Judgement 06 September 2011 VRS 72 110906
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29246
IT-04-81-T
D29246 - D28597
06 September 2011
UNITED
NATIONS
International Tribunal for the
Prosecution of Persons
Responsible for Serious Violations of
International Humanitarian Law
Committed in the Territory of the
Former Yugoslavia since 1991
Case No.
IT-04-81-T
Date:
6 September 2011
Original:
English
IN TRIAL CHAMBER I
Before:
Judge Bakone Justice Moloto, Presiding
Judge Pedro David
Judge Michèle Picard
Registrar:
Mr. John Hocking
PROSECUTOR
v.
MOMČILO PERIŠI]
JUDGEMENT
PUBLIC WITH CONFIDENTIAL ANNEX C
The Office of the Prosecutor:
Mark Harmon
Daniel Saxon
Counsel for the Accused:
Novak Luki}
Gregor Guy-Smith
AJ
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I. INTRODUCTION ..........................................................................................................................1
A. THE ACCUSED MOMČILO PERIŠIĆ ................................................................................................1
B. THE CASE AGAINST MOMČILO PERIŠIĆ ........................................................................................1
1. Alleged Crimes in Sarajevo (August 1993 - November 1995)................................................2
2. Alleged Crimes in Zagreb (2 and 3 May 1995) .......................................................................3
3. Alleged Crimes in Srebrenica (July 1995)...............................................................................4
C. CONSIDERATIONS REGARDING THE EVIDENCE .............................................................................5
1. General Evidentiary Principles ................................................................................................5
2. Specific Evidentiary Considerations........................................................................................8
(a) Statements of the Accused ....................................................................................................... 8
(b) Suspect Interview..................................................................................................................... 8
(c) Evidence of Persons Convicted by the Tribunal ...................................................................... 9
(d) Evidence Pursuant to Rule 92 bis, ter, quater.......................................................................... 9
(i) Use of Rule 92 bis Statements ............................................................................................ 10
(ii) Use of Rule 92 ter Statements ........................................................................................... 10
(iii) Use of Rule 92 quater Statements .................................................................................... 10
(e) Evidence Pursuant to Rule 71 ................................................................................................ 11
(f) Evidence Pursuant to Rule 94 bis ........................................................................................... 11
(g) Use of Unscheduled Incidents................................................................................................ 13
(h) Intercepted Communications ................................................................................................. 14
(i) Documents and Statements of Individuals Admitted Solely for Credibility Purposes and
Not for the Truth of Their Content ....................................................................................... 15
(j) Paragraphs 12 and 13 of the Guidelines.................................................................................. 15
(k) Documents Admitted through the Bar Table ......................................................................... 16
(l) Agreed Facts, Adjudicated Facts and Stipulations.................................................................. 16
(i) Agreed Facts and Stipulations ............................................................................................ 16
(ii) Judicial Notice of Adjudicated Facts ................................................................................. 16
(m) Supreme Defence Council (“SDC”) Stenographic Transcripts and Minutes........................ 17
(n) VJ Collegium Stenographic Transcripts and Minutes ........................................................... 17
(o) Mladi} Notebook Excerpts..................................................................................................... 18
II. APPLICABLE LAW ..................................................................................................................19
A. GENERAL REQUIREMENTS OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE STATUTE ........................................................19
1. Existence of an Armed Conflict and Nexus Between the Alleged Acts of the Perpetrator
and the Armed Conflict .......................................................................................................19
2. The Tadi} Conditions.............................................................................................................20
3. Status of the Victims..............................................................................................................21
B. GENERAL REQUIREMENTS OF ARTICLE 5 OF THE STATUTE ........................................................22
1. Requirements of Article 5 of the Statute................................................................................22
C. ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS .............................................................................................................24
1. Actus Reus..............................................................................................................................24
2. Mens Rea................................................................................................................................26
D. MURDER .....................................................................................................................................27
E. EXTERMINATION.........................................................................................................................28
F. OTHER INHUMANE ACTS.............................................................................................................29
G. PERSECUTIONS ...........................................................................................................................31
H. INDIVIDUAL CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY ....................................................................................33
1. Responsibility Under Article 7(1) of the Statute – Aiding and Abetting ..............................33
(a) Aiding and Abetting ............................................................................................................... 33
(i) Actus Reus........................................................................................................................... 33
(ii) Mens Rea ........................................................................................................................... 34
(iii) Omission........................................................................................................................... 35
(iv) “Tacit Approval and Encouragement”.............................................................................. 36
2. Responsibility Under Article 7(3) of the Statute – Superior Responsibility .........................36
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(a) The Elements of Superior Responsibility............................................................................... 37
(i) Superior-Subordinate Relationship..................................................................................... 38
(ii) Mental Element: “Knew or Had Reason to Know”........................................................... 40
a. Actual Knowledge ........................................................................................................... 40
b. “Had Reason to Know” ................................................................................................... 41
(iii) Failure to Prevent or Punish ............................................................................................. 42
a. Duty to Prevent................................................................................................................ 42
b. Duty to Punish................................................................................................................. 43
c. Necessary and Reasonable Measures .............................................................................. 44
III. GENERAL OVERVIEW OF EVENTS IN CROATIA AND BIH BETWEEN 1990
AND 1995 ...................................................................................................................................45
A. CROATIA ....................................................................................................................................45
B. BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA .......................................................................................................48
IV. POLITICAL ENTITIES AND STRUCTURE OF THE ARMIES ......................................55
A. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA.........................................................................................55
B. ORGANS OF THE FRY .................................................................................................................55
1. The Supreme Defence Council ..............................................................................................55
2. The FRY President.................................................................................................................57
3. Chief of the VJ General Staff.................................................................................................58
4. Cabinet of the Chief of the VJ General Staff.........................................................................59
5. Structure of the VJ General Staff...........................................................................................60
(a) Collegium ............................................................................................................................... 62
6. Ministry of Defence ...............................................................................................................63
(a) Structure ................................................................................................................................. 63
(b) Functions of the MOD ........................................................................................................... 64
(c) The Role of the MOD in the Military Budget ........................................................................ 65
C. UNITS OF THE VJ ........................................................................................................................66
1. The Guards Brigade ...............................................................................................................67
2. The 72nd Special Brigade .......................................................................................................67
D. MILITARY JUDICIAL SYSTEM IN THE FRY ..................................................................................68
1. Structure and jurisdiction.......................................................................................................68
(a) Military courts ........................................................................................................................ 68
(b) Military disciplinary courts.................................................................................................... 69
2. The procedure for criminal and disciplinary violations.........................................................70
3. Jurisdiction over crimes committed abroad ...........................................................................71
E. STRUCTURE AND ORGANISATION OF THE ARMY OF REPUBLIKA SRPSKA (“VRS”).....................72
1. Establishment of the VRS......................................................................................................72
2. Hierarchy in the VRS.............................................................................................................73
(i) RS Supreme Command....................................................................................................... 73
(ii) Main Staff .......................................................................................................................... 74
a. Organisation .................................................................................................................... 74
b. Decision Making Process ................................................................................................ 76
3. VRS Units ..............................................................................................................................76
a. Drina Corps ..................................................................................................................... 78
b. Sarajevo-Romanija Corps (“SRK”)................................................................................. 80
4. Judicial Military System ........................................................................................................81
F. STRUCTURE AND ORGANISATION OF THE SERBIAN ARMY OF KRAJINA (“SVK”) 81
1. Establishment of the SVK......................................................................................................81
2. The Main Staff .......................................................................................................................82
3. SVK Units..............................................................................................................................83
4. Judicial Military System ........................................................................................................84
V. FINDINGS ON THE CRIMES..................................................................................................85
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A. SARAJEVO ..................................................................................................................................85
1. The City of Sarajevo ..............................................................................................................85
2. The Siege Unfolds..................................................................................................................85
(a) Basics of the Siege ................................................................................................................. 85
(b) Chronology of the Siege ........................................................................................................ 86
(c) Comparison of Forces During the Siege ................................................................................ 88
3. Methods of Warfare ...............................................................................................................90
(a) Overview ................................................................................................................................ 90
(b) Shelling .................................................................................................................................. 91
(c) Sniping ................................................................................................................................... 93
4. Scheduled Shelling Incidents.................................................................................................97
(a) 22 January 1994 (Incident A1)............................................................................................... 97
(i) Indictment ........................................................................................................................... 97
(ii) Incident .............................................................................................................................. 97
(iii) Findings ............................................................................................................................ 98
(b) 4 February 1994 (Incident A2)............................................................................................... 98
(i) Indictment ........................................................................................................................... 98
(ii) Incident .............................................................................................................................. 98
(iii) Investigation ..................................................................................................................... 99
(iv) Findings ............................................................................................................................ 99
(c) 5 February 1994 (Incident A3)............................................................................................. 100
(i) Indictment ......................................................................................................................... 100
(ii) Incident ............................................................................................................................ 101
(iii) Findings .......................................................................................................................... 102
(d) 22 December 1994 (Incident A4)......................................................................................... 103
(i) Indictment ......................................................................................................................... 103
(ii) The Flea Market in the Old Town of Sarajevo ................................................................ 103
(iii) Incident ........................................................................................................................... 103
(iv) Investigation.................................................................................................................... 104
(v) Findings............................................................................................................................ 105
(e) 24 May 1995 (Incident A5).................................................................................................. 106
(i) Indictment ......................................................................................................................... 106
(ii) Incident ............................................................................................................................ 106
(iii) Investigation ................................................................................................................... 108
(iv) Findings .......................................................................................................................... 109
(f) 24 May 1995 (Incident A6) .................................................................................................. 109
(i) Indictment ......................................................................................................................... 109
(ii) Incident ............................................................................................................................ 109
(iii) Investigation ................................................................................................................... 111
(iv) Findings .......................................................................................................................... 111
(g) 18 June 1995 (Incident A7).................................................................................................. 112
