SC10 369 Jurisdictional Initial Brief 400 10 Juris Ini Ada

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PROVIDED
TO
GLADES
IN
THE
SUPREME
COURT
OF
FLORIDa£°^§I=CTIONAL
MSIITLJTION
FORivd
^
ANTHONY
GREEN,
Petitioner,
VS.
S.C.NO.
SC10-369
D.C.A.NO.4D08-3864
L.T.
No:99-9246CF10B
STATE
OF
FLORIDA,
Respondent.
3
p-
cr:
m
fS3
cn
O
P
>
PETITIONER'S
JURISDICTIONAL
BRIEF
f
COUNSEL
]
Anthony
Green
DC
#274930,
Dorm
A1-120L
Glades
Correctional
Institution
500
Orange
Avenue Circle
Belle
Glade,
Florida
33430
TABLE
OF
CONTENTS
TABLE
OF
CONTENTS
j_
TABLE
OF
CITATIONS
AND
AUTHORITIES
ii
STATEMENT
OF
THE
CASE
AND
FACTS
1
SUMMARY
OF
THE
ARGUMENT
1
STATEMENT
ON
JURISDICTION
3
ARGUMENT
4
THE
FOURTH
DISTRICT
COURT
OF
APPEAL'S
DECISION
GREEN
V.
STATE.
34
FLA.
L.
WKLY.
D2494
(4th
DCA
2009)
DIRECTLY
AND
EXPRESSLY
CONFLICTS
WITH
THE
FIRST
DISTRICT
IN
KNIGBT
V.
STATE.
566
SO.2D
339
(1990);
AND
WHITE
V.
STATE,
619
SO.2D
429
(1993);;
SECOND
DISTRICT
IN
GRADDY
V.
STATE. 517
SO.2D
772
(1988);
BOWLING
V.
STATE.
779
SO.2D
613
(2001);
SWILLEY
V.
STATE.
781
SO.2D
458
(2001)
;
AND
THE
FIFTH
DISTRICT
IN
MANIS
V.
STATE,
5D09-615,
FEBRUARY
19,
2010
(35
FLA.
L.
WKLY.
D422)
,
AND
OTHER
DECISION
OF
THE
FLORIDA
SUPREME
COURT.
CONCLUSION
10
UNNOTARIZED
OATH
10
CERTIFICATE
OF
SERVICE
10
CERTIFICATE
OF
COMPLIANCE
10
TABLE
OF
CITATIONS
PAGE
NO
Baptists
v.
State.
995
So.2d
285
at
294
(S.Ct.
2008)
5
Bernhardt
v.
State,
288
So.2d
490
(Fla.
1974)
6,8
Bowling
v.
State,
779
So.2d
613
(2nd
DCA
2001)
4
Dade
County
Metropolitan
Transit
Authority
v.
Even,
262
So.2d
685
(3rd
DCA
1972)
4
Dawkins
v.
State,
936
So.2d
710
(Fla.
2nd
DCA
2006)
8
Dolinger
v.
State,
779
So.2d
419,420-21(Fla.
2nd
DCA
2000)...8,9
Gagnon
v.
Scarpelli,
93
S.Ct.
1756
(1973)
8
Graddy
v.
State,
517
So.2d
772
(Fla.
2nd
DCA
1988)
4,7
Green
v.
State,
34
Fla.
L.
Weekly
D2494
(4th
DCA
2009)
4
Holland
v.
State,
696
So.2d
757
(Fla.
1997)
4
Jackson
v.
State,
807
So.2d
684
(Fla.
2nd
DCA
2001)
8,9
Knight
v.
State,
566
So.2d
339
(1st
DCA
1990)
4,9
Manis
v.
State,
5D09-615,
Feb
19,
2010,
(35,
Fla.
L.
Wkly.
D422)
4,9
Martin
v.
State,
399
So.2d
128
(5th
DCA
1981)
6
Morrisey
v.
Brewer,
92
S.Ct.
2593
(1972)
8
Pendergrass
v.
State,
601
So.2d
1250
(Fla.
2nd
DCA
1992)
7
Ramirez
v.
State,
15
So.
3d
827
(2nd
DCA
2009)
8
Rodriguez
v.
State,
111
So.2d
1175
(4th
DCA
2001)
8
Swilley
v.
State,
781
So.2d
458
(Fla.
2nd
DCA
2001)
4,7
Tackett
v.
