana, Inc. Aboite Wastewater Division | Docket No. 44752 | Rate of Return |
| Twin Lakes, Utilities, Inc. | 08/13 | Twin Lakes, Utilities, Inc. | Docket No. 44388 | Rate of Return |
| Kansas Corporation Commission |  |  |  |  |
| Atmos Energy | 07/19 | Atmos Energy | 19-ATMG-525-RTS | Rate of Return |
| Louisiana Public Service Commission |  |  |  |  |
| Atmos Energy | 04/20 | Atmos Energy | Docket No. U-35535 | Rate of Return |
| Louisiana Water Service, Inc. | 06/13 | Louisiana Water Service, Inc. | Docket No. U-32848 | Rate of Return |
| Maryland Public Service Commission |  |  |  |  |
| Washington Gas Light Company | 08/20 | Washington Gas Light Company | Case No. 9651 | Rate of Return |
| FirstEnergy, Inc. | 08/18 | Potomac Edison Company | Case No. 9490 | Rate of Return |
| Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities |  |  |  |  |
| Unitil Corporation | 12/19 | Fitchburg Gas \& Electric Co. (Elec.) | D.P.U. 19-130 | Rate of Return |
| Unitil Corporation | 12/19 | Fitchburg Gas \& Electric Co. (Gas) | D.P.U. 19-131 | Rate of Return |
| Liberty Utilities | 07/15 | Liberty Utilities d/b/a New England Natural Gas Company | Docket No. 15-75 | Rate of Return |
| Mississippi Public Service Commission |  |  |  |  |
| Atmos Energy | 03/19 | Atmos Energy | Docket No. 2015-UN-049 | Capital Structure |
| Atmos Energy | 07/18 | Atmos Energy | Docket No. 2015-UN-049 | Capital Structure |
| Missouri Public Service Commission |  |  |  |  |
| Indian Hills Utility Operating Company, Inc. | 10/17 | Indian Hills Utility Operating Company, Inc. | Case No. SR-2017-0259 | Rate of Return |
| Raccoon Creek Utility Operating Company, Inc. | 09/16 | Raccoon Creek Utility Operating Company, Inc. | Docket No. SR-2016-0202 | Rate of Return |
| Public Utilities Commission of Nevada |  |  |  |  |
| Southwest Gas Corporation | 08/20 | Southwest Gas Corporation | Docket No. 20-02023 | Return on Equity |
| New Jersey Board of Public Utilities |  |  |  |  |
| FirstEnergy | 02/20 | Jersey Central Power \& Light Co. | Docket No. ER20020146 | Rate of Return |
| Aqua New Jersey, Inc. | 12/18 | Aqua New Jersey, Inc. | Docket No. WR18121351 | Rate of Return |
| Middlesex Water Company | 10/17 | Middlesex Water Company | Docket No. WR17101049 | Rate of Return |
| Middlesex Water Company | 03/15 | Middlesex Water Company | Docket No. WR15030391 | Rate of Return |
| The Atlantic City Sewerage Company | 10/14 | The Atlantic City Sewerage Company | Docket No. WR14101263 | Cost of Service / Rate Design |
| Middlesex Water Company | 11/13 | Middlesex Water Company | Docket No. WR1311059 | Capital Structure |
| North Carolina Utilities Commission |  |  |  |  |
| Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC | 07/20 | Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC | Docket No. E-7, Sub 1214 | Return on Equity |
| Duke Energy Progress, LLC | 07/20 | Duke Energy Progress, LLC | Docket No. E-2, Sub 1219 | Return on Equity |
| Aqua North Carolina, Inc. | 12/19 | Aqua North Carolina, Inc. | Docket No. W-218 Sub 526 | Rate of Return |
| Carolina Water Service, Inc. | 06/19 | Carolina Water Service, Inc. | Docket No. W-354 Sub 364 | Rate of Return |
| Carolina Water Service, Inc. | 09/18 | Carolina Water Service, Inc. | Docket No. W-354 Sub 360 | Rate of Return |
| Aqua North Carolina, Inc. | 07/18 | Aqua North Carolina, Inc. | Docket No. W-218 Sub 497 | Rate of Return |


| SpONSOR | Date | Case/Applicant | Docket No. | SubJect |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Public Utilities Commission of Ohio |  |  |  |  |
| Aqua Ohio, Inc. | 05/16 | Aqua Ohio, Inc. | Docket No. 16-0907-WW-AIR | Rate of Return |
| Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission |  |  |  |  |
| Valley Energy, Inc. | 07/19 | C\&T Enterprises | Docket No. R-2019-3008209 | Rate of Return |
| Wellsboro Electric Company | 07/19 | C\&T Enterprises | Docket No. R-2019-3008208 | Rate of Return |
| Citizens' Electric Company of Lewisburg | 07/19 | C\&T Enterprises | Docket No. R-2019-3008212 | Rate of Return |
| Steelton Borough Authority | 01/19 | Steelton Borough Authority | Docket No. A-2019-3006880 | Valuation |
| Mahoning Township, PA | 08/18 | Mahoning Township, PA | Docket No. A-2018-3003519 | Valuation |
| SUEZ Water Pennsylvania Inc. | 04/18 | SUEZ Water Pennsylvania Inc. | Docket No. R-2018-000834 | Rate of Return |
| Columbia Water Company | 09/17 | Columbia Water Company | Docket No. R-2017-2598203 | Rate of Return |
| Veolia Energy Philadelphia, Inc. | 06/17 | Veolia Energy Philadelphia, Inc. | Docket No. R-2017-2593142 | Rate of Return |
| Emporium Water Company | 07/14 | Emporium Water Company | Docket No. R-2014-2402324 | Rate of Return |
| Columbia Water Company | 07/13 | Columbia Water Company | Docket No. R-2013-2360798 | Rate of Return |
| Penn Estates Utilities, Inc. | 12/11 | Penn Estates, Utilities, Inc. | Docket No. R-2011-2255159 | Capital Structure / Long-Term Debt Cost Rate |
| South Carolina Public Service Commission |  |  |  |  |
| Blue Granite Water Co. | 12/19 | Blue Granite Water Company | Docket No. 2019-292-WS | Rate of Return |
| Carolina Water Service, Inc. | 02/18 | Carolina Water Service, Inc. | Docket No. 2017-292-WS | Rate of Return |
| Carolina Water Service, Inc. | 06/15 | Carolina Water Service, Inc. | Docket No. 2015-199-WS | Rate of Return |
| Carolina Water Service, Inc. | 11/13 | Carolina Water Service, Inc. | Docket No. 2013-275-WS | Rate of Return |
| United Utility Companies, Inc. | 09/13 | United Utility Companies, Inc. | Docket No. 2013-199-WS | Rate of Return |
| Utility Services of South Carolina, Inc. | 09/13 | Utility Services of South Carolina, Inc. | Docket No. 2013-201-WS | Rate of Return |
| Tega Cay Water Services, Inc. | 11/12 | Tega Cay Water Services, Inc. | Docket No. 2012-177-WS | Capital Structure |
| Tennessee Public Utility Commission |  |  |  |  |
| Piedmont Natural Gas Company | 07/20 | Piedmont Natural Gas Company | Docket No. 20-00086 | Return on Equity |
| Virginia State Corporation Commission |  |  |  |  |
| Aqua Virginia, Inc. | 07/20 | Aqua Virginia, Inc. | PUR-2020-00106 | Rate of Return |
| WGL Holdings, Inc. | 07/18 | Washington Gas Light Company | PUR-2018-00080 | Rate of Return |
| Atmos Energy Corporation | 05/18 | Atmos Energy Corporation | PUR-2018-00014 | Rate of Return |
| Aqua Virginia, Inc. | 07/17 | Aqua Virginia, Inc. | PUR-2017-00082 | Rate of Return |
| Massanutten Public Service Corp. | 08/14 | Massanutten Public Service Corp. | PUE-2014-00035 | Rate of Return / Rate Design |

# Northern States Power Company, a Minnesota Corporation <br> Table of Contents <br> to Exhibit_(DWD-1) 

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Financial Profiles of Northern States Power Company,a Minnesota Corporation and the Utility Proxy Group
Indicated Common Equity Cost Rate Using the Discounted Cash Flow Model ..... 3
Indicated Common Equity Cost Rate Using the Risk Premium Model ..... 4
Indicated Common Equity Cost Rate Using the Capital Asset Pricing Model ..... 5Basis of selection for the Non-Price Regulated CompaniesComparable in Total Risk to the Utility Proxy Group
Cost of Common Equity Models Applied to the Non-Price Regulated Proxy Group ..... 7
Estimated Market Capitalization for the Minnesota Electric Operations of Northern States Power Company, a Minnesota Corporation and the Utility Proxy Group ..... 8
Calculation of Flotation Costs ..... 9

## Northern States Power Company, a Minnesota Corporation

Brief Summary of Common Equity Cost Rate



Notes:
(1) All capitalization and financial statistics for the group are the arithmetic average of the achieved results for each individual
(2) Computed by relating actual total debt interest or preferred stock dividends booked to average of beginning and ending total
(3) Total debt relative to EBITDA (Earnings before Interest, Income Taxes, Depreciation and Amortization).
(4) Funds from operations (sum of net income, depreciation, amortization, net deferred income tax and investment tax credits, less

Proxy Group of Fifteen Electric Companies CAPITALIZATION AND FINANCIAL STATISTICS (1)

2015-2019, Inclusive

|  | $\underline{2019}$ |  | $\underline{2018}$ | $\underline{2017}$ |  |  | $\underline{2016}$ | $\underline{2015}$ |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| CAPITALIZATION STATISTICS |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| AMOUNT OF CAPITAL EMPLOYED |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| TOTAL PERMANENT CAPITAL |  | \$19,170.073 |  | \$17,563.380 |  | \$16,026.006 |  | \$15,844.640 |  | 799.184 |  |  |
| SHORT-TERM DEBT | \$554.853 |  | \$638.869 |  | \$601.956 |  | \$462.079 |  | 79.850 |  |  |
| TOTAL CAPITAL EMPLOYED | \$19,724.926 |  | \$18,202.249 |  | \$16,627.962 |  | \$16,306.719 |  | 279.034 |  |  |
| INDICATED AVERAGE CAPITAL COST RATES (2) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| TOTAL DEBT | 4.40 | \% | 4.62 | \% | 4.60 | \% | 4.85 | \% | 4.65 | \% |  |
| PREFERRED STOCK | 5.44 |  | 5.22 |  | 5.28 |  | 5.42 |  | 5.39 |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 5 YEAR |
| CAPITAL STRUCTURE RATIOS |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | AVERAGE |
| BASED ON TOTAL PERMANENT CAPITAL: |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| LONG-TERM DEBT | 52.09 | \% | 50.93 | \% | 50.34 | \% | 50.28 | \% | 49.69 | \% | 50.67 \% |
| PREFERRED STOCK | 0.67 |  | 0.80 |  | 0.84 |  | 0.94 |  | 0.96 |  | 0.84 |
| COMMON EQUITY | 47.24 |  | 48.27 |  | 48.82 |  | 48.78 |  | 49.35 |  | 48.49 |
| TOTAL | 100.00 | \% | 100.00 | \% | 100.00 | \% | 100.00 | \% | 100.00 | \% | 100.00 \% |
| BASED ON TOTAL CAPITAL: |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| TOTAL DEBT, INCLUDING SHORT-TERM | 52.95 | \% | 52.07 | \% | 52.19 | \% | 51.75 | \% | 50.98 | \% | 51.99 \% |
| PREFERRED STOCK | 0.65 |  | 0.77 |  | 0.79 |  | 0.90 |  | 0.94 |  | 0.81 |
| COMMON EQUITY | 46.40 |  | 47.16 |  | 47.02 |  | 47.36 |  | 48.08 |  | 47.20 |
| TOTAL | 100.00 | \% | 100.00 | \% | 100.00 | \% | 100.00 | \% | 100.00 | \% | 100.00 \% |

FINANCIAL STATISTICS

| FINANCIAL RATIOS - MARKET BASED |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| EARNINGS / PRICE RATIO | 4.84 | \% | 4.91 | \% | 4.57 | \% | 4.58 | \% | 4.70 | \% | 4.72 | \% |
| MARKET / AVERAGE BOOK RATIO | 203.29 |  | 194.96 |  | 204.20 |  | 167.90 |  | 161.63 |  | 186.40 |  |
| DIVIDEND YIELD | 3.14 |  | 3.44 |  | 3.21 |  | 3.49 |  | 3.61 |  | 3.38 |  |
| DIVIDEND PAYOUT RATIO | 66.31 |  | 51.18 |  | 76.23 |  | 53.36 |  | 59.95 |  | 61.41 |  |
| RATE OF RETURN ON AVERAGE BOOK COMMON EQUITY | 9.68 | \% | 8.52 | \% | 8.78 | \% | 7.97 | \% | 7.77 | \% | 8.54 | \% |
| TOTAL DEBT / EBITDA (3) | 4.52 | x | 5.01 | x | 4.02 | x | 5.28 | x | 4.33 | x | 4.63 | x |
| FUNDS FROM OPERATIONS / TOTAL DEBT (4) | 15.23 | \% | 20.10 | \% | 20.06 | \% | 18.97 | \% | 23.09 | \% | 19.49 | \% |
| TOTAL DEBT / TOTAL CAPITAL | 52.95 | \% | 52.07 | \% | 52.19 | \% | 51.75 | \% | 50.98 | \% | 51.99 | \% |

Notes:
(1) All capitalization and financial statistics for the group are the arithmetic average of the achieved results for each individual company in the group, and are based upon financial statements as originally reported in each year.
(2) Computed by relating actual total debt interest or preferred stock dividends booked to average of beginning and ending total debt or preferred stock reported to be outstanding.
(3) Total debt relative to EBITDA (Earnings before Interest, Income Taxes, Depreciation and Amortization).
(4) Funds from operations (sum of net income, depreciation, amortization, net deferred income tax and investment tax credits, less total AFUDC) plus interest charges as a percentage of total debt.

Capital Structure Based upon Total Permanent Capital for the
Proxy Group of Fifteen Electric Companies
2015-2019, Inclusive


Capital Structure Based upon Total Permanent Capital for the
Proxy Group of Fifteen Electric Companies 2015-2019, Inclusive

|  | $\underline{2019}$ |  | $\underline{2018}$ |  | $\underline{2017}$ |  | $\underline{2016}$ |  | $\underline{2015}$ |  | 5 YEAR <br> AVERAGE |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| NorthWestern Corporation |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Long-Term Debt | 52.27 | \% | 51.98 | \% | 50.26 | \% | 52.05 | \% | 53.08 | \% | 51.93 \% |
| Preferred Stock | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | 0.00 |
| Common Equity | 47.73 |  | 48.02 |  | 49.74 |  | 47.95 |  | 46.92 |  | 48.07 |
| Total Capital | 100.00 | \% | 100.00 | \% | 100.00 | \% | 100.00 | \% | 100.00 | \% | 100.00 \% |
| OGE Energy Corporation |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Long-Term Debt | 43.56 | \% | 44.00 | \% | 43.78 | \% | 43.31 | \% | 45.31 | \% | 43.99 \% |
| Preferred Stock | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | 0.00 |
| Common Equity | 56.44 |  | 56.00 |  | 56.22 |  | 56.69 |  | 54.69 |  | 56.01 |
| Total Capital | 100.00 | \% | 100.00 | \% | 100.00 | \% | 100.00 | \% | 100.00 | \% | 100.00 \% |
| $\underline{\text { Otter Tail Corporation }}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Long-Term Debt | 46.88 | \% | 44.74 | \% | 41.31 | \% | 44.56 | \% | 45.17 | \% | 44.53 \% |
| Preferred Stock | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | 0.00 |
| Common Equity | 53.12 |  | 55.26 |  | 58.69 |  | 55.44 |  | 54.83 |  | 55.47 |
| Total Capital | 100.00 | \% | 100.00 | \% | 100.00 | \% | 100.00 | \% | 100.00 | \% | 100.00 \% |
| Pinnacle West Capital Corp. |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Long-Term Debt | 50.91 | \% | 49.59 | \% | 48.68 | \% | 46.33 | \% | 45.45 | \% | 48.19 \% |
| Preferred Stock | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | 0.00 |
| Common Equity | 49.09 |  | 50.41 |  | 51.32 |  | 53.67 |  | 54.55 |  | 51.81 |
| Total Capital | 100.00 | \% | 100.00 | \% | 100.00 | \% | 100.00 | \% | 100.00 | \% | 100.00 \% |
| PNM Resources, Inc. |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Long-Term Debt | 64.02 | \% | 61.10 | \% | 57.89 | \% | 58.64 | \% | 55.66 | \% | 59.46 \% |
| Preferred Stock | 0.25 |  | 0.26 |  | 0.28 |  | 0.28 |  | 0.31 |  | 0.28 |
| Common Equity | 35.73 |  | 38.64 |  | 41.83 |  | 41.08 |  | 44.03 |  | 40.26 |
| Total Capital | 100.00 | \% | 100.00 | \% | 100.00 | \% | 100.00 | \% | 100.00 | \% | 100.00 \% |
| Portland General Electric Co. |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Long-Term Debt | 50.06 | \% | 49.72 | \% | 50.10 | \% | 50.06 | \% | 49.39 | \% | 49.87 \% |
| Preferred Stock | - |  | - |  | 0.01 |  | - |  | - |  | 0.00 |
| Common Equity | 49.94 |  | 50.28 |  | 49.90 |  | 49.94 |  | 50.61 |  | 50.13 |
| Total Capital | 100.00 | \% | 100.00 | \% | 100.01 | \% | 100.00 | \% | 100.00 | \% | 100.00 \% |
| Xcel Energy, Inc. |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Long-Term Debt | 57.77 | \% | 57.01 | \% | 56.66 | \% | 56.73 | \% | 55.36 | \% | 56.71 \% |
| Preferred Stock | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | 0.00 |
| Common Equity | 42.23 |  | 42.99 |  | 43.34 |  | 43.27 |  | 44.64 |  | 43.29 |
| Total Capital | 100.00 | \% | 100.00 | \% | 100.00 | \% | 100.00 | \% | 100.00 | \% | 100.00 \% |
| Proxy Group of Fifteen Electric |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Companies |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Long-Term Debt | 52.09 | \% | 50.94 | \% | 50.35 | \% | 50.29 | \% | 49.70 | \% | 50.62 \% |
| Preferred Stock | 0.67 |  | 0.80 |  | 0.84 |  | 0.94 |  | 0.96 |  | 0.82 |
| Common Equity | 47.24 |  | 48.26 |  | 48.81 |  | 48.77 |  | 49.34 |  | 48.56 |
| Total Capital | 100.00 | \% | 100.00 | \% | 100.00 | \% | 100.00 | \% | 100.00 | \% | 100.00 \% |

## Northern States Power Company, a Minnesota Corporation <br> Operating Subsidiary Company Capital Structures of the Proxy Group of Fifteen Electric Companies

| Company Name |  | 2019 |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Parent <br> Company Ticker | Common Equity | Long-Term Debt | Total Capital |
| ALLETE (Minnesota Power) | ALE | 59.59\% | 40.41\% | 100.00\% |
| Superior Water, Light and Power Company | ALE | 58.08\% | 41.92\% | 100.00\% |
| Interstate Power and Light Company | LNT | 50.23\% | 49.77\% | 100.00\% |
| Wisconsin Power and Light Company | LNT | 53.78\% | 46.22\% | 100.00\% |
| Ameren Illinois Company | AEE | 53.00\% | 47.00\% | 100.00\% |
| Union Electric Company | AEE | 51.90\% | 48.10\% | 100.00\% |
| Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC | DUK | 52.11\% | 47.89\% | 100.00\% |
| Duke Energy Florida, LLC | DUK | 49.91\% | 50.09\% | 100.00\% |
| Duke Energy Indiana, LLC | DUK | 52.84\% | 47.16\% | 100.00\% |
| Duke Energy Kentucky, Inc. | DUK | 49.37\% | 50.63\% | 100.00\% |
| Duke Energy Ohio, Inc. | DUK | 65.22\% | 34.78\% | 100.00\% |
| Duke Energy Progress, LLC | DUK | 51.29\% | 48.71\% | 100.00\% |
| Southern California Edison Company | EIX | 50.43\% | 49.57\% | 100.00\% |
| Entergy Arkansas, LLC | ETR | 47.90\% | 52.10\% | 100.00\% |
| Entergy Louisiana, LLC | ETR | 47.47\% | 52.53\% | 100.00\% |
| Entergy Mississippi, LLC | ETR | 48.60\% | 51.40\% | 100.00\% |
| Entergy New Orleans, LLC | ETR | 49.26\% | 50.74\% | 100.00\% |
| Entergy Texas, Inc. | ETR | 50.43\% | 49.57\% | 100.00\% |
| Evergy Kansas Central, Inc. | EVRG | 57.97\% | 42.03\% | 100.00\% |
| Evergy Missouri West, Inc. | EVRG | 50.34\% | 49.66\% | 100.00\% |
| Evergy Metro, Inc. | EVRG | 50.31\% | 49.69\% | 100.00\% |
| Idaho Power Company | IDA | 55.14\% | 44.86\% | 100.00\% |
| NorthWestern Corporation | NWE | 47.59\% | 52.41\% | 100.00\% |
| Oklahoma Gas and Electric Company | OGE | 55.15\% | 44.85\% | 100.00\% |
| Otter Tail Power Company | OTTR | 51.12\% | 48.88\% | 100.00\% |
| Public Service Company of New Mexico | PNM | 45.23\% | 54.77\% | 100.00\% |
| Texas-New Mexico Power Company | PNM | 52.74\% | 47.26\% | 100.00\% |
| Arizona Public Service Company | PNW | 52.80\% | 47.20\% | 100.00\% |
| Portland General Electric Company | POR | 49.85\% | 50.15\% | 100.00\% |
| Northern States Power Company - MN | XEL | 52.20\% | 47.80\% | 100.00\% |
| Northern States Power Company - WI | XEL | 54.23\% | 45.77\% | 100.00\% |
| Public Service Company of Colorado | XEL | 56.32\% | 43.68\% | 100.00\% |
| Southwestern Public Service Company | XEL | 54.14\% | 45.86\% | 100.00\% |
|  | Mean | 52.32\% | 47.68\% | 100.00\% |
|  | Median | 51.90\% | 48.10\% | 100.00\% |

Source: S\&P Global Market Intelligence




|  | 2017 | $\mathbf{2 0 1 8}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 1 9}$ |  |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| \% Change Retail Sales (KWH) | +8.4 | -.2 | -1.5 |  |
| Avg. Indust. Use (MWH) | NA | NA | NA |  |
| Avg. Indust. Revs. per KWH (c) | NA | NA | NA |  |
| Capacity at Peak (Mw) | NA | NA | NA |  |
| Peak Load, Winter (MW) | 1599 | 1589 | 1573 |  |
| Annual Load Factor (\%) | NA | NA | NA |  |
| \% Change Customers (avg.) | NA | NA | NA |  |
| Fixed Charge Cov. (\%) |  | 339 | 296 | 277 |
| ANNUAL RATES | Past | Past |  | Est'd '17-'19 |
| of change (per sh) | 10 Yrs. | 5 Yrs. | to '23.'25 |  |
| Revenues | $1.0 \%$ | $2.0 \%$ | $-1.0 \%$ |  |
| "Cash Flow" | $5.5 \%$ | $6.0 \%$ | $4.0 \%$ |  |
| Earnings | $2.5 \%$ | $4.0 \%$ | $5.5 \%$ |  |
| Dividends | $3.0 \%$ | $3.5 \%$ | $4.5 \%$ |  |
| Book Value | $5.0 \%$ | $5.0 \%$ | $3.5 \%$ |  |


| Calendar | QUARTERLY REVENUES (\$ mill.) Mar. 31 Jun. 30 Sep. 30 Dec. 31 |  |  |  | Full <br> Year |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2017 | 365.6 | 353.3 | 362.5 | 337.9 | 1419.3 |
| 2018 | 358.2 | 344.1 | 348.0 | 448.3 | 1498.6 |
| 2019 | 357.2 | 290.4 | 288.3 | 304.6 | 1240.5 |
| 2020 | 311.6 | 280 | 280 | 288.4 | 1160 |
| 2021 | 330 | 300 | 300 | 315 | 1245 |
| Calendar | Mar. 3 |  | $\text { Sep. } 30$ | $\text { Dec. } 31$ | Full Year |
| 2017 | . 97 | . 72 | . 88 | . 56 | 3.13 |
| 2018 | . 99 | . 61 | . 59 | 1.18 | 3.38 |
| 2019 | 1.18 | . 64 | . 60 | . 92 | 3.33 |
| 2020 | 1.28 | . 50 | . 52 | . 75 | 3.05 |
| 2021 | 1.20 | . 70 | . 65 | . 95 | 3.50 |
| Calendar | QUART <br> Mar. 31 | RLY DIVID Jun. 30 | DENDS PAID Sep. 30 | $\begin{gathered} \text { ID B } ■ \dagger \\ \operatorname{Dec} .31 \end{gathered}$ | Full Year |
| 2016 | . 52 | . 52 | . 52 | . 52 | 2.08 |
| 2017 | . 535 | . 535 | . 535 | . 535 | 2.14 |
| 2018 | . 56 | . 56 | . 56 | . 56 | 2.24 |
| 2019 | . 5875 | . 5875 | . 5875 | . 5875 | 2.35 |
| 2020 | . 6175 | . 6175 |  |  |  |