(i) Indictment ......................................................................................................................... 112
(ii) The Water Distribution Pump at the Simon Bolivar Elementary School in Dobrinja..... 112
(iii) Incident ........................................................................................................................... 113
(iv) Investigation.................................................................................................................... 115
(v) Findings............................................................................................................................ 118
(h) 1 July 1995 (Incident A8) .................................................................................................... 120
(i) Indictment ......................................................................................................................... 120
(ii) Hrasnica ........................................................................................................................... 120
(iii) Incident ........................................................................................................................... 121
(iv) Investigation.................................................................................................................... 123
(v) Possible Military Targets ................................................................................................. 126
(vi) Findings .......................................................................................................................... 127
(i) 28 August 1995 (Incident A9) .............................................................................................. 128
(i) Indictment ......................................................................................................................... 128
(ii) The City Market............................................................................................................... 128
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(iii) Incident ........................................................................................................................... 128
(iv) Investigation.................................................................................................................... 129
a. Introduction ................................................................................................................... 129
b. UNMO Observation Post 1 ........................................................................................... 130
c. UNMO and UNPROFOR Investigations ...................................................................... 132
d. Local Police Investigations ........................................................................................... 135
e. Casualties....................................................................................................................... 137
f. Follow up to Investigation ............................................................................................. 141
g. Expert Report ................................................................................................................ 142
h. Allegations of Staged Incident ...................................................................................... 143
i. Investigation into Other Mortar Shell Impacts in the Same Area .................................. 144
(v) Findings............................................................................................................................ 145
5. Scheduled Sniping Incidents................................................................................................146
(a) 3 September 1993 (Incident B1) .......................................................................................... 146
(i) Indictment ......................................................................................................................... 146
(ii) Findings ........................................................................................................................... 146
(b) 2 November 1993 (Incident B2) .......................................................................................... 146
(i) Indictment ......................................................................................................................... 146
(ii) Incident ............................................................................................................................ 146
(c) 6 January 1994 (Incident B3) ............................................................................................... 147
(i) Indictment ......................................................................................................................... 147
(ii) Findings ........................................................................................................................... 147
(d) 19 June 1994 (Incident B4).................................................................................................. 147
(i) Indictment ......................................................................................................................... 147
(ii) Findings ........................................................................................................................... 147
(e) 26 June 1994 (Incident B5) .................................................................................................. 148
(i) Indictment ......................................................................................................................... 148
(ii) Findings ........................................................................................................................... 148
(f) 22 July 1994 (Incident B6) ................................................................................................... 148
(i) Indictment ......................................................................................................................... 148
(ii) Incident ............................................................................................................................ 148
(iii) Findings .......................................................................................................................... 149
(g) 8 November 1994 (Incident B7) .......................................................................................... 149
(i) Indictment ......................................................................................................................... 149
(h) 23 November 1994 (Incident B8) ........................................................................................ 150
(i) Indictment ......................................................................................................................... 150
(ii) Location of the Sniping Incident ..................................................................................... 150
(iii) Incident ........................................................................................................................... 150
(iv) Investigation.................................................................................................................... 152
(v) Findings............................................................................................................................ 154
(i) 10 December 1994 (Incident B9).......................................................................................... 154
(i) Indictment ......................................................................................................................... 154
(ii) Location of the Sniping Incident ..................................................................................... 154
(iii) Incident ........................................................................................................................... 155
(iv) Investigation.................................................................................................................... 156
(v) Findings............................................................................................................................ 158
(j) 27 February 1995 (Incident B10).......................................................................................... 158
(i) Indictment ......................................................................................................................... 158
(ii) Incident ............................................................................................................................ 158
(iii) Aftermath of the Incident ............................................................................................... 160
(iv) Investigation.................................................................................................................... 161
(v) Findings............................................................................................................................ 162
(k) 3 March 1995 (Incident B11)............................................................................................... 162
(i) Indictment ......................................................................................................................... 162
(ii) Incident ............................................................................................................................ 162
(iii) Aftermath and Investigation ........................................................................................... 164
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(iv) Findings .......................................................................................................................... 166
(l) 3 May 1995 (Incident B12)................................................................................................... 166
(i) Indictment ......................................................................................................................... 166
6. Conclusion ...........................................................................................................................166
7. Identity of the Principal Perpetrators ...................................................................................170
8. Legal Findings .....................................................................................................................172
(a) Crimes under Article 3 of the Statute................................................................................... 172
(b) Offences under Article 5 of the Statute................................................................................ 173
B. ZAGREB .................................................................................................................................174
1. Lead-up to Shelling..............................................................................................................174
2. Shelling on 2 May 1995.......................................................................................................175
3. Shelling on 3 May 1995.......................................................................................................176
4. Who Ordered the Shelling of Zagreb? .................................................................................177
5. Weaponry Used....................................................................................................................180
6. Legal Findings .....................................................................................................................181
(a) Crimes under Article 3 of the Statute................................................................................... 181
(b) Crimes under Article 5 of the Statute................................................................................... 181
C. SREBRENICA ........................................................................................................................183
1. Srebrenica from 1992 to 6 July 1995...................................................................................183
(a) Srebrenica in the Beginning of the War ............................................................................... 183
(b) UN Intervention and “Safe Area” Designation.................................................................... 183
(c) Lead-up to the Military Offensive on Srebrenica................................................................. 185
2. The Take-Over of Srebrenica...............................................................................................186
3. 11 July 1995: Refugees Flee to the Potočari Compound.....................................................188
4. The Establishment of Serb Authority over Srebrenica Municipality...................................189
5. Hotel Fontana Meetings.......................................................................................................190
6. Transfer of Population .........................................................................................................192
(a) Organisation of Buses .......................................................................................................... 192
(b) Separation of Refugees ........................................................................................................ 194
(c) Column of Military-Aged Men ............................................................................................ 197
7. Detention and Killings of Bosnian Muslim Men.................................................................199
(a) General ................................................................................................................................. 199
(b) Number of Missing Persons................................................................................................. 200
8. Potočari Area (12–17 July 1995).........................................................................................200
(a) “Opportunistic” Killings near the UN Compound ............................................................... 200
(b) Mass Execution near the Cinkara Zinc Factory ................................................................... 201
9. Bratunac Area (12-15 July 1995).........................................................................................203
(a) General ................................................................................................................................. 203
(b) Meetings in Bratunac on 13 July 1995 Discussing the Execution of Prisoners................... 203
(c) Vuk Karad`i} School ........................................................................................................... 205
(d) Jadar River (13 July 1995) ................................................................................................... 206
(e) Cerska Valley (13 July 1995)............................................................................................... 206
(f) Nova Kasaba (13 July 1995)................................................................................................. 206
(g) Glogova (17–27 July 1995).................................................................................................. 207
(h) Kravica Market (13–14 July 1995)...................................................................................... 208
(i) Kravica Warehouse (13 July 1995)....................................................................................... 208
10. Zvornik Area......................................................................................................................211
(a) Transfer from Bratunac to the Zvornik Municipality........................................................... 211
(b) Orahovac (14 July 1995)...................................................................................................... 211
(c) Petkovci School and the Dam (14 July 1995) ...................................................................... 214
(d) Pilica School (14–15 July 1995).......................................................................................... 216
(e) Branjevo Military Farm (16 July 1995) ............................................................................... 216
(f) Pilica Cultural Centre (16 July 1995) ................................................................................... 218
(g) Kozluk (16 July 1995).......................................................................................................... 220
(h) Nezuk (19 July 1995)........................................................................................................... 221
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(i) 18 July–1 November 1995.................................................................................................... 221
11. Identity of the Principal Perpetrators .................................................................................222
12. MUP Resubordination to the VRS.....................................................................................222
13. Legal Findings ...................................................................................................................223
(a) General Requirements under Article 3................................................................................. 223
(b) General Requirements under Article 5................................................................................. 223
(c) Murder.................................................................................................................................. 224
(d) Inhumane Acts (Article 5(i))................................................................................................ 225
(i) Inflicting Serious Injuries and Wounding......................................................................... 225
(ii) Forcible Transfer ............................................................................................................. 225
(e) Persecutions on Political, Racial or Religious Grounds....................................................... 226
(i) Underlying Acts................................................................................................................ 226
a. Murder ........................................................................................................................... 226
b. Cruel and Inhumane Treatment..................................................................................... 226
c. Forcible Transfer ........................................................................................................... 227
(ii) Conclusion ....................................................................................................................... 227
(f) Extermination ....................................................................................................................... 227
VI. INDIVIDUAL CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY .................................................................229
A. PERSONNEL ASSISTANCE - 30TH AND 40TH PERSONNEL CENTRES .............................................229
1. Events Leading up to the Formation of the Personnel Centres............................................229
2. Legal Documents Establishing the Personnel Centres.........................................................232
3. The Role of the 30th and the 40th PCs and their Secrecy .....................................................236
4. Appointment and Transfers to the VRS and SVK through the Personnel Centres..............239
5. Appointment to SVK and VRS Positions and Temporary Transfers ..................................243
6. VJ Officers who Refused to be Transferred to the VRS and SVK......................................245
7. Redeployment to the VJ.......................................................................................................248