Hartack,
98
So.2d
896
(3rd
DCA
1957)
4
White
v.
State,
619
So.2d
429
(1st
DCA
1993)
4
u
COURT
RULES
F.S.A.
90.401
(2007)
2
Fla.
R.
App.
P.
9.030
(a)
(2)
(A)
(iv)
3
Fla.
R.
App.
P.
9.200(f)(2)
2
Fla.
R.
App.
P.
9.210(a)(2)
10
West's
F.S.A.
316.075(1)(c)(1)
4
West's
F.S.A. 948.06
67
CONSTITUTIONAL
PROVISIONS
Art.
V,
§
3(b)(3),
Fla.
Const
3
F.S.A.
Const.
Art.
5,
§
2
(a) g
Fourteenth
Amendment
«
m
STATEMENT
OF
THE
CASE
AND
FACTS
This
is
a
Petition
to
invoke
the
discretionary
jurisdiction
of
the
Supreme
Court
of
Florida.
The
Petitioner
following
an
unlawful
traffic
stop,
beaten
by
officers,
and
being
medically
cleared
at
Bethesda
Memorial
Hospital
was
booked
into
Palm
Beach
County
Jail,
for
Battery
on
a
Law
Enforcement
Officer,
Resisting
Arrest
with
Violence,
Possession
of
Cocaine,
Tampering
with
Evidence,
and
Possession
of
Drug
Paraphernalia.
June
5,
2008,
Affidavit
of
Violation
of
Probation
was
filed
based
on
new
law
offenses.
August
11,
2008,
the
State
informed
the
trial
court
at
violation
hearing
that
the
County
of
Palm
Beach
charged
by
Information
1-count
Possession
of
Cocaine,
1-count
Resisting
Officer
without
Violence,
dismissing
the
other
charges
per:
(no-info)
(no-action).
Prior
to
the
commencement
of
Final
Revocation,
the
Court
stated
that
Final
Revocation
Hearing
was to
be
as
testimony
only,
to
be
reset
the
following
week
to
allow
all
parties
to
view
the
video
of
the
alleged
traffic
violation
before
the
court
made
its
findings,
however,
following
testimony-only,
the
court
found
Petitioner
guilty and sentenced him
to
180
months.
An
appeal
was
taken,
and
on
December
2,
2009,
the
Fourth
District
affirmed
revocation
but
remanded
for
order
of
revocation.
A
timely
filed
rehearing
and
clarification
was
denied
on
January
14,
2010,
and
the
Petitioner's
Notice
to
Invoke the
Discretionary
Jurisdiction
of
this
Court
was
timely
filed
on
February
12,
2010.
This
Petitioner
to
Invoke
Discretionary
Jurisdiction
follows:
SUMMARY
OF
THE
ARGUMENT
Petitioner
concedes
that
upon
receiving
the
record
on
appeal,
thereafter
reviewing,
finding
it
incomplete,
timely
filed
rehearing
informing
District
Court
of
the
record
being
incomplete,
respectfully
requesting
the
Clerk
to
direct
the
1
Court
Reporter
to
complete
the
record
for
full
appellate
review,
and
unfortunately
the
District
Court
allowed
this
fatal error
to
go
uncorrected,
denying
rehearing,
thus,
Petitioner's
liberty
interest
resulting
in
further
manifest
injustice.
The
Court's
have
frequently
invoked
this
"manifest
injustice"
when
a
person
has
been
wrongly
seized,
convicted,
and
imprisoned.
It
is
well
established
P[W]here....the
Court
finds
that
a
manifest
injustice
has
occurred,
it
is
the
responsibility
of
that
Court
to
correct
the
injustice,
if
it
can.")
trial
court's
failure
to
continue
revocation,
whereas
full
hearing
is'
demanded
by
due
process,
court
reporter's
failure
to
transcribe,
the
hearing
prior
to
the
commencement
of
revocation,
where
the
trial
court
stated
the
final
revocation
hearing,
for
9-12-08
was
to
commence
as
testimony-only
to
be
reset
for
the
following
week
to
allow
all
parties
to
view
video
before
court made
its
findings.
Petitioner
was
and
will
continue
to
be
prejudiced
without
the
complete
record
on
appeal,
pursuant
to
Rnle
9.200(f)(2)
.
Fla.
R.
App.
P.