BUSINESS: ALLETE, Inc. is the parent of Minnesota Power, which supplies electricity to 146,000 customers in northeastern MN, \& Superior Water, Light \& Power in northwestern WI. Electric rev. breakdown: taconite mining/processing, 26\%; paper/wood products, $9 \%$; other industrial, $8 \%$; residential, $12 \%$; commercial, $13 \%$; wholesale, $16 \%$ other, $16 \%$. ALLETE Clean Energy (ACE) owns renewable en-
ALLETE's main utility subsidiary had its interim rate increase reduced. Last November, Minnesota Power filed for a $\$ 65.9$ million ( $10.6 \%$ ) rate increase, based on a return on equity of $10.05 \%$ and a common-equity ratio of $53.81 \%$. At the start of 2020, Minnesota Power received an interim hike of $\$ 36.1$ million ( $5.8 \%$ ). The interim hike was reduced to $\$ 25.5$ million ( $4.1 \%$ ), and the effective date postponed to May 1st, in response to the economic problems caused by the coronavirus situation. This will result in a $\$ 12$ million revenue refund to customers. The utility also withdrew its rate application and will not refile a case before November 1, 2021. It may file as early as March 1st under certain conditions, such as a 50-megawatt loss of load for three months.
We lowered our 2020 and 2021 earnings estimates. The revenue refund will result in a charge of $\$ 0.16$ a share against second-quarter results, and having a lower interim rate hike will affect the company's earning power until Minnesota Power files its next rate case. In addition, revenues from large industrial customers will proba-
bly be lower in the last four months of
ergy projects. Acq'd U.S. Water Services 2/15; sold it 3/19. Generating sources: coal \& lignite, $30 \%$; wind, $11 \%$; other, $5 \%$; purchased, $54 \%$. Fuel costs: $31 \%$ of revs. ' 19 deprec. rate: $3.3 \%$. Has 1,400 employees. Chairman: Alan R. Hodnik. President \& CEO: Bethany M. Owen. Inc.: MN. Address: 30 West Superior St., Duluth, MN 55802-2093. Tel.: 218-279-5000. Internet: www.allete.com.
2020. (For now, there is no revenue impact because these customers put forth full power-demand nominations, before the economy worsened, through the end of Au gust.) Putting it all together, we cut our 2020 share-net estimate by $\$ 0.50$, to $\$ 3.05$, and our 2021 expectation by $\$ 0.30$, to $\$ 3.50$. Due to the problems and increased uncertainty caused by the coronavirus, ALLETE has withdrawn its earnings guidance. Management hopes to update guidance with its second-quarter release.
ALLETE Clean Energy is faring well. Its wind projects are on track, and the coronavirus has not disrupted construction. Most significantly, a 300-megawatt project is scheduled for completion by yearend at an expected cost of $\$ 450$ million.
This has been one of the poorestperforming stocks in this industry in 2020. The price is down $27 \%$ in this time frame. Minnesota Power's service area has a much-larger industrial sector than most utilities, which worries investors. The dividend yield is above the industry average, and total return potential for the 18 month period is strong.
Paul E. Debbas, CFA
June 12, 2020


|  |  |  | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| \% Change | Retail Sales (KW |  | -1.0 | +2.0 | -2.2 |
| Avg. Incust | Use (MWH) |  | 11769 | 11830 | 11448 |
| Avg. Indus | Revs. per KWH |  | 7.16 | 7.25 | 6.98 |
| Capacity a | Peak (Mw) |  | 5375 | 5459 | 5626 |
| Peak Load | Summer (Mw) |  | 5375 | 5459 | 5626 |
| Annual Loa | d Factor (\%) |  | NA | NA | NA |
| \% Change | Cusiomers yree |  | +. 4 | +. 4 | +. 6 |
| Fixed Char | ge Cov. (\%) |  | 319 | 322 | 324 |
| ANNUAL | AL RATES | Past |  | st Est'd | ' '17-'19 |
| of chang | (per sh) | 10 Yrs. |  |  | '23-25 |
| Reven |  | -.5\% |  | 5\% | 2.0\% |
| "Cash | Flow" | 4.5\% |  | 5\% | 6.0\% |
| Earnin |  | 5.0\% |  | 0\% | 6.5\% |
| Dividen |  | 7.0\% |  | 0\% | 5.5\% |
| Book V | value | 4.0\% |  | 0\% | 7.5\% |
|  | QUAR | TERLY RE | VENUE | \$ mill.) | Full |
| endar | Mar. 31 | Jun. 30 | Sep. 30 | Dec. 31 | Year |
| 2017 | 853.9 | 765.3 | 906.9 | 856.1 | 3382.2 |
| 2018 | 916.3 | 816.1 | 928.6 | 873.5 | 3534.5 |
| 2019 | 987.2 | 790.2 | 990.2 | 880.1 | 3647.7 |
| 2020 | 915.7 | 840 | 1020 | 899.3 | 3675 |
| 2021 | 1040 | 860 | 1040 | 910 | 3850 |
|  |  | NINGS PE | ER SHAR |  | Full |
| endar | Mar. 31 | Jun. 30 | Sep. 30 | Dec. 31 | Year |
| 2017 | . 44 | . 41 | . 73 | . 41 | 1.99 |
| 2018 | . 52 | . 43 | . 87 | . 37 | 2.19 |
| 2019 | . 53 | . 40 | . 94 | . 46 | 2.33 |
| 2020 | . 72 | . 43 | . 90 | . 40 | 2.45 |
| 2021 | . 60 | . 50 | 1.00 | . 45 | 2.55 |
|  | QUAR | Y DIV | NDS PA | B | Full |
| endar | Mar. 31 | Jun. 30 | Sep. 30 | Dec. 31 | Year |
| 2016 | . 295 | . 295 | . 295 | . 295 | 1.18 |
| 2017 | . 315 | . 315 | . 315 | . 315 | 1.26 |
| 2018 | . 335 | . 335 | . 335 | . 335 | 1.34 |
| 2019 | . 355 | . 355 | . 355 | . 355 | 1.42 |
| 2020 | . 38 | . 38 |  |  |  |

[^15] ings, IES Industries, and Interstate Power. Supplies electricity, gas, and other services in Wisconsin, lowa, and Minnesota. Elect. revs. by state: WI, 42\%; IA, $57 \%$; MN, $1 \%$. Elect. rev.: residential, $34 \%$; commercial, $29 \%$; industrial, $28 \%$; wholesale, $7 \%$; other, $2 \%$. Fuel
We look for modest earnings increases at Alliant Energy in 2020 and 2021. The utility's largest subsidiary, Interstate Power and Light, is receiving rate relief through an order from the Iowa Utilities Board. The company's rates were increased by $\$ 127$ million and $\$ 12$ million for electricity and gas, respectively, at the beginning of 2020. Alliant is also benefiting from customer growth, lower fuel expenditures, cost savings, and tax credits tied to its renewable energy portfolio. Our 2020 share-net estimate, now at $\$ 2.45$-up a nickel since our March reviewrepresents growth of 5\% over 2019's tally.
The COVID-19 outbreak has affected Alliant. The utility saw a $9 \%$ drop in retail power sales during the month of April, due to declines in the commercial and industrial sector, partially offset by an increase in residential activity. Although leadership kept its 2020 EPS guidance range untouched at $\$ 2.34-\$ 2.48$, it did say the pandemic has increased earnings risk through higher operating expenses and elevated macroeconomic uncertainty. The company has responded to this by deferring some capital expenditures and ac-
sources, 2019: coal, 27\%; gas, 34\%; other, 39\%. Fuel costs: $41 \%$ of revs. 2019 depreciation rate: $5.9 \%$. Estimated plant age: 17 years. Has approximately 3,597 employees. Chairman \& Chief Executive Officer: John O. Larsen. Incorporated: Wisconsin. Address: 4902 N. Biltmore Lane, Madison, Wisconsin 53718. Telephone: 608-458-3311. Internet: www.alliantenergy.com.
celerating planned cost-saving initiatives.
Alliant has taken several steps to improve its liquidity situation. During the first quarter, it refinanced a $\$ 300$ million term loan and issued $\$ 350$ million in 30-year debentures for its Wisconsin Utility. Both deals were well received by the market at favorable interest rates. In addition, the company generated $\$ 222$ million from common equity issuance, in line with prior projections, and reiterated its plan to move forward with a $\$ 300$ million debt issuance for its lowa utility subsidiary. At the end of March, total available liquidity, including borrowing capacity under its existing credit revolver, stood at $\$ 1.2$ billion.
This stock is now ranked 2 (Above Average) for year-ahead relative price performance, having slipped a notch on our Timeliness scale since March. Like many utility issues, the recent quotation is well within our 2023-2025 Target Price Range, resulting in unexciting total return potential over that time frame. In addition, at $3.1 \%$, the dividend yield doesn't stand out for a utility, further reducing the equity's investment appeal. Daniel Henigson, CFA

June 12, 2020

10, (8¢); '11, (16); '12, (8C). Next earnings rpt. avail. (C) Incl. deferred chgs. In '19: $\$ 72.0$ mill., WI, Above Avg.; IA, Avg due early August. (B) Dividends historically $\$ 0.29 /$ sh. (D) In millions, adjusted for split. (E) paid in mid-Feb., May, Aug., and Nov. - Div'd Rate base: Orig. cost. Rates all'd on com. eq.
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## Company's Financial Strength

 Stock's Price Stability Price Growth Persistence Earnings Predictability| A ${ }^{\text {A }}$ | ERE | NY | －AEE |  |  |  |  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { ENT } \\ & \text { CE } \end{aligned}$ | $743$ | P／E <br> RATIO | $21$ | （Trailing | $\begin{aligned} & g: 23.5 \\ & 1: 17.0 \end{aligned}$ | RELATIVE P／E RATIO | $1 .$ | DIV＇D YLD | $2.8$ | $0$ |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| TIMELIN | $\text { JESS } 3$ | Lowered | 3/29/19 | High： <br> Low： | $\begin{array}{r} 35.3 \\ 19.5 \\ \hline \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 29.9 \\ 23.1 \\ \hline \end{array}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 34.1 \\ & 25.5 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 35.3 \\ & 28.4 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 37.3 \\ & 30.6 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 48.1 \\ & 35.2 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 46.8 \\ & 37.3 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 54.1 \\ & 41.5 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 64.9 \\ & 51.4 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 70.9 \\ & 51.9 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 80.9 \\ & 63.1 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 87.7 \\ & 58.7 \end{aligned}$ |  |  | Target Pric 2023202 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Range } \\ & 10025 \end{aligned}$ |
| SAFET |  | Raised 6／2 | 20／14 | $\begin{gathered} \text { LEGEI } \\ \text { div } \end{gathered}$ | S x Divid ed by In | nds $p$ sh terest Rate |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | $-128$ |
| TECHN |  | Raised | /20 |  | d by | $\begin{aligned} & \text { terest Rate } \\ & e \text { Strength } \end{aligned}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | －96 |
| BETA | （1．00 | arket） |  | Options |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | －80 |
| 18－Mo | Targ | Pric | Range | Shaded | ind | reces |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | ， | $1{ }^{\circ}$ |  |  |  | －64 |
|  | Targ | Price | Range |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 48 |
| Low－Hi | Mid | int (\% tc | Mid） | 1 |  |  |  |  |  |  | ＋14 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 40 |
| \＄56－\＄1 | \＄87 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | リハリツ |  | 析 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 32 |
|  |  |  |  |  | 110 | 听 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | －24 |
|  | Price |  | Total turn |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | ＊＊＊＊ |  |  |  |  | －24 |
| High <br> Low | $\begin{aligned} & 80 \\ & 60 \end{aligned}$ |  | $\begin{gathered} 5 \% \\ -1 \% \end{gathered}$ |  |  |  | ．a＊＊ |  |  |  | ＊＊＊＊ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | －12 |
| Institu | nal D | cision |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { RETURN } 5 / 20 \\ & \text { THIS VLARITH } \end{aligned}$ |  |
|  | 3 Q2019 | 4 Q2019 | 1 Q2020 | Perce |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | STOCK INDEX |  |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { to Buy } \\ & \text { to Sell } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 257 \\ & 257 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 266 \\ & 265 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 242 \\ & 273 \end{aligned}$ | shares <br> traded |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 1 yr. 3 yr. | 4.5 -1.3 <br> 43.3 5.2 | － |
| （e） | 186859 | 186367 | 187833 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 5 yr ． | 117.718 .7 |  |
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 |  | UE LINE PUB．LLC | 23－25 |
| 26.43 | 33.12 | 33.30 | 36.23 | 36.92 | 29.87 | 31.77 | 31.04 | 28.14 | 24.06 | 24.95 | 25.13 | 25.04 | 25.46 | 25.73 | 24.00 | 22.05 | 22.70 | Reve | es per sh | 24.25 |
| 5.57 | 6.10 | 6.02 | 6.76 | 6.44 | 6.06 | 6.33 | 5.87 | 5.87 | 5.25 | 5.77 | 6.08 | 6.59 | 6.80 | 7.64 | 7.83 | 8.05 | 8.50 | ＂Cash | Flow＂per sh | 10.00 |
| 2.82 | 3.13 | 2.66 | 2.98 | 2.88 | 2.78 | 2.77 | 2.47 | 2.41 | 2.10 | 2.40 | 2.38 | 2.68 | 2.77 | 3.32 | 3.35 | 3.45 | 3.65 | Earni | s per sh A | 4.50 |
| 2.54 | 2.54 | 2.54 | 2.54 | 2.54 | 1.54 | 1.54 | 1.56 | 1.60 | 1.60 | 1.61 | 1.66 | 1.72 | 1.78 | 1.85 | 1.92 | 2.01 | 2.11 | Div＇d | cel＇d per sh B－ | 2.45 |
| 4.13 | 4.63 | 4.99 | 6.96 | 9.75 | 7.51 | 4.66 | 4.50 | 5.49 | 5.87 | 7.66 | 8.12 | 8.78 | 9.05 | 9.56 | 9.92 | 15.85 | 11.55 | Cap＇ | pending per sh | 11.00 |
| 29.71 | 31.09 | 31.86 | 32.41 | 32.80 | 33.08 | 32.15 | 32.64 | 27.27 | 26.97 | 27.67 | 28.63 | 29.27 | 29.61 | 31.21 | 32.73 | 35.70 | 37.40 | Book | alue per sh C | 43.50 |
| 195.20 | 204.70 | 206.60 | 208.30 | 212.30 | 237.40 | 240.40 | 242.60 | 242.63 | 242.63 | 242.63 | 242.63 | 242.63 | 242.63 | 244.50 | 246.20 | 254.00 | 260.00 | Com | Shs Outst＇g D | 275.00 |
| 16.3 | 16.7 | 19.4 | 17.4 | 14.2 | 9.3 | 9.7 | 11.9 | 13.4 | 16.5 | 16.7 | 17.5 | 18.3 | 20.6 | 18.3 | 22.1 | Bold fig | res are | Avg | n＇I P／E Ratio | 15.5 |
| ． 86 | ． 89 | 1.05 | ． 92 | ． 85 | ． 62 | ． 62 | ． 75 | ． 85 | ． 93 | ． 88 | ． 88 | ． 96 | 1.04 | ． 99 | 1.18 | Value | Line | Rela | P／E Ratio | ． 85 |
| 5．5\％ | 4．9\％ | 4．9\％ | 4．9\％ | 6．2\％ | 6．0\％ | 5．8\％ | 5．3\％ | 5．0\％ | 4．6\％ | 4．0\％ | 4．0\％ | 3．5\％ | 3．1\％ | 3．0\％ | 2．6\％ | estim | ates | Avg | Div＇d Yield | 3．5\％ |
| CAPITAL STRUCTURE as of $3 / 31 / 20$ <br> Total Debt $\$ 10350$ mill．Due in 5 Yrs $\$ 2660$ mill． <br> LT Debt $\$ 9378$ mill．LT Interest $\$ 428$ mill． <br> （LT interest earned：3．4x） <br> Leases，Uncapitalized Annual rentals $\$ 8$ mill． <br> Pension Assets－12／19 \＄4564 mill． <br> Oblig $\$ 4967$ mill． <br> Pfd Stock $\$ 142$ mill．Pfd Div＇d $\$ 6$ mill． <br> 807,595 sh．$\$ 3.50$ to $\$ 5.50$ cum．（no par），$\$ 100$ <br> stated val．，redeem．\＄102．176－\＄110／sh．；616，323 <br> sh． $4.00 \%$ to $6.625 \%, \$ 100$ par，redeem．$\$ 100-$ <br> \＄104／sh． <br> Common Stock 246，891，031 shs．as of 4／30／20 <br> MARKET CAP：$\$ 18$ billion（Large Cap） |  |  |  |  |  | 7638.0 | 7531.0 | 6828.0 | 5838.0 | 6053.0 | 6098.0 | 6076.0 | 6177.0 | 6291.0 | 5910.0 | 5600 | 5900 | Rev | （\＄mill） | 6700 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | 669.0 | 602.0 | 589.0 | 518.0 | 593.0 | 585.0 | 659.0 | 683.0 | 821.0 | 834.0 | 875 | 950 | Net P | fit（\＄mill） | 1230 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | 36．8\％ | 37．3\％ | 36．9\％ | 37．5\％ | 38．9\％ | 38．3\％ | 36．7\％ | 38．2\％ | 22．4\％ | 17．9\％ | 12．5\％ | 12．5\％ | Incom | Tax Rate | 12．5\％ |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | 7．8\％ | 5．6\％ | 6．1\％ | 7．1\％ | 5．7\％ | 5．1\％ | 4．1\％ | 5．6\％ | 6．9\％ | 5．8\％ | 6．0\％ | 5．0\％ | AFUD | \％to Net Profit | 4．0\％ |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | 48．2\％ | 45．3\％ | 49．5\％ | 45．2\％ | 47．2\％ | 49．3\％ | 47．7\％ | 49．2\％ | 50．3\％ | 52．1\％ | 54．0\％ | 51．0\％ | Lon | $m$ Debt Ratio | 49．5\％ |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | 50．9\％ | 53．7\％ | 49．4\％ | 53．7\％ | 51．7\％ | 49．7\％ | 51．3\％ | 49．8\％ | 48．8\％ | 47．1\％ | 45．5\％ | 48．5\％ | Comm | n Equity Ratio | 50．0\％ |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | 15185 | 14738 | 13384 | 12190 | 12975 | 13968 | 13840 | 14420 | 15632 | 17116 | 20000 | 20150 | Total | apital（\＄mill） | 23900 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | 17853 | 18127 | 16096 | 16205 | 17424 | 18799 | 20113 | 21466 | 22810 | 24376 | 27225 | 28950 | Net P | （\＄mill） | 33600 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | 6．0\％ | 5．6\％ | 6．0\％ | 5．6\％ | 5．8\％ | 5．3\％ | 6．0\％ | 6．0\％ | 6．4\％ | 6．0\％ | 5．5\％ | 6．0\％ | Return | on Total Cap＇l | 6．5\％ |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | 8．5\％ | 7．5\％ | 8．7\％ | 7．7\％ | 8．7\％ | 8．3\％ | 9．1\％ | 9．3\％ | 10．6\％ | 10．2\％ | 9．5\％ | 9．5\％ | Retur | on Shr．Equity | 10．0\％ |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | 8．6\％ | 7．5\％ | 8．8\％ | 7．8\％ | 8．7\％ | 8．3\％ | 9．2\％ | 9．4\％ | 10．7\％ | 10．3\％ | 9．5\％ | 9．5\％ | Retur | on Com Equity E | 10．0\％ |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | $\begin{gathered} \hline 3.8 \% \\ 56 \% \end{gathered}$ | 2．8\％ | 3．0\％ | 1．9\％ | 2．9\％ | 2．5\％ | 3．3\％ | 3．4\％ | 4．8\％ | 4．4\％ | 4．0\％ | 4．0\％ | Retai | d to Com Eq | 4．5\％ |
| ELECTRIC OPERATING STATISTICS |  |  |  |  |  |  | 63\％ | 66\％ | 76\％ | 67\％ | 70\％ | 64\％ | 64\％ | 56\％ | 57\％ | 58\％ | 58\％ | All Div | ds to Net Prof | 55\％ |


|  |  | 2017 |  | 2018 | 2019 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| \％Change Retail Sales（KWH） |  | －3．4 |  | ＋5．6 | －3．5 |
| Avg．Inoust．Use（MWH） |  | NA |  | NA | NA |
| Avg．Indust．Revs．per KWH（c） |  | NA |  | NA | NA |
| Capacity at Peak（MW） |  | NA |  | NA | NA |
| Peak Load，Summer（Mw） |  | NA |  | NA | NA |
| Annual Load Factor（\％） |  | NA |  | NA | NA |
| \％Change Cusiomeris（y－end） |  | NA |  | NA | NA |
| Fixed Charge Cov．（\％） |  | 350 |  | 313 | 307 |
| ANNUAL RATES |  |  | Past |  | ＇17－＇ |
| of change（per sh） | 10 Yrs ． |  | 5 Yrs． |  |  |
| Revenues ${ }^{\text {che }}$ | －3．0\％ |  | －．5\％ |  | －5\％ |
| ＂Cash Flow＂ | 1．5\％ |  | 5．5\％ |  | 5．0\％ |
| Earnings | 1．0\％ |  | 6．5\％ |  | 6．0\％ |
| Dividends | －2．0\％ |  | 3．0\％ |  | 5．0\％ |
| Book Value | －．5\％ |  | 2．5\％ |  | 5．5\％ |


| Cal－ <br> endar | QUARTERLY REVENUES（\＄mill．） <br> Mar．31 |  |  | Full <br> Jun．30 |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2017 | 1514 | 1538 | 1723 | 1402 | 6177.0 |
| 2018 | 1585 | 1563 | 1724 | 1419 | 6291.0 |
| 2019 | 1556 | 1379 | 1659 | 1316 | 5910.0 |
| 2020 | 1440 | 1300 | 1600 | 1260 | 5600 |
| 2021 | 1600 | 1350 | 1650 | 1300 | 5900 |
| Cal－ | EARNINGS PER SHARE A |  |  |  | Full |
| endar | Mar．31 | Jun．30 | Sep．30 | Dec． 31 | Year |
| 2017 | .42 | .79 | 1.18 | .39 | 2.77 |
| 2018 | .62 | .97 | 1.45 | .28 | 3.32 |
| 2019 | .78 | .72 | 1.47 | .38 | 3.35 |
| 2020 | .59 | .80 | 1.61 | .45 | 3.45 |
| 2021 | .65 | .85 | 1.70 | .45 | 3.65 |
| Cal－ | QUARTERLY DIVIDENDS PAID B | Full |  |  |  |
| endar | Mar．31 | Jun．30 | Sep．30 | Dec． 31 | Year |
| 2016 | .425 | .425 | .425 | .44 | 1.72 |
| 2017 | .44 | .44 | .44 | .4575 | 1.78 |
| 2018 | .4575 | .4575 | .4575 | .475 | 1.85 |
| 2019 | .475 | .475 | .475 | .495 | 1.92 |
| 2020 | .495 | .495 |  |  |  |

BUSINESS：Ameren Corporation is a holding company formed through the merger of Union Electric and CIPSCO．Has 1.2 million electric and 127，000 gas customers in Missouri； 1.2 million electric and 813,000 gas customers in Illinois．Discontinued nonregulated power－generation operation in＇13．Electric revenue breakdown： residential， $43 \%$ ；commercial， $32 \%$ ；industrial， $8 \%$ ；other， $17 \%$ ．
We cut our 2020 and 2021 earnings es－ timates for Ameren．The company＇s elec－ tric business in Missouri is being hurt by kilowatt－hour sales reductions resulting from the weak economy．Ameren＇s electric operations in Illinois have had a cut in the allowed return on equity，which tracks the 30－year U．S．Treasury bond rate．At least Ameren Illinois isn＇t being hurt by a de－ cline in sales because it operates under a regulatory mechanism that decouples vol－ ume and revenues．Moreover，the compa－ ny＇s transmission business does not de－ pend on retail sales．We lowered our 2020 earnings estimate by $\$ 0.05$ a share，to $\$ 3.45$ ．This is still within the company＇s guidance of $\$ 3.40-\$ 3.60$ ，which manage－ ment did not change upon releasing March－quarter results．Because any growth in 2021 will come off a lower base， we cut our estimate by $\$ 0.10$ a share，to $\$ 3.65$ ．The $6 \%$ increase we estimate for next year is within Ameren＇s target of 6\％－ $8 \%$ for annual profit growth．