(a) Requests for Redeployment ................................................................................................. 250
(b) Peri{i}’s Role in the Redeployment of Personnel ................................................................ 252
(c) Final Findings....................................................................................................................... 255
8. De Jure Status of Members of the Personnel Centres .........................................................255
(a) Promotions ........................................................................................................................... 258
(i) Law on Promotions........................................................................................................... 258
(ii) The Procedure of Verification ......................................................................................... 259
(iii) The Effect of the “Verification” ..................................................................................... 261
(iv) Role of Peri{i} in the “Verification” Process.................................................................. 263
(v) Final Findings .................................................................................................................. 266
(b) Salaries ................................................................................................................................. 267
(c) Pensions................................................................................................................................ 273
(d) Housing ................................................................................................................................ 275
(e) Medical Assistance............................................................................................................... 278
(f) Other Benefits....................................................................................................................... 279
(g) FRY Citizenship................................................................................................................... 283
9. Termination of Service ........................................................................................................284
(a) Law on Termination of Service............................................................................................ 284
(i) Role of Peri{i} in the Termination of Service Process ..................................................... 286
(ii) Final Findings .................................................................................................................. 290
10. Removal from Duty ...........................................................................................................291
11. Disbandment ......................................................................................................................292
B. PERIŠIĆ’S AUTHORITY OVER THE LOGISTICAL ASSISTANCE PROCESS .....................................293
1. Submissions of the Parties ...................................................................................................293
2. Coordination and Meetings with VRS and SVK Officials ..................................................293
3. Establishment of a Procurement and Delivery Procedure ...................................................295
4. Supreme Defence Council Decisions on Logistical Assistance ..........................................301
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5. Cooperation with the FRY Ministry of Defence and Influence Over FRY Military
Factories ............................................................................................................................309
6. State Secrecy of Logistical Assistance ................................................................................313
7. Conclusion ...........................................................................................................................315
C. LOGISTICAL AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO THE VRS ..........................................................317
1. Submissions of the Parties ...................................................................................................317
2. Delivery of Weaponry and Military Equipment to the VRS ...............................................317
(a) Analysis of Military Material Delivery Forms..................................................................... 317
(b) Deliveries Conducted Between August 1993 and August 1994 .......................................... 325
(c) Deliveries Conducted Between August 1994 and December 1995 during the Period of
Sanctions Imposed by the FRY on Republika Srpska ........................................................ 329
3. The Koran Depot in Republika Srpska ................................................................................336
4. The Pretis Military Factory in Republika Srpska ................................................................337
(a) Status of Pretis as a Company.............................................................................................. 338
(b) Relationship between the VJ and Pretis............................................................................... 339
(i) Presence of the Accused at Pretis in January 1994 .......................................................... 339
(ii) Involvement of the VJ in Pretis’ Production ................................................................... 339
(iii) Importation of Raw Materials and Components from the FRY ..................................... 341
(c) Supply of Weapons Produced by Pretis to the VRS ............................................................ 342
5. Provision of Modified Air-Bombs .......................................................................................344
6. Provision of Fuel..................................................................................................................348
7. Lack of Payment for Military Supplies................................................................................350
8. Military Training of VRS Troops ........................................................................................357
9. Other Sources of Logistics...................................................................................................362
(a) Supplies and Training from Other Countries ....................................................................... 362
(b) Weaponry Purchased Directly from FRY Military Factories .............................................. 366
(c) Ammunition Reserves in Republika Srpska......................................................................... 367
(d) Fuel Reserves in Republika Srpska...................................................................................... 376
(e) Military Factories in Republika Srpska................................................................................ 378
(f) Local Sponsors in Republika Srpska .................................................................................... 381
(g) Unauthorised Donations of Weaponry by VJ Personnel...................................................... 382
(h) Smuggling ............................................................................................................................ 383
(i) Conclusion ............................................................................................................................ 385
10. Conclusions on Logistical and Technical Assistance to the VRS .....................................385
D. LOGISTICAL AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO THE SVK..........................................................388
1. Dependence of the SVK on VJ ............................................................................................388
2. Delivery of Weaponry and Military Equipment to the SVK ...............................................389
(a) Provision of Weapons and Ammunition .............................................................................. 389
(b) Provision of the Orkan Rocket System ................................................................................ 391
(c) Provision of Fuel and Miscellaneous Equipment................................................................. 392
(d) Training of SVK Soldiers .................................................................................................... 393
3. Conclusions..........................................................................................................................396
E. THE DEFENCE’S EXPERT WITNESS ON LOGISTICAL ASSISTANCE..............................................397
1. Ðokić’s Background ............................................................................................................397
2. Questionable Methodology of Expert Report ......................................................................397
3. Use of Anonymous Sources.................................................................................................398
4. Claim that Perišić Had Limited Authority Over Logistical Assistance...............................399
5. Gross Underestimation of Logistical Assistance from VJ...................................................402
6. Conclusion ...........................................................................................................................403
F. EVIDENCE RECOVERED FROM THE ALLEGED CRIME SCENES ....................................................405
1. Submissions of the Parties ...................................................................................................405
2. Shells Recovered from Sarajevo Crime Scenes...................................................................405
3. Bullets Recovered from Srebrenica Crime Scenes ..............................................................406
4. Conclusion ...........................................................................................................................408
G. OTHER FORMS OF ASSISTANCE ................................................................................................409
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1. Drina Plan ............................................................................................................................409
2. Gvozd Plan...........................................................................................................................412
3. VJ Members Deployed to the RS.........................................................................................413
(a) Operation Pancir-2............................................................................................................... 413
(i) VJ Special Units Corps Deployment ................................................................................ 415
(ii) Mount @u} – 27 December 1993..................................................................................... 416
(iii) Aftermath........................................................................................................................ 417
(b) Secrecy of VJ Presence in the Area ..................................................................................... 420
(c) Peri{i}’s Presence in the Area .............................................................................................. 422
(d) SDC 18th Session of 7 February 1994 .................................................................................. 422
4. Other Instances of Direct Involvement of the VJ in BiH.....................................................423
5. Assistance in Communications and Electronic Data Transmissions ...................................424
H. PERI{I}’S RELATIONSHIP WITH MLADI} ...................................................................................427
1. Personal Relationship between Peri{i} and Mladi} .............................................................427
2. Peri{i}’s Support for Mladi}’s Selection as Commander of the VRS Main Staff ...............428
3. Peace Plans...........................................................................................................................428
4. Release of French Humanitarian Workers...........................................................................430
5. UNPROFOR Hostages.........................................................................................................431
6. Meeting between Perišić and Mladi} in Bosnia on 18 July 1995........................................432
7. Release of the French Pilots by the VRS .............................................................................432
8. Peri{i}’s Attendance at Darko Mladi}’s Wedding in July 1997 ..........................................435
9. Peri{i}’s Visit to Mladi} at the Rajac Facility in July 1997.................................................436
10. Peri{i}’s Visit to Mladi} at the VJ Command Post in Stragari in the Autumn of 1997.....436
11. Peri{i}’s Visit to Mladi} at the Rajac Facility in February 1998.......................................437
I. PERI{I}’S ACCESS TO INFORMATION ..........................................................................................438
1. Background ..........................................................................................................................438
2. Activities and Reports of Relevant VJ Organs ....................................................................439
(a) Operations Centre................................................................................................................. 439
(b) Intelligence Administration.................................................................................................. 440
(c) Security Administration ....................................................................................................... 441
(d) Information Administration ................................................................................................. 442
3. Information Flow between VJ, SVK and VRS....................................................................442
(a) Coordination Meetings......................................................................................................... 442
(b) Other Meetings..................................................................................................................... 444
(c) Reporting.............................................................................................................................. 445
(i) Regular Operations Reports.............................................................................................. 445
(ii) Reporting during Operation “Pauk” ................................................................................ 448
(iii) SVK and VRS Intelligence and Security Administrations’ Reports .............................. 449
(iv) Ad Hoc Reports and Communication Lines ................................................................... 451
(d) Conclusion ........................................................................................................................... 452
J. PERI{I}’S KNOWLEDGE OF THE CRIMES COMMITTED IN SARAJEVO AND SREBRENICA ..............454
1. Submissions of the Parties ...................................................................................................454
2. Peri{i}’s Knowledge of the VRS’s Criminal Conduct.........................................................454
(a) Evidence Preceding Peri{i}’s Appointment as Chief of the VJ General Staff ..................... 454
(b) Evidence Following Peri{i}’s Appointment as Chief of the VJ General Staff .................... 460
(i) Statements by Peri{i} ........................................................................................................ 460
(ii) Information Received through the UN and Other Diplomatic Channels......................... 460
(c) Conclusion............................................................................................................................ 467
3. Peri{i}’s Knowledge of Crimes Committed by the VRS in Sarajevo..................................468
(a) Diplomatic Cables ................................................................................................................ 468
(b) Documentation by the International Community of Crimes in Sarajevo............................. 471
(c) Media Coverage of Crimes in Sarajevo ............................................................................... 475
(d) Conclusion ........................................................................................................................... 480
4. Peri{i}’s Knowledge of Crimes Committed by the VRS in Srebrenica...............................483
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(a) Peri{i}’s Knowledge of the Sensitivity of the Situation in and Around Srebrenica and the
Eastern Enclaves ................................................................................................................. 483
(b) Peri{i}’s Knowledge of Events in Srebrenica Before and During the Attack...................... 485
(i) Intelligence Reports .......................................................................................................... 486
(ii) Peri{i}’s Knowledge of Crimes Committed by the VRS in Srebrenica .......................... 489
a. Statements by Peri{i}..................................................................................................... 490
b. Diplomatic Cables ......................................................................................................... 491
c. Meetings with Members of the VRS ............................................................................. 493
d. Documentation by the International Community of Crimes in Srebrenica................... 494
e. Indictments of the Tribunal ........................................................................................... 495
f. Media Coverage of Crimes in Srebrenica ...................................................................... 496
(c) Conclusion............................................................................................................................ 499
VII. PERI[I]’S CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR AIDING AND ABETTING
CRIMES UNDER ARTICLE 7(1).........................................................................................501
A. ELEMENTS OF AIDING AND ABETTING......................................................................................501
B. FINDINGS ON OBJECTIVE ELEMENTS OF AIDING AND ABETTING ..............................................501
1. Submissions of the Parties ...................................................................................................501
2. Preliminary Remarks ...........................................................................................................502
3. The VRS’s War Strategy Encompassed the Commission of Crimes ..................................503
4. Logistical Assistance ...........................................................................................................504
(a) Submissions.......................................................................................................................... 504
(b) Discussion ............................................................................................................................ 505
5. Personnel Assistance............................................................................................................507
(a) Submissions.......................................................................................................................... 507
(b) Discussion ............................................................................................................................ 508
