

April 3, 2019

John T. Krzeszewski  
Chief Engineer, Cybersecurity  
Chair, “PG1: Risk Management” in ISO/SAE 21434



● ISO/SAE 21434  
AUTOMOTIVE CYBERSECURITY STANDARD

# AGENDA



- Overview of Aptiv and cybersecurity
- ISO/SAE 21434 “Road vehicles: Cybersecurity Engineering”
  - Why the standard is needed and general background
  - Key principles
  - Scope
  - ISO and SAE delegations involved in the development
  - Overview of the document structure
  - Timeline
  - Cybersecurity Assurance Level

We are a global technology company that develops **secure, safer, greener, and more connected** solutions, which enable the future of mobility.

• APTIV •



# Aptiv Addressing Mobility's Toughest Challenges


Aptiv Provides End-to-end Solutions that Allow us to Commercialize New Mobility

## SMART VEHICLE ARCHITECTURE

SOFTWARE



SENSING AND COMPUTING



SIGNAL AND POWER DISTRIBUTION



CONNECTIVITY



## SMART MOBILITY SOLUTIONS

ACTIVE SAFETY



USER EXPERIENCE



CONNECTED SERVICES



AUTONOMOUS SYSTEMS




• **A P T I V** •

# Experience with Cybersecurity Guidelines and Techniques

## Security must be part of the entire product life-cycle

- Cybersecurity is a product architecture, a design, and a system qualification
- Cybersecurity follows the development v-cycle



## We have a multi-layered guideline to protect products

- Proper protection is based on TARA (Threat Analysis / Risk Analysis) results

## Aptiv's 4-levels of system security

- Level 1 – Guidelines and best practices – TARA, reviews, code analysis
- Level 2 – Authenticated software – secure boot, secure updates
- Level 3 – Secure external attack surfaces – firewall, communication restrictions
- Level 4 – Secure internal messaging – encrypt data, protect diagnostics



# Experience with Cybersecurity

## Established Cybersecurity Facility - CyberSEAL Lab

Operational World Class Cybersecurity Testing Facility

### Lab Responsibilities

- Threat modeling (TARA)
- Vulnerability assessments
- Penetration assessments
- Development of advanced security tools
- Training & awareness in the art of exploitation (hands-on)
- Advanced cybersecurity R&D
  - Blockchain work group
- POC evaluations

### Lab Achievements

- Highly qualified security experts in place
- Completed penetration assessments
- Established lab test processes




Test Benches




Advanced Tools (Aptiv GPS spoofing tool)




Training



- RECON
- DOCUMENTATION REVIEW



- PLANNING
- BUILD ENVIRONMENT



- ASSESSMENT



- REPORTING

Penetration Testing Process

Multiple Partnerships with Leading Cybersecurity Companies

# Why is Standard needed for Automotive Cybersecurity?



- Existing cybersecurity standards do not address unique automotive challenges
  - Safety
  - Long lifecycle
  - Use of embedded controllers
  - etc.

# Benefit of Standard for Automotive Cybersecurity



- Define common terminology for use throughout supply chain
- Drive industry consensus on key cybersecurity issues
- Set minimum criteria for vehicle cybersecurity engineering
- Reference for regulators, etc. to minimize contradictions
- Provide evidence that industry is taking cybersecurity seriously

# ISO/SAE 21434 – How Did This Begin?



- SAE issued Best Practice document
  - J3061 “Cybersecurity Guidebook for Cyber-Physical Vehicle Systems”
  - Issued 2016-01-14
- ISO New Item Work Proposal 3556 “Automotive Security Engineering”
- Nov. 2016: Partnership Standards Development Organization (PSDO)
- Cooperation agreement between ISO and SAE in two areas:
  - Road Vehicles
  - Intelligent Transportation Systems
- SAE & ISO to work together to develop cybersecurity standard
- ISO/SAE 21434 = first standard to be created under new agreement
  - Will be jointly released by both SAE and ISO

# ISO SAE 21434 Participation

- 82 companies



**OEMs**

**ECU  
SUPPLIERS**

**GOVERNING  
ORG**

**Technology  
Providers**

**STANDARDS  
ORG**


**MICRO  
SUPPLIERS**

**RESEARCH  
&  
VALIDATION**

**CYBERSECURITY  
COMPANIES**

***OTHERS***

# ISO SAE 21434 Participation



# ISO/SAE 21434 – Key Principles (1 of 2)



1. Applicable to **road-vehicles**
2. Goal of **reasonably secure** vehicles and systems
3. Automakers and suppliers can use to show “**due diligence**”
4. Focus on **automotive cybersecurity engineering**
5. Based on **current state-of-the-art** for cybersecurity engineering

# ISO/SAE 21434 – Key Principles (2 of 2)



## 6. **Risk-oriented** approach

- Risk is used for prioritization of action
- Analyses of risk factors for methodical elicitation of cybersecurity requirements
- Common language for communicating/managing cyber risk among stakeholders

## 7. **Management activities for cybersecurity**

## 8. Cybersecurity activities/processes for **all phases of vehicle lifecycle**:

- Design and Engineering, Production, Operation by Customer
- Maintenance and Service, Decommissioning

# ISO/SAE 21434

## What will it be applicable to?



- Applicable to:
  - Road vehicle,
  - its systems,
  - its components,
  - its software,
  - its connection from vehicle to any external device/network.

# ISO/SAE 21434 – What is Out of Scope?



- ISO/SAE 21434 will:
  - **NOT** prescribe specific cybersecurity technology or solutions
  - **NOT** include requirements on specific remediation methods
  - **NOT** include requirements for telecommunications system
  - **NOT** specify requirements for connected back-office
  - **NOT** specify requirements for electric vehicle chargers
  - **NOT** specify unique requirements for autonomous vehicles

# ISO/SAE 21434 -- Purpose



## The purpose is to:

- Define a structured process to ensure cybersecurity is designed in upfront
  - Following a structured process helps reduce the potential for a successful attack, thus reducing the likelihood of losses
  - A structured process also provides a clear means to react to a continually changing threat landscape
- Maintain consistency across global industry
- Be complete and promote conscious decision making

# ISO/SAE 21434 – Joint Working Group (JWG)



- Equal number of votes for SAE experts and ISO delegations:
  - 1 vote per ISO Delegation
  - 1 vote per SAE expert (limited to equivalent number of national delegations)
- Co-chaired by SAE & ISO
- Votes on key issues relative to 21434
- Coordinate work of Project Groups (PGs)

# Delegations



- ISO
  - Austria
  - Belgium
  - China
  - France
  - Germany
  - Israel
  - Italy
  - Japan
  - Korea
  - Netherlands
  - Sweden
  - Switzerland
  - United Kingdom
- SAE Experts (13 votes)
  - Angela Barber
  - Lisa Boran
  - Jonathon Brookfield
  - Chris Clark
  - Gary English
  - Di Jin
  - John Krzeszewski
  - Susan Lightman
  - Bill Mazarra
  - Brian Murray
  - Dan Selke
  - Anuja Sonalker
  - Alan Tatourian
  - Giri Venkat
  - David Ward
  - André Weimerskirch

# ISO/SAE 21434 – Project Groups (PGs)



- PG1: Risk Assessment Methods 54 participants
- PG2: Product Development 42 participants
- PG3: Production, Operations & Maintenance 29 participants
- PG4: Process Overview and Interdependencies 37 participants
- Drafting Team (ISO co-chair; SAE co-chair)
- Terms & Definitions Team (member from each PG)
- Use Case Team (members from each PG)



# ISO/SAE 21434 – Committee Draft Outline

(1 of 4)



- 1.0 Scope**
- 2.0 Normative References**
- 3.0 Terms and Abbreviations**
- 4.0 General Considerations
- 5.0 Management of Cybersecurity
- 6.0 Risk Assessment Methods & Treat
- 7.0 Concept Phase
- 8.0 Product Development
- 9.0 Production, Operations and Maintenance
- 10.0 Supporting Processes
- Annexes



Mandatory elements of every ISO standard.

- What the standard does & its applicability
- External sources of mandatory contents

# ISO/SAE 21434 – Committee Draft Outline

(2 of 4)



- 1.0 Scope
- 2.0 Normative References
- 3.0 Terms and Abbreviations
- 4.0 General Considerations**
- 5.0 Management of Cybersecurity**
- 6.0 Risk Assessment Methods & Treatment
- 7.0 Concept Phase
- 8.0 Product Development
- 9.0 Production, Operations and Maintenance
- 10.0 Supporting Processes
- Annexes

Informative text – no requirements.

- Provides context
- Describes structure of the standard
- Explains interrelationships of clauses

Cybersecurity-specific or cybersecurity focused management activities:

- At corporate level
- For different phases of engineering lifecycle
- Over product lifetime

# ISO/SAE 21434 – Committee Draft Outline

(3 of 4)



- 1.0 Scope
- 2.0 Normative References
- 3.0 Terms and Abbreviations
- 4.0 General Considerations
- 5.0 Management of Cybersecurity
- 6.0 Risk Assessment Methods & Treatment**
- 7.0 Concept Phase**
- 8.0 Product Development
- 9.0 Production, Operations and Maintenance
- 10.0 Supporting Processes
- Annexes

Methodology for analysis, assessment and management of cybersecurity risk.

Processes and activities relative to cybersecurity engineering during concept phase.

# ISO/SAE 21434 – Committee Draft Outline

(4 of 4)



- 1.0 Scope
- 2.0 Normative References
- 3.0 Terms and Abbreviations
- 4.0 General Considerations
- 5.0 Management of Cybersecurity
- 6.0 Risk Assessment Methods & Treatment
- 7.0 Concept Phase
- 8.0 Product Development**
- 9.0 Production, Operations and Maintenance**
- 10.0 Supporting Processes**
- Annexes

Product Development phase processes and activities (not cybersecurity focused) that add to or support cybersecurity engineering.

Processes and activities relative to cybersecurity engineering in post-development phase.

General processes and activities (not cybersecurity focused) that add to or support cybersecurity engineering.