## Ameren＇s electric rates were reduced

 in Missouri，but this wasn＇t a bad out－ come for the utility．The commission cut Ameren＇s rates by $\$ 32$ million，effectiveGenerating sources：coal， $63 \%$ ；nuclear， $23 \%$ ；hydro \＆other， $6 \%$ ； purchased， $8 \%$ ．Fuel costs： $24 \%$ of revenues．＇19 reported deprec． rates： $3 \%-4 \%$ ．Has 9,300 employees．Chairman，President \＆CEO： Warner L．Baxter．Inc．：Missouri．Address：One Ameren Plaza， 1901 Chouteau Ave．，P．O．Box 66149，St．Louis，Missouri 63166－6149． Tel．：314－621－3222．Internet：www．ameren．com．
April 1，2020．But this included the pass－ through to customers of some $\$ 115$ million of lower fuel costs and $\$ 50$ million of de－ creased nonfuel expenses．This was a ＂black box＂order in which an allowed ROE and common－equity ratio were not specified，but the decision was based on an implicit ROE in a range of $9.4 \%-9.8 \%$ ．
A gas rate application is pending in Il－ linois．Ameren filed for $\$ 102$ million，in－ cluding $\$ 46$ million that would otherwise be recovered through riders（surcharges） on customers＇bills．The utility requested a $10.5 \% \mathrm{ROE}$ and a $54.1 \%$ common－equity ratio．A ruling is due by January，with new tariffs taking effect in February．
Ameren is adding wind projects．The company is spending $\$ 1.2$ billion to add 700 megawatts of capacity．Most，if not all， of this should be in service by yearend．
The stock has outperformed most util－ ity equities in 2020．Its price has fallen just $3 \%$ ．The dividend yield is almost one percentage point below the industry aver－ age．Total return potential is average for the next 18 months，but not for the 2023－ 2025 period．
Paul E．Debbas，CFA
June 12， 2020

| （A）Dil．EPS．Excl．nonrec．gain（losses）：＇05， | $\begin{array}{l}\text { Next egs．report due early Aug．（B）Div＇ds pd．}\end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{l}\text { all＇d on com．eq．in MO in＇20：elec．，none；in } \\ \text {（114）；＇10，（\＄2．19）；＇11，（ } 324 \text { ）；＇12，（ } \$ 6.42 \text { ）；＇} 17,\end{array}$ |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| late Mar．，June，Sept．，\＆Dec． |  |  | （63¢）；gain（loss）from disc．ops．：＇＇13．（92¢）；$\quad \begin{aligned} & \text { lan } \\ & \text { plan avail．（C）Incl．intang．In＇19：} \$ 5.70 / \mathrm{sh} \text { ．} \\ & \text { gas，} 9.87 \% \text { ；earned on avg．com．eq．，＇19：}\end{aligned}$ ＇15，21c．＇17 EPS don＇t sum due to rounding．

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| Cal- <br> endar | QUARTERLY REVENUES (\$ mill.) |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Mar.31 | Jun.30 | Sep.30 | Dec.31 | Year |  |
| 2017 | 5729 | 5555 | 6482 | 5799 | 23565 |
| 2018 | 6135 | 5643 | 6628 | 6115 | 24521 |
| 2019 | 6163 | 5873 | 6940 | 6103 | 25079 |
| 2020 | 5949 | 5300 | 6600 | 5801 | 23650 |
| 2021 | 6200 | 5650 | 6850 | 6050 | 24750 |
| Cal- | EARNINGS PER SHARE A |  |  |  | Full |
| endar | Mar.31 | Jun.30 | Sep.30 | Dec.31 | Year |
| 2017 | 1.02 | .98 | 1.36 | .86 | 4.22 |
| 2018 | 1.17 | .71 | 1.63 | .61 | 4.13 |
| 2019 | 1.24 | 1.12 | 1.82 | .89 | 5.07 |
| 2020 | 1.24 | 1.05 | 1.86 | .95 | 5.10 |
| 2021 | 1.35 | 1.10 | 1.90 | .95 | 5.30 |
| Cal- | QUARTERLY DIVIDENDS PAID B | Full |  |  |  |
| endar | Mar.31 | Jun.30 | Sep.30 | Dec.31 | Year |
| 2016 | .825 | .825 | .855 | .855 | 3.36 |
| 2017 | .855 | .855 | .89 | .89 | 3.49 |
| 2018 | .89 | .89 | .927 | .928 | 3.64 |
| 2019 | .927 | .928 | .945 | .945 | 3.75 |
| 2020 | .945 | .945 | .965 |  |  |

BUSINESS: Duke Energy Corporation is a holding company for utilities with 7.6 mill. elec. customers in NC, FL, IN, SC, OH, \& KY, and 1.6 mill. gas customers in OH, KY, NC, SC, and TN. Owns independent power plants \& has $25 \%$ stake in National Methanol in Saudi Arabia. Acq'd Progress Energy 7/12; Piedmont Natural Gas 10/16; discontinued most int'l ops. in '16. Elec. rev. breakdown:
The Atlantic Coast Pipeline project, 47\%-owned by Duke Energy, has been canceled. The project was plagued by delays and cost overruns stemming from litigation. This wasn't expected to be completed until early 2022, more than three years after the original target. The total cost had risen to an expected $\$ 8.0$ billion, from $\$ 4.5$ billion- $\$ 5.0$ billion initially. Two unfavorable rulings from U.S. courts convinced Duke and its partner, Dominion Energy, to pull the plug. As a result, the company will take a nonrecurring, noncash pretax charge of $\$ 2.0$ billion- $\$ 2.5$ billion, most of which will be recorded against June-quarter results. However, the cancelation will also affect ongoing earnings because Duke will no longer record the Allowance for Funds Used During Construction, a noncash credit to earnings. Accordingly, management is now guiding analysts toward the low end of its 2020 earnings target of $\$ 5.05-\$ 5.45$ a share. The project was expected to contribute $\$ 0.30$ $\$ 0.35$ a share to profits in 2021. However, we did not change our expectations because our 2020 estimate of $\$ 5.10$ a share was already near the low end of the range.
residential, 44\%; commercial, 28\%; industrial, 14\%; other, $14 \%$. Generating sources: gas, $29 \%$; nuclear, $29 \%$; coal, $22 \%$; other, $1 \%$; purchased, $19 \%$. Fuel costs: $30 \%$ of revs. '19 reported deprec. rate: 3.1\%. Has 28,800 employees. Chairman, President \& CEO: Lynn J. Good. Inc.: DE. Address: 550 South Tryon St., Charlotte, NC 28202-1803. Tel.: 704-382-3853. Internet: www.duke-energy.com.
Duke received a rate increase in Indiana and reached partial settlements in North Carolina. The commission granted the utility an increase of $\$ 146$ million, based on a return on equity of $9.7 \%$ and a common-equity ratio of $53 \%$. About $75 \%$ of the increase took effect last month, with the remainder set to take effect in the first quarter of 2021. The company's two utilities in North Carolina reached partial settlements of their rate cases, subject to approval by the state commission. When new tariffs will take effect is unknown.
The board of directors raised the dividend this quarter. The quarterly increase was two cents a share ( $2.1 \%$ ). This growth rate is less than half the utility average, which is a result of Duke's high payout ratio.
Duke stock has an above-average dividend yield for a utility. The write-off of the pipeline project did not surprise Wall Street, and the stock price has fallen at a low double-digit percentage this year-less than many utility equities. Total return potential is attractive for the 18 -month span, but not for the 3 - to 5 -year period. Paul E. Debbas, CFA

August 14, 2020

## (A) Diluted EPS. Excl. nonrec. losses: '12, 70 ; ; $\quad$ early Nov. (B) Div'ds paid mid-Mar., June, ${ }^{2}$ all'd on com. eq. in '18 in NC: $9.9 \%$; in '19 in $\quad$ Company's Financial Strength


 sum due to rounding. Next earnings report due rev. split. (E) Rate base: Net orig. cost. Rates Reg. Clim.: NC Avg.; SC, OH, IN Above Avg. © 2020 Value Line, Inc. All rights reserved. Factual material is obtained from sources believed to be reliable and is provided without warranties of any kind.
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| Cal- <br> endar | QUARTERLY REVENUES (\$ mill.) <br> Mar.31 |  |  | Full <br> Year |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | ---: |
| 2017 | 2463 | 2965 | 3672 | 3220 | 12320 |
| 2018 | 2564 | 2815 | 4269 | 3009 | 12657 |
| 2019 | 2824 | 2812 | 3741 | 2970 | 12347 |
| 2020 | 2790 | 2710 | 3700 | 2800 | 12000 |
| 2021 | 2800 | 2900 | 3900 | 3000 | 12600 |
| Cal- | EARNINGS PER SHARE A |  |  |  | Full |
| endar | Mar.31 |  |  |  |  |
| 2017 | 1.11 | Jun.30 | Sep.30 | Dec.31 | Year |
| 2018 | .82 | .84 | 1.43 | 1.12 | 4.51 |
| 2019 | .64 | 1.57 | 1.35 | .49 | d1.26 |
| 2019 | 3.98 |  |  |  |  |
| 2020 | .50 | 1.30 | 1.45 | .85 | 4.10 |
| 2021 | .70 | 1.20 | 1.50 | .85 | 4.25 |
| Cal- | QUARTERLY DIVIDENDS PAID B |  |  |  |  |
| endar | Mar.31 | Full |  |  |  |
| 2016 | .48 | .48 | .48 | .48 | 1.92 |
| 2017 | .5425 | .5425 | .5425 | .5425 | 2.17 |
| 2018 | .605 | .605 | .605 | .605 | 2.42 |
| 2019 | .6125 | .6125 | .6125 | .6125 | 2.45 |
| 2020 | .6375 | .6375 |  |  |  |

BUSINESS: Edison International (formerly SCECorp) is a holding company for Southern California Edison Company (SCE), which supplies electricity to 5.1 mill. customers in a $50,000-\mathrm{sq}$.-mi. area in central, coastal, \& southern CA (excl. Los Angeles \& San Diego). Edison Energy is an energy svcs. co. Disc. Edison Mission Energy (independent power producer) in '12. Elec. rev. breakdown: resi-
Edison International's utility subsidiary has a general rate case pending. Southern California Edison filed for increases of $\$ 1.109$ billion ( $11.4 \%$ ) for 2021, $\$ 423$ million for 2022 , and $\$ 514$ million for 2023. The California Public Advocates proposed hikes of $\$ 458$ million in 2021, $\$ 242$ million in 2022 , and $\$ 250$ million in 2023 , and recommended the approval of roughly $90 \%$ of SCE's proposed capital spending. Even if an order doesn't come by yearend, any rate relief the utility receives will be retroactive to the start of 2021.
Our 2020 earnings estimate is below the company's targeted range of $\$ 4.32$ $\$ 4.62$ a share for "core" earnings. Edison International's guidance excludes charges the company books for the amortization expense stemming from a fund utilities contributed to in order to address the potentially huge liabilities associated with wildfires in California. This amounted to $\$ 60$ million after taxes in the March quarter. Note that the coronavirus should have little effect on the company's income because its revenues and volume are decoupled and it should be able to defer related costs for future recovery.
dential, 39\%; commercial, 43\%; industrial, 4\%; other, 14\%. Generating sources: nuclear, $8 \%$; gas, $7 \%$; hydro, $5 \%$; purchased, $80 \%$. Fuel costs: $39 \%$ of revs. '19 reported depr. rate: $3.6 \%$. Has 12,500 empls. Chairman: William P. Sullivan. Pres. \& CEO: Pedro J. Pizzaro. Inc.: CA. Address: 2244 Walnut Grove Ave., P.O. Box 976, Rosemead, CA 91770. Tel.: 626-302-2222. Web: www.edison.com.
The company has completed its financing plans for 2020. Earlier this year, the parent and SCE issued $\$ 2.7$ billion of long-term debt. Any debt the utility issues subsequently will be for refinancing. Edison International also sold $\$ 900$ million of common stock (up from $\$ 800$ million previously expected), and stated that its equity needs will be "minimal" beyond this year. Because of these significant financing moves, we estimate only a modest increase in share net next year, despite the benefit of rate relief from the aforementioned general rate case.
Wildfires in California continue to be an investment concern. The company took a big reserve in the fourth quarter of 2018 and a much-smaller charge in the same period of 2019 for potential liabilities stemming from wildfire damage. Additional charges might well occur. At least the aforementioned fund should help meet costs associated with future wildfires.
The stock's yield is about a percentage point above the utility average. Total return potential to $2023-2025$ is modest, but above average for the group. Paul E. Debbas, CFA

July 24, 2020

[^16] (\$1.12); '15, (\$1.18); '17, (\$1.37); '18, (15c); earnings report due late July. (B) Div'ds paid all'd on com. eq. in '20: $10.3 \%$; earned on avg. Price Growth Persistence '19, (214); gains (loss) from disc. ops.: '12, |late Jan., Apr., July, \& Oct. - Div'd reinv. plan com. eq., '19: 11.5\%. Regulatory Climate: Avg.
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BUSINESS: Entergy Corporation supplies electricity to 2.9 million customers through subsidiaries in Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Texas, and New Orleans (regulated separately from Louisiana). Distributes gas to 202,000 customers in Louisiana. Has a nonutility subsidiary that owns six nuclear units (four no longer operating). Electric revenue breakdown: residential, $38 \%$; commercial, 26\%; in-
Entergy's earnings are likely to decline this year. The fourth quarter of 2019 benefited from tax credits, which we included in our earnings presentation because the company has recorded similar benefits in previous years. In addition, Entergy's nonutility activities (primarily nonregulated nuclear units) lost $\$ 0.55$ a share in the first quarter of 2020. The company is exiting most of these operations and excludes these results from its 2020 earnings guidance of $\$ 5.45-\$ 5.75$, but we include these results. We cut our 2020 earnings estimate by $\$ 0.40$ a share, to $\$ 5.05$, because March-quarter results were below our $\$ 1.00$ estimate.
The company did not change its earnings guidance, despite the falloff in the economy. Management estimates the slump in commercial and industrial kilowatt-hour sales will reduce revenues by $\$ 120$ million- $\$ 140$ million this year, only partially offset by rising residential volume. In response, Entergy is cutting operating and maintenance expenses by $\$ 100$ million. The company's utilities are deferring for future recovery their costs associated with the coronavirus problem. En-
dustrial, $27 \%$; other, $9 \%$. Generating sources: gas, $40 \%$; nuclear, $28 \%$; coal, $6 \%$; purchased, $26 \%$. Fuel costs: $30 \%$ of revenues. ' 19 reported depreciation rate: $2.8 \%$. Has 13,600 employees. Chairman \& CEO: Leo P. Denault. Incorporated: Delaware. Address: 639 Loyola Avenue, P.O. Box 61000, New Orleans, Louisiana 70161. Telephone: 504-576-4000. Internet: www.entergy.com.
tergy's targeted range for 2021 profits remains \$5.80-\$6.10 a share. Our estimate is at the bottom end of this range.
Entergy Louisiana completed a gasfired generating plant in March, and three more gas-fired facilities are under construction. The new plant cost $\$ 872$ million for 994 megawatts of capacity. Entergy New Orleans is adding 128 mw at a cost of $\$ 210$ million, Entergy Louisiana is building a 361-mw facility for $\$ 261$ million, and Entergy Texas is constructing 993 mw at a cost of $\$ 937$ million. These facilities are still needed to meet customer demand, despite the recession, and will boost the company's earning power. The utilities will recover the costs of these projects either with a general rate case or through a formula rate plan.
The valuation of Entergy stock is about average for a utility. The dividend yield is close to the industry mean. The stock has declined $14 \%$ this year, a similar proportion to many utility issues. Total return potential is about average for the 18 -month span and unspectacular for the 3 - to 5 -year period.
Paul E. Debbas, CFA
June 12, 2020

[^17]| EVERGV, INC, NYSE-EVRG |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { ECENT } \\ & \text { RICE } \end{aligned}$ | $62$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { P/E } \\ & \text { RATIO } 23.8\binom{\text { Trailing: 23.1 }}{\text { Median:NMF }} \end{aligned}$ |  |  |  | $\begin{array}{\|l\|l\|} \hline \text { RELATIVE } \\ \text { P/E RATIO } \end{array}$ |  | $1 \text { YIV'D }$ | $3.4 \%$ |  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { VALUE } \\ & \text { LINE } \end{aligned}$ |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | High Low: | $\begin{aligned} & 61.1 \\ & 50.9 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \hline 67.8 \\ & 54.6 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 76.6 \\ & 42.0 \end{aligned}$ |  |  | Target Pric 2023 202 | Range 2025 |
|  |  |  |  | LEGENDS$\ldots$ Relative Price StrengthOptions: YesShaded area indicates recession |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 128 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 96 80 |
| 18-Month Target Price Range <br> Low-High Midpoint (\% to Mid) \$42-\$97 \$70 (10\%) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 64 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 48 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 32 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 24 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | -12 |
|  |  |  |  | Percent shares traded |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | T. RETURN 5/20 |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | ( 1 yr . | $\begin{array}{lr} 9.5 & -1.3 \\ - & 5.2 \end{array}$ |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | $18.7$ |  |
| Evergy, Inc. was formed through the merger of Great Plains Energy and Westar Energy in June of 2018. Great Plains Energy holders received .5981 of a share of Evergy for each of their shares, and Westar Energy holders received one share of Evergy for each of their shares. The merger was completed on June 4, 2018. Shares of Evergy began trading on the New York Stock Exchange one day later. |  |  |  |  |  | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 |  | JE LINE PUB. LLC | 23-25 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 16.75 | 22.71 | 21.35 | 22.25 | Reven | sper sh | 24.50 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 4.89 | 7.18 | 6.95 | 7.50 | "Cash | ow" per sh | 9.00 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 2.50 | 2.79 | 2.65 | 2.95 | Earnin | per sh A | 3.25 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 1.74 | 1.93 | 2.05 | 2.17 | Div'd | cl'd per sh B $\quad$ - | 2.55 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 4.19 | 5.34 | 6.90 | 7.20 | Cap'I | ending per sh | 6.00 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 39.28 | 37.82 | 38.40 | 39.15 | Book | lue per sh c | 41.50 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 255.33 | 226.64 | 227.00 | 227.00 | Comm | Shs Outst'g ${ }^{\text {D }}$ | 227.00 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 22.7 | 21.8 | Bold fig | res are | Avg An | IP/E Ratio | 20.5 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 1.23 | 1.17 |  |  | Relat | P/E Ratio | 1.15 |
| CAPITAL STRUCTURE as of $3 / 31 / 20$ Total Debt $\$ 10390$ mill. Due in 5 Yrs $\$ 3907.4$ mill. LT Debt $\$ 8993.5$ mill. LT Interest $\$ 377.7$ mill. Incl. \$47.9 mill. capitalized leases. (LT interest earned: 3.1x) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 3.1\% | 3.2\% |  |  | Avg A | Div'd Yield | 3.8\% |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 4275.9 | 5147.8 | 4850 | 5050 | Reve | (\$mill) | 5550 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 535.8 | 669.9 | 625 | 685 |  | t (\$mill) | 775 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 9.8\% | 12.6\% | 13.0\% | 13.0\% |  | Tax Rate | 13.0\% |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 2.5\% |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 40.0\% | 50.6\% | 51.5\% | 52.5\% | Long-T | $m$ Debt Ratio | 53.5\% |
| Pension Assets-12/19 \$1732.8 mill. <br> Oblig $\$ 2718.2$ mill. <br> Pfd Stock None |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 60.0\% | 49.4\% | 48.5\% | 47.5\% | Comm | Equity Ratio | 46.5\% |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 16716 | 17337 | 17925 | 18700 | Total | pital (\$mill) | 20300 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 18952 | 19346 | 19950 | 20550 | Net | (\$mill) | 21300 |
| Pfd Stock None |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 4.0\% | 4.8\% | 4.5\% | 4.5\% | Return | Total Cap'I | 5.0\% |
| Common Stock 226,740,469 shs. as of $5 / 1 / 20$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 5.3\% | 7.8\% | 7.0\% | 7.5\% | Return | Shr. Equity | 8.0\% |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 5.3\% | 7.8\% | 7.0\% | 7.5\% | Retur | Com Equity E |  |
| MARKET CAP: $\mathbf{\$ 1 4}$ billion (Large Cap) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | .6\% | 2.4\% | 1.5\% | 2.0\% | Reta | to Com Eq | 2.0\% |
| ELECTRIC OPERATING STATISTICS |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 89\% | 69\% | 75\% | 72\% | All Div | to Net Prof | 75\% |
|  | Retail Sales (K |  |  |  |  |  |  | BUSINESS: Evergy, Inc. was formed through the merger of Great Plains Energy and Westar Energy in June of 2018. Through its subsidiaries (now doing business under the Evergy name), provides electric service to 1.6 million customers in Kansas and Missouri, including the greater Kansas City area. Electric revenue breakdown: residential, $37 \%$; commercial, $35 \%$; industrial, $12 \%$; wholesale, $7 \%$; |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | Ge | rating | ource | coal | \%; nuclear, |  |
| Avg. Indus | Use (MWH) |  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { NA } \end{aligned}$ |  | NA |  | 29\%. |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | uel costs: | 25\% | f reve | s. '19 reported | deprec. |
| Avg. Indus | t. Revs. per KW |  | NA | $7.11$ | 7.25 | rate: 3\% | Has 4, |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 600 emp | loyees. | Chairm | : Mark A. Ruelle | Presi- |
| Capacity Load | Summer (Mw) |  | NA |  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { NA } \\ & \text { N } \end{aligned}$ | dent 8 | Chief E |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | cutive O | Ificer: T | erry Ba | ham. Incorpora | d: Mis- |
| Annual Loa | ad Factor (\%) |  |  |  | NA | souri. | ddress: |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 1200 Ma | in Str | t, Kan | City, Missour | 64105. |
| \% Change | Customeis yre |  | NA |  | NA | Tel.: | 56-2 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | Int | t: ww | verg | com. |  |
| Fixed Charge Cov. (\%) NA 322305 |  |  |  |  |  | review of Evergy has |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | decl | ne an | a | proba | le i | rease in | bad- |
| ANNUAL RATES Past <br> of change (per sh) Past <br> 10 Yrs. <br> 5 Yrs. <br> to 2019    |  |  |  |  |  | delayed two months. In January, Elliott debt expense because utilities are not disManagement, an activist investor group, connecting customers for nonpayment. took a stake in the company (equivalent to Management is not providing earnings |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Revenues " -- -- 1.5\% |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  | . | 11.3 million shares) because it felt Evergy |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | guida | nce d | ue to |  | rate | c review. |  |
| Earnings -- -- $3.0 \%$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | We think profits in 2021 will be much |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Dividends Book Value |  |  |  | $--\quad 5.5 \%$$--\quad 2.0 \%$ |  | direc | tors | uppor | ted b | y Elli | tt to | its boa | ard. | impr | oved. | We | assum | no | mal weath |  |
| $\begin{array}{\|c} \text { Cal- } \\ \text { endar } \end{array}$ | QUARTERLY REVENUES (\$ mill.) |  |  |  |  | The new directors are part of a four-man Strategic Review \& Operations Committee |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | the first quarter and a better economy. Also, the March-period comparison will |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | Mar. 31 | Jun. 30 | $\text { Sep. } 30$ | $\text { Dec. } 31$ | Year |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2017 |  |  |  |  |  | that | will | make | a reco | mme | ndatio | n by | July | benefit from the absence of the charge forthe headcount reduction. Even so, we |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2018 | 600.2 | 893.4 | 1582.5 | 1199.8 | 4275.9 | 30th, which the board will vote on by Au- |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2019 | 1216.9 | 1221.7 | 1577.6 | 1131.6 | 5147.8 | gust | 17th | The | se da | tes a | re two | o mo | aths | lower | ed our | $r$ esti | mate | by | . 30 a shar | e, to |
| 2020 | 1116.71200 | 1100 | 1533.3 | 31100 | 4850 | later than the original schedule due to the turmoil in the markets. Evergy has al- |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | \$2.95, because growth will be coming off a |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2021 |  | 1200 | 1550 | 1100 | 5050 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | lower base. |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { Cal- } \\ & \text { endar } \end{aligned}$ | EARNINGS PER SHARE A |  |  |  |  | $\$ 1.5$ billion and ended its stock-repurchase |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | Evergy stock has a dividend yield that is about average, by utility standards. |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | Mar. 31 | Jun. 30 | Sep. 30 | Dec. 31 | Year |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2017 |  |  |  |  |  | We cut our 2020 earnings estimate by |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | There is some speculative appeal due to |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | . 42 | . 56 | 1.32 | . 07 | 2.50 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | the p | ossibi | lity th | hat a | sale | of the com | pany |
| 2019 | . 39 | . 57 | 1.56 | . 28 | 2.79 | \$0.45 a share, to \$2.65. First-quarter |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | will emerge from the strategic review. We |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2020 | . 31 | . 49 | 1.55 | . 30 | 2.65 | profits fell short of our \$0.45-a-share es- |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | think this is why the price has declined $3 \%$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | . 45 | . 60 | 1.60 | . 30 | 2.95 | tima | de du | main | nly to | a \$2 | mill | ion pr |  |  |  |  |  |  | cks in the |  |
| Calendar | QUARTERLY DIVIDENDS PAID ${ }^{\text {® }}$ |  |  |  |  | charge for a voluntary severance plan. |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | tric utility industry. The equity's total re- |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | Mar. 31 Jun. 30 Sep. 30 Dec. 31 |  |  |  | Year | Winter weather patterns were milder than normal. Furthermore, the economic de- |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | turn potential is subpar for the 18-month |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2016 | -- | .- | -. | .- |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | span and the period to 2023-2025. It is unranked for Timeliness due to its short |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | cline is |  | Furthermore, the economic dehurting kilowatt-hour sales. |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2018 | . 40 | . 40 | . 46 | . 475 | 1.74 | Weather-adjusted volume declined 8\% in |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | trading history since Evergy was formed |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2019 | . 475 | . 475 |  |  | 1.93 | April. Evergy is stepping up its costreduction efforts in response to the sales |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2020 | . 505 | . 505 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | Paul | $E . D e$ | bbas, | CFA |  | June 12, | 2020 |