6. Other Forms of Assistance...................................................................................................512
7. Conclusion ...........................................................................................................................513
C. FINDINGS ON THE MENTAL ELEMENTS OF AIDING AND ABETTING ...........................................514
1. Preliminary Remarks ...........................................................................................................514
2. Sarajevo................................................................................................................................515
3. Srebrenica ............................................................................................................................516
D. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................519
VIII. PERI[I]’S CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY UNDER ARTICLE 7(3) .........................520
A. SUPERIOR-SUBORDINATE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PERI{I} AND THE PERPETRATORS OF THE
CRIMES...................................................................................................................................520
1. Whether Members of the 30th and the 40th PCs were Subordinates of Peri{i} ....................521
(a) Whether the Principal Perpetrators were Members of the 30th and 40th PCs ....................... 521
(b) Whether the 30th and 40th PC Members were VJ Members ................................................. 524
(c) Conclusion............................................................................................................................ 524
2. Effective Control..................................................................................................................524
(a) Indicators of Effective Control............................................................................................. 526
(i) Whether Peri{i} had the Ability to Discipline and to Punish the PC Members................ 526
a. The 40th PC .................................................................................................................... 526
b. The 30th PC.................................................................................................................... 531
(ii) Whether Peri{i} had the Authority to Issue Binding Orders to the 40th PC Members .... 534
a. “Naredba” and “Nare|enje” .......................................................................................... 534
i. Naredba...................................................................................................................... 535
ii. Nare|enje.................................................................................................................. 535
b. Ability of Peri{i} to Issue Command Orders (nare|enje) to the 40th PC members ...... 536
i. Before the Shelling of Zagreb in May 1995............................................................... 536
ii. 1-3 May 1995............................................................................................................ 538
iii. After the Shelling of Zagreb in May 1995............................................................... 541
c. Ability of Peri{i} to Issue Command Orders (nare|enje) to the 30th PC members....... 543
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(iii) Whether Peri{i} was Involved in the Payment of Salaries and Provision of Other
Benefits for the 40th and the 30th PC Members............................................................... 543
(iv) Whether Peri{i} had the Capacity to Promote Members of the 30th and the 40th PCs.... 544
(v) Whether Peri{i} had the Authority to Terminate the Professional Military Service of the
40th PC Members ............................................................................................................ 546
(vi) Whether the SVK and the VRS Depended on the VJ Logistical Support ...................... 547
(vii) Whether the SVK and VRS Reported to the VJ General Staff...................................... 547
B. FINDINGS ON SUPERIOR-SUBORDINATE RELATIONSHIP ............................................................548
1. Preliminary Remarks ...........................................................................................................548
2. Whether Peri{i} Exercised Effective Control over the SVK and VRS................................548
(a) SVK...................................................................................................................................... 549
(b) VRS...................................................................................................................................... 553
3. Knew or Had Reason to Know ............................................................................................555
4. Failure to Punish ..................................................................................................................556
5. Conclusion ...........................................................................................................................556
IX. CUMULATIVE CONVICTIONS..........................................................................................558
A. ARTICLES 3 AND 5: WAR CRIMES AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY ......................................558
B. ARTICLE 3: MURDER AND ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS ..................................................................558
C. ARTICLE 5: PERSECUTIONS, MURDER, AND INHUMANE ACTS ..................................................558
X. SENTENCING ..........................................................................................................................560
A. LAW ON SENTENCING ...............................................................................................................560
1. Purposes of Sentencing ........................................................................................................560
2. Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances ........................................................................561
3. General Sentencing Practice in the Former Yugoslavia ......................................................563
4. Credit for Time Served in Custody......................................................................................564
B. DETERMINATION OF THE SENTENCE .........................................................................................564
1. Submissions of the Parties ...................................................................................................564
2. Findings of the Trial Chamber.............................................................................................566
(a) Gravity of the Crimes and the Role of the Accused............................................................. 566
(i) Sarajevo ............................................................................................................................ 566
(ii) Zagreb .............................................................................................................................. 567
(iii) Srebrenica ....................................................................................................................... 567
(iv) Aggravating Circumstances............................................................................................ 568
3. Mitigating Circumstances ....................................................................................................569
XI. DISPOSITION.........................................................................................................................571
XII. DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE MOLOTO ON COUNTS 1 TO 4 AND 9 TO 12....1
A. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS ...........................................................................................................1
1. VRS Dependence on VJ Logistical and Personnel Support ....................................................1
2. Crimes Linked to the Strategy of the Bosnian Serb Leadership..............................................2
B. ACTUS REUS ..................................................................................................................................2
1. Preliminary Remarks on the Requisite Objective Element of Aiding and Abetting ...............2
2. Logistical Assistance ...............................................................................................................5
3. Personnel Assistance................................................................................................................7
4. Conclusions..............................................................................................................................8
C. PERI{I}’S KNOWLEDGE OF THE CRIMES COMMITTED IN SARAJEVO AND SREBRENICA ...............10
1. Preliminary Remarks on the Standard of Knowledge............................................................10
2. Peri{i}’s Knowledge of the VRS’s Criminal Conduct...........................................................11
(a) Evidence Preceding Peri{i}’s Appointment as Chief of the VJ General Staff ....................... 12
(b) Evidence Following Peri{i}’s Appointment as Chief of the VJ General Staff ...................... 14
(i) Letter from the VRS ........................................................................................................... 14
(ii) UN Reports and Resolutions ............................................................................................. 15
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(iii) Media Reports................................................................................................................... 16
3. Peri{i}’s Knowledge of Crimes Committed by the VRS in Sarajevo....................................17
(a) Intelligence Reports................................................................................................................ 17
(b) Diplomatic Cables.................................................................................................................. 18
(c) Documentation by the International Community of Crimes in Sarajevo ............................... 19
(d) Media Reports ........................................................................................................................ 21
4. Peri{i}’s Knowledge of Crimes Committed by the VRS in Srebrenica.................................21
(a) Statements made by Peri{i}.................................................................................................... 21
(b) Intelligence Reports ............................................................................................................... 22
(c) Meetings with Members of the VRS...................................................................................... 22
(d) Diplomatic Cables.................................................................................................................. 23
(e) Documentation by the International Community of Crimes in Srebrenica............................ 24
(f) Media Reports......................................................................................................................... 24
5. Conclusion .............................................................................................................................25
XIII. DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE MOLOTO ON COUNTS 5 TO 8.........................26
A. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS .........................................................................................................26
B. PERI{I}’S ABILITY TO ISSUE ORDERS TO THE 40TH PC MEMBERS ...............................................26
(a) It was written on the authority of Milo{evi}, not of Peri{i};.................................................. 27
(b) Milo{evi} was neither in the chain of command of the VJ nor the SVK to entitle him to
issue a command order; ........................................................................................................ 27
(c) One of the addressees, Milan Marti}, was not a member of the 40th PC and therefore could
not be within Peri{i}’s alleged chain of command; .............................................................. 27
(d) Reasons were provided for the issuance of the document, a feature not present in
command orders;................................................................................................................... 27
(e) One of the reasons for issuing it was that Milan Marti} had promised Yasushi Akashi to
facilitate the passage of UNPROFOR humanitarian aid in Western Bosnia; therefore it is
more of a reminder to Marti} to honour his word as opposed to an order; and.................... 27
(f) Čeleketi} addressed his response to Milo{evi}, not to Peri{i}, evincing his view of whom,
between Milo{evi} and Peri{i}, he regarded as the one having given the order................... 27
C. ABILITY TO INITIATE DISCIPLINARY AND/OR CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION ...................................32
a. Whether Peri{i} had the Capacity to Promote Members of the 40th PC.......................... 34
b. Whether Peri{i} had the Capacity to Appoint 40th PC Members to Specific Posts in the
SVK .............................................................................................................................. 34
D. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................................................35
XIV. ANNEXES .................................................................................................................................1
A. ANNEX A – PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND........................................................................1
1. Pre-Trial Proceedings...............................................................................................................1
(a) Surrender and Initial Appearance............................................................................................. 1
(b) Amendments to the Indictment ................................................................................................ 1
(c) Composition of the Trial Chamber........................................................................................... 2
(d) Counsel..................................................................................................................................... 3
(e) Preparations for Trial ............................................................................................................... 3
2. Trial Proceedings .....................................................................................................................4
(a) Provisional Release .................................................................................................................. 5
(b) Site Visit................................................................................................................................... 6
B. ANNEX B – GLOSSARY...........................................................................................................7
1. ICTY Judgements and Decisions.............................................................................................7
2. ICTR Judgements and Decisions ...........................................................................................15
3. Other Jurisprudence ...............................................................................................................16
4. Table of other Authorities......................................................................................................17
(a) Domestic Laws....................................................................................................................... 17
(b) International Legal Instruments and Commentaries .............................................................. 17
5. Table of Short Forms .............................................................................................................18
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XV. CONFIDENTIAL ANNEX C
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. The Accused Momčilo Perišić
1.
Momčilo Perišić, son of Srećko, was born on 22 May 1944 in Koštunići, Serbia, in the
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (“SFRY”). After joining the Yugoslav People’s Army
(“JNA”), he graduated from the Ground Forces Military Academy in 1966.1
2.
When the conflict in the former Yugoslavia began, Perišić was Commander of the JNA
Artillery School Centre in Zadar, Croatia.2 In January 1992, he was appointed the Commander of
the newly established 13th Corps of the JNA in the Mostar region, Bosnia and Herzegovina (“BiH”).
After the JNA’s formal withdrawal from BiH in May 1992, Perišić became the Chief of Staff and
then Commander of the 3rd Army within the Yugoslav Army (“VJ”) based in Niš, Serbia.3
3.
On 26 August 1993, the President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (“FRY”) appointed
Perišić as Chief of the VJ General Staff, a position which made him the most senior officer in the
VJ.4 He held this position until 24 November 1998, when the FRY President appointed him as
government advisor for defence issues.5
B. The Case Against Momčilo Perišić
4.
An initial indictment against Perišić was confirmed on 24 February 2005 and unsealed on
7 March 2005.6 Perišić expressed his intention to voluntarily surrender and on 7 March 2005, he
was transferred into the custody of the Tribunal.7 Amended indictments were filed on
26 September 2005, 13 September 2007 and 5 February 2008, the last being the operative
indictment in this case (“Indictment”).8
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Ex. P196, Decree of the President of the FRY, 26 August 1993, p. 2; Ex. P812, Transcript of Interview with
Peri{i}, 24 January 2004, p. 1.
Jožef Poje, T. 3089-3090; Ex. P706, Peri{i}’s Written Response to a Question from Trial Attorney, 19 October
2003, p. 2.
Ex. P706, Peri{i}’s Written Response to a Question from Trial Attorney, 19 October 2003, p. 2; Ex. P810,
Transcript of Interview with Peri{i}, 23 January 2004, p. 6; Ex. P815, Transcript of Interview with Peri{i},
25 January 2004, p. 15.
Ex. P196, Decree of the President of the FRY, 26 August 1993, p. 2; Ex. P375, Expert Report of Patrick Treanor
Entitled: Belgrade Leadership and Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia, 1 September 2008, p. 26.
Ex. P703, Presidential Decree on Deployment and Appointment of General Periši}, 24 November 1998.
Confirmation of Indictment (under seal), 24 February 2005; Order to Disclose Indictment and Warrant of Arrest
Against Momčilo Perišić, 14 March 2005.
Order for Detention on Remand, 8 March 2005.
Prosecution’s Filing of Amended Indictment in Compliance with Trial Chamber Order of 29 August 2005,
26 September 2005; Prosecution Filing of Second Amended Indictment, 13 September 2007; Prosecution Filing
of Revised Second Amended Indictment with Annex A, 5 February 2008.
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5.
The Office of the Prosecutor (“Prosecution”) charges Perišić with 13 counts of violations of
the laws or customs of war and crimes against humanity, pursuant to Articles 3 and 5 of the Statute
of the Tribunal (“Statute”), respectively.
6.
Pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Statute, Perišić is alleged to bear individual criminal
responsibility for having aided and abetted in the planning, preparation, or execution of the crimes
referred to in Articles 3 and 5 of the Statute.9 In particular, Perišić is alleged to have provided
personnel and logistical assistance to the Army of the Republika Srpska (“VRS”), contributing
substantially and materially to their capacity to commit crimes.10
7.
In addition, pursuant to Article 7(3) of the Statute, Perišić, as a superior, is alleged to bear
individual criminal responsibility for having failed to prevent or punish the crimes committed by his
subordinates as described in the Indictment.11 It is alleged that Perišić had a superior-subordinate
relationship with former members of the JNA who joined the newly formed VRS and Army of the
Serbian Krajina (“SVK”) and who became officers in the 30th and 40th Personnel Centres (“PCs”) of
the VJ General Staff.12
8.
The Prosecution further alleges that Perišić created an environment of impunity in which his
subordinates believed they could commit crimes without fear of sanction. The creation of this
environment of impunity amounted to aiding and abetting by facilitating and encouraging the
commission of the crimes alleged in the Indictment.13
1. Alleged Crimes in Sarajevo (August 1993 - November 1995)
9.
The Prosecution alleges that an extensive campaign of shelling and sniping took place in
Sarajevo between August 1993 and November 1995, where civilians were specifically targeted or
were subjected to reckless fire in areas where civilians were known to have been.14 The Prosecution
contends that these crimes were, in part, “planned, instigated, ordered, committed and aided” by
members of the 30th PC of the VJ General Staff.15
10.
The Prosecution alleges that Perišić aided and abetted these crimes with the knowledge that
the assistance he provided would be used in the commission thereof.16 It is further alleged that
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
Indictment, paras 8-33; Prosecution Final Brief, paras 450-689.
Indictment, para. 9.
Indictment, paras 34-39. See also Prosecution Final Brief, paras 690-834.
Indictment, para. 7.
Indictment, para. 31.
Indictment, paras 40, 42; Annexes A and B to the Indictment.
Indictment, para. 43; Prosecution Final Brief, para. 387.
Indictment, para. 44.
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Perišić had reason to know that members of the 30th PC participated in the perpetration of the said
crimes,17 and that he failed to initiate an inquiry and to take the necessary and reasonable measures
to prevent such acts or punish the perpetrators thereof.18
11.
Thus, in relation to crimes allegedly committed in Sarajevo between August 1993 and
November 1995, Perišić is charged with individual criminal responsibility under Articles 7(1) and
7(3) of the Statute for murder (Counts 1 and 2) as a crime against humanity pursuant to Article 5 of
the Statute and as a violation of the laws or customs of war pursuant to Article 3 of the Statute; for
inhumane acts (Count 3) as a crime against humanity pursuant to Article 5 of the Statute; and for
attacks on civilians (Count 4) as a violation of the laws or customs of war pursuant to Article 3 of
the Statute.19
2. Alleged Crimes in Zagreb (2 and 3 May 1995)
12.
The Prosecution alleges that on 2 May 1995 an Orkan Multiple Barrel Rocket fitted with
“cluster bombs” warheads was fired from the area of Petrova Gora into central Zagreb and the
airport (Pleso). It is alleged that these rockets killed at least five civilians and wounded at least
146.20 On 3 May 1995, an Orkan Multiple Barrel Rocket fitted with “cluster bombs” warheads was
again fired from the area of Petrova Gora into central Zagreb, killing two civilians and wounding 48
others.21
13.
The Prosecution submits that the shelling was not justified by military necessity and that the
affected areas were either specifically targeted or were hit as the result of reckless fire in areas
where civilians were known to have been.22 It is alleged that the said crimes were committed by
members of the 40th PC of the VJ, including, but not limited to, Milan Čeleketi}.23
14.
It is alleged that Perišić had reason to know that Milan Čeleketi} and other senior officers
who served in the SVK via the 40th PC participated in these crimes.24 In spite of this, it is alleged,
Perišić failed to initiate an inquiry and to take necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the
alleged crimes or punish his subordinates for the perpetration thereof.25
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
Indictment, para. 45; Prosecution Final Brief, para. 808.
Indictment, para. 46; Prosecution Final Brief, para. 808.
Indictment, para. 46; Prosecution Closing Arguments, T. 14636.
Indictment, para. 49.
Indictment, para. 50.
Indictment, para. 51.
Indictment, para. 52. See also Prosecution Final Brief, para. 449.
Indictment, para. 53; Prosecution Final Brief, paras 818-821, 833.
Indictment, para. 54; Prosecution Final Brief, paras 822-824.
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15.
Thus, in relation to crimes allegedly committed in Zagreb on 2 and 3 May 1995, Perišić is
charged with individual criminal responsibility under Article 7(3) of the Statute for murder (Counts
5 and 6), as a crime against humanity pursuant to Article 5 of the Statute and as a violation of the
laws or customs of war pursuant to Article 3 of the Statute; for inhumane acts (Count 7) as a crime
against humanity pursuant to Article 5 of the Statute; and for attacks on civilians (Count 8) as a
violation of the laws or customs of war pursuant to Article 3 of the Statute.26 Subsequently, the
Prosecution clarified that it does not charge Peri{i} with his failure to prevent these crimes but only
with his failure to punish the perpetrators thereof.27
3. Alleged Crimes in Srebrenica (July 1995)
16.
The Prosecution alleges that on 8 March 1995, Radovan Karad`i}, as the Supreme
Commander of the VRS, issued Operational Directive 7, instructing the VRS to eliminate the
Muslim enclaves of Srebrenica and Žepa in furtherance of the “six strategic objectives” of
12 May 1992. The Prosecution contends that between 6 and 11 July 1995, the Srebrenica enclave
came under attack from the VRS and other Bosnian Serb forces under the command and control of
Ratko Mladi}. It is alleged that Perišić was aware of the planned attack, of the “six strategic
objectives”, and of the fact that some members of the VRS would engage in criminal conduct
against the Bosnian Muslim civilian population; criminal conduct that would include persecution,
forcible transfers and killings.28
17.
It is alleged that, between 12 July 1995 and about 20 July 1995, thousands of Bosnian
Muslim men were captured by, or surrendered to, Bosnian Serb forces under the command and
control of Mladi} and were summarily executed between 13 and 19 July 1995 and buried in mass
graves. The Prosecution contends that between 1 August 1995 and 1 November 1995, VRS units
under the command of Mladi} participated in an organised effort to conceal the killings by
reburying bodies of Bosnian Muslim men killed in July 1995, exhumed from mass graves.29
18.
From July 1995 onwards, it is alleged that the VRS forcibly transferred thousands of
Bosnian Muslim civilian women, children and elderly men from Poto~ari and other areas
surrounding Srebrenica to Kladanj and other non-Serb areas of BiH.30
26
27
28
29
30
Indictment, para. 54; Prosecution Closing Arguments, T. 14636.
Prosecution Closing Arguments, T. 14637, 14921-14922 (partly private session).
Indictment, para. 56; Prosecution Final Brief, paras 388-404, 636.
Indictment, para. 57; Prosecution Final Brief, paras 416-436.
Indictment, para. 57.
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19.
The Prosecution alleges that these crimes were, in part, planned, instigated, ordered,
committed and aided by members of the 30th PC of the VJ.31 The Prosecution contends that Perišić
aided and abetted these crimes with the knowledge that the assistance he provided would be used in
the commission thereof. It is alleged that the said crimes were perpetrated with the intent to
discriminate against the Bosnian Muslim population of Srebrenica on political, racial or religious
grounds and that Perišić was aware of the perpetrators’ discriminatory intent.32
20.
It is argued that Perišić had reason to know that his subordinates participated in the
perpetration of crimes in Srebrenica33 and failed to initiate an inquiry and to take necessary and
reasonable measures to prevent the alleged crimes or punish the perpetrators thereof.34
21.
Thus, in relation to crimes allegedly committed in Srebrenica in July 1995, Perišić is
charged with individual criminal responsibility under Articles 7(1) and 7(3) of the Statute for
murder (Counts 9 and 10) as a crime against humanity pursuant to Article 5 of the Statute and as a
violation of the laws or customs of war pursuant to Article 3 of the Statute. Perišić is further
charged with individual criminal responsibility under Articles 7(1) and 7(3) of the Statute for
inhumane acts (Count 11), for persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds (Count 12) and
for extermination (Count 13) as crimes against humanity pursuant to Article 5 of the Statute.35
C. Considerations Regarding the Evidence
1. General Evidentiary Principles
22.
The Trial Chamber has received evidence both in oral and documentary form. This evidence
was diverse in nature, ranging from direct evidence, circumstantial evidence, original and hearsay
evidence, to facts agreed upon by the Parties or previously adjudicated before this Tribunal. The
evidence also included written statements in lieu of oral testimony admitted pursuant to Rules 92
bis, 92 ter and 92 quater of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Tribunal (“Rules”).
23.
The Trial Chamber has duly considered and given appropriate weight to all the evidence
adduced at trial in light of the entire trial record, in accordance with the Statute and the Rules even
if not expressly referred to. The Trial Chamber underlines that the right of an accused to a reasoned
31
32
33
34
35
Indictment, para. 58.
Indictment, para. 60.
Indictment, para. 61.
Indictment, para. 62.
Indictment, para. 62; Prosecution Closing Arguments, T. 14636-14637.
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opinion in writing, as set forth in Article 23(2) of the Statute and Rule 98 ter(C), in no way imposes
an obligation to explain every detail of its assessment of the evidence adduced during the trial.36
24.
Article 21(3) of the Statute establishes that an accused shall be presumed innocent until
proven guilty.37 The Prosecution bears the burden of proof for the guilt of the Accused and must
establish beyond reasonable doubt each element of the crimes and of the modes of liability charged
as well as any fact indispensable for conviction.38 Hence, in accordance with the principle in dubio
pro reo, the Trial Chamber resolved any reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the Accused in his
favour.
25.
At the start of the trial, the Trial Chamber issued “Guidelines” that governed the
presentation and admission of evidence during the trial.39
26.
In its evaluation of viva voce witnesses, the Trial Chamber took into consideration the
demeanour of a witness on the stand, as well as individual circumstances, including any protective
measures granted. In assessing the viva voce witnesses, the Trial Chamber also considered the time
that elapsed since the crimes alleged in the Indictment occurred and its possible impact on the
accuracy of the testimony. Hence, the lack of precision, or the existence of minor discrepancies
between a previous statement or testimony and the one given in this case, did not necessarily
discredit the testimony.
27.
Hearsay evidence is evidence of facts not within the witness’s own knowledge.40 The
jurisprudence of the Tribunal allows admission of hearsay evidence pursuant to Rule 89(C). The
weight to be attributed to that evidence depends on the circumstances.41 In particular, the Trial
Chamber has taken into account the fact that the original source was not the subject of a solemn
declaration or tested by cross-examination and that the reliability of such evidence could be flawed
by a potential compounding of errors of perception and memory.
28.
Circumstantial evidence is evidence of circumstances surrounding an event from which a
fact at issue may be reasonably inferred.42 Where an inference is drawn from circumstantial
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
See Kvo~ka et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 23.
Article 21(3) of the Statute.
Rule 87(A) of the Rules; Limaj et al. Trial Judgement, para. 10; Br|anin Trial Judgement, para. 22. The fact that
the Defence has not challenged certain factual allegations contained in the Indictment does not mean that the
Trial Chamber has accepted these facts to be proven.
Order for Guidelines on the Admission and Presentation of Evidence and Conduct of Counsel in Court,
29 October 2008 (“Guidelines”).
Halilovi} Trial Judgement, para. 15.
See Aleksovski February 1999 Appeal Decision, para. 15.
See ^elebi}i Appeal Judgement, para. 458.
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evidence to establish a fact on which a conviction relies, that inference must be the only reasonable
one that could be drawn from the evidence presented.43
29.
The evidence of a single witness on a material fact does not, as a matter of law, require
corroboration.44 However, the Trial Chamber has carefully analysed such evidence before relying
upon it to a decisive extent.
30.
In its Final Brief, the Defence argues that evidence originating from the same source but at
different times does not amount to corroboration.45 Likewise, it posits that a person giving the same
narration more than once is not corroboration but mere proof of a good memory.46 The Trial
Chamber recalls that there is no specific legal requirement as to the source of corroboration.47
However, the Trial Chamber is of the view that generally a person cannot corroborate his or her
own testimony and has considered evidence originating from the same person but at different times
to be reflective of the consistency of the witness’s testimony and has accorded it appropriate
weight.
31.
In assessing the authenticity of documentary evidence, the Trial Chamber considered
various factors such as the source of the evidence, its chain of custody and other evidence relating
to the document. In accordance with its Guidelines, the Trial Chamber did not consider unsigned or
unstamped documents to be necessarily void of authenticity.48 When the Trial Chamber was
satisfied of the authenticity of a particular document, it did not automatically accept the statements
contained therein to be an accurate portrayal of the facts.49 Rather, the Trial Chamber evaluated all
evidence within the context of the entire trial record.
32.
In evaluating the evidence adduced through witnesses in court, the Trial Chamber assessed
whether the witnesses were reliable. In this light, the Trial Chamber notes that credibility is an
essential element that needs to be satisfied in order for a witness to be found reliable. The Trial
Chamber took into account any potential bias or partiality on the part of a witness.
33.
Some of the witnesses may have had close links with persons involved in the commission of
crimes during the conflict in the former Yugoslavia and thus may have had a personal interest in
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
Stakić Appeal Judgement, para. 219. See also ^elebi}i Appeal Judgement, para. 458; Had`ihasanovi} and
Kubura Appeal Judgement, para. 286.
Aleksovski Appeal Judgement, para. 62; ^elebi}i Appeal Judgement, para. 506. See also Tadi} Appeal
Judgement, para. 65.
Defence Final Brief, para. 32.
Ibid.
See Haraqija and Morina Appeal Judgement, para. 62.
See Decision on Prosecution’s Second and Third Bar Table Motions, 16 November 2009, para. 13; Guidelines,
para. 34.
See Guidelines, para. 32.
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being inaccurate in their testimony. In other cases, witnesses seemed to feel a sense of loyalty
towards the Accused and were evasive in providing answers implicating the acts or omissions of
Peri{i}. The Chamber has considered this factor when weighing and assessing their credibility.50
34.
Where witnesses were found to have displayed a lack of candour towards the Trial
Chamber, their evidence was not relied upon. However, in cases where only part of the testimony
was found to be unreliable, the Trial Chamber did not disregard the entire testimony but only
rejected the portion it found to be unreliable.
2. Specific Evidentiary Considerations
(a) Statements of the Accused
35.
Article 21(4)(g) of the Statute provides that an accused shall not be compelled to testify
against himself. In the present case, the Accused elected not to give evidence during the trial. In
accordance with existing jurisprudence of this Tribunal,51 the Trial Chamber, in the determination
of his guilt or innocence, has not drawn any inference from his silence.
36.
The Trial Chamber notes that the Accused gave an unsworn statement at the commencement
of the trial on 3 October 2008, pursuant to Rule 84 bis(A).52 The purpose of Rule 84 bis is to give
an accused the opportunity to be heard by the Trial Chamber without having to appear as a
witness.53 The Trial Chamber has the discretion to decide as to any probative value of statements
given pursuant to Rule 84 bis.54 In this regard, the Trial Chamber has decided to attach limited
weight to the Accused’s Rule 84 bis statement.
(b) Suspect Interview
37.
On 9 March 2009, the Trial Chamber admitted into evidence the statement given by the
Accused at the end of 2003 and early 2004, as well as his written response to questions asked by the
Prosecution (“Suspect Interview”).55 In its Final Brief, the Defence “urges extreme caution in
50
51
52
53
54
55
See e.g. DragomirVasi} and Borivoje Te{i}.
See ^elebi}i Appeal Judgement, para. 783.
Mom~ilo Peri{i} Rule 84 bis Statement, 3 October 2008, T. 425-432.
Prli} et al. April 2009 Appeal Decision, para. 13.
Prli} et al. April 2009 Appeal Decision, para. 28.
See Bretton Randall, T. 4117-4118; Ex. P705, Transcript of Interview with Periši}, 6 December 2003; Ex. P706,
Periši}’s Written Response to a Question from Trial Attorney, 19 October 2003. See also Ex. P801, Transcript of
Interview with Periši}, 7 December 2003; Ex. P802, Transcript of Interview with Periši}, 7 December 2003;
Ex. P803, Transcript of Interview with Periši}, 8 December 2003; Ex. P804, Transcript of Interview with Periši},
18 December 2003; Ex. P805, Transcript of Interview with Periši}, 18 December 2003; Ex. P806, Transcript of
Interview with Periši}, 19 December 2003; Ex. P807, Transcript of Interview with Periši}, 19 December 2003;
Ex. P808, Transcript of Interview with Periši}, 20 December 2003; Ex. P809, Transcript of Interview with
Periši}, 20 December 2003; Ex. P810, Transcript of Interview with Periši}, 23 January 2004; Ex. P811,
8
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relying on any parts of the interview” on the grounds that the Accused was not able to review prior
to this interview many of the documents later introduced at trial. The Defence further avers that the
interview took place almost ten years after the events on which the Accused was questioned.56 The
Trial Chamber is satisfied, however, that the procedural safeguards set out in Rules 42 and 43 were
made available to the Accused during his interview with the Prosecution.57 Furthermore, the Trial
Chamber notes that the Accused submitted his written response through his counsel,58 and that
counsel was present during the interview.59 The Trial Chamber has thus awarded appropriate weight
to the Suspect Interview in light of all the evidence on the trial record.
(c) Evidence of Persons Convicted by the Tribunal
38.
The Trial Chamber received testimony from several witnesses who have been the subject of
criminal proceedings before this Tribunal, namely Momir Nikoli}, Miroslav Deronji}, Milan Babi}
and Dra`en Erdemovi}. This testimony was received viva voce, as well as pursuant to Rules 92 ter
and 92 quater.60 Such evidence was examined by the Trial Chamber with great caution.61 This
evidence has been considered throughout the Judgement accordingly.
(d) Evidence Pursuant to Rule 92 bis, ter, quater
39.
The Trial Chamber has received evidence adduced by both Parties pursuant to Rule 92 bis,
92 ter and 92 quater.62
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
Transcript of Interview with Periši}, 23 January 2004; Ex. P812, Transcript of Interview with Periši}, 24 January
2004; Ex. P813, Transcript of Interview with Periši}, 24 January 2004; Ex. P814, Transcript of Interview with
Periši}, 25 January 2004; Ex. P815, Transcript of Interview with Periši}, 25 January 2004; Ex. P816, Transcript
of Interview with Periši}, 26 January 2004; Ex. P817, Transcript of Interview with Periši}, 27 January 2004.
Defence Final Brief, para. 40.
See Ex. P705, Transcript of Interview with Peri{i}, 6 December 2003, pp 1-6.
Ex. P706, Peri{i}’s Written Response to a Question from Trial Attorney, 23 July 1998, p. 1.
Ex. P705, Transcript of Interview with Peri{i}, 6 December 2003, pp 1-4.
Ex. P2511, Transcript of Momir Nikoli} from Prosecutor v. Popovi} et al., 21 April 2009; Ex. P2512, Momir
Nikoli} Statement of Facts and Acceptance of Responsibility, 6 May 2003; Ex. P2513, Supplementary Statement
of Momir Nikoli}, 16 April 2009; Ex. P2514, Joint Motion for Consideration of Plea Agreement Between
Momir Nikoli} and the Prosecution, 7 May 2003; Ex. P2515, Tab B to Joint Motion for Consideration of Plea
Agreement Between Momir Nikoli} and the Prosecution, 6 May 2003; Ex. P2516, Minutes of Bratunac Brigade
Meetings From 28 June 1995 Through 16 October 1995; Ex. P2517, Transcript of Momir Nikoli} from
Prosecutor v. Popovi} et al., 22 April 2009.
See Kraji{nik Appeal Judgement, para. 146, stating that “[…] it is well established in the jurisprudence of both
ad hoc Tribunals that nothing prohibits a Trial Chamber from relying on evidence given by a convicted person,
including evidence of a partner in crime of the person being tried before the Trial Chamber”.
Decision on Prosecution Motion for Admission of Evidence Pursuant to Rule 92 bis, 2 October 2008; Decision
on Prosecution Motion to add Garry Selsky as a 92 bis Witness, 21 January 2010; Decision on Mr. Peri{i}’s
Motion for the Admission of Evidence Pursuant to Rule 92 bis with Public Annex A, 13 April 2010; Decision on
Mr. Peri{i}’s Motion for the Admission of Evidence Pursuant to Rule 92 bis, 29 October 2010; Decision on
Defence Motions to Amend its Rule 65 ter Witness List and to Admit Evidence Pursuant to Rule 92 bis,
2 December 2010; Decision on Mr. Peri{i}’s Motion for the Admission of Evidence Pursuant to Rule 92 bis
Regarding the Prosecution Motion to Reopen, 14 December 2010; Decision on Prosecution Motions for
Admission of Evidence Pursuant to Rule 92 quater, 10 October 2008 (confidential); Decision on Prosecution
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(i) Use of Rule 92 bis Statements
40.
The Trial Chamber is guided by the Appeals Chamber holding in Gali}, according to which
“where the witness who made the statement is not called to give the accused an adequate and proper
opportunity to challenge the statement and to question that witness, the evidence which the
statement contains may lead to a conviction only if there is other evidence which corroborates the
statement”.63
41.
In its Final Brief, the Defence submits that 92 bis evidence must be accorded less weight
than evidence admitted through viva voce witnesses who were available to answer questions in
court.64 While there is no basis for assuming that as a general rule, Rule 92 bis evidence carries less
weight than the viva voce evidence, in evaluating and weighing it, the Trial Chamber took into
account the fact that the witnesses were not cross-examined. The Trial Chamber has awarded
appropriate weight to 92 bis evidence in light of all the evidence on the trial record.
(ii) Use of Rule 92 ter Statements
42.
The Trial Chamber further recalls that Rule 92 ter allows for the admission of evidence that
relates to the proof of the acts or conduct of the accused.65 The Trial Chamber admitted evidence in
accordance with its Guidelines66 and the requirements of Rule 92 ter.67 The Trial Chamber took into
account the fact that the witnesses were present in court and available for cross-examination, as
well as the fact that the said transcripts or statements reflected the testimony that the witnesses
would give if examined in court. The Trial Chamber considered such testimony in the same manner
as it would consider other viva voce testimony.
(iii) Use of Rule 92 quater Statements
43.
In its Final Brief, the Defence argues that some of the evidence submitted by the
Prosecution pursuant to Rule 92 quater should be found unreliable and disregarded as it was
ultimately not corroborated by witnesses.68
63
64
65
66
67
68
Motions for Admission of Evidence Pursuant to Rule 92 quater, 23 April 2009; Decision on Prosecution’s
Second Motion for Admission of Evidence Relating to Mirsad Ku~anin Pursuant to Rule 92 quater,
20 May 2009 (confidential); Decision on Defence Motion for Admission of Evidence Pursuant to Rule 92
quater, 21 April 2010.
Gali} June 2002 Appeal Rule 92 bis(C) Decision; Blagojevi} and Joki} Trial Judgement, paras 316-318.
Defence Final Brief, para. 37.
Rule 92 ter(B) of the Rules.
Guidelines, paras 20-21.
The evidence of 36 witnesses was admitted pursuant to Rule 92 ter.
Defence Final Brief, para. 38.
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44.
In this regard, the Trial Chamber recalls that Rule 92 quarter evidence, as a general rule,
does not require corroboration. However, the jurisprudence of the Tribunal is clear that
uncorroborated Rule 92 quater evidence cannot form the sole basis for a conviction.69 In all other
circumstances, corroboration is simply one factor that the Trial Chamber, in its discretion, may
consider when determining the weight to be given to such evidence.70 In addition, the Trial
Chamber, in evaluating the weight of the evidence admitted pursuant to Rule 92 quater, carefully
considered the fact that the evidence was admitted without the possibility of cross-examination.71
(e) Evidence Pursuant to Rule 71
45.
On 13 December 2008 a deposition was taken pursuant to Rule 71, pursuant to a decision by
the Trial Chamber.72
46.
The Trial Chamber in evaluating this evidence considered that it was given during trial, it
was taken in the presence of the Senior Legal Officer of Trial Chamber I, both Parties and
representatives of the Registry and that the Defence had the possibility to cross-examine the person
whose deposition was taken.73 Hence, Trial Chamber in assessing this evidence considered it in the
same way that it considers evidence admitted in court.
(f) Evidence Pursuant to Rule 94 bis
47.
The Trial Chamber admitted the testimony and reports of several expert witnesses pursuant
to Rule 94 bis.74 The jurisprudence of the Tribunal defines an expert as a person who by virtue of
some specialised knowledge, skill or training can assist the Trial Chamber to understand or
determine an issue.75
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
Marti} September 2006 Appeal Decision, para. 20; Popovi} et al. Trial Judgement, para. 60, stating that
“evidence which has not been cross-examined and goes to the acts and conduct of the Accused or is pivotal to
the Prosecution case cannot be used as the sole basis by which to establish a conviction”; Prli} et al. November
2007 Appeal Decision, para. 53. See also Gotovina et al. Trial Judgement, para. 43, stating that the “Trial
Chamber used as a standard that it would not enter into a conviction where the evidence supporting that
conviction was based solely on hearsay evidence. Similarly, with regard to written, non cross-examined
evidence, such as Rule 92 bis or quater statements, the Trial Chamber required corroboration of other evidence
before entering into a conviction”.
D. Milo{evi} Appeal Judgement, para. 215.
See Gali} June 2002 Appeal Rule 92 bis(C) Decision, fn. 34; Prli} et al. November 2007 Appeal Decision,
paras 50-61; Popovi} et al. Trial Judgement, para. 60.
Ex. P505, Transcript of Nikola To{ovi} Deposition, 13 December 2008, T. 2-3.
Ex. P505, Transcript of Nikola To{ovi} Deposition, 13 December 2008, T. 5-28.
See e.g. Decision on Uncontested Srebrenica Expert Reports, 26 August 2009; Decision on Expert Reports of
Ewa Tabeau, 23 April 2009; Decision on Expert Report by Richard Phillips, 10 March 2009; Decision on Expert
Reports by Richard Butler, 4 March 2009; Decision on Mungu Melvin’s Status as an Expert, 21 October 2009.
Gali} July 2002 Trial Expert Witnesses Decision, p. 2.
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48.
In evaluating such evidence, the Trial Chamber took into account the totality of evidence
admitted during the entire case.76 The Trial Chamber further considered factors such as professional
competence of the expert, the material at his disposal, the methodology used, the credibility of the
findings made in light of these factors and other evidence, the proximity of the expert to the party
offering him or her as an expert, as well as whether the opposing party opposed some of the expert
evidence and/or reports.77
49.
The Defence contends that the Trial Chamber should “place little to no weight on the
conclusions, opinions and summaries” of experts Patrick Treanor and Robert Donia.78 It also
challenges the report of Prosecution expert witness Morten Torkildsen.79
50.
As regards Treanor’s report, the Defence recalls the Trial Chamber’s concerns regarding the
methodology used, as well as the criteria chosen in selecting the documents cited in his report.80
The Trial Chamber recalls that Treanor was extensively questioned by the Defence and the Trial
Chamber between 3 November 2008 and 12 November 2008 inter alia on his methodology and
selection criteria.81 The Trial Chamber further recalls that in its decision admitting the expert report,
the Majority held that: “although the Report does not explicitly state the methodology and criteria
used for selecting documents, a certain methodology can nonetheless be inferred from it”.82 When
determining the weight to be given to the report, the Trial Chamber took into consideration the
witness’s testimony, particularly his cross-examination and the Defence’s concerns.83 The Trial
Chamber has given limited weight to the report and used it only to support findings related to the
background of this case or when corroborated.
51.
As regards Donia’s reports, the Defence repeats its concerns expressed during the trial phase
regarding the lack of objectivity of the report and its lack of value to the Trial Chamber.84 The Trial
Chamber recalls its finding that “the concerns advanced by the Defence concerning the fact that
Dr. Donia’s opinions and conclusions are mixed with factual summaries and that his Reports are
'essentially the prosecution’s version of what happened in Sarajevo [and RS] during the time
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
Gali} June 2002 Appeal Rule 92 bis(C) Decision, fn. 34; Prli} et al. November 2007 Appeal Decision, paras 5061.
Decision on Expert Reports of Richard Higgs, 26 January 2009, para. 3; Decision on Uncontested Srebrenica
Expert Reports, 26 August 2009, para. 2.
Defence Final Brief, paras 107-122.
Defence Final Brief, paras 123-125.
Defence Final Brief, para. 109, citing Trial Chamber “Decision on Defence Motions to Exclude the Expert
Reports of Mr. Patrick J. Treanor”, 27 October 2008, para. 23.
Patrick Treanor, T. 905-1416.
Decision on Admissibility of Expert Report of Patrick Treanor, 27 November 2008, para. 15.
Decision on Admissibility of Expert Report of Patrick Treanor, 27 November 2008, para. 17.
Defence Final Brief, paras 117-122, referring to Trial Chamber Decision on the Defence Motion to Exclude the
Expert Reports of Robert Donia, paras 11, 12, 16.
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alleged in the indictment' might have an impact on the weight given to such Reports”.85 The Trial
Chamber has taken the Defence’s concerns into account when determining the weight to attribute to
these reports and has given them limited weight, using them only for findings related to the
background of this case or when corroborated.
52.
Similarly, the Defence repeats its concerns relating to the Torkildsen report.86 The Trial
Chamber notes that these concerns were taken into consideration during the admission of the said
report.87 The Trial Chamber has attributed limited weight to this expert report and only used it when
corroborated.
53.
With respect to Defence expert witness Ivan Ðokić, the Trial Chamber defers its assessment
of his credibility to a separate part of the Judgement.88
(g) Use of Unscheduled Incidents
54.
In its Final Brief, the Defence “maintains its standing objection to the use of unscheduled
incidents” on the grounds that they are prejudicial to the Accused and that it did not have any notice
in order to adequately respond to them.89 The Trial Chamber recalls that these Defence objections
were extensively addressed in the Trial Chamber’s decision of 31 October 2008. In this decision,
the Trial Chamber found that evidence relating to the campaign of sniping and shelling did not
constitute unscheduled incidents.90 The Trial Chamber recalled that in relation to crimes against
humanity, “it is well-established in the jurisprudence that the Prosecution must prove not only the
underlying offences of those crimes (which are represented by the scheduled incidents), but also the
existence of a widespread or systematic attack on the civilian population”.91 In the same decision,
the Trial Chamber also found that no prejudice was caused to the Accused as he was put on notice
well in advance by the 65 ter witness summaries which made reference to unscheduled incidents in
relation to which the Prosecution had to seek leave of the Trial Chamber.92
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
See Decision on the Defence Motion to Exclude the Expert Reports of Robert Donia, 27 October 2008, para. 16.
Defence Final Brief, paras 123-125.
Morten Torkildsen, T. 1611-1617. See Decision on Defence Motion to Exclude the Expert Report of Morten
Torkildsen, 30 October 2008, paras 12-19.
See infra section VI.E.
Defence Final Brief, para. 555.
Decision on Prosecution’s Submission on Interpretation of the Trial Chamber’s Decision of 15 May 2007
Regarding “Unscheduled Incidents”, 31 October 2008, para. 10.
Decision on Prosecution’s Submission on Interpretation of the Trial Chamber’s Decision of 15 May 2007
Regarding “Unscheduled Incidents”, 31 October 2008, para. 11.
Decision on Prosecution’s Submission on Interpretation of the Trial Chamber’s Decision of 15 May 2007
Regarding “Unscheduled Incidents”, 31 October 2008, para. 14.
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(h) Intercepted Communications
55.
On 21 December 2009, the Trial Chamber admitted several intercepted communications
(“intercepts”) into evidence.93 The Trial Chamber also took judicial notice of intercepted
communications that had been admitted into evidence in the Prosecutor v. Popovi} et al. case.94 In
its Final Brief, the Defence submits that there is no proof as to the methodology for the collection of
the intercepts. In particular, it avers that MP-17 failed to provide any adequate foundation and that
“[the intelligence notes] are replete with conjecture, speculation and assumptions that cannot be
tested”.95 The Trial Chamber notes that the documents the Defence refers to as “intelligence notes”
include both intercepts and intelligence notes.96 Intercepts of the more important conversations were
both transcribed and copied on other tapes for archive, while less important conversations were
summarised into what were called intelligence notes.97 The Trial Chamber notes that the concerns
raised by the Defence relate to the reliability of these documents and were taken in consideration
when deciding on the admission of the documents.98 In addition, in assessing the intercepts, the
Trial Chamber duly considered the testimony of MP-16 and MP-17 on the process of interception
and transcription of communication.99 The Trial Chamber has also taken into account the testimony
of those witnesses in relation to the voice recognition and use of code-names in communication.100
Hence, the Trial Chamber is satisfied with the methodology used in putting together the intelligence
notes and transcribing the intercepts.
56.
Regarding the intercepted communications of which the Trial Chamber took judicial notice,
the Trial Chamber notes that Rule 94(B) creates a presumption for the authenticity of these
documents, which has not been rebutted by the Defence.101
57.
In light of all the evidence on the trial record, the Trial Chamber has awarded appropriate
weight to both intercepts and intelligence notes taking into account the fact that intelligence notes
are summaries of conversations rather than transcriptions of conversations.
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
Decision Regarding Outstanding Documents Marked for Identification, 21 December 2009 (confidential),
paras 47-75.
Decision on Prosecution’s Motion for Judicial Notice of Srebrenica Intercepts, with Confidential Annexes,
1 September 2008; Decision on Motion for Reconsideration of the Trial Chamber’s Decision of
1 September 2008, 7 October 2008. See also Popovi} et al. December 2007 Trial Decision, para. 79, Appendix I.
Defence Final Brief, para. 45.
See Defence Final Brief, para. 45, fn. 53.
See MP-16, T. 5085, 5159-5166.
Decision Regarding Outstanding Documents Marked for Identification, 21 December 2009 (confidential),
paras 73-75.
MP-16, T. 5163 (closed session); MP-17, T. 4968, 5078-5079 (closed session).
See e.g. MP-16, T. 5138, 5190-5191 (closed session); MP-17, T. 4970-4972 (closed session).
See Stani{i} and @upljanin February 2011 Trial Decision, para. 14.
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(i) Documents and Statements of Individuals Admitted Solely for Credibility Purposes and Not for
the Truth of Their Content
58.
During the trial, several documents including prior statements of witnesses were admitted by
the Trial Chamber solely for the purpose of assessing witnesses’ credibility.102 The Trial Chamber
used such evidence strictly for the purpose for which it was admitted, i.e. to assess the credibility of
the witness, and disregarded it in relation to the truth of its content.
(j) Paragraphs 12 and 13 of the Guidelines
59.
In its Final Brief, the Defence argues that Paragraphs 12 and 13 of the Guidelines violated
the Accused’s right to examine or have examined the witnesses who testified against him.103 In
addition, the Defence submits that based on Paragraph 13 of the Guidelines, the Trial Chamber
would be obliged to disregard Krayishnik’s testimony regarding Le{i}’s witness statement as the
latter did not testify in the present case.104
60.
The Trial Chamber recalls that the Guidelines governed the admission and presentation of
evidence in court during the trial and were equally applicable to both parties.105 The purpose of this
part of the Guidelines was to ensure that a party using a prior statement of a different person to
confront a witness also calls that person to testify as a witness. In relation to Krayishnik’s
testimony, the Defence posed questions to Krayishnik based on Milan Le{i}’s prior interview with
the Prosecution.106 Since the Defence did not call or try to call Le{i} to testify during the Defence
case, the part of Krayishnik’s testimony regarding Le{i}’s prior interview will not be considered by
the Trial Chamber. Considering that the Defence had the opportunity to call Le{i} and was well
aware of the Guidelines the Trial Chamber is of the view that the Accused was not prejudiced by
the application of paragraphs 12 and 13 of the Guidelines. In addition, the Trial Chamber notes that
neither party sought reconsideration of the Guidelines, nor certification to appeal them, upon their
adoption at the start of the trial.
102
103
104
105
106
See e.g. Sini{a Borovi}, T. 14108-14112, concerning Ex. P2930, Report on Splav Operation. See also Ex. P2893,
Order for Engineering Support of the VRS, undated; Ex. P2894, Operational Documents of the Drina Corps
Command From a Folder Marked From the VRS Main Staff, Drina Corps; Ex. P2895, List of Documents of the
SRK submitted to the VRS Main Staff, 2 February 1994; Ex. P2896, Order for the Use of the SRK, 26 January
1994; Ex. P2897, Document relating to the Use of the Anti-Aircraft Forces and the Air Force, undated;
Ex. P2898, Plan for Morale, Psychological Activities and Information for the SRK, undated; Ex. P2899, Plan for
Morale, Psychological Activities and Information for the SRK, undated; Ex. P2900, Plan for Security Measures
for the SRK, undated.
Defence Final Brief, para. 11.
Defence Final Brief, para. 13.
Guidelines, p. 2.
Ned Krayishnik, T. 9639-9644.
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(k) Documents Admitted through the Bar Table
61.
The Trial Chamber admitted into evidence hundreds of documents through the bar table in
accordance with Rule 89(C).107 In its Final Brief, the Defence urged the Trial Chamber to exercise
extreme caution in attributing weight to documents admitted through the bar table and thus
introduced in isolation. The Defence submits that the vast majority of these documents were never
testified to by a witness and should thus be awarded less weight than those that were explained by
the testimony of a witness.108 While there is no basis for assuming that, as a general rule, bar table
documents carry less weight than those that were explained by the testimony of a witness,
especially in light of the fact that many of them were self-explanatory, the Trial Chamber has
carefully considered them in light of all the evidence adduced at trial and given them appropriate
weight.
(l) Agreed Facts, Adjudicated Facts and Stipulations
(i) Agreed Facts and Stipulations
62.
Upon the encouragement of the Trial Chamber, the Parties reached an agreement on
material facts relating to the Indictment on 31 May 2007.109 However, due to the fact that, the
Accused apparently did not consent to the facts contained in the agreement, the Parties sought
permission to withdraw the agreement and substitute it with a new agreement.110 The Trial Chamber
subsequently admitted the new agreed facts into evidence.111 The Trial Chamber also admitted a
“Joint Stipulation” by the Parties relating to Schedule B of the Indictment.112 The Trial Chamber
considered this stipulation as an agreed fact. At the same time, the Trial Chamber underlines that it
is not bound by any agreements reached by the Parties and is not obliged to make explicit findings
on such agreed facts.113 The Trial Chamber notes that the reference to such facts is by itself
indicative that the Trial Chamber considers those facts to be accurate.
(ii) Judicial Notice of Adjudicated Facts
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
Decision on Prosecution’s First Bar Table Motion, 5 October 2009 (confidential); Decision on Prosecution’s
Second and Third Bar Table Motions, 16 November 2009 (confidential); Decision on Prosecution’s Fourth Bar
Table Motion, 22 December 2009 (confidential); Decision on Motion to Reopen the Prosecution Case and
Tender Documents through the Bar Table, 4 November 2010; Decision on Defence Motion to Amend 65 ter List
and Second Bar Table, 1 December 2010; Decision on Defence Motion for the Admission of Evidence from the
Bar Table, 1 December 2010.
Defence Final Brief, para. 27.
Parties Joint Submission: Agreements on Matters of Fact, 1 June 2007.
Joint Submission in Respect of Srebrenica Agreed Facts, 24 July 2009 (partially confidential).
Decision in Respect of Srebrenica Agreed Facts, 19 August 2009; Second Decision in Respect of Srebrenica
Agreed Facts, 30 September 2009; Decision in Respect of Joint Submission of Agreed Facts Proposed by the
Defence, 29 June 2010.
Hearing, T. 14580-14581.
See Babi} Sentencing Appeal Judgement, para. 18; Popovi} et al. Trial Judgement, para. 68.
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63.
The Trial Chamber took judicial notice of hundreds of adjudicated facts pursuant to Rule
94(B) from the following cases: Gali}, Marti}, Krsti}, Blagojevi} and Joki}, and Dragomir
Miloševi}.114
64.
The effect of taking judicial notice pursuant to Rule 94(B) is that the Prosecution is relieved
of its initial burden to produce evidence on the point; and the Defence may then put the point into
question by introducing reliable and credible evidence to the contrary.115 Importantly, however, the
judicial notice of adjudicated facts “does not shift the ultimate burden of persuasion which remains
with the Prosecution”.116 The Trial Chamber in assessing the ultimate weight to be given to the
adjudicated facts took into consideration the totality of the trial record and, in particular, the
evidence adduced by the non-moving party to rebut the adjudicated facts.
(m) Supreme Defence Council (“SDC”) Stenographic Transcripts and Minutes
65.
SDC.
The Trial Chamber admitted several stenographic transcripts and minutes of the FRY
117
In its Final Brief, the Defence contends that the Prosecution must corroborate statements
found in these documents when they are “relied on to prove intent, liability and factual matters”.118
66.
The Trial Chamber took into account the stenographic transcripts as well as the minutes of
the FRY SDC in light of the entire evidence adduced in this case and gave them appropriate weight.
The Trial Chamber generally finds that the SDC stenographic transcripts and minutes are reliable
contemporaneous records of the events that occurred.
(n) VJ Collegium Stenographic Transcripts and Minutes
67.
The Trial Chamber admitted into evidence a number of VJ Collegium stenographic
transcripts and minutes. In its Final Brief, the Defence maintains that these documents lack
sufficient indicia of authenticity. It argues that it would be unsafe to rely on these extracted pages
on which the Accused is recorded as being the speaker without having an understanding of the
totality of the circumstances.119
114
115
116
117
118
119
Decision on Prosecution’s Motion for Judicial Notice of Adjