



FUTURE
ELECTRONICS

Security Access System

Energy Harvesting Smart Label



NXP Reader, and NFC to MCU Demo

Security Access System (SAS)

LPC43S37


- 204 MHz ARM Cortex-M4/M0+ Dual core
- AES engine for encryption and decryption
- Extensive Communication peripherals

A7001CM

- Tamper resistant secure Micro
- Complete security platform enabling customized solutions

Capacitive Sensor (PCA8885)

- Proximity sensing
- Ruggedized keypad




Energy Harvesting Smart Label (EnSL)

LPC824

- Ultra-efficient, 30 MHz ARM Cortex-M0+
- Versatile and Low power

NTAG I2C

- Contactless and contact interfaces
- Energy harvesting functionality



Agenda


- Motivation for Security
- What is the NXP Secure Access Demo exactly ?
- The Hardware + Firmware Implementation
- What we CAN and CANNOT offer?

Motivation for Security



Risks

- Attacking the device
 - Tampering with the device
 - Counterfeit device
- Attacking the device link
 - Stealing information (Eavesdropping)
 - Modifying information (or Fabrication)
- Attacking the system (Denial of Service)




Requirements

- **Safety**
 - Do what you are supposed to do
- **Privacy**
 - Restrict access to user data
- **Access control**
 - Restrict access to authorized persons



Key Takeaway for Security



Hardware Security



Main Security Services

Data protection

Confidentiality

Encryption

Integrity

Hashing

Logging & Auditing

Security log

Remember actions

Auditor access

Log interpretation

Authentication Authorization

Authentication

Password

Biometry - Token

Authorization

Access rights

Software protection

Code Integrity

Code signature

Code verification

Runtime integrity

Provisioning

Code Update


System upgrade

App upgrade

Bug fixing

Hardware Security Solution

- Authenticate boot software
- Key storage for encrypted firmware
- Secure Firmware Update
- Node Authentication
 - Use pre-stored cert or hash to authenticate without cloud connection
- Cloud Authentication
 - Use PKI structure for mutual authentication
- Tamper resistant



Hardware Implementation



Secured Access Demo Platform

Multi-factor authentication to support user access


★ PIN using NXP PCA8885 (capacitive touch keyboard)

★ Fingerprint reader FPC1011F3 (Fingerprints security)

★ NXP NFC reader CLRC663



Core Security



★ NXP 3-Axis Accelerometer FXO8700



★ NXP Secure Element A70CM

★ NXP MCU with integrated security
LPC43S57

Core Security

The heart of this kit is the:

1. MCU – LPC4300 Series
2. Secure Element Co-processor – A7001



LPC43S57 MCU Features

ARM Cortex-M4F
up to 204 MHz

ARM Cortex-M0
up to 204 MHz

CORE

SCTimer/PWM

32-bit (4)

WWDT

MCPWM

QEI

RTC

Alarm

TIMERS

EMC

SPIFI

SDIO

GPDMA

Graphic LCD

Ethernet MAC

SPI (3)

I²C (2)

I²S (2)

UART (4)

CAN 2.0B (2)

SGPIO

GPIO (164)

USB (2x HS Host/Dev)

INTERFACES

ADC (2-3)

DAC

ANALOG

Flash
up to 512 kB

Flash
up to 512 kB

RAM
up to 282 kB

EEPROM
16 kB

ROM
with ROM drivers

MEMORY

System PLL

USB PLL

Audio PLL


Power Management Unit
Power saving modes, BOD, POR

Clock Generation Unit
12 MHz, 1-24 MHz System OSC

SYSTEM

- ★ Dual Core MCU
- ★ 1MB Flash
- ★ 136kB SRAM
- ★ High-speed Connectivity
- ★ Advanced Peripherals

LPC43S57 Security Features




- ★ Unique Device ID
- ★ Secure Boot from encrypted image
- ★ True Random Number Generator
- ★ Hardware-accelerated AES-128 Engine
- ★ Two 128-bit nonvolatile OTP memories for encrypted keys

Private Key Storage

Where to Store Private Keys on MCU?

- **SRAM – Bad Idea ...**
- **Non-Volatile Memory – Even Worse!**
- **There is NO good place to store the private key in the MCU!
Especially going through a 3rd party**
- **So, the answer is ...**


**The private key MUST REMAIN in the A70CM
... NEVER store your private keys in the MCU!!**



What is an A70CM?

- An integrated system with enhanced security
 - Anti-cloning
 - Key storage
 - Asymmetric/Symmetric key encryption, decryption and generation
 - Signature generation and verification
 - Authentication based on PKI
- Security OS JCOP 2.4.2 OS – Smart Card Operating System
- Card Manager Applet
 - Configuration of the cipher suites
 - Cryptographic operations
 - Trust Provisioning at different stages

A7005 Product Features



MIFARE on A7005/6
depending on the
configuration


A70CM Key Features


- Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) authentication to support TLS session
- RSA/ECC key-pair generation and signature generation/verification
- RSA encryption/decryption
- AES algorithm: AES-128/256
- **Total 78 AES keys in the key store.**
 - 26 Key sets in the key store. Accessible to users
 - 1 default key-wrapping key. Invisible to user
 - 1 local encryption key. Invisible to users
- Key wrapping
- Two formats of key set
- Secure remote key management
- Trust Provisioning service in NXP certified and secure environment



A70CM Keys and Certificates

Key ID

 Device ID1, K_{pr}/K_{pub}

 Device ID2, K_{pr}/K_{pub}

 Device certificates

 $K_{root\ CA}$


 DK_{128}


 DK_{256}


 $K_{AES,1}$

...

 $K_{AES,24}$

 SM K_{ADMIN}

 SM K_{WRAP}

 SM K_{MK}

Object type/purpose	NXP Provisioning
(ECC/RSA) public/private key pair for Device Authentication (TLS)	Created by NXP and injected by NXP at Wafer Level
(ECC/RSA) public/private key pair for Device Authentication (TLS)	-
2 certificates for Device Authentication corresponding to Dev ID1 and Dev ID2	Optional: creation and injection by NXP
2 Public key (ECC/RSA) Server/client certificate checking	-
AES Key store: default AES 128 bits key set (triplet) (*)	Initialized by NXP to Random
AES Key store: default AES 256 bits key set (triplet) (*)	Initialized by NXP to Random
AES Key store: AES key Set 1 (triplet) (*)	Initialized by NXP to Random
...	Initialized by NXP to Random
AES Key store: AES key Set 24 (triplet) (*)	Initialized by NXP to Random
Public key (ECC/RSA) Remote key/certificate mgmt (access control)	-
AES-128 key Encrypt keys exchanged on SM IF	Initialized by NXP to Random
AES Key for Secure Module Upgrade (Card Manager Key)	Unique by Secure Element. Available through NXP Key Delivery Service (KDS).

Note: Device = OEM product

(*) Eg DLMS keys (K_{MK} K_{AK} K_{EK}) or Mbus keys (K_M K_C -)

A70CM Security in Hardware




Memory:
holding secret data

CPU with Glue Logic
+ Memory Scrambling
+ Active Shield

Active Shields


(Co-)Processor, Logic:
operating on secret data

A70CM: System Implementation



Transmit Keys Securely

Recall: I2C bus between LPC43S & A70CM is **NOT** secure



How to **send keys securely** on I2C?

Solution:


- Use **Key-Wrapping Key** to encrypt keys before transmitting!

Key-Wrapping Key

How to Use Key-Wrapping Key?



- Save Symmetric Key-Wrapping Key to:
 - ✓ A70CM
 - ✓ OTP key in LPC43S
- LPC43S requests AES key from A70CM
- A70CM Key-Wraps AES key & sends to LPC43S
- LPC43S decrypts AES key with Key-Wrapping Key in OTP
- AES engine uses decrypted AES key to encrypt/decrypt




A70CM

Life Cycle and Firmware Implementation



A70CM Life Cycle



Firmware Implementation

OEM – Life Cycle: Configure Init

- OEM - Life Cycle:
 - Configure Init
 - Configure

Configure the A7
• Elliptic C
Or, you may cho

Benefit of ECC: s
reducing storage

```

/***** Beginning of
// Following two steps
// Configure A7 for EC
result = configure_ecc
// Switch A7 to CONFIG
result &= switch_to_cc
    
```

OEM – Life Cycle: Configure Step 1

- OEM - Life Cycle:
 - Configure Init
 - Configure

Ask A7 to generate an
Public and Private key

The Public & Private k
signing and authentic

```

if (A70UserAction == action_g
/****Generate key pair in
result = generate_key_pai
}
if (A70UserAction == action_s
/****Store Public and Pri
result = generate_key_pai
}
    
```

OEM – Life Cycle: Configure Step 2

- OEM - Life Cycle:
 - Configure Init
 - Configure

Ask A7 to generate
AES-128 bit Key

The AES Key will be
decryption in norm


```

if (A70UserAction == act
//Generate random AES
generate_random_aes_
} else if (A70UserAction
//Generate fixed AES
generate_fixed_aes_k
}
    
```

OEM – Life Cycle: Configure Step 3

- OEM - Life Cycle:
 - Configure Init
 - Configure


LPC creates hash of the Device ID &
A7 signs hash with its Private Key



Manufacturing Mode

Configure Init

Configure



WE CAN

- We can share the schematic on a request
- We can share the gerbers files on request
- We can share the BOM on request
- We can help our customers with their designs needs

WE CANNOT DO:

- Provide this demo board to our customer. As we are using a “debug version” of the secure element (A7001) which customer will need a NDA with NXP to proceed.
- Give away the library for the finger print sensor. The library is not free and customer will need to license it from Fingerprints
- Give away any source code of the demo application as mentioned secure element need NDA with NXP and in some case some of our IP is in the code as well

Latest NFC Frontend Evaluation Board



NXP PN5180 NFC Frontend Evaluation Board

Target Application:


- Payment (e.g. Point-of-Sales Terminals), Physical-access, eGov, Industrial

Key Components:

- **NXP – PN5180A0HN**

Features:


- Based on NXP PN5180 Eval Board and removed the MCU and reduce the size of the antenna to fit smaller dimension.
- PCB Dimension – 68mm x 38mm (FR-4, 2-layers board)
- Highly integrated high performance full NFC Forum-compliant frontend for contactless communication at 13.56 MHz
- Transmitter current up to 250 mA
- Dynamic Power Control (DPC) for optimized RF performance, even under detuned antenna conditions
- Adaptive Receiver Control (ARC) automatically adjusts the receiver parameters for always reliable communication
- Includes NXP ISO/IEC14443-A, Innovatron ISO/IEC14443-B and NXP MIFARE Crypto 1 intellectual property
- Full compliancy with all standards relevant to NFC, contactless operation and EMVCo
- Active load modulation supports smaller antenna in Card Emulation Mode
- Automatic EMD handling performed without host interaction relaxes the timing requirements on the Host Controller
- Low-power card detection (LPCD) minimizes current consumption during polling
- Automatic support of system LDO or system DC/DC power-down mode during LPCD
- Zero-Power-Wake-up
- One host interface based on SPI



NXP PN5180 NFC Frontend Evaluation Board

The PN5180 frontend supports the following RF operating modes:

- Reader/Writer mode supporting ISO/IEC 14443-A up to 848 kBit/s, MIFARE
- Reader/Writer mode supporting ISO/IEC 14443-B up to 848 kBit/s
- Reader/Writer mode supporting JIS X 6319-4 (comparable with FeliCa scheme)
- Supports reading of all NFC tag types (type 1, type 2, type 3, type 4A and type 4B)
- Reader/Writer mode supporting ISO/IEC 15693
- Reader/Writer mode supporting ISO/IEC 18000-3 Mode 3
- ISO/IEC 18092 (NFC-IP1)
- ISO/IEC 21481 (NFC-IP-2)
- ISO/IEC 14443-type A Card emulation up to 848 kBit/s



2017



Engineering Tomorrow's **Ideas**

Thank you