[^18]


| Calendar | QUARTERLY REVENUES(\$ mill.) |  |  |  | Full Year |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Mar. 31 | Jun. 30 | Sep. 30 | Dec. 31 |  |
| 2017 | 302.6 | 333.0 | 408.3 | 305.6 | 1349.5 |
| 2018 | 310.1 | 340.0 | 408.8 | 311.9 | 1370.8 |
| 2019 | 350.3 | 316.9 | 386.3 | 292.9 | 1346.4 |
| 2020 | 291.0 | 309 | 375 | 275 | 1250 |
| 2021 | 305 | 325 | 385 | 285 | 1300 |
| Calendar | Mar. 31 | RNINGS P | ER SHAR | $\begin{aligned} & \mathrm{A} \\ & \text { Dec. } 31 \end{aligned}$ | Full Year |
| 2017 | . 66 | . 99 | 1.80 | . 76 | 4.21 |
| 2018 | . 72 | 1.23 | 2.02 | . 52 | 4.49 |
| 2019 | . 84 | 1.05 | 1.78 | . 93 | 4.61 |
| 2020 | . 74 | 1.10 | 1.90 | . 81 | 4.55 |
| 2021 | . 85 | 1.15 | 2.00 | . 75 | 4.75 |
| Cal- | QUARTERLY DIVIDENDS PAID ${ }^{\text {B }} \dagger \dagger$ |  |  |  | Full |
| endar | Mar. 31 | Jun. 30 | Sep. 30 | Dec. 31 | Year |
| 2016 | . 51 | . 51 | . 51 | . 55 | 2.08 |
| 2017 | . 55 | . 55 | . 55 | . 59 | 2.24 |
| 2018 | . 59 | . 59 | . 59 | . 63 | 2.40 |
| 2019 | . 63 | . 63 | . 63 | . 67 | 2.56 |
| 2020 | . 67 | . 67 |  |  |  |

BUSINESS: IDACORP, Inc. is a holding company for Idaho Power Company, a regulated electric utility that serves 572,000 customers throughout a 24,000 -square-mile area in southern Idaho and eastern Oregon (population: 1.2 million). Most of the company's revenues are derived from the Idaho portion of its service area. Revenue breakdown: residential, $39 \%$; commercial, $22 \%$; industrial,
IDACORP's utility subsidiary, Idaho Power, is faring better than many other utilities during the coronavirus problem. The company's service area has numerous food processing and agriculturerelated businesses, which continued to operate even as some industries were shut down temporarily. In fact, Moody's estimates that the economy of the utility's service territory will grow $0.7 \%$ this year, which is good considering that the U.S. economy is in a recession. Customer growth for the 12 -month period that ended on March 31st was $2.6 \%$, which is well above the norm (slightly below 1\%) for electric companies. Upon reporting firstquarter results, IDACORP maintained its 2020 earnings guidance of $\$ 4.45-\$ 4.65$ a share, and we did not change our estimate of $\$ 4.55$ a share. This would amount to a slight decline from the 2019 tally of $\$ 4.61$ a share, which benefited from an unusually high fourth-quarter showing.
We expect record profits in 2021. The economy will likely be much better, with Moody's estimating economic growth of $5.0 \%$ in Idaho Power's service area. This 5 -year period. should enable the utility's healthy custom-
$13 \%$; irrigation, $10 \%$; other, $16 \%$. Generating sources: hydro, $45 \%$; coal, $16 \%$; gas, $11 \%$; purchased, $28 \%$. Fuel costs: $33 \%$ of revenues. '19 reported depreciation rate: 2.9\%. Has 2,000 employees. Chairman: Richard J. Dahl. President \& CEO: Lisa Grow. Incorporated: Idaho. Address: 1221 W. Idaho St., Boise, Idaho 83702. Telephone: 208-388-2200. Internet: www.idacorpinc.com.
er growth to continue. The company might well benefit from an increase in datacenter customers, now that the state has eliminated the sales tax on data centers. Our estimate of $\$ 4.75$ a share would produce a $4 \%$ increase.
A regulatory mechanism is available to stabilize the utility's income, if needed. Idaho Power may use up to $\$ 25$ million of accumulated deferred investment tax credits annually if its return on equity falls below $9.4 \%$. The company does not expect to use any of these credits in order to attain its earnings target for 2020.
The board of directors will probably raise the dividend in September. IDACORP's target for a payout ratio is $60 \%-70 \%$, and management plans to recommend to the board annual increases of at least $5 \%$. We estimate a hike of $\$ 0.05$ a share ( $7.5 \%$ ) quarterly.
The stock price is down $15 \%$ in 2020. This is less than many utility issues. The dividend yield is below the utility mean. Total return potential is below the median for both the $18-$ month span and the 3 - to

Paul E. Debbas, CFA

[^19]'05, (24¢); '06, 17c. '17 \& '19 earnings don't ment plan available. $\dagger$ Shareholder investment in '11: 10\% (imputed); earned on avg. com. Stock's Price Stability sum due to rounding. Next earnings report due plan available. (C) Incl. intangibles. In '19: eq., '19: 9.6\%. Regulatory Climate: Above late July. (B) Dividends historically paid in late $\$ 26.31 / \mathrm{sh}$. (D) In millions. (E) Rate base: Net Average.
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|  |  |  | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  | +3.8 | +2.9 | +4.6 |
| \% Change Retail Sales (KWH) Avg. Indust. Use (MWH) |  |  | 30987 | 34573 | 37808 |
| Avg. Indust. Revs. per KWH (c) |  |  | NA | NA | NA |
| Capacity at Paak (Mw) |  |  | NA | NA | NA |
| Peak Load, Winter (Mw) |  |  | 2133 | 2173 | 2237 |
|  |  |  | NA | NA | NA |
|  |  |  | +1.3 | +1.2 | +1.2 |
| Fixed Charge Cov. (\%) |  |  | 275 |  | 284 |
| ANNUAL RATES |  | Past | Past Est'd '17-'19 |  |  |
|  |  | 10 Yrs. |  |  | '23-25 |
| "Revenues |  | -2.5\% |  | \% | 1.0\% |
| "Cash Flow Earnings |  | 5.0\% |  | \% | 2.5\% |
|  |  | 7.0\% |  | \% \% | 1.5\% |
| Divid |  | 5.5\% |  | 5\% | 4.0\% |
|  |  | 6.0\% |  | \%\% | 3.0\% |
| Calendar | QUARTERLY REVENUES (\$ mill.) |  |  |  | Full |
|  | Mar. 31 | Jun. 30 | Sep. 30 |  | Year |
| 2017 | 367.3 | 283.9 | 309.9 | 344.6 | 1305.7 |
| 2018 | 341.5 | 261.8 | 279.9 | 314.9 | 1198.1 |
| 2019 | 384.2 | 270.7 | 274.8 | 328.2 | 1257.9 |
| 2020 | 335.3 | 254.7 | 290 | 320 | 1200 |
| 2021 | 355 | 270 | 295 | 330 | 1250 |
| Calendar | EARNINGS PER SHARE A |  |  |  | Full Year |
|  | Mar. 31 | Jun. 30 | Sep. 30 | Dec. 31 |  |
| 2017 | 1.17 | . 44 | . 75 | . 98 | 3.34 |
| 2018 | 1.18 | . 61 | . 56 | 1.06 | 3.40 |
| 2019 | 1.44 | . 49 | . 42 | 1.18 | 3.53 |
| 2020 | 1.00 | . 45 | . 65 | 1.20 | 3.30 |
| 2021 | 1.15 | . 50 | . 65 | 1.20 | 3.50 |
| Calendar | QUARTERLY DIVIDENDS PAID ${ }^{\text {B }} \dagger$ |  |  |  |  |
|  | Mar. 31 | Jun. 30 | Sep. 30 | Dec. 31 | Year |
| 2016 | . 50 | . 50 | . 50 | . 50 | 2.00 |
| 2017 | . 525 | . 525 | . 525 | . 525 | 2.10 |
| 2018 | . 55 | . 55 | . 55 | . 55 | 2.20 |
| 2019 | . 575 | . 575 | . 575 | . 575 | 2.30 |
| 2020 | . 60 | . 60 |  |  |  |

BUSINESS: NorthWestern Corporation (doing business as NorthWestern Energy) supplies electricity \& gas in the Upper Midwest and Northwest, serving 443,000 electric customers in Montana and South Dakota and 292,000 gas customers in Montana ( $85 \%$ of gross margin), South Dakota (14\%), and Nebraska (1\%). Electric revenue breakdown: residential, $39 \%$; commercial, $47 \%$; industrial,
Upon reporting first-quarter earnings in late April, NorthWestern cut its guidance for 2020. Previously, the company expected share net to wind up in a range of \$3.45-\$3.60. Now, management's target is $\$ 3.30-\$ 3.45$. This is only partly due to the economic weakness caused by the coronavirus, which was felt most noticeably in the second quarter. Firstperiod profits fell short of management's expectation due to some unusual costs. NorthWestern bases its guidance on normal weather, but we note that a mild winter reduced share earnings by $\$ 0.06$. Putting it all together, we lowered our 2020 earnings estimate from $\$ 3.45$ a share to $\$ 3.30$. Because growth in 2021 will come off a lower base, we trimmed our estimate from $\$ 3.55$ a share to $\$ 3.50$.
The utility needs additional generating capacity. NorthWestern has more exposure to the purchased-power markets than other electric companies in the region. The utility intends to build a gasfired facility in South Dakota, which will add about 60 megawatts of capacity in late 2021 at an expected cost of $\$ 80$ million. NorthWestern also agreed to pay 50 cents

4\%; other, $10 \%$. Generating sources: hydro, $34 \%$; coal, $28 \%$; wind, $5 \%$; other, $3 \%$; purchased, $30 \%$. Fuel costs: $25 \%$ of revenues. ' 19 reported deprec. rate: $2.8 \%$. Has 1,500 employees. Chairman: Stephen P. Adik. President \& CEO: Robert C. Rowe. Inc.: Delaware. Address: 3010 West 69th Street, Sioux Falls, South Dakota 57108. Tel.: 605-978-2900. Internet: www.northwesternenergy.com.
to Puget Sound Energy for a $12.5 \%$ stake ( 92.5 mw ) in Unit 4 of the Colstrip coalfired plant. NorthWestern would sell 45 mw back to Puget Sound Energy and use the remainder to serve its customers. (This deal was originally twice the size, but was halved after another company exercised its purchase option.) The transaction requires the approval of the Montana commission. NorthWestern issued a request for proposals for up to 280 mw of peaking and intermediate capacity for commercial operation in early 2023. The successful project(s) are expected to be selected by early 2021.
The company added some debt in April, and plans to add some equity as well. In the second quarter, NorthWestern issued a $\$ 100$ million term loan and $\$ 150$ million of long-term debt. The company plans to issue common equity, possibly in late 2020 but more likely in 2021.
The stock's yield is above the utility average. The price has fallen $26 \%$ in 2020, affected by the cut in earnings guidance. Total return potential is strong for the 18 -month span, but not as impressive for the 3- to 5 -year period.
Paul E. Debbas, CFA
Paul E. Debbas, CFA

## (A) Diluted EPS. Excl. gain (loss) on disc. ops.: $\quad$ July. (B) Div'ds historically paid in late Mar., $\begin{aligned} & \text { allowed on com. eq. in MT in '19 (elec.): } \\ & \text { Company's Financial Strength }\end{aligned}$

 '15, 27¢;' '18, 524 ; '19, 45c. '18 EPS don't sum avail. (C) Incl. def'd charges. In '19: $\$ 16.68 / \mathrm{sh}$. $\operatorname{spec.\text {.;inNEin'07:}10.4\% \text {;earnedonavg.PriceGrowthPersistence}}$ due to rounding. Next earnings report due late $\mid$ (D) In mill. (E) Rate base: Net orig. cost. Rate $\mid$ com. eq., '19: $9.0 \%$. Reg. Climate: Below Avg. © 2020 Value Line, Inc. All rights reserved. Factual material is obtained from sources believed to be reliable and is provided without warranties of any kind.
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| Cal- <br> endar | QUARTERLY REVENUES (\$ mill.) <br> Mar.31 |  |  | Full <br> Yun.30 |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2017 | 456.0 | 586.4 | 716.8 | 501.9 | 2261.1 |
| 2018 | 492.7 | 567.0 | 698.8 | 511.8 | 2270.3 |
| 2019 | 490.0 | 513.7 | 755.4 | 472.5 | 2231.6 |
| 2020 | 431.3 | 503.5 | 715.2 | 450 | 2100 |
| 2021 | 500 | 550 | 750 | 500 | 2300 |
| Cal- | EARNINGS PER SHARE A |  |  |  | Full |
| endar | Mar.31 | Jun.30 | Sep.30 | Dec. 31 | Year |
| 2017 | .18 | .52 | .92 | .30 | 1.92 |
| 2018 | .27 | .55 | 1.02 | .27 | 2.12 |
| 2019 | .24 | .50 | 1.25 | .26 | 2.24 |
| 2020 | .23 | .51 | 1.13 | .23 | 2.10 |
| 2021 | .25 | .55 | 1.20 | .25 | 2.25 |
| Cal- | QUARTERLY DIVIDENDS PAID B |  |  |  |  |

BUSINESS: OGE Energy Corp. is a holding company for Oklahoma Gas and Electric Company (OG\&E), which supplies electricity to 858,000 customers in Oklahoma ( $84 \%$ of electric revenues) and western Arkansas (8\%); wholesale is (8\%). Owns $25.5 \%$ of Enable Midstream Partners. Electric revenue breakdown: residential, 40\%; commercial, $23 \%$; industrial, $10 \%$; oilfield, $9 \%$; other, $18 \%$. Genera-
The price of Enable Midstream Partners stock continues to affect the price of OGE Energy stock. OGE has a $25.5 \%$ stake in the midstream natural gas master limited partnership. Enable has been hurt by reduced activity in the gas and oil sector this year, so its units have lost nearly $50 \%$ of their value since the start of 2020. The distributions that OGE receives from Enable have been halved. In addition, OGE took a pretax charge of $\$ 780$ million in the first quarter to write down the value of its stake in Enable. (There will be tax adjustments throughout the remainder of 2020 , and the company expects the aftertax nonrecurring charge for the full year to amount to $\$ 590$ million.) The price of OGE stock has fallen $28 \%$ this year, making this one of the worst-performing equities in the electric utility industry.

## We cut our 2020 earnings estimate by

 $\$ 0.05$ a share, to \$2.10. June-quarter profits were a bit below our estimate. Our revised estimate is near the low end of OGE's targeted range of \$2.08-\$2.18 a share, which is unchanged. Earnings are likely to fall short of the 2019 tally due toting sources: gas, $35 \%$; coal, $15 \%$; wind, $5 \%$; purchased, $45 \%$. Fuel costs: $35 \%$ of revenues. '19 reported depreciation rate (utility): $2.7 \%$. Has 2,400 employees. Chairman, President and Chief Executive Officer: Sean Trauschke. Incorporated: Oklahoma. Address: 321 North Harvey, P.O. Box 321, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 731010321. Telephone: 405-553-3000. Internet: www.oge.com.
a decline in equity income from OGE's stake in Enable. Oklahoma Gas and Electric has held up well despite the coronavirus problem. Oklahoma has a relatively low unemployment rate, and OG\&E received permission to defer for future recovery its coronavirus-related costs in Oklahoma and Arkansas. A better economy ought to help earnings rebound in 2021.
OG\&E is awaiting a regulatory decision in Oklahoma. The utility is asking the state regulators to approve an $\$ 810$ million grid modernization plan. The company wants to recover the costs through a rider (surcharge) on customers' bills. A ruling is expected by yearend.
A dividend increase is likely later this month, effective with the October payment. We estimate a boost of $\$ 0.09$ a share $(5,8 \%)$ in the annual disbursement, and project similar dividend growth over the 3 - to 5 -year period.
This stock has an attractive yield. This is more than one percentage point above the utility average. Total return potential is strong for the 18 -month period and respectable for the pull to 2023-2025.
Paul E. Debbas, CFA September 11, 2020
(A) Diluted EPS. Excl. nonrecurring gain (losses): '04, (3c); '115, (334))' '17, \$1.18; '19,
(8c); ' 20 , (\$2.95); gains on discont. ops.: '05, 254;' '06, 20c. '18 \& '19 EPS don't sum due to
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| rounding. Next earnings report due early Nov. | $\begin{array}{l}\text { mill., adj. for split. (E) Rate base: Net original } \\ \text { (B) Div'ds historically paid in late Jan. Apr } \\ \text { cost } \\ \text { Rate allowed }\end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{l}\text { Company's Financial Strength }\end{array}$ |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Stock's Price Stability |  |  | (B) Div'ds historically paid in late Jan., Apr., cost. Rate allowed on com. eq. in OK in '19: July, \& Oct. - Div'd reinvestment plan avail. (C) $9.5 \%$; in AR in '18: 9.5\%; earned on avg. com.

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|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | RECENTPRICE $\mathbf{4 2 0 0}$ |  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { P/E } \\ & \text { RATIO } 20.5\binom{\text { Trailing: } 19.8}{\text { Median: } 22.0} \end{aligned}$ |  |  |  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { RELATIVE } \\ & \text { P/E RATIO } \\ & \hline 1.04 \end{aligned} \left\lvert\, \begin{array}{ll} \text { DIV'D } & \mathbf{3 . 6} \\ \text { YLD } & \mathbf{3} \end{array}\right.$ |  |  |  |  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { VALUE } \\ & \text { LINE } \end{aligned}$ |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|    <br> TIMELINESS $\mathbf{3}$ Lowered 3／1／19  <br> SAFETY $\mathbf{2}$ Raised $6 / 17 / 16$ <br> TECHNICAL 3 Raised $5 / 8 / 20$  <br> BETA $.85 \quad$（ 1.00 ＝Market）   |  |  |  | High： Low： | 25.4 15.5 | 25.4 18.2 | 23.5 17.5 | 25.3 20.7 | $\begin{aligned} & 31.9 \\ & 25.2 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 32.7 \\ & 26.5 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 33.4 \\ & 24.8 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 42.6 \\ & 25.8 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 48.7 \\ & 35.7 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 51.9 \\ & 39.0 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 57.7 \\ & 45.9 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 56.9 \\ & 31.0 \end{aligned}$ |  |  | Target Pric 2023202 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Range } \\ & 10025 \end{aligned}$ |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | $-80$ |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | －60 |
| 18－Month Target Price Range <br> Low－High Midpoint（\％to Mid） $\$ 37-\$ 74 \quad \$ 56 \text { (30\%) }$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 40 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | $1{ }^{1+}$ | － |  |  |  |  |  | $-30$ |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | Tいい |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | －30 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | 1111 | 听 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 20 |
| 2023－25 PROJECTIONS    <br>    Ann＇I Total <br> Hice Gain Return  <br> High 60 $(+45 \%)$ $12 \%$ <br> Low 45 $(+5 \%)$ $6 \%$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 15 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | －10 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | －7．5 |
| Institutional Decisions |  |  |  |  | $\left.\right\|_{1}\| \|\| \|\| \| \\|_{11}\| \| \mid$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | RETURN 5／20 |  |
|  | 302019 | 4 Q2019 | 1 Q2020 | Percent |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | $\begin{array}{cc}\text { STOCK } & \text { INDEX } \\ -11.5 & -1.3\end{array}$ |  |
| to Buy | $\begin{aligned} & 88 \\ & 61 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 85 \\ & 69 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 78 \\ & 84 \end{aligned}$ | shares <br> traded |  |  | I | I |  | ， |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 1 yr. 3 yr. | 11.5 -1.3 <br> 16.6 5.2 <br> 10.6  | － |
| Hld＇s＇（000） | 18133 | 18484 | 18228 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 5 yr ． | 86.618 .7 |  |
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | ${ }^{\text {© }} \mathrm{V}$ | UE LINE PUB．LLC | 23－25 |
| 30.45 | 35.59 | 37.43 | 41.50 | 37.06 | 29.03 | 31.08 | 29.86 | 23.76 | 24.63 | 21.48 | 20.60 | 20.42 | 21.47 | 23.10 | 22.90 | 20.70 | 22.60 | Reve | s per sh | 26.50 |
| 2.88 | 3.35 | 3.39 | 3.55 | 2.81 | 2.76 | 2.60 | 2.36 | 2.71 | 3.02 | 3.09 | 3.14 | 3.44 | 3.70 | 3.96 | 4.11 | 4.00 | 4.25 | ＂Cas | low＂per sh | 5.00 |
| 1.50 | 1.78 | 1.69 | 1.78 | 1.09 | ． 71 | ． 38 | ． 45 | 1.05 | 1.37 | 1.55 | 1.56 | 1.60 | 1.86 | 2.06 | 2.17 | 2.05 | 2.20 | Earni | sper sh A | 2.50 |
| 1.10 | 1.12 | 1.15 | 1.17 | 1.19 | 1.19 | 1.19 | 1.19 | 1.19 | 1.19 | 1.21 | 1.23 | 1.25 | 1.28 | 1.34 | 1.40 | 1.48 | 1.56 | Div＇d D | cl＇d per sh B ■ | 1.80 |
| 1.72 | 2.04 | 2.35 | 5.43 | 7.51 | 4.95 | 2.38 | 2.04 | 3.20 | 4.53 | 4.40 | 4.23 | 4.10 | 3.36 | 2.66 | 5.16 | 9.30 | 3.40 | Cap＇ | eending per sh | 2.75 |
| 14.81 | 15.80 | 16.67 | 17.55 | 19.14 | 18.78 | 17.57 | 15.83 | 14.43 | 14.75 | 15.39 | 15.98 | 17.03 | 17.62 | 18.38 | 19.46 | 20.60 | 21.20 | Book | lue per sh C | 23.25 |
| 28.98 | 29.40 | 29.52 | 29.85 | 35.38 | 35.81 | 36.00 | 36.10 | 36.17 | 36.27 | 37.22 | 37.86 | 39.35 | 39.56 | 39.66 | 40.16 | 41.50 | 41.60 | Com | Shs Outst＇g ${ }^{\text {D }}$ | 41.50 |
| 17.3 | 15.4 | 17.3 | 19.0 | 30.1 | 31.2 | 55.1 | 47.5 | 21.7 | 21.1 | 18.8 | 18.2 | 20.2 | 22.1 | 22.2 | 23.5 | Bold fig | ures are | Avg | ＇I P／E Ratio | 20.5 |
| ． 91 | ． 82 | ． 93 | 1.01 | 1.81 | 2.08 | 3.51 | 2.98 | 1.38 | 1.19 | ． 99 | ． 92 | 1.06 | 1.11 | 1.20 | 1.26 | Value | Line | Relativ | P／E Ratio | 1.15 |
| 4．2\％ | 4．1\％ | 3．9\％ | 3．5\％ | 3．6\％ | 5．4\％ | 5．7\％ | 5．6\％ | 5．2\％ | 4．1\％ | 4．1\％ | 4．3\％ | 3．9\％ | 3．1\％ | 2．9\％ | 2．7\％ | estim |  | Avg An | ＇I Div＇d Yield | 3．5\％ |
| CAPITAL STRUCTURE as of $3 / 31 / 20$ <br> Total Debt $\$ 744.5$ mill．Due in 5 Yrs $\$ 190.3$ mill． LT Debt $\$ 724.3$ mill．LT Interest $\$ 33.8$ mill． <br> （LT interest earned：4．1x） |  |  |  |  |  | 1119.1 | 1077.9 | 859.2 | 893.3 | 799.3 | 779.8 | 803.5 | 849.4 | 916.4 | 919.5 | 860 | 940 | Rev | （\＄mill） | 1115 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | 13.6 | 16.4 | 39.0 | 50.2 | 56.9 | 58.6 | 62.0 | 73.9 | 82.3 | 86.8 | 85.0 | 90.0 | Net P | it（\＄mill） | 110 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | $\cdots$ | 14．5\％ | 5．2\％ | 21．3\％ | 22．5\％ | 27．0\％ | 24．5\％ | 25．5\％ | 15．0\％ | 16．7\％ | 18．0\％ | 18．0\％ | Incom | Tax Rate | 18．0\％ |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | ．6\％ | 3．8\％ | 1．7\％ | 5．6\％ | 3．9\％ | 3．5\％ | 2．2\％ | 2．3\％ | 4．1\％ | 4．9\％ | 9．0\％ | 4．0\％ | AFUD | \％to Net Profit | 3．0\％ |
| Leases，Uncapitalized Annual rentals $\$ 22.3$ mill． Pension Assets－12／19 \＄329．8 mill． |  |  |  |  |  | 40．2\％ | 44．6\％ | 44．0\％ | 42．1\％ | 46．5\％ | 42．4\％ | 43．0\％ | 41．3\％ | 44．7\％ | 46．9\％ | 42．0\％ | 45．5\％ | Long | rm Debt Ratio | 47．0\％ |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | 58．4\％ | 54．0\％ | 54．4\％ | 57．9\％ | 53．5\％ | 57．6\％ | 57．0\％ | 58．7\％ | 55．3\％ | 53．1\％ | 58．0\％ | 54．5\％ | Com | Equity Ratio | 53．0\％ |
| Pfd Stock None |  |  |  |  |  | 1083.3 | 1058.9 | 959.2 | 924.4 | 1071.3 | 1051.0 | 1175.4 | 1187.3 | 1318.9 | 1471.1 | 1480 | 1615 | Total | pital（\＄mill） | 1850 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | 1108.7 | 1077.5 | 1049.5 | 1167.0 | 1268.5 | 1387.8 | 1477.2 | 1539.6 | 1581.1 | 1753.8 | 2060 | 2115 | Net P | t（\＄mill） | 2275 |
| Common Stock 40，416，779 shs． as of $4 / 30 / 20$ |  |  |  |  |  | 2．7\％ | 3．2\％ | 5．7\％ | 6．8\％ | 6．7\％ | 6．8\％ | 6．5\％ | 7．3\％ | 7．3\％ | 7．0\％ | 6．5\％ | 6．5\％ | Retur | on Total Cap＇l | 7．0\％ |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | 2．1\％ | 2．8\％ | 7．3\％ | 9．4\％ | 9．9\％ | 9．7\％ | 9．3\％ | 10．6\％ | 11．3\％ | 11．1\％ | 10．0\％ | 10．5\％ | Return | on Shr．Equity E | 11．0\％ |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | 2．0\％ | 2．7\％ | 7．3\％ | 9．3\％ | 9．9\％ | 9．7\％ | 9．3\％ | 10．6\％ | 11．3\％ | 11．1\％ | 10．0\％ | 10．5\％ | Retur | n Com Equity | 11．0\％ |
| MARKET CAP：$\$ 1.7$ billion（Mid Cap） |  |  |  |  |  | NMF | NMF | NMF | 1．2\％ | 2．2\％ | 2．0\％ | 2．1\％ | 3．3\％ | 4．0\％ | 4．0\％ | 3．0\％ | 3．0\％ | Retain | to Com Eq | 3．5\％ |
| ELECTRIC OPERATING STATISTICS$2017 \quad 2018 \quad 2019$ |  |  |  |  |  | NMF | NMF | 113\％ | 87\％ | 78\％ | 79\％ | 78\％ | 69\％ | 65\％ | 64\％ | 72\％ | 70\％ | All Div | s to Net Prof | 69\％ |



| Cal－ | QUARTERLY REVENUES（\＄mill．） |  |  |  | Full Year |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| endar | Mar． 31 | Jun． 30 | Sep． 30 | $\text { Dec. } 31$ |  |
| 2017 | 214.1 | 212.1 | 216.5 | 206.7 | 849.4 |
| 2018 | 241.2 | 226.3 | 227.7 | 221.2 | 916.4 |
| 2019 | 246.0 | 229.2 | 228.6 | 215.7 | 919.5 |
| 2020 | 234.7 | 200 | 215 | 210.3 | 860 |
| 2021 | 250 | 235 | 235 | 220 | 940 |
| Cal－ endar | Mar． 31 | RNINGS Jun． 30 | ER SHAR Sep． 30 | $\text { Dec. } 31$ | Full Year |
| 2017 | ． 49 | ． 42 | ． 45 | ． 50 | 1.86 |
| 2018 | ． 66 | ． 47 | ． 58 | ． 35 | 2.06 |
| 2019 | ． 66 | ． 39 | ． 62 | ． 51 | 2.17 |
| 2020 | ． 60 | ． 35 | ． 60 | ． 50 | 2.05 |
| 2021 | ． 65 | ． 40 | ． 65 | ． 50 | 2.20 |
| Cal－ endar | QUAR <br> Mar． 31 | TERLY DIV Jun． 30 | IDENDS P Sep． 30 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { AID }^{\mathrm{B}} \quad \\ & \mathrm{Dec}^{2} 31 \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ | Full Year |
| 2016 | ． 3125 | ． 3125 | ． 3125 | ． 3125 | 1.25 |
| 2017 | ． 32 | ． 32 | ． 32 | ． 32 | 1.28 |
| 2018 | ． 335 | ． 335 | ． 335 | ． 335 | 1.34 |
| 2019 | ． 35 | ． 35 | ． 35 | ． 35 | 1.40 |
| 2020 | ． 37 | ． 37 |  |  |  |

BUSINESS：Otter Tail Corporation is the parent of Otter Tail Power
Company，which supplies electricity to 132,000 customers in Minnesota（ $52 \%$ of retail electric revenues），North Dakota（38\％）， and South Dakota（10\％）．Electric rev．breakdown：residential， $32 \%$ ； commercial \＆farms， $36 \%$ ；industrial， $30 \%$ ；other， $2 \%$ ．Generating sources：coal， $45 \%$ ；wind \＆hydro， $8 \%$ ；other， $1 \%$ ；purchased， $46 \%$ ．
Otter Tail Corporation cut its earn－ ings guidance for 2020．This is due to the effects of the weak economy，which is especially hurting the Manufacturing seg－ ment．Many customers of this division＇s businesses have had to close their facilities temporarily．Backlog is down，too．The division contributed $\$ 0.32$ a share to the bottom line in 2019，and when manage－ ment issued its 2020 earnings guidance of \＄2．22－\＄2．37 a share in February，it expect－ ed profits of $\$ 0.31-\$ 0.35$ a share from Manufacturing．In May，this was slashed to $\$ 0.14-\$ 0.23$ a share．As for Otter Tail Power，the economic troubles are hurting many of its industrial customers，and the suspension of shutoffs for nonpayment will cause bad－debt expense to rise．In res－ ponse to these difficulties，the company is cutting costs．But there is only so much this can do，so Otter Tail reduced its 2020 earnings target to $\$ 2.00-\$ 2.25$ a share．
We lowered our 2020 and 2021 share－ earnings estimates by $\$ 0.20$ and $\$ 0.15$ ， respectively．Demand from Otter Tail＇s customers isn＇t likely to bounce back to normal even as the economy continues to
recover next year．

Fuel costs： $14 \%$ of revenues．Also has operations in manufacturing and plastics（ $38 \%$ of＇18 income）．＇19 reported deprec．rate（utility）： $2.8 \%$ ．Has 2,300 employees．Chairman：Nathan I．Partain．Presi－ dent \＆CEO：Charles S．MacFarlane．Inc．：Minnesota．Address： 215 South Cascade St．，P．O．Box 496，Fergus Falls，Minnesota 56538－ 0496．Tel．：866－410－8780．Internet：www．ottertail．com．
Otter Tail Power is building some sig－ nificant capital projects．A $\$ 258$ mil－ lion， 150 －megawatt wind project，the larg－ est project in the company＇s history，is on budget but slightly behind schedule．An in－service date by yearend is still achiev－ able，but there is an increased risk of supply－chain and labor－related delays due to coronavirus．This is significant because the company might lose production tax credits if the project is not completed by yearend．Otter Tail is also building a $\$ 158$ million， $245-\mathrm{mw}$ gas－fired facility．Comple－ tion is expected in late 2020 or early 2021. The company is financing these expendi－ tures with a combination of long－term debt and common equity．
The reduction in earnings guidance didn＇t affect the stock price much．It came as no surprise to Wall Street that the economic troubles were hurting Otter Tail，especially its Manufacturing division． The price had already dropped significant－ ly，and is down $18 \%$ in 2020．The dividend yield is about average for a utility．Total return potential is better for the 18－month span than for the 2023－2025 period．
Paul E．Debbas，CFA
June 12， 2020
（A）Dil．EPS．Excl．nonrec．gains（loss）：＇10， （44¢）；＇11，26¢；＇ $13,2 ¢$ ；gains（losses）from disc．ops．：＇04，8ct；＇05，33c；＇06，14；＇＇11， （\＄1．11）；＇12，（\＄1．22）；＇13，2¢；＇14，2¢；＇15，2¢； histor．pd．in early Mar．，Jun．，Sept．，\＆Dec．－
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of it may be reproduced，resold，stored or transmitted in any printed，electronic or other form，or used for generating or marketing any printed or electronic publication，service or product． ＇16，1c；＇17，14．＇19 EPS don＇t sum due to
mdg．Next egs．rept．due early Aug．（B）Div＇ds ndg．Next egs．rept．due early Aug．（B）Div＇ds in MN in＇17：9．41\％；in ND in＇18： $9.77 \%$ ；in SD



| Calendar | QUARTERLY REVENUES (\$ mill.) |  |  |  | Full Year |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Mar. 31 | Jun. 30 | Sep. 30 | Dec. 31 |  |
| 2017 | 677.7 | 944.6 | 1183.3 | 759.7 | 3565.3 |
| 2018 | 692.7 | 974.1 | 1268.0 | 756.4 | 3691.2 |
| 2019 | 740.5 | 869.5 | 1190.8 | 670.4 | 3471.2 |
| 2020 | 661.9 | 700 | 1088.1 | 600 | 3050 |
| 2021 | 725 | 775 | 1100 | 625 | 3250 |
| Calendar | EARNINGS PER SHARE A <br> Mar. 31 Jun. 30 Sep. 30 Dec. 31 |  |  |  | Full Year |
| 2017 | . 21 | 1.49 | 2.46 | . 27 | 4.43 |
| 2018 | . 03 | 1.48 | 2.80 | . 23 | 4.54 |
| 2019 | . 16 | 1.28 | 2.77 | . 57 | 4.77 |
| 2020 | . 27 | 1.23 | 2.95 | . 30 | 4.75 |
| 2021 | . 10 | 1.45 | 3.15 | . 35 | 5.05 |
| Cal- | QUARTERLY DIVIDENDS PAID ${ }^{\text {B }}$ ■ |  |  |  | Full |
| endar | Mar. 31 | Jun. 30 | Sep. 30 | Dec. 31 | Year |
| 2016 | . 625 | . 625 | . 625 | . 655 | 2.53 |
| 2017 | . 655 | . 655 | . 655 | . 695 | 2.66 |
| 2018 | . 695 | . 695 | . 695 | . 7375 | 2.82 |
| 2019 | . 7375 | . 7375 | . 7375 | . 7825 | 3.00 |
| 2020 | . 7825 | . 7825 |  |  |  |

BUSINESS: Pinnacle West Capital Corporation is a holding company for Arizona Public Service Company (APS), which supplies electricity to 1.3 million customers in most of Arizona, except about half of the Phoenix metro area, the Tucson metro area, and Mohave County in northwestern Arizona. Discontinued SunCor real estate subsidiary in '10. Electric revenue breakdown: residential, $51 \%$;
The rate case of Pinnacle West's utility subsidiary probably won't be resolved until 2021. Last year, Arizona Public Service requested an increase of $\$ 184$ million ( $5.6 \%$ ), based on a $10.15 \%$ return on equity and a $54.7 \%$ common-equity ratio. Among other things, the utility wants to place a $\$ 390$ million environmental upgrade to a coal-fired plant in rates and get some regulatory mechanisms that would defer for future recovery increases in certain expenses, such as property taxes. When APS filed the application in the fall of 2019, the hope was to get an order as early as December 1, 2020. However, the proceedings have been delayed long enough so that the company can't estimate when in 2021 the decision is likely to come. We were already not expecting any rate relief in our 2020 earnings estimate, but the delay has added uncertainty to our 2021 estimate.
Management reiterated its 2020 earnings guidance of $\$ 4.75-\$ 4.95$ a share upon reporting first-quarter results in May. This is despite the company's disclosure that the reduction in kilowatt-hour sales stemming from the weak economy
commercial, $38 \%$; industrial, $5 \%$; other, $6 \%$. Generating sources: nuclear, $28 \%$; gas \& other, 28\%; coal, $24 \%$; purchased, 20\%. Fuel costs: $30 \%$ of revenues. ' 119 reported deprec. rate: $2.8 \%$. Has 6,200 employees. Chairman, President \& CEO: Jeffrey B. Guldner. Inc.: AZ. Address: 400 North Fifth St., P.O. Box 53999, Phoenix, AZ 85072-3999. Tel.: 602-250-1000. Internet: www.pinnaclewest.com.
hurt the bottom line by $\$ 0.10$ a share, compared with the original expectation, from March 13th through April 30th. We note that Pinnacle West posted a higher-than-usual March-period profit thanks to tax credits. Thus, we did not cut our 2020 estimate of $\$ 4.75$ a share. However
We trimmed our 2021 estimate by $\mathbf{\$ 0 . 1 0}$ a share. We are concerned that any rate relief the utility receives from the pending rate application will come later than we had expected. Our revised figure of $\$ 5.05$ a share would still produce a solid $6 \%$ increase over our estimated 2020 tally. Finances are solid. The company's earned ROE has been consistent for the past several years. The fixed-charge coverage and common-equity ratio are healthy. Pinnacle West merits a Financial Strength rating of $\mathrm{A}+$
This stock has appeal for conservative accounts stressing income. The Safety rank is 1 (Highest). The dividend yield is above average, even for a utility. Total return potential is attractive for the 18 month period and respectable (on a riskadjusted basis) for the 3 - to 5 -year span.
Paul E. Debbas, CFA
July 24, 2020

##  <br> (\$1.45); '17, 8c; gains (losses) from discont. Aug. (B) Div'ds historically paid in early Mar., (E) Rate base: Fair value. Rate allowed on Stock's Price Stability ops.: ' 05 , (36¢); ' 06 , 10c; ' 08 , 28¢; ' 09 , (13¢); June, Sept., \& Dec. There were 5 declarations com. eq. in '17: 10.0\%; earned on avg. com.

 '10, 18¢;' '11, 10¢;' '12, (5¢¢). '19 EPS don't sum in '12. - Div'd reinvestment plan avail. (C) Incl. eq., '19: $10.1 \%$. Regulatory Climate: Average.© 2020 Value Line, Inc. All rights reserved. Factual material is obtained from sources believed to be reliable and is provided without warranties of any kind.
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| Calendar | QUARTERLY REVENUES (\$ mill.) |  |  |  | Full Year |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Mar. 31 | Jun. 30 | Sep. 30 | Dec. 31 |  |
| 2017 | 330.2 | 362.3 | 419.9 | 332.6 | 1445.0 |
| 2018 | 317.9 | 352.3 | 422.7 | 343.7 | 1436.6 |
| 2019 | 349.7 | 330.2 | 433.6 | 344.1 | 1457.6 |
| 2020 | 333.6 | 320 | 415 | 331.4 | 1400 |
| 2021 | 345 | 330 | 430 | 345 | 1450 |
| Calendar | $\underset{\text { Mar. } 31 \mathrm{JARI}}{\mathrm{~J}}$ | RNINGS Jun. 30 | ER SHARE Sep. 30 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { A } \\ & \text { Dec. } 31 \end{aligned}$ | Full Year |
| 2017 | . 29 | . 47 | . 92 | . 25 | 1.92 |
| 2018 | . 19 | . 48 | 1.09 | d. 10 | 1.66 |
| 2019 | . 23 | . 36 | 1.29 | . 40 | 2.28 |
| 2020 | d. 19 | . 52 | 1.24 | . 33 | 1.90 |
| 2021 | . 18 | . 47 | 1.30 | . 30 | 2.25 |
| Calendar | QUARTER <br> Mar. 31 | ERLY DIVID Jun. 30 | ENDS PA Sep. 30 | D B■ $\dagger$ <br> Dec. 31 | Full Year |
| 2016 | . 22 | . 22 | . 22 | . 22 | . 88 |
| 2017 | . 2425 | . 2425 | . 2425 | . 2425 | . 97 |
| 2018 | . 265 | . 265 | . 265 | . 265 | 1.06 |
| 2019 | . 29 | . 29 | . 29 | . 29 | 1.16 |
| 2020 | . 3075 | . 3075 |  |  |  |

BUSINESS: PNM Resources, Inc. is a holding company with two regulated electric utilities. Public Service Company of New Mexico (PNM) serves 532,000 customers in north central New Mexico, incl. Albuquerque and Santa Fe. Texas-New Mexico Power Company (TNMP) transmits and distributes power to 257,000 customers in Texas. Electric revenue breakdown: residential, $40 \%$; commercial,
PNM Resources' utility subsidiary in New Mexico delayed the filing of a general rate case, but there are still some regulatory matters pending. Public Service of New Mexico had planned to file an application in the second quarter, but decided not to do so due to the state of the economy. PNM did request a regulatory mechanism that would decouple revenues and volume for residential and small commercial customers. Currently, the fixed charges billed to these users aren't high enough to reflect the fixed costs of serving them. The company expects an order by yearend. By October 1, the New Mexico commission is expected to rule on PNM's plan to replace the capacity of a coal-fired facility that is scheduled for a shutdown (well before the end of its useful life). The utility would build 280 megawatts of gas-fired capacity and 70 mw of battery storage, a total investment of \$278 million. The regulators have already approved the issuance of up to $\$ 361$ million of securitized bonds so that PNM can recover the cost of the plant.
We raised our 2020 earnings estimate
by $\$ 0.10$ a share. Although kilowatt-hour
$35 \%$; industrial, 6\%; other, 19\%. Generating sources not available. Fuel costs: $28 \%$ of revenues. '19 reported deprec. rates: $2.5 \%$ $7.9 \%$. Has 1,700 employees. Chairman, President \& CEO: Patricia K. Collawn. Incorporated: New Mexico. Address: 414 Silver Ave. SW, Albuquerque, New Mexico 87102-3289. Telephone: 505-2412700. Internet: www.pnmresources.com.
sales declines stemming from the recession are hurting the company, PNM benefited from hotter-than-normal weather in the second quarter. The company has also cut certain expenses, such as executive travel. We are sticking with our 2021 estimate of $\$ 2.25$ a share.
The company's TNMP subsidiary in Texas received some rate relief. Each year, TNMP gets revenues to recover transmission and distribution expenditures. In March, the utility was granted $\$ 7.8$ million for transmission costs, and another such filing was expected this month. For distribution, TNMP reached a settlement calling for a $\$ 14.3$ million increase, effective September 1st.
The share count will increase, probably in late 2020. In early 2020 , PNM Resources raised $\$ 290$ million through a forward sale of 6.18 million common shares.
Although the stock price has declined 23\% this year, the dividend yield is still below the utility mean. The equity offers good total return potential for the next 18 months, but not for the period to 2023-2025.
Paul E. Debbas, CFA

[^20](\$1.28); '17, (92c); '18, (59c); '19, (\$1.31). May, Aug., \& Nov. - Div'd reinv. plan avail. (C) $10.125 \%$; earned on avg. com. eq., '19: 10.2\%. Price Growth Persistence
Excl. gains from disc. ops.: ' 08 , 42¢; ' ${ }^{\circ} 9$, 78c. $\mid$ Incl. intang. In '19: $\$ 11.81 /$ sh. (D) In mill., adj. $R$ Regulatory Climate: NM, Below Avg.; TX, Avg.
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| DODR |  | ERAL NYSE－POR |  |  |  |  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { RECENT } \\ & \text { PRICE } \end{aligned} \quad 42,31$ |  |  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { P/E } \\ & \text { RATIO } 18.4\binom{\text { Trailing: }}{\text { Median: } 17.1} \end{aligned}$ |  |  |  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { RELATIVE } \\ & \text { P/E RATIO } 0.80 \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ |  |  |  |  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { VALUE } \\ & \text { LINE } \end{aligned}$ |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| TIMELINESS $\mathbf{3}$ Lowered $6 / 12 / 20$  <br> SAFETY $\mathbf{2}$ Raised $5 / 4 / 12$ <br> TECHNICAL 3 Lowered $6 / 12 / 20$ <br> BETA $85 \quad$（1．00 $=$ Market）  |  |  |  | High： Low： | 21.4 13.5 | $\begin{aligned} & 22.7 \\ & 17.5 \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ | 26.0 21.3 | 28.1 24.3 | $\begin{aligned} & 33.3 \\ & 27.4 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 40.3 \\ & 29.0 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 41.0 \\ & 33.0 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 45.2 \\ & 35.3 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 50.1 \\ & 42.4 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 50.4 \\ & 39.0 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 58.4 \\ & 44.0 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 63.1 \\ & 37.8 \end{aligned}$ |  |  | Target Pric 2023202 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Range } \\ & 2025 \end{aligned}$ |
|  |  |  |  | LEGENDS <br> divided <br> dividends p sh <br> $\ldots$ Relded by Interest Rate <br> Options：Yes Price Strength <br> Shaded area indicates recession |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | $-128$ |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | ， |  |  |  | －128 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | －80 |
| 18－Month Target Price Range <br> Low－High Midpoint（\％to Mid） $\$ 34-\$ 78 \quad \$ 56(30 \%)$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | ＇ |  |  |  |  | －64 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 年㒂＂ |  |  |  |  | －48 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | ， |  | 年1＂1｜ |  | \｜ |  |  |  | －48 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 1，111 | － |  | 右 |  |  |  |  |  | －32 |
|  | PR | ECTIO |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | ＇＇ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | －24 |
|  | ce |  | n＇l Total Return |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | － |  |  |  | －16 |
|  |  |  | $\begin{gathered} 12 \% \\ 6 \% \end{gathered}$ |  |  | ， |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | － |  |  |  | －12 |
| Institutional Decisions |  |  |  | Percent |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | THETURN 6／20 |  |
|  | 302019 | 4 Q2019 | 1 Q2020 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | $\begin{array}{ll}\text { STOCK } & \text { INDEX } \\ -20.3 & -5.1\end{array}$ | － |
| to Buy | 151 157 | 160 159 | 132 | shares <br> traded |  |  |  |  |  | ， |  | 111 | 1 |  | 析 |  |  | 1 yr. 3 yr ． | $\begin{array}{rr}-20.3 & -5.1 \\ 0.5 & 6.8 \\ 47.1 & 24.4\end{array}$ | － |
| Hld＇s（000） | 84892 | 86645 | 86455 |  | 2009 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 5 yr ． | $47.1 \quad 24.4$ |  |
| 2004 2005 ${ }^{\text {F }}$ |  | 2006 | 2007 |  |  | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 |  | E LINE PUB．LLC | 23－25 |
| －－ | 23.14 | 24.32 | 27.87 | 27.89 | 23.99 | 23.67 | 24.06 | 23.89 | 23.18 | 24.29 | 21.38 | 21.62 | 22.54 | 22.30 | 23.75 | 23.45 | 24.55 | Rev | es per sh | 27.25 |
| －－ | 4.75 | 4.64 | 5.21 | 4.71 | 4.07 | 4.82 | 4.96 | 5.15 | 4.93 | 6.08 | 5.37 | 5.78 | 6.16 | 6.65 | 6.97 | 7.05 | 7.55 | ＂Cas | Flow＂per sh | 9.00 |
| －－ | 1.02 | 1.14 | 2.33 | 1.39 | 1.31 | 1.66 | 1.95 | 1.87 | 1.77 | 2.18 | 2.04 | 2.16 | 2.29 | 2.37 | 2.39 | 2.30 | 2.55 | Earn | s per sh A | 3.00 |
| －－ | ．－ | ． 68 | ． 93 | ． 97 | 1.01 | 1.04 | 1.06 | 1.08 | 1.10 | 1.12 | 1.18 | 1.26 | 1.34 | 1.43 | 1.52 | 1.54 | 1.62 | Div＇d | ecl＇d per sh B－$\dagger$ | 1.95 |
| －－ | 4.08 | 5.94 | 7.28 | 6.12 | 9.25 | 5.97 | 3.98 | 4.01 | 8.40 | 12.87 | 6.73 | 6.57 | 5.77 | 6.67 | 6.78 | 8.50 | 6.45 | Cap | pending per sh | 6.00 |
| －－ | 19.15 | 19.58 | 21.05 | 21.64 | 20.50 | 21.14 | 22.07 | 22.87 | 23.30 | 24.43 | 25.43 | 26.35 | 27.11 | 28.07 | 28.99 | 29.70 | 30.65 | Book | Value per sh c | 33.75 |
| －－ | 62.50 | 62.50 | 62.53 | 62.58 | 75.21 | 75.32 | 75.36 | 75.56 | 78.09 | 78.23 | 88.79 | 88.95 | 89.11 | 89.27 | 89.39 | 89.55 | 89.65 | Com | Shs Outst＇g D | 90.00 |
| －－ | －－ | 23.4 | 11.9 | 16.3 | 14.4 | 12.0 | 12.4 | 14.0 | 16.9 | 15.3 | 17.7 | 19.1 | 20.0 | 18.4 | 22.3 | Bold fig | ures are | Avg | n＇I P／E Ratio | 17.0 |
| －－ | －－ | 1.26 | ． 63 | ． 98 | ． 96 | ． 76 | ． 78 | ． 89 | ． 95 | ． 81 | ． 89 | 1.00 | 1.01 | ． 99 | 1.21 | Value | Line | Relativ | P／E Ratio | ． 95 |
|  |  | 2．5\％ | 3．3\％ | 4．3\％ | 5．4\％ | 5．2\％ | 4．4\％ | 4．1\％ | 3．7\％ | 3．3\％ | 3．3\％ | 3．1\％ | 2．9\％ | 3．3\％ | 2．8\％ | est | es | Avg | n＇l Div＇d Yield | 3．8\％ |
| CAPITAL STRUCTURE as of 3／31／20 |  |  |  |  |  | 1783.0 | 1813.0 | 1805.0 | 1810.0 | 1900.0 | 1898.0 | 1923.0 | 2009.0 | 1991.0 | 2123.0 | 2100 | 2200 | Rev | es（\＄mill） | 2450 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | 125.0 | 147.0 | 141.0 | 137.0 | 175.0 | 172.0 | 193.0 | 204.0 | 212.0 | 214.0 | 210 | 230 | Net P | fit（\＄mill） | 275 |
| LT Debt $\$ 2478$ mill．LT Interest $\$ 124$ mill． Incl．$\$ 135$ mill．capitalized leases． |  |  |  |  |  | 30．5\％ | 28．3\％ | 31．4\％ | 23．2\％ | 26．0\％ | 20．7\％ | 20．6\％ | 25．3\％ | 7．4\％ | 11．2\％ | 11．0\％ | 11．0\％ | Incom | Tax Rate | 11．0\％ |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | 17．6\％ | 5．4\％ | 7．1\％ | 14．6\％ | 33．7\％ | 19．8\％ | 16．6\％ | 8．8\％ | 8．0\％ | 7．0\％ | 10．0\％ | 7．0\％ | AFUD | \％to Net Profit | 5．0\％ |
| Leases | （LT interest earned：3．0x） |  |  |  |  | 53．0\％ | 49．6\％ | 47．1\％ | 51．3\％ | 52．7\％ | 47．8\％ | 48．4\％ | 50．1\％ | 46．5\％ | 51．3\％ | 52．5\％ | 53．5\％ | Long | erm Debt Ratio | 52．5\％ |
| Pension Assets－12／19 \＄695 mill． |  |  |  |  |  | 47．0\％ | 50．4\％ | 52．9\％ | 48．7\％ | 47．3\％ | 52．2\％ | 51．6\％ | 49．9\％ | 53．5\％ | 48．7\％ | 47．5\％ | 46．5\％ | Comm | n Equity Ratio | 47．5\％ |
| Pfd Stock None Oblig $\$ 905$ mill． |  |  |  |  |  | 3390.0 | 3298.0 | 3264.0 | 3735.0 | 4037.0 | 4329.0 | 4544.0 | 4842.0 | 4684.0 | 5323.0 | 5615 | 5905 | Total | apital（\＄mill） | 6400 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | 4133.0 | 4285.0 | 4392.0 | 4880.0 | 5679.0 | 6012.0 | 6434.0 | 6741.0 | 6887.0 | 7161.0 | 7495 | 7630 | Net P | nt（\＄mill） | 7725 |
| Common Stock 89，488，773 shs． as of $4 / 20 / 20$ |  |  |  |  |  | 5．4\％ | 6．2\％ | 5．9\％ | 5．1\％ | 5．8\％ | 5．4\％ | 5．6\％ | 5．5\％ | 5．8\％ | 5．1\％ | 5．0\％ | 5．0\％ | Retur | on Total Cap＇l | 5．5\％ |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | 7．9\％ | 8．8\％ | 8．2\％ | 7．5\％ | 9．2\％ | 7．6\％ | 8．2\％ | 8．4\％ | 8．5\％ | 8．3\％ | 8．0\％ | 8．5\％ | Return | on Shr．Equity | 9．0\％ |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | 7．9\％ | 8．8\％ | 8．2\％ | 7．5\％ | 9．2\％ | 7．6\％ | 8．2\％ | 8．4\％ | 8．5\％ | 8．3\％ | 8．0\％ | 8．5\％ | Retur | on Com Equity E | 9．0\％ |
| MARKET CAP：$\$ 3.8$ billion（Mid Cap） |  |  |  |  |  | 3．0\％ | 4．1\％ | 3．5\％ | 2．9\％ | 4．6\％ | 3．3\％ | 3．5\％ | 3．6\％ | 3．5\％ | 3．1\％ | 2．5\％ | 3．0\％ | Retai | d to Com Eq | 3．0\％ |
| ELECTRIC OPERATING STATISTICS <br> 201720182019 |  |  |  |  |  | 62\％ | 54\％ | 57\％ | 61\％ | 50\％ | 56\％ | 57\％ | 58\％ | 59\％ | 63\％ | 66\％ | 63\％ | All Di | ds to Net Prof | 64\％ |




[^21]$36 \%$ ；coal， $19 \%$ ；wind， $8 \%$ ；hydro， $6 \%$ ；purchased， $31 \%$ ．Fuel costs： $29 \%$ of revenues．＇19 reported depreciation rate： $3.6 \%$ ．Has 2,900 employees．Chairman：Jack E．Davis．President and Chief Execu－ tive Officer：Maria M．Pope．Incorporated：Oregon．Address： 121 S．W．Salmon Street，Portland，Oregon 97204．Telephone：503－464－ 8000．Internet：www．portlandgeneral．com．
crease the dividend in the second quarter．This is noteworthy because this is when the board usually raises the dis－ bursement．The directors will review the dividend every quarter，but we think they will be cautious until an economic recovery is clearly under way．We don＇t know when this will occur，but are estimating a hike in the first quarter of 2021．PGE＇s target for the payout ratio is $60 \%-70 \%$ ．
The company cut its capital budget for 2020 and 2021．The reductions were $\$ 145$ million for this year and $\$ 30$ million for next year．Some of this spending will be deferred until 2022 or later．Two key projects were still on track as of late April： a $\$ 200$ million integrated operations cen－ ter and a $\$ 160$ million investment for a one－third stake in a wind project．PGE won＇t need to issue equity to finance its spending，but has already issued debt． More issuances are likely by yearend．
This stock has an average dividend yield，by utility standards．Total return potential is attractive for the 18 －month span，but doesn＇t stand out for the 3 －to 5 － year period．
Paul E．Debbas，CFA


|  |  |  | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| \% Change | Retail Sales (KV |  | -. 7 | +3.2 | -1.2 |
| Large C \% | Use (MWH) |  | 22642 | 23004 | NA |
| Large C \& | Revs. per KWH |  | 6.36 | 5.91 | 5.96 |
| Capacity | Peak (Mw) |  | NA | NA | NA |
| Peak Load | Summer (Mw) |  | 19591 | 20293 | 20146 |
| Annual Loa | d Factor (\%) |  | NA | NA | NA |
| \% Change | Cusiomers (yren |  | +. 9 | +1.1 | +1.0 |
| Fixed Char | ge Cov. (\%) |  | 330 | 281 | 272 |
| ANNU | AL RATES | Past |  | st Est'd | '17-'19 |
| of chang | e (per sh) | 10 Yrs. |  |  | '23-25 |
| Reven | ues |  | \% | 5\% | 5\% |
| "Cash | Flow" | 5.5 |  | 5\% | 6.5\% |
| Earnin |  |  |  | \% | 6.0\% |
| Dividen | nds | 5.0 |  | 5\% | 6.0\% |
| Book V | Value | 4.5 |  | 5\% | 5.0\% |
|  | QUAR | TERLY RE | VENUES (\$ | \$ mill.) |  |
| endar | Mar. 31 | Jun. 30 | Sep. 30 | Dec. 31 | Year |
| 2017 | 2946 | 2645 | 3017 | 2796 | 11404 |
| 2018 | 2951 | 2658 | 3048 | 2880 | 11537 |
| 2019 | 3141 | 2577 | 3013 | 2798 | 11529 |
| 2020 | 2811 | 2189 | 2700 | 2600 | 10300 |
| 2021 | 3000 | 2400 | 2850 | 2750 | 11000 |
|  |  | RNINGS | ER SHARE |  | Full |
| endar | Mar. 31 | Jun. 30 | Sep. 30 | Dec. 31 | Year |
| 2017 | . 47 | . 45 | . 97 | . 42 | 2.30 |
| 2018 | . 57 | . 52 | . 96 | . 42 | 2.47 |
| 2019 | . 61 | . 46 | 1.01 | . 56 | 2.64 |
| 2020 | . 56 | . 54 | 1.10 | . 55 | 2.75 |
| 2021 | . 65 | . 55 | 1.15 | . 55 | 2.90 |
|  | QUARTE | TERLY DIV | IDENDS PA | Ald $^{\mathbf{B}}$ | Full |
| endar | Mar. 31 | Jun. 30 | Sep. 30 | Dec. 31 | Year |
| 2016 | . 32 | . 34 | . 34 | . 34 | 1.34 |
| 2017 | . 34 | . 36 | . 36 | . 36 | 1.42 |
| 2018 | . 36 | . 38 | . 38 | . 38 | 1.50 |
| 2019 | . 38 | . 405 | . 405 | . 405 | 1.60 |
| 2020 | . 405 | . 43 | . 43 |  |  |

## (A) Diluted EPS. Excl. nonrecurring gain (losses): '10, 5¢; '15, (16¢); '17, (5¢); gain

 (losses) on discontinued ops.: '04, (30¢); '05, 3c; '06, 1c; '09, (1c); '10, 1c. '17 EPS don'tBUSINESS: Xcel Energy Inc. is the parent of Northern States
Power, which supplies electricity to Minnesota, Wisconsin, North Dakota, South Dakota \& Michigan \& gas to Minnesota, Wisconsin, North Dakota \& Michigan; P.S. of Colorado, which supplies electricity \& gas to Colorado; \& Southwestern Public Service, which supplies electricity to Texas \& New Mexico. Customers: 3.7 mill. elec.,
Xcel Energy's utilities have reached settlements on pending rate cases. The New Mexico commission approved a settlement calling for a $\$ 31$ million electric increase for Southwestern Public Service, based on a $9.45 \%$ return on equity and a $54.8 \%$ common-equity ratio. New tariffs took effect on May 28th. In Texas, SPS reached a "black box" agreement calling for an $\$ 88$ million hike without specifying an allowed ROE or common-equity ratio. A ruling from the state regulators is expected in the current quarter, with the increase retroactive to September of 2019. Public Service of Colorado, the state commission's staff, and intervenors have reached a settlement calling for a gas rate increase of $\$ 76.9$ million, based on a $9.2 \%$ ROE and a $55.6 \%$ common-equity ratio. If the regulators approve the agreement, new tariffs will be implemented on April 1, 2021, retroactive to November of 2020.
Xcel believes it can reduce expenses enough to offset the effects of the recession on kilowatt-hour sales. Cost cuts should enable operating and maintenance expenses to decline $4 \%-5 \%$ in 2020.
Accordingly, management did not adjust
2.1 mill. gas. Elec. rev. breakdown: res'l, $31 \%$; sm. comm'l \& ind'l, $36 \%$; Ig. comm'l \& ind'l, $18 \%$; other, $15 \%$. Generating sources not avail. Fuel costs: $39 \%$ of revs. ' 19 reported depr. rate: $3.3 \%$. Has 11,300 empls. Chairman \& CEO: Ben Fowke. President \& COO: Bob Frenzel. Inc.: MN. Address: 414 Nicollet Mall, Minneapolis, MN 55401. Tel.: 612-330-5500. Internet: www.xcelenergy.com.
its earnings guidance of \$2.73-\$2.83 a share for this year. Our estimate of $\$ 2.75$ a share is unchanged. We have also stuck with our 2021 estimate of $\$ 2.90$ a share. This would produce profit growth of $5 \%$, which is within the company's annual goal of $5 \%-7 \%$.
At least one rate case is upcoming. P.S. of Colorado plans to put forth an electric application later this summer. Northern States Power is considering filing for new electric and gas tariffs in Minnesota in November, but might well postpone its case if it can reach an agreement with the commission that compensates the utility for the decline in volume.
This high-quality stock has been one of the top performers in the electric utility industry in 2020. While the prices of most electric equities have fallen more than $10 \%$, Xcel is almost unchanged from yearend 2019, thanks in part to its maintaining profit guidance. The dividend yield is a percentage point below the industry average, and with the recent quotation near the top of our 2023-2025 Target Price Range, total return potential is low. Paul E. Debbas, CFA

July 24, 2020

# Northern States Power Company, a Minnesota Corporation 

Summary of Risk Premium Models for the
Proxy Group of Fifteen Electric Companies

|  | Proxy Group of <br> Fifteen Electric <br> Companies |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| Predictive Risk Premium <br> Model (PRPM) (1) <br> Risk Premium Using an <br> Adjusted Total Market <br> Approach (2) | $10.09 \%$ |

Notes:
(1) From page 2 of this Schedule.
(2) From page 3 of this Schedule.

Northern States Power Company, a Minnesota Corporation

## Indicated ROE

Derived by the Predictive Risk Premium Model (1)


Northern States Power Company, a Minnesota Corporation<br>Indicated Common Equity Cost Rate<br>Through Use of a Risk Premium Model<br>Using an Adjusted Total Market Approach

1. Prospective Yield on Aaa Rated Corporate Bonds (1)
2.98 \%
2. Adjustment to Reflect Yield Spread

Between Aaa Rated Corporate
Bonds and A Rated Public Utility Bonds 0.58 (2)
3. Adjusted Prospective Yield on A Rated Public Utility Bonds 3.56 \%
4. Adjustment to Reflect Bond Rating Difference of Proxy Group

Adjusted Prospective Bond Yield
6. Equity Risk Premium (4)
7. Risk Premium Derived Common Equity Cost Rate

$$
\begin{aligned}
& 10.76
\end{aligned} \%
$$

Notes: (1) Consensus forecast of Moody's Aaa Rated Corporate bonds from Blue Chip Financial Forecasts (see pages 10-11 of this Schedule).
(2) The average yield spread of A rated public utility bonds over Aaa rated corporate bonds of $0.58 \%$ from page 4 of this Schedule.
(3) Adjustment to reflect the A3 Moody's LT issuer rating of the Utility Proxy Group as shown on page 5 of this Schedule. The $0.12 \%$ upward adjustment is derived by taking $1 / 3$ of the spread between A2 and Baa2 Public Utility Bonds $(1 / 3 * 0.35 \%=0.12 \%)$ as derived from page 4 of this Schedule.
(4) From page 7 of this Schedule.

# Northern States Power Company, a Minnesota Corporation 

Interest Rates and Bond Spreads for
Moody's Corporate and Public Utility Bonds

Selected Bond Yields
[1]
[2]
[3]

|  | Aaa Rated Corporate Bond | A Rated Public Utility Bond | Baa Rated Public Utility Bond |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Aug-2020 | 2.25 \% | 2.73 \% | 3.06 \% |
| Jul-2020 | 2.14 | 2.74 | 3.09 |
| Jun-2020 | 2.41 | 3.07 | 3.44 |
| Average | 2.27 \% | 2.85 \% | 3.20 \% |
| Selected Bond Spreads |  |  |  |

A Rated Public Utility Bonds Over Aaa Rated Corporate Bonds:

$$
0.58 \%(1)
$$

Baa Rated Public Utility Bonds Over A Rated Public Utility Bonds:

$$
0.35 \%(2)
$$

Notes:
(1) Column [2] - Column [1].
(2) Column [3] - Column [2].

Source of Information:
Bloomberg Professional Service

Northern States Power Company, a Minnesota Corporation
Comparison of Long-Term Issuer Ratings for
Proxy Group of Fifteen Electric Companies

| $\frac{\text { Moody's }}{\text { Long-Term Issuer Rating }}$ |  | Standard \& Poor's |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| August 2020 |  | Long-Term Issuer Rating |


| Proxy Group of Fifteen Electric Companies |  | Long-Term Issuer Rating (1) | Numerical <br> Weighting (2) | Long-Term Issuer Rating <br> (1) | Numerical <br> Weighting (2) |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| ALLETE, Inc. |  | A3 | 7.0 | NR | -- |
| Alliant Energy Corporation |  | A3/Baa1 | 7.5 | A/A- | 6.5 |
| Ameren Corporation |  | A3 | 7.0 | BBB+ | 8.0 |
| Duke Energy Corporation |  | A3 | 7.0 | A- | 7.0 |
| Edison International |  | Baa2 | 9.0 | BBB | 9.0 |
| Entergy Corporation |  | Baa1/Baa2 | 8.5 | A- | 7.0 |
| Evergy, Inc. |  | Baa1 | 8.0 | A- | 7.0 |
| IDACORP, Inc. |  | A3 | 7.0 | BBB | 9.0 |
| NorthWestern Corporation |  | NR | -- | NR | -- |
| OGE Energy Corporation |  | A3 | 7.0 | A- | 7.0 |
| Otter Tail Corporation |  | A3 | 7.0 | BBB+ | 8.0 |
| Pinnacle West Capital Corp. |  | A2 | 6.0 | A- | 7.0 |
| PNM Resources, Inc. |  | Baa1 | 8.0 | $\mathrm{BBB}+/ \mathrm{BBB}$ | 8.5 |
| Portland General Electric Co. |  | A3 | 7.0 | BBB+ | 8.0 |
| Xcel Energy, Inc. |  | A3 | 7.0 | A- | 7.0 |
|  | Average | A3 | 7.4 | BBB+ | 7.6 |

Notes:
(1) Ratings are that of the average of each company's utility operating subsidiaries.
(2) From page 6 of this Schedule.

Source Information: Moody's Investors Service
Standard \& Poor's Global Utilities Rating Service

| Numerical Assignment for Moody's and Standard \& Poor's Bond Ratings |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Moody's Bond Rating | Numerical Bond Weighting | Standard \& Poor's Bond Rating |
| Ааa | 1 | AAA |
| Aa1 | 2 | AA+ |
| Aa2 | 3 | AA |
| Aa3 | 4 | AA- |
| A1 | 5 | A+ |
| A2 | 6 | A |
| A3 | 7 | A- |
| Baa1 | 8 | BBB+ |
| Baa2 | 9 | BBB |
| Baa3 | 10 | BBB- |
| Ba1 | 11 | $\mathrm{BB}+$ |
| Ba 2 | 12 | BB |
| Ba3 | 13 | BB- |
| B1 | 14 | B+ |
| B2 | 15 | B |
| B3 | 16 | B- |

# Northern States Power Company, a Minnesota Corporation 

Judgment of Equity Risk Premium for Proxy Group of Fifteen Electric Companies

| Line No. |  | Proxy Group of Fifteen Electric Companies |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1. | Calculated equity risk premium based on the total market using the beta approach (1) | 9.07 \% |
| 2. | Mean equity risk premium based on a study using the holding period returns of public utilities with A rated bonds (2) | 6.25 |
| 3. | Predicted Equity Risk Premium Based on Regression Analysis of 1168 Fully-Litigated Electric Utility Rate Cases | 5.92 |
| 4. | Average equity risk premium | 7.08 \% |

Notes: (1) From page 8 of this Schedule.
(2) From page 12 of this Schedule.
(3) From page 13 of this Schedule.

Northern States Power Company, a Minnesota Corporation

| $\underline{\text { Line No. }}$ | Equity Risk Premium Measure | Proxy Group of Fifteen Electric Companies |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Ibbotson-Based Equity Risk Premiums: |  |  |
| 1. | Ibbotson Equity Risk Premium (1) | 5.78 \% |
| 2. | Regression on Ibbotson Risk Premium Data (2) | 9.39 |
| 3. | Ibbotson Equity Risk Premium based on PRPM (3) | 9.62 |
| 4. | Equity Risk Premium Based on Value Line Summary and Index (4) | 11.47 |
| 5. | Equity Risk Premium Based on Value Line S\&P 500 Companies (5) | 10.85 |
| 6. | Equity Risk Premium Based on Bloomberg S\&P 500 Companies (6) | 10.80 |
| 7. | Conclusion of Equity Risk Premium | 9.65 \% |
| 8. | Adjusted Beta (7) | 0.94 |
| 9. | Forecasted Equity Risk Premium | 9.07 \% |

Notes provided on page 9 of this Schedule.

## Northern States Power Company, a Minnesota Corporation <br> Derivation of Equity Risk Premium Based on the Total Market Approach <br> Using the Beta for the <br> Proxy Group of Fifteen Electric Companies

Notes:
(1) Based on the arithmetic mean historical monthly returns on large company common stocks from Ibbotson® SBBI® 2020 Market Report minus the arithmetic mean monthly yield of Moody's average Aaa and Aa corporate bonds from 1926-2019.
(2) This equity risk premium is based on a regression of the monthly equity risk premiums of large company common stocks relative to Moody's average Aaa and Aa rated corporate bond yields from 1928-2019 referenced in Note 1 above.
(3) The Predictive Risk Premium Model (PRPM) is discussed in the accompanying direct testimony. The Ibbotson equity risk premium based on the PRPM is derived by applying the PRPM to the monthly risk premiums between Ibbotson large company common stock monthly returns and average Aaa and Aa corporate monthly bond yields, from January 1928 through August 2020.
(4) The equity risk premium based on the Value Line Summary and Index is derived by subtracting the average consensus forecast of Aaa corporate bonds of 2.98\% (from page 3 of this Schedule) from the projected 3-5 year total annual market return of $14.45 \%$ (described fully in note 1 on page 2 of Exhibit_(DWD-1), Schedule 5).
(5) Using data from Value Line for the S\&P 500, an expected total return of $13.83 \%$ was derived based upon expected dividend yields and long-term earnings growth estimates as a proxy for capital appreciation. Subtracting the average consensus forecast of Aaa corporate bonds of $2.98 \%$ results in an expected equity risk premium of $10.85 \%$.
(6) Using data from the Bloomberg Professional Service for the S\&P 500, an expected total return of $13.78 \%$ was derived based upon expected dividend yields and long-term earnings growth estimates as a proxy for capital appreciation. Subtracting the average consensus forecast of Aaa corporate bonds of $2.98 \%$ results in an expected equity risk premium of $10.80 \%$.
(7) Average of mean and median beta from Exhibit_(DWD-1), Schedule 5.

## Sources of Information:

Stocks, Bonds, Bills, and Inflation - 2020 SBBI Yearbook, John Wiley \& Sons, Inc.
Industrial Manual and Mergent Bond Record Monthly Update.
Value Line Summary and Index
Blue Chip Financial Forecasts, June 1, 2020 and September 1, 2020
Bloomberg Professional Service

## Consensus Forecasts of U.S. Interest Rates and Key Assumptions

Interest Rates
Federal Funds Rate Prime Rate
LIBOR, 3-mo.
Commercial Paper, 1-mo.
Treasury bill, 3-mo.
Treasury bill, 6-mo.
Treasury bill, 1 yr.
Treasury note, 2 yr. Treasury note, 5 yr . Treasury note, 10 yr . Treasury note, 30 yr . Corporate Aaa bond Corporate Baa bond State \& Local bonds Home mortgage rate

Key Assumptions
Fed's AFE \$ Index
Real GDP
GDP Price Index
Consumer Price Index

| Aug 21 | Aug 14 | Aug 7 | Jul 31 | Jul | Jun | May | 2Q 2020 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 0.10 | 0.10 | 0.10 | 0.09 | 0.09 | 0.08 | 0.05 | 0.06 |
| 3.25 | 3.25 | 3.25 | 3.25 | 3.25 | 3.25 | 3.25 | 3.25 |
| 0.25 | 0.27 | 0.25 | 0.26 | 0.27 | 0.31 | 0.40 | 0.60 |
| 0.09 | 0.10 | 0.10 | 0.11 | 0.11 | 0.12 | 0.13 | 0.24 |
| 0.10 | 0.11 | 0.10 | 0.10 | 0.13 | 0.16 | 0.13 | 0.14 |
| 0.12 | 0.12 | 0.11 | 0.12 | 0.14 | 0.18 | 0.15 | 0.17 |
| 0.13 | 0.14 | 0.13 | 0.13 | 0.15 | 0.18 | 0.16 | 0.17 |
| 0.14 | 0.15 | 0.11 | 0.13 | 0.15 | 0.19 | 0.17 | 0.19 |
| 0.28 | 0.28 | 0.21 | 0.25 | 0.28 | 0.34 | 0.34 | 0.36 |
| 0.67 | 0.67 | 0.55 | 0.58 | 0.62 | 0.73 | 0.67 | 0.69 |
| 1.40 | 1.36 | 1.21 | 1.22 | 1.31 | 1.49 | 1.38 | 1.38 |
| 2.53 | 2.46 | 2.32 | 2.32 | 2.43 | 2.73 | 2.85 | 2.81 |
| 3.14 | 3.06 | 2.95 | 2.98 | 3.12 | 3.44 | 3.69 | 3.67 |
| 2.87 | 2.85 | 2.89 | 2.91 | 2.99 | 3.10 | 3.33 | 3.28 |
| 2.99 | 2.96 | 2.88 | 2.99 | 3.02 | 3.16 | 3.23 | 3.23 |
|  |  |  | -Histo |  |  |  |  |
| 3Q | 4Q | 1Q | 2Q | 3Q | 4Q | 1Q | 2Q |
| $\underline{2018}$ | $\underline{2018}$ | $\underline{2019}$ | $\underline{2019}$ | $\underline{2019}$ | $\underline{2019}$ | $\underline{2020}$ | $\underline{2020}$ |
| 107.8 | 109.4 | 109.4 | 110.3 | 110.5 | 110.3 | 111.2 | 112.4 |
| 2.1 | 1.3 | 2.9 | 1.5 | 2.6 | 2.4 | -5.0 | -31.7 |
| 1.8 | 1.8 | 1.2 | 2.5 | 1.5 | 1.4 | 1.4 | -2.0 |
| 2.1 | 1.3 | 0.9 | 3.0 | 1.8 | 2.4 | 1.2 | -3.5 |


| Consensus Forecasts-Quarterly Avg. |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 3Q | 4Q | $1 Q$ | 2Q | 3Q | 4Q |
| $\underline{2020}$ | 2020 | 2021 | 2021 | 2021 | $\underline{2021}$ |
| 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 |
| 3.3 | 3.3 | 3.3 | 3.3 | 3.3 | 3.3 |
| 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.5 | 0.5 |
| 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.3 |
| 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 |
| 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 |
| 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.3 |
| 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.4 |
| 0.3 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.5 | 0.6 | 0.7 |
| 0.7 | 0.8 | 0.8 | 0.9 | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| 1.4 | 1.5 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 1.7 | 1.8 |
| 2.3 | 2.4 | 2.5 | 2.6 | 2.7 | 2.8 |
| 3.5 | 3.6 | 3.7 | 3.7 | 3.8 | 3.8 |
| 2.5 | 2.4 | 2.5 | 2.5 | 2.6 | 2.6 |
| 3.0 | 3.1 | 3.1 | 3.1 | 3.2 | 3.2 |
| Consensus Forecasts-Quarterly |  |  |  |  |  |
| 3Q | 4Q | $1 Q$ | 2 Q | 3Q | 4Q |
| $\underline{2020}$ | $\underline{2020}$ | 2021 | 2021 | $\underline{2021}$ | $\underline{2021}$ |
| 108.0 | 107.7 | 107.5 | 107.4 | 107.0 | 106.8 |
| 21.5 | 5.7 | 5.0 | 4.4 | 3.8 | 3.5 |
| 1.9 | 1.3 | 1.5 | 1.4 | 1.6 | 1.6 |
| 3.2 | 1.8 | 1.9 | 1.7 | 2.0 | 2.0 |

Forecasts for interest rates and the Federal Reserve's Major Currency Index represent averages for the quarter. Forecasts for Real GDP, GDP Price Index and Consumer Price Index are seasonally-adjusted annual rates of change (saar). Individual panel members' forecasts are on pages 4 through 9 . Historical data: Treasury rates from the Federal Reserve Board's H.15; AAA-AA and A-BBB corporate bond yields from Bank of America-Merrill Lynch and are 15+ years, yield to maturity; State and local bond yields from Bank of America-Merrill Lynch, A-rated, yield to maturity; Mortgage rates from Freddie Mac, 30-year, fixed; LIBOR quotes from Intercontinental Exchange. All interest rate data are sourced from Haver Analytics. Historical data for Fed's Major Currency Index are from FRSR H.10. Historical data for Real GDP and GDP Chained Price Index are from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). Consumer Price Index (CPI) history is from the Department of Labor's Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).


## Long-Range Survey:

The table below contains the results of our twice-annual long-range CONSENSUS survey. There are also Top 10 and Bottom 10 averages for each variable. Shown are consensus estimates for the years 2021 through 2026 and averages for the five-year periods 2022-2026 and 2027-2031. Apply these projections cautiously. Few if any economic, demographic and political forces can be evaluated accurately over such long time spans.


# Northern States Power Company, a Minnesota Corporation <br> Derivation of Mean Equity Risk Premium Based Studies <br> Using Holding Period Returns and <br> Projected Market Appreciation of the S\&P Utility Index 

| $\underline{\text { Line No. }}$ |  | Implied Equity Risk Premium |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Equity Risk Premium based on S\&P Utility Index Holding Period Returns (1): |  |
| 1. | Historical Equity Risk Premium | 4.21 \% |
| 2. | Regression of Historical Equity Risk Premium (2) | 6.83 |
| 3. | Forecasted Equity Risk Premium Based on PRPM (3) | 5.53 |
| 4. | Forecasted Equity Risk Premium based on Projected Total Return on the S\&P Utilities Index (Value Line Data) (4) | 6.80 |
| 5. | Forecasted Equity Risk Premium based on Projected Total Return on the S\&P Utilities Index (Bloomberg Data) (5) | 7.89 |
| 6. | Average Equity Risk Premium (6) | 6.25 \% |

Notes: (1) Based on S\&P Public Utility Index monthly total returns and Moody's Public Utility Bond average monthly yields from 1928-2019. Holding period returns are calculated based upon income received (dividends and interest) plus the relative change in the market value of a security over a one-year holding period.
(2) This equity risk premium is based on a regression of the monthly equity risk premiums of the S\&P Utility Index relative to Moody's A rated public utility bond yields from 1928-2019 referenced in note 1 above.
(3) The Predictive Risk Premium Model (PRPM) is applied to the risk premium of the monthly total returns of the S\&P Utility Index and the monthly yields on Moody's A rated public utility bonds from January 1928 - August 2020.
(4) Using data from Value Line for the S\&P Utilities Index, an expected return of $10.36 \%$ was derived based on expected dividend yields and long-term growth estimates as a proxy for market appreciation. Subtracting the expected A rated public utility bond yield of $3.56 \%$, calculated on line 3 of page 3 of this Schedule results in an equity risk premium of $6.80 \%$. $(10.36 \%-3.56 \%=6.80 \%)$
(5) Using data from Bloomberg Professional Service for the S\&P Utilities Index, an expected return of $11.45 \%$ was derived based on expected dividend yields and longterm growth estimates as a proxy for market appreciation. Subtracting the expected A rated public utility bond yield of $3.56 \%$, calculated on line 3 of page 3 of this Schedule results in an equity risk premium of $7.89 \%$. $(11.45 \%-3.56 \%=7.89 \%)$
(6) Average of lines 1 through 5.


Source of Information: Regulatory Research Associates
of the Traditional Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) and Empirical Capital Asset Pricing Model (ECAPM)

|  | [1] | [2] | [3] | [4] | [5] | [6] | [7] | [8] |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Proxy Group of Fifteen Electric Companies | Value Line <br> Adjusted Beta | Bloomberg Adjusted Beta | Average <br> Beta | Market Risk <br> Premium (1) | Risk-Free <br> Rate (2) | Traditional CAPM Cost Rate | ECAPM Cost Rate | Indicated <br> Common <br> Equity Cost <br> Rate (3) |
| ALLETE, Inc. | 0.85 | 0.99 | 0.92 | 10.65 \% | 2.05 \% | 11.85 \% | 12.06 \% | 11.95 \% |
| Alliant Energy Corporation | 0.80 | 1.00 | 0.90 | 10.65 | 2.05 | 11.63 | 11.90 | 11.77 |
| Ameren Corporation | 0.80 | 0.92 | 0.86 | 10.65 | 2.05 | 11.21 | 11.58 | 11.39 |
| Duke Energy Corporation | 0.85 | 0.96 | 0.91 | 10.65 | 2.05 | 11.74 | 11.98 | 11.86 |
| Edison International | 0.90 | 1.03 | 0.96 | 10.65 | 2.05 | 12.27 | 12.38 | 12.33 |
| Entergy Corporation | 0.95 | 1.10 | 1.02 | 10.65 | 2.05 | 12.91 | 12.86 | 12.89 |
| Evergy, Inc. | 1.05 | 1.03 | 1.04 | 10.65 | 2.05 | 13.12 | 13.02 | 13.07 |
| IDACORP, Inc. | 0.80 | 0.99 | 0.90 | 10.65 | 2.05 | 11.63 | 11.90 | 11.77 |
| NorthWestern Corporation | 0.90 | 1.20 | 1.05 | 10.65 | 2.05 | 13.23 | 13.10 | 13.16 |
| OGE Energy Corporation | 1.05 | 1.17 | 1.11 | 10.65 | 2.05 | 13.87 | 13.58 | 13.72 |
| Otter Tail Corporation | 0.85 | 0.99 | 0.92 | 10.65 | 2.05 | 11.85 | 12.06 | 11.95 |
| Pinnacle West Capital Corp. | 0.85 | 1.04 | 0.95 | 10.65 | 2.05 | 12.17 | 12.30 | 12.23 |
| PNM Resources, Inc. | 0.90 | 1.26 | 1.08 | 10.65 | 2.05 | 13.55 | 13.34 | 13.44 |
| Portland General Electric Co. | 0.85 | 0.99 | 0.92 | 10.65 | 2.05 | 11.85 | 12.06 | 11.95 |
| Xcel Energy, Inc. | 0.75 | 0.95 | 0.85 | 10.65 | 2.05 | 11.10 | 11.50 | 11.30 |
| Mean |  |  | 0.96 |  |  | 12.27 \% | 12.37 \% | 12.32 \% |
| Median |  |  | 0.92 |  |  | 11.85 \% | 12.06 \% | 11.95 \% |
| Average of Mean and Median |  |  | 0.94 |  |  | 12.06 \% | 12.22 \% | 12.14 \% |

# Northern States Power Company, a Minnesota Corporation <br> Notes to Accompany the Application of the CAPM and ECAPM 

Notes:
(1) The market risk premium (MRP) is derived by using six different measures from three sources: Ibbotson, Value Line, and Bloomberg as illustrated below:

Historical Data MRP Estimates:
Measure 1: Ibbotson Arithmetic Mean MRP (1926-2019)
Arithmetic Mean Monthly Returns for Large Stocks 1926-2019:
12.10 \%

Arithmetic Mean Income Returns on Long-Term Government Bonds:
MRP based on Ibbotson Historical Data:
5.09

Measure 2: Application of a Regression Analysis to Ibbotson Historical Data
(1926-2019)
10.24 \%

Measure 3: Application of the PRPM to Ibbotson Historical Data:
(January 1926 - August 2020)
10.73 \%

Value Line MRP Estimates:
Measure 4: Value Line Projected MRP (Thirteen weeks ending September 04, 2020)
Total projected return on the market 3-5 years hence*: $\quad 14.45 \%$
Projected Risk-Free Rate (see note 2):
MRP based on Value Line Summary \& Index:

| 2.05 |
| ---: |
| 12.40 |$\%$

*Forcasted 3-5 year capital appreciation plus expected dividend yield
Measure 5: Value Line Projected Return on the Market based on the S\&P 500
$\begin{array}{lr}\text { Total return on the Market based on the S\&P 500: } & 13.83 \% \\ \text { Projected Risk-Free Rate (see note 2): } & 2.05\end{array}$
MRP based on Value Line data
Measure 6: Bloomberg Projected MRP
Total return on the Market based on the S\&P 500:

|  | 13.78 <br> MRP based on Bloomberg data <br> 2.05 |
| ---: | :--- |
| Average of Value Line, Ibbotson, and Bloomberg MRP: | 11.73 |
| 10.65 |  |

(2) For reasons explained in the direct testimony, the appropriate risk-free rate for cost of capital purposes is the average forecast of 30 year Treasury Bonds per the consensus of nearly 50 economists reported in Blue Chip Financial Forecasts. (See pages 10-11 of Exhibit_(DWD-1) Schedule 4.) The projection of the risk-free rate is illustrated below:

| Third Quarter 2020 | $1.40 \%$ |
| ---: | ---: |
| Fourth Quarter 2020 | 1.50 |
| First Quarter 2021 | 1.60 |
| Second Quarter 2021 | 1.60 |
| Third Quarter 2021 | 1.70 |
| Fourth Quarter 2021 | 1.80 |
| $2022-2026$ | 3.00 |
| $2027-2031$ | $\underline{3.80}$ |
|  | $\underline{2.05} \%$ |

(3) Average of Column 6 and Column 7.

Sources of Information:
Value Line Summary and Index
Blue Chip Financial Forecasts, June 1, 2020 and September 1, 2020
Stocks, Bonds, Bills, and Inflation - 2020 SBBI Yearbook, John Wiley \& Sons, Inc.
Bloomberg Professional Services

Northern States Power Company, a Minnesota Corporation Basis of Selection of the Group of Non-Price Regulated Companies Comparable in Total Risk to the Utility Proxy Group

The criteria for selection of the Non-Price Regulated Proxy Group was that the non-price regulated companies be domestic and reported in Value Line Investment Survey (Standard Edition).

The Non-Price Regulated Proxy Group companies were then selected based on the unadjusted beta range of 0.64-0.92 and residual standard error of the regression range of 2.5047 - 2.9871 of the Utility Proxy Group.

These ranges are based upon plus or minus two standard deviations of the unadjusted beta and standard error of the regression. Plus or minus two standard deviations captures $95.50 \%$ of the distribution of unadjusted betas and residual standard errors of the regression.

The standard deviation of the Gas Utility Proxy Group's residual standard error of the regression is 0.1206 . The standard deviation of the standard error of the regression is calculated as follows:

Standard Deviation of the Std. Err. of the Regr. $=$ Standard Error of the Regression $\sqrt{2 N}$
where: $\mathrm{N}=$ number of observations. Since Value Line betas are derived from weekly price change observations over a period of five years, $\mathrm{N}=259$

$$
\text { Thus, } 0.1206=\frac{2.7459}{\sqrt{518}}=\frac{2.7459}{22.7596}
$$

# Northern States Power Company, a Minnesota Corporation 

Basis of Selection of Comparable Risk
Domestic Non-Price Regulated Companies

|  | [1] | [2] | [3] | [4] |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Proxy Group of Fifteen Electric Companies | Value Line <br> Adjusted Beta | Unadjusted Beta | Residual <br> Standard <br> Error of the <br> Regression | Standard <br> Deviation of Beta |
| ALLETE, Inc. | 0.85 | 0.72 | 2.5517 | 0.0644 |
| Alliant Energy Corporation | 0.80 | 0.69 | 2.7475 | 0.0694 |
| Ameren Corporation | 0.80 | 0.66 | 2.6493 | 0.0669 |
| Duke Energy Corporation | 0.85 | 0.75 | 2.7615 | 0.0697 |
| Edison International | 0.90 | 0.82 | 3.2630 | 0.0824 |
| Entergy Corporation | 0.95 | 0.86 | 2.6168 | 0.0661 |
| Evergy, Inc. | 1.05 | 1.02 | 3.0695 | 0.0916 |
| IDACORP, Inc. | 0.80 | 0.64 | 2.5630 | 0.0647 |
| NorthWestern Corporation | 0.90 | 0.79 | 2.7647 | 0.0698 |
| OGE Energy Corporation | 1.05 | 1.05 | 2.6291 | 0.0664 |
| Otter Tail Corporation | 0.85 | 0.75 | 2.4932 | 0.0630 |
| Pinnacle West Capital Corp. | 0.85 | 0.75 | 2.6801 | 0.0677 |
| PNM Resources, Inc. | 0.90 | 0.84 | 3.0989 | 0.0782 |
| Portland General Electric Co. | 0.85 | 0.75 | 2.6422 | 0.0667 |
| Xcel Energy, Inc. | 0.75 | 0.61 | 2.6583 | 0.0671 |
| Average | 0.88 | 0.78 | 2.7459 | 0.0703 |
| Beta Range (+/-2 std. Devs. of Beta) | 0.64 | 0.92 |  |  |
| 2 std. Devs. of Beta | 0.14 |  |  |  |
| Residual Std. Err. Range ( $+/-2$ std. Devs. of the Residual Std. Err.) | 2.5047 | 2.9871 |  |  |
| Std. dev. of the Res. Std. Err. | 0.1206 |  |  |  |
| 2 std. devs. of the Res. Std. Err. | 0.2412 |  |  |  |

Northern States Power Company, a Minnesota Corporation
Proxy Group of Non-Price Regulated Companies
Comparable in Total Risk to the
Proxy Group of Fifteen Electric Companies

|  | [1] | [2] | [3] | [4] |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Proxy Group of Forty-Seven Non-Price Regulated Companies | VL Adjusted Beta | Unadjusted Beta | Residual <br> Standard <br> Error of the <br> Regression | Standard Deviation of Beta |
| Apple Inc. | 0.95 | 0.89 | 2.8953 | 0.0731 |
| Analog Devices | 0.95 | 0.90 | 2.7284 | 0.0689 |
| Assurant Inc. | 0.90 | 0.79 | 2.7586 | 0.0697 |
| Amgen | 0.85 | 0.74 | 2.6870 | 0.0678 |
| Amer. Tower 'A' | 0.90 | 0.85 | 2.8552 | 0.0721 |
| ANSYS, Inc. | 0.90 | 0.79 | 2.7316 | 0.0690 |
| Smith (A.O.) | 0.95 | 0.86 | 2.7319 | 0.0690 |
| Becton, Dickinson | 0.80 | 0.68 | 2.6431 | 0.0667 |
| Brown-Forman 'B' | 0.90 | 0.79 | 2.6084 | 0.0659 |
| Bio-Rad Labs. 'A' | 0.80 | 0.67 | 2.8493 | 0.0719 |
| Black Knight, Inc. | 0.85 | 0.73 | 2.6526 | 0.0670 |
| Broadridge Fin'l | 0.85 | 0.73 | 2.7938 | 0.0705 |
| Cadence Design Sys. | 0.95 | 0.88 | 2.8991 | 0.0732 |
| CDW Corp. | 0.95 | 0.92 | 2.7232 | 0.0688 |
| Cerner Corp. | 0.90 | 0.84 | 2.8660 | 0.0724 |
| Chemed Corp. | 0.85 | 0.77 | 2.5217 | 0.0637 |
| Cooper Cos. | 0.95 | 0.89 | 2.6587 | 0.0671 |
| Dolby Labs. | 0.95 | 0.85 | 2.6147 | 0.0660 |
| Lauder (Estee) | 0.90 | 0.82 | 2.6597 | 0.0672 |
| ESCO Technologies | 0.95 | 0.88 | 2.5170 | 0.0636 |
| Exponent, Inc. | 0.85 | 0.75 | 2.8247 | 0.0713 |
| Forward Air | 0.95 | 0.89 | 2.7021 | 0.0682 |
| Gentex Corp. | 0.95 | 0.92 | 2.7002 | 0.0682 |
| Alphabet Inc. | 0.90 | 0.83 | 2.7286 | 0.0689 |
| Hershey Co. | 0.85 | 0.73 | 2.6704 | 0.0674 |
| Ingredion Inc. | 0.90 | 0.78 | 2.8600 | 0.0722 |
| Hunt (J.B.) | 0.95 | 0.89 | 2.7263 | 0.0688 |
| J\&J Snack Foods | 0.85 | 0.76 | 2.7347 | 0.0691 |
| St. Joe Corp. | 0.80 | 0.65 | 2.9722 | 0.0751 |
| ManTech Int'l 'A' | 0.85 | 0.75 | 2.9683 | 0.0750 |
| McCormick \& Co. | 0.85 | 0.76 | 2.6762 | 0.0676 |
| Altria Group | 0.85 | 0.72 | 2.9098 | 0.0735 |
| Motorola Solutions | 0.85 | 0.75 | 2.6058 | 0.0658 |
| Vail Resorts | 0.90 | 0.78 | 2.9711 | 0.0750 |
| NewMarket Corp. | 0.85 | 0.70 | 2.5462 | 0.0643 |
| Northrop Grumman | 0.85 | 0.71 | 2.8334 | 0.0715 |
| PerkinElmer Inc. | 1.00 | 0.92 | 2.5564 | 0.0646 |
| Pool Corp. | 0.90 | 0.82 | 2.5263 | 0.0638 |
| Rollins, Inc. | 0.85 | 0.72 | 2.8610 | 0.0722 |
| Selective Ins. Group | 0.85 | 0.70 | 2.6898 | 0.0679 |
| Sirius XM Holdings | 0.95 | 0.87 | 2.5986 | 0.0656 |
| Bio-Techne Corp. | 0.85 | 0.72 | 2.8139 | 0.0711 |
| Tetra Tech | 0.90 | 0.78 | 2.8216 | 0.0712 |
| Texas Instruments | 0.85 | 0.75 | 2.6653 | 0.0673 |
| AMERCO | 0.90 | 0.80 | 2.6496 | 0.0669 |
| VeriSign Inc. | 0.95 | 0.90 | 2.5465 | 0.0643 |
| West Pharmac. Svcs. | 0.80 | 0.70 | 2.8223 | 0.0713 |
| Average | 0.89 | 0.79 | 2.7300 | 0.0700 |
| Proxy Group of Fifteen Electric |  |  |  |  |
| Companies | 0.88 | 0.78 | 2.7459 | 0.0703 |

# Northern States Power Company, a Minnesota Corporation <br> Summary of Cost of Equity Models Applied to <br> Proxy Group of Forty-Seven Non-Price Regulated Companies <br> Comparable in Total Risk to the <br> Proxy Group of Fifteen Electric Companies 

Principal Methods
Proxy Group of Forty-Seven NonPrice Regulated Companies

Discounted Cash Flow Model (DCF) (1)
11.91 \%

Risk Premium Model (RPM) (2)
12.68

Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) (3)
11.83
12.14 \%
11.91 \%
12.03 \%

Notes:
(1) Average of resutls from the Constant Growth DCF Model and Two Growth DCF Model from pages 2 and 3 of this Schedule.
(2) From page 4 of this Schedule.
(3) From page 7 of this Schedule.

Northern States Power Company, a Minnesota Corporation
DCF Results for the Proxy Group of Non-Price-Regulated Companies Comparable in Total Risk to the Proxy Group of Fifteen Electric Companies



## Northern States Power Company, a Minnesota Corporation Indicated Common Equity Cost Rate <br> Through Use of a Risk Premium Model <br> Using an Adjusted Total Market Approach

Line No.
Proxy Group of Forty-
Seven Non-Price
$\underline{\text { Regulated Companies }}$

| 1. | Prospective Yield on Baa Rated Corporate Bonds (1) | 4.10 \% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2. | Adjustment to Reflect Proxy Group |  |
|  | Bond Rating (2) | (0.20) |
| 3. | Prospective Bond Rating | 3.90 |
| 4. | Equity Risk Premium (3) | 8.78 |
| 5 | Risk Premium Derived Common |  |
|  | Equity Cost Rate | 12.68 \% |

Notes: (1) Average forecast of Baa corporate bonds based upon the consensus of nearly 50 economists reported in Blue Chip Financial Forecasts dated June 1, 2020 and September 1, 2020 (see pages 10-11 of Exhibit_(DWD-1) Schedule 4). The estimates are detailed below.

| Third Quarter 2020 | $3.50 \%$ |
| ---: | :--- |
| Fourth Quarter 2020 | 3.60 |
| First Quarter 2021 | 3.70 |
| Second Quarter 2021 | 3.70 |
| Third Quarter 2021 | 3.80 |
| Fourth Quarter 2021 | 3.80 |
| 2022-2026 | 5.00 |
| 2027-2031 | 5.70 |
| Average | 4.10 |

(2) To reflect the Baa1 average rating of the non-utility proxy group, the prosepctive yield on Baa corporate bonds must be adjusted downward by $1 / 3$ of the spread between $A$ and Baa corporate bond yields as shown below:

|  | A Corp. <br> Bond Yield | Baa Corp. <br> Bond Yield | Spread |
| ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Aug-2020 | 2.68 | $\%$ | 3.27 |
| Jul-2020 | 2.69 | 3.31 | 0.59 |
| Jun-2020 | 3.02 | 3.65 | 0.62 |
|  | Average yield spread |  | 0.0 .63 |
|  |  |  | 0 |

(3) From page 6 of this Schedule.

Northern States Power Company, a Minnesota Corporation<br>Comparison of Long-Term Issuer Ratings for the<br>Proxy Group of Forty-Seven Non-Price Regulated Companies of Comparable risk to the Proxy Group of Fifteen Electric Companies

| Moody's | Standard \& Poor's |
| :---: | :---: |
| Long-Term Issuer Rating | Long-Term Issuer Rating |
| August 2020 | August 2020 |


| Proxy Group of Forty-Seven NonPrice Regulated Companies | Long-Term Issuer Rating | Numerical Weighting (1) | Long-Term Issuer Rating | Numerical Weighting (1) |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Apple Inc. | Aa1 | 2.0 | AA+ | 2.0 |
| Analog Devices | Baa1 | 8.0 | BBB+ | 8.0 |
| Assurant Inc. | Baa3 | 10.0 | BBB | 9.0 |
| Amgen | Baa1 | 8.0 | A- | 7.0 |
| Amer. Tower 'A' | Baa3 | 10.0 | BBB- | 10.0 |
| ANSYS, Inc. | NR | -- | NR | -- |
| Smith (A.O.) | NR | -- | NR | -- |
| Becton, Dickinson | Ba1 | 11.0 | BBB | 9.0 |
| Brown-Forman 'B' | A1 | 5.0 | A- | 7.0 |
| Bio-Rad Labs. 'A' | Baa2 | 9.0 | BBB | 9.0 |
| Black Knight, Inc. | Ba3 | 13.0 | BB | 12.0 |
| Broadridge Fin'l | Baa1 | 8.0 | BBB+ | 8.0 |
| Cadence Design Sys. | Baa2 | 9.0 | BBB+ | 8.0 |
| CDW Corp. | WR | -- | BB+ | 11.0 |
| Cerner Corp. | NR | -- | NR | -- |
| Chemed Corp. | WR | -- | NR | -- |
| Cooper Cos. | WR | -- | NR | -- |
| Dolby Labs. | NR | -- | NR | -- |
| Lauder (Estee) | A1 | 5.0 | A+ | 5.0 |
| ESCO Technologies | NR | -- | NR | -- |
| Exponent, Inc. | NR | -- | NR | -- |
| Forward Air | NR | -- | NR | -- |
| Gentex Corp. | NR | -- | NR | -- |
| Alphabet Inc. | Aa2 | 3.0 | AA+ | 2.0 |
| Hershey Co. | A1 | 5.0 | A | 6.0 |
| Ingredion Inc. | Baa1 | 8.0 | BBB | 9.0 |
| Hunt (J.B.) | Baa1 | 8.0 | BBB+ | 8.0 |
| J\&J Snack Foods | NR | -- | NR | -- |
| St. Joe Corp. | NR | -- | NR | -- |
| ManTech Int'l 'A' | WR | -- | BB+ | 11.0 |
| McCormick \& Co. | Baa2 | 9.0 | BBB | 9.0 |
| Altria Group | A3 | 7.0 | BBB | 9.0 |
| Motorola Solutions | Baa3 | 10.0 | BBB- | 10.0 |
| Vail Resorts | B2 | 15.0 | BB | 12.0 |
| NewMarket Corp. | Baa2 | 9.0 | BBB+ | 8.0 |
| Northrop Grumman | Baa2 | 9.0 | BBB | 9.0 |
| PerkinElmer Inc. | Baa3 | 10.0 | BBB | 9.0 |
| Pool Corp. | NR | -- | NR | -- |
| Rollins, Inc. | NR | -- | NR | -- |
| Selective Ins. Group | Baa2 | 9.0 | BBB | 9.0 |
| Sirius XM Holdings | NR | -- | NR | -- |
| Bio-Techne Corp. | NR | -- | NR | -- |
| Tetra Tech | NR | -- | NR | -- |
| Texas Instruments | A1 | 5.0 | A+ | 5.0 |
| AMERCO | WR | -- | NR | -- |
| VeriSign Inc. | Ba1 | 11.0 | BBB- | 10.0 |
| West Pharmac. Svcs. | NR | -- | NR | -- |
| Average | Baa1 | 8.3 | BBB+ | 8.3 |

Notes:
(1) From page 6 of Exhibit_(DWD-1), Schedule 4.

Source of Information:
Bloomberg Professional Services

Northern States Power Company, a Minnesota Corporation
Derivation of Equity Risk Premium Based on the Total Market Approach
Using the Beta for
Proxy Group of Forty-Seven Non-Price Regulated Companies of Comparable risk to the Proxy Group of Fifteen Electric Companies

| Line No. | Equity Risk Premium Measure | Proxy Group of Forty-Seven NonPrice Regulated Companies |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Ibbotson-Based Equity Risk Premiums: |  |  |
| 1. | Ibbotson Equity Risk Premium (1) | 5.78 \% |
| 2. | Regression on Ibbotson Risk Premium Data (2) | 9.39 |
| 3. | Ibbotson Equity Risk Premium based on PRPM (3) | 9.62 |
| 4. | Equity Risk Premium Based on Value Line Summary and Index (4) | 11.47 |
| 5 | Equity Risk Premium Based on Value Line S\&P 500 Companies (5) | 10.85 |
| 6. | Equity Risk Premium Based on Bloomberg S\&P 500 Companies (6) | 10.80 |
| 7. | Conclusion of Equity Risk Premium | 9.65 \% |
| 8. | Adjusted Beta (7) | 0.91 |
| 9. | Forecasted Equity Risk Premium | 8.78 \% |

Notes:
(1) From note 1 of page 9 of Exhibit_(DWD-1), Schedule 4.
(2) From note 2 of page 9 of Exhibit_(DWD-1), Schedule 4.
(3) From note 3 of page 9 of Exhibit_(DWD-1), Schedule 4.
(4) From note 4 of page 9 of Exhibit_(DWD-1), Schedule 4.
(5) From note 5 of page 9 of Exhibit_(DWD-1), Schedule 4.
(6) From note 6 of page 9 of Exhibit_(DWD-1), Schedule 4.
(7) Average of mean and median beta from page 7 of this Schedule.

Sources of Information:
Stocks, Bonds, Bills, and Inflation - 2020 SBBI Yearbook, John Wiley \& Sons, Inc.
Value Line Summary and Index
Blue Chip Financial Forecasts, June 1, 2020 and September 1, 2020
Bloomberg Professional Services

Traditional CAPM and ECAPM Results for the Proxy Group of Non-Price-Regulated Companies Comparable in Total Risk to the Proxy Group of Fifteen Electric Companies

|  | [1] | [2] | [3] | [4] | [5] | [6] | [7] | [8] |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Proxy Group of Forty-Seven NonPrice Regulated Companies | Value Line Adjusted Beta | Bloomberg Beta | Average Beta | Market Risk <br> Premium (1) | Risk-Free Rate <br> (2) | Traditional CAPM Cost Rate | ECAPM Cost Rate | Indicated Common Equity Cost Rate (3) |
| Apple Inc. | 0.95 | 1.00 | 0.98 | 10.65 \% | 2.05 \% | 12.49 \% | 12.54 \% | 12.51 \% |
| Analog Devices | 0.95 | 1.03 | 0.99 | 10.65 | 2.05 | 12.59 | 12.62 | 12.61 |
| Assurant Inc. | 0.90 | 1.06 | 0.98 | 10.65 | 2.05 | 12.49 | 12.54 | 12.51 |
| Amgen | 0.85 | 0.80 | 0.82 | 10.65 | 2.05 | 10.78 | 11.26 | 11.02 |
| Amer. Tower 'A' | 0.90 | 0.89 | 0.89 | 10.65 | 2.05 | 11.53 | 11.82 | 11.67 |
| ANSYS, Inc. | 0.90 | 0.96 | 0.93 | 10.65 | 2.05 | 11.95 | 12.14 | 12.05 |
| Smith (A.O.) | 0.95 | 1.02 | 0.98 | 10.65 | 2.05 | 12.49 | 12.54 | 12.51 |
| Becton, Dickinson | 0.80 | 0.68 | 0.74 | 10.65 | 2.05 | 9.93 | 10.62 | 10.28 |
| Brown-Forman 'B' | 0.90 | 0.93 | 0.92 | 10.65 | 2.05 | 11.85 | 12.06 | 11.95 |
| Bio-Rad Labs. 'A' | 0.80 | 0.72 | 0.76 | 10.65 | 2.05 | 10.14 | 10.78 | 10.46 |
| Black Knight, Inc. | 0.85 | 0.86 | 0.86 | 10.65 | 2.05 | 11.21 | 11.58 | 11.39 |
| Broadridge Fin'l | 0.85 | 0.83 | 0.84 | 10.65 | 2.05 | 10.99 | 11.42 | 11.21 |
| Cadence Design Sys. | 0.95 | 0.94 | 0.94 | 10.65 | 2.05 | 12.06 | 12.22 | 12.14 |
| CDW Corp. | 0.95 | 1.29 | 1.12 | 10.65 | 2.05 | 13.98 | 13.66 | 13.82 |
| Cerner Corp. | 0.90 | 0.96 | 0.93 | 10.65 | 2.05 | 11.95 | 12.14 | 12.05 |
| Chemed Corp. | 0.85 | 0.96 | 0.91 | 10.65 | 2.05 | 11.74 | 11.98 | 11.86 |
| Cooper Cos. | 0.95 | 0.94 | 0.95 | 10.65 | 2.05 | 12.17 | 12.30 | 12.23 |
| Dolby Labs. | 0.95 | 0.95 | 0.95 | 10.65 | 2.05 | 12.17 | 12.30 | 12.23 |
| Lauder (Estee) | 0.90 | 0.96 | 0.93 | 10.65 | 2.05 | 11.95 | 12.14 | 12.05 |
| ESCO Technologies | 0.95 | 0.94 | 0.95 | 10.65 | 2.05 | 12.17 | 12.30 | 12.23 |
| Exponent, Inc. | 0.85 | 0.89 | 0.87 | 10.65 | 2.05 | 11.31 | 11.66 | 11.49 |
| Forward Air | 0.95 | 1.11 | 1.03 | 10.65 | 2.05 | 13.02 | 12.94 | 12.98 |
| Gentex Corp. | 0.95 | 0.99 | 0.97 | 10.65 | 2.05 | 12.38 | 12.46 | 12.42 |
| Alphabet Inc. | 0.90 | 0.88 | 0.89 | 10.65 | 2.05 | 11.53 | 11.82 | 11.67 |
| Hershey Co. | 0.85 | 0.77 | 0.81 | 10.65 | 2.05 | 10.68 | 11.18 | 10.93 |
| Ingredion Inc. | 0.90 | 0.94 | 0.92 | 10.65 | 2.05 | 11.85 | 12.06 | 11.95 |
| Hunt (J.B.) | 0.95 | 0.92 | 0.94 | 10.65 | 2.05 | 12.06 | 12.22 | 12.14 |
| J\&J Snack Foods | 0.85 | 0.77 | 0.81 | 10.65 | 2.05 | 10.68 | 11.18 | 10.93 |
| St. Joe Corp. | 0.80 | 0.96 | 0.88 | 10.65 | 2.05 | 11.42 | 11.74 | 11.58 |
| ManTech Int'l 'A' | 0.85 | 1.10 | 0.98 | 10.65 | 2.05 | 12.49 | 12.54 | 12.51 |
| McCormick \& Co. | 0.85 | 0.69 | 0.77 | 10.65 | 2.05 | 10.25 | 10.86 | 10.56 |
| Altria Group | 0.85 | 0.84 | 0.85 | 10.65 | 2.05 | 11.10 | 11.50 | 11.30 |
| Motorola Solutions | 0.85 | 0.95 | 0.90 | 10.65 | 2.05 | 11.63 | 11.90 | 11.77 |
| Vail Resorts | 0.90 | 1.16 | 1.03 | 10.65 | 2.05 | 13.02 | 12.94 | 12.98 |
| NewMarket Corp. | 0.85 | 0.59 | 0.72 | 10.65 | 2.05 | 9.72 | 10.46 | 10.09 |
| Northrop Grumman | 0.85 | 0.84 | 0.84 | 10.65 | 2.05 | 10.99 | 11.42 | 11.21 |
| PerkinElmer Inc. | 1.00 | 0.92 | 0.96 | 10.65 | 2.05 | 12.27 | 12.38 | 12.33 |
| Pool Corp. | 0.90 | 0.93 | 0.91 | 10.65 | 2.05 | 11.74 | 11.98 | 11.86 |
| Rollins, Inc. | 0.85 | 0.70 | 0.77 | 10.65 | 2.05 | 10.25 | 10.86 | 10.56 |
| Selective Ins. Group | 0.85 | 0.93 | 0.89 | 10.65 | 2.05 | 11.53 | 11.82 | 11.67 |
| Sirius XM Holdings | 0.95 | 1.13 | 1.04 | 10.65 | 2.05 | 13.12 | 13.02 | 13.07 |
| Bio-Techne Corp. | 0.85 | 0.81 | 0.83 | 10.65 | 2.05 | 10.89 | 11.34 | 11.11 |
| Tetra Tech | 0.90 | 1.01 | 0.95 | 10.65 | 2.05 | 12.17 | 12.30 | 12.23 |
| Texas Instruments | 0.85 | 0.90 | 0.88 | 10.65 | 2.05 | 11.42 | 11.74 | 11.58 |
| AMERCO | 0.90 | 1.03 | 0.97 | 10.65 | 2.05 | 12.38 | 12.46 | 12.42 |
| VeriSign Inc. | 0.95 | 0.84 | 0.90 | 10.65 | 2.05 | 11.63 | 11.90 | 11.77 |
| West Pharmac. Svcs. | 0.80 | 0.82 | 0.81 | 10.65 | 2.05 | 10.68 | 11.18 | 10.93 |
| Mean |  |  | 0.90 |  |  | 11.68 \% | 11.93 \% | 11.80 \% |
| Median |  |  | 0.91 |  |  | 11.74 \% | 11.98 \% | 11.86 \% |
| Average of Mean and Median |  |  | 0.91 |  |  | 11.71 \% | 11.96 \% | 11.83 \% |

Notes:
(1) From note 1 of page 2 of Exhibit_(DWD-1), Schedule 5.
(2) From note 2 of page 2 of Exhibit_(DWD-1), Schedule 5.
(3) Average of CAPM and ECAPM cost rates.
Docket No. E002/GR-20-273

Northern States Power Company, a Minnesota Corporation
Market Capitalization of Northern States Power Company, a Minnesota Corporation and the

|  |  | [1] |  | [2] |  | [3] |  | [4] | [5] |  |  | [6] |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Company | Exchange | Common Stock Shares Outstanding at Fiscal Year End 2019 |  | Value per at Fiscal End 2019 (1) |  | Common at Fiscal Year nd 2019 |  |  | Market-toBook Ratio on August <br> 31, 2020 (2) |  |  | Market <br>  n August 31, 2020 (3) |
|  |  | ( millions) |  |  |  | millions) |  |  |  |  |  | ( millions) |
| Northern States Power Company, a Minnesota Corporation |  | NA |  | NA |  | 5,831.152 ${ }^{(4)}$ |  | NA |  |  |  |  |
| Based upon Proxy Group of Fifteen Electric Companies |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 177.7 | (5) |  | 10,361.958 |
| Proxy Group of Fifteen Electric Companies |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ALLETE, Inc. | NYSE | 51.696 | \$ | 43.173 | \$ | 2,231.900 | \$ | 53.960 | 125.0 | \% |  | 2,789.543 |
| Alliant Energy Corporation | NASDAQ | 245.023 |  | 21.243 |  | 5,205.100 |  | 54.150 | 254.9 |  |  | 13,267.985 |
| Ameren Corporation | NYSE | 246.232 |  | 32.729 |  | 8,059.000 |  | 79.110 | 241.7 |  |  | 19,479.391 |
| Duke Energy Corporation | NYSE | 733.322 |  | 63.849 |  | 46,822.000 |  | 80.340 | 125.8 |  |  | 58,915.087 |
| Edison International | NYSE | 361.985 |  | 36.750 |  | 13,303.000 |  | 52.480 | 142.8 |  |  | 18,996.980 |
| Entergy Corporation | NYSE | 199.727 |  | 51.188 |  | 10,223.675 |  | 99.140 | 193.7 |  |  | 19,800.909 |
| Evergy, Inc. | NASDAQ | 226.641 |  | 37.821 |  | 8,571.900 |  | 53.220 | 140.7 |  |  | 12,061.858 |
| IDACORP, Inc. | NYSE | 50.410 |  | 48.892 |  | 2,464.628 |  | 89.900 | 183.9 |  |  | 4,531.850 |
| NorthWestern Corporation | NYSE | 53.999 |  | 37.762 |  | 2,039.094 |  | 51.640 | 136.8 |  |  | 2,788.518 |
| OGE Energy Corporation | NYSE | 200.177 |  | 20.679 |  | 4,139.500 |  | 31.860 | 154.1 |  |  | 6,377.651 |
| Otter Tail Corporation | NASDAQ | 40.158 |  | 19.460 |  | 781.482 |  | 38.850 | 199.6 |  |  | 1,560.122 |
| Pinnacle West Capital Corp. | NYSE | 112.540 |  | 48.255 |  | 5,430.648 |  | 73.350 | 152.0 |  |  | 8,254.818 |
| PNM Resources, Inc. | NYSE | 79.654 |  | 21.075 |  | 1,678.698 |  | 43.680 | 207.3 |  |  | 3,479.270 |
| Portland General Electric Co. | NYSE | 89.387 |  | 28.986 |  | 2,591.000 |  | 38.150 | 131.6 |  |  | 3,410.119 |
| Xcel Energy, Inc. | NASDAQ | 524.539 |  | 25.239 |  | 13,239.000 |  | 69.475 | 275.3 |  |  | 36,442.347 |
| Average |  | 214.366 | \$ | 35.807 | \$ | 8,452.042 | \$ | 60.620 | 177.7 | \% |  | 14,143.763 |

[^22]Average rate base for the period 2021-2023 multiplied by the requested common equity ratio.
The market-to-book ratio of Northern States Power Company, a Minnesota Corporation on August 31,2020 is assumed to be
equal to the market-to-book ratio of Proxy Group of Fifteen Electric Companies on August 31,2020 as appropriate.

[^23]Northern States Power Company, a Minnesota Corporation
Derivation of the Flotation Cost Adjustment to the Cost of Common Equity

| Flotation Cost Adjustment |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | [Column 1] | [Column 2] | [Column 3] | [Column 4] | [Column 5] | [Column 6] | [Column 7] |
|  | Average Dividend Yield (1) | Average Projected EPS Growth Rate (2) | Adjusted Dividend Yield (3) | Average DCF Cost Rate Unadjusted for Flotation (4) | Flotation Cost <br> Percentage (5) | DCF Cost Rate <br> Adjusted for <br> Flotation (6) | Flotation Cost <br> Adjustment (7) |
| Proxy Group of Fifteen Electric Companies | 3.71 \% | 4.78 \% | 3.80 \% | 8.58 \% | 3.76 \% | 8.73 \% | 0.15 \% |
| Notes: (1) | Exhibit_(DWD-1). Sche | dule 3. |  |  |  |  |  |
| (2) | Exhibit_(DWD-1). Sche | dule 3. |  |  |  |  |  |
| (3) | Column $1 \times(1+0.5 \times$ C | olumn 2). |  |  |  |  |  |
| (4) | Column $2+$ Column 3 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| (5) | Exhibit_(SWS-1), Sche | dule 21. |  |  |  |  |  |
| (6) | (Column 3 / (1-Colum | 5)) + Column 2. |  |  |  |  |  |
| (7) | Column 6-Column 4. |  |  |  |  |  |  |


[^0]:    The Commission noted in Docket E002/M-17-797: "Continuing to use this ROE going forward will provide administrative efficiency, and the Commission will therefore require Xcel to use an ROE of 9.06\% in all electric dockets filed by the Company that require an ROE until the Commission issues an order in the Company's next rate case authorizing a different ROE." In the Matter of the Petition of Northern States Power Company for Approval of the Transmission Cost Recovery Rider Revenue Requirements for 2017 and 2018, and Revised Adjustment Factor, Docket No. E002/M-17-797, September 29, 2019, at 8. See, also, In the Matter of the Petition of Northern States Power Company for Approval of the Renewable Energy Standards (RES) Rider Revenue Requirements for 2017 and 2018 and RES Adjustment Factors, Docket No. E002/M-17-818, September 30, 2019, at 3.
    Source: S\&P Global Market Intelligence.

[^1]:    9 Source: S\&P Global Market Intelligence.

[^2]:    13
    14
    See, Northern States Power Company, SEC Form 10-K at 4, 7 (Dec. 31, 2019). Source: S\&P Global Market Intelligence.

[^3]:    19 Communications Satellite Corp. et. al. v. FCC, 198 U.S. App. D.C. 60, 63-64611 F.2d 883.

[^4]:    21 See Exhibit___(DWD-1), Schedule 2.
    22 See, Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp, 80 FERC $\mathbb{1}$ 61,157, 61,657 (1997) (Opinion No. 414).
    23148 FERC 961,049 Docket No. EL14-12-000, at 190.

[^5]:    26
    See, for example, Docket No. E017/GR-15-1033, In the Matter of the Application of Otter Tail Power

[^6]:    $50 \quad$ As shown on line 1, page 12 of Exhibit___(DWD-1), Schedule 4.
    51

[^7]:    54 As shown on page 7 of Exhibit__(DWD-1), Schedule 4.
    55 As shown on page 3 of Exhibit _ (DWD-1), Schedule 4.

[^8]:    56 Morin, at 175.
    57 Eugene F. Fama and Kenneth R. French, The Capital Asset Pricing Model: Theory and Evidence, Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 18, No. 3, Summer 2004 at 33 ("Fama \& French").

[^9]:    58 Morin, at 175.
    59 Morin, at 190.
    60 Fama \& French, at 32.

[^10]:    64 Blue Chip, June 1, 2020, at page 14 and September 1, 2020, at page 2.
    65 Derived on page 5 of Exhibit__(DWD-1), Schedule 7

[^11]:    67 Fama \& French, at 25-43.

[^12]:    75 Morin, at p. 321.
    76 Eugene F. Brigham and Phillip R. Daves, Intermediate Financial Management, 9th Edition, Thomson/Southwestern, at p. 342.
    77 Morin, at pp. 327-30.

[^13]:    80 Source: Bloomberg Professional Service.
    81 SBBI-2020, at 6-17.

[^14]:    91 Morningstar, Correlations Going to 1: Amid Market Collapse, U.S. Stock Fund Factors Show Little Differentiation, March 6, 2020.
    92 Consistent with the calculation horizon of Bloomberg's Beta coefficients
    93 Consistent with the calculation horizon of Value Line's Beta coefficients.

[^15]:    BUSINESS: Alliant Energy Corp., formerly named Interstate Ener-
    gy, is a holding company formed through the merger of WPL Hold-

[^16]:    
    $\$ 2.12 ;$ '09, (644); '10, 54 ¢4; '11, (\$3.33); '13, '19 EPS don't sum due to chng. in shs. Next (D) In mill. (E) Rate base: net orig. cost. Rate Stock's Price Stability

[^17]:    
    10 14. ${ }^{\prime}$, $\$ 1.14$; '14, 564 ; ' $15, \$ 6.99$; '16, reinvestment plan avail. $\dagger$ Shareholder invest- earned on avg. com. eq., '19: $13.0 \%$. Regula\$10.14; '17, \$2.91; '18, \$1.25. Next earnings ment plan avail. (C) Incl. def'd charges. In '19: tory Climate: Average. report due early Aug. (B) Div'ds historically $\$ 29.67 / \mathrm{sh}$. (D) In millions. (E) Rate base: Net
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[^18]:    (A) Diluted EPS. '19 earnings don't sum to fullyear total due to rounding. Next earnings report due early Aug. (B) Dividends paid in midMarch, June, September, and December. -

    Dividend reinvestment plan available. (C) Incl.
    intangibles. In '19: $\$ 4077.1$ mill., $\$ 17.99 / \mathrm{sh}$.
    inssouri in '18: none specified; in Kansas in
    ' $9.3 \%$. Earned on average common equity, (D) In millions. (E) Rate base: Original cost
    '19: 7.2\%. Regulatory Climate: Average.
    depreciated. Rate allowed on common equity
    $\varrho$
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[^19]:    (A) Diluted EPS. Excl. nonrecurring gain (loss); $\begin{aligned} & \text { Feb., May, Aug., and Nov. - Dividend reinvest- } \\ & \text { original cost. Rate allowed on common equity } \\ & \text { Company's Financial Strength }\end{aligned}$

[^20]:    (A) Dil. EPS. Excl. nonrec. gain (losses): '08, '17 EPS don't sum due to rounding. Next egs. for split. (E) Rate base: net orig. cost. Rate all'd $_{\text {Company's Financial Strength }}$
    ( $\$ 3.77$ ); '10, ( $\$ 1.36$ ); '11, 88¢; '13, (16¢C); '15, $\quad$ report due late July. (B) Div'ds paid mid-Feb., , on com. eq. in NM in '18: $9.575 \%$; in TX in '11: Stock's Price Stability

[^21]:    （A）Diluted EPS．Excl．nonrecurring losses：＇13， holder investment plan avail．（C）Incl．deferred $^{\prime} 19: 8.4 \%$ ．Regulatory Climate：Average．（F）＇05 $\quad$ Company＇s Financial Strength
    424；＇17，19¢．Next earnings report due late charges．In＇19：$\$ 483$ mill．，$\$ 5.40 / \mathrm{sh}$ ．（D）In mill． per－share data are pro forma，based on shs． July．（B）Div＇ds paid mid－Jan．，Apr．，July，and（E）Rate base：Net orig．cost．Rate allowed on outstanding when stock began trading in＇06． Oct．－Div＇d reinvestment plan avail．$\dagger$ Share－$\quad$ com．eq．in＇19： $9.5 \%$ ；earned on avg．com．eq．，
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[^22]:    Notes: (1) Column 3 / Column 1. (6) Column [3] multiplied by Column [5].

[^23]:    Source of Information: 2019 Annual Forms 10K

