



THE MIGRATIONS OF BOSNIAKS
TO TURKEY FROM 1945 TO 1974

The Case of Sandžak

Sabina Pačariž

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The Case of Sandžak



CENTAR ZA NAPREDNE STUDIJE
CENTER FOR ADVANCED STUDIES

Sarajevo, 2016.

To my father Izudin

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ABSTRACT

The subject of this study is the migrations of Bosniaks from the former Federative People's Republic of Yugoslavia / Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia (FPRY/SFRY)¹ to Turkey in the period 1945-1974. More specifically, such emigration was widespread amongst Bosniaks from the Sandžak region, while such emigration occurred only sporadically amongst those from Bosnia and Herzegovina. Sandžak was distinctive for its specific economic and socio-political situations, which seriously disadvantaged the populace and which were the central driving force of emigration. Due to the long-established historical bonds, the migrants tended to perceive Turkey as their "original" homeland, particularly since they were primarily concerned with preserving their religious and cultural identity. As a result of various administrative and international regulations that came into effect at the time, the emigrants bound for Turkey had to transit through Macedonia, often with a lengthy stay in Macedonia. Over time, this came to have a pronounced and long-lasting effect on Macedonia's ethnographic composition. While questioning the widely promoted official FPRY/SFRY ideology of "Brotherhood and Unity", this study examines the effects of the policies of the ruling regime, and highlights the importance of a fuller appreciation of the role of religious and national identity within a multi-ethnic communistic country in the Balkans.

1 The official name of the country from 1945-1963 was Federative People's Republic of Yugoslavia (FPRY). In 1963 it became the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY).

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INTRODUCTION

The migrations of Bosniaks toward Turkey comprise a phenomenon that contains numerous historical narratives within itself, but also vividly illustrates the political and socio-cultural surroundings of a particular period in the Balkans. The research of the topic can reveal volumes about identity and minority issues, ethnicity, nation formation and nationalism. Regarding the recent wars in the Balkans, such research can also provide insight into certain state identity policies affecting national identity, which though furtively applied in times of socialism, had detrimental impacts on the status and destiny of Bosniaks. This research will explore why the Bosniaks were so often pushed to migrate and why Turkey was their “most natural” destination.

The subject of this study is the migrations of Bosniaks from the former Socialistic Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) to Turkey, after the Second World War (1945-1974). Numerous works of research have been undertaken on the migrations of Bosniaks, but such research has often given more attention to the late Ottoman and post-Ottoman periods. Numerous authors have addressed the migrations during the communist period as well, but there are aspects that can be complemented too. Such cases include the military formations in Sandžak and the treatment of those involved after the war. In that respect, more information should be developed regarding communist crimes after the war, perpetrated under the umbrella of “protecting the people of socialist Yugoslavia.”

The purpose of this study is to offer a more comprehensive introduction specifically to the socialist period, and to explore why people from Sandžak migrated in such mass numbers when

the official Yugoslav policy promoted a common Yugoslav identity, where “no religious or national differences matter.” The times of nationalism were formally ended and the Communist Party of Yugoslavia was applying an atheistic approach, under whose umbrella various peoples “from Vardar to Triglav” (*i.e.*, from Macedonia to Slovenia, that is, all of Yugoslavia) could be merged into a single Yugoslav nation. But were all peoples within Yugoslavia equally given the right to be treated as separate federative peoples? And was atheism an easily acceptable idea or was it pushed into a form of oppression!?

Recent socio-political events in the Balkans have released certain restraints that existed for many years, and therefore much interesting research has emerged in the Balkans on topics that authors were previously reluctant to write about (such example are works oriented at communist crimes after the war). Authors from Sandžak also started collecting oral history on the forced secularization, but also on other “forbidden topics,” such as the shootings in Hadžet, the role of the Muslim militias, and the treatment of leading Bosniak figures. This study seeks to integrate these various aspects of Bosniak collective memory and interpret them through the migration perspective.

The methodology applied within this study will be descriptive research, aimed at content analysis of secondary resources. It covers books that deal specifically with issues of migrations, but also with international relations, minority issues and various topics that address the political, economic and socio-cultural aspects in Yugoslavia and Sandžak. Many of them integrate archival materials, contemporaneous documents, laws and other agreements (mostly from the archives of the SFRY, but also the Archives of the respective Federative Republics); analysis of various texts and books; and some qualitative research (interviews with specific groups of people). One main challenge that has emerged is to find sufficient material on subjects of “controversial nature”, *e.g.*, hidden police pressure, Muslim militias, and Communist crimes. Some resources referring to the concrete aspect were available, but in some instances the phenomenon was

explained using a deductive approach – conclusions were driven from the general aspect of the respective study. It should be noted that most of the resources are written in Balkan languages, but there are a few in English and Turkish. Since the language of this book is English, the author has translated the quotations where necessary.

This study begins with a presentation of a theoretical framework of migrations, in order to identify the general characteristics of migration. Once the basic notions are defined, theories are organized into three groups (economic, political and social) and explained respectively. The theories relevant for this study are emphasized and it is demonstrated why are they of such importance.

It could be asked why this study is focused on the period from 1945-1974, when the migrations were most intense during the years 1954-1968. There are specific reasons for choosing this broader time frame. As the chapter on the Second World War will demonstrate, there were cases where migrating to Turkey seemed to be the only choice for preserving one's life. Though sporadic in the early aftermath of WWII, these migrations carried strong political messages for the local people. Conversely, it might also be asked why this study covers a period when migrations started decelerating, until they largely ceased. Here too the choice of time frame is rooted in the political context. As shown in the main body of this research, focused at the political context in the former Yugoslavia, Bosniaks did not become a recognized people within the SFRY until 1974, even though the bulk of the Partisan's National Liberation Movement took place right in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Even when they did become a recognized federative people, they become Bosnians, not Bosniaks, which in the complicated Balkans is a term with stronger regional than national implications. The alteration of the Yugoslav Constitution, when the above-mentioned change was introduced, is taken as the termination period of the migrations examined here.

As the chapter on the historical context will illustrate, migrations of Bosniaks emerged much before the WWII. As the

late XIX century was a period of romanticism and nationalism, the young Balkan nation-states perceived their respective nation-building as a process of emphasizing national elements against everything that seemed Turkish. The change in architecture, the devastation of Ottoman sites, and especially the expulsion of the “Turkicized ones” were all measures of the De-Ottomanization process, against which nationalistic feelings were striving. The goal of that chapter is not to provide a detailed introduction to the migrations of the late Ottoman and post-Ottoman period. It is more oriented toward explaining the continuity of the process, as well as the roots of certain beliefs and politics that would unfortunately continue even in the times of socialism. As the subsequent chapters show, in the times of former Yugoslavia these politics were not exercised in an open manner and often carried the stamp of communism and building of a common Yugoslav identity. In the case of Sandžak it will be demonstrated that the country of “Brotherhood and Unity” did not apply the same standards to all of its people.

Another characteristic of this research is that it refers to the region of Sandžak, an area that straddles the border between Serbia and Montenegro and is populated mostly by Bosniaks. The reason for such “territorial limitation” is that, unlike in previous periods, in the times after the WWII Bosniak emigrants to Turkey were almost exclusively from Sandžak. But regardless of the specific period, Sandžak turns out to be a grand observatory for any migration to Turkey and an excellent case study of the minority politics in the former Yugoslavia. The fact that only Sandžak Bosniaks were migrating raises another question: why would Bosniaks from Sandžak migrate while their compatriots from Bosnia and Herzegovina did not, since they share the same national and religious background and live within the same federative state of Yugoslavia!?

The answers lie in the specific socio-political characteristics of Sandžak, which though perceived in the collective memory of its local people as strongly bound to Bosnia and Herzegovina, was and still is under the official state jurisdiction of two

different federal republics: Serbia and Montenegro. The first place to seek explanation would be the chapter on WWII. Being under constant threat of Chetnik attacks, Bosniaks organized their own resistance units that in certain areas inclined towards the authorities of Greater Albania. The aftermath of the war showed that, though primarily oriented toward protecting the lives of civilians, these Bosniaks were on the wrong side of history. Another interesting phenomenon is the organization of the National Liberation Movement in Sandžak. In times of war, the people of Sandžak were promised that their status in the future Republic of Yugoslavia would be organized according to the will of these people. The later solution of “having no national basis” for such decision, marked the beginning of a particular way of treating the Bosniaks in Yugoslavia.

The bulk of this research focuses on the events that followed in socialist times of Yugoslavia. Even though some other aspects are mentioned, the central aim of this thesis is to demonstrate the factors “on the ground” that primarily influenced the moving process. These reasons are divided into three categories: economic, social and political, though these categories sometimes overlap. Very often certain phenomena were introduced as progressive economic or social measures, yet in meantime gained multiple layers of particular significance in Sandžak.

In modern times it is difficult to isolate any kind of migration from economically unfavorable conditions. Sandžak during socialist times is no exception. It was a region with an insufficient number of factories and investments in general. The number of schools and hospitals was not satisfactory either, not to mention a high rate of illiteracy. However, for reasons presented throughout this study, the emigration from Sandžak was not of purely economic background, but also included strong political and religious features. The economic backwardness was an additional factor contributing toward migration.

One of the goals of this study is to demonstrate that Bosniaks felt insecure and threatened in preserving their religious and cultural identity, which to them sometimes was of higher

priority than preserving a national identity. Actually, they were practically de-nationalized, being officially identified only as “Muslims” (with a capital M) and as such could become a subgroup within the Serbian, Croatian or Montenegrin national pools. As people often primarily concerned with preserving their religious identity, Bosniaks of Sandžak often interpreted atheization politics and restrictions on the free practice of religion as oppression. As this study will show, a particular generation of women felt especially jeopardized, which sometimes caused very strong reactions.

The political factors of migration present the most challenging issues for analysis, and even today still provoke much controversy in the Balkans. Particularly problematic are the liquidations by the interior security forces and the hidden police pressure during the times of Aleksandar Ranković, since these were “forbidden themes” in the former Yugoslavia. Certain official authorities still deny their existence. Resources are lacking and the ones to be found are not all focused on Sandžak. Qualitative research on this subject would offer a more comprehensive introduction, but a significant disadvantage is the fact that many of its witnesses are no longer alive. Such a comprehensive study would offer answers to numerous issues related to Sandžak.

In times of socialism, the migration of Bosniaks toward Turkey was not an isolated phenomenon that emerged only upon the initiative of Sandžak Bosniaks. On the contrary, it was regulated through international arrangements, which for reasons mentioned in the respective chapter were never formulated in an official agreement. Paradoxically, Aleksandar Ranković was treated by his Turkish counterparts as the “guardian of the fulfillment of the ‘Gentlemen’s Agreement.’” As this book is focused primarily on the events in Sandžak that drove people to migrate, the role of international agreement is covered only partially.

The road through Macedonia is an inevitable aspect of the migrations during socialism. Even though local authorities sought and eventually found a way to decelerate the direct migrations to Turkey, by making difficult the procedures for giving

up one's Yugoslav citizenship, Bosniaks found an alternative path leading through Macedonia. It required specific "technicalities" that would eventually affect the Macedonian ethnic map. At the same time, it creates analytical difficulties in statistically identifying the separate ethnic groups of migrants.

Like any study, this one has its limitations. As mentioned above, there are difficulties in finding resources on "controversial topics." In that respect, comprehensive qualitative research could offer more detailed information. Another problematic issue is in identifying reliable statistical data. Namely, the people who migrated to Turkey in the socialist period all had to identify themselves as Turks, since that was the only means of navigating the necessary procedures. So it is now difficult to determine the exact number of Bosniaks, Albanians, Gorans, Torbesh and ethnic Turks who migrated to Turkey. When speaking of nationalities, it should also be noted that the terminology used for Bosniaks varies among the different resources. They are alternatively identified as: Bosniaks, Muslims, Serb Muslims, Montenegrin Muslims, Yugoslav Muslims, etc. In this study they are referred to as "Bosniaks" while the word "Muslims" is used to refer to their religious identity.

This study seeks to demonstrate that certain patterns of treating minority issues did not change even in the socialist republic of "Brotherhood and Unity." Being of "dual identity", or more precisely being Muslim (that is, being related to Turkish identity) was an unfavorable position in the former Yugoslavia. At first Bosniaks were given the option to co-identify with the broad platform of the National Liberation Movement, but once the war was over, the politics of "demographic De-Ottomanization" continued. Covering different aspects of this migration, this study aims to explain why the Bosniaks were forced to choose never to return to Yugoslavia and why from the very beginning they considered Turkey as their "natural homeland." In a certain respect, this study is an effort to demystify the politics of Socialist Yugoslavia and eventually relate it to the events that later took place in Yugoslavia upon its dissolution. As noted, anyone

concerned with issues of nationalism in the Balkans should become familiar with the contours of the migrations toward Turkey. Recent history has demonstrated the obvious need for changing the narratives in the Balkans, which often “have more history than they can consume.”

I. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK REGARDING INTERNATIONAL MIGRATIONS

I.1. INTRODUCTION

Since the earliest human existence, people have been migrating. The impulse to migrate has been a major source of survival, adaptation and growth over the centuries. Indeed, the very separation of humankind into its ethnic, cultural, linguistic and racial groups has been shaped by migration. Through such mass movements of humanity, values, ideas, culture, language, and even diseases were exchanged – and eventually genes as well - as various civilizations formed, rose, and were supplanted by others. Through this interactive process, new social and environmental system emerged, permanently altering both the migrants and the hosts.

In the modern age of globalization, migrations have been intensified, usually followed by social transformations. The existing nation-state system (with the exceptions of United States of America (USA), Canada and Australia) is being challenged by the emergence of international migration as an increasingly prevalent phenomenon. In many countries, ethnic homogeneity has traditionally been defined through common language, culture, customs and history. This unity has often been fictitious – a construction of the ruling elite – but it has proven to be a powerful argument in the process of nation-building. As a result of increasing migration, growing ethnic diversity in many receiving societies has presented challenges to national identities based on common ethnic origin. Countries such as the USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand are built by multi-ethnic migrants,

so their perceptions of national identity differ from those in countries such as Germany, Austria, Hungary or Poland, who for many years declined to be countries of immigration and applied policies accordingly. This is one of the reasons why we face “diversity management” in the way countries are treating issues of international migration.

While there is little prospect of the actual disappearance of nation states, the global scope of the recent migrations nonetheless undeniably portends social and economic transformation, with attendant implications for domestic and international politics. If the power of global markets, multilateralism and regional integration are also taken into consideration, one could well conclude that novel forms of interdependence, transnational societies, and bilateral and regional cooperation are emerging, inextricably shaping the fates of states and societies.

Different types of migrants follow different patterns, as manual workers, highly qualified specialists, entrepreneurs, refugees, or family members of previous migrants. Regardless of their initial intentions, whether to stay temporarily or permanently, many migrants become settlers. Migratory networks develop, connecting the regions of origin and destination and simultaneously changing them both, bringing social, economic and political transformation.

Migration is not an isolated phenomenon. Quite the contrary, it has become intensified in the recent era of global cultural interchange, improved transport possibilities, and the proliferation of print and electronic media. It is apparent that migration will almost certainly continue to grow into the new millennium, and may even become the most important factor of global change² (along with climate change and continued technological transformation). This conclusion is based on several factors:

- Growing inequalities between the North and South motivate people to seek better living conditions;
- Political, ecological and demographic pressures reinforce these same impulses;

2 Stephen Castles and Mark J. Miller, *The Age of Migration*, New York, 1998, p. 4.

- Increasing political and ethnic conflict in certain areas result increasingly in mass flights;
- Creation of new, free-trade areas would require movements of labor, regardless of the primary intentions of the state entities involved;

Countries around the world will certainly be affected by migration, either as receiving societies, sending societies, or both.

Within this chapter three categories of theories are explored according to the motives for migration. Respectively, each of these theories places primary emphasis on economic, social, and political motivations. Given the scope of the instant study, namely the migrations of Bosniaks from the former Yugoslavia to Turkey in the period 1945-1974, special attention will be given to the social theories that emphasize the importance of social capital and networks. As described herein, Bosniaks who migrated during the times of Socialist Yugoslavia did not leave for purely economic reasons, even though post-WWII Yugoslavia faced economic challenges and Sandžak was a particularly under-developed region. Bosniaks were more concerned with certain identity issues, and though they were an autochthonous population, they were essentially pushed to feel that they did not belong in Yugoslavia.

There are also additional reasons that economic explanations alone are inadequate. One is that at the time when these migrations took place, Turkey itself was not a developed country, and therefore not an attractive destination on economic grounds. It could be argued that it might have been in an even worse economic situation than Yugoslavia. A certain number of Bosniaks, though initially planning to settle there, were discouraged by the living conditions in Turkey and stayed in Macedonia. At the same time there were migrations from other parts of Yugoslavia toward the economically booming countries of the West, but only the emigrants who were heading to Turkey were required to renounce their Yugoslav citizenship.

Theories that emphasize social capital and networks can best address the question why did this particular ethnic group

choose to migrate to Turkey. The chapter on the historical context of this type of migration illustrates the continuity of the process and the socio-cultural ties that were contemporaneously constructed. Due to their religious and cultural background, Bosniaks generally considered Turkey to be their original homeland. At a certain point, the right for “repatriation of families” was used as a basis for migration, and sometimes interpreted very broadly. Migrants from the later waves benefited from the network connections they had with earlier migrants. Certain neighborhoods in Istanbul, such as Yeni Bosna, Beşyüzevler and Pendik, offer clear illustrations of the effect of those mechanisms.

However, social theories alone are insufficient to explain fully the migrations of Bosniaks toward Turkey after WWII. The subject of this study can be better understood when analyzed through the scope of forced migration. Hereby, the migration of Bosniaks is not regarded as a typical example of force through direct danger to lives and security, but as Bell-Fialkoff defines it, as an force or compulsion by unfavorable living conditions.

In summary, the migrations of Bosniaks toward Turkey after the WWII is treated herein within the scope of social theories. Attention will be given to the economic factors, but they do not appear to be predominant. At the end of this chapter, explanations on forced migration will be offered, since these appear to be the most applicable phenomena for this case study.

1.2. BASIC NOTIONS IN THE THEORY OF MIGRATION

The term migration refers to the act or process by which people, individually or as a group move from one city, country, or region to another. International migration generally refers to the push-pull movements of populations across national frontiers, that is, the circulation patterns of persons who emigrate and immigrate. The term migrant has no legal status. Therefore, many

nations use the terms immigrant or emigrant. Those terms have legal status and are carefully defined in various national and international codes. Immigration typically refers to the process of people entering one nation from another, for long-term or permanent residence. Emigration typically refers to the process of people leaving a nation; usually it is a matter of exodus of people from their country of origin for settlement, usually permanently in a new country.³

1.2.1. Types of migrants

The term migrant broadly captures all those persons who migrate from or to a particular country on a short-term, long-term or permanent basis. Either type of migrants, the emigrants and the immigrants, can move on a voluntary or involuntary basis.

Voluntary migrants are usually the most numerous migrants within advanced industrialized countries. Among them there are:⁴

- a) Migrant workers/laborers – persons who travel to another country with the intention of gaining temporary employment.
- b) Seasonal workers/migrants – persons who migrate at a particular time of the year and usually for a specific type of employment, such as agricultural work.
- c) Family members of migrants – through the process of family reunification, the permanently settled immigrants are brought together with their immediate or secondary family members within the host society.
- d) Illegal or undocumented immigrants – persons who either enter a country without proper documentation

3 Anthony J. Marsella and Erin Ring, "Human Migration and Immigration: An Overview", in: *Migration: Immigration and Emigration in International Perspective*, edited by Leonore Loeb Adler and Uwe P. Gielen, London, 2003, pp. 10-11.

4 Anthony M. Mesina and Gallya Lahav, *The Migration Reader, Exploring Politics and Policies*, Boulder, 2006, pp. 9-10.

or formal authorization or who clandestinely assume or maintain residence there, most often for an extended period. Depending upon the individual motivations, they can be referred to as overstayers, undocumented workers or undocumented immigrants. The overstayer usually enters a foreign country with a tourist, student, or other temporary visa, but fails to leave when it expires. Such illegal or undocumented migration is closely related to legal migration, since the number of extra-legal immigrants tends to rise whenever the legal avenues of immigration become more restrictive.

In contrast to voluntary migrants, asylum seekers and refugees do not migrate of their own volition, but are forced or driven to migrate in order to preserve their own safety, well-being, beliefs and/or identity.

Due to various religious, political and ethnic pressures these people have faced, the term “refugee” is somewhat difficult to define. According to the United Nations’ Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, a refugee is specifically defined as an individual who:

owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside of the country of his nationality and is unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country, or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.⁵ On the other hand, the USA’s Immigration and Nationality Act of 1980 (INA) uses the following definition of refugees: “any person who is outside any country of such person’s nationality, or in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside any country in which such person last habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the pro-

5 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, Section 1(A)(2), as amended by the 1967 Protocol.

tection of, that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.”⁶

An asylum seeker is a person who seeks formal protection, due to fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion, but typically submits a request for asylum and legal residence upon entering the country of destination or soon thereafter. Host countries generally grant asylum and refugee status on the basis of the principle of non-refoulement (i.e. non-return), which is embedded in international and constitutional law. They do so for a host of humanitarian and political reasons.

Although immigration includes all types of population movement, for analytical purposes it can be differentiated by the motives of the migrants and the circumstances in their countries of origin. According to Sarah Collinson,⁷ migration is shaped by a mix of motivations and circumstances, and so can be: (1) strongly political and voluntary; (2) strongly political and involuntary; (3) strongly economic and voluntary; and (4) strongly economic and involuntary; Even though this classification scheme considers many important dimensions of migration, it still fails to capture fully migration’s complex nature. Once a person becomes a migrant, he/she can also switch among the above-mentioned categories.

I.3 THEORIES OF MIGRATION

Migration studies is an interdisciplinary field of study. There is no single, coherent theory of international migration, but rather a fragmented set of theories that have developed in relative isolation from one another – sometimes, but not always, separat-

6 INA, Section 101(a) (42) (A).

7 Sarah Collinson, *Europe and International Migration*, London, 1994, p. 2; quoted in A.M. Mesina and G. Lahav *op.cit.*, p. 11.

ed by disciplinary boundaries. These theories differ in terms of their focus on migrants as individuals or groups; in their views of the processes generating international migration or those sustaining it; and whether they deal with the causes or consequences of migration. They even differ in the dependent variable, that is, in what they are trying to explain.

It is clear that there is no single theory of migration widely accepted among social scientists. Actually, the current patterns and trends suggest that a full understanding of the contemporary migratory processes requires reliance not on the tools of any single discipline or conceptual model, nor a focus on any single level of analysis. Instead, the complex, multifaceted nature of contemporary migration suggests that what is required is a sophisticated theory that incorporates a variety of perspectives, levels and assumptions. In the following pages, several contemporary theories will be explained, according to the main fields of studies with which they are related.

The three major categories of theories of migration are primarily economic, sociological and political. However, as Douglas S. Massey, together with Joaquin Arango, Graeme Hugo, Ali Kouaouci, Adela Pellegrino and J. Edward Taylor in their book *Worlds in Motion*, demonstrate that various sub theories exist even within each respective discipline.

1.3.1. Economic Theories

With massive industrialization and rapid economic growth, a need for a workforce emerged in the developed countries. At the same time, people from poorer regions sought better living conditions, which they could best realize through migration. Due to the visible disparities between societies in terms of wealth, power and prospects for economic growth, migration motivated by hopes of better income gained massive dimensions. In his paper "The Laws of Migration" Ernst George Ravenstein presents prin-

ciples to explain the mechanisms by which migration functions, which are particularly important when analyzing migration from an economic perspective.⁸ His observations can be summarized as follows: most migrants move short distances, but those who move longer distances tend to settle in big cities; rural populations and young adults are more likely to move than urban populations and families respectively; the growth of big cities is due to migration rather than natural growth; every migration is followed by return or counter migration; most migrants are adults; and migration occurs along well-defined geographical channels.

I.3.1.1. Push-Pull Theory

Clearly, migration is rarely a result of any single factor. It is usually a result of complex sets of inter-related reasons that prompt a person or a group to decide to move. Depending on which forces prevail in the decision-making equilibrium, the reasons are defined as push and pull factors. When opposed to each other, they help the individual to calculate the benefits of staying versus migrating.

When we observe migration apart from the motives of personal security or political constraint, we can say that people quite rationally and autonomously decide to migrate. The decision-making process is quite complex and cannot be reduced to simple gaps in wages or economic well-being. Migrants are not motivated simply by the financial gain, but also by the aversion to risk, and by a desire to be comfortable or simply to build better lives.

Besides the lure of greater income, the following circumstances can also act as pull factors:

- (a) Differences in the cost of living;
- (b) Availability of public goods and the required financial contribution;
- (c) Relative growth prospects – if they rise in the country of origin they might cause past emigrants to return or potential ones to reconsider;

8 http://cla.umn.edu/sites/cla.umn.edu/files/migration-_ravenstein_thorntwaite_and_beyond.pdf (Access date: 01.09.2015).

- (d) Costs of migration, which can be direct, such as job search, moving, adjustment etc. There are also “special costs”, such as separation from family, social and cultural networks;
- (e) Distance between the country of origin and destination country – which implicates the costs of migrating and staying in touch with family, as well the cultural proximity between the two countries.
- (f) Existence of social networks: family members, friends and/or national groups that help to procure information and to overcome language barriers and cultural gaps.
- (g) Degree of match between foreign labor supply and domestic demand for particular types of labor.⁹

Sometimes the difficult situation in the country of origin can prevail over the expectations for the destination country. In such cases, push factors come to the fore and initiate migration: flight from misery, famine, natural disaster, war, difficult living conditions etc.

The push-pull theory framework often coincides with theories that emphasize economic factors, or more precisely standard microeconomics. As we see in the studies of Thomas, this framework was quite applicable for the great transatlantic migrations of the industrial era, since it refers to predominance of one of the forces over the other – push or pull (with pull forces usually predominating).¹⁰

However, this theory does not integrate new forms of migration that have become more prevalent in the post-industrial period, such as undocumented migration and the movement of asylum seekers and refugees. Restrictive admission policies, which were rare in the industrial period, add greatly to the risks and costs of migration. Education, skills, wealth and family

9 *Deutsche Bank Research*, Frankfurt, 2003, in: A.M. Mesina and G. Lahav *op.cit.*, p. 16.

10 Brinley Thomas, *Migration and Economic Growth: A Study of Great Britain and the Atlantic Economy*, Cambridge, 1973, quoted in Massey, Arango, Hugo, Kouaouci, Pellegrino, Taylor, *Worlds in Motion*, Oxford, 1998, p. 13.

connections became essential in determining whether a person was an eligible candidate to migrate. At the same time, there are many aspiring migrants who do not meet the legal requirements, and so must rely on other sources, such as social connections to people in the receiving country, in order to overcome the obstacles and gain access to foreign employment.

Zelinsky proposed a theory of international migration that integrated demographic, geographic and historic factors.¹¹ His strong focus on the proximity of the receiving area now seems outdated, in the light of the rapid technological development of the last three decades. With improved transportation and communication, distance has become a much easier barrier to overcome.

As Zolberg explains, the state and its policies are essential for explaining contemporary migration, since border control policies turn the whole experience of migration into a social process.¹² Border controls reduce the applicability of standard economic models, since they hinder the free circulation of labor as a factor of production, and diminish the development of international migration to its fullest potential. And even though border-control and restrictive policies do reduce the influx of migrants, all borders remain porous to a certain degree. Undocumented migrants find clandestine ways to enter and work in the country; others take advantage of the legal exceptions for humanitarian reasons (family reunification, political asylum, flight from wars and natural disasters). In conclusion, the total influx of migrants always surpasses the numbers envisaged by official migration policies.

According to Andreas, such a state of affairs sometimes proves to be highly functional and adaptive; basic labor demands are met by undocumented migrants and “temporary workers”, while legal immigrants manage to overcome the barriers and

11 Wilbur Zelinsky, “The hypothesis of the mobility transition”, *Geographical Review* 61, April 1971, pp. 219-249, quoted in Massey, Arango, Hugo, Kouaouci, Pellegrino, Taylor, *op.cit.*, p. 12.

12 Aristide R. Zolberg, Astri Suhrke and Sergio Aguayo, *Escape from Violence: Conflict and Refugee Crisis in the Developing World*, New York, 1989, p. 405, quoted in Massey, Arango, Hugo, Kouaouci, Pellegrino, Taylor, *op.cit.*, p. 14.

keep their employers happy. The government is not perceived as promoter of immigration, thus avoiding political backlash.¹³

Regardless of the nature of contemporary migration in terms of being functional and deliberate, it is important to stress that modern international migration is no longer driven by two equally important forces. Push factors are now more often predominant, are usually paired with diminished, but constant pull factors, while governments of receiving countries act as intermediaries to limit the size of the flows through restrictive policies. In the present world, distances are small, but the barriers imposed by governments are large and have become key factors that define the size and character of international migration.

In order to respond to actual trends, migration theory has shifted its analysis. In recent years, more emphasis is given to the interactions between the microeconomic and macroeconomic levels and the migrants themselves, whereas earlier theories were more focused on the social, economic and demographic/political differences among the relevant countries. Simultaneously, theories that include multilevel models of study and require an inter-disciplinary approach have emerged and become predominant.

I.3.1.2. Neoclassical economics:

Macroeconomic and Microeconomic Theory

Neoclassical economics focuses on differentials in wages and employment conditions between sending and receiving countries, and on migration costs. It generally conceives movement as an individual decision for income maximization.

I.3.1.2.1. Macroeconomic Theory

Migration theories were initially developed in order to explain internal labor migration in the processes of economic development. According to Todaro and Maruszko, international migration,

¹³ Peter Andreas, "The Escalation of U.S. Immigration Control in the Post-NAFTA Era", *Political Science Quarterly* 113/4, 1998, pp. 591-615 quoted in Massey, Arango, Hugo, Kouaouci, Pellegrino, Taylor, *op.cit.*, p. 14.

like its internal counterpart, is caused by geographic differences in the supply and demand for labor.¹⁴ This causes workers from the low-wage or labor-surplus country to move to the high-wage or labor-scarce country. The outcome of the movement is to decrease the supply of labor and eventually raise wages in the capital-poor country, while the supply of labor increases and wages ultimately fall in the capital-rich country. At equilibrium, according to this theoretical approach, these forces lead to an international wage differential that reflects only the financial and physical costs of international movement.

Neoclassical macroeconomic explanations of international migration contain several assumptions, including: international migration is a result of wage differences among countries and as such it will cease once these differences are eliminated; the international flow of workers is directly influenced by labor market demands, whereby the patterns of migration for unskilled workers may be quite different from the patterns of the skilled ones; and governments can regulate migration flows only by controlling the labor markets.¹⁵

I.3.1.2.2. Microeconomic Theory

As expected, neoclassical microeconomic theory is focused on the decision-making of individual actors, based on cost-benefit calculations. According to Todaro and Maruszko, people choose to move where they believe to be most promising for employment, given their skills; but in order to obtain these higher wages they must undertake certain investments – sometimes called “barriers to entry” – like the costs of travelling, maintenance costs while moving and looking for work, learning a new language and culture, adapting to a new labor market, as well as psychological costs of cutting old ties and forging new ones.¹⁶

14 Michael P. Todaro and Lydia Maruszko, “Illegal migration and US immigration reform: A conceptual framework”, in *Population and Development Review* 13 (1), 1987, pp. 101-114, quoted in Massey, Arango, Hugo, Kouaouci, Pellegrino, Taylor, *op.cit.*, p. 19.

15 Massey, Arango, Hugo, Kouaouci, Pellegrino, Taylor, *op.cit.*, p. 19.

16 *Ibid*, p. 20.

The microeconomic formulations identify the following characteristics of migration:

1. International migration stems from differences in both employment rates and expected earnings;
2. Factors that lower migration costs will increase the probability of migration, such as individual characteristics (education, experience, language skills), improved technology, social conditions;
3. International migrations occur due to differences in earnings and employment rates, and will exist until such differences are equalized; Also movement of population is just a sum of individuals who have calculated the costs and benefits of migration;
4. Labor markets are the main factors that influence decisions to migrate and therefore governments should apply policies that affect these markets if they want to control migration flows.

I.3.1.3. The New Economics of Migration

The approach of Stark and Bloom challenged the assumptions and conclusions of neoclassical theory.¹⁷ According to the “new economics of labor migration”, migration decisions are not made by isolated individuals, but by larger units of related people – typically families or households, but sometimes communities in which people act collectively. Such collective decision-making may be aimed not only at maximizing expected income, but also at minimizing risks and loosening constraints associated with various kinds of market failures, apart from those in the labor market. In contrast to individuals, households are generally in a better position to diversify the allocation of resources and therefore better manage potential risks.

The theoretical model of the new economics of migration focuses not on the characteristics of individual migrants but on

17 Oded Stark and David E. Bloom, “The new economics of labor migration”, *American Economic Review* 75, 1985.

communities, families, households or other culturally defined units.¹⁸ Consequently, decisions are examined as being made in the interest of the whole household and not necessarily under the influence of general factors, such as wage differences, capital and risk constraints. Families or communities with different income or different income distribution will demonstrate different probabilities for migration. In order to affect the whole group, governments should apply policies that go beyond the labor markets and affect such larger economic issues as insurance, capital, and consumer credit markets. Government incentive programs, such as unemployment insurance, retirement and loan programs can efficiently decrease the economic incentives for emigration, as can policies that address not only the mean income, but also its income distribution.

I.3.1.4 Segmented Labor-Markets Theory

The most forceful proponent of segmented labor-market theory is Piore, who argues that international migration is caused by a permanent demand for immigrant labor that is inherent to the economic structure of developed countries.¹⁹ According to him, immigration is not a result of push factors in sending countries (low wages or high unemployment), but it is caused by pull factors in the receiving countries (chronic and unavoidable need for foreign workers). Segmented labor-market theory accepts that actors make rational, self-interested decisions, as predicted by microeconomic models. The negative qualities that people in advanced industrialized societies tend to attach to the low-wage jobs may open up employment opportunities to foreign workers and therefore enable them to overcome obstacles, such as risk and credit constraints, thus easing access to better earnings. Recruitment from employers also reduces informational and other official constraints on international movement, which makes migration an even more attractive solution.

18 Massey, Arango, Hugo, Kouaouci, Pellegrino, Taylor, *op.cit.*, p. 27.

19 Michael Piore, *Birds of Passage*, New York, 1979, quoted in Massey, Arango, Hugo, Kouaouci, Pellegrino, Taylor, *op.cit.*, p. 28.

In order to better understand this theoretical viewpoint, it is best to analyze the demand for immigrant labor through the characteristics and economies of advanced industrial societies. Under this model, one critical issue is structural inflation. The cost to employers of raising wages of low-level workers is more than the cost of these workers' wages alone, since wages would have to be raised throughout the whole job hierarchy in order to keep them in line with expectations – a problem known as structural inflation. Since attracting native workers would be expensive and disruptive, employers are motivated to seek easier and cheaper solutions, such as importing migrant workers who would accept low wages. A second issue would be hierarchical constraints on motivation, since the jobs at the bottom of the occupational hierarchy offer little status nor many possibilities for upward mobility. Since there is always a bottom in any hierarchy, employers need workers who view these jobs simply as a means of earning money, with no implications for status. Migrants tend to satisfy this need, at least at the beginning of their migratory careers, because they often seek earnings that improve their status at home, and even low wages abroad seem generous by the standards of the home country. A third factor is economic dualism. Bifurcated labor markets are typical of advanced industrialized societies because of the inherent duality between labor and capital. Workers in the capital-intensive primary sector hold stable, high-skilled jobs for which employers invest in specialized trainings and education. On the other hand, workers in the labor-intensive sector hold unstable, unskilled jobs, which make them easier to lay off at any time with little cost. Since native workers are concentrated in the primary, capital-intensive sector, with more favorable working conditions, the shortfall in demand for the secondary sector is usually met through migrant workers. A fourth factor would be the emergence of ethnic enclaves, which tend to emerge when elite immigrants possessing significant amounts of financial or cultural capital concentrate disproportionately in one urban area, and after becoming established there and founding new business enterprises, employ

successive immigrants of lower status but from the same country. Such enclaves also tend to generate a demand for specialized cultural products and ethnic services. Additionally, their social and cultural access to low-wage immigrant labor puts them in better position than firms outside the enclave. Finally, demographics should also be considered. For example, low-income unstable jobs have often been filled by women, teenagers and rural-to-urban migrants. With the rise of female labor participation, higher divorce rates, lower birth rates, and the extension of formal education and urbanization, the domestic supply of such workers declines, thus opening up employment possibilities for immigrants from less developed countries.

Economic theories of migration (e.g. microeconomic and macroeconomic, neoclassical, new economics, dual labor markets, historical-structural approaches) are the most developed, because of the central assumption that economic factors are the most important during the decision-making process. However, these theories have often been criticized for neglecting other psychological, social and political motivations for migration.

1.3.2 Social Theories

While economic theories focus on wage and labor market differences between regions, *i.e.* improving income possibilities as a major initiator of migration, social theories draw attention to phenomena that exist in the receiving societies and often act as independent reasons of migration. According to social scientists, immigration is more likely to emerge in societies where networks and institutions supporting migration exist, followed by social diversification of work. Although these social characteristics do not generally act as primary motives, they enable a certain continuity of the whole migratory process. Sociologists also deal with researching the consequences of migration in the receiving society.

I.3.2.1 Historical-Structural Theory and World Systems

Historical-structural theory reached its peak of influence during the 1960s and 1970s, when theorists such as Furtado²⁰, Cardoso and Faletto,²¹ observing the trade between wealthy capitalist countries and poor nations after the WWII, argued that developing nations were being forced into dependency by structural conditions dictated by the powerful capitalist countries. Or as Frank noted, “global capitalism acted to develop underdevelopment within the Third World”.²² This approach in historical-structural thinking became known as dependency theory, and it drew various scholars inspired by the work of Baran²³ and his conceptualization of the ideas of Marx and Lenin.

A second line of historical-structural theory appeared later and its most prominent promoter was Immanuel Wallerstein.²⁴ He classified countries according to the degree of their dependency on the dominant capitalist powers, which he termed “core” nations. “Peripheral” nations were the most dependent ones, whereas “semi-peripheral” were somewhat wealthier and had slightly more independence in the global marketplace. Nations from the “external arena” remained isolated and mostly outside the global capitalist system. This line of thought eventually became known as “world systems theory” (Simmons).²⁵

20 Celso Furtado, *Development and Underdevelopment*, Berkeley, 1971, quoted in Massey, Arango, Hugo, Kouaouci, Pellegrino, Taylor, *op.cit.*, p. 34.

21 Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, *Dependency and Development in Latin America*, University of California Press (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London), 1979, quoted in Massey, Arango, Hugo, Kouaouci, Pellegrino, Taylor, *op.cit.*, p. 34.

22 Andre Gunder Frank, “Latin America: Underdevelopment or Revolution”, in *Monthly Review Press*, London and New York, 1969, quoted in Massey, Arango, Hugo, Kouaouci, Pellegrino, Taylor, *op.cit.*, p. 34.

23 Paul Baran, “The Political Economy of Growth”, Berkeley 1956 and “On the Political Economy of Backwardness” in *The Political Economy of Development and Underdevelopment*, New York, 1973, quoted in Massey, Arango, Hugo, Kouaouci, Pellegrino, Taylor, *op.cit.*, p. 34.

24 Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern World System: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World Economy in the Sixteenth Century*, New York, 1974 and *The Modern World-System II: Mercantilism and the Consolidation of the European World-Economy, 1600-1750*, San Francisco, 1980, quoted in Massey, Arango, Hugo, Kouaouci, Pellegrino, Taylor, *op.cit.*, p. 35.

25 Alan B. Simmons, “World System-Linkages and International Migration: New Directions in Theory and Method with an Application to Canada”, *International Population Conference*, New Delhi, 1989, quoted in Massey, Arango, Hugo, Kouaouci, Pellegrino, Taylor, *op.cit.*, p. 35.

At first migration did not attract much interest among these theorists. It was usually perceived as being linked to the macro-organization of socio-economic relations, the geographic division of labor, and the political mechanisms of power and domination. One exception to this general lack of interest was the phenomenon of "brain-drain", by which talented and educated people from poor countries were migrating to wealthier nations, which undermined the prospects for development of the sending countries.²⁶ Even more, since developing countries were covering the costs of feeding, clothing, educating and maintaining the emigrants until their productive age, the brain drain actually constituted a subsidy of wealthier nations by poorer ones.

In conclusion we can say, as Massey has observed, that historical-structural theory sought to explain international migration not as a product of individual or household decision, but as a structural consequence of the expansion of markets within a global political hierarchy.²⁷ As raw materials and labor within peripheral markets came under the influence of global markets, rather than under the local communities or national bureaucracies, migration flows became inevitable, with some of them necessarily moving abroad.²⁸

I.3.2.2. Social Capital Theory

The concept of "social capital" was first introduced by Loury²⁹, referring to set of intangible resources in families and communities that help to promote social development among young people. Bourdieu and Wacquant³⁰ expanded this concept to include

26 *Deutsche Bank Research, op.cit.*, p. 21.

27 Douglas Massey, "Economic Development and International Migration in Comparative Perspective", *Population and Development Review Vol.14 No.3*, 1988, pp. 383-413, quoted in Massey, Arango, Hugo, Kouaouci, Pellegrino, Taylor, *op.cit.*, p. 37.

28 *Ibid.*

29 Glenn C. Loury, "A Dynamic Theory of Racial Income Differences", in *Women, Minorities and Employment Discrimination*, eds. Phyllis A. Wallace and Annette LaMond, Lexington, 1977, quoted in Massey, Arango, Hugo, Kouaouci, Pellegrino, Taylor, *op.cit.*, p. 42.

30 Pierre Bourdieu and Loic Wacquant, *An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology*, Cambridge UK, 1992, p. 119, quoted in Massey, Arango, Hugo, Kouaouci, Pellegrino, Taylor, *op.cit.*, p. 42.

networks of more or less institutionalized relationships and drew attention to its broader relevance for human society. Though aware of the negative effects on an individual, Coleman³¹ focused on the positive effects, especially upon the acquisition and accumulation of other forms of “capital.” The most important feature of social capital is its convertibility; it can be transformed into other forms of capital, most often financial capital such as foreign wages and remittances. Through membership in a particular network, people gain better accessibility to social institutions, thus enabling them to improve their positions in the society. The name of Putnam is necessary to mention when discussing social capital theories.³² In his work, he analyzed the organization and forms of social capital in American society. Putnam differentiates two types of social capital: bonding (among people in the same group) and bridging (among people in different identity groups). The theory of social capital accepts the view of international migration as an individual or household decision, but argues that collective acts of migration eventually come to systematically alter the context in which future migration decisions are made, usually increasing the likelihood of following generations to migrate. This theory is based on the existence of migrant networks and migrant-supporting institutions, which is very relevant for the Bosniak migration that is subject of this study.

1.3.2.2.1. Migrant networks

Migrant networks are sets of interpersonal ties that relate migrants, former migrants and non-migrants in origin and destination areas through relations of kinship, friendship and shared community origin. The presence of social networks increases the potential international migration, since it decreases the cost and risk and increases the expected net returns to migration.

31 James S. Coleman, “Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital”, in *American Journal of Sociology* 94, 1988; quoted in Massey, Arango, Hugo, Kouyouci, Pellegrino, Taylor, *op.cit.*, pp. 42-43.

32 Robert D. Putnam, *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community*, New York, 2000 and *Democracies in Flux: The Evolution of Social Capital in Contemporary Society*, New York, 2002.

They are a form of social capital that enables people access to various kinds of financial capital: foreign employment, high wages and possibility of accumulating savings and sending remittances.³³ According to Massey, once a migrant is in a personal network, the existing relations turn into a resource that can be used to gain access to foreign employment and all the following forms of capital. In this way, the people in the community related to the previous migrant have higher odds to migrate as well. Therefore, the migration costs are usually the highest for the first migrants. Charles Tilly defines this type of migration as “chain migration”, since the various sets of arrangements (aid, information and encouragement) at the destination country enable the influx of new migrants from the place of origin. At the same time, there is a tendency for creating durable clusters of people linked by similar origin in the new location.³⁴

As Goss and Lindquist argue, the interpersonal ties are not the single-sufficient means of international movement.³⁵ The migrant institutions, as a structural complement to migrant networks, tend to balance the gap between large number of people who seek entry into capital rich countries and the limited number of officially offered immigrant visas.

Profit organizations and entrepreneurs for certain fees at the black market offer surreptitious smuggling across borders; clandestine transport to internal destinations, labor-contracting between employers and migrants; counterfeit documents and visas; arranged marriages between migrants and legal residents or citizens of the destination country, lodging, credit and other assistance at their destination.

On the other hand, humanitarian groups try to prevent exploitation and victimization of the migrants and assist them by providing counseling, social services, shelter, legal advice how to obtain legitimate papers and even insulation from immigration law enforcement authorities.

33 Massey, Arango, Hugo, Kouaouci, Pellegrino, Taylor, *op.cit.*, p. 42.

34 Charles Tilly, *Migration in Modern European History*, Michigan, 1976, pp. 8-11.

35 Jon Goss and Bruce Lindquist, “Conceptualizing International Labor Migration: A Structuration Perspective”, *International Migration Review* 29, 1995.

With time, the above-mentioned individuals, firms and organizations become not only well known to migrants, but also institutionally stable, creating another type of social capital that enables access to foreign employment.

1.3.2.2.2. Theory of Cumulative Causation

Another theoretical approach, first articulated by Myrdal and later reintroduced by Massey, explains international migration through cumulative causation, since each act of migration alters the social surrounding within which subsequent migration decisions are made, making each following migration more probable³⁶. Phenomena that contribute to this dynamic include the expansion of networks in the receiving country. This is reinforced by success stories, as examples of families who have improved their income through migration and therefore become incentives encouraging more migrants. Another factor is that migrants from rural communities often tend to purchase land for its prestige or economic value. Migration can also create its own cultural effects, as migrants within a certain time period become accustomed to the lifestyle they acquired through migration and are more likely to migrate again. Further, as the receiving countries attract more well-educated professionals, the capacities of the sending countries decrease. In the long term, this further increases the attractiveness of migration. "Social labeling" can be another factor, as some jobs are labeled as "immigrant" jobs, which makes them "culturally inappropriate" for native workers, reinforcing the demand for immigrant workers. But of course there are limits to cumulative causation, and migration cannot last indefinitely. With time the networks and labor demands become saturated, which also keeps the migrant costs and risks high and decreases further migration probability.

36 Gunnar Myrdal, *Economic Theory and Underdeveloped Regions*, London, 1957; and Douglas Massey, "Social Structure, Household Strategies and the Cumulative Causation of Migration", *Population Index* 56 (1), 1990, quoted in Massey, Arango, Hugo, Kouaouci, Pellegrino, Taylor, *op.cit.*, p. 45.

I.3.3. Political Theories

Within the disciplines related to political science, the study of international migration emerged quite late, in the 1980s and 1990s. Here analysis is focused primarily on the role of the state, addressing three major themes: (1) the role of the nation-state in establishing rules of entry and exit; (2) the impact of international migration on national security and sovereignty, as well as on international relations; and (3) “incorporation,” or the effects of international migration on citizenship, political behavior, and the polity.³⁷

I.3.3.1. Politics of Control

While in the connected disciplines of economics and sociology researchers were concentrating on interest, scarcity and efficiency, political science researchers focused on issues connected with authority, power, influence, as well as justice, membership and citizenship. Numerous examples prove that more liberal and democratic societies have issues with “unwanted migration”, due to their problems with control of migration. Namely, migration persisted beyond their expectations, creating a gap between the goals of immigration policies and the results of these policies. This argument is known as the “gap hypothesis”.³⁸ Yet, Gary Freeman considers that political theory of immigration must explain the persistent gaps between the goals and effects of policies, as well as the similar gap between public sentiment and public policy.³⁹ According to Freeman, public policies in democratic societies are heavily dependent on organized

37 James F. Hollifield, “The Politics of International Migration. How Can We “Bring the State Back In?” in: *Migration Theory, Talking across Disciplines*, Caroline B. Brettell and James F. Hollifield, eds., New York, 2000, p. 138.

38 Wayne A. Cornelius, Philip L. Martin and James F. Hollifield, eds. *Controlling Immigration: A Global Perspective*, Stanford, 1994, cited in J. F. Hollifield, *op.cit.*, p. 144.

39 Gary P. Freeman, *Immigrant Labor and Racial Conflict in Industrial Societies: The French and British Experiences*, Princeton, 1998, cited in J. F. Hollifield, *op.cit.*, pp. 144-145.

interests. The relative balance between productive factors (land, labor, capital) and the substitutability of immigrants for native labor will dictate the costs and benefits of immigration. As a result of different cost-benefit distributions, Freeman identifies four specific “modes of politics”: interest group, client, entrepreneurial or majoritarian.

On the other hand, James Hollifield is not so concerned with the political processes and related cost-benefit issues, but focuses instead on the state as a unit of analysis, developing the so-called “liberal state thesis”. In his view, economists and sociologists give insufficient consideration to the role of the state and the way it influences mass movements. Welfare states can exert a serious pull factor. The social capital and network theory explains the difficulties a state may encounter in order to reduce the individual’s propensity to migrate. Still none has incorporated political variables, such as rights. Hollifield defines international migration as a function of (1) economic forces (demand-pull and supply-push), (2) networks and (3) rights.⁴⁰ Economic and sociological factors are necessary conditions for continued migration, while political and legal factors are sufficient conditions. The accretion of rights for foreigners in liberal democracies is what has sustained international migration in recent decades. Rights can be civil, political and social, and vary considerably in different nations and times.

Additionally, there is a third theory concerning the capacity of states to control migration: the “globalization thesis”. It was originally developed by sociologists, but was later adapted by some political scientists.⁴¹ Due to the economic globalization of recent decades, transnational social networks and communities have been created. Therefore structural demand for foreign

40 J. F. Hollifield, *op.cit.*, p.148.

41 Wayne A. Cornelius “The Structural Embeddedness of Demand for Mexican Immigrant Labor: New Evidence from California”, in: *Crossings: Mexican Immigration in Interdisciplinary Perspectives*, Marcelo M. Suarez-Orozco ed., Cambridge, 1998; Rey Koslowski, *Migration and Citizenship in World Politics: From Nation-States to European Polity*, Ithaca, 1999; Saskia Sassen, *Losing Control? Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization*, New York, 1996; cited in J. F. Hollifield, *op.cit.*, p.150.

labor emerges (at both ends of the market) and a loss of control of borders, greatly reducing the importance of both sovereignty and citizenship.⁴²

I.3.3.2. National Security and Sovereignty

In the current phase of globalization, transnational movement of goods, services, capital and people are the basis for the functioning of the new systems. However, states need to have control over migrations. The end of the Cold War largely expanded the notion of security, prompting scholars to research issues, encompassing conflict and cooperation in all fields, including environmental degradation, protection of human rights, and combating terrorism. Academics started emphasizing the fact that international migration can seriously affect national security and sovereignty. In that respect, three schools of thought can be identified in International Relations:

1. Realism or neorealism
2. Transnationalism, or as Hollifield names it the “globalization thesis”
3. Liberal institutionalism

Political realism considers states as unitary rational actors, whose behavior is constrained by the anarchic structure of the international system. Caught in such security dilemma, they are forced to protect their sovereignty, but also seek enhance their power and capabilities. In such frames we can differentiate two hypotheses. First, migration or refugee policies (rules of entry and exit) are a matter of national security, and states will open or close their borders according to their national interests. Second, migration policy (and flows) results from international systemic factors, such as the distribution of power in the international system and the relative positions of states. According to

42 Rainer Baubock, *Transnational Citizenship: Membership and Rights in International Migration*, Aldershot, 1994; Stephen Castles and Alastair Davidson, *Citizenship in the Age of Migration: Globalization and the Politics of Belonging*, London, 1998; Yasemin N. Soysal, *Limits of Citizenship: Migrants and Post-national Membership in Europe*, Chicago, 1994; cited in J. F. Hollifield, *op.cit.*, p.150.

their position and interests, states will make decisions related to migration, whether it is a matter of immigration, emigration or acceptance of refugees.⁴³

In contrast to political realism theories, globalization theory extends to the other end, defining nation-states as the primary decision-making units in international relations. Though they advance various arguments, what is common for all globalization theorists is that they emphasize that the sovereignty and regulatory power of the state is weakened by transnationalism, in the form of movement of goods, capital or people.⁴⁴ Namely, firms, individuals and international communities have found ways to bypass the regulatory power of the nation-states. The world has been “individualized” and states have been “deterritorialized”.

The basic assumptions of liberal institutionalism are that the recent economic and social changes have created much higher interdependence among states, as well as new mechanisms for cooperation, coordination and problem solving. States are more willing to risk opening their economies to trade (and by extension migration) if some type of international regime (or hegemonic power) exists that would regulate migration flows and solve collective action and free-rider problems. Another influential hypothesis is that the maintenance of a relatively open world economy is closely related to the existence of coalitions of powerful interests in the most dominant liberal states.⁴⁵

I.3.3.3. Politics of Incorporation, Citizenship and National Identity

In order to better understand the rise of international migration in the postwar era, three categories of factors need to be analyzed.⁴⁶

- (1) historical, cultural and shared-belief factors which are closely related to formal definitions of citizenship;

43 J. F. Hollifield, *op.cit.*, p.154.

44 S. Sassen, *op.cit.*, p.155.

45 J. F. Hollifield, *op.cit.*, p. 154.

46 J. F. Hollifield, *op.cit.*, pp. 139-151.

- (2) economic interests, which are dependent on land, labor and capital ratios; and
- (3) institutional factors, *i.e.*, rights derived from liberal-republican constitutions.

The impact of immigration on the state can be analyzed through the relation between immigration and society. In that respect Hollifield categorizes theories referring the social impact of immigration into four main groups:⁴⁷

1. Smithian or liberal view. Market oriented societies are highly dynamic and therefore have large capacities to absorb. Immigrants will contribute to the human capital stock and the wealth of the society. Ethnic politics, affirmative action and bilingual education are not introduced, since they prolong the process of acculturation and raise ethnic tensions.
2. Malthusian view; opposite of the liberal one. It assumes that every society has limited resources, and that any larger immigration therefore imposes threat to the society and environment.
3. Marxist views, which hold that large numbers of industrial reserve workers are necessary to capitalist societies. Those workers are often composed of foreign immigrants, who efficiently contribute to the overcoming of the periodic crises of accumulation. Additionally, immigrants will strengthen class conflict and drive further politicization and ethnicization of the working class.
4. Durkheimian view; immigration brings a stronger sense of alienation, which results in fragmentation, even potential dissolution of societies. The grouping and obvious concentration of foreigners in certain locales reinforces class, ethnic and racial tensions.

47 *Ibid.*, p. 164.

1.3.4. Forced migration

To better understand the subject of this study, an inspection into theories of forced migrations is necessary. Namely, the motives for migration of Bosniaks to Turkey were dominantly social and political. Considering that the destination country, Turkey, was not economically developed in the period of Bosniak migration and that the migrants themselves did not use the opportunities for colonization of Vojvodina, it can be concluded that better income was not their priority goal. However, Sandžak did lag economically behind other regions, which only reinforced the urge to migrate.

In his book on ethnic cleansing, Andrew Bell-Fialkoff offers the following definition:

Population cleansing is a planned, deliberate removal from a certain territory of an undesirable population distinguished by one or more characteristics such as ethnicity, religion, race, class or sexual preference. These characteristics must serve as the basis for removal for it to qualify as cleansing.⁴⁸

As the author himself suggests, these terms can be vague and the lines for defining a particular example of migration as cleansing or population removal are often blurred. Referring to the Bosniak case study of this thesis, it can be said that it is rather a milder form of population removal, whereby pressure is exercised on a certain category of people by creating difficulties upon their lives, so that they decide to leave.⁴⁹

It is also difficult to define the various types of cleansing, not least because of differences between the perceptions of the group itself and the perceptions of others. The motives of the cleanser are not easy to define either. Generally it can be said that religious, ethnic, ideological and post-colonial cleansing exist (sometimes in combination, as with ethnic and religious). To

48 Andrew Bell-Fialkoff, *Ethnic Cleansing*, New York, 1999, p. 3.

49 *Ibid.*, p. 1.

a much lesser extent there is economically driven cleansing and cleansing by gender or sexual preference. Cleansing can also be divided into permanent and temporary.⁵⁰

According to Bell-Fialkoff, ethnic cleansing emerges when there arises a perception that a particular group is a potential enemy and a threat to the collectivity or the institutions of another group. The group perceived as dangerous shares a collective identity and it is quite often a minority group that is seen as having the potential to rebel against the central authorities or ally with some external enemy. Minorities that belong to ethnic majorities of an adjacent country are perceived as especially "risky". In the past, religion was often the central unifying element around which collective identity gravitated, but starting in the 18th century "a new religion worshipping ethnos and nation, supplanted the old religion that worshipped God."⁵¹ Religion did not disappear as an identity indicator, but was rather reinforced and strengthened by ethnicity. Various examples in history indicate ethnic cleansing based on these characteristics. In the case of Bosniak migration to Turkey, it can be said that it is an example of population removal based on collective ethno-religious identity. The subsequent chapter on WWII demonstrates that certain Bosniaks of Sandžak fought on opposite sides from the Partisans (Communists). This was later used to identify the people as whole as candidates for population removal, based on ideology, religion and ethnicity.

50 *Ibid.*, pp. 51-56.

51 *Ibid.*, p. 60.

II. MIGRATIONS OF BOSNIAKS AS PART OF THE DE-OTTOMANIZATION PROCESSES IN THE BALKANS, 1878-1940

The migration of Bosniaks toward modern Turkey was a process that took place over many decades, stretching almost for a century. To illustrate the continuity of the process and to provide a better understanding of the reasons that pushed Bosniaks to move, a short history of this particular migration is presented in this chapter. This look at the historical context covers the period from the Berlin Congress (1878) until the eve of the Second World War, when a substantial Muslim population moved in tandem with the Ottoman withdrawal from the Balkans. In the late nineteenth century, these people perceived their identities primarily through religion, so sources use various terms to refer to them, including: Bosniaks, Muslims⁵², Mohamedans (*Muhamedanci*), Muslims of Slavic origin, Muslim Slavs, Muslim Serbs, Muslim Montenegrins, Turks, and even Turkified ones (*poturčenjaci*) or “our Turks.” Throughout this period, there were also mass movements of Albanian, Goran, Torbesh, and Pomak people, however within the context of the study, this chapter focuses only on the Bosniak movements. In order to better understand the mass migration during the socialist period, short historical introduction to the process is considered necessary by the author of this study.

52 The orthography of the Balkan languages differs Muslim from muslim. The word with capital ‘M’ refers to a national category, while small ‘m’ refers to a religious category.

II.1 MIGRATIONS OF BOSNIAKS AFTER THE BERLIN CONGRESS OF 1878

The late eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries were the age of national awakening for the Balkan peoples. The development of towns and the bourgeoisie, the breakup of feudal relations and the agrarian reforms took place simultaneously with great European wars, and the rivalries of the great powers in the Balkans often paved the way for the creation of modern Balkan nation-states. The gradual decline of the Ottoman and Hapsburg empires often created clashes among the interests of the powers, such as France, Austria, and Russia, so that hardly any significant event or social process could unfold without their intervention and influence.

Capitalizing on opportune circumstances, Serbia and Montenegro undertook negotiations on a concerted course toward national liberalization, formally concluding a secret military convention for an alliance in Venice on 15 June 1876. The two kingdoms agreed upon the leadership of the war, the creation of state administration, and the splitting of territories. The Montenegrin Prince (*knjaz*) focused his aspirations on east Herzegovina and on an outlet to the sea, leaving Serbia much larger territories to the north and east, where roughly half a million Muslims lived and therefore seemed more difficult to conquer.⁵³ Formally the Russian Tsar was against the alliance, but the activities of Russian diplomats in Istanbul indicated quite the opposite. The Russian ambassador and prominent diplomat of the time, N.P. Ignjatiev noted: "What would you want, maybe the ruler should openly tell you his secret wishes? Of course he cannot do that. But I repeat to you: once you declare the war, Russia will be right behind you."⁵⁴

53 E.P.Novikov – A.M.Gorčakovu, Beč 19 decembra 1875, Branko Pavičević, *Rusija i Bosansko-Hercegovački ustanak 1875-1878*, Titograd, 1985, cited in: M. Ekmečić, *Stvaranje Jugoslavije 1790-1918 II*, Beograd, 1989, p. 301.

54 General M. Gazenkamf, *Moi dnevniki 1877-1878*, S.Peterburg, 1908, cited in: M. Ekmečić, *op.cit.*, p. 301.

The second war between Russia (assisted by Serbia and Montenegro) and the Ottoman Empire was concluded with the Peace Treaty of San Stefano in March 1878, yielding a greater Bulgaria that accorded entirely with the Russian interests. But this quickly proved unacceptable to the great powers, which revised these arrangements at the Berlin Congress, 13 June 1878. According to the Treaty of Berlin, Bosnia and Herzegovina were to be administered by Austria-Hungary, Serbia was recognized as independent and its territory was extended to include Niš, Pirot, Toplica and Vranje, Montenegrin territory grew significantly and now included the coveted outlet to the sea, while Bulgaria was considerably reduced. Macedonia and Albania remained Ottoman territory. In sum, the Berlin Congress prominently demonstrated the role of the great powers in dividing the Balkans to suit their own interests, while simultaneously deepening the divisions among the various societies living there. One powerful consequence of the Berlin Congress was mass migration and the resultant alteration of the ethnic and religious map of much of the region.

The annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1878 marked the beginning of Austrian influence in the Balkans, whereas Russia focused its energies on Bulgaria and on unifying it with Eastern Rumelia to the south. Indeed, Russia and Austria signed a secret convention in Budapest on 1 January 1877,⁵⁵ agreeing not to assist the formation of a Yugoslav state and to divide the Balkans up into mutual spheres of interest. The territory between their spheres was supposed to remain a buffer zone, but each side strove toward occupying it. Austrian territorial aspirations toward Serbia were apparent in Austria's threats to launch a customs war or to block the import of Serbian livestock. Another example can be found in railway construction. Austria's undertaking of the "Bosnian Railways" project of 1900, (connecting Sarajevo and Uvac) was a clear indication of Austria's intention to acquire an outlet at Salonika.

55 Milorad Ekmečić, *The History of Yugoslavia*, 1974, McGraw-Hill Inc., US p. 396 (Translation of *Istorija Jugoslavije*, Belgrade, 1972).

The political turnovers created panic among the Muslim population of the Balkans, resulting in mass movements of people towards Thrace, Macedonia and Asia Minor. As Dr. Safet Bandžović quoted: "a steady stream of refugees was moving along the roads, some going toward Macedonia, some toward Turkey and some coming back."⁵⁶ Significant populations of Turkish, Caucasian, Albanian Muslims, as well as Muslims of Slavic origin were heading towards Asia Minor, Syria, Cyprus and the areas that now make Arab countries. One portion of the migrating population stayed within the shrinking lines of the Ottoman Empire, inhabiting the *vilayet*⁵⁷ of Kosovo and Shkodër. Very often the processes of creating Balkan nation-states became stories of peasant uprisings and the cleansing of Muslims. The whole concept of liberty was often interpreted through hatred toward the Turks and everything deemed to be Turkish, so as Durham noted, the hostility towards the Turks became "a real state religion." "Freedom for many Balkan Christians means freedom for killing Muslims and taking their properties."⁵⁸ After many years spent living within the two great empires, the emerging Balkan peoples were newly discovering the enchantments of nationalism, often embracing barbaric methods to prove their "patriotism." The new Balkan states envisaged their formative "nations" as homogeneous in terms of religion, ethnicity and language. They relied in particular upon religion as a main denominator in building the culture and identity, and as a factor for holding the community together. The common Christian identity, reinforced by Russian support and pan-Slavist ideas, became the cornerstone for nationhood in the Balkans.⁵⁹ The Turks or the Muslims (used as synonyms in this period) were soon seen as a former oppressor and occupier, and a group against which all nationalist impulses were juxtaposed.

56 Safet Bandžović, *Iseljavanje Bošnjaka u Tursku*, Sarajevo, 2006, p. 42.

57 *Vilayet* is a first-order administrative division or province of the later Ottoman Empire.

58 Mary Edith Durham *Twenty years of Balkan tangle*, London, 1920, cited in: Božidar Jezernik, *Zemlja u kojoj je sve naopako*, Sarajevo, 2000, p. 143.

59 Kemal H. Karpat, *Ottoman population 1830-1914; Demographic and Social Characteristics*, Wisconsin, 1985, p. 60.

According to Dr. Milorad Ekmečić, “the scholarly consensus” was reached on the view that Muslims from Ottoman territories were expelled mostly due to the lack of international provisions for protection of the Muslim population in the newly liberated territories. He observes that migrations were a consequence of repeated wars, as well as the “custom” of Ottoman generals, when withdrawing, to pull back the Muslim population as well. This is partly true, but as Dr. Bandžović has argued, these explanations discount the enormous scope of migration and overlook the complete disappearance of Muslims from certain territories.⁶⁰

Dr. Ekmečić provides a significant introduction to the processes of Bosniak migration.⁶¹ The total loss of population in Bosnia and Herzegovina was some 150.000 people, both Muslims and Serbs. Moreover, there were some 200.000 refugees in Serbia and another 70.000 in Montenegro. The Muslim population of Bosnia and Herzegovina fled toward Sandžak, Macedonia, Albania and Kosovo, all territories newly conquered by Serbs and Montenegrins, and sometimes they even reached the heartlands of the remaining Ottoman Empire.

In 1878, according to official contemporaneous records, the population of the Priština *sanjak*⁶² grew by 12.232 inhabitants, while the Skopje *sanjak* grew by 8.424. However, migrations caused the population to decline significantly in other districts. For example, the Prizren *sanjak* shrank by 16.462 inhabitants, Novi Pazar by 14.140 and Debar by 77.125.⁶³

That same year, the International Committee for Refugee Assistance was formed in Istanbul. The last ten days of January 1878 saw the arrival of some 80.000 refugees. Many suffered from typhus and cholera; some were dying from hunger and exhaustion. In those times, the population of Istanbul doubled due

60 Safet Bandžović, *op.cit.*, p. 45.

61 M. Ekmečić, *Istorija Srpskog Naroda*, Beograd, 1994, p. 525.

62 *Sanjak* refers to military-administrative units into which a larger district (*vilayet*) was divided. When spelled *Sandžak* it refers specifically to the Balkan region of Sandžak.

63 Safet Bandžović, *op.cit.*, p. 64.

to the influx of migrants. Statistics show that in the seventies of the XIX century, half of the population of the Balkans was Muslim. However, in the period 1870-1890, some 300.000 Muslims were killed and more than 5 million were expelled to Anatolia.⁶⁴ Bilal Šimšir describes these events as genocide.⁶⁵

Tadeuš Kovalski explains that as the Balkan peoples finally achieved their political independence, waves of "Turkish newcomers,"⁶⁶ who were not tied to the land, but primarily to the state system, started leaving rapidly. In Kovalski's view, small "Turkish islands" remained in the Balkans after the Berlin Congress, slowly decreasing, falling apart or completely disappearing.⁶⁷ The emigrants moved towards Rumelia and Anatolia, forming new colonies and bringing with them more advanced and more productive methods of agriculture. Kovalski also argues that a portion of the population in these "islands" might originate from a much earlier period, so that Ottomans were colonizing an already Turkified base here. Therefore, Kovalski concludes, these people "have emphasized resistance and are the hardest to subdue under pressure from non-Turkish elements."⁶⁸

One of the major reasons for Muslim migration was that many Muslims refused to be part of a non-Muslim state, "though international agreements and our laws guaranteed everything to them."⁶⁹ Another contributing factor was the hidden desire of many Serbian officials to reduce or eliminate their Muslim populations. Complaints about the brutality of Serbian officials towards Muslims in Niš reached even the British government. The head of the police in Niš was replaced, but it was reported that the Muslim population could not stand living "equally with

64 R. Mahmutćehajić, "Trajnost stradanja", *Glasnik, Rijaset IZ u RBiH*, br. 7-9, Sarajevo, 1996, 397; K. H. Karpat *Ottoman Population 1830-1914. Demographics and social characteristics*, Madison, 1985, cited in: S. Bandžović *op.cit.*, p. 49.

65 Bilal Šimšir, cited in: S. Bandžović *op.cit.*, p. 51.

66 "Došljaci" or "newcomers," a word that originally emphasized that a person was not a member of the indigenous people.

67 Tadeuš Kovalski, "O balkanskim Turcima", in: *Knjiga o Balkanu I*, Belgrade, 1936, p. 180.

68 *Ibid.*

69 *Istorija srpskog naroda*, knjiga V, tom I, 526, cited in S. Bandžović *op.cit.*, p. 86.

Christians or under their authority” and that they were rushing to sell their properties and move to Turkey, where they can live “among people of their own customs, religion and race.”⁷⁰ Similarly, many Muslims in Montenegro refused to join the Montenegrin army, where they would have been obliged to wear the Montenegrin hat with a cross.

The presence of army troops in Bosnian homes and mosques created a similar revolt among the local Muslims. When Austria-Hungary imposed the obligation for military service, they encountered substantial resistance, especially from Muslims. The Austrians were a symbol of a distant and alien culture and religion, and so represented a threat to Islamic identity. Many soldiers were quartered in the houses of locals. Mosques were turned into military warehouses where alcohol and pork was kept, while locals were treated with disrespect. Meanwhile in the mosques, the sultan’s name was still glorified and Ottoman flags were still prominently displayed.

Austrians soon came to understand that they needed to change their approach if they wanted to curtail the exodus of Muslims, who represented a valuable bulwark for securing Hapsburg power against a rising Orthodox population (which was supported by Russia). The old social system in Bosnia was preserved and, through the district chiefs, the people were informed that “the new authority had not entered Bosnia and Herzegovina to abolish the old laws, but only to apply them equally to everyone.”⁷¹ Reforms for an efficient gendarmerie and civil service were introduced. Since the locals were not well trusted, workers necessary to operate the state apparatus were brought from other parts of the monarchy. Along with the imported civil servants, Austrian peasants were also colonizing different parts of Bosnia. Even though it can be argued that the Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina facing Austro-Hungarian occupation were “luckier” than those in Serbia or Montenegro, this did not prevent them from migrating.

70 *Istorija srpskog naroda*, knjiga V, tom I, 526, cited in S. Bandžović *op.cit.*, p. 80.

71 M. Ekmečić, *op.cit.*, p. 404.

Serbian authorities were also against the mass migrations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, since their national interests were jeopardized as well. The issue was often a headline in the Serbian press – the Austrian authorities were blamed for spurring immigration in order to colonize underpopulated areas with foreigners, and Muslims were urged to resist. The Serbian Ministry of Foreign Affairs instructed its diplomats to deliver the following message: “All people of authority should urge our Muslim brothers in Bosnia and Herzegovina to be patient and wait for better days, to defend their rights in a lawful way, and by no means should they leave their houses and ancestors` lands.”⁷²

According to Ekmečić, around 180.000-200.000 newcomers settled in Bosnia and Herzegovina by 1914, while 140.000 indigenous people left. At first the settlers moved primarily to the free lands, but later they were brought together to form an ethnic wall along the Drina river and in Bosanska Krajina, where they could impede further Serbian expansion. Records show that between 1879 and 1910 Catholics grew from 18% to 23% of the population, while Muslims decreased from 39% to 32% and the Orthodox essentially held steady at 43%.

The region that is now southern Serbia was predominantly inhabited by Muslims, but once the turmoil started, the demographic map changed rapidly. Toplica region had been inhabited mostly by Albanians and Caucasian Muslims, but after the Berlin Congress those groups withdrew completely from the region.⁷³ The artifacts in each of these towns (Prokuplje, Kuršumlija and Blace) speak volumes about their identity and population. Each had a few mosques, Turkish baths, and graveyards belonging to each of the different ethnic groups. For example in Prokuplje: “the Serbian cemetery was in the church yard...the Turkish and Albanian one in the middle of the town, where the park is today.”⁷⁴ The same author informs us that there was great enthusiasm in Prokuplje after the liberation, but soon “it turned into chaos, stealing and robbing of Turkish properties.”⁷⁵

72 S. Bandžović, *op.cit.*, p. 131.

73 See more Petko D. Marjanović, *Toplica kroz vekove*, Prokuplje, 2008, p. 62.

74 Petko D. Marjanović, *op.cit.*, p. 69.

75 *Ibid.*

Even more prominent examples of the mentioned changes can be found in the towns of Leskovac, Niš and Vranje. In peace times, Leskovac was home to 900 Muslim households with 4500 inhabitants. By 1884 only 15 homes with 60 inhabitants remained.⁷⁶ In military reports of the Serbian Army from 18 August 1878, the exodus of refugees on 1,924 carriages is registered, whereas 79 families with 316 members are recorded as staying behind, but only temporarily.⁷⁷ A similar fate befell the Muslims from Pirot, Vranje, Bela Palanka, Kuršumlija, and Prokuplje. Huge numbers moved to Kosovo, where they were often treated with hostility from the domestic population. On their deserted properties, King Milan colonized "healthier" national elements from other parts of Serbia and Montenegro.

II.2 A GRAND OBSERVATORY OF THE BALKAN MIGRATIONS: THE SANDŽAK REGION

The demographic alterations that took place in the Novi Pazar *sanjak* at the end of the XIX and the beginning of the XX century probably offer the most vivid illustration of the socio-political circumstances of those times. This region became a significant point on the migration routes of the Balkan people. "Whenever some of the sultan's people would fall into Christian hands, their masses would arrive here."⁷⁸ The provisions of the Berlin Congress enabled Montenegro to nearly double its territory, acquiring an outlet to the sea and fertile lands and towns. Such shifts significantly affected the mentality of the state politics whose unfortunate victims were the people of Islamic faith, being perceived as potential enemies.

76 S. Bandžović, *op.cit.*, p. 77.

77 M. Milićević, *Kraljevina Srbija*, p. 108, cited in S. Popović, *Putovanje po novoj Srbiji (1878-1880)*, Beograd, 1950.

78 G. Gravje, *Novopazarski Sandžak*, Novi Pazar, 1977, cited in: Ejup Mušović, "Sandžačke migracije i imigracije u XIX veku" in *Simpozijum Seoski Dani Sretna Vukosavljevića V, Prijepolje*, 1978, p. 213.

The first few years after the Berlin Congress saw mass flows of Muslims from Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro pour into this area. They were on their way to Turkey, but some families' descendants are still living there today. The most prominent example was the Muslims coming from the Montenegrin town of Nikšić (Ongošt in Ottoman times), for which Jovan Cvijić noted that "before 1878 there was no more progressive Muhammadan town than Nikšić".⁷⁹ In 1877-1878, 391 Muslim families left Nikšić. Many were unwilling to continue to Turkey, since the journey was very difficult, fraught with hunger and disease. It was a common habit among them to accept the surname Nikšić after arriving in Sandžak, whereas their original surnames included: Ljuca, Ljuhar, Džidić, Bajrović, Brunčević, Mulić, Numanović, Dervišević, and Pašović.

While the Muslims of Nikšić came within a short period of time, the ones from Kolašin arrived gradually. Transforming from a dominantly Muslim town, by 1925 Kolašin's ethnic milieu changed distinctly. Due to its fertile lands, this town became very attractive to the Montenegrin Vasojević, Moračan and Rovčan tribes. The "Turkish Kolašin" were an obstacle to their plans, "as those tribes were constantly directing their eyes toward that town."⁸⁰ Two major events set the Muslim population in motion: the sudden attack on Kolašin on 28 July 1858 and the Agreement for handing Kolašin over to Montenegrin authorities on 3 October 1878. On the first occasion, hundreds of men, women and children were killed and many houses were set on fire. At Russian insistence, the Ottoman Empire agreed to officially define borders with Montenegro in 1859, so Montenegro acquired significant territory in Gornji (Upper) Kolašin. While the constant clashes and violence between the two religious communities was a major cause, the migrations also became more intense following the decisions of the Berlin Congress. The town became an isolated Muslim enclave and

79 Đ. Pejović, *Iseljavanje Crnogoraca u XIX vijeku*, Titograd, 1962, quoted in: Ejup Mušović, *op.cit.*, p. 214.

80 N. Rakočević, "Borbe Crnogoraca za Kolašin i iseljavanje Muslimana iz Kolašina i okoline 1878-1886" in: *Stogodišnjica crnogorsko-turskog rata 1876-1878*, Titograd, 1978, 284, cited in S. Bandžović *op. cit.*

surrender seemed the most rational solution. The Kolašin mayor (*kaymakam*) Nuri Bey, together with the representatives of the Kolašin Bosniaks, signed the above-mentioned agreement and a day later the Ottoman army withdrew toward Bijelo Polje.⁸¹ Mass movements of the Bosniak Muslims soon followed, some heading toward Asia Minor and some stopping along the way.

There are numerous descendants of those *muhacirs*⁸² in Sandžak even today. Some of them still carry the surnames Nikšić or Kolašinac, but such families also include the Alibašić, Alić (Spaga), Alomerović, Atović, Babić, Bajrović, Bašović, Bošnjak, Brunčević, Čadjević, Ćustović, Demović, Dervišević, Duraković, Džidić, Džubura, Fazlagić, Fortić, Gološ, Hadžajlić, Hadžibegović, Hadžibulić, Hadžović, Hasanbegović, Hasić, Hasković, Hrčinović, Hrnjak, Iković, Jandrić, Kapetanović, Kaljić, Kolić, Kahrović, Kozica, Kriještorac, Kurahović, Kurtović, Lukač, Ljuca, Ljuhar, Ljutković, Malmudirović, Medjedović, Mecinović, Mekić, Melić, Mujović, Mustafić, Mušović, Pašović, Pepić, Redžepfendić, Salaković, Saračević, Selmanović, Srefatlić, Smailagić, Šukić, Šahović, Vranjković, Zejnelović, Zvizdić and many others.⁸³

These were turbulent years for Sandžak, so the border lines often became blurred. Many Serbs and Montenegrins headed towards the liberated territories in Serbia. "The Serbian government was granting them lands that Serbia acquired after the Berlin Treaty and which were deserted due to the Muslims' emigration."⁸⁴ In 1890 Serbia populated the Ottoman border with Montenegrins, while the Ottomans settled Muslim refugees from Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro along the Serbian border. Each side attempted to use the migrants to protect its own interests.

The *muhacirs* were not welcome in Sandžak. As they arrived with insufficient means of support, they brought even greater

81 S. Bandžović, *op.cit.*, p. 110.

82 *Muhacir* is a word of Turkish origin meaning refugee, but it is quite commonly used in all the literature dealing with this period.

83 Ejup Mušović, *op.cit.*, p. 216.

84 Ejup Mušović, "Novopazarski Sandžak u memoarima Simona Joanovića (1978-1900)" in *Simpozijum Seoski dani Sretena Vukosavljevića IX*, Prijepolje, 1981, p. 159.

impoverishment to already poor areas. As Vukoman Šalipurović observes: "The world has not seen harder misery and poorer people in that area [old Serbia] than the *muhacirs*. On the deserted wastelands next to the town settlements they were dying of hunger and cold... They could not settle on the properties of the *beys*,⁸⁵ because the *beys* did not allow them, nor on the *vakif*⁸⁶ properties, because the Islamic church and state did not allow them either. Only the pastures and grasslands were left for them to settle on."⁸⁷

Together with the refugees arrived their customs and beliefs, as well as their linguistic traditions. In areas where they were predominant in numbers, their cultural and linguistic influence was particularly pronounced. The traces of that influence are still visible in Sandžak today, through the dialect differs among the towns. Since they were a minority in Novi Pazar, the dialect there remained resistant to changes and preserved many Turkish and Albanian elements, whereas in Prijepolje, Nova Varoš and Priboj the dialect varies significantly from that in Novi Pazar and is much closer to Bosnian.

Not all roads of Bosniak emigration after the withdrawal of the Ottoman Empire passed through Sandžak. Such were the routes from the towns of Podgorica, Bar and Ulcinj. The Muslims of Podgorica left mainly due to the obligatory education, military obligation and calls from the Ottoman state.⁸⁸ Particularly, they feared assimilation through the educational system, but later with a decision of the Grand Court in Podgorica, Muslim children were able to be taught by a Muslim teacher from Bar, could keep their "fez" hats, could wear symbols without crosses and were granted free days on the Aid holidays (*Bayram*) and during Ramadan.⁸⁹ In terms of their military obligation, Muslims

85 *Bey* is a high ranking officer title in the Ottoman Empire, appointed for military and administrative command of a district.

86 *Vakif* is a pious foundation whose properties cannot be sold, but only used for public services.

87 Vukoman Šalipurović, *Raonička buna II*, cited in Ejup Mušović, "Sandžačke migracije i imigracije u XIX veku", *Simpozijum Seoski Dani Sretena Vukosavljevića V, Prijepolje*. 1978, p. 215.

88 S. Bandžović, *op.cit.*, p. 118.

89 Zakon za osnovne škole u Knjaževini Crnoj Gori, cited in: Safet Bandžović, *op.cit.*, p. 118.

were told that they would not be forced to shoot fellow Muslims and would have the right to leave Montenegro. By 1880, 260 Muslim families had left Podgorica.

The Bar and Ulcinj Muslims left for the same reasons. Some of them fled to Shkodër, Albania during the turbulent years 1877-1878, but their return was made difficult by Prince (*knjaz*) Nikola. In 1883 the right of redemption of refugee lands was introduced and title was granted to the state, which never allowed open or accurate valuation and paid prices much lower than actual value. Around the year 1880 "200 households" left Ulcinj, mostly seafarers' families. An order of the state to keep dead bodies for 24 hours before burying was another incentive for Muslim emigration in Bar, where in 1906 two hundred families left the town. Many boarded ships that the Sultan Abdul Hamid II had sent for them as a reward for their courage.⁹⁰ Another group moved toward Albania. Other migrants from Bosnia and Herzegovina also headed toward Albania, Macedonia and what is now Kosovo. The studies of onomastics in these regions perfectly illustrates the courses of these movements.⁹¹

II.3 THE MIGRATIONS OF BOSNIAKS AFTER THE BALKAN WARS

The Young Turk Revolution of 1908 failed to revitalize the Ottoman Empire. Moreover, it inspired the outbreak of stronger revolts in Yemen and Albania; while Greeks attacked Crete and Italy declared war on the Ottoman Empire in Libya and the Mediterranean. Meanwhile the Balkan states prepared their armies for combat and simultaneously ran diplomatic negotiations, which resulted in the secret treaties of 1912. Russia, France and

90 F. Hadžibajrić, "Murteza efendija Karađuzović muftija crnogorskih muslimana", *Glasnik, VIS*, Sarajevo, 1963, cited in S. Bandžović, *op.cit.*, p. 120.

91 Recep Škriyel, "Rumeli `Vilayat-ı Selase'sinde` Boşnak Muhacir Onomastiği (1878-1912)", *Hikmet, Uluslararası Hakemli İlmî Araştırma Dergisi No.21*, Gostivar, 2013, pp. 100-111.

later Italy agreed to support the Balkan states. The first cannon fired against the Ottoman Empire was in Montenegro, on 8 October 1912 and soon Serbia, Greece and Bulgaria followed in what was to become the First Balkan War. The Ottomans – with insufficient military preparations, preoccupied by war with Italy in Libya, and denied the use of sea lanes by the Greeks – suffered a quick defeat. The First Balkan War was officially concluded with the Treaty of London, on May 30 1913, according to which the Ottoman Empire lost all of its territories in Europe, except for a tiny strip around Istanbul along the Enos-Midia line. Only in the Second Balkan War (1913) did the Ottomans manage to retrieve some small territories around Istanbul (Thrace, Edirne and Kirk Kilise).

By the time of the Balkan wars, the Muslim population of the Balkans was already in motion. By 1911 they were still the majority in the Empire. Each of the victors of the Balkan wars strove towards diminution of its own Muslim population, but they were not organized in unified actions. Instead of consistently expelling the Muslims from the Balkans altogether, they often pushed them from a territory conquered by one Christian country to a territory conquered by another. The mortality rate in this migration wave was much higher than in 1978.⁹²

The overall Muslim population of the Balkans decreased by 62%. The Muslims of what later became Yugoslavia declined by 46%. The Christian population also declined by 11%, due to wartime deaths and migration.⁹³ Justin McCarthy's tables are quite illustrative of the demographic shifts taking place during the Balkan wars.

92 Justin McCarthy, *Death and Exile of Ottomans-The Ethnic Cleansing of Ottoman Muslims 1821-1922*, Princeton, New Jersey, 1996, p. 139.

93 Justin McCarthy, *op.cit.*, p. 164.

Table 1: Regions of the Ottoman Empire Taken by the Balkan Allies. Population in 1911, before the Balkan Wars.

| | Greek Conquest | Bulgarian Conquest | Serbian Conquest |
|-----------|----------------|--------------------|------------------|
| Muslim | 746.485 | 327.732 | 1.241.076 |
| Greek | 797.118 | 29.255 | 285.985 |
| Bulgarian | 145.186 | 204.701 | 781.769 |
| Jewish | 75.522 | 920 | 9.866 |
| Other | 8.419 | 19.044 | 22.122 |
| TOTAL | 1.772.730 | 581.652 | 2.340.818 |

Table Source: J. McCarthy, 'Death and Exile of Ottomans-The Ethnic Cleansing of Ottoman Muslims 1821-1922', Princeton, New Jersey, 1996, p.162

Table 2: Population after the Wars. Areas of Greece, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia Taken from the Ottoman Empire

| | Greece 1923 | Bulgaria 1920 | Yugoslavia 1921 |
|-----------|-------------|---------------|-----------------|
| Muslim | 124.460 | 179.176 | 566.478 |
| Greek | 1.773.964*1 | | 949.366* |
| Bulgarian | | 192.552* | |
| Jewish | 65.569 | 704 | 6.103 |
| Other | 7.467 | 898 | 18.277 |
| TOTALS | 1.971.460 | 373.330 | 1.540.224 |

Table Source: J. McCarthy, 'Death and Exile of Ottomans-The Ethnic Cleansing of Ottoman Muslims 1821-1922', Princeton, New Jersey, 1996, p.162

Table 3: Muslims in Ottoman Areas Taken by Greece, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia and Muslims Remaining in Those Countries

| | Muslims in 1911 | Muslims Remaining | Difference |
|------------|-----------------|-------------------|------------|
| Greece | 746.485 | 124.460 | 622.025 |
| Bulgaria | 327.732 | 179.176 | 148.556 |
| Yugoslavia | 1.241.076 | 566.478 | 674.598 |
| TOTALS | 2.315.293 | 870.114 | 1.445.179 |

Table Source: J. McCarthy, 'Death and Exile of Ottomans-The Ethnic Cleansing of Ottoman Muslims 1821-1922', Princeton, New Jersey, 1996, p.162

The reasons for migration in this period were not much different from the previous ones. The falling apart of the Ottoman Empire already became a reality and the wars only intensified the feelings of alienation. According to Milorad Ekmečić, forced Christianization was not proposed and the Serbian soldier "did not see the Turks or the Arnauts as enemies, but as neighbors and friends."⁹⁴ This was not the case with the authorities in Montenegro. The Montenegrin soldiers were so aggressive that numerous populations were forced to move to Serbian territories, seeking protection. Even the Prime Minister of Serbia, Nikola Pašić was informed that due to forced Christianization of Muslims in the villages Log and Gločin a complaint note was sent to Istanbul.⁹⁵

The following controls did prove that the Montenegrins forced the Muslims of Berane on 7 May 1913, to Christianize, and later they did it in Plav and Gusinje, where "no single Turk was left". As Jovan Cvijić witnessed the events himself, many such Muslims kept their Turkish names and behaved according to the old customs, which only proved that they accepted the new religion as temporary. "They were still addressing each oth-

⁹⁴ Nikola Pašić – Vrhovnoj komandi u Skoplje, Beograd, 16-29 mart 1913, O. br. 4422, cited in M.Ekmečić, *Ratni ciljevi Srbije 1914*, Beograd 2014, p. 148.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*

er by their Turkish names. They do not even know their Christian ones and when asked about it, they reply: "The godfather knows!"⁹⁶ Cvijić also noted that he could not identify whether the Christianization initiative came from the central authorities in Cetinje, or they just approved it, since other local authorities already started Christianizing the Muslims.⁹⁷ The Serbian government condemned these events and sought them to be checked, since it did not want to share responsibility for the actions of its neighbor.

By the end of the Second Balkan War, the Ottoman Empire stretched only on a tiny strip in Europe, including Istanbul and eastern Thrace up to Edirne, losing 83% of its land and 69% of its population in Rumelia. Due to severe nationalist pressure, thousands of refugees were forced to look for new homes in and out of the Empire. Growing migration raised the number of population in the Empire up to 75%. In the 1885-1914 period the population rose from 17.375.225 up to 18.520.016 people.⁹⁸

II.4 THE MIGRATIONS OF BOSNIAKS AFTER THE WORLD WAR I

The World War I, as practically all wars in the Balkans, was actually a religious war. "God is a great warrior!" becomes quite commonly used sentence in the Balkans after year 1912.⁹⁹ Even from its early foundations, Yugoslavian politics did not manage to overcome the religious differences of its people. Once the Ottomans and the Habsburgs left the territory, the people were divided in their religion, cultures, mentality and types of social

96 Jovan Cvijić, *Balkansko poluostrvo i južnoslovenske zemlje. Osnovi antropogeografije*, Beograd, 1966, p. 415.

97 *Ibid.*

98 Stanford J. Shaw, "Ottoman population movements during the last years of the Empire, 1885-1914: Some preliminary remarks" in *The Journal of Ottoman Studies I*, Istanbul, 1980, p. 192.

99 Milorad Ekmečić, *Ratni ciljevi Srbije 1914*, Beograd, 2014, p. 148.

organizing. All these imposed new challenges for the nation building process.

After the World War I, the Balkan states faced new challenges: being democratically inexperienced, burdened with nationalism and exhausted by wars, they were supposed to create new state order in the young multinational country. In order to create a joint Yugoslav state, unique belief and unique church community was necessary (the focus was strictly on Christian communities). "The Slavism primarily needs to reconcile the east and the west church within itself and in such way remove the main obstacle for unique culture in its environment".¹⁰⁰ In such circumstances the path towards infrastructural unity was supposed to be laid and within few generations the results of the united society would have become visible.

The Versailles peace agreement on 28 June 1919 imposed protection of minority rights, which in the case of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (from now on Kingdom SHS) referred to the protection of Muslims, as minority religion and carriers of special rights.¹⁰¹ However, reality confirmed the opposite. The inefficiency of the League of Nations allowed the young Balkan nation-states to continue their state building policies according to the premise of "one state-one people". The *vakif* properties had no protection and often became subjects of robbery. Prominent mosques were turned into storage spaces and *madrasah* schools were used for various other purposes.

The *reis-ul ulema*¹⁰² Džemaludin Čaušević often protested about the unjustified arrests, beating till death in prisons, unlawful searches, robberies and illegalities of the "national guard". He warned the authorities in Belgrade to cease all the aggression or they will be forced to seek protection for their lives and properties by other parties. In the interview for the French "La temps" Čaušević appealed for protection and mediation, explaining:

100 Milan Marjanović, *Kulturne tendencije Jugoslovena*, Niš, 1915, quoted in Milorad Ekmečić, *Ratni ciljevi Srbije 1914*, Beograd, 2014, p. 149.

101 S. Bandžović, *op.cit.*, p. 310.

102 *Reis-ul ulema* is an Islamic title used in several countries of the former SFRY, to denote the leader of the Islamic Community within that particular country.

“Thousands killed, six women set to fire, 270 villages robbed and destroyed – that is the outcome for us Muslims upon the ceremonial creation of Yugoslavia, for which we were prepared to serve with our souls. We are Slavs after all, but Serbs reject to consider us as such. They consider us to be intruders. After the Serbs became rulers of the situation, we were never invited to participate in the political meetings and consultations.”¹⁰³ The authorities demanded him to confute his statements, but he rejected.

The relations between Orthodox and Muslims living in the border regions were increasingly restrained in the inter-war period. The Serbian population was rightfully seeking indemnity of properties robbed during the war. As the judicial authorities showed little interest in solving the issue, they often acted on their own in retrieving their properties that were now kept in the houses of the Muslims. Unfortunately, this often became an excuse for robbing Muslim families, creating additional pressure on the already disturbed relations.¹⁰⁴

Even the minister of interior Svetozar Pribičević in his telegrams to the Country government in Sarajevo in 1918-1919 expressed his concern over the treatment of Muslims and he warned about the risks that might jeopardize the internal stability in the country and the situation in the international arena: “Numerous violence attacks were committed against the Muslim population... and the performers of violence are the Orthodox. Besides burning whole villages, properties were robbed as well (detailed list of the robbed persons is submitted).”¹⁰⁵ At the end, Pribičević ordered “strict measures for preventing the repetition of such events”, protection of Muslims and strict punishment of the wrong-doers.

The land owners did not have any privileged position either. The Agrarian reform of 1931 envisaged granting of 2-15ha of land to every peasant and the ones interested in owning the land had to repurchase it from the state. In such a way 13.071.848 dunums of land was taken from the Muslims in the Kingdom of

103 S. Bandžović *op.cit.*, p. 324.

104 For more see: Dr. Atif Purivatra, *Jugoslavenska muslimanska organizacija u političkom životu Kraljevine Srva, Hrvata i Slovenaca*, Sarajevo, 1977, p. 39.

105 Arhiv Bosne i Hercegovine, ZV, Pr.1645/1919, cited in A. Purivatra *op.cit.*, p. 35.

Serbs, Croats and Slovenes; 10.766.850 in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and 2.310.990 in Sandžak, Kosovo and Macedonia.¹⁰⁶ The formerly rich land owners, having no other skills or administrative positions, were left on the verge of survival.

The Bosniak population of Sandžak had a strong aversion towards the official education system, which resulted in high rates of illiteracy. They were strongly bound to their Islamic way of living and often feared that the schooling will cause alienation from their original identity. Many historic events were interpreted unilaterally, religious classes were accompanied by many complications, which all together reinforced the impression that schools were places for gradual assimilation.

However, major factor that pushed Bosniaks towards migration was the brutal aggressive regime of certain gendarme units, who often misused their authority for harassment of the local Muslim population. Namely, led by the famous Kosta Pećanac, chetnik units were perpetrating numerous killings, beatings and rapes with the excuse that they were acting against Muslim renegades.¹⁰⁷ In reality, few Muslim paramilitary formations did act in Sandžak, but they were acting in an unorganized and uncoordinated manner, protecting only the Muslim population of a certain area. The fight "against the irresponsible armed groups" often became an excuse for killings of innocent civilians.¹⁰⁸ Numerous petitions, pledges and notes were sent to the Serbian officials. Some of them brought minor deceleration of the acts in certain areas, but did not protect them. A prominent example is the massacre in Šahovići, which provoked mass migration of the remaining population towards Turkey.¹⁰⁹

106 R. Muminović, *Fenomenologija srpske genocidne svijesti*, cited in S. Bandžović, *op.cit.*, p. 346.

107 The author Bajro Agović explains how the respectable imam Pačariz – Biočak, together with his neighbours were taken out of their homes in Brodarevo and killed by the chetnik units of Kosta Pećanac, under the accusation of supporting the Muslim renegades. B. Agović "Ibrahim Pačariz – Biočak" in magazine *Elif No.78*, Rožaje, 2015, pp. 74-75.

108 See more S. Bandžović *op.cit.*, p. 372.

109 See more Šerbo Rastoder, *Šahovići 1924 – Kad su vakat kaljali insani*, Podgorica, 2011.

II.5 LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF THE MIGRATIONS TOWARD TURKEY

The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was devastated by the wars. Huge number of people waited for land to be granted to them. Often these lands were the ones that stayed behind the Muslims who moved out. In order to intensify the migration, an official state framework was necessary - one that would accelerate the process and facilitate the procedures on Turkey's behalf. Positive signals came from Turkey. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk stated that the *muhacirs* are Turkish national reminiscence of the lands that Ottoman Empire has lost.¹¹⁰ Certain arrangements with Romania were already initiated.

As Vladan Jovanović defined it, the duality of identity of "the people of Turkish culture" in this region was used as a suitable pretext for expelling "disloyal elements."¹¹¹ The first official regulation of migration toward Turkey was in the 1928 Law of Citizenship, Article 55, whereby "non-Slavic" citizens could opt to give up their citizenship in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes within 5 years and the state would assist them in the process of selling property and moving out. Still, the absence of a regulated bilateral process caused many emigrants to be returned from the Turkish border.¹¹² Jovanović presented an integral version of two confidential documents of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Belgrade, which vividly illustrate the state's attitude toward Muslims. Here it must be mentioned that huge attention was given to expelling Albanians (who are separately emphasized in several places). But for the purpose of this study, the documents will be treated as ones referring generally to all Muslims. In the report of the Inter-Ministerial Conference on the issue of forcing out non-Slavic residents from South Serbia, held

110 S. Bandžović, *Ratovi i demografska deosmanizacija Balkana* p. 214, cited in V. Jovanović, *op.cit.*, pp. 218-225.

111 V. Jovanović, "Priprema plana za iseljavanje jugoslovenskih muslimana u Tursku 1935 godine" in *Novopazarški Zbornik br.34*, Novi Pazar, 2011, p. 213.

112 AJ, 370-9-42, l. 506, 630, MIP delegatu SHS u Carigradu Trajanu Živkoviću (3.6.1923), cited in V. Jovanović, *op.cit.*, pp. 218-225.

in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 20 September 1935, the following conclusions were noted:¹¹³

- 1) The issue of removing population should be initiated with the Turkish government and it should be solved the way Romania did it, i.e. through a special convention.
- 2) Free passports should be issued to everyone who wants to emigrate.
- 3) All these people should be released from their debt obligations (taxes, surtaxes, etc.)
- 4) The requests of all people who ask for free transportation to the border should be met in exchange for their immovable properties. For the poor people who do not possess any properties, free transportation should be secured, and the ones who sold their properties transportation discount of 75% should be given.
- 5) These persons should be released from paying all the taxes related to moving their movable properties or their money.
- 6) The Ministry of Military and Navy has already issued an order for all these people to be granted emigration licenses, regardless of completing their military service. Those who want to leave, but are still serving in the army, should be released.

Previously the Colonel General J. Sokolović proposed that, apart from the Convention, the migration of the non-Slavs should be stimulated through forcing them to pay every tax exactly on time; forcing the children of “our Turks” to go to the national schools because “three quarters of them still write in Turkish when they reach military age”; issuing a confidential note for the ones who do not want to emigrate, barring them from ever being accepted in state services; nationalizing the names of places, so that they acquire “our marks”; colonizing “our elements” along the border first and later heading inwards.

Here special attention should be given to the people of Sandžak, because “a mistake has been done”. Namely, “our

113 V. Jovanović, *op.cit.*, pp. 218-225.

Muslims from Sandžak, who are actually our people, are also requesting to migrate. Therefore there would be no reason for them to separate from the country. We draw the attention of the Ministry of Interior in order not to accept any such statements from our Slavic people in the future.”¹¹⁴

As relations between Yugoslavia and Turkey improved, the migration process was gradually formalized. In 1931, both countries reached an initial agreement and in 1933 in Geneva the “Agreement on Friendship, Non-aggression, Judicial Resolution, and Arbitration” was concluded.¹¹⁵ On 9 February 1934, the representatives of Turkey, Yugoslavia, Greece and Romania met in Athens to form the Balkan Pact. Throughout these negotiations Muslim migration toward Turkey was discussed. Abandoned Turkish properties and those affected by the agrarian reform would be treated as property with no owners and the state would convey them to poor peasantry that was already waiting for it. The Belgrade consul in Istanbul received the following instructions: “That is our primary task, and as a priority the building of new houses or educating in their homelands should not be allowed. All issues related to emigration should be handled by a single government commission composed of specialists. The only problem that is left is to decide which groups should be removed first.”¹¹⁶

From 9 June to 11 July 1938, Yugoslav-Turkish negotiations were held in Istanbul regarding the emigration of “Turkish population.” The Yugoslav representatives presented the problem as an economic and social one, the solution of which would help both the Yugoslav and Turkish economy, as Turkey needed population to cultivate the vast fertile lands. On the last day of the negotiations a Convention was signed “ad referendum” on the emigration of “Yugoslav Muslim population that spoke Turkish and had Turkish culture” from South Serbia towards Turkey. Its provisions included emigration of 40.000 village families totaling

114 V. Jovanović, *op.cit.*, p. 220.

115 ASSIP, PO, Poslanstvo Kraljevine Jugoslavije u Turskoj, 1935, f.17. pov.br:366, cited in: S. Bandžović, *op.cit.*, p. 426.

116 S. Bandžović, *op.cit.*, p. 425.

200.000 persons. Previously they had been obliged to act according to article 55 of the Yugoslav Law on Citizenship and give a written statement renouncing their Yugoslav citizenship. Organized removal was supposed to start on 1 July 1939 and last for six years – first year 4.000 families, second 6.000, third and fourth 7.000 each, fifth and sixth 8.000 Muslim families were supposed to migrate. In return, the Yugoslav government was supposed to pay 500 Turkish liras for each family, or total of 20.000.000 Turkish liras to the Turkish government. However, due to the death of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in 1939, the Convention was not ratified in the Turkish Parliament. Some claim that Turkey was not satisfied with the financial arrangements with Yugoslavia.¹¹⁷ The soon outbreak of the World War II prevented any further actions.

Certain Bosniak intellectuals tried to convince the people not to move out. According to the Sarajevo gazette “Pravda” from 3 April 1925, some 60.000 Muslims moved to Turkey. In the same article the Muslims were urged not to leave, since there was no official agreement with Turkey, but it did not bear many results.¹¹⁸

Many of the migrants who managed to reach the Ottoman territories were unhappy with the living conditions they faced there and tried to go back to what seemed to be their homeland. At the beginning of 1890, the Empire granted houses and land to the refugees along the Serbian and Bulgarian borders, whereby they became free land owners. Throughout the turbulent years, the number of migrants grew and consequently the burden on the Ottoman treasury became heavier. In order to meet the housing and feeding expenses, the finances started relying more on loans, rather than on outright grants.¹¹⁹ Istanbul was particularly struck with huge influx of refugees – they were placed in mosques, office buildings and schools, sometimes in the streets

117 S. Bandžović, *op.cit.*, pp. 432-436.

118 S. Bandžović, *op.cit.*, p. 403.

119 Babiali Evrak Odasi (hereafter referred to as BEO) 264280 cited in Stanford J. Shaw, “Ottoman Population Movements During the Last Years of the Empire, 1885-1914: Some Preliminary Remarks”, in *The Journal of Ottoman Studies I*, Istanbul, 1980, p. 191.

and tents, they faced various diseases and constant danger until resettled out of the city.¹²⁰ For the Albanian and Macedonian refugees leaving from Thessaloniki via direct shipping, passing through the Aegean and reaching directly to Izmir was organized, but this was not sufficient to relieve the over-crowded city of Istanbul, since most immigrants arrived in small groups via land route. Such state of affairs continued until the outbreak of the World War I.¹²¹

The migrants, who arrived in Turkey in times when the foundations of the republic were laid, were mainly sent to Eastern Anatolia. Many of them found the living conditions difficult and completely different from what they have left behind. Some were so disappointed that they were re-migrating, this time back to their native lands. They were not welcome back and Yugoslav authorities paid special attention to preventing their return. The new homeland, Turkey, was not willing to facilitate their return either. However, the desire to be happy again was sometimes stronger than state borders, so they moved again. Destiny was rarely merciful to these return migrants. The issue of return migration deserves a separate research, which is beyond the scope of this study.

120 BEO 294994 (20 Aug, 1327), 308964 (26. Nov 1328), 309114, cited in Stanford J. Shaw, *op.cit.*, p. 193.

121 BEO 308950 (26 Nov, 1328), 312728 (25 April 1329), 312696 (25 April 1329), cited in Stanford J. Shaw, *op.cit.*, p. 194.

III. THE WORLD WAR II AND THE PATH TO MIGRATIONS OF BOSNIAKS OF SANDŽAK IN THE POST-WAR PERIOD

The events taking place during the Second World War in Sandžak strongly defined the peace times destiny of the Bosniak population living there. Lacking a single leading authority and still under the impressions of the pressure and direct nationalistic attacks exercised upon them during the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, they faced the emergence of WW II. In certain parts of Sandžak, local Bosniaks were influenced by the ideas of „Greater Albania“ and as such they collaborated with the enemy. In other parts, the collaboration was due to “practical reasons“, since such forces were the only guarantee of Bosniak security against the “primary enemy” – the chetniks. Meanwhile, the partisan movement gained power, ending the war as its victor. Such “victory“ often turned out to be of multiple layers and double standards for the Sandžak people, who still bitterly remember certain chapters of that period. As presented in the following pages, the conditions during WWII strongly traced the path of migration to Turkey.

III.1 THE KINGDOM OF YUGOSLAVIA DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR

When the government of Yugoslavia, with the blessing of Regent Prince Pavle, acceded to the Nazi-led Triple Pact (Vienna, 25 March 1941), it drew a swift domestic response. The next night, Aviation Commander Dušan T. Simović and his deputy general

Borivoje Mirković, led a successful coup d'état. The government of Dragiša Cvetković was overthrown, all its representatives in Belgrade were arrested, and the 17-year-old crown prince was declared to be an adult and crowned as King Petar II. Simović assumed the presidency. Despite rumors of a potential attack from Germany, the new government failed to announce any mobilization. By the time of the first Nazi attack on Belgrade, 6 April 1941, the new government members and its advisors were slowly gathering in Nikšić, Montenegro. Over the next ten days, all had followed King Petar in fleeing to Greece, from where they eventually reached England. The Yugoslav Army of the King signed an unconditional surrender in Belgrade, on 17 April 1941.¹²²

With the fall of the government in Belgrade, various resistance movements rapidly took shape. One – consisting mostly of Serb nationalists and royalists known as “Chetniks” – was led by Brigade General Dragoljub “Draža” Mihailović. At first, Mihailović steered clear of politics, stating that as a colonel and a representative of the army, he should focus on building a relationship with the people and stay out of politics. As Krizman notes, Mihailović's emissary Miloš Sekulić noted in his memoirs that Mihailović later realized that it was not realistic to stay out of politics, and organized a political committee. Sekulić, as Mihailović's representative, travelled to London to meet with the Serbian government in exile, and specifically with Prime Minister Simović.

On 11 January 1942 King Petar II signed a decree in London according to which Slobodan Jovanović became the Prime Minister and Minister of Interior of the new Yugoslav government-in-exile, while Mihailović became Minister of the Army, Navy and Air Force. At the same time, Jovanović was named the representative of the Minister of the Army, Navy and Aviation, since Mihailović was in Yugoslavia.¹²³ The arrangement was not

122 Bogdan Krizman, *Jugoslovenske vlade u izbjeglištvu, 1941-1943*, Beograd-Zagreb, 1981, p. 12.

123 Arhiv Jugoslavije, 103-1, in B. Krizman, *op.cit.*, p. 36.

universally embraced. Former Prime Minister Dušan Simović, wrote to King Petar that the arrangement was unconstitutional and that the political representatives in London had no legitimacy among the people.¹²⁴ But the very participation of Mihailović in the government, gave the arrangement some legitimacy.

In May 1942, Prime Minister in exile Jovanović met in London with Russian Ambassador Bogomolov to discuss eventual support of USSR forces for Mihailović's forces. Bogomolov responded like a diplomat, informing Jovanović that his country did not want to interfere in the internal issues of Yugoslavia and the relations between partisans and Mihailović's forces. A few months later, the Ambassador of the Kingdom Yugoslavia in Moscow, Stanoje Simić was informed by Aleksandar Lozovski, the deputy director of the Soviet Information Bureau that Mihailović cooperated with Italian forces, sometimes even in combating the Soviet-supported Yugoslav partisans,¹²⁵ led by Josip Broz Tito.¹²⁶ This precluded potential assistance for Mihailović on behalf of the Soviets.

One outline for a Chetnik ideology was provided in the June 1941 memorandum "Homogenous Serbia"¹²⁷ prepared by Dr. Stevan Moljević, who two months later became a member of the Chetnik National Committee. Many of his ideas were repeated in numerous Chetnik programmatic statements, such as the territorial proposals of the Belgrade Chetnik Committee delivered to the government-in-exile in September 1941. One ideological tenet that grew far beyond Moljević's initial memorandum was a proposal for the large-scale shift of population that would make "Great Serbia" purely ethnically Serb. More precisely, it was proposed that 2.675.000 people would have to be expelled from the projected Great Serbia (including 1.000.000 Croats and 500.000

124 Kosta St. Pavlović, "Jugoslovensko-britanski odnosi 1939-1945. Kairska afeta vidjena iz Londona" in *Savremenik* 1978, No.4/205, p. 29 in B. Krizman, *op.cit.*, p. 36.

125 Gradja, dok.br. 184, quoted in B. Krizman, *op.cit.*, p. 75.

126 Josip Broz Tito was the leader of the National Liberation Movement during WWII and later President for life of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia.

127 Jozo Tomasevich, *The Chetniks*, Stanford, California, 1975, p. 167.

Germans); while 1.310.000 would be brought into the territory (including 300.000 Serbs from Croatia); and some 200.000 Croats would be allowed to stay within the new Great Serbia. Muslims were mentioned only briefly, as “a grave problem, which if possible should be solved in this phase.”¹²⁸

It is interesting to note that the Yugoslav government-in-exile had close cooperation with the government of Turkey. Much of the communication among various Serbian representatives, including Mihailović was forwarded through the Serbian Embassy in Ankara. For example, the Serbian Ambassador in Moscow, M.Gavrilović, informed the Minister of Foreign Affairs, M.Ninčić about his meeting with the Turkish ambassador, Mr.Hajdar.¹²⁹ They had discussed the prospect of Soviet influence in the Balkans, where they had agreed that it was in neither party’s interest to allow Russian entrance. As Gavrilović wrote, the Turkish ambassador told him “that we should return to the efforts of late King Aleksandar and Atatürk for tighter binding of all of us in the Balkans, so that we can jointly and decisively demonstrate that whoever touches the Balkans will face the risk of a war with the whole Balkans.” Gavrilović later responded that this was a matter for the future, but that they generally supported the policy of “The Balkans to the Balkan people.”

An excellent illustration of the attitude of the Yugoslav government-in-exile toward the Muslim population is found in the report prepared by Major General Živan L. Knezević, the Chief of Military Staff, sent to Prime Minister Jovanović.¹³⁰ Knezević formed the “Draž” file, with attachments that included 4 articles:

- 1) Actions during the war;
- 2) Actions in the interim period;
- 3) Preparations for normal state of affairs; and
- 4) Issues of interior organization – social and political.

128 J. Tomasevich, *op.cit.*, p. 170.

129 AJ 103-61, M.Gavrilović – M.Ninčiću, Moskva, 11.10.1941, in B. Krizman, *op.cit.*, p. 219.

130 Referat Z. Kneževića S. Jovanoviću, London 26.1.1942, A-VII, VK, Kut.162, Br.Reg. 34, F.1/1 quoted in B. Krizman, *op.cit.*, p. 272.

For the purpose of this study, only articles 2 and 3 are quoted:

II Article

To get prepared in such way that during the breaking days the following actions can be undertaken:

- a: Punish all those who have in a felonious way served the enemy and who have consciously worked on extermination of the Serbian people;
- b: Border the “de facto” Serbian lands and act in such way that only Serb population stay in them;
- v: Especially consider the rapid and radical cleansing of towns and their filling with fresh Serb elements;
- g: Build a plan for cleansing or moving the village population, aiming at homogeneous Serb state community;
- d: Consider the Muslim issue as a particularly difficult problem for the Serbian community unit, and if possible solve it in this phase;
- e: Determine in advance which and what type of units should fulfill the program items b, v, g, d.

III Article

1. The ideal is a strong and homogeneous Serbian state unit, politically and economically capable of living. As such, it will serve as a *bahbike*¹³¹ to broader political combinations; and
2. Choose experts for preparing the documentation of this goal for the peace conference.

The representatives of the National Liberation Action (*Narodno-Oslobodilački Pokret* or “NOP”) had several negotiations with the forces of Mihailović. One example is the meeting between Tito and Mihailović in the village of Brajići on 26 October

¹³¹ The word “bahbike” has no meaning in the Serbian language. It may be a typographical error, since a question mark is noted in the resource book as well.

1941. Five days earlier, NOP sent a proposal to the Chetnik forces in Ravna Gora, which included the following¹³²:

1. Joint military operations against the enemies, Germans or Nedić's supporters. Joint operational headquarters should be formed for that purpose;
2. Joint equipment and feeding of our fighters, which would be realized through joint intendature (a military composition within the National Liberation War forces);
3. Joint split of the trophy, according to the needs of the battlefield and the principle: everything for the battlefield, everything for the fight;
4. Joint command, actually two commands that would cooperate;
5. Creation of joint commissions that would solve problematic issues;
6. Organization of interim government that would take care of the feeding of population, organizing the economy, collecting assets for war etc.;
7. In terms of forced mobilization, we are principally against it. It should be voluntarily based and everybody should decide for themselves whether they should join Partisan or Chetnik forces.
8. All units, Partisan or Chetnik, should obey their respective commands.

Mihailović rejected any agreements upon articles 1, 2, 6 and 7, for which Tito wrote: "they rejected the most important articles, the ones that would have enabled unity of the people in the great liberation combat."¹³³

There are numerous studies on the cooperation of Mihailović with the occupying Italian and German forces, as well as of attacks on Partisan forces, which led to his conviction and execution after the end of WWII. However, those issues are outside

132 Branko Latas, Milovan Dželebdžić, *Četnicki pokret Draže Mihailovića 1941-1945*, Beograd, 1979, p. 89.

133 B. Latas, M. Dželebdžić, *op.cit.*, p. 93.

the scope of this study. Here it is important to mention that NOP forces were not at first focused on destroying Mihailović, since as Vladimir Dedijer noted in his *Diary*: “have to be cautious, not to cause foreign policy difficulties for the Soviet Alliance.”¹³⁴ There was constant pressure from the British government, through their ambassador in Moscow, but also through the Russian ambassador in London, for the Soviet government to influence the Yugoslav Communists to obey Mihailović “as the commander of all Yugoslav armed forces in the country” and cease the fight against the Chetniks. The negotiations between Partisans and Chetniks continued, and ultimately resulted in an agreement, signed in Čačak, 29 November 1941. The Agreement consisted of 9 articles and was focused on ceasing fire, creating joint commissions for discussing war crimes, releasing prisoners and other issues, but this study draws special attention to Article No.6, according to which: “All persons who have voluntarily switched to the other side during the combat, or later, will not be considered guilty and they can stay where they are.”¹³⁵ This article enabled numerous Chetniks to change their uniforms and enter the Yugoslav military, as the end of the war was approaching, which explains why migrations of Bosniaks were so intense in the land of “Brotherhood and Unity.” Soon after signing the Agreement, Mihailović informed the refugee government in London that he managed to stop the fratricidal war.

In November and December 1941, Chetnik formations attacked Novi Pazar three times.¹³⁶ Prior to these attacks, Chetniks harassed many villages with Bosniak population around Novi Pazar. The President of the Municipality of Novi Pazar, Aćif Efendija Hadžiahmetović proposed negotiations and establishing a demarcation line with the Chetnik command. The proposal was refused and the above-mentioned attacks followed. In the third one, Germans also participated, since Chetniks convinced them that Partisan forces were stationed in Novi Pazar. Soon

134 B. Latas, M. Dželebdžić, *op.cit.*, p. 110.

135 B. Latas, M. Dželebdžić, *op.cit.*, pp. 111-112.

136 Dr. Safet Bandžović and Semiha Kačar, *Sandžak Historija i činjenice*, Novi Pazar, 1994, pp. 46-47.

after the deception was discovered, the Germans withdrew in Raška, so that the Chetniks also gave up the attacks. Between July and December 1941, a total of 756 Bosniaks, Serbs and Albanians were killed in the Novi Pazar district, along with the burning of 2.792 houses. The hardest casualties were in Pože-ga, Trnava, Rajetiće, Deževa, Postijenje, Bijeje Vode and Nikol-jača districts of Novi Pazar.¹³⁷

On 20 December 1941, Mihailović issued a directive to the Montenegrin leaders, mayors Djordjija Lasić and Pavle Djurišić, setting forth the following objectives:

- (1) The struggle for the liberty of our whole nation under the scepter of His Majesty King Petar II;
- (2) The creation of a Greater Yugoslavia and within it of a Greater Serbia which is to be ethnically pure and is to include Serbia (meaning also Macedonia), Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Srijem, the Banat, and Bačka;
- (3) The struggle for the inclusion into Yugoslavia of all still unliberated Slovene territories then under the Italians and Germans, as well as Bulgaria and northern Albania with Shkodër;
- (4) The cleansing of the state territory of all national minorities and a-national elements;
- (5) The creation of contiguous frontiers between Serbia and Montenegro, as well as between Serbia and Slovenia, by cleansing the Muslim population from Sandžak and the Muslim and Croatian populations from Bosnia.¹³⁸

Actions followed to fulfill these goals. At the beginning of January 1943, in Šahovići, Chetnik commanders (Zaharije Ostojić, Pavle Djurišić and Vojislav Lukačević) held a conference where the plan for cleansing Muslim villages was developed in greater detail.¹³⁹ First attacked Lukić, on 5 January 1943, fol-

137 Muhedin Fijuljanin, "Sandžak i sandžački Bošnjaci u Drugom svjetskom ratu" in *Sandžak multietnička regija*, Ed. Esad Džudžević, Tutin, 2010, p. 43.

138 Dokumenti o izdajstvu Draže Mihailovića, I, 12, quoted in J. Tomasevich, *op.cit.*, p. 170.

139 B. Latas, M. Dželebdžić, *op.cit.*, pp. 45-49.

lowed by Savić the next day, both aimed at the Bijelo Polje area. Some 33 Muslim villages were cleansed, with 400 armed men and approximately 1000 women and children killed. The rest of the Muslim population was expelled on the other side of the river Lim, and all the houses were robbed and then burned.

A much worse massacre followed soon, under the alleged “cleansing of Ustasha-Muslim militia.” Oral instructions were given in order to avoid written traces. On 29 January 1943, Pavle Djurišić ordered formation of four combined units, with 6000 Chetniks, to attack the Čajniče, Foča and Pljevlja regions. The Italian forces were ordered to be spared, but “all Muslim fighters, Ustashes and Communists to be killed, women and children to be spared.” However, in another confidential order of Djurišić, from 8 February 1943, it was written: “also an order should be given to certain units to cruise the surrounding area and destroy all the Muslim population they will come across.”¹⁴⁰

The attack started on 5 February. On 13 February Djurišić sent the following report to Mihailović: “All Muslim villages in the mentioned districts are completely burned, so that none of their homes is left. All the property is destroyed, except for the cattle, wheat and hay... During the operations complete destruction of the Muslim population was applied, regardless of their gender and age.”¹⁴¹ He further reported that 200 Muslim men – partly Muslim Militia fighters, and 8000 women, children, old and sick people had been killed. This massacre is considered to be one of the largest of WW II.

Mehmed Filuljanin presents the following statistical data on Chetnik rage upon Bosniaks of Sandžak:¹⁴²

- Between 5-8 January 1943, 33 villages in Bihor region set on fire, 1.400 Bosniaks killed (out of whom only 300 were men of fighting age, the rest were women, children and old men) and around 10.000 Bosniaks left homeless;

140 *Ibid.*

141 *Ibid.*

142 M. Filuljanin *op.cit.*, p. 44.

- Between 1-7 February 1943, in Pljevlja and Priboj region, 1.352 Bosniaks killed (out of whom 379 were children age 8 or less and 424 were between 8 and 18), 5.992 houses and other objects set on fire;

In their book on the Chetnik movement, Latas and Dželebdžić argue that the National Liberation Movement (NLM) demonstrated its greatness in preventing the killing of brothers. Namely, the NLM gave a possibility to “all honorable people to find their real place in the broad and united National Liberation War. Fighting against all types of chauvinism, only its major actors and the ones who committed crimes were punished.”¹⁴³ What happened in reality was that as the end of the war approached many Chetniks switched to Partisan ranks, but that did not much change their ideology and attitude toward the Muslims.

By the end of 1944, Mihailović tried to provide support from the Western Allies for his troops. He first wrote a message to General Wilson, Supreme Allied Commander in the Mediterranean and later repeated his requests for support to Field Marshal Harold Alexander.¹⁴⁴ Soon it became clear that the Allies were supporting only Tito and his Partisans, which influenced the situation in the battlefield, but also the moral of the Chetnik fighters. The Chetniks grew weaker and hungrier, facing diseases and significant internal dissension over future actions. At the same time, the Partisans exercised systematic propaganda campaigns for demoralizing Chetnik and other anti-Communist forces and promising those who shifted to Partisan units that they would be allowed to keep their rank.¹⁴⁵ By the end of the war many Chetniks started leaning toward the Partisan movement, or as Mirko Ćuković in his book on Sandžak defines it: “Even for those who were determined and became part of the Chetniks, one had the impression that they were stepping out on their orders with one leg.”¹⁴⁶

143 B. Latas, M. Dželebdžić, *op.cit.*, p. 49.

144 J. Tomasevich, *op.cit.*, p. 431.

145 J. Tomasevich, *op.cit.*, p. 437.

146 Mirko Ćuković, *Sandžak*, Beograd, 1964, Preface p. XI.

The meetings of the security forces (*Odeljenje za zaštitu naroda* - Department of National Security or "OZNA") of Communist Yugoslavia held in Belgrade at the end of 1944, made it clear that they were keen on destroying the internal enemies in the final stages of war, especially since Communists faced difficulties with the Western Allies (over Istria and Trieste) and feared that if anti-Communist representatives escaped, they might pose a serious danger to new Yugoslavia. The conference was chaired by Aleksandar Ranković, as a member of the Supreme Headquarters of the National Liberation Army of Yugoslavia, who stated: "Peace is very near, but for the officers of OZNA there remains the difficult and persistent struggle against domestic traitors. In this struggle, we are going to have, as we had up to now, the unstinting aid of our people, the people's government, our army, and especially of the Corps of National Defense, and the People's Militia."¹⁴⁷

As illustrated in the following section, "the struggle against domestic traitors" soon became a concept of very broad interpretation and often served as an excuse for numerous liquidations in the early aftermath of the Second World War. During socialist times very few resources were left on the subject, or as Jozo Tomasevich defined: "The decision to destroy all domestic enemies of the Communists...is one of those things that the Yugoslavs do not write about."¹⁴⁸ Fortunately, the new socio-political circumstances in the Balkans have slowly released the existing pressure, enabling (at least partly) introspection of the realistic state of affairs.

III.2 SANDŽAK IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR

According to an agreement between the German and Italian occupation forces, dated 23 April 1941, Sandžak was divided between the two states. Pljevlja, Bijelo Polje, Prijepolje and Tutin were under Italian jurisdiction, while Priboj, Nova Varoš, Sjenica and Novi

147 J. Tomasevich, *op.cit.*, p. 437.

148 J. Tomasevich, *op.cit.*, p. 438.

Pazar belonged to German forces. The Italian part was also separated into two federative units: Tutin, Rožaje, Plav and Gusinje were designated as part of "Greater Albania" and Berane, Bijelo Polje and Pljevlja were part of the Montenegrin unit.¹⁴⁹

Once the Germans delineated the military power, they turned to settling the civil administration. Albanian leading figures from the region were invited to Kosovska Mitrovica on 21 April 1941, where it was decided for the Albanians to take over the organs of administration – finances, judiciary, education, but all under the supervision of German *Ortskommandantur* (local commanding units). The local armed units also acted under German supervision. Even though in Sandžak most of the population was Bosniak, the governing administration had pro-Albanian characteristics. Aćif ef. Hadziahmetović (Bljuta), as the mayor of Novi Pazar, nominated 36 new municipality board members, all Bosniak.¹⁵⁰

Prior to entering Sandžak, Germany occupied vast Croatian territories. In collaboration with the German officials, Ante Pavelić, the leader of the Croatian nationalist guards – the notorious Ustashas proclaimed the existence of the Independent State of Croatia (originally *Nezavisna Država Hrvatska* or "NDH"). With German consent, the Ustasha units entered Pljevlja, Prijepolje, Priboj, Nova Varoš and Sjenica in the period between 29 April and 5 May 1941.¹⁵¹ NDH leadership expressed territorial ambitions toward the whole of Sandžak on many occasions, and treated the Bosniaks as Croatian Muslims, naming them "the flowers of Croatian people."¹⁵² Certain Muslim militias cooperated with NDH. They provided arms through Pavelić's support and had a common enemy – the Chetniks.¹⁵³

149 Dr. Nadežda Jovanović, *Rifat Burdžević Tršo*, Beograd, 1973, p. 52, cited in E.Rahić *op.cit.*

150 Esad Rahić, "Sandžak u Drugom Svjetskom Rat" in *Avlija* – portal for culture, literature and social themes <http://www.avlija.me/historija/sandzak-u-drugom-svjetskom-ratu> (Access date: 20 June 2015).

151 M. Ćuković, *op.cit.*, pp. 55-56.

152 S. Bandžović, *Iseljavanje Bosnjaka u Tursku*, Sarajevo, 2008, p. 452.

153 Harun Crnovršanin (author) and Nuro Sadiković (co-author), *Sandžak – Porobljena zemlja (Bosna, Sandžak i Kosovo kroz historiju)*, Zagreb, II edition 2001, p. 449.

Before any examination on the end of WW II and the post-war period is undertaken, it is important to focus on the circumstances in Sandžak during the war, but from the perspective of the Muslim communities. Facing open threats and violence from Chetnik forces, Muslims constituted their own military formations, which usually acted only in the local area. Official Yugoslav history makes little mention of their contribution in fighting the Chetniks. Communists often described them as betrayers and war criminals (while often leaving former Chetniks unpunished) and liquidated them through OZNA and UDBA forces. However, Muslim militias did preserve the lives of many civilians in the territories where they were dominant, so Muslims of Sandžak treat them as heroes.

Experience taught Bosniak people that they needed to fight back if they wanted to survive the nationalist rages, especially those intensified in war times. Bosniaks were organized as boards for defense of towns, under the name Muslim Militia. In the work of Harun Crnovršanin and Nuro Sadiković, but also of Esad Rahić, the leaders of the Muslim militias are presented in the following manner:¹⁵⁴

1. In Novi Pazar area: Aćif efendija (Bljuta) Hadžiahmetović, Bahrija Abdurahmanović, Murat Lotinac. The brothers Biko and Dreko Drešević were part of the German Shutz polizei (protection police in charge of keeping the public order), but also fought for protecting the local people;
2. In Tutin area: Džemail Koničanin, Ilijaz hodža Kurtović;
3. In Sjenica area: the leader was Hasan Zvizdić, and his vice-president was a Serb named Rade Karamarković (Sjenica militia was recognizable for its ethnically mixed composition). Also Sefer Tarić and Šefko Totić. Under special command were the units of Ćamil Prašović;
4. In Prijepolje area: Sulejman hodža Pačariz, Iso Sadiković, Husen hodža Rovčanin, Selim Juković;
5. In Priboj area: Ćamil Hasanagić;
6. In Pljevlja area: the commander was Asim Hasanbegović, and his deputy was Hamdija Kriještorac. This militia

154 H. Crnovršanin and N. Sadiković, *op.cit.*, pp. 388-533. Also E. Rahić, *op.cit.*

was part of the Bosniak unit for defence of Plevlje of chetniks, and in September 1943 the majority of fighters joined the II Proleter Sandžak Brigade;

7. In Bijelo polje area: Ćazim Sijarić, Vehbo Bučan, Smajo Trubljanin, Ibrahim hodža Mekić, Junus hodža Idrizović, Reka Šahman, Delija i Zito Mehović, Hašir Ćorović, Bejto Smakić;
8. In Berane area: Osman Hrastoder (in charge of Gornji Bihor) and Galjan Lukač (of Donji Bihor). In the battalion of Lukač there were Bosniak and Montenegrin fighters;
9. In Rožaje area: Mula Jakub Kardović, his commander of gendarmerie was Ćerim Kurpejović and nonperfect (mayor of the area) was Agim-aga Kurtagić;
10. In Plav and Gusinje area commanders were: Rizo i Šemso Ferović, Adem (Šabanhaković) Lješanin, Haso Redžepagić, Mehmed, Amir and Hakija Šabović, Juso Medunjanin, Zajo Radončić, Abdulah Đombalić, Zejnil Đombalić, Muharem Rašić, Bajram Laličić, Iso Deljanin, Kupo Radončić. Some of them cooperated with the National Liberation, some even joined it in 1944.

After the March 1943 slaughter of more than 5000 Muslims in West Sandžak (along the Lim river) the Mufti of Pljevlja on 2-3 March gathered the leading Muslim figures of Pljevlje, Čajniče, Prijepolje, Bijelo Polje, Priboj, Nova Varoš and Sjenica. A Resolution issued at this Conference first noted that thousands of women, children and old men had been killed and that all property was either robbed or set on fire. Also it was noted: "We, the Muslims, as part of the native community of this area and being ethnically connected with the other citizens, have no hidden intentions towards our co-citizens, or any other political pretensions that would put us into conflict with the other co-citizens of ours."¹⁵⁵ Later on, they formally turned to the occupying forces, seeking protection:¹⁵⁶

155 Dr. Mustafa Memić "Rezolucija Sandžačkih Muslimana donešena u Prijepolju marta 1943.godine" in *Sandžak na putu autonomije*, Sarajevo, Vijeće Kongresa bosanskomuslimanskih intelektualaca, 1995, p. 78.

156 Dr. Mustafa Memić *op.cit.*, pp. 78-79.

1. According to the basic principles of justice and humanity to fully protect at least the remaining part of the Muslim population...and guarantee for our lives and properties.
2. If the occupying forces cannot set such rule of law for the remaining 80.000 Muslims to be protected...then we request from His Excellency, the Governor of Montenegro to find a way for our Muslim population to move out of Sandžak completely into a place that will be determined for such purpose.
3. We, the Muslims, through centuries have lived in good neighbor relations with our co-citizens of Serb-Orthodox faith. We claim this apodictically...the commander of troops in Montenegro, General Nastasi suggested us to contact the real leaders of Serbian people in this region, and together define a modality for peaceful and tolerable mutual life... If such contact is possible, we ask His Excellency, the Governor, to initiate the necessary steps for fulfilling it.

As Dr. Memić explains, , this document was of no danger for the National Liberation Movement, but practically all signers of the Resolution were severely punished by OZNA at the end of the war. It can be best illustrated by the fates of the representatives of Prijepolje region: Aginčić Alija, Šećeragić Murat, Ahmet Salihbegović, Ćamil Čičić, Husein Rovčanin, Selim Juković, Šerif Bašić, Sulejman Pačariz – one cooperated with NLP (Sećeragic) while each of the other six was executed by the Communists.

Different from the Muslim militia were the so-called *vulnetar* units (*Milizia volontario anticomunista* in the original Italian). As the name signifies, these were voluntary units for anticommunist resistance and existed on the territories under Italian occupation, actually within Greater Albania: in Gusinje, Plav, Rožaje, Gornja Rzanica. Their units consisted not only of Albanian and Bosniak fighters, but also Serb and Montenegrin. Each unit acted independently, on the level of a battalion, and they were not hierarchi-

cally nor militarily inter-connected. The *vulnetar* units were primarily oriented toward guarding the newly constituted Albanian border with Montenegro (NB: here referring to them as states collaborating with the occupier).¹⁵⁷ However, the main goals of the *vulnetars* did not differ much from those of the Muslim militias. Both were concerned with protecting their homes, tradition and faith, and both fought against chetnik formations.

Another important military formation that emerged in Sandžak were divisions within the infamous Nazi Waffen SS. At the beginning of 1943, the grand mufti of Jerusalem Husein el-Emin (known as "El-Hoseini") advised Bosniak leaders to form strong SS divisions, which would be part of the notorious Nazi SS. Two divisions were formed: the 13th SS Division, which was later renamed the Handžar Division, and the Skenderbeg Division, which was of mixed ethnic constitution (Sandžak Bosniaks and Kosovo Albanians). Bosniaks of Sandžak were mobilized during April-June 1943 and, according to the Communist post-war data, 820 men from Novi Pazar and Tutin area participated in the German SS divisions and *Schutzpolizei* (protection police). They were sent to Germany for training and later were supposed to fight for German interests. Some of them did so, fighting against Partisans upon their return to Sandžak and Bosnia and Herzegovina. As the war was about to end, many fighters of the German divisions deserted. "We threw away the uniforms and weapons and hid in the villages. That is how we met the liberation of Novi Pazar."¹⁵⁸

Although the Muslim militias were technically on the opposite side from the Partisans, there are nonetheless examples of their occasional cooperation: "The Muslim leaders from Komaran have written to our quarters on several occasions that they have no hostile intentions towards the Partisans..."¹⁵⁹ and "Delegation of the National Liberation War of Nova Varoš sought

157 Dr. Mustafa Memić, *Bošnjaci (Muslimani) Crne Gore*, Podgorica, p. 222.

158 Dr. E. Mušović, *Novi Pazar i okolina*, Beograd, 1969, p. 357, quoted in H. Crnovršanin and N. Sadiković *op.cit.*, p. 542.

159 Izvještaj Oblasnog komiteta KPJ za Sandžak upućen Centralnom komitetu KPJ, 15 maja 1942, Prilog Dr. Nadežde Jovanović, *Tršo*, 131; quoted in Mustafa Memić, *Bošnjaci (Muslimani) Crne Gore*, Podgorica, 2003, p. 224.

agreements with the leadership of the Muslim militia of Sjenica.”¹⁶⁰ Between May 1942 and May 1943, Partisans decided to withdraw from Sandžak and Montenegro. None of the Partisans who was hiding in the Plav-Gusinje area (under the control of *vulnetars*) was killed, which was not the case with the ones in Andrijevića, which was in Chetnik hands.¹⁶¹

However, history also records some negative examples in their relations. Most prominent was one in the town of Sjenica, which consequently faced strong economic neglect during peace times of Socialist Yugoslavia. Before any attack was launched, the Partisans sent a delegation to negotiate with the municipal board of Sjenica, headed by Hasan aga Zvizdić. The Sjenica town leadership refused to fight on the side of Partisans, but stated that their main concern was the protection of the local populace. Zvizdić himself said: “We will not attack you, but please remove your units from Sjenica. Do not attack, because I have 5000 armed men...I will resist.”¹⁶² Partisans typically aimed at the “villages full of cattle...shops full of goods that we need, even tobacco for the army,”¹⁶³ so they disregarded the warnings of Zvizdić and attacked the town on 22 December 1941. The Muslim militias led by Džemail Koničanin, Sulejman Pačariz, Bajram Seferović, Ćamil Prašević and Sefer Tarić soon joined the defense of Sjenica. This became a major defeat for the Partisans, bringing criticism even from Tito himself. According to a letter Tito sent to Milovan Djilas on 28 December 1941, the operation was politically wrong and militarily poorly prepared. It restrained the relations with the Muslims and caused valuable casualties.¹⁶⁴

Much controversy persists even today in Serbia about the character of Aćif efendija Hadžiahmetović (actually Aćif ef. Bljuta). Certain Serbian sources blame him for the death of 7000

160 Istorijski institut SR CG, IV 1a-8 (41) Vrh.stab, 28.12.1941; Izvještaj političkog komesara Glavnog štaba NOO za Sandžak, Voja Lekovića; quoted in Mustafa Memić, *op.cit.*, p. 224.

161 Radovan Lekić, *Andrijevički srez 1941-1945*, cited in M. Memić, *op.cit.*, p. 209.

162 M. Ćuković, *Putovanje u slobodu*, Nova Varoš, 1979, pp. 115-116, quoted in H.Crnovršanin and N.Sadiković *op.cit.*, p. 434.

163 E. Rahić, *op.cit.*

164 M. Ćuković, *Sandžak*, Beograd, 1964, p. 211.

Serbs, while in the collective memory of Bosniaks he is the hero who saved the local populace from mass killings at the hands of the Chetniks during the winter of 1941. According to Dr. Redžep Škrijelj, Aćif ef. was an indisputable leader of the Bosniaks who enjoyed huge respect and authority in the region. As the founder of the Community for Protection of Muslims – Džemijet (Bosniak-Albanian party), he used all legitimate democratic forms for representing Muslims on the local and parliamentary level during the days of the Kingdom. Škrijelj criticizes all efforts at painting Aćif ef. as an enemy of the Serbs, since "...he was friend, political collaborator and trade partner of his co-citizen Serbs. During the successful defense from Chetnik aggression (three attacks, 1941), no hostility was exercised toward peaceful and honest Serb co-citizens. Everyone in Novi Pazar and Sandžak knows that."¹⁶⁵ More details on the same occasion are presented by Esad Rahić, according to whom each Serb family in the town of Novi Pazar had a Bosniak protector, sometimes even whole families were responsible for it. "The defense board of the town led by Aćif ef. Hadžiahmetović, decided to move 420 Novi Pazar Serbs to the premises of the District Court of Novi Pazar and protect them in such way."¹⁶⁶ Rahić informs us that Mullah Jakub Kardović deserved special credit for fulfilling this noble task. Both leading figures, Hadžiahmetović and Kardović were killed by Communist security forces at the end of the war.

Some of the Chetnik attacks on the Muslim population of Sandžak have been explored above, along with the main reasons for forming the militias. In the areas where they were powerful, they fulfilled their task of protecting the Muslim populace (Novi Pazar, Prijepolje, Komaran, Sjenica, Plav, Gusinje and Rožaje). It

165 Column of Dr. Redžep Škrijelj in the Sandžak online newspaper *Sandžačke novine* <http://www.sandzacke.rs/kolumne/dr-redzep-skrijelj-acif-efendija-je-zrtva-komunisticke-zavjere/> (Access date 20.06.2015).

Also interview with Dr. R. Škrijelj for Al Jazeera Balkans <http://balkans.aljazeera.net/vijesti/skrijelj-acif-efendija-je-velikan-bosnjaka> (Access date 20.06.2015) and transcript of his participation in the show "Around 11" on the Serbian State Television RTS <http://www.bnv.org.rs/vijesti/transkript-gostovanja-dr-redzepa-skrijelja-u-emisiji-oko-11-na-rtv-u/> (Access date 20.06.2015).

166 Esad Rahić, *op cit*.

is important to stress that the Muslim militias did not act in a coordinated fashion; they were not hierarchically inter-connected and acted only for the needs of protection of their local areas. They practically acted independently in their own territories and cooperated with each other on specific occasions, but they did not follow a broader ideological or military platform. Dr. Mustafa Memić evenhandedly presented valuable information on the militias. According to him, the only military characteristics of these formations were that they were armed and that they had commanders. In all the other respects they did not differ much from the remaining village populace, “they lived in their houses, fed in their families, moved around in peasant clothes and were mostly armed with their own weapons.”¹⁶⁷

III.3 THE EMERGENCE AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT IN SANDŽAK

At the very beginning of the war, Partisans were not a significant factor in Sandžak, and even later they did not gain the sort of broad support they enjoyed in other regions. The majority of Muslims in Sandžak considered communism to be a foreign (Bolshevik) and distant ideology. Many of them were landowners, former beys and agas, so they supported the capitalistic order of society. Another significant factor was the atheistic attitude of communism, since Islam was a major axis of identity for Bosniaks. Recent tragic history taught Muslims to be distrustful of regional authority, so a dominant part of the community relied upon the authority of local leading figures.

In the very beginning, the first Bosniaks who approached the National Liberation Movement (“NLM”) were usually students who had developed their antifascist attitudes during schooling. Very often they would become the organizers of Partisan power in their home areas. This was also an advantage, since

167 Dr. Mustafa Memić, *Bošnjaci-Muslimani Sandžaka i Crne Gore*, Sarajevo, 1996, p. 313.

these people were trained within the Belgrade party organization. Such was the case of Rifat Burdžević Tršo, the secretary of the Regional committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (in original *Komunistička Partija Jugoslavije* or “KPJ”). He contributed greatly to the functioning of NLM in Sandžak and was a respected authority among his comrades. It can be argued that Tršo’s early death in 1942 contributed to the later stream of events in the history of socialist Sandžak. As the end of war approached, Partisans gained more mass support.

Once they liberated the majority of the territory in Sandžak (the towns of Pljevlja, Priboj, Prijepolje, Nova Varoš, Bijelo Polje, Berane, Andrijevica, Kolašin, Žabljak, Gacko and Bileća) in summer 1943, the KPJ oriented toward mass mobilization of the populace and gradual formation of communist power. All groups were given a chance to become part of the NLM, as there were various organizations within it, such as the Antifacist Women’s Front, Antifacist Youth, and Pioneer organization. Great attention was given to mobilizing new fighters.

The first regional NLM board was constituted in Prijepolje, with Sreten Vukosavljević as its president and Murat Šećeragić, as its vice-president. Soon regional boards were formed in Priboj, Nova Varoš, Pljevlje and Bijelo Polje. The Communists in Sandžak were entirely focused on “gathering the people in a single battle front against the occupier and the domestic traitors.”¹⁶⁸ The statements in the resolution offered the prospect of broad mobilization and a better future, where no religious or national divisions would exist and where the people of Sandžak would gain their sovereignty within the framework of a new Yugoslavia:¹⁶⁹

“...only such Yugoslavia where no people or federative unit is oppressed can unite our peoples in a lasting and happy state community.”

“In order to mobilize and gather all forces of the people...the Antifacist Council for National Liberation of Yugoslavia (*Antifašističko Vijeće Narodnog Oslobođenja Jugoslavije* or “AVNOJ”)

168 M. Ćuković, *op.cit.*, p. 438.

169 M. Ćuković, *op.cit.*, pp. 442 – 444.

chooses to elect a State Antifascist Council for the National Liberation of Sandžak (*Zemaljsko Antifašističko Vijeće Narodnog Oslobođenja Sandžaka* or “ZAVNOS”)...as the highest political and representative body of the people of Sandžak.”

“In ZAVNOS are gathered all representatives of the people, regardless of their national and religious belonging...all those who truly desire the brotherhood of Serbs and Muslims, their future.”

On 10 November 1943, in Pljevlja an Initiative Board for constituting ZAVNOS was created. Its members included Vojo Leković, Mile Peruničić, Dušan Ivović, priest Jevstatije Karamatićević, Sreten Vukosavljević, and Murat Šećeragić. The Assembly of ZAVNOS was held on 20 November 1943 in Pljevlja and was opened by the AVNOJ Executive Board member Mile Peruničić. On this constitutive assembly 263 delegates representing five Sandžak municipal areas were present. An executive board (wartime government) of Sandžak was elected, as well as a delegation of ten representatives for the Second Assembly of AVNOJ. The first president of ZAVNOS was Sreten Vukosavljević and the three vice-presidents were Murat ef. Šećeragić, Dušan Ivović and Mirko Ćuković. On this occasion a resolution was adopted, recognizing the AVNOJ as the only representative of the people of Yugoslavia, “as a reflection of the democratic and freedom tendencies of our peoples.”¹⁷⁰

Though the creation of ZAVNOS, as the highest organ of people’s power, illustrates the importance that the Partisans gave to Sandžak during the war, the downside of the selection process for representatives was the fact that the candidates elected were supposed to represent the whole Sandžak region. In fact, there were no representatives from the Sjenica, Štavlje (Tutin) and Deževa (Novi Pazar) regions, where more than 43% of the total Sandžak and 54% of the total Bosniak population lived. Rožaje, Petnica, Berane, Plav and Gusinje municipalities, where 30,000 Bosniaks lived, were also not part of ZAVNOS, since they fell under the administration of the State Antifascit

170 *Ibid.*

Council of Montenegro. Even the representatives who were elected did not reflect the ethnic makeup of Sandžak – the proportion of Serbs and Montenegrins compared to Bosniaks was 4:1.¹⁷¹ Even more cynically, when the decision for disintegration of Sandžak was brought, none of the Bosniaks voted against it. Quite the contrary, two Serbian representatives of ZAVNOS were the only ones who did not support the decision.

The creation of ZAVNOS jeopardized Montenegrin interests. Because the plan was for Montenegro to become a federative unit of Yugoslavia after the war, the emergence of Autonomous Sandžak would have rendered Montenegro the smallest state within Yugoslavia. Montenegro's first destructive efforts began during preparations for the Second Assembly of AVNOJ in the town Jajce, Bosnia and Herzegovina. Namely, both delegations should have reached Jajce together, under the guidance of the Headquarter of the 2nd Strike Force. The leader of the Force, Ivan Milutinović, left Kolašin together with the Montenegrin delegation and reached Pljevlja, where the Sandžak delegation was located. They spent the night in Pljevlja without initiating any communication with ZAVNOS and continued to Jajce the next day. At the Second Assembly of AVNOJ, the absence of ZAVNOS was blamed on bad weather, a difficult road, inexperience etc.¹⁷²

Soon after the Second Assembly, on 3 January 1944, the Montenegrin Communists initiated formation of a joint State Anti-fascist Council of the National Liberation for Montenegro and Sandžak, and requested for the Sandžak Communist Party to join the Communist Party of Montenegro. Practically, this meant cancellation of ZAVNOS only 44 days after its creation.¹⁷³ The author Memić argues that such an act would have been impossible if Rifat Burdžević were alive, since his activities excluded such

171 E. Rahić, *op.cit.*

172 E. Rahić *op.cit.*, and M. Memić *op.cit.*, pp. 217-218.

173 *ZAVNO Crne Gore i Boke, Zbirka dokumenata*, Titograd, 1963, dok.37, 134; Also Arhiv Istorijskog instituta SR CG, Titograd, 127-7 (44), stav PK KPJ za Crnu Goru i Boku o pripajanju Sandžaka Crnoj Gori and Dr. Branko Petranović, *Položaj Sandžaka u svijetlosti odluka II zasjedanja AVNOJ-a o izgradnji Jugoslavije na federativnom principu*, "Istorijski zapisi", Titograd 1971, No.3-4, p.571; all quoted in M. Memić, *op.cit.*, p. 220.

potential even in 1941. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia sent a letter to the Montenegrin leadership on 31 March 1944, asserting that they were making a mistake and that there is no basis for such attitude in the decisions of AVNOJ. Moreover, in the case of Sandžak “everything that comrade Tito has written about Vojvodina in the first issue of *Nova Jugoslavija*, will be applicable”¹⁷⁴ referring to Tito’s attitude that the issue of whether a certain autonomous region shall be made a part of a specific federal state should depend upon the will of its people and its representatives and be decided after the war. In the letter of the Central Committee it is also stated: “And as far as Sandžak is concerned, it will have the position that its freely elected representatives will vote for.”¹⁷⁵

Throughout 1944 ZAVNOS received positive signals from the Presidency of AVNOJ. In the Declaration of Basic Rights of the Nation and Citizens of the Democratic Federative Yugoslavia, prepared by Moša Pijade in 1944, it is said that “Sandžak will be one of the elements of the future Federation.”¹⁷⁶ However, 16 months after its creation, at the beginning of 1945, ZAVNOS was dissolved. At the fifth session of the Presidency of AVNOJ, on 24 February 1945 in Novi Pazar, Moša Pijade announced that it was in the best interest of Sandžak to be divided between Serbia and Montenegro, with Deževa Sjenica, Priboj, Štavlje and Nova Varoš areas belonging to Serbia and Bijelo Polje and Pljevlja to Montenegro.¹⁷⁷

The President of ZAVNOS, Sreten Vukosavljević and Mirko Ćuković, member of the Executive board of Sandžak and third vice-president of ZAVNOS (and a close friend of Rifat Burdžević) spoke strongly against the splitting of Sandžak. Vukosavljević agreed that it is no longer necessary for ZAVNOS to exist as a separate unit, but according to him the real question was whether

174 Arhiv Istorijiskog instituta SR Crne Gore, 1971, 3-4, p. 328, quoted in M. Memić, *op.cit.*, p. 220.

175 Dr. Branko Petranović, *Položaj Sandžaka u svijetlosti odluka II zasjedanja AVNOJ-a o izgradnji Jugoslavije na federativnom principu*, Istorijiski zapisi, Titograd, 1971, pp. 571-572, quoted in E.Rahić, *op.cit.*

176 *Ibid.*

177 H.Crnovršanin and N.Sadiković *op.cit.*, pp. 549-550.

Sandžak should be split or joined to one of the neighboring federal units as a whole. In his opinion, a solution should not be rushed and Sandžak should be kept as whole, regardless of which state it would join. "It is a region, a notion with its specific political and commercial characteristics. It is historically correct. And that is the attitude of the people."¹⁷⁸ As a sign of protest, Sreten Vukosavljević and Mirko Čuković refused to attend the last session of ZAVNOS, held on 29 March 1945 in Novi Pazar, where ZAVNOS was dissolved. Nor did they sign the resulting document.

The explanations given by the leadership of KPJ essentially presaged the forthcoming attitude of Socialist Yugoslavia toward the Bosniaks: „Sandžak has no national basis for reaching such status“, as well as „the insisting and maintaining of autonomous Sandžak would now mean needless and irrational grinding of the Serbian and Montenegrin national entirety.“¹⁷⁹ In the light of such explanations, it is understandable why thereafter there was no such people as Bosniaks, nor even Bosnians until 1974. They could be Muslims (at this stage sometimes written with capital „M“, sometimes not), and as such could identify as Serbs, Croats or Montenegrins. Even Milovan Djilas, who was a central figure in the KPJ during the early post-war years, has noted: „The Serbian and Croatian national, and especially nationalistic ideologies, could not, did not want to understand and accept the specialty/separateness of the Muslims. The Communists did not understand it either.“¹⁸⁰ Dr. Safet Bandžović noted a very illustrative statement of the writer Muhamed Abdagić, which strongly captures this issue: „In the AVNOJ Yugoslavia five nations are recognized, which means that we do not belong to those five...They do not accept us, unless a massacre is taking place, then it is well known that we are a separate nation.“¹⁸¹

178 Zoran Lakić, *Partizanska autonomija Sandžaka*, pp.72-73, quoted in E.Rahić, *op.cit.*

179 Dr. Branko Petranović, *op.cit.*, p. 573, cited in M. Memić, *op.cit.*, p. 221.

180 Milovan Djilas, *Revija Sandžak*, Novi Pazar, 1-15, 1993, pp. 7-9, quoted in E.Rahić, *op.cit.*

181 Safet Bandžović, *Zbornik Sjenice, No.8*, 1997, quoted in H.Crnovršanin and N. Sadiković, *op.cit.*, p. 621.

III.4 THE AFTERMATH OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR

By the end of the war the number of partisans was growing. Many fighters who belonged to other military formations started joining the National Liberation. Unfortunately, the previous hostilities continued, now under the umbrella of „dealing with domestic enemies.“ It can be argued that the resistance formations of the Muslims were not antifascist, but it would be unjust to observe their role out of the context of protecting the local people from Chetnik attacks. Numerous data, which are partly presented within the scope of this study, proved that wherever militias existed, the Muslims survived and lived in much better conditions than in the areas where they were not in power. The way numerous Muslims, and especially leading figures, were treated at the end of the war left strong marks on the collective memory of Bosniaks, forcing them to move during times of peace.

There were a few occasions when strong Anti-Muslim attitudes were presented even at gatherings of the NLM. As Dr. Memić quotes them, there were proposals to ignore the occupier and turn arms against the Turks and Arnauts, “our constant enemies.” Several similar claims emerged during battalion conferences; there were even trials to liquidate Bosniak partisans.¹⁸² Even before the very formation of ZAVNOS, strong emphasis was given to dealing with the traitors. One example is the resolution brought at the first plenary session of the Interim NLM board for the Pljevlje area on 4 October 1943, where it was written: “We must launch a harsh and merciless fight against the fifth column (the traitors)...they disintegrate our units and are against the interests of the people and the interests of our national liberation battle... This will not be easy, but in today’s great battle there is no bigger honor than to be a representative of the national power, to work and fight for your people, fulfilling the above-mentioned tasks.”¹⁸³

182 Radovan Lekić, *Andrijevski srez 1941-1944*, Cetinje 1961, p. 88, cited in M. Memić, *op.cit.*, pp. 205-206.

183 M. Ćuković, *op.cit.*, pp. 440-441.

This ideology was broadly applied among the followers of the NLM, but came to be frequently abused.

Dr. Srdjan Cvetković has in recent years researched the crimes of the Communists perpetrated in the years after the WW II (1944-1953). Though he says that an extensive study of Sandžak is not complete, some of his general conclusions on the repressions carried out “in the name of the people” are applicable in this region as well.¹⁸⁴ Namely, after the liberation there was a tendency to imitate the Soviet example for building a socialist community, which was a combination of ideology and Party repression. The various war and post-war characteristics in the different regions often determined the scope of the oppression. Such circumstances create difficulties in differentiating “the victims of ideological repression (class and political enemies) from the victims of war revenge.”¹⁸⁵ Another challenge Cvetković faced involved the victims who were condemned as war criminals or collaborators without court procedures or upon summary trials – numerous such people did not belong to any of the mentioned groups, but became victims of war revenge or subjects of mass abuse of the anti-fascists.

Cvetković also presents valuable data on the “technology of wild cleansings”. The process was managed through the Department for Protection of the People (*Odeljenje za zaštitu naroda*, or “OZNA”), which was constituted on 13 May 1944. In this period many killings without trial, or after show trials that inevitably ended with conviction and a death sentence. From the second half of February 1945 judicial processes had to be applied (judicial and military courts and courts of honor). Many politicians and civil servants from the previous system, merchants, factory and land owners, priests, “dishonest intelligentsia” and all potential “class enemies” were liquidated. Here it is important to mention that the director of OZNA for the whole of Yugoslavia was Aleksandar Ranković, later the Minister of Interior, who became an important factor in the expulsion of Bosniaks from

184 Based on a conversation of the author with Dr. Srdjan Cvetković.

185 Dr. Srdjan Cvetković, *Represija Komunističkog režima u Srbiji na kraju Drugog Svetskog Rata sa osvrtom na evropsko iskustvo*, manuscript (unpublished).

Sandžak. How much attention was given to the “collaborators” is well demonstrated in a document from the top of OZNA, which Cvetković quoted: “One of the greatest tasks generally is the destruction of the domestic reactionaries – traitors – their extinction from the very roots and empowering the people.”¹⁸⁶ The liquidations were often done by local military units as well.

By the end of the war more fighters were necessary for the Partisans to successfully end the war. By an order of their Top Commander, King Petar II, the Chetnik movement was dissolved on 12 September 1944. It was also ordered that the Army of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia (the Chetnik units) be put under the command of Josip Broz Tito. The ones who respected the order and joined the NLM would be judged according to the military laws, and those who had committed war crimes would not be protected by the Crown. On 21 November 1944, Tito proclaimed the “Decision for General Amnesty of Persons who have Participated or Helped the Chetnik Units of Draža Mihailović or the Croatian and Slovenian *Domobran* (nationalistic military formations of the respective nations) Units.” Pursuant to the Decree of General Amnesty from 3 August 1945, all participants in Chetnik, Domobran, Muslim Militia, White Guard, Balist and all other units collaborating with the occupiers were granted amnesty, except for perpetrators of war crimes. In 1946 the same was applied to the deserters of NLM.¹⁸⁷ Upon the mentioned Decree 168 “Chetniks, militia fighters and deserters” surrendered in Novi Pazar. They were all released immediately after interrogation.¹⁸⁸

However, in the field double standards were applied. The new authorities often demonstrated tolerance for former Chetniks, while the Muslim Militia fighters were liquidated in short order. Šefko Totić, who had fought for the Muslim Militia but later joined NLM, witnessed such an event. As an experienced fighter

186 *Opunomoćenik 47. Divizije*, Ćuprija, 15 Novembar 1944, VA, Beograd. Fond VBA, gradja Odeljenja zaštite naroda, K-11, F-1, cited in S. Cvetković, *op.cit.*

187 Web portal of the *Union Alliance of the fighters of National Liberation War in Serbia*, <http://www.subnor.org.rs/fasisticki-antifasizam-srbije> (Access date: 27.06.2015).

188 *Bratstvo* No.7, Novi Pazar, 5 September 1945, cited in Safet Bandžović, *Iseljavanje Bosnjaka u Tursku*, Sarajevo, 2006, p. 475.

with the Chetniks, he managed to catch the notorious Chetnik Staljeta and turn him over to the Partisans. Staljeta was sentenced to death by the court in Novi Pazar and faced terror while in prison. To the great shock of the citizens of Novi Pazar, he was soon released.¹⁸⁹ As Husnija H. Čengiđ wrote in "Muslimanski Glas" ("Muslim Voice") on 5 July 1991: "In Hadžet [an infamous site of anti-Muslim massacres] numerous innocent people were killed, who paid their debts for fighting against the Chetniks... Chetniks were caught, interrogated and roundly scolded not to joke around and not to go back to Chetniks...because in November 1944 the Chetniks were granted amnesty, but not the Muslims..."¹⁹⁰

Actually as they were liberating major territories of Sandžak at the end of 1944, Partisans were ordered to liquidate all leading figures of the Muslim Militia. This can be demonstrated through the following list of reported killings:

1. Aćif ef. Hadžiahmetović (Bljuta) was shot in Hadžet;
2. Murat Lotinac, Fehim Salković and Daut Novalić were killed by partisans in chases/manhunts organized in 1946;
3. Hasan Zvizdić managed to escape and later moved to Turkey, but his brother Osman Zvizdić (though never involved in politics) was shot in Hadžet;
4. Ćamil Prašević shot in Hadžet. A few days earlier his wife and brother obtained an order that he be freed, signed by Milan Peruničić, but they reached Novi Pazar too late;
5. Sefer Tarić, was invited by Partisans to negotiate a joint fight in Nova Varoš, but then shot;
6. Sulejman Pačariz, was liquidated by OZNA agents in 1945;
7. Selim Juković, joined the NLM at the end of 1944 and stayed among Partisans until June 1945, when he was arrested. Sentenced to death following a summary trial;
8. Ćamil Hasanagić, liquidated by OZNA;
9. Hamdija Kriještorac and his fighters joined NL. However, after the conflict between Tito with the Informbiro

189 H. Crnovršanin and N. Sadiković, *op.cit.*, pp. 444-445.

190 H. Crnovršanin and N. Sadiković, *op.cit.*, p. 401.

in 1948, they were all convicted and severely sentenced. Some of his fighters ended up in the notorious Goli Otok prison. Hamdija spent 8 years in jail and was released in 1958 free of charges;

10. Ćazim Sijarić, who never fought against the partisans and even joined them in September 1944, was sentenced to death following a summary trial. His brother Abdulah Sijarić was killed under mysterious circumstances during fighting in NLM (Communist resources offered different versions of his death);
11. Ibrahim (Ličina) Mekić, sentenced to death;
12. Reka Šahman, killed by an UDBA pursuit team;
13. Osman Hrastoder killed in a chase. His fighters Hrastoder Hako, Hrastoder Ćamil, Hrastoder Daka, Hrastoder Rustem, Hrastoder Jonuz, Kozar Šećo, Škrijel Hivzo, Ličina Hako, Ličina Nail, Ličina Hivzo, Šabotić Jonuz and Palamar Ramo were killed prior to Osman, who managed to escape on that occasion.
14. Jakup (Agović) Kardović, arrested and later killed by partisans;

Džemail Koničanin, Husein and Hasan Rovčanin are not mentioned on this list because they were killed in combat with the Partisans.¹⁹¹

One particularly black spot in the history of Sandžak Bosniaks was the sustained killings on the hill Hadžet, Novi Pazar, lasting from November 1944 to May 1945. In Bosniak collective memory, the massacres in these killing fields are considered a genocide, where 1500 to 2000 victims were killed according to Admir Muratović, the president of the Board for Protection of Human Rights – Bosniak National Council, whereas Dr. Srdjan Cvetković, the secretary of the State Commission for Discovering Mass Graves after 1944 claims that there were a few hundred, but

191 H. Crnovršanin and N. Sadiković, *op.cit.*, pp. 389-540.

the lists are not yet definite.¹⁹² According to the memoir of Husein –Ceno Zatrić, cited by Crnovršanin and Sadiković, the most prominent Bosniaks of Novi Pazar and the neighboring towns were killed here. “The president of the Summary Court in Novi Pazar was Djordje Peruničić, who destroyed our people... among the killed ones, besides Aćif ef. were also Ahmetaga Daga, Ćamil Karišik, Ibrahim-Ibro Rasovac, Abit Grbović, Azem Balinac, Mehmed Ćilerdžić, Hasib Nikšić, Iso Hrvačanin, Amir Brunčević, Osman Zvizvić and many others. They were terribly many, cannot remember all those poor people who lost their lives unjustly.”¹⁹³

The victims were not only former Militia fighters. Many were respected local leaders, very often wealthy people or simply ones who did not accept the communist ideology. For example Osman Zvizdić never participated in politics. His only transgression was that he was the brother of Hasan Zvizdić, the militia leader of Sjenica, and also a wealthy man. The night he was taken out of his house, he secretly left a letter under his wife’s pillow stating: “I am writing you my last letter, they will shoot me tonight. HG (NB: only initials stated in the resource) and others have set me up in Sjenica, so I will be killed right away.”¹⁹⁴ Men were often taken from the houses during the night, quickly arrested, convicted and killed within a short period of time.

These are some of the names of those reported to be killed in Hadžet: Rašljanin Huso, Adžović Azem, Hamzagić Mehmed, Nikšić Hasib, Gargović Džemo, Karišik Ćamil, Rasovac Ibrahim, Hrvačanin Iso, Hudović Džibo, Bakračević Mika, Buhić Šećer, Ljajić Ejup-aga, Poturović Abit, Brunčević Amir, Vucelj Meho, Ganić Tahir-beg, Grbović Abit, Rugovac Rifo, Jejna Uzeir, Škarep Uzeir,

192 An article in the Serbian daily newspaper *Novosti*, online version: <http://www.novosti.rs/vesti/naslovna/aktuelno.290.html:373692-Novi-Pazar-Pocelo-ispitivanje-masovne-grobnice> (Access date: 27.05.2015). Also the authors H. Crnovršanin and N.Sadiković in their book *Sinovi Sandžaka* (details previously quoted) claim that more than 1500 Bosniaks were unjustly killed in Hadžet.

193 H. Crnovršanin and N. Sadiković, *op.cit.*, p. 399.

194 Nazim Ličina, *Hadžet, masovna grobnica i mjesto zlocina nad sandžačkim Bošnjacima*, published on the Web portal [Bosnjaci.rs](http://www.bosnjaci.rs) – digitalized cultural heritage of the Bosniaks, <http://www.bosnjaci.rs/tekst/10/hadzet-masovna-grobnica-i-mjesto-zlocina-nad-sandzackim-bosnjacima-1944-1946.html> (Access date: 27.06.2015).

Zejneliagić Hakija, Krnjojelac-Turković Šučo, Dražanin Husko, Drustinac Ćamil, Zolotarevski Vladimir, Gorjanstov Aleksej, Ladonja Bela, Ladonja Marija, Ljajić Abit, Muminović Medo, Mum-džić Feho, Plojović Muharem, Nokić Šerif, Paljevac Latif, Paljevac Ramiz, Sarašević Hamdo, Solinger Marija, Čilerdžić Mehmed, Petlača Ibro, Hadžiahmetović Aćif, Džanefendić Osman.¹⁹⁵

The bodies were buried in the huge holes that were left in the ground after the Allied bombing. In order to cover and minimize the notorious killings in the biggest town of Sandžak, Communist authorities soon started construction projects on this spot (nowadays the Novi Pazar City hospital and the surrounding structures are located here). Such decision is understandable, since an Order No.1253 from the Ministry of Interior of the Federative State Yugoslavia, dating from 18 May 1945 was received, stating that all mass graves of the “people’s enemies and fascists” were considered secret and that “all traces of their existence should be removed” and the access of the relatives should be denied.¹⁹⁶ The whole process was coordinated by the mayor of OZNA Djordje Peruničić and Rade Obradović. “The common people were frightened about their lives. Unfortunately, the Bosniak communists of the time did not speak for their relatives, neighbors and friends. In 1945 Abdulah Šarukić was nominated as deputy commander, but since he did not want to act in the same manner as his fellow officers, he was withdrawn from the position.”¹⁹⁷

Dr. Bandžović also presented another valuable information on the issue of killings upon summary court procedures. Namely, the Military Cort in Novi Pazar on 21 December 1944 convicted 16 Bosniaks and 1 Serb; on 29 December 1944 five Bosniaks; and on 19 January 1945: 8 Bosniaks, 2 Russians, 1 Croat, 1 Hungarian

195 S. Bandžović in the magazine *Mak*, no. 20-21, 1998, cited in H. Crnovršanin and N. Sadiković, *op.cit.*, p. 401.

196 Depeša br. 1259 Saveznog ministarstva za unutrašnje poslove od 18.05.1945 i ponovljena depeša str.pov.br. 63 od 9 Avgusta 1946 o uklanjanju fašističkih grobnica – Dokumentarni material slovenačke Komisije za rješavanje pitanja prikrivenih grobnica ustupljen dobrotom predsednika komisije istoričara Mitje Ferenc 25.06.2009, quoted in S. Cvetković, *op.cit.*

197 Batrić – Bačo M.Rakočević, *Bijelopoljski srez u ratu i revoluciji*, Bijelo Polje, 1984, p. 313, cited in H. Crnovršanin and N. Sadiković, *op.cit.*, p. 583.

and 1 Austrian.¹⁹⁸ For things to be more paradoxical, a day before the Communist arrests and killing started, the people of Novi Pazar organized a celebration for meeting the new authorities. According to the memory of Hilmija Hasanagić, a partisan of Bosniak origin who stayed in Novi Pazar for 2 days at the time: "The comrades were so impressed with the celebration...A ceremonial meeting order consisted of the most prominent Muslims was organized. Such a celebration was organized for our leaders, there was everything...various pies, tasty meals..." The very next day all the members of the ceremonial meeting border were arrested, convicted in summary procedures and shot in Hadžet.¹⁹⁹

The writer Abdagić witnessed similar shootings. While acting in Bosnia and Hercegovina he saw the shootings that were ordered by Svetozar Vukmanović – Tempo. „They would take off men`s pants...as soon as they would see that the men were circumcized, they would accuse them of being ustasha spies. Treated with suspicion, people were ready for shooting.“ As a secretary of the Kalinovac partisan unit, Abdagić was present at the shootings of 54 Muslims, caught randomly in the street. Upon his insisting, they were taken to the Quarters for trial. Some of the gathered people claimed that the accused were not ustashas, since they knew their neighbors well. None was spared.²⁰⁰

Almost all fighters of the Muslim militia ended tragically, except for the ones who joined the NLM. The only one who survived and remained living in Yugoslavia was Iso Sadiković. He was arrested and survived due to the prison guard who knew him. Namely, the commander of the partisan militia ordered to the guard to kill Iso by midnight, since from the next day the new law for abolition of liquidations upon short procedure was to be applied. The guard took another prisoner instead, already convicted to death. Eleven years after the liberation Sadiković and his family faced strong oppression. UDBA ac-

198 Safet Bandžović, *op.cit.*, p. 470.

199 H. Hasanagić, *Nevolje sandžačkih Muslimana pod našom vlašću*, manuscript (unpublished), cited in S. Bandžović, *op.cit.*, pp. 469-470.

200 Fehim Kajević, *Treća ruka*, Novi Pazar, 1993, p. 29, cited in H. Crnovršanin and N. Sadiković *op.cit.*, pp. 559- 560.

cused him on several occasions, but could not prove any of the crimes; police officers were placed to live within their household, even his wife was beaten on one occasion. Iso died while working as a miner in Gostivar in 1964 and his death was proclaimed a tragic case. A day after he was buried former chetnik followers danced on the green market right next to the house of Iso Sadiković.²⁰¹

The writer Muhamed Abdagić, who has participated in the National Liberation Movement noted that by the end of the war many chetniks joined the partisans and became eager participants in the summary courts and liquidation of Bosniaks. He proposed for the former chetniks to be separated in a different unit that would be led by a prominent party commissioner. "And what happened? At the beginning national, ideological and even religious revanchism spoke first. Over night we stayed without our most prominent people of Sandžak. Many intellectuals were among the shot."²⁰²

The life of the writer Muhamed Abdagić quite picturesquely presents the treatment of Bosniaks in Socialist Yugoslavia, even when they were communists. He and his two brothers participated in NLM, as one of the rare Sjenica families joining the partisans. After the war he was convicted three times, once even condemned to death, but later pardoned. His first accusation was the murder of 60 Serbs. In an interview Abdagić gave in 1991, he stated that those people were killed by Voja Leković and that Milovan Djilas (leading communist figure at the end of the war) knew about it. The second accusation was that he was promoting factionism within the party, together with Daut and Musa Musić from Nova Varoš. This happened after he stressed many times that the shootings should not be fulfilled following a „summary court procedure“. The third accusation was most tragic. Mirko Ćuković, who was a leading communist of the region and who wrote the book „Sandžak“ (quoted on several occasions within this study as well) accused Abdagić of collabo-

201 H. Crnovršanin and N. Sadiković, *op.cit.*, pp. 456-457, also from the same authors *Sinovi Sandžaka*, Frankfurt, 1996, p. 162-163.

202 *Mak, časopis za književnost i kulturu*, br. 21-22, p. 71, Novi Pazar, 1998, cited in H. Crnovršanin and N. Sadiković, *op.cit.*, p. 583.

rating with the Abver (German intelligence service) during the war. None of his crimes was proved, but Abdagić was convicted to 10 years of prison. Even his later life in freedom was under


constant oppression. In 1983 Mirko Ćuković denied the statements he gave about Abdagić.²⁰³

All the families of Muslim militia fighters were strongly stigmatized by the Communist regime. They faced various forms of oppression – frequent police controls, frightening, employment difficulties and different kinds of pressure, as a punishment for being “inner enemies.” This was often applied even to the wives and under-aged children, who as such did nothing particular during the war. A strong incentive for marking the “wrong-doers” and spreading feelings of, as Bandžović names it “collective guilt,” were quite present in Socialist Yugoslavia. In such an atmosphere of fear and distrust in the system, the families of the former militia fighters were the first to migrate to Turkey, once the possibility was given.

In the first decades after the WWII, not only these families, but many other Bosniaks in Sandžak (some even with communist beliefs), were challenged to question their belonging to the new Yugoslavia. Regardless of their progressive propaganda at the beginning that “no national and religious divisions will be made”, reality proved the opposite on several occasions. People of Sandžak still wonder what was the real goal behind the creation of ZAVNOS. Was it just means of more efficient mobilization of the people in Sandžak or autonomy was really planned for this region!? The very disintegration was concluded with the impression that “there is no national basis” for such decision, which was another step further in diminishing the identity of Bosniaks in general. The early aftermath not only witnessed double standards in coping with the “inner enemies”, but the realistic threats that existed upon the Muslim civilians were completely ignored. Pressure followed upon the remaining families, as a next phase in the alienation process. Post-

203 M. Ćuković, *Putovanje u slobodu*, Nova Varoš, 1979, p. 119, and S. Bandžović *Zbornik Sjenice No.8*, 1997, both cited in H. Crnovršanin and N. Sadiković *op.cit.*, pp. 560-561.

war Socialist Yugoslavia simply did not offer a possibility to numerous Sandžak Bosniaks to identify with the new state. In such



Imageresource:https://www.google.rs/search?q=Sandžak+mapa&espv=2&biw=1280&bih=709&source=lnms&tbn=isch&sa=X&ved=-0CAYQ_AUoAWoVChM1wujf4I-xyAIVhJYsCh0QzA7t#imgrc=N-P2jkaLkWQRqM%3A (Access date: 20.08.2015)

IV. THE COUNTRY OF “BROTHERHOOD AND UNITY”

The creation of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) did not stem the tide of Bosniak emigration to Turkey. Quite the contrary, Bosniaks continued to follow their well-established pattern, and even to intensify their pace. What was different under the SFRY was that the emigrants came mostly from the region of Sandžak, unlike in previous waves where large portions of the emigrants came also from Bosnia and Herzegovina. Socialism was supposed to bring prosperity and equal opportunity to everyone, at least according to the promises trumpeted at the end of WWII. To many Sandžak Bosniaks, however, it brought troubles instead. As the following chapter will demonstrate, Sandžak was an area of lagging development, with staggering unemployment rates and other economic and social woes. Simultaneously, the new state imposed numerous restriction measures upon the free exercise of religion and on the cultivation of a separate Bosniak identity. But nothing gave a greater impetus to mass emigration than the political oppression.

In the following chapter these broader contexts are categorized into three groups of factors impacting emigration: economic, social and political. Certain phenomena often caused multiple effects on the lives of this populace, so the lines between these overlapping sets of factors are blurred. As will be demonstrated, this migration was primarily of a social and political character, and only to lesser extent by economic motives. Indeed, in reality it carried strong elements of forced emigration, where the state created unfavorable conditions that made life in Sandžak more difficult and the prospect of emigration more appealing.

IV.1 ECONOMIC REASONS FOR MIGRATION

After World War II, the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia (hereinafter SFRY) was economically exhausted. Due to its specific geo-strategic and political position, the country could not realistically expect significant foreign assistance. It was impossible to expect help from the United States, since Yugoslavia was a country within the Communist bloc and the orbit of the Soviet Union. On the other hand, the Soviets themselves lacked resources and were preoccupied with their own development. Under such circumstances, the SFRY had to rely upon its own capacities. It was very convenient to agitate young Yugoslavs and benefit from the “enthusiasm of the patriotic forces”²⁰⁴ in rebuilding the country. Whenever labor was required for major development projects, “voluntary actions” were organized, in which young people voluntarily participated in the building of roads, rail tracks, dams, factories and other construction projects. During the days of such actions, various cultural projects were usually organized. Youth generally found these activities appealing, since they could socialize with other young people from all over the country. The Communist Party of Yugoslavia (Komunistička Partija Jugoslavije, hereinafter KPJ) took advantage of this unique opportunity for political and cultural mobilization and for establishing connections to young people.

Private property was treated officially as a “major evil” in Socialist Yugoslavia. In the early postwar years, the authorities were eager to establish an inclusive new state order of “all the people” and to form a socialist society “of no classes”. Officials were often harsh when applying the policies of eliminating private property, ignoring the will of the owners. Through measures of state enforcement, such as confiscation, agrarian reform, colonization (*i.e.*, the redistribution of expropriated land) and nationalization, and sometimes even expropriation, the state turned private into state property, rarely with any compensation. Before the 1950s,

204 Mustafa Memić, *Bošnjaci (Muslimani) Crne Gore*, Podgorica, 2003, p. 241.

when public promotion of Stalin was yet not a crime in Yugoslavia, quotations of Stalin were often used in the communist campaigns. It was said that even the owner of the smallest business had big dreams about ownership, which were a direct precursor to capitalism. Therefore "nobody is allowed to dream about it."²⁰⁵

A huge number of peasants participated in the National Liberation Movement during WWII, and once the war was over, there were high expectations for solving the agrarian issue in ways commensurate with the new Yugoslavia. A leading figure in KPJ, Moša Pijade, noted in 1945: "It is well known that we have a large agrarian population that does not own any land at all...the peasants` hunger for land is a general phenomenon throughout the whole country".²⁰⁶ The Law on Agrarian Reform and Colonization from August 23, 1945²⁰⁷, aimed at diminishing the bourgeoisie and granting land to poor peasants, "the ones who own nothing or insufficient land, to be given as much as it is needed", since they had fought in the name of such beliefs.

The above-mentioned Law on Agrarian Reform contemplated the uncompensated expropriation of land from: non-agrarians who owned more than 25-35 hectares of land, banks, joint-stock companies and similar private legal entities, churches, monasteries, mosques and other religious entities owning more than 10 hectares. Only entities with specific historical and cultural importance were allowed to hold up to 30ha of arable land and 30ha of forest. The issue of nationalization of religious property will be covered in more detail later in this chapter, in a discussion of the socio-cultural reasons for migration.

What is particularly interesting is that, for the first time in Yugoslavia, decisions for expropriation of arable land were made on an individualized basis, according to whether a specific owner was actively cultivating a given piece of land. Through this mechanism, land could be completely expropriated, *viz.*, the

205 Ramiz Crnišanin, *Čaršijske priče i anegdote*, Novi Pazar, 2009, p. 98.

206 Moša Pijade, *Agrarna reforma*, Zagreb, 1945, cited in Vladimir Stipetić, *Agrarna reforma i kolonizacija u FNRJ godine 1945-1948*, Zagreb, 1954, pp. 431-432.

207 *Službeni list DFJ*, no.64/65; *Službeni list FNRJ*, no.24/46, 107/47, 105/48, 21/56, 55/57 and *Službeni list SFRJ*, no.10/65.

“surplus” of land over the supposed maximum could be nationalized and compensation would be paid for it. In practice, however, Stupić has noted that compensation was not actually paid.²⁰⁸

This law on agrarian reform also affected those peasant landowners who did cultivate their own land, since the state expropriated the entire surplus (land exceeding 20ha). Through this approach, a total of 6.879 properties, or 95.680ha of land, were expropriated by the state in Serbia and Montenegro. Those landowners who did not cultivate their land were precluded from owning more than 3-5 ha of land. All the confiscated land became part of the national holdings, from which it was later granted to peasants who owned little or no land. Sometimes this land was used to create large state-owned agricultural facilities. Approximately 52% of the total agricultural lands of Yugoslavia was allocated to peasant-worker cooperatives or became state property, while 47% was granted to peasants and colonists (*i.e.*, recipients of redistributed land).²⁰⁹

The Law on Confiscation of Property and Execution of Confiscation, enacted 9 June 1945,²¹⁰ provided another arrangement through which the state exercised control of private property. After the war there was a broad list of crimes for which the punishment was partial or complete confiscation of property, *e.g.*, the Law on Suppression of Illegal Speculation and Commercial Sabotage; the Law on Banning the Spread of National, Racial and Religious Hatred; the Law on Crimes against the People and the State.²¹¹ Peasants were also punished through confiscation if they failed to achieve mandatory quotas for the production of agricultural goods.

The KPJ identified three types of peasants according to their property: *kulaks* (richer peasants), middle class peasants, and poor peasants. The peasants themselves often considered these classifications unjust, particularly because the classifications were seen as over-estimating peasants' buying power.

208 V. Stipetić, *op.cit.*, pp. 431-434.

209 Vladimir Todorović, “Nacionalizacija i drugi oblici prinudnog oduzimanja imovine u drugoj Jugoslaviji”, in *Pravni život, Časopis za pravnu teoriju i praksu*, Beograd, No.9-10, 1994, pp. 836-837.

210 *Službeni list DFJ*, no. 40/45.

211 V. Todorović, *op.cit.*, p. 839.

Peasants were often punished with imprisonment, fines, and the confiscation of property, crops, or agricultural equipment. Although it is beyond the scope of this study, it should be noted that by a decision of Anti-Fascist Council of the National Liberation of Yugoslavia (Antifašističko Vijeće Narodnog Oslobođenja Jugoslavije, hereinafter AVNOJ) addressing "properties of the German Reich and its citizens, war criminals and their helpers", properties of numerous citizens of German, Czech, and Hungarian origin were unjustly confiscated.²¹²

Another mechanism for diminishing private property was the Law on the Nationalization of Private Trading Companies, enacted on 5 December, 1946.²¹³ Based on its provisions, mines, power plants, hospitals, hotels, and companies in industry, transport, tourism and insurance were all nationalized and became state-owned companies. In addition, small shops and service business were also nationalized, which particularly affected town life in Sandžak.

Property of army officers of the former Kingdom of Yugoslavia, as well as of former fighters who had belonged to other military formations that served the occupier or fled the country, was confiscated as well. Another prominent consequence of the nationalization laws was the nationalization of properties of citizens who by January 1, 1965 had moved out of Yugoslavia to a country associated with their own ethnic origin and who had acquired citizenship there. In this way, they were *ex lege* released from Yugoslav citizenship. Numerous Bosniaks moving to Turkey lost their properties in such way, as did Jews who emigrated to Israel, and Italians to Italy.²¹⁴ This aspect of nationalization was introduced primarily for political reasons.

The conditions in Sandžak after the war were even harsher. There was barely any industry, while agriculture was carried out in an old-fashioned, inefficient and marginally profitable manner. More than 87% of the people (147.943 out of 169.529) supported

212 *Ibid.*

213 *Službeni list FNRJ*, br. 98/46.

214 V. Todorović, *op.cit.*, p. 845.

themselves through agriculture, which further hindered Sandžak's potential for development. These municipalities were often characterized as primitive and without any prospects, and therefore were granted lower budget support within the administrative apparatus. Certain economic analyses proposed emigration and forestation of the region.²¹⁵ It was quite a poor and underdeveloped area, with very low levels of literacy. In the Serbian part of Sandžak some 59% of the population over the age of 10 was illiterate.²¹⁶ Literacy courses were instituted after 1948 and classes were often organized in the "cultural centers", as well as in private houses.²¹⁷ In 1961 in Prijepolje, the illiteracy rate for people over the age of 10 was 28,8%, with only 3,5% having completed secondary education and only 0,4% having graduated from university or higher education.²¹⁸

Soon after the war, famine emerged in certain areas of Sandžak,²¹⁹ while food was in short supply throughout the region. Goods could be bought through vouchers, whereby workers had greater privileges than others. Hardly any clothes or shoes could be bought without vouchers until 1950. In addition, foreign assistance sometimes provided some food packages for distribution.²²⁰

The unemployment rate was extraordinarily high. By the end of the 1960s, only 3,4% of the people in Tutin were officially employed (741 out of 29.354), as were 5.6% of those in Sjenica. While the general income rate per capita in Serbia was 7.045 dinars, in Novi Pazar, Tutin and Sjenica it was below 3.000 dinars.²²¹ Metrics of the number of hospital beds, electrical consumption, and ownership of televisions and radios were all the lowest in the

215 Ekonomski institut NR Srbije, *Ekonomski problemi Novog Pazara*, pp. 9-15; and *Razvoj privrede Sandžaka u periodu 1956-1966*, Služba društvenog knjigovodstva, Centrala za SR Srbiju, Beograd 1967, p. 57, quoted in S. Bandžović *op.cit.*, pp. 494-495.

216 S. Bandžović, *op.cit.*, p. 494.

217 Ejup Mušović, *Tutin i okolina*, Beograd, 1985, p. 102.

218 Milinko P. Femić, *Prijepoljski kraj u prostoru i vremenu*, Beograd-Prijepolje, 1999, pp. 85-87.

219 R. Crnišanin, *Tijesna Čaršija* p. 185, quoted in S. Bandžović, p. 491.

220 Munevera Hadžišehovic, *Muslimanka u Titovoj Jugoslaviji*, Tuzla, 2006, pp. 119-120.

221 *Izvori i oblici nacionalizma u SR Srbiji, CK SK Srbije, za internu upotrebu*, Beograd, maj 1974, pp. 158-159, quoted in S. Bandžović, *op.cit.*, p. 497.

country. At the beginning of the 1960s municipalities did not allocate sufficient resources for the salaries of the teachers and often educators from Belgrade and Kragujevac volunteered in Sandžak villages. Some authorities from the republican level advised "to close the schools if you do not have enough money."²²²

These harsh circumstances often forced Bosniaks to accept very risky jobs, under unfavorable conditions. They often applied for work in difficult fields where mechanization was lacking and their lives were put in danger. During the construction of the Bi-oča-Kolašin road, a two-year project, 15 Bosniaks were killed.²²³ There is no precise data on the participation of Bosniaks in the "voluntary" work actions, but according to Mustafa Memić "it did not lack and it was a compatible contribution."²²⁴ Memić also notes that it was difficult to include young Bosniak women in the actions, due to the traditional beliefs of the community.

Table 4: Comparative employment rates: towns from Sandžak and towns from other regions in Serbia

| 1961 | Novi Pazar (in Sandžak) | Čačak | Kraljevo | Kruševac | T.Užice |
|----------------|-------------------------|--------|----------|----------|---------|
| Population | 58.903 | 55.984 | 62.258 | 62.336 | 46.411 |
| Employed | 5.161 | 11.338 | 14.488 | 12.356 | 12.126 |
| In percentages | 8,7 | 20,4 | 23,2 | 22,5 | 34 |
| 1967 | | | | | |
| Employed | 6.793 | 14.627 | 17.191 | 19.193 | 15.090 |
| In percentages | 10,9 | 24,3 | 28,8 | 30,7 | 31,1 |

²²² Ramiz Crnišanin, *Rasprave (Dokumenti, polemike, članci i predlozi)*, - hereinafter referred to as "*Rasprave*", Beograd, 1999, p. 123.

²²³ M. Memić, *op.cit.*, p. 242.

²²⁴ *Ibid.*

| 1961 | Sjenica (in Sandžak) | Tutin (in Sandžak) | Lućani | Trstenik | Raška |
|----------------|----------------------------|--------------------------|--------|----------|--------|
| Population | 35.151 | 28.817 | 10.380 | 35.836 | 29.264 |
| Employed | 1.430 | 592 | 1.398 | 4.161 | 3.732 |
| In percentages | 4,3 | 2 | 13,4 | 11,8 | 12,5 |
| 1967 | | | | | |
| Employed | 1.950 | 905 | 3.631 | 5.913 | 4.082 |
| In percentages | 5,3 | 3 | 35,9 | 16,8 | 13,7 |

Table resource: Ramiz Crnišanin, *Rasprave (Dokumenti, polemike, članci i predlozi)*, Beograd 1999, p. 122

Nationalization policies very much affected the lives of the Bosniaks living in towns, since many residents were owners of small businesses such as shops, cafes, and small restaurants. There were barely any substantial private businesses in the 1950s. Though nationalization measures primarily aimed at destroying capitalistic ideas, in practice they virtually destroyed the “bazaar life”, quite typical for the towns of Sandžak. Ramiz Crnišanin, former high official of KPJ, demonstrates this phenomenon in his book “Tijesna Čaršija”. Writing about the various socio-cultural circumstances in postwar Novi Pazar, Crnišanin explains that the KPJ considered the bazaar a symbol of feudalism and backwardness. Striving toward building a communist society, communist officials acted “with enthusiasm” in destroying it, leaving numerous families on the edge of survival.²²⁵ For example, in 1948 in Novi Pazar 60 private businesses were closed: 28 shops, six food shops, five pastry shops, seven mess halls and twelve cafes.²²⁶

Certain families of Pljevlje suffered a similar fate. In order to complete a thermal power plant project there, the core of the

225 Ramiz Crnišanin, *Tijesna Čaršija*, Novi Pazar, 1992, pp. 145-146.

226 IAR, GK KPS Novi Pazar, k.2, Zapisnik sa sastanka Mjesnog komiteta KPS Novi Pazar od 4.5.1948, cited in S.Bandžović, *op.cit.*, p. 504.

town and the bazaar, including 300 small shops, was destroyed. Many of the former shop owners (the majority of them Bosniaks) remained jobless, since no production industry was every initiated. In their search for a better life, they chose emigration as a solution, often to Bosnia and Herzegovina. This mass emigration rapidly changed the demographic map of Pljevlja –the Bosniak portion of the population of Pljevlja dropped from 80% to 15%. Many peasants and miners from the surrounding villages moved into the town.²²⁷ Simultaneously, the industrialization process took its stake upon the holders of small businesses.

The opening of factories introduced an important shift into the life of Sandžak. It caused not only economic changes, but also noticeable changes in the social and cultural milieu. With the large employment in the production sector, women were transferred from their previous role in the community, "strictly tied to the home and *avlija*"²²⁸. Semiha Kačar interviewed women in Novi Pazar who witnessed that period, presenting valuable data on the broader social context.²²⁹ When the textile factory "Raška" was opened in 1956, 71,8% out of total 611 employees were women. In 1985, 3222 people worked in Raška, out of whom 67,2% were women. Initially, these pioneering workers among Sandžak women faced strong social pressure due to existing conservative beliefs, but later their employment significantly contributed toward improving the position of women in the society.

The statements of the interviewed women well illustrate the existing poverty of the period. The first workers came from unprivileged backgrounds, some even had to wear traditional clothes inappropriate for work in the factory. On that occasion the director ordered that every woman should get a piece of fabric, to make herself two skirts for work. Another woman reported that "we had nothing" in the postwar years, there were no proper cookers or beds in many households.

227 N. Kostović, *Sarajevo između dobrotvorstva i zla*, Sarajevo, 1995, pp. 136-137, quoted in S. Bandžović, *op.cit.*, p. 502.

228 Traditional house yards where a tall concrete wall used to surround the house, preventing passengers from seeing anything that happened within the yard.

229 Semiha Kačar, "U svijetu mašina", *Almanah no. 19-20*, Podgorica, 2002, pp. 105-113.

Kačar also notes that in times of nationalization, agrarian reform and stigmatization of “counter-revolutionaries,” Bosniaks of Sandžak could opt between emigrating and staying in these unfavorable conditions. Quite often local authorities were instructed directly from the republican level to advise people to move, since schools and factories “could not be opened everywhere”.²³⁰

Another important layer of the industrialization process is that private property was often nationalized for factories to be built. Quite often the owners of land in Sandžak were Muslim families. Such is the case with the car factory FAP in Priboj, built on the land of the Hasanagić family (whose members fought in Muslim militia) and the textile factory “Ljubiša Miodragović” in Prijepolje. Many Muslim houses in the center of Pljevlja were ruined due to changed infrastructural plans.²³¹

Huge investment projects were rarely promoted in Sandžak. It was more common to exploit the raw materials and transport them to other centers. Even the few initiatives for industrialization rarely gave significant results. For example in Tutin, raw wood and minerals were taken to other municipalities for processing. The coal mine “Kredara” and the water power plant “Cana” were closed after they had operated for just a few years. The wood-processing factory “Jelak” initially showed good results – 272 employees in 1962 and 406 in 1965. But “Jelak” soon shared the same fate as the other factories, and was closed due to bad management, low productivity, insufficient technology and unqualified personnel.²³²

The state collective farm “Pešter” in Sjenica faced liquidation in the early 1950s due to its negative balance of 250 million dinars. It previously held 5.000 sheep, numerous cattle, several thousand hectares of pasture land, and several hundred employees, and was related through cooperatives with many households in the area. Due to depressed prices and inefficient repurchase procedures, the farm shrunk and state officials concluded that they did not have sufficient resources to salvage the situa-

230 S. Bandžović, *op.cit.*, p. 497.

231 M. Hadžišehović, *op.cit.*, p. 29.

232 E. Mušović, *op.cit.*, pp. 115-116.

tion. At the same time the Executive Council of the Republic of Serbia financed the construction of the stadium "Crvena Zvezda" in Belgrade through the extra-budget balance of the Republic.²³³ When the "counter-revolutionary" past of Sjenica is taken into consideration (explained in the previous chapter), the fact that this was the most depressed municipality in Serbia is not surprising. Local authorities often say that it was "the punished municipality of Former Yugoslavia".

In the municipality of Prijepolje, there was a long-held view that development should focus on the center of the town, while for 30 years republican officials indicated that a project for a hydroelectric plant in Strugovi would be started. For those reasons up to the 1990s no investments were made in Brodarevo, an area of Prijepolje municipality where 90% of the population is Bosniak.²³⁴ The plant has not been built yet.

In her memoirs Munevera Hadžišehović described the many changes in her native Prijepolje. While describing how much of the private property was expropriated, she remarked: "For a long time the people did not want to appropriate the confiscated fields and meadows, because they were afraid it was a sin, but the very land was not of much value anyway. In the end the authorities gave it to the newcomers."²³⁵ The redistribution provoked strong reactions among the former landowners in Sandžak. Quite often the older generation did not accept the notion of the proletariat, which the communist powers promoted so intensively, or the fact that "the destitute ones came on other people's land".²³⁶ The whole concept of cultivating the land in the early postwar years later proved to be unsustainable. People from certain areas in Sandžak supported themselves only through the land they owned and often these were families with numerous members. Once the surplus was taken from them, they faced difficulties in surviving.

233 R. Crnišanin, *Rasprave*, p. 123.

234 Ljubiša Vuković, "Populacija i depopulacija, raslojavanje i revitalizacija prijepoljskih sela u drugoj polovini 20. i prvoj deceniji 21.veka", in *26.Simpozijum Dani Sretena Vukosavljevića*, Prijepolje, 2012, p. 89.

235 M. Hadžišehović, *op.cit.*, p. 118.

236 R. Crnišanin, *Čaršijske priče i anegdote*, pp. 87-88.

The creation of peasant-worker cooperatives was another very important factor in the post-war economic life of the villagers. A strong campaign for building municipal cooperatives, of so-called *kolhoz* took place after 1946. At the time Yugoslavia was still in close relations with the Soviets, so the local activists spread messages about the progressiveness of the *kolhozes* in USSR: "Everything is done with mechanization, enormous results are reached and peasants compete among each other as to who will enter the *kolhoz* first."²³⁷ According to Memić, there was no goodwill among the majority of peasants to unite in cooperatives, and in any event mechanization was insufficient. However, the new leadership wanted to avoid accusations of "introducing capitalistic relations in the village" and therefore used its socio-political organizations, but also the internal security forces (Uprava državne bezbednosti, hereinafter UDB) to organize village life around the cooperatives. Those who did not want to join were often proclaimed to be internal enemies. Once the productivity and food reserves rapidly decreased, a decision was made to abolish the cooperatives. But that hardly undid the powerful effect on the owners of smaller pieces of land.²³⁸

A report on the work of the National Liberation Board in the Štavica region (around Tutin) confirms the above-mentioned attitudes of Memić. Namely, in addressing the assistance to cooperative members, the report states that there is a great difference between the understanding of the needs of the people in the previous and current Yugoslavia. In the past, "all this money would have gone to the hands of the loan sharks ... now it is returned to the hands of the people, since it is allocated to the national organizations - the cooperatives." The report goes on to state that each cooperative was given a certain number of guns to preserve the cooperative's property and that "the organs of the national police pay sufficient attention to this issue."²³⁹ The

237 *Ibid*, p. 93.

238 M. Memić, *op.cit.*, p. 243.

239 IARNP ONO NP F.1, p.25, L6 - Izveštaj o radu Sreskog narodnog odbora Sreza štavičkog u vremenu 1.januar i 31.decembar 1946 godine (salution speech of the chairperson), No.2109 Tutin, 26 December 1946, cited in H. Gološ, "Zadruga sreza Štavičkog (1945-1947)", *Tutinski zbornik broj 1*, 2000, pp. 258-259.

report also posits that the general goal of the cooperatives was to become trading centers in their respective territories, but that the local people did not take their role very seriously: "the peasants do not pay their participation regularly...in order to fulfill these goals, the cooperative managers should be more efficient in doing their jobs."²⁴⁰

In practice, people were essentially forced to join cooperatives, but they soon proved to be inefficient. Slowly different types of production were adopted – the agricultural, trading and service sector activities were often merged into a single cooperative. Eventually cooperatives focused mainly on trading. According to the agrarian reform plan, the surplus of land had to be granted to the cooperatives, which had the effect of removing it from cultivation. Another consequence of such provisions was that private property eventually became state owned; after 1953 the cooperatives were put under the jurisdiction of commercial combines and gradually lost their cooperative identity, so the private and cooperative properties turned into state ones.²⁴¹

When discussing the life of agrarians in socialist Yugoslavia, attention should be given to the example of colonization of Vojvodina offered through the above-mentioned Law on Agrarian Reform and Colonization. Hence, a vast amount of fertile land in the region of Vojvodina, which had been confiscated from the citizens of German origin, became property of the state. That land was later granted to agrarians who wanted to cultivate it, but did not own any land of their own. In such a way the region was "colonized" with people from other parts of Yugoslavia (*e.g.*, Montenegro, central Serbia, Croatia, and even parts of Macedonia). While this possibility was often exploited by other citizens of Yugoslavia, the Bosniaks of Sandžak rarely considered it as an option. They feared what they saw as a lifestyle quite different and "distant" from their own. They were also influenced by cases of propaganda claiming that

240 *Ibid.*

241 V. Todorović, *op.cit.*, p. 845.

Bosniaks would be colonized in a dispersed manner and therefore would be prevented from preserving their religiosity and traditional way of life.²⁴²

Due to its geographical characteristics, a main income resource in the Tutin region was the breeding of livestock. Families with numerous children survived in this way. However, the breeding methods in the whole territory were outmoded, and the cattle were of poor quality and low production capacity, in terms of milk, meat and wool. The only advantage was that it was bred in huge numbers. The good quality and taste of the produced cheese and meat mostly relied on the favorable environmental conditions, but the breeders were often insufficiently educated for dealing with the various risks.²⁴³ The harsh climate and lack of arable land, the low agriculture – based income pushed people to rely on food markets out of Tutin.²⁴⁴

The prohibition against breeding goats from 1954 also had an impact on the life of Sandžak. In fact, only “mountain” breeds of goats were actually forbidden, since they fed mostly in the woods. The new authorities wanted to protect the forests, which had been devastated during the war. The population, however, which traditionally preferred the mountain breeds and was used to consuming goat products, showed strong resistance.²⁴⁵ There were around 1.800.000 goats in Yugoslavia after WW II and usually people from poorer areas dealt with this activity. Once the new law was enacted, 80% of the goats were eliminated. In the end, however, this hardly spared the forests. Analysis performed 30 years later showed that the forests of Yugoslavia had strongly suffered due to floods, erosion, fires and especially due to human factors such as irrational cutting.²⁴⁶

242 S. Bandžović, *op.cit.*, p. 491.

243 Dr. Slobodan Zečević, “Perspektive razvoja stočarske proizvodnje u Tutinskoj opštini sa posebnim osvrtom na zakonske okvire sprovođenja mjera sprječavanja, otkrivanja, suzbijanja i iskorenjivanja zaraznih bolesti životinja”, *Tutinski zbornik No.1*, Tutin, 2001, pp. 263-264.

244 E. Mušović, *op.cit.*, pp. 106-107.

245 M. Hadžišehović, *op.cit.*, pp. 124-125.

246 <http://poljoprivreda.info/?oid=12&id=493> Agricultural internet magazine (Access date 17.08.2015).

The agrarian reform applied before the WWII still had its consequences in the post-war period. Namely, one part of the Muslim population of Plav and Gusinje moved to Albania after 1918. Their land was proclaimed to be a land "of *komits*"²⁴⁷ and as such was granted to Montenegrins. After WWII and the emergence of a communist regime in Albania, the original owners came back to their lands and sought its return, claiming that they had escaped from the old system, but now they wanted to live in their own homes on their own lands, since "the national liberation powers were their authorities as well."²⁴⁸ In order to regulate this situation, the Government of the Federal Republic of Montenegro enacted a separate law and created a special Agrarian Court. The author Mustafa Memić was a member of that court and he personally witnessed the events of the time. He noted that the Agrarian Court decided to return the lands only to those people who had not acted against the National Liberation activists, believing that they achieved certain justice in such way. However, procedures were initiated again through the regular courts and their decisions repealed the decisions of the Agrarian Court. As a result, the land ended up in the hands of Montenegrin new settlers, while the original owners were left practically impoverished.²⁴⁹

As a contemporary of the period, Memić also noted that the northern part of Montenegro (the Montenegrin Sandžak actually) particularly lagged behind the other regions of Montenegro. The main focus of development was on the touristic seaside and since Bosniaks lived mostly in the north, national inequality was created alongside with the general economic one. Industry was lacking in the north, together with a sufficient infrastructural network: "the horse was the main means of communication with the world".²⁵⁰ The least developed municipalities of Montenegro were those in Sandžak: Gusinje, Plav, Berane, Rozaje and Bijelo Polje, while Pljevlje was in the rank of the average Montenegrin

247 Rebels fighting against the state system.

248 M. Memić, *op.cit.*, p. 243.

249 M. Memić, *op.cit.*, pp. 243-244.

250 *Ibid.*

municipal development. Plav was the least developed municipality in whole SFRY. The state invested in Budva (a seaside town) 5,6 times more than in the average Montenegrin towns, which equaled 20 times more investments than in the least developed municipalities.²⁵¹ Bosniaks rarely benefited from the employment possibilities in Sandžak as well. There were few state servants, post officers, policemen or other professionals of Bosniak origin in the state sector.

Tutin gained the status of town at the beginning of 1960s. After the WWII this municipality faced numerous difficulties due to its under-development, poverty and pervasive illiteracy. As Dr. Ejup Mušović has noted, all troubles that usually accompany poverty were present here: "pronounced economic backwardness, lack of education, low level of culture... and very high birth rate".²⁵² Electricity was introduced in only a few houses in the 1950s and by 1982 some 8,6% of the municipality were still awaiting it. All the burden of building the municipality was "on the youth and the national powers".²⁵³ The road infrastructure was particularly weak in this area, and the only road of decent quality was the Novi Pazar-Tutin-Rožaje-Berane road, whose construction started between the two world wars.²⁵⁴ In such circumstances, it was urgent to build roads, so that the local people and their cooperatives could function. But "the road basis was weak, their maintenance was difficult, often ending in being impassable."²⁵⁵ Bus lines to certain villages in the Sjenica-Tutin area were introduced by the end of the 1960s. Prijepolje also had poor road infrastructure, which was especially difficult during the winter. In 1960, a road connecting Belgrade and Podgorica was built. The building of the

251 Dr. Avdul Kurpejović, "Ekonomsko-socijalni uslovi, nacionalna afirmacija", *Zbornik radova "Identitet Bošnjaka-Muslimana"* sa Simpozijuma održanog u Plavu, Beograd, 1995, p. 36, quoted in M. Memić *op.cit.*, p. 245.

252 Dr. Ejup Mušović, *Tutin i okolina*, Etnografski institut SANU, Posebna izdanja, knj.27, Beograd, 1985, p. 119.

253 Hivzo Gološ, *op.cit.*, p. 254.

254 Zdravko Vasković, "Železnica i putevi u Sandžaku", *Sandžak* (Magazine for cultural and economic development of Sandzak), Year III, No.35, Prijepolje, 1 February 1934, p. 2, cited in H. Gološ, *op.cit.*, p. 255.

255 H. Gološ, *op.cit.*, p. 256.

railroad passing through Prijepolje in 1976 significantly improved the connection with other centers.²⁵⁶

The state of public health in Sandžak was a clear indicator of the low living standards. Malnutrition, anemia, rickets and high rates of mortality were present throughout the whole region. Infant mortality was an appalling 10%.²⁵⁷ Scabies and endemic syphilis were also diagnosed, while a portion of the population struggled with lice infestation. Children suffered from intestinal diseases, and even typhoid and spotted fever were present. The first basic health clinic in Tutin was opened in 1953. Rožaje also had no doctor until 1953. In 1964, Novi Pazar had 18 general doctors and five specialists, compared to following respective rates in the towns outside of Sandžak: Kraljevo 62 general practitioners and 27 specialists; Čačak 52:27; Kruševac 48:32. Put another way, while in 1969 in Čačak there was one doctor for every 859 patients, and in Kraljevo one for every 120 patients, the comparable figures in Sandžak were 1.1959 patients in Novi Pazar, 10.650 in Sjenica, and 11.600 in Tutin.²⁵⁸

After WWII Sandžak became an area of inadequate investments and poor infrastructure. The emergence of famine at a certain point is a vivid indicator of the level of poverty that prevailed. The majority of people relied upon agriculture as their primary means of support, but even this was carried out using antiquated techniques. The agricultural reform ushered in SFRY further complicated these already difficult conditions. The consequences were most visible among large families, which were quite common in this period, as their loss of property often drove such families to the brink of survival. Simultaneously, the state was pushing farmers to merge into agricultural cooperatives, which later proved to be highly unproductive. The state's instruments for the "eradication of private property", through various laws on nationalization and confiscation, particularly affected town life in Sandžak. Left without property and possessing no other relevant

256 Milinko P. Femić, *op.cit.*, pp. 122-123.

257 R. Crnišanin, *Rasprave*, p. 123.

258 S. Bandžović, *op.cit.*, pp. 495-591.

skills, the former owners of small businesses were often forced to seek better prospects elsewhere, permanently altering the “bazaar life” that gave these towns their distinctive character. Moreover, the industrialization of the country did not proportionally include Sandžak, which resulted in drastic rates of unemployment. It was not unusual for existing factories to be closed within short periods, due to bad management and unqualified personnel. The fact that in this area raw materials were usually exploited and transported to other centers, while production capacities lagged, only further eroded the already difficult economic prospects. Additionally, the region had to cope with pervasive illiteracy and atrocious health care. And even though the impetus for emigration of Sandžak Bosniaks to Turkey was not predominantly economic, the deficient economy of the region did contribute significantly to the push toward emigration.

IV.2 SOCIAL REASONS FOR MIGRATION

For the Bosniaks of Sandžak, religion and tradition were always central elements of their identity. In light of various historical tribulations, the Bosniaks tended to adhere to these values as guarantees of their survival and identity. In the times of socialist Yugoslavia, when religiosity was viewed officially as undesirable, and all segments of life were under strong state control, Bosniaks often had difficulty in co-identifying with the new state that offered little space for the actual complexity of the nation.

The memoirs of Hadžišehović present a picturesque reflection of the country of “Brotherhood and Unity”, seen from the perspective of a Bosniak woman from Sandžak. She noted several reasons why part of the Muslim population had such negative impressions of communism. Suddenly everything that bore any reminiscence of an Islamic identity or relation to Turkey was deemed to be undesirable and backward. On the other hand, the “progressive ones” ate pork, did not go to mosque, did not (in

the case of women) wear head scarves or the *dimije*,²⁵⁹ and entered into mixed marriages. Those Muslims who claimed to be communists from the very beginning (during and immediately after WWII) claimed to have "liberated themselves from faith by Marxist literature" and considered Islam and the Ottoman rule as main factors slowing progress. Such Bosniaks "identified their tendencies for equality with other peoples of Yugoslavia with the communist ideas about society. In communism they saw protection from the Serbian and Croatian nationalists."²⁶⁰

In the SFRY there was a strong incentive to erase the old Ottoman, and especially religious identity, so often such objects that had connections with the Ottoman past were destroyed and replaced with other objects. Property was confiscated from religious organizations - churches, monasteries and *vakif*²⁶¹ organizations. The laws on expropriation and nationalization, discussed *supra*, very much affected the property of the Islamic Religious Community (Islamska Verska Zajednica, hereinafter IVZ).

In the biggest Sandžak town of Novi Pazar this alteration quickly became apparent. The location of the former Gazi Isa Beg Mosque, which suffered during the WWII bombings, was nationalized and used for commercial purposes without any compensation. The Kolo mosque was expropriated and a building constructed in its place; the Sinan Madeni (Ejup beg) mosque was expropriated for a proposed cultural center that was never built, on a location now featuring kiosks. The Devlet Hatun mosque was expropriated for a construction project. The Sofi Memi mosque was demolished on the grounds that it obstructed the regulation of traffic, though houses now stand on that location. The Ak Iljas mosque was simply allowed to fall into ruin. The land where the swimming pool now sits in Novi Pazar previously belonged to the Islamic Community, but was expropriated without any compensation (1ha and 6ars of land). The spa "Ildža", five stores, the lands of the whole "Kapuđžibaša" and

259 Traditional loose trousers, typical for the Muslim women of Sandžak.

260 M. Hadžišehović, *op.cit.*, p. 116.

261 A vakif is a pious Islamic organization, whose property is an inalienable religious endowment.

“Čalap Verdi” *vakifs* and another piece of land were also expropriated from the Novi Pazar IVZ without any compensation.²⁶²

In Prijepolje three Muslim graveyards, a *turbe*²⁶³ and a mosque were destroyed and buildings were constructed in their places.²⁶⁴ The Bakija Hanuma Madrasah was also destroyed in 1956 and the books from its library were thrown into the land-fill.²⁶⁵ The *musallah*²⁶⁶ in Prijepolje was ruined during the WWII bombings, but was still used for religious purposes after the war. In 1957 the National Board of the municipality forbid its further use and removed nine Muslim graves from it. It was turned into children’s playground and park. Later it was expropriated from the IVZ and given to the “Svetlost” corporation to manage it. The old Ottoman Fortress in Sjenica was completely destroyed and a school was built in its place. The remains of the fortress are still easily visible in the present school building.²⁶⁷

Berane, as a Montenegrin town with a large Muslim population, faced the destruction of two mosques due to changed infrastructural plans. The Berane-Rožaje road now passes through the former location of the first mosque, but the destruction of the second (the central one) provoked particularly negative reactions among the Muslims. This mosque was demolished with a strong detonation in 1949, without any prior notification to the Islamic leadership. The secretary of Berane Vakif Office, Hamdija Ramušović, stated at a public meeting in 1951: “There were many mistakes in the work with Muslim masses, since the destruction of the mosque in the center of town and the other one in Haremi reflected very negatively upon our Muslims.”²⁶⁸

262 Archive of the Islamic Community in Serbia, unsettled materials – courtesy of Admir Muratović. Also Senad Gluhavičanin, *Historijat Pazarskih dzamija*, (unpublished script).

263 Tomb of a leading religious figure.

264 M. Hadžišehović, *op.cit.*, p. 118.

265 Nadir Dacić, *150 godina Bakije Hanume Medrese u Prijepolju*, Prijepolje, 2014, p. 53.

266 An Islamic prayer site, which is actually an open space, surrounded by a fence.

267 Muhedin Fiuljanin, *Sandžački Bošnjaci*, Tutin, 2010, pp. 297-303.

268 AIIP, nesređena grada, Zapisnik sa zasijedanja Vakufskog sabora NR Crne Gore, 6.08.1951, quoted in Zvezdan Folić, *Vjerske zajednice u Crnoj Gori 1918-1953*, Podgorica, 2001, p. 180.

Later he conceded that the mosques need to be destroyed because of locations, but still contended that it would have been right to pay compensation, so that a new mosque could have been built in another location. In Pljevlja the Muslim graveyard was expropriated for a mining company, while two stores were taken from the local Vakif Office. In Bijelo Polje the state appropriated more than 29 ars of land from IVZ.²⁶⁹

Certain religious objects were not ruined or expropriated, but were allowed to fall into disrepair. Here it must be acknowledged that certain imams themselves abandoned initiatives for renovation of mosques, citing as a greater priority the more urgent production needs of the country.²⁷⁰ During socialism the Sinan-Beg mosque in Novi Pazar was used as a storage facility for agricultural products and even horses.²⁷¹ The mosque on Oslobodjenja street in Novi Pazar, which was also a *vakif* property, was rented by the District Court for storing firewood. The Muslim community of Sebečevo wanted to use the former building of the *mekteb* for *Teravi*²⁷² and *Janaza*²⁷³ prayers, but the Municipality board designated it for the storage of machinery. The walls of the Paricka mosque had been damaged, but restoration requests were rejected. Interesting is the report from the meeting of the Vakif office in Novi Pazar, regarding a discussion of a request from the agricultural cooperatives to use the graveyards in Hadžet. The office concludes that currently utilized graveyards should be preserved, but the rest can be used for raising fodder. "This is because the cows fed from here will give milk to be used in the hospital for our patients."²⁷⁴

Religion was not forbidden during communism; formally the citizens were free in that respect. However, any person who performed a public function and went to a church or mosque was

269 Z. Folić, *op.cit.*, p. 181.

270 *Ibid.*, pp. 189-190.

271 S. Gluhavičanin, *op.cit.*

272 A *teravi* is a type of Islamic prayer practiced only during the holy month of Ramadan.

273 A *janaza* is a type of Islamic prayer recited at a burial ceremony.

274 Archive of the Islamic Community in Serbia, unsettled materials – courtesy of Admir Muratović.

punished and later excluded from the Party. All the people and especially party activists were under constant surveillance by the interior security forces. "Officials, and especially a teacher, professor or a judge would lose his job."²⁷⁵ People employed in sectors that were not directly related to the state faced fewer restrictions in that respect. And while a portion of the population was eagerly embracing their new communist identity, others found it difficult to distance themselves from centuries-old traditions and beliefs. In this second group, religion became more of a "private issue." It was usually practiced only at home, where any fasting for Ramadan was kept secret, concealed with vacations during those days and visits to relatives from other towns or in Turkey. Some even used these days of secret observance to circumcise their sons.²⁷⁶ Circumcision was not a forbidden practice in Former SFRY, but people often felt pressure against expressing their identity.

In such an atmosphere, a *haj*-pilgrimage was a rare event in postwar Yugoslavia. The first organized travel to Mecca was in 1949, where the group consisted of five members (the very leadership of IVZ). During their stay in the holy land they met the King of Saudi Arabia, as well as numerous politicians and journalists, to whom they described the state of affairs in the SFRY, particularly following the 1948 split between Tito and Stalin set forth in the Cominform Resolution, and spoke about the position of the Islamic Community in a socialist state.²⁷⁷ After a four-year suspension of travel rights, visas were again issued to groups for organized travel, so long as trips were limited to 35 members. These regulations remained in place until 1961. As Socialist Yugoslavia became economically stronger, the number of pilgrims rose, which is not surprising in light of the SFRY's new foreign policy strategy. Namely, Tito was one of the main leaders of the Non-Aligned Movement, and in that context Is-

275 M. Hadžišehović, *op.cit.*, p. 127.

276 *Ibid.*, p. 131.

277 "Prvi hodočasnici iz Nove Jugoslavije", *Glasnik Vrhovnog islamskog starešinstva*, Sarajevo, br.1-3, 1950, p. 57, cited in Dragan Novaković, "Organizacija hadževa i problem koji su pratili izvršavanje te vjerske obaveze u Jugoslaviji od 1945 do 1991 godine", in *Historiografija, Časopis za suvremenu povijest* br. 2, Zagreb, 2004, pp. 463-465.

lamic countries were of growing importance. Also on the world stage, the high number of pilgrims was a proof of the existing religious freedoms and minority rights in Yugoslavia.²⁷⁸

As previously mentioned, the state very much controlled the religious communities. There are many examples of clear state intervention upon the IVZ, which reflected upon the whole Muslim community. Until 1955 all important issues (admission of students in *Madrasah*²⁷⁹ schools, religious classes in the mosques, circumcision, performing *mevlud*²⁸⁰ or teravi prayers, amnesty of convicted Muslims etc.) were discussed among the reis-ul ulema and the president of the Federative Commission for Religious Issues (Savezna komisija za verska pitanja, hereinafter SKVP). The state organs were satisfied with the work of IVZ and regarded it as being "led by positive people." Especially interesting are the perceptions of the president of SKVP Dobrivoje Radosavljević, who noted that although IVZ leadership acted supportively toward the state organs, they sometimes forgot their primary duty – the religious one – since they distanced themselves from the religious community and led IVZ meetings as if they were party conferences.²⁸¹

By the end of the 1950s, the state decided to allow broader expression of religious freedoms, since it recognized it as a strong need of the Muslim population. The state also strived to minimize the influence of conservative forces and emigration. In the same period IVZ was reorganized, its Constitution was amended, and a new reis-ul-ulema was elected.²⁸²

Bosniak women after the WWII were traditionally wearing burkas,²⁸³ covering their face and heads, as well as the whole

278 D. Novaković, *op.cit.*, p. 465.

279 A *madrasah* is an Islamic secondary school.

280 A *mevlud* is a type of prayer celebrating the birth of the Prophet Muhammad (s.a.w.s.).

281 Radmila Radić, *Država i verske zajednice 1945-1970*, Drugi deo 1954-1970, Beograd, 2002, pp. 574-576.

282 *Ibid.*, p. 575.

283 The original terminology would be *zar* and *feredža*, which are both equivalents of burkas, but are made of different material. Since there are no identical equivalents for these words in English, the words: "burka", "headscarf", "veil" or "scarf" will be used here. In common usage, women generally tended to call it "the scarf".

body (practically from head to foot). Younger women wore shorter headscarves, stretching under the chin, while older ones preferred longer scarves. They were very bound to family households and rarely mixed with other men, unless in the presence of their husbands. It was only in the presence of other women or close family members that they would uncover their faces. With the arrival of communism, this habit started to change.

The first public promotion of removing the headscarf was in an article entitled "The renaissance of the Muslim woman" by Murat ef. Šećeragić (a *hodža*, judge of the Supreme Sharia Court and vice-president of ZAVNOS), published on 25 December 1944, in the newspaper "The Voice of Sandžak."²⁸⁴ It contained most of the elements that were used in later campaigns, where the headscarf was interpreted as an obsolete practice. The author advocated diminishing relations with the traditional "feudal" past, and approaching the communists becomes a matter of pride and progress: "Our girl...throws off the burka and with her head up straight approaches the National Liberation Army of Yugoslavia". Later four Muslim women from Gusinje were praised for running away from their homes under burkas and coming to the liberated territory of Berane: "They threw off their burkas and cut off their braids, saying good-bye to the tradition."²⁸⁵ The Montenegrin print media expressed strong support for such attitudes, often repeating the saying "the burka and headscarf under your feet", and the whole practice as a symbol of "slavery, darkness, ignorance and backwardness."²⁸⁶ Women were also told that this act was necessary for security reasons, since many criminals used it to hide themselves in such a way during the early postwar period.

Once the five-year development plan of 1947 was launched, the Yugoslav state emphasized the importance of involving the entire citizenry in its realization. Special focus was given to the role of women, so the magazine "Naša Žena" (Our Woman) urged

284 *Glas Sandžaka*, no.4-5, 25.12.1945; *Zbornik građe za istoriju radničkog pokreta Crne Gore, knj. III* Titograd, 1960, 384-385, quoted in Z. Folić, *op.cit.*, p. 133.

285 Z. Folić, *op.cit.*, p. 133.

286 *Ibid.*, p.138.

readers to: "Get to work in fulfilling the Plan, in creating a happy life and a bright future for the mothers and children". In the same issue the Vice President of Montenegro claimed: "There is not a single production sector we envision without the mass participation of women."²⁸⁷

In the first years following WWII, KPJ took advantage of any public event taking place in territories with a Muslim majority to promote the idea of removing the headscarf. The first examples were supposed to be set by the Muslim communists, and particularly by the wives of Party activists. Usually they needed to attend some Party event, such as a meeting, conference or celebration of local elections, where they would appear "bare-headed" and thus demonstrate that they had severed their connections to the "backward past." One secretary of a village county remembers: "We struggled to find more men who would help us and bring their wives first, who would voluntarily remove their headscarves. We worked on the literacy of people, for them to become more progressive than they were. But they did not want to leave that practice [of wearing headscarves]".²⁸⁸

The atheistic approach and removal of any religious symbols was a general characteristic of the new authorities, but when it came to introducing new irreligious practices, representatives of Muslim origin often felt a greater need to show support and thus to demonstrate their communist identity. "Ours were worse than them, I swear to God! They insisted on removing the scarf."²⁸⁹ Often party officials themselves had trouble within their own families, since many women strongly resisted uncovering their faces. "We had so many troubles and fights about it – all down to despair. He was required to support the removal of the scarves, because he was a little bit *red* (communist). Well, he was red, I won't hide."²⁹⁰ Later the same woman reports that her husband sent her to stay with his sister in a village tower house near a different town: "He sent me in that

287 *Ibid.*, p.135.

288 Semiha Kačar, *Zarozavanje zara*, Podgorica, 2000, p. 23.

289 S. Kačar, *op.cit.*, p. 8.

290 *Ibid.*, p. 11.

tower to be far away, so that he could hide any trace of me not wanting to remove the scarf. He constantly asked me to remove it. He asks - I do not want." Another woman reported that after many fights with her husband, who "had pressure from the Party", she removed her scarf only after he threatened to throw a bomb and destroy everything. Finally she accepted it, especially after seeing a few other religious women doing the same on their way to a party event. "Others were laughing out of despair and I cried. Šefko's wife cried too, Bayram's so and so..."²⁹¹

The book of Semiha Kačar included interviews of women who experienced this change, providing a close perspective on the whole emotional experience. The first generations had the most difficulties to adjust. "It was very hard, all of us cried...I cannot explain how I felt each time I would go out." Another woman tells the story of her mother: "It was very difficult for them to remove the scarf...It was as if we would walk naked now. There was lot of screaming and crying when they would remove it."²⁹²

In her book, Kačar creates a powerful impression of enforcement and strong emotional resistance. Zvezdan Folić in his book on the religious communities of Montenegro sheds a different light on the same phenomenon. At first the author draws attention to the equality of all ethnicities and religions, as proclaimed by the KPJ. In the context of their recent past and the burden of nationalistic outbursts, many Bosniaks were willing to embrace the new regime.²⁹³ He explains that the communists wanted to include all human capital in the building of socialism and that women were central participants.

In order to avoid "unwanted repercussions that can jeopardize the establishment of stable inter-ethnic and inter-religious relations", KPJ first worked through its women's organization, the Antifacist Front of Women (Antifašistički front žena, hereinafter AFZ). The role of women in all fields was strongly affirmed, at first through literacy courses and later through their

291 *Ibid.*, p. 20.

292 *Ibid.*, pp. 8-29.

293 Darko Tanasković, "Islam na Balkanu", *Enciklopedija živih religija*, Beograd, 2004, pp. 306-307, quoted in Z. Folić, *op.cit.*, p. 132.

involvement in development projects. In Gusinje they participated in the construction of a hydroelectric plant, in Rozaje in the building of a bridge, while in Bijelo Polje Fea Čevapović was the first "Muslim woman-mechanic."²⁹⁴

The communists were aware that this issue required a sensitive approach, so they included the religious authorities in their propaganda, as influential leaders among the Muslim population. As explained *supra*, the *hoca* Murat Šećeragić, who later became the deputy *reis-ul-ulema*, was the first to promote the idea of removing the headscarf. This is hardly surprising since Šećeragić had been active in the partisans even during the war. The imams of Plav and Gusinje organized public events in 1947, where the removal was represented as a condition for cultural progress and participation in the Five-Year Plan. It was also stressed that the practice did not violate religious principles. Such an approach yielded significant results, so the Executive Board of the Federative Republic of Montenegro recommended to all regional boards that they include religious officials and credible Muslims in removing the headscarf on July 13 1947, a national holiday celebrating the Montenegrin rebellion. According to the journal "Pobjeda", it resulted in 1.352 women of Montenegro removing their burkas, mostly from the Bijelo Polje, Berane and Andrijeva region.²⁹⁵

Folić explains that the *hodžas* promoting the idea were attracted by the progressive politics of KPJ in terms of removing illiteracy, enabling free education, constructing schools, increasing employment, etc. Often it was stressed that their religious beliefs would be treated as equal with others. And while the extent of "equal treatment" is debatable, it is true that certain modernization policies of the communists did contribute to the progress of Sandžak. Statistics from the prewar period (census of 1931) show that over 80% of women in the Montenegrin municipalities with Muslim majorities were illiterate (Bar, Podgorica, Andrijeva, Berane, Bijelo Polje, Pljevlje).²⁹⁶ These numbers rapidly decreased in

294 Z. Folić, *op.cit.*, p. 131.

295 *Pobjeda*, No.43, 20.02.1949 p. 3, quoted in Z. Folić, *op.cit.*, p. 136.

296 Z. Folić, *op.cit.*, p. 128.

postwar Yugoslavia. The statements of the women in Kačar's book confirm these statistics: "Afterwards I went to a literacy course and learned to write... Had I continued I would have learned even more. But I did not work, so I could not continue."²⁹⁷ In tandem with decreasing illiteracy, the number of women participating in employment also began to rise.

However, a knowledgeable reader might find the statements of the representatives of the IVZ during socialism somewhat contradictory. The *reis-ul-ulema* of the IVZ of Socialist Yugoslavia stated in 1947 that the headscarf was an obstacle for the Muslim woman seeking equality. "It is a duty of Muslim men and women to cease this old and now harmful custom, so that the Muslim woman can become a real and full member of our community".²⁹⁸ Upon their meeting, the Islamic authorities of Montenegro sent a telegram to the Executive Board of Montenegro, saying: "We invite our Muslim women to break with the centuries old chains of the headscarf and burka, which are not proposed by Islam and are an obstacle to the cultural and educational progress of the Islamic masses."²⁹⁹

Other resources suggest that Muslim religious authorities supporting the abolition were more indoctrinated than included in the campaign. The interviews of Kačar show how shocked women were to hear the religious leaders completely changing their narrative: "Earlier the *hodžas* used to tell us that it is a sin even for your finger to be seen, not to mention the face. Later the same *hodžas* tell us it is not a sin anymore."³⁰⁰ The only *hodža* not accepting it was the old Ismail efendija from Novi Pazar, a very respectful imam whose word enjoyed huge respect in the community. He often avoided meetings with the Party representatives, justifying it with his illness. KPJ was aware of his influence, so they sent a carriage to bring him on the day when he was supposed to sign his consent, but the old imam died few hours

297 S. Kačar, *op.cit.*, p. 13.

298 *Glasnik VIS-a*, No.1-3, January-March 1950, pp. 18-19, quoted in Z. Folić, *op.cit.*, p. 137.

299 *Pobjeda*, No.54, 1608.1947, p. 5, quoted in Z. Folić, *op.cit.*, p. 137.

300 S. Kačar, *op.cit.*, p. 53.

earlier. "Smail efendija Filibarić from Lug, was the only one who did not want to sign up for the removal of scarves. They inflicted a lot of terror on him. He was given a one-day deadline. He prayed that night and died... He was the only real *hodža*, as one should be."³⁰¹ All the *imams* who behaved inconsistently with Communist policies faced strong pressure. Some were directly arrested, while others warned of the threat of being declared an enemy of the state and sentenced to many years in prison.³⁰²

Despite the strong campaigning and various forms of pressure, the removal of headscarves did not achieve the required level of acceptance in the first years of National Liberation. Women resisted strongly and sometimes removed the scarves only for public events. Alternatively, they often merely exchanged it for another shorter type of headscarf. At the same time, the women who removed it did not show much interest in participating in public life. By the end of 1949, women from predominantly Muslim municipalities showed the lowest rate of employment anywhere in Yugoslavia, while the state failed to establish any clear strategy of development.³⁰³

In order to implant the new attitude on a mass level, the leadership of Bosnia and Herzegovina decided to regulate the issue on the legal level. The Law on Abolition of the Veil and Burka was enacted in the People's Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1950.³⁰⁴ Montenegro and Serbia soon followed suit, passing the same law on November 2, 1950 and January 9, 1951, respectively. With the enforcement of such legislation, the wearing of scarf became illegal and punishable by a sentence of up to three months in jail or a fine of up to 20.000 dinars. The punishment was even harsher (a maximum of a 50.000 dinar fine or up to two years in prison with forced labor) for any who would instigate such practice: "a) who by enforcement, threats, blackmail or other similar means compels the wearing of the headscarf or burka, *i.e.* on covering the woman's

301 *Ibid.*, p. 16.

302 Senad Gluhavićanin, *op.cit.*

303 Radmila Radić, "Verom protiv vere", *Država i verske zajednice u Srbiji 1945-1953*, Beograd, 1995, pp. 214-215, quoted in Z. Folić, *op.cit.*, p. 141.

304 *Glasnik VIS-a*, 1950, p.278-305, cited in Z. Folić, p. 142.

face; b) who by abuse of religious feelings uses the prejudice and backwardness or in any other way exercises propaganda for wearing the headscarf or burka, *i.e.* covering the woman's face,"³⁰⁵

The stories of the women in Kačar's book indicate that the law was not welcomed. Although it was forcefully applied, it tended to provoke a reaction that was directly opposite to its intended purpose: "We barely went out, there were many women who did not want to remove it, but had to. I especially. They wanted to punish Hazbo, my old man, so I had to...They would collect our men and frighten them!"³⁰⁶ The removal of the headscarves resulted in some women not leaving their homes for months and years after the legislation, with some elderly women remaining at home for the rest of their lives. Folić described the same consequence in Pljevlje: "A feeling of insecurity was created among the Muslims of Pljevlje, so a portion of the Muslim women in the period December 1950-March 1951 did not leave their *avliya* at all."³⁰⁷

This provided yet another strong incentive to immigrate to Turkey. "People went to Turkey afterwards. They were leaving even earlier, in '25 and '45. But also afterwards. My sister left when the headscarf was removed..."³⁰⁸ Another woman who witnessed the events reported: "People were going to Turkey out of fear.. They were frightened that something worse might happen. Many left. Well, nobody even tried to stop them."³⁰⁹ "Čeba's" story confirms the same in details: "They would take to prison the husbands of the ones who did not want to remove the scarf. Lots of evil was done. The scarf was a reason for moving to Turkey. The people were running away, to avoid being Christianized."³¹⁰ The same woman describes how they would leave secretly during night, carrying nothing but some food. Some already had the required papers, while some went through Skopje.

305 *Ibid.*

306 S. Kačar, *op.cit.*, p. 8.

307 *Rad Narodnog fronta sreza pljevaljskog* od 13.11.1950-28.03.1951, quoted in Z. Folić, *op.cit.*, p. 143.

308 *Ibid.*

309 S.Kačar, *op.cit.*, p. 16.

310 *Ibid.*, pp. 34-35.

Even though officially religion was a matter of free choice, in reality life functioned differently. All religious practices were restricted and put under state control. "After the scarf, they abolished the *mekteb*³¹¹...Nobody could go to one, only within the houses, but never in the mosque! They were restricting fasting too. They restricted everything that was ours, as if we lived in a foreign country."³¹² The *mektebs* were forbidden in 1947. In Serbia and Montenegro there were examples where the believers reacted and requested that the *mektebs* be spared. On one occasion, the Ministry of Education in Serbia responded to the Islamic Leadership of Novi Pazar that the operating of the *mektebs* was unconstitutional and that as for religious classes in schools, the state does not distinguish between Muslim and other children.³¹³ On certain occasions, the very religious leadership rejected requests for opening religious schools in Sandžak, on the ground that they were needless and backward in current conditions, especially since Muslims could fulfill such needs in the Gazi Husrev-Beg Madrasah in Sarajevo.³¹⁴

The women who worked in the factories (now without scarves) often faced strong pressure against expressing their religious identity. This was especially visible during the month of Ramadan. Kačar's women reported that they had been monitored as to whether they were fasting and were then forced to break the fast. On other occasions a person would walk around the factory with candies and force the workers to eat it. "Everything was good in the factory, but when it was Ramadan we had to hide even in the toilets. There was one to observe who is fasting, and then straight to hearing and breaking the fast."³¹⁵

The *Teravi* prayer was another complication of Ramadan. According to the story of Aza, the government decided to outlaw

311 *Mektebs* include voluntary classes on Islam, usually performed within the mosques.

312 S. Kačar, *op.cit.*, p. 36.

313 Arhiv Islamske Zajednice u Srbiji. Nesređena gradja, courtesy of Admir Muratović.

314 AIIP, nesređena gradja, Zapisnik sa Petog redovnog zasijedanja Vakufskog sabora Crne Gore od 02.06.1951, quoted in Z. Folić, *op.cit.*, p. 187.

315 S. Kačar, *op.cit.*, p. 59.

it, since they wanted to forbid any kind of gathering. Later the local *hodža* managed to preserve it, as a reward for his contribution to removing the scarf.³¹⁶

As can be seen from a range of sources, religion was a very important part of the Bosniak identity. Facing various kinds of pressure throughout the years and feeling confused in the new political reality, they often gravitated around Islam, as the strongest element of self-identification. However, in socialist Yugoslavia expressing this identity was not a freely permitted act. As previously noted, religious leadership was under constant state surveillance. It should also be noted that the postwar *imams* of Sandžak often had inadequate education. Some of them were not even graduates from Madrasah, but acquired their positions by a decree from the *mufti* or older *imam*.³¹⁷

Another important characteristic of some Islamic leaders during socialism was that certain *hocas* often expressed much stronger consideration for the expectations of the party than for the needs of the citizens. One startling example is the report of the secretary of the Vakif Office, sent to the Commission for Religious Issues of Montenegro: "Relying upon the Constitution of the Federative People's Republic of Yugoslavia and the Constitution of IVZ...we are trying to reduce the religious practices to minimum, to restrict the number of mosques and of *hoca-imams*, despite the opportunistic and deeply religious attitudes of certain members of the *Vakif* office."³¹⁸

The connections to Bosniak religious and ethnic identity were inexorably fading in the whole region of Sandžak. Even through changing toponyms the identity of the new Yugoslavia was promoted. The term "Sandžak" was often avoided in official use, especially now that the region belonged to two states – Montenegro and Serbia – and as such bore reminiscence of the Ottoman past. More often it became "the Raška region" or the

316 *Ibid.*, p. 38.

317 Z. Folić, *op.cit.*, p. 176.

318 AIIP, nesređena građa, Udruženje "Ilmije" u Crnoj Gori –Sado Vodopić –Komisiji za vjerska pitanja pri Predsjedništvu Vlade NR Crne Gore, 20.10.1952, quoted in Z. Folić, *op. cit.*, pp. 189-190.

"Zlatibor region" (according to the location of the respectful towns in Serbia) or Northern Montenegro. In the middle of towns populated mostly with Muslims the street names were changed into ones celebrating battles with the Ottomans or names of non-Muslims who fought for the partisans. The number of Muslims participating in the National Liberation was not negligible, but they were granted the status of "national heroes" to a much lesser extent. The school curriculum did not include anything related to Bosniak identity. Historical events or the works of Muslim writers and poets were never introduced. While towns from other regions in Serbia, such as Kragujevac, Niš and Užice gained separate universities and institutions of higher education, none was opened in Sandžak. Apart from the Museum "Ras" in Novi Pazar, other cultural institutions such as quality museums and theaters were lacking throughout the whole area. Even in the Museum "Ras" simple maintenance work could not be fulfilled without approval from Belgrade. In an environment of restricted religious freedoms, limited possibilities for cultural development and general feeling of oppression upon preserving their specific identity, Bosniaks reached their decisions to migrate easily. Perceiving Turkey as country where "everybody is one of us", they chose it as their destination, proving once again the social character of this migration.

IV.3 POLITICAL REASONS FOR MIGRATION

In the period of socialism, Sandžak was an area of too many people, but very few schools and factories. Its population had to cope with numerous difficulties on all levels of existence: income, education, health care, cultural development and preservation of identity. The underdevelopment of the region, its economic deficits and the limitations upon the free exercise of religion all contributed greatly toward the emigration of the Bosniak population to Turkey, but the fact that they moved to a

country with an even worse economy, and without any language skills, clearly indicates that the motives for migration went far beyond those typically associated with voluntary migration. To better understand the surroundings in which these people decided to migrate, it is necessary to understand the political conditions in Sandžak during the early decades of socialism.

After the WWII many families were internally divided, in terms of their political beliefs. It was very common for the older generation to be against communism, especially because of its atheism but also because of its attitude toward private property: "It was said that for communists everything is shared, they do not own houses or properties, they even share their wives. 'What a weird people, God forbid!' our folks used to say".³¹⁹

Since the whole society was supposed to be founded on the principle of diminishing the bourgeoisie, Yugoslav state officials in the post-war period would often move strangers into the bigger houses, to share with their previous owners. The newcomers were usually civil servants, police officers or other persons close to the party. In Sandžak big houses with larger numbers of rooms were often owned by Muslims. The higher officials were granted entire houses, after they had been confiscated from the original owners, who were often Muslim.

One particularly significant practice of socialist Yugoslavia was the stigmatization of "counter-revolutionary" families. As discussed in the preceding chapter on WWII, many Bosniaks were found "on the wrong side of the history". The killings in Hadžet still reverberate negatively in the collective memory of Bosniaks from Novi Pazar. "Justice" was interpreted only through the Partisan/Communist perspective and, due to the summary proceedings, numerous Bosniaks were sentenced to death on little or no evidence. By 1947 the Organization for Protection of the People (Organizacija za zaštitu naroda, hereinafter OZNA), which later became the State Security Administration (Uprava državne bezbednosti, hereinafter UDBA) liquidated nearly all

319 M. Hadžišehović, *op.cit.*, p. 116.

members of the Muslim militia.³²⁰ Officially amnesty was proclaimed for those who had not fought for the Partisans, but numerous examples (some quoted in the previous chapter) proved that in practice this rule was less often applied for Muslims. Even many of those who surrendered voluntarily were killed.³²¹ And the punishment did not stop there.

The families whose members fought in the Muslim militia were marked as "enemies of the state" and faced intense pressure once the communist power was consolidated. They were often accused of hiding food or acting illegally, and had much worse educational and employment possibilities. Such families were under constant surveillance by the internal security forces. By killing the leaders, sending others to prison for many years, denying them the right to vote, and detaining them in their homes, the Communists silenced all those who did not embrace their ideology.³²² When the alternative of migrating to Turkey became a possibility, these were generally the first families to leave Sandžak. Hadžišehović recalls the days when these people were held as prisoners by the new authorities: "One day there were no more prisoners, so we realized from secret communications that they had been killed. Some of their families moved out of Prijepolje".³²³

A particularly dark chapter in the history of Sandžak was the ascendancy of Aleksandar Ranković, a Serb nationalist who served as the powerful and notorious Minister of Interior of the SFRY from 1946 to 1953 (and in the mid-1960s as First Vice President of the SFRY). As Interior Minister, Ranković also controlled the powerful State Security Administration (UDBA), whose repressive policies inflicted grievous harm on the Bosniak community, among others. But the campaigns of the UDBA pose a particular challenge to a research initiative such as this one, based on secondary sources. Due to the longstanding fear

320 <http://www.komisija1944.mpravde.gov.rs/cr/articles/pocetna/> (Access Date 24.08.2015).

321 Šerbo Rastoder, "Crna Gora u XX vijeku", in *Istorija Crne Gore, Od najstarijih vremena do 2003*, Podgorica, 2006, p. 443.

322 M. Hadžišehović, *op.cit.*, p. 117.

323 *Ibid.*

in Yugoslavia, it is only recently that works on this topic have started to emerge. Many of the victims who survived the police oppression are no longer alive.

Muslim men of Sandžak were often accused of possessing and hiding arms, which resulted in arrests and brutal police interrogations. Sometimes they were detained, questioned, and beaten for days. According to the book of Crnovršanin and Sadiković, some Bosniaks who no longer live in Sandžak witnessed detainees so desperate that they sold their livestock or another private property to buy guns in the black market to surrender to the UDBA.³²⁴

More data on these “dark times” can be found in the memoirs of Mesrur Šačić, writing on the events that took place in his native municipality, Duga Poljana. He remembers that the action started in 1956 and lasted about a year. It was carried out in Sandžak and Kosovo: “Somehow people treated these as a whole (*i.e.* Sandžak and Kosovo were treated as a single region). The weapons were mostly sought and taken from the Muslim population.”³²⁵ The author describes in detail the state of fear among the people. What panicked them most was not the collecting of the arms, but the other “phenomena” that typically followed such actions. Namely, people from this area remembered similar actions from the 1920s, after which many people died under police torture. The whole process was carried out under unjust conditions, in which anyone could inform on a neighbor or rival. As the author says, it was a perfect occasion for the worse people in society to get closer to the authorities through spying on others. The whole notion was a clear sign to the Bosniaks that they were not only to be treated as inferior, but also to have their lives and well-being put in danger. “When arms starts getting collected in this way, people consider that the worst times have come - catastrophe, distrust, it does not bring anything good and they often conclude: These authorities are finished as well!”³²⁶

324 Harun Crnovršanin and Nuro Sadiković, *Sandžak Porobljena zemlja*, Zagreb, 2001, p. 612.

325 Mesrur Šačić, *Vučji tragovi*, Beograd, 1996, p. 185.

326 M. Šačić, *op.cit.*, p. 186.

Šačić notes that the municipal authorities were not included or consulted in the process. The regional representatives from the Communist Alliance of Novi Pazar simply gathered the citizenry and ordered them to submit their weapons. Without little or no explanation, arrests soon followed. It is symptomatic that men were taken to police stations in the middle of the night, often harassed, beaten and tortured, and then told to return within a few days, again in the middle of the night. The author states that those who did possess arms submitted them immediately, while the others took the advice of their old men: "They were buying (arms) with gold and the last money they had, if only they could find it somewhere, so that they could save their lives."³²⁷

Šačić was asked by numerous co-citizens to intervene and help, but as noted previously, the Municipality had little influence on orders coming "straight from above". He notes that among the local population this event carried long lasting effects. People were harassed and humiliated, and left with numerous physical and psychological disorders. It is noteworthy that the agents performing the action were of both nationalities, Serb and Bosniak. "Trust in authorities, leadership, the state and the security organs were lost because they started dividing citizens according to their nationality, which was very bad for these people."³²⁸

Information related to the overwhelming police brutality began to emerge more often after the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Alliance of Communists of Yugoslavia on 1 July 1966, in Brioni, nowadays Croatia. At this plenum the work of the State Security Services (Služba Državne Bezbednosti, hereinafter SDB), the successor organization to the State Security Administration or UDBA, was scrutinized, and it was pointed out that the SDB had abused its authority and put itself "above the state". The notorious Aleksandar Ranković, who by now had been elevated from Interior Minister to the post of Vice President of the SFRY, was dismissed on this occasion, after which he completely withdrew from public life. Investigations and changes of abuse of official

327 *Ibid.*, p. 187.

328 *Ibid.*

positions were instituted on lower levels as well, and many security officers were removed from their positions.

A comprehensive qualitative research would be useful on this issue, but to illustrate the level of brutality only a few cases need be mentioned. In the village Ribarići men were beaten and then put in pits to coerce confessions. Besir Etemović died as the result of such a beating.³²⁹ Rasim Dazdarević attempted suicide, due to the harassment by Krsto Malešević, the police commander in Tutin. When a person with the surname Bibić was called for the third time to a police interrogation, he hanged himself. A police officer of Novi Pazar, Bejto Dizdarević, stated that the officers of Bosniak origin who did not want to participate in the beatings were criticized and pushed into early retirement: "People who did not want to harass other people were called all kind of names, while the ones who often used their nightsticks and beat people for no justified reasons, were promoted as the best."³³⁰ As do many others writing on Sandžak during socialism, Šaćić also connects these events with the rule of Minister Ranković.

Another significant political event was the case of the organization "Young Muslims". This organization was originally constituted in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but this study will confine its attention to only the cases in Sandžak. The formation of the "Young Muslims" was initiated through contacts between Sulejman Kačar from Novi Pazar and the soldier Nurija from Banja Luka (in Bosnia and Herzegovina). As Nurija was serving the army in Novi Pazar, he often went for *Jumah* prayers in the Bor mosque. Through their conversations Kačar heard about the existence of the "Young Muslims" in Bosnia. Impressed with the idea, he and two other men on 17 April 1946 founded the same organization in Sandžak.

The organization acted illegally and focused its activities on preserving Muslim interests: the free practice of religion and the re-opening of mektebs, an end to the killings of Muslims (as pre-

329 H. Hasanagić, *Nevolje Sandžačkih Muslimana*, p. 65, cited in S. Bandžović, *op.cit.*, p. 585.

330 Note of Ramiz Crnišanin from his conversation with the officer Bejto Dazdarević, Novi Pazar, 19.09.1966, quoted in S. Bandžović, *op.cit.*, p. 583.

viously explained, in the early postwar years summary convictions and death sentences were common), and preventing Muslims from migrating to Turkey. At the beginning the group wrote slogans against the regime, in order to raise the awareness of the Muslim citizenry. According to Dupljak, they even managed to infiltrate the UDBA and gain classified information related to the arrests of Muslims. However, the internal security force of SFRY consisted of professionals who had a well developed network of contacts and informants. Before long the activists of Sandžak's "Young Muslims" were discovered. The first group was arrested in 1948 and another in 1952. The Communists required harsh punishment for these men, since they wanted it to serve as an example to anyone who dared work against the regime.³³¹

UDBA treated the "Young Muslims" as an illegal terrorist organization whose aim was to destroy the state and the social order, to take power, liquidate certain political and state leaders, and to ruin state and military institutions. In that regard the members of "Young Muslims" were accused of secretly collecting and producing arms.³³² Even before the verdict was returned, these suspects were treated with brutality. Rifat Dupljak interviewed most of them and detailed how they were treated: "In the cell I was held for four days without water and bread, every morning two men took turns beating me."³³³ After days spent under such conditions, the suspects were forced to sign previously prepared confessions. According to the testimony of Sulejman Kačar, a former convict of this process, the typist who prepared the statements begged the officers to stop beating Ahmet Kolašinac, since she could not stand to watch it anymore.³³⁴

After many years of imprisonment, harassment of these people did not cease with their liberation. Once they returned to their hometowns, the police generally tracked their entire families. The

331 Rifat Dupljak, *Mladi Muslimani Sandžaka*, Novi Pazar, 2003, p. 32.

332 Verdict of Kačar Sulejman, Kolašinac Ahmet, Bektešević Ismet and Draževićanin Ibro, reached on 19.01.1949, quoted in R. Dupljak, *op.cit.*, p. 47. Similar accusations consisted in the verdict of the group arrested in 1952.

333 R. Dupljak, *op.cit.*, p. 160.

334 *Ibid.*, p. 79.

father of Ismet Bektešević had to pay the highest tax of any carpenter paid within his municipality. The complaints for usurpation (closing his store, forbidding his work and taking over his property) submitted by Mašo Kolašinac were rejected, since he, as the father of a member of “Young Muslims,” had no right to complain. The entire family was later forced to move into a space that was a former stall for livestock. Even the neighbors of these people were warned by the UDBA not to help. On the occasion of Tito’s visit to Novi Pazar, Sait Kolašinac (the brother of Ahmet Kolašinac) together with the relatives of other members of “Young Muslims” were held for a week in prison.³³⁵

As mentioned previously, Muslims who were part of the Communist regime were often more concerned with proving their loyalty to the Party than focusing on the progress of the Bosniak people. While not all Bosniaks followed this course, it was not uncommon for them to be designated tasks that tested their “loyalty”. One such example was of Hamdija Mujezinović, the judge in the case of the “Young Muslims” in Novi Pazar. Upon his decision, the defendants were found guilty and sentenced to lengthy terms of imprisonment. To make matters worse, he had not even graduated from Law School.³³⁶

Upon release from prison, the former convicts could hardly find any employment, since they were stigmatized as “enemies of the state” in a country where all businesses were state-owned. Facing various forms of pressure, many of them decided to immigrate to Turkey. Some managed to fulfill their plan, while others ended up staying in Macedonia. One part tried to move, but was stopped by state legal provisions prohibiting emigration of “enemies of the state”. The convicts who remained living in Sandžak, had no privileged life: “After prison I spent all my life in some kind of slavery, I was spied on every corner, tracked...I avoided public places and events, avoided and silently took what was left from this difficult life.”³³⁷

335 *Ibid.*, p. 93.

336 *Ibid.*, p. 24.

337 *Ibid.*, p. 120.

The police inspector Hrane Bogdanović retained very negative memories of many people from Sandžak. Besides his brutality in "coping with the terrorists", there is another dark side in his abuse of his public position. According to Dupljak, on many occasions Bogdanović arrested Muslim men under the suspicion of "acting against the system and the state" and later secretly asked their wives for sexual favors. In return he would release the husbands. Some of those people never learned the reasons for their arrests, and the author does not reveal the names of the families for understandable reasons. "I will remain silent on the data (*i.e.*, the names and surnames), but the ones who could not even imagine such a thing should hear about it".³³⁸ The name of Hrane Bogdanović is mentioned in later reports of the Central Committee of the Communist Party on the work of internal security services, as a synonym for abuse of official powers and the misuse of force: "the time of Hrane Bogdanović, Lale Minić and others who thought that everything was permissible."³³⁹

Another shocking event in Dupljak's book involves a Serb doctor, referring to a patient who complained of being hit "by the Turks". Dr.Vladić responded: "And you call yourselves some Cetniks... On this very table I killed more with my injections than people like you slaughtered outside. I am more important in this one position than hundreds like you."³⁴⁰ Dupljak reports that the conversation was overheard by a paramedic working in the hospital.

One unavoidable event in political life during socialism is the schism between USSR and Yugoslavia that opened in 1948. Once the Resolution of the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform or Informbiro) was reached in 1948, UDBA started tracking all supposed supporters of Informbiro. From a much later perspective this campaign often seemed like a "witch hunt". This action inevitably had repercussions in Sandžak. Mesrur Šaćić, a contemporary of the period, noted in his diary that these were very intense days, permeated with mutual distrust and

338 R. Dupljak, *op.cit.*, p. 25.

339 Opštinski komitet SKS Novi Pazar, interni materijal, Novi Pazar, 28.09.1966, quoted in S. Bandžović, *op.cit.*, p. 584.

340 R. Dupljak, *op.cit.*, p. 25.

fear even of one's closest friends: "If somebody hated you, he could put a label on you that you are supporter of Informbiro and destroy you forever...We remained silent, worked and maximally supported what the authorities and the Party requested. It was the only way to stay alive, normal and in one piece."³⁴¹

This period saw the creation of the notorious prisons for Stalin supporters: Goli Otok, Sveti Grgur, Rab and Ugljan. The inmates who eventually left these prisons usually had permanent health damage. According to the statistics, most of them were Serbs. However, since Bosniaks were not recognized as a separate nationality, Bosniaks generally fell into the categories of the respective countries where they lived. From today's perspective it can be difficult to establish a precise number, but the practice does not appear to have focused disproportionately on Bosniaks.

The sphere of influence of the intelligence agencies during communism permeated all aspects of life. If a person wanted to advance in their career, or a student requested a scholarship or admission to a prestigious educational institution (not only to Military academy, but even to the schools such as the Crafts Centre in Kragujevac), they had to prove that they come from a "conscientious" background, meaning they and their families supported communism. The Party Youth Organization listed the characteristics of the referee and UDBA checked their validity. Candidates had to submit detailed applications, explaining who their parents were, what they had done during the war, whether they had relatives abroad and whether they were in touch with them. As expected, people of Sandžak had many relatives in Turkey, and while some of their ancestors had fought with the Partisans, others had joined the Muslim militia or other enemy formations. Some wrote that their parents were "neutral" during the war, which was not a good reference at the time. In order to marry a person professionally serving in the army, one needed state approval. The check-ups for such an approval sometimes lasted for months.³⁴²

341 M. Šačić, *op.cit.*, p. 102.

342 M. Hadžišehović, *op.cit.*, p. 149.

A precondition to any type of advancement was membership in Communist Party (KPJ), but even that needed to be checked and approved by the higher state organs. It was not unusual for people to be rejected due to their "blurry past".³⁴³ UDBA was a pervasive presence, as was widespread spying of citizens on their fellow citizens. Šačić notes an illustrative example of a Party meeting where the behavior of a leading activist was discussed. The criticized person was fast to reply that Šačić himself was not without sin, since his father, a *hodža*, was a better communist than he. Later he retold in detail a discussion of Šačić's family members gathered on the occasion of a relative's visit. The relative had migrated to Turkey and complained about life there, whereas Šačić's father praised Tito and their religious liberties. "As M.B. stated, he listened to this whole conversation under our window during the night, most probably in order to check the locals, the guest and me as well."³⁴⁴ The defendants in the case "Young Muslims" gave similar narratives, explaining that the security forces often quoted precisely every word they had uttered.

UDBA considered virtually everyone a potential enemy and spy, domestic or foreign. Therefore surveillance of citizens became a common practice, especially of those who had come in contact with foreign citizens. Šačić recalls that during the voluntary action for the construction of the student town in Zagreb, where many foreigners participated as well, they were warned not to accept any presents: "do not humiliate yourselves and accept presents from foreigners, such as pens or similar items. And in Yugoslavia these were sought and appreciated among students."³⁴⁵ He also noted that exchanging letters with someone from abroad was not easy either in those days. Munevera Hadžišehović had trouble with the security forces herself upon the visit of her friend Mishra to her hometown Prijepolje. The citizens of the small town were impressed with the unusual

343 M. Šačić, *op.cit.*, p. 169.

344 M. Šačić, *op.cit.*, p. 173.

345 M. Hadžišehović, *op.cit.*, p. 110.

guest, who held a presentation about his native India in the Prijeplje high school. Hadžišehović was afterwards warned by the security forces about her friendship with the spy. UDBA also questioned her statements given in informal conversations with the foreign students, such as “We do not have good roads” or “Where I come from things are not done that way” referring to the way relationships between men and women are regulated in her homeland.³⁴⁶

People who were Party activists often had a much easier time gaining positions during socialism. It was not unusual for them to hold positions for which they were not qualified. Such was the case with the director of the primary school in Duga Poljana, who was later found to have completed only a few months of the curriculum for teachers, but who had participated in the National Liberation War. On the other hand, those who did not act according to the expectations of the communist leaders often found themselves punished. One example was a math teacher in the Novi Pazar Pedagogy School, Sadik Hodžić. He was reportedly a respected teacher, but also a practicing Muslim and thus a “potential risk” for the students. After sustained pressure in Novi Pazar, Hodžić moved first to Kragujevac and later to Sjenica, where he also taught. His troubles continued: “as he complained much later, they were surveilling him, opening his letters and doing many surreptitious things against him”.³⁴⁷

Although this study focuses primarily on the circumstances in Sandžak that caused Bosniaks to migrate, international regulations also played an important role in facilitating the whole process of migration. The “Gentlemen’s Agreement” between the SFRY and Turkey emerged in the same period when the actions for collection of arms was taking place. Thus, apart from the events taking place on the local level, the whole process of migration to Turkey was slowly brought within an official framework on the international level. The relations between SFRY and Turkey improved significantly and in 1951 Turkey, through its

³⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 198 – 201.

³⁴⁷ M. Šaćić, *op.cit.*, pp. 104-157.

Embassy in Belgrade, initiated repatriation of families of people of Turkish origin with their relatives who had previously immigrated to Turkey.³⁴⁸ The number of such requests grew daily, so that there rapidly developed a need to address it more systematically. During an official visit to Yugoslavia in January 1953, the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Fuat Köprülü held meetings with President Tito and a range of Yugoslav government ministers. It is believed that this is the occasion when the "Gentlemen's Agreement" was initiated, though no precise written data has been uncovered to confirm it. Tito's visit to Turkey followed one year later.

The Legal Council of the State Secretary of Foreign Affairs of SFRY issued its consent to the following text of the platform for regulating migration to Turkey:³⁴⁹

- a) All requests for repatriating husbands and wives, children and parents, and supporters of the family should be solved positively, unless there is a legal obstacle to emigrating. Each request should be individually resolved.
- b) Migration should be preconditioned by a request for dismissal from our citizenship of such person and a statement of the Turkish Embassy that if the request of such person is resolved positively, he/she will be considered as a Turkish and no longer Yugoslav citizen.

It was also stressed that difficulties should not be created for those who wanted to emigrate and they should also be allowed to sell their property, so that later nationalization would be avoided. The research of Pezo confirms another reality cov-

348 Arhiv Saveznog ministarstva inostranih poslova, Politički arhiv (hereinafter ASMIP PA), 1954, F95 (Beograd), Februar 1954, Turska, p. 107, cited in Edvin Pezo, "Komparativna analiza jugoslovensko-turske konvencije iz 1938 i "Džentlenskog sporazuma" iz 1953. Pregovori oko iseljavanja muslimana iz Jugoslavije u Tursku", in *Tokovi istorije, Časopis Instituta za noviju istoriju Srbije 2/2013*, Beograd, 2013, p. 97.

349 ASMIP, PA, F96, Beograd, 3.3.1953, Pov.br: 91737, Modaliteti za iseljenje naših državljana turske narodnosti radi spajanja sa porodicama koje su već u Turskoj, quoted in E. Pezo, *op.cit.*, p. 117.

ered within this platform: the notion of “family repatriation” was interpreted very broadly, sometimes even including a spouse’s family.

Another interesting aspect of this platform is the criteria upon which the national identity was confirmed, with the language and national preference of such person taken as valid. In this way, along with the Turkish population of Macedonia, numerous Bosniaks from Sandžak, Albanians from Kosovo and Macedonia, and Goran and Torbes citizens started “fitting within” this definition and so applied for permission to emigrate. They often simply signed documents in Turkish, without even understanding what they were signing, including the clause that Turkey had no obligations toward them once they reach the country. The potential migrants had prepared dubious stories about their Turkish origin, with one tale regularly repeating: their father had been a Turk but died young, so that they could not learn the language.³⁵⁰ Due to certain economic provisions, the Agreement was never officially ratified, but remained in effect as a “Gentlemen’s Agreement”. Even more interesting is the creation, in Belgrade, on 16 March 1955, of a Special Commission for Implementation of the Gentlemen’s Agreement. The Commission members included Interior Minister Ranković, along with Svetislav Stefanović, Milan Bartos, Krste Crvenkovski, Leo Gersković, Vojkan Lukić, Marko Vučković and Pavle Ivičević.³⁵¹

When all these are taken into consideration, it is understandable that it was in the interest of both countries’ officials for this migration to take place. Even the police oppression is no surprise, considering that the Minister of Interior was the “protector of the implementation” of the Agreement. Nor is the passive attitude of authorities toward the obvious demographic change in these regions. The way that officials addressed this issue may not have initiated the migration itself, but obviously did very little to prevent it.

350 S. Bandžović, *op.cit.*, p. 536.

351 F. Shehu - S. Shehu, *Pastrimet etnike*, 20; J.Lluka, *Shperngulja a shqiptareve*, 55; “Borba”, Beograd, 25 January 1994, quoted in S. Bandžović, *op.cit.*, p. 537.

The stream of emigration to Turkey intensified after the police oppression of 1956. The population was mobilized at all levels, seeking different ways to fulfill their goal. Relatives who had left earlier started sending papers for repatriation of their families, while long lines grew in front of the Turkish Embassy in Belgrade. Some were following the official procedures, while some found shortcuts bribing various "professionals". *Vasikas* (official permits for emigration to Turkey) started becoming obtained very quickly. Particularly famous became the "Vasika Perovača", the name of which derived from an employee in the Turkish Embassy Pera Mastilović. For the price of 100.000 dinars (ten or more times the average annual salary) Mastilović sold *vasikas* in a fully prepared format, since many applicants had difficulties proving the legitimacy of their Turkish origin. Mastilović was later convicted and sentenced to seven years of imprisonment.³⁵²

During this period various "points for the regulation of documents" emerged even in the smallest and most backward villages, offering to arrange emigration documents for the local peasants. The new municipality secretary of Duga Poljana, who was "constantly typing something, retyping and writing much more than any other previous secretary"³⁵³ secretly offered such services for the same purpose. Peasants gave him handmade rugs and other things, just to have their papers settled. Hadžišehović remembers that people at the train stations had to show a destroyed ID, as a proof of the dismissal from citizenship, in order to buy tickets to Turkey.³⁵⁴

The numbers of migrant requests started dropping after the Brioni Plenum of 1966, or to be more precise after the dismissal of the Minister Ranković – an event that made life in Yugoslavia somewhat less oppressive for Bosniaks. In Yugoslav resources, this event is seen as connected not only to extensive use of official powers, but also to the centralized type of state

352 E. Mušović, *O posleratnim migracijama sandžačkih Muslimana u Tursku i Makedoniju*, pp. 456-457, quoted in S. Bandžović, *op.cit.*, p. 573.

353 M. Šačić, *op.cit.*, pp. 191-192.

354 M. Hadžišehović, *op.cit.*, p. 151.

order and Serbian dominance over the other republics. For the purpose of this study, the aspects relevant to this research will be mentioned. Namely, soon after Brioni the Communist Alliance started dealing more closely with the relations between the republics, their respective peoples and minorities. It was in this context that the Constitution of SFRY was amended in 1974, recognizing Bosnians for the first time as official federative people. The 1974 amendments also resulted in changing Yugoslavia's official coat of arms, which previously had six torches and five flames symbolizing the six republics and its five peoples. Now a sixth flame referring to the Bosnians was added.

Here it must be mentioned that in Balkan languages the term *Bosnian* carries territorial denomination – referring to someone who comes from Bosnia and Herzegovina, while the term *Bosniak* refers to national identity, as a Bosnian Muslim. However, in former Yugoslavia there was no possibility to identify oneself as *Bosniak*, and the term *Muslim* (with a capital “M”) was introduced instead. According to the orthography rules of the time, when one referred to the religious identity, the term *muslim* (with a small “m”) was to be used, to express the difference. On the other hand, such definitions opened the possibility of Muslims being treated as a subgroup, which can then be assigned to the Serbian, Croatian or Montenegrin national pool. But this complex issue requires a separate research and is beyond the scope of this study.

When discussing the political factors affecting migration, those influencing on a psychological level should also be taken into consideration. Namely, even when the years of direct pressure passed, Bosniaks still kept immigrating to Turkey. These factors are best demonstrated in the book of Ramiz Crnišanić, former high official of KPJ and one of the first Sandžak representatives who became vocal on the issue of mass emigration to Turkey. Emigrants often stated that they felt insecure about their future in the long term: “It can be good for us here while Tito is alive, but nobody knows what will happen when he dies. I am sure that I will live fifty times worse where I am going now,

but at least I will not worry about keeping my head...I am not sure how long will this freedom last, and what if somebody else comes? Again the old torment".³⁵⁵

There persisted a strong feeling of impermanence and of not belonging, which affected the whole attitude toward the economy and other aspects of life in Sandžak. This was partly due to the broad impression that Bosniak identity is directly tied to Turkish identity. The educational system taught about events from the Ottoman period followed by numerous negatives images of the Turks. Šaćić also recalls the tone of a history teacher in Sandžak, where children were made to blush and feel uncomfortable at those classes. Crnišanin in his public speech on the political situation and the tasks of the Communist Alliance in the Municipality of Novi Pazar, drew attention to the need to introduce a curriculum addressing the identity of Bosniaks (N.B. Crnišanin uses the word Muslims), so that young people would be released from the feeling of collective "Turkish guilt". It would have also enabled development of brotherhood and unity, so that young people might learn to perceive people on their individual merits rather than according to their names.³⁵⁶

For similar reasons and led by the criterion of religion, many Bosniaks ignored the fact of being an autochthonous people of the Balkans and considered Turkey as their real homeland. The urge to emigrate was reinforced by the fact that many had relatives who had already left, so even people who did not plan to move were left with little reason to remain. There were cases when even Party activists emigrated, because they faced the possibility of staying completely alone once their whole family had left.

Crnišanin also notes cases of propaganda, where persons who had "trouble with the regime", used arguments such as unjust development of certain regions and lower employment abilities to encourage the population to emigrate. Certain respected citizens of Novi Pazar supported the idea of emigration to Turkey too. Their aim was to spread the belief that Bosniaks did not

355 Ramiz Crnišanin, *Rasprave*, Beograd, 1999, p. 25.

356 *Ibid.*, p. 22.

belong to this new country and that they should leave while it was still possible. Many of the emigrants were selling their property, but were obliged to offer it first to the state. Only if the state did not want it could they offer it to another party. In this way, the state had its pick of the most attractive locations and often did not pay the proper price. It was not unusual for the “propaganda promoters” to actually aim at the properties of the potential emigrants, who ultimately sold it for prices much lower than expected.³⁵⁷ In conditions of complete passivity of state officials, this propaganda took hold.

IV.4 EMIGRATION FROM SANDŽAK

Once Partisans won WWII, slogans that the old days of fear and inequality were over could be heard all over Sandžak. Many young people, impressed with the ideas of Communism, approached the Party; while the older generations often could not even grasp the new notions and remained skeptical of the changes. The SFRY was widely promoted as a country of “Brotherhood and Unity”, the evil of capitalism was about to be eliminated, and the broad national masses were finally about to progress. However, the large-scale emigration of Bosniaks during socialism is a significant proof that such supposed “equality” was not equal for everyone.³⁵⁸

Precisely defining the number of emigrants to Turkey in the postwar period is a difficult task. Officially “only ethnic Turks” could leave, but in reality this category was interpreted very broadly, to include numerous Bosniaks, along with Albanians, Gorans and Torbesh, all of whom left identifying themselves as Turks. The data presented by Dr. Bandžović can be used to illustrate the scope of this migration. In his book they are submitted

357 *Ibid.*, pp. 22-31.

358 Or to quote George Orwell: “All animals are equal, but some animals are more equal than others.” *Animal Farm*, Ch. 10, George Orwell (London, 1945).

in written form, but for purposes of better illustration, they will be re-interpreted in a table format. The data refers to the total numbers of emigrants from Yugoslavia, but in the period 1955-1958 it is considered that most of the emigration is toward Turkey. There is an obvious decrease in numbers in the period 1961-1970.

Table 5: Statistical data on emigrants from Yugoslavia

| Year | Number of emigrants | Year | Number of emigrants | Year | Number of emigrants |
|------|---------------------|------|---------------------|------|---------------------|
| 1955 | 51.543 | 1961 | 11.418 | 1966 | 10.684 |
| 1956 | 54.862 | 1962 | 7.891 | 1967 | 8.774 |
| 1957 | 57.070 | 1963 | 8.661 | 1968 | 9.205 |
| 1958 | 41.426 | 1964 | 7.107 | 1969 | 6,665 |
| 1959 | 27.840 | 1965 | 9.701 | 1970 | 3.804 |
| 1960 | 23.182 | | | | |

Some statistical data can be interpreted in the following manner as well: in the period between 1954 - 1965 from Novi Pazar 722 families with 5.916 members left, and between 1964 - 1968, 914 families with 6.166 members, which is a total of 1.816 families with 12.212 members. From Tutin in the period from 1945-1965, 1.211 families with 8.545 people moved out. From Rožaje in the period 1945-1968 331 family with 2.795 members migrated to Turkey. According to Ejup Mušović, the Turkish "Hürriyet" newspaper on 18 April 1878 published a total number of 190.000 immigrants from Yugoslavia.³⁵⁹

If the emigration of Bosniaks to Turkey is to be summarized, it can be said that it started with the settling of the Communist power. As previously shown, many Bosniaks of Sandžak fought on different sides during WWII. Often they were motivated by protection of the local population, but sometimes they closely

³⁵⁹ E. Mušović, "Posleratne migracije iz Sandžaka", p.7 in *Odjek*, Sarajevo, br.22, 15-30.11.1989.

cooperated with the occupiers, blurring the lines between the two sides. In the earliest aftermath of the war, Communists began “settling their accounts” with the “enemies of the state” through the internal security forces. Many people who were considered to be leading figures among Bosniaks were liquidated by OZNA and UDBA. The pressure then continued on their families, burdened with the collective guilt of being “counter-revolutionary”.

As can be expected for a Communist leadership, the new powers imposed an atheist identity on the SFRY. Such measures included removal of the veil and burka, which among the Bosniak population, traditionally bound to its religious identity, was interpreted as form of pressure. The limitations upon the other religious practices were also not welcome.

The strongest incentive came with the various actions of the internal security forces, where the overwhelming use of force upon the Bosniak population was a clear sign of persistent nationalistic attitudes at higher levels. Facing direct threats to their lives and well-being, the numbers of potential emigrants grew rapidly. Moreover, the stagnant economy and the obviously lagging development of the region added a significant impetus. Simultaneously, the Gentlemen’s Agreement concluded on the international level, further facilitated the decision-making process.

IV.5 CONCLUSION

In an environment described in this chapter on economic, social and political factors conducive to emigration of Bosniaks from Sandžak, Bosniaks felt detached from this new state that was supposed to guarantee a better life. They began rushing toward “the homeland they had never seen”, using all available resources to obtain their permits - *Vasika*. Once the first wave of emigration took place, Turkey started sending different signals. Many

IV. THE COUNTRY OF "BROTHERHOOD AND UNITY"

of the newcomers were not "real Turks". Simultaneously, the local authorities undertook efforts to decelerate the process. But the feeling of not belonging in Yugoslavia was stronger, and pushed people to seek other arrangements. This time the road led more often through Macedonia.

Image 2: An official certification from the Consular Department of the Turkish Embassy in Belgrade stating that the below-mentioned persons are authorized to enter Turkey and are eligible to become Turkish citizens


TURSKA AMBASADA
KONZULARNO ODELENJE
Broj 5634/2686

Beograd, 27 Decembra 1956

UVERENJE

Konzularno Odeljenje Turske Ambasade u Beogradu ovim potvrđuje, da je Turska Vlada odobrila ulazak u Tursku licima, čija su imena, srodstvo i adresa dole označeni, i da će ista biti primljena u tursko državljanstvo.

Načelnik
Konzularnog Odeljenja



Imena:
1) Abdullah Şarukit pašanog Reşata Misirliogluja iz Turske
2) Azize " supruža Abdulaha Şarukita

Adresa: Novi-Pazar, Stevanja Nemanja No.37.
Lista No.411/61-I-

Image resource: Courtesy of Nadir Dacić.

V. THE ROUTE THROUGH MACEDONIA FOR BOSNIAK MIGRANTS

Through the 1950s, the number of families emigrating from Sandžak grew steadily. Most nights there was at least one bus full of people leaving from Novi Pazar to Turkey, often accompanied by dramatic emotional scenes.³⁶⁰ The emigrants included not just people who had troubles with the regime, but also old city families with comfortable incomes. There were representatives from all walks of life: merchants, craftsmen, administrative officers and agricultural workers, and most of them were loyal citizens. The phenomenon of mass emigration became so widespread that it affected all spheres of public life in Sandžak. As Crnišanin noted, it became practically the only subject of conversation among people, and even those who did not plan to emigrate began at least to consider it.³⁶¹ The various economic, social and political contexts created the impression that, although indigenous, Bosniaks did not truly belong to these lands. On the one hand the political pressure and restricted religious liberties threatened them directly. The problems were only exacerbated by the unfavorable economic conditions, backward agricultural techniques and poor employment prospects. On the other hand many family members had already left, making it even more difficult for those remaining to stay behind. Caught in the complex constellation of various influences, Sandžak became a fertile soil for diverse propaganda promoting emigration to Turkey.

Spurred by feelings of detachment and impermanence, many Bosniaks started acting indifferently toward the businesses and

360 O.Turković, *Velika Čuprija*, Novi Pazar, 1995, pp. 240-241, quoted in S. Bandžović, *op.cit.*, p. 565.

361 Ramiz Crnišanin, *Rasprave*, Beograd, 1999, p. 18.

potential development programs, which in turn affected progress as a whole. Many lost interest in any long term investments, production planning, or sometimes even basic infrastructural changes. Illustrative is the case of the village Glogovik, which could not be properly electrified because its population could not reach consensus. Half wanted to emigrate and so had little interest in local infrastructure, while the other half wanted to stay.³⁶² It even affected family life. Young people often opposed the idea of emigrating, because many of them were already enrolled in institutions of higher education. Not uncommon were cases in which one spouse was against emigrating, while the other favored it. Such families often ended up separating. "Divorces and unpleasant scenes take place, relatives gather to convince the 'disobedient' one, who does not want to listen to the elders and go under the 'Turkish cap'. Some students have their education discontinued by their parents. Some stay alone, without their family, because they do not want to leave."³⁶³ During the regime of Minister Ranković officials rarely spoke out on this issue, but this is hardly a justification. The people themselves interpreted the passivity of the state organs as a clear signal of support for their emigration. Taking the Gentlemen's Agreement into consideration, such an attitude seems logical in the broader political context. However, some Party officials of Bosniak origin did not completely turn a blind eye to the obvious demographic changes and became more vocal on the issue. One of the first such representatives was Ramiz Crnišanin, who by addressing the issue at the session of the Communist Alliance in Novi Pazar in 1956, initiated a discussion on the regional level. On that occasion Crnišanin listed all the reasons for emigration and warned the Party leadership about the urgency of the problem.³⁶⁴ The Party leadership of Sandžak acted on various levels to decelerate the process. Due to such initiative, and the activities of the Members of Parliament Vojo Leković and Selmo Hašimbegović, the Government of Serbia amended the pro-

362 *Ibid.*, p. 37.

363 Interview of Ramiz Crnišanin in Newspaper *Politika*, 17.03.1968, quoted in R. Crnišanin, *op.cit.*, p. 45.

364 *Ibid.*, p. 29.

cedures for renouncing Yugoslav citizenship, making the process considerably more cumbersome and difficult. However, these administrative steps had only a palliative effect, since they did little to stem emigration overall. Quite the contrary, it only pushed Bosniaks, committed to their decisions to emigrate, to seek alternative solutions.

Simultaneously, the Turkish side became skeptical of the "Turkishness" of certain newcomers. It turned out that large numbers of them belonged to different ethnic groups. Therefore the Consular Office of the Turkish Embassy in Skopje emphasized that it would "approve migration only of the Turkish minority from Macedonia, and reject the requests of Albanians from Macedonia and the Muslims coming from Kosovo and Sandžak."³⁶⁵ Bosniaks coming from Sandžak could overcome this regulation by spending at least two years in Macedonia, after which they could obtain the required documents, and then continue on their quest.

There were efforts on behalf of Sandžak politicians to end the possibility of moving through Macedonia to Turkey, and they even urged Macedonian officials on several occasions to tighten the migratory flow. Such requests were rejected, however, on the ground that dismissal was approved only for "real Turks."³⁶⁶ On the other hand, Imami notes that in this period the documents required to prove Turkish origin could be easily purchased or falsified in Macedonia.³⁶⁷

The census of the population in Yugoslavia clearly shows this tendency for identifying as a Turk: in 1948 – 97.954 citizens identified as Turks, in 1953 – 259.535, in 1961 – 182.964 and in 1971 – a total of 127.920.³⁶⁸ In the period 1953-1959 approximately 150.000 people who identified as "Turks" left Macedonia, and it

365 Arhiv Jugoslavije, 130-992-1502, sveska 1/56, Stenografske beleške sa sednice Odbora za unutrašnju politiku SIV-a, održana dana 18 aprila, 1956, document: Tempo iseljavanja pripadnika turske nacionalne manjine iz NR Makedonije, pp. 17-18, cited in E. Pezo, *op.cit.*, p. 119.

366 R. Crnišanin, *Tijesna Čaršija*, p. 192, cited in S. Bandžović, *op.cit.*, p. 551.

367 P. Imami, "Srbi i Albanci kroz vjekove", *feljton "Dan"*, Belgrade, 25.09.1998, quoted in S. Bandžović, *op.cit.*, p. 552.

368 K. Hadžić, "Brojnost i rasprostranjenost muslimana u Jugoslaviji", *Takvim*, Sarajevo, 1975, pp. 120-121, quoted in S. Bandžović, *op.cit.*, p. 194.

seems that many Bosniaks participated in this wave of emigration.³⁶⁹ According to other statistics, in 1959, 22.776 persons who migrated to Macedonia gained the republican citizenship of this country: 2.965 were from Sandžak and 2.850 were from Montenegro (N.B. Here the term “Sandžak” refers only to its Serbian part).³⁷⁰ None of these numbers can be taken as precise, since a very large portion of the population was un-registered.

Interviews conducted by Aleksandar Trajanovik with this population living in the villages around Prilep confirm the same reasons for migration as presented in the previous chapters.³⁷¹ Interviewees pointed particularly to police pressure applied by the forces of Ranković, but also to the fact that they were officially registered as Serbs of Muslim religion. Trajanovik notes that the “counter-revolutionary” background of some families strongly influenced their decisions to emigrate. These persons were punished and imprisoned even after coming to Macedonia.³⁷² Gorgi Malkovski also cites a desire to flee blood feud, which still persisted in some part of Sandžak. He also draws attention to the formerly Turkish villages that remained practically empty after ethnic Turks emigrated, and became populated mostly by Bosniaks from Sandžak who bought these properties at very low prices.³⁷³ On the other hand, Jovan Trifunoski contends that the over-population of Sandžak was a key reason for emigration: “they multiplied so much that one part had to go somewhere.”³⁷⁴

The first “gathering point” of Bosniaks coming to Macedonia was Skopje; it was only later that they started spreading to the villages around Veles and Prilep. On an annual level some 200 families from Sandžak were moving into Macedonia. They

369 Violeta Ačkovska, *Iseluvanjeto na Turcite od NR Makedonija po Vtorata svetska vojna*, quoted in Gorgi Malkovski, “Povoenite procesi na doseluvanje na Bošnjacite vo Makedonija do 1961 godina”, in *Bošnjacite na Balkanot*, Skopje, 2003, p. 138.

370 Arhiv na Makedonija – Skopje, f.CK KPM/SKM, komisija za nacionalni malcinstva, k-128, quoted in G. Malkovski, *op.cit.*, p. 139.

371 Aleksandar Trajanovski, “Bošnjacite vo Prilepsko”, in *Bošnjacite na Balkanot*, Skopje, 2003, p. 152.

372 *Ibid.*

373 Gorgi Malkovski, *op.cit.*, pp. 139-140.

374 Jovan Trifunoski, *Posleratne migracije stanovništva u Narodnoj Republici Makedoniji*, p. 125 in S. Bandžović, *op.cit.*, p. 550.

mostly concentrated in areas close to the major roads and city centers. By 1961 approximately 412 Bosniak families moved to Skopje and the neighboring villages of Dolno and Sredno Konjari, Orlandi, Batinci, Čojlija, Ljuboš, Kruša, Strahojadica, Kondovo, Čiflik and Katlanovo. Another 442 families populated the villages around Veles, including Gorno Orizari, Milino, Viničani, Crkvino and Vodovrati. In Prilep, 251 Bosniak families were located in the villages of Desovo, Lažani, Gorno Zitoše, Borino, Debrešte, Kanatlarci, Jakrenovo, Sazdevo and Peštalevo.³⁷⁵

The migrants were predominantly from Novi Pazar, Tutin and Sjenica, and to a much smaller extent from Priboj, Prijepolje, Pljevlje, Berane and Bijelo Polje. Certain grouping existed according to their place of origin. Thus Gorno Orizari became mostly populated with families from Sjenica, while the village of Crkvine became a destination for the people from Berane, and Gradsko and Vodovrati were popular among the immigrants from Tutin.³⁷⁶ Desovo and Kanatlarci were mostly populated by Bosniaks from Prijepolje and Sjenica.³⁷⁷ Bosniaks still live in these areas together with the other nationalities, including Macedonians, Albanians, Turks, Torbes, Gorans.

Bosniaks heading to Macedonia were mostly from the agricultural sector. Possessing no other relevant skills, these migrants often remained engaged in the same sector, following a period of adjustment to their new surroundings. Some of them learned to raise new crops, which were unfamiliar in their old homelands, such as rice, tobacco, and cotton. They were also successful in raising such crops as melons, wheat, and barley.³⁷⁸ The author Biberovik also noted that mostly younger generations were coming, since it was easier for them to adjust to new environments. One part of the population worked in animal husbandry, while a small portion joined the state administration. Most of these mi-

375 J. Trifunoski, "Bošnjaci" u Makedoniji", *Geografski pregled V*, Sarajevo, 1961, p. 95, quoted in G. Malkoski, *op.cit.*, p. 14.

376 Ramo Biberovik, "Bošnjacite vo Povardarjeto (Demografski prikaz od 1954 do denes)", in *Bošnjacite na Balkanot*, Skopje, 2003, pp. 164-175.

377 R. Škrijelj, "Neimarstvo na bošnjački način (IX)", *feljton "Glas Islama, br. 60*, Novi Pazar, Novembar 2001, cited in S. Bandžović, *op.cit.*, p. 558.

378 Ramo Biberovik, *op.cit.*, p. 164.

grants populated the villages where the Turkish minority had lived previously. As Turks were moving to Turkey in mass numbers, large numbers of easily affordable properties became available, thus creating preconditions for the Bosniaks to come. It is also worth noting that the migration in these villages continued up to 1985. This was not always a result of new waves of migrants, but was often a result of fluctuations between the villages where Bosniaks now lived.³⁷⁹

After the necessary documentation was obtained, many of these people continued to Turkey. However, there were cases where families returned to Sandžak. There were even Bosniak returnees from Turkey, who stayed in Macedonia and did not continue all the way back. There were also families that did not even try to continue their path, but decided to remain where they already settled in Macedonia. The reasons for such decisions can be found in the poor economic situation in Turkey, which lagged behind Yugoslavia. Also communications from families who had already left were intense and most of them did not live in favorable conditions at first. At the same time, many Bosniaks in Macedonia had already created a comfortable lifestyle. They were slowly learning the language, which was not drastically different from their native one; they already had jobs in towns or developed some crops in the villages; and they were positively accepted in their new environment. When the “political migrants” are taken into consideration, the decent surroundings in Macedonia are of even greater significance.

The Bosniaks who nowadays live in Macedonia are generally well adjusted to the state system as a whole. They have generally learned the Macedonian language while preserving their native Bosnian, have gained their education in the official Macedonian institutions, and have integrated well into the socio-economic and political context of Macedonia. With the 2001 amendment to the preamble of the Macedonian Constitution, Bosniaks also became one of the constitutional peoples composing the ethnic composition of Macedonia. According to the last official

379 *Ibid.*, p. 171.

census in Macedonia, completed in 2002, there are 17.018 Bosniaks, which is 0.84% of the total population.³⁸⁰ The census of 2011 was cancelled before it was completed, but Bosniak officials expected that number to rise to approximate 30.000.

The number of migrants pouring into Macedonia started decreasing once the new legislation on citizenship was enacted. Namely, in 1964 a new Law on Citizenship³⁸¹ was passed, which facilitated the procedures for relinquishing Yugoslav citizenship, and which simultaneously enabled emigrants to go to Turkey directly from their places of origin. According to this law, once an adult regularized his other financial and legal obligations toward all entities in the state (including mandatory military service for men) and proved that he or she was or would be accepted to the citizenship of another country, they could renounce their Yugoslav citizenship. The decision on a petition to renounce Yugoslav citizenship was made on the regional level, directly by the Alliance Secretariat for Internal Affairs. Now migrants were able to follow new routes, sometimes completely circumventing Macedonia. From Raška and sometimes from Belgrade they would travel by train to Niš in southern Serbia, and then continue through Bulgaria directly to Turkey.

These new regulations enabled emigration to gain even greater momentum. Documents were obtained more easily than before, and there was hardly a case in which such a request was rejected. On the other hand, there were a few scattered cases of people returning to Sandžak, often due to the administrative difficulties imposed on both sides. But on balance the demographic maps of Sandžak were permanently changed, leaving certain villages virtually empty.³⁸² The de-population became so stark that the regional Party leadership deemed it a regular discussion topic

380 Državen zavod za statistika na Republika Makedonija (2003):Soopštenie na Državniot zavod za statistika, Popis na naselenieto, domakinstvata, stanovite vo Republika Makedonija, 2002 godina – definitivni podatoci, Skopje, quoted in Zečir Ramčilović, "Teritorijalna rasporedjenost Bošnjaka u Republici Makedoniji", in *Seobe kao sudbina*, Skopje, 2011, p. 394.

381 *Službeni list SFRJ*, br.38/64, cited in S. Bandžović, *op.cit.*, p. 564.

382 S. Bandžović, *op.cit.*, pp. 568-573.

for its meetings. As a result, certain measures were applied.³⁸³

The fact that this migration route passed through Macedonia is a vivid demonstration that administrative measures alone are insufficient to regulate a wave of emigration. If people are determined to emigrate, they will strive to find shortcuts around the bureaucratic apparatus. This is especially relevant in cases where people feel compelled to move. As explained in the preceding chapter, legislative provisions can impose strong impetus for or against it. However, the decision to emigrate is far too major and complex decision to be curtailed by administrative measures, especially in cases when it involves whole families moving to unfamiliar locations. The reasons behind such an impulse must be found "on the ground", in the surroundings where the immigrants come from and where their decisions are formed. Sandžak, with its specific socio-political characteristics, was obviously not on the Yugoslav leadership's priority list for development. Moreover, various measures tacitly stimulated mass migration. The present ethnic mosaic of Macedonia is an excellent indicator of the results of such policies.

383 R. Crnišanin, *op.cit.*, pp. 15-106.

IV. THE COUNTRY OF “BROTHERHOOD AND UNITY”

Image 3: Ethnic map of Macedonia (in next page)

Map resource: https://sr.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%A0%D0%B5%D0%BF%D1%83%D0%B1%D0%BB%D0%B8%D0%BA%D0%B0_%D0%9C%D0%B0%D0%BA%D0%B5%D0%B4%D0%BE%D0%BD%D0%B8%D1%98%D0%B0#/media/File:Makedonija_-_Etnicki_sastav_po_naseljima_2002.gif (Access date: 01.09.2015)

РЕПУБЛИКА МАКЕДОНИЈА


Етнички состав по населенија
према попису становништва из 2002. године

Автори: Милан Ђоџа, Иван Вукчиќ
2010.

REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA


Ethnic structure by settlements
according to 2002. census

Authors: Milan Djogo, Ivan Vukicev
2010.



* Муслиманци су у резултатима пописа сврстани у групу Осталих.
* Паспаљ Власки и Одровци су у резултатима пописа наведени
као две општине Дебар, уместо као две општине Центар Заг.

* Muslims are in the census results included in group Other.
* Settlements Vlaski and Odrinci are listed in the census results as part
municipality of Debar instead as a part of municipality of Centar Zag



CONCLUSION

The goal of this research on the migrations of Bosniaks from former Yugoslavia to Turkey during times of socialism is to reconstruct the actual sociopolitical and economic context of Sandžak during the years 1945-1974, as a means of scrutinizing the credibility of the widespread SRFJ slogan of “Brotherhood and Unity”. Bosniak emigration to Turkey took place in several waves, starting from the Berlin Congress of 1878 to the early 1970s, but the communist period was chosen here for specific reasons. Namely the previous migrations took place in times when the old Empires (the Ottoman, the Austro-Hungarian and later the Russian) were falling apart and young nation-states were emerging in the turbulent Balkans. Religion was still considered as a strong indicator of one’s identity, and nation-building was often perceived as imposing the dominance of one nation to the detriment of another. In that sense, the expulsion of Bosniaks, along with other “Ottoman populations” (as Justin McCarthy calls them), is no surprise. But why would authorities whose ideology is supposedly based on atheism, unity and equality choose to drive out the populace of regions primarily inhabited by religious and national minorities?

World War II, like any war, inflicted devastating consequences upon the whole territory of the SFRY. Entrapped in its complex ethnic and political constellations, this legacy of bitterness was even stronger in Sandžak. The Bosniak population was already accustomed to longlasting fear and insecurity, which had often shaped its choices during the war. While one portion joined the National Liberation Movement, others were more concerned with protecting the local populace against the Chetnik attacks.

Other Bosniaks formed separate military units, the so-called Muslim militias, which on several occasions cooperated with the occupiers to achieve their goals. There were also Bosniaks who fought in special SS divisions of the German Nazi regime. The end of the war brought serious troubles to all of them.

By the end of 1944, the Partisans needed more fighters in their ranks. They promised amnesty for all those who would join them, along with broadly propagated promises of social well-being and equality for all peoples of the new Yugoslavia. In that light a separate Antifascist Assembly of the National Liberation for Sandžak (Zemaljsko Antifašističko Vijeće Narodnog Oslobođenja Sandžaka- ZAVNOS) was constituted, guaranteeing that all questions there would be resolved according to the will of the people of Sandžak. As positive impressions grew, so too did the number of supporters approaching the Partisans. By 1945 ZAVNOS was abolished with the explanation that “there is no national ground” for creating an autonomous unit, which raises the question of whether the discourse previously promoted by the National Liberation was just propaganda for gathering support or instead that some other factors came to the fore later.

While one part of the Sandžak population was still hesitant in their attitudes toward the new authorities, the events of the early aftermath of WWII left serious scars upon Bosniak collective memory. Under the veil of dealing with “counter-revolutionaries”, hundreds of former Bosniak fighters were executed. Numerous people were killed in the notorious Hadžet, while others became objects of the secret police. The punishment extended to the younger generations as well, stigmatizing every member of such a family and hindering their wholesome integration into the new country. In Sandžak, the promises of amnesty were not only largely forgotten by the new authorities, but were often applied according to a double standard.

As often happens, the young people were most eager to embrace the new Yugoslav identity. They voluntarily joined the work actions, participated in the various educational institutions, and helped spread the ideas of the “progressive proletariat”. And

while the number of Party members grew, the older generation skeptically waited to see the other side of these new powers. Before long their skepticism was confirmed. As people who witnessed numerous disturbances due to their beliefs, Bosniaks were strongly bound to their traditional life and religious identity. On the other hand, communism based its ideology on atheism and consequently shaped its policies in that direction. The incentives for removing the veil and the burka, accompanied by various restrictions on the practice of religion, pushed against a wall of stark resistance among the Sandžak population. Once removing the veil became legally mandatory, numerous women responded by simply remaining within their homes for long periods. No small number feared that this was just the first in what could become a line of prohibitions against expressing their Islamic identity. This anxiety is central to answering the question of why Bosniaks chose Turkey as their destination, particularly in times when conditions in Turkey made it a less-than-ideal destination. Though most Bosniaks had never seen Turkey before, nor possessed skills that would guarantee well-being, they packed their bags, apparently comforting themselves that “at least we will be among our people.”

Yugoslav Communists were very proud of their leadership, and often expressed it through comparisons with the “old Yugoslavia” where the bourgeoisie only got richer on the expense of the people. But certain phenomena in Sandžak show that the Communists did copy certain practices from the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. Police and security forces seemed to best remember the tricks for turning a potential emigration into a mass one. Bosniaks could not forget those either. The brutal interrogations in the middle of the night due to police actions for “collecting arms” powerfully created the impression that the state treated these people with deep distrust.

The system taught consecutive generations in Yugoslavia that there was no such thing as a separate Bosniak identity. These were Muslims (with capital “M”) and as such could become a sub-group of a “proper” national pool, be it Serbian, Croatian, Montenegrin or

eventually Yugoslav. This, according to the official ideology, was where they actually belonged, since they had accepted Islam in the era of the “evil Turks”. On the other hand, such an approach seemed designed to engender some feelings of collective guilt and even inferiority. Consequently, it was no surprise that many Bosniaks embraced the possibility of identifying as Turks and rushed to the “primordial fatherland”. This issue can also be analyzed from the perspective of the first and second generations of Bosniak immigrants in Turkey. It would be even more intriguing if it eventually provokes a comparative study of the respective generations in Turkey and in some other country of non-Muslim majority, which would serve as an interesting indicator of the role of religion upon the creation and embracing of identity.

The data presented in this research mainly focuses on the factors that acted in the country of origin, in order to demonstrate that emigration is not always preconditioned on the economic attractiveness of the target destination. History has shown many times that it is difficult to fully control a migration wave. This notion turned out to be a big disappointment for the Sandžak leadership. Of course certain guilt can be ascribed to their passive attitude, which may not have motivated migration all by itself, but certainly did not prevent it either. Administrative restrictions seemed to be the most logical solution at the beginning. With time, the Sandžak leadership learned an important lesson in migrations – it is necessary to keep the sociopolitical and economic conditions at a satisfactory level if people are to be prevented from mass emigration.

The fact that Bosniaks did not move to more prosperous locations, and instead chose Turkey at a time when it lagged economically behind Yugoslavia, shows that this migration was not primarily driven by economics. However, the economic conditions in Sandžak cannot be overlooked. As this study shows, banishing private businesses largely affected the life in towns, but it also affected the villages. Moreover, large investment projects often circumvented Sandžak. Some researchers use this as an argument for proving that nationalist politics were

important even within the SFRY. But other realities should not be excluded either. Due to its past, Sandžak was not viewed as a “sufficiently revolutionary” region. The municipality of Sjenica can serve as an excellent illustration of such an attitude. Additionally, the number of Bosniaks in decision making positions, *i.e.* the level of their integration within the whole state system, could not contribute significantly to larger development either.

Although this study is concentrated on the living conditions in Sandžak, this emigration can by no means be isolated from the events on the international scene. The improvement of Yugoslav-Turkish relations and the consequent Gentlemen’s Agreement not only shaped this specific migration, but also affected the demographic map of a third country – Macedonia. What is particularly interesting, and ironic, is that the Turkish side considered Interior Minister Ranković to be the “guardian” of the implementation of the Agreement.

The slogan of “Brotherhood and Unity” was widely promoted in the SFRY, and was supposed to be the magic glue that would keep together the various nations and minorities within one socialist country. And while it did bring certain prosperity to the region as a whole, the tragic events of the 1990s unavoidably raise the question of how things went so wrong. When the people preparing to emigrate were asked why, given that Yugoslavia was a better place to live, they often answered that they were not sure what would come after Tito’s inevitable death. This should not be confused with any Yugo-nostalgic attitudes, but in light of the subsequent events, one cannot avoid the question of whether these emigrants were right so many years before. And one also wonders whether stable inter-ethnic relations in this area today are perhaps only temporary.

The sociopolitical and economic portrait of Sandžak laid out in the previous pages of this book is aimed at illustrating the anomalies of socialist Yugoslavia during 1945-1974. It would be utopian to expect any country to be perfectly organized, and the aim of the author was not to demonstrate the imperfections of SFRY. However, the emergence of mass emigration is a clear

indicator of the existence of “oppressors and oppressed”. In this respect, the discussions integrated within the theoretical framework of Andrew Bell-Fialkoff inevitably intertwine in this study: what is forced migration? Is it only when people are directly pushed to emigrate or can it also occur where authorities create such an environment that emigration seems like the most logical solution for a decent life?

The authorities of SFRY can argue in their defense that they did not impose any official measures aimed only at a specific population. Moreover, state policies were applied on the territory of the whole country, without any special geographic preferences. But these do not answer the question of why Sandžak Bosniaks did not choose some location other than Turkey as their destination, especially given the possibilities for colonization of fertile lands in Vojvodina. And if Yugoslavia truly was concerned with all its peoples equally, why is it that only emigrants heading to Turkey had to renounce their citizenship, while other emigrants did not?

This study seeks to make a modest contribution to those seeking answers about the complex inter-ethnic relations in the Balkans. It is a result of an analysis of secondary resources covering various relevant aspects of the issue. Research often disclosed sources offering completely different interpretations of identical events, which is to be expected in any study of history. On the other hand, many policies applied in the SFRY had multifaceted results. But this study covers only the “negative” ones, since only those served as factors contributing to emigration. Another disadvantage is the limited number of resources covering “controversial” issues in the post-WWII era. It is only recently that these topics have begun to be addressed and various works have begun to be published. And of course some of these new works tend toward the more “romantic-patriotic” and less toward the “scientific” approach.

Access to the archives of the former Inner Security Agency of Yugoslavia for files older than 50 years has recently been allowed to the scientific public. These files have been covered only

through secondary resources in this study, but even those documents are not properly systematized. A comprehensive qualitative study covering these issues could offer closer perspective on the “forbidden topics”. Unfortunately many of the direct participants and observers are no longer alive, which limits the extent of a proper analysis.

The migration of Bosniaks to Turkey has been an inspiration for many researchers. Various authors have covered different aspects of it to demonstrate a specific aspect of the region as a whole. Researchers dealing with nationalism and ethnicity politics, minority issues, identity policies, and even international relations and history can find this topic enlightening from various perspectives. What is especially rewarding is the fact that this subject enables a variety of different approaches to be combined. The growing number of researchers addressing it highlights its vivid character.

Instead of a closing paragraph, this study concludes with a quotation from the old lady Derva, illustrating a whole era in Sandžak.

“People were going and running away, all out of fear. Well, even now, don’t they run away? The youngsters are spread all over the world...The way it has started, it will never calm down. All dispersed...God knows whether they will ever come together.”³⁸⁴

384 Semiha Kačar, *op.cit.*, p. 9.

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(Footnotes)

- 1 NB: *Listed only as Orthodox. Greek, Bulgarian and Yugoslavian censuses for the years listed.