Whereas
the
burden
fall
upon
the
Petitioner
to
initiate
a
correction
in
the
record
before
this
Court.
Furthermore,
due
to
the
incompleteness
of
the
record,
Petitioner
was
not
afforded,
as
a
matter
of
right,
to
effective
assistance
of
appellate
counsel
to
raise
this
fatal
issue.
Manifest
Injustice,
on
its
face,
the
records
reflect
the
officer's
patrol
car
was
equipped
with
video
surveillance,
which
would
have captured
the
alleged
traffic
infraction,
also
the
traffic
stop,
the
video
is
and
was
"relevant"
to
establish
a
"material"
fact
as to
those
terms
are
defined
in
Section
90.401,
Fla.
Stat.(2007)
of
the
evidence
code.
Accordingly, this
Court
has
recognized
that
due
process
entitles
a
criminal
defendant
to
a
full
appellate
review,
whereas
the
record
on
appeal
was
incomplete,
this
Court
should
and
must
correct
the
miscarriage
of
justice,
to
uphold
the
liberty-'
interest
of
Petitioner.
JURISDICTIONAL
STATEMENT
THE
FLORIDA
SUPREME
COURT
has
discretionary
jurisdiction
to
review
a
decision
of
a
District
Court
of
Appeals
that
expressly
and
directly
conflicts
with
a
decision
of
the
Supreme
Court
of
Florida
or
another
District
Court
on
the
same
point
of
law.
(Article
V,
§
3(b)
(3)
,
Fla.
Const,
and
Rule
9.
030(a)
(2)
(A)
(Iv)
,
Fla.
R.
App.
P.)
ARGUMENT
THE
FOURTH
DISTRICT
COURT
OF
APPEAL'S
DECISION
GREEN
V.
STATE,
34
FLA.
L.
WKLY.
D2494
(4th
DCA
2009)
DIRECTLY
AND
EXPRESSLY
CONFLICTS
WITH
THE
FIRST
DISTRICT
IN
KNIGHT
V.
STATE,
566
SO.2D
339
(1990)
;
AND
WHITE
V.
STATE,
619
SO.2D
429
(1993);;
SECOND
DISTRICT
IN
GRADDY
V.
STATE,
517
SO.2D
772
(1988);
BOWLING
V.
STATE,
779
SO.2D
613
(2001);
SWILLEY
V.
STATE, 781
SO.2D
458
(2001)
;
AND
THE
FIFTH
DISTRICT
IN
MANIS
V.
STATE,
5D09-615,
FEBRUARY
19,
2010
(35
FLA.L.WKLY.
D422)
,
AND
OTHER
DECISION OF THE
FLORIDA
SUPREME
COURT.
It is
well
established
that
when
a
court
gives
grace
of
probation,
the
probationer
must
abide
by
the
conditions
and
limitations.
Thus,
in
order
to
be
in
violation,
the
deviation
must
be
knowingly and
a
willful
act.
In
this
case,
the
Petitioner
driving
lawfully
with
a
valid
driver's
license
(safe
driver
endorsement)
in
a
2008
rented
Saturn
Vue
in
his
name
was
heading
home,
traveling
down
10th
Ave.
(MLK
Blvd.)
coming
upon
N.
Seacrest
Blvd.,
in
the
City
of
Boynton
Beach,
as
crossing
thru
the
intersection
N.W.
9th
Ave.,
the
traffic
light
changed
to
yellow.
In
accordance
to
West's
F.S.A.
316.075(1)
(c)
(1),
2.
Right
of
Way
See
Dade
Comity
Metropolitan
Transit
Authority
v.
Even,
262So.2d
685
(3rd
DCA
1972);
West's
F.S.A.
316.075(1)
(C) (1)
1
R^c-may^a
r=,r-o
see
Tackett
v.
Ear
tack,
98
So.2d
896
(3rd
DCA
1957),
thus,
the
decision
of
the
Fourth
District
directly
conflicts
with
the
Second
District
in
Bowling
v.
State,
779
So.2d
613
(2001);
and the
First
District
in
White
v.
State,
619
So.2d
429
(1993).
See;
Holland
v.
State, 696
So.2d
757
(Fla.
1997)
on
the
same
point
of
law.
Here
at
present,
the
record
is
totally
devoid
of
any
traffic
citations
or
warning
issued
for
basis
of
stop
(implicit
in
the
language
of
Section
949.10,
to
wit:
subsequently
arrested
on
a
felony
charge
is
that
the arrest
be
lawful
in
accordance
with
Chapter
901.
Fla.
Stat.)
Immediately
the
patrol
car
turned
behind
and
began
to
travel
directly
behind
Petitioner
for
a
distance
of
six
blocks
and two
stop
signs
before
activating
stop
lights
while
Petitioner
was
turning
left
upon
N.W.
4th
Ave.,
therein
three
houses
Petitioner
stopped,
whereas
officer
ordered
Petitioner
out
of the car
at
gunpoint,
thus
illegally
seizing,
(See:Baptlste,
995So.2d
285
at
294(S.Ct.
2008),
which
Petitioner
replied,
"Sorry
Sir,
I
don't
see
why
you
are
stopping
me."
Officer advised
Petitioner
to
keep
his
hands
up
and
turn
around,
which
Petitioner
complied,
when
another
patrol
car
coming
at
a
high
rate
of speed,
Petitioner's
knees
gave
out
due
to
being
shot
with
a
taser
by
the
officer
that
held
him
at
gunpoint.
Whereas,
Petitioner caught
his
balance
before
falling
on
instinct,
thinking
he
was
being
shot
at,
ran
to
his
front
door
yelling
for
help,
to
no-avail
ran
across
his
yard
to
neighbors
house,
where
again
at
gunpoint
was
ordered
to
get
face
down
or
be
shot,
which
Petitioner
complied,
after being
handcuffed
was
badly
beaten
with
kicks
and
punches
that
Petitioner's
body
was
numb,
thus,
carried
to
police
car
and
medically
cleared
at
hospital
for
taser
wounds
to
left
upper
arm,
multiple
wounds
to the
face,
face
swollen,
and
a
punctured
blood'
vessel
to
the
left
eye, (also
notable:
Consquella
Green
was
arrested
for
disorderly
conduct
for
taking
pictures
with
a
camera
phone,
subsequently
was
never
returned).
Prior
to
the
revocation,
a
hearing
was
conducted,
whereas
the
state
informed
the
Court,
it
was
ready
to
proceed
the
witnesses
were
outside
the
courtroom,
they
have
the
suspected
cocaine,
however
not
the
video,
also
if
it
was
possible
to get
testimony
then
to
reset
it
altogether,
since
the
witness
was
out
of
the
county.
The
Court
stated
"that
the final
hearing
for
September
12,
2008 was
to
commence
as
testimony-only
to
be
reset
the
following
week
to
allow
all
parties
to
view
video
before
the
Court
makes
its
finding,
thus,
manifest
injustice
occurred.
This
portion
of
the
proceeding
was
not
furnished
in
the
transcript
for
full
appellate
review
by
District
Court,
also
in
the
liberty
interest
of
Petitioner,
deprived
of
the
right
to
effective
assistance
of
counsel
to
raise
this
fundamental
fatal
error
on
appeal,
thus,
in
conflict
of
procedural
due
process,
Petitioner
was
and
will
continue
to
be
prejudiced
by
the
absence
of
complete
transcripts.
Here
on
the
face
of
the
record,
it is
clear
that
there
is
a
vxdeo
recording
of
the
alleged
traffic
infraction
and
stop
Petitioner
states
in
liberty-interest,
the
video
is
and
was
"relevant
exculpatory
evidence"
involved
evidence
to
establish
"material"
fact
(that's
consistent
to
defense
exhibit
#2,
a
Photo
of
left
upper
arm,
also
supports
Petitioner's
flight,
'was
not
to
run
away
from
officer
,
but
in
fact,
an
act-
to
safety
due
to
being
tasered,
also
proves
that
Petitioner
was
complying
to
his
terms
of
probation)
,
as
to
those
terms
defined
in
Section
90.401,
Fla.
Stat,
of
the
evidence
code,
trial
court's
failure
to
continue hearing
to
the
following
week
to
allow
all
parties
to
view
the
video,
as
stated
prior
to
the
commencement
of
the
revocation
hearing
,
deprived
Petitioner
of
his
constitutional
due
process
requirements
of
a
full
revocation
hearing,
whereas
a
full
hearing
is
a
condition
precedent
to
revocation
and
such
a
hearing
is
demanded
by
due
process
(F.S.A.
948.06.
Fla
Stat
)
wherein
this
Court
has
constitutional
power
to
correct
'
a
manifest
injustice
by
the
trial
court,
failure
to
continue
hearing
as
stated
(See:Mart±n
v.StMt*.
399
So.2d
128
(5th
DCA
1981)
(finding
probationer
was
entitled
to
a
new
probation
revocation
hearing,
where
judge
revoked
probation
on
mistaken
belief
that
hearing,
which
had
been
continued,
had
been
completed).
The
facts
of
the
instant
case
are
even
more
compelling,
perhaps
equally
important,
the
trial court
departed
from
procedural
due
process
requirements
of
the
law
as
set
out
in
Bernhardt
v.
State, 288
So.2d
490
(Fla.
1974),
therein
opportunity
to
present
documentary
evidence,
thus
when
Petitioner attempted
to
show
an
aerial-
view
map
from
which
the
alleged
infraction
occurred
was
a
series
of
two
stop
signs
and
a
distance
of
six
blocks
when
patrol
car
activated
its
stop
lights
while
Petitioner
was
in
the
process
of
turning
left
upon
N/8f.
4th
Ave., and
a
short
distance
of
three
houses,
to
which
the
Court
replied
"I
don't
need
to
see
that",
also
noted
the
record
reflects
the
State
made
that
remark,
in
fact,it
Was
the
trial
court
.
Furthermore,
trial
court,
when
told
that
Petitioner
was
only
charged
by
Information,
with
1-count
of
possession
of
cocaine, 1-count
Resisting
Arrest
Without
Violence,
trial
court
replied,
"the
charges
are
really
irrelevant,"
where
the
trial
court
lacked
subject
matter jurisdiction
to
make
a
finding
on
charges
that
are
dismissed,
per
no-info,
no-action
l
,
in
accordance
to
West's
F.S.A.
948.06
at
footnote
156,
DISMISSED
CHARGES,
Pendergrass
v.
State,
601
So.2d
1250
(Fla.
2nd
DCA
1992)
expressly
and
directly
conflicts
with
the
Second
District
in
Graddy
v.
State,
517
So.2d
772
(reversing
probation
revocation
where
State
conceded
error
in
probation
violation
based
upon
dismissed
charges)
also
the
Second
District
in
Swllley
v.
State,
781
So.2d
458 at
461,
furthermore,
the
trial
court
relied
on
"what's
listed
on
the
warrant,"
also,
it is
well-settled
that
evidence
that
a
mere
arrest
is
insufficient
to
establish
that
probationer
violated
the law
in
violation
of
the
terms
of
probation
and
will
not
support
a
revocation,
here
trial
court
1
(See:
Petitioner's
Suggestion
for
Certification)
used
an
improper
standard
to
me
its
credibility
assessment;
"do
I
believe
him,
or
do
I
believe
the
polir^i"
The
Fourth
District
allowed
these
fatal
error
to go
uncorrected,
thus,,
allowing
a
further
miscarriage
of justice.
The
District
Court
in
reviewing
case
at
hand,
did
acknowledge
that
the
State
failed
to
prove
the
allegations
of
tampering
with
evidence,
possession
of
narcotic
equipment,
to be
stricken,
the
miscarriage
of
justice,
by
the
record
being
incomplete,
the
reviewing
court
was
unaware
that
the2
possession
of
narcotic
equipment
was
the
alleged
2x2
zip-loc
baggy
filled
with
a
white
powder,
test
for
cocaine,
(notable
the
record
is
devoid
of
such
lab
report,
also
the
officer
that
alleged
he
found
the
cocaine
was
the
same to
bring
it
to
revocation,
thus,
a
violation
of
procedural
chain
of
custody).
The
District
Court
also
noting
that
the
record
in
the
instant
case
is
devoid
of
an
order
of
revocation,
Petitioner
states
since
rules
of
practice
and
procedure
adopted
by
this
C°Urt'
*•*•*• Const-
'***•
5
*
2(^
on
the
Constitutional
Right
to
Due
Process
of the
Fourteenth
toendm.nf
as
set
forth
in
Bemhardt
y.
State,
288
So.2d
490
(Fla.
1974);
Morr±ssBV
v.
Brever,
92
S.Ct.
2593;
and
Sagnon
v.
Samxpmin
93
S.Ct.
1756
(1973),
a
written
statement
by
the
fact
finder
as to
the
evidence
relied
on
and
reasons
for
revoking
probation,
these
requirements
in
themselves
serve
as
substantial
protection
against
ill-considered
revocation.
Furthermore,
the
written
order
of
revocation
must
conform
to
court's
oral
pronouncement,
a
due
process
precedent
of
law.
Ramirez
y.
sfcate,
15
So.3d
827
(2nd
DCA
2009);
Rodriguez
v.
Sfcat*.
777
So.2d
30
1175,
(4th
DCA
2001),
regrettably
the
Fourth
District,
got
it
wrong,
on
remand,
pursuant
to
Jackson
y.
State.
807
So.
864
(Fla.
2nd
DCA
2001);
2
(See:
Rehearing
Appendix
Probable
Cause
Affidavit)
nd
DCA
following
Dollncrer
v.
State.
779
So.2d
419,
420-421
(Fla.
2
2000)
relying
on
Dawklns
v.
stmtm.
936
So.2d
710
(2nd
DCA
2006)
with
Doling
and
Darrklns
on
the
face
of
the
record
admitted
the
alleged
violations,
thus
conforming
oral
pronouncement,
probation
was
revoked
based
on
those
admissions,
here
the case
at
bar,
at
the
close
of
revocation,
the
Defense
informed
the
trial
court Petitioner
was
currently
only
charged
with
1-count
of
possession
of
cocaine,
1-count
of
resisting
arrest
without
violence,
in
Palm
Beach,
the
trial
court
stated
"the
charges
are
really
irrelevant.
.
.what's
listed
on
the
warrant,
but
I
need
to
determine,
number
one,
whether
he
committed
battery
on
a
law
enforcement
officer,
whether
he
tampered
with
evidence,
whether
he
possessed
cocaine,
whether
he
possessed
narcotic
equipment
(although
he
failed
to
mention
resisting
arrest
with
violence
District
Court
failed
to
correct
it).
Thereafter,
the
determination
of
what's
listed
on
warrant
and
speaking
to
defense,
the
trial
court
stated
"and
I
have
to
tell
von
a,*,
™
a
-credibility
assessment".
.
.1
do
find
that
that
von
did
indeed
willfully
and
substantially
violate
yoUr
probation
in
c»se
number
99-9246CF10B"
(emphasis
added)."
The
record reflects
trial
court
was
aware
of
the
allegations
of
violation,
the
court
was
aware
of
what
it
needed
to
determine
and
the
burden
of
proof,
thus,
the
court
should
have
specified
orally,
or in
writing/
which
of
the
five
criminal
offenses,
without
such an
oral
or
written
finding,
the
Fourth
District's
miscarriage
of
justice
be
remanding
for
order
of
probation
pursuant
to
Jackson,
following
DolintTer'
expressly
and
directly
conflicts
with the
Fifth
District
in
Manls
v.
State.
5D09-615
Feb.
19,
2010
[35
Fla
L
Weekly
D422]
(finding
as
to
condition
7,
the
trial court
made
an
express
finding
that
defendant
violated
that
condition
by using
prescription
medicine
Percocet
without
having
a
legal
prescription,
however,
as
to
condition
5,
the
trial
court
verbally
indicated
that
defendant
violated
condition
5,
but
did
not
make
an
express
finding
that
the
defendant
had
filed
a
false
police
report).
also,
expressly
and
directly
conflicts
with
the
decision
of
the
First
District
in
Knight
v.
State.
566
So.2d
339
(1990)
(finding
the
court
neither
orally
announced
nor
entered
a
written
finding)
Thus,
Fourth
District
rendered
a
further
manifest
injustice,
failure
to
uphold
Petitioner's
liberty
interest.
CONCLUSION
This
Court
has
discretionary
jurisdiction
to
remedy
the
manifest
injustice,
based
on
the
foregoing
facts,
authorities,
and
arguments
this
Honorable
Court
should
exercise
its
constitutional
powers,
of
liberty-interest
of
Petitioner,
accept
review
the
decision
of
the
Fourth
District
Court
of
Appeal.
Respectfully
submitted,
Anthony
D.
Green,
DC
#27930,
Dorm
A1-120L
Glades
Correctional
Inst.
500
Orange
Avenue
Circle
Belle
Glade,
Florida
33430
UNNOTARIZED
OATH
UNDER
PENALTIES
OF
PERJURY,
I
declare
that
I
have read
the
foregoing
brief,
and the
facts
stated
herein
are
true.
Anthony
D.
Green,
DC
#247930,
Dorm
A1-120L
10
CERTIFICATE
OF
SERVICE
I
HEREBY
CERTIFY
that
a
true
and
correct
copy
of
the
foregoing
Junsdictional
Brief
was
sent
via
U.S.
Mail
to:
Office
of
the
Attorney
General,
The
Capitol,
Tallahassee,
Florida
32399.
Anthony
D.
Green,
DC
#247930,
Dorm
A1-120L
CERTIFICATE
OF
COMPLIANCE
I
HEREBY
CERTIFY
that
this
Brief
is
in
compliance
with
the
font
requirements
prescribed
in
Rule
9.210(a)
(2),
Florida
Rules
of
Appellate
Procedure.
Anthony
D.
Green,
DC
#247930,
Dorm
A1-120L
11
IN
THE
SUPREME
COURT
OF
FLORIDA
ANTHONY
GREEN,
Petitioner,
S.C.NO.
SC10-369
D.C.A.NO.4D08-3864
VS.
L-T-
No:99-9246CF10B
STATE
OF
FLORIDA,
Respondent.
APPENDIX
TO
PETITIONER'S
JURISDICTIONAL
BRIEF
Fourth
District
Court
of
Appeal
Decision
Filed
December
2,
2009
D
"ages
1~3
Fourth
District
Court
of
Appeal
Denial
Motion
for
Rehearing
and
Clarification
Decision
Filed
January
14,
2010
Pa
e
4
f
ta
District
Court
Of
Appeal
Of
The
State
Of
Florida
Fourth
District
July
Terrp.
2009
ANTHONY
GREEN,
-
..
.
Appellant,
STATE
OP
FLORIDA,
Appellee.
No.
4D08-3864
[December
2,
2009]
Stevenson,
j.
and
possessing
narcotics
incident
on
June
2
2008
noticed
a
silve"
S^
to
make
a
traffic
f
Possessing
cocaine,
charSes
arose
from
an
^
fa
Boynt°n
Beaeh
°fficer
tempted
stopping
sooner,
SB^ve^r^ibiinf^WetE^^-K0^^^^-^'
hi
SS^^vUvrnJ^*™^™**^*-
.*•»
^ditionai
n
C0Urt
detem^ed
the
State
had
th
willful
and
substantial
f&c
violation
must
be
SS
§=g2
-Oilappeal
Gxeen_contends.thtSlateJailed_tQ_prove
tempering
wxth
evidence
and
possession
of
narcotics
^P°P^
d
h
tics
equ^
and
the-Statedoesnot
argue
otheLSe
a
sentence.
On
Grin's
second
poin^we
by a
preponderance
of
the
evidence
jVfBiSs
probation
for
any
one
of
the
three
violations
fe
reflect
only
the
three
charges
proven
bytte
State
^and
Gerber,
jjef
concur.
rehearing.
iN
THE
DISTR|CT
COURT
OF
APPEAL
OF
THE
STATE
OF
Fl
ORin
A
FOURTH
DISTRICT,
1525
PALM
BEACH
LAKES
SLVD.,
WEST
PALMTb^CH
FL
33401
January
14,
2010
ANTHONY
GREEN
v.
CASE
NO.:
4D08-3864
L.T.
No.
:
99-9246
CF10B
STATE
OF
FLORIDA
Appellant
/
Petitioners),
BY
ORDER
OF
THE
COURT:
Appellee
/
Respondent(s).
ORDERED
that
appellant's
pro
se
motion
filed
December
21,
2009
for
rehearing
is
hereby
denied;
further,
ORDERED
that
appellant's
pro
se
motion
filed
December
21,
2009
for
clarification
is
hereby
denied.
I
HEREBY
CERTIFY
that
the
foregoing
is
a
true
copy
of
the
original
court
order.
Served:
Public
Defender-P.B.
kb
Anthony
Green
1ENMULLER,
Clerk
Fourth
District
Court
of
Appeal
Attorney
General-W.P.B.
CERTIFICATE
OF
SERVICE
I
HEREBY
CERTIFY
THAT
a
true
and
correct
copy
of
the
foregoing
document
has
been
furnished
by
U.S.
Mail
to
the
following:
this
,
20
Respectfully
Submitted,
Glades
Correctional
Institution
500
Orange
Ave.
Circle
Belle
Glade,
Fl.
33430
pro
se

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