# ISO/SAE 21434 – High-level Timeline



Kickoff meeting  
October 17<sup>th</sup>, 2016

...

ISO **CD**/SAE  
Wider Committee  
Ballot

Sept 2018

ISO **WD**/SAE  
Internal Committee  
Ballot

April 2018

ISO **DIS**/SAE  
MVC Ballot

October 2019

Expect a 2020 release  
(Late in year, if DIS does not pass ballot)

# ISO/SAE 21434

## Overview of Stages WD, CD, DIS



- **Working Draft (WD)**

- Developed/reviewed by JWG participants
- Informal comment resolution

- **Committee Draft (CD)**

- Request for comments sent to ISO Technical Committee & SAE Committee
- 8 weeks review period/ballot; approval by consensus
- Formal comment resolution process

- **Draft International Standard (DIS)**

- Request for comments sent to all ISO National Bodies and to SAE Committee
- 12 weeks review period/ballot; 2/3 majority for approval
- Formal comment resolution process (no technical comments for passage)
- Publicly for sale

# ISO/SAE 21434 – Committee Draft (CD)



- All CD comments received (3,534) must be formally addressed
  - Plan is to address majority of those by May for an internal draft
    - Internal draft review amongst 21434 delegates, resulting in DIS
- All normative clauses to be indicated by terms “shall” or “shall not”
  - Requirements to be strictly followed in order to meet ISO/SAE 21434
  - No deviation is permitted from these requirements
- Rationale will be provided for each normative clause
  - A short explanation of the purpose of a requirement, or group of requirements

# ISO/SAE 21434 – Committee Draft (CD)



- JWG has voted to have Cybersecurity Assurance Level (CAL) in 21434
- Decision made to including CAL:
  - CAL level would indicate the required level of cybersecurity process rigor
  - Methodology for determining CAL is defined in ISO/SAE 21434
  - CAL is **informational**
- CD has recently been released for comment

# CAL Purpose and Benefits



## - What problem does CAL solve?

- ISO/SAE 21434 is a single standard which is to be applied to many types of items, which contain assets with different levels of criticality
- Applying all requirements of ISO/SAE 21434 in all cases is **neither appropriate nor feasible**
- An appropriate means of **scaling the effort and costs** of implementing the cybersecurity engineering process requirements is required
- The automotive distributed development process requires a common means of **communicating these process requirements** through the supply chain, and also within an organization

# CAL Purpose and Benefits

## - How CAL helps



### Appropriate scaling of engineering process

The CAL concept enables **scaling of the engineering process** to ensure we build in **appropriate security** while managing costs, without over-engineering

### Assurance / confidence

Scaling is achieved based on how much **assurance (confidence)** we need to have in the developed item based on what could go wrong

### Engineering process rigour

CAL sets assurance requirements in terms of the **engineering process rigour**

### Methods and measures

The required engineering process rigour determines the applicable **methods and measures** within the ISO/SAE 21434 requirements in order to achieve that assurance

# 1. CAL Purpose and Benefits

## - Assurance – some definitions

- grounds for **confidence** that a TOE meets the SFRs
  - ISO/IEC 15408-1:2009
  - Information technology — Security techniques — Evaluation criteria for IT security
- grounds for **justified confidence** that a claim has been or will be achieved
  - ISO/IEC 15026-1:2013 (also NIST SP 800-160)
  - Systems and software engineering — Systems and software assurance
- grounds for **confidence** that a deliverable meets its security objectives
  - ISO/IEC 21827:2008
  - Information technology — Security techniques — Systems Security Engineering — Capability Maturity Model<sup>®</sup> (SSE-CMM<sup>®</sup>)
- Assurance in this context means **confidence**, it does **not** imply **guarantee**

# CAL Purpose and Benefits

## - “Heritage” of CAL



- Assurance levels are **not** a new invention for ISO/SAE 21434
- Variants of integrity or assurance levels can be found in other established standards:

- **Functional safety**

- IEC 61508 – Safety Integrity Level (SIL)
- ISO 26262 – Automotive Safety Integrity Level (ASIL)
- DO-178 – Design Assurance Level (DAL)

- **Security**

- ISO/IEC 15408 – Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL)
- IEC 62443 – Security Level (SL)

The different risk models adopted by these standards mean that their uses of levels are not directly comparable

- None of these is suitable to use **directly** in ISO/SAE 21434
- However the CAL takes **inspiration** from several of these


# How CAL relates to other concepts




- **CAL** and **Risk** have a connection, but are **not the same**
- Need to decouple **CAL** and dynamic **Risk** factors (so CAL remains as stable as possible)

What is my current residual risk given the current spec / design / implementation?

What level of assurance do I need given the criticality of the assets I need to protect?



# How CAL relates to other concepts



# Thank you

# Questions?

**John T. Krzeszewski**

Chief Engineer, Cybersecurity Architecture  
Aptiv

[john.t.krzeszewski@aptiv.com](mailto:john.t.krzeszewski@aptiv.com)

aptiv.com

# Revisions



- Updated 19MAR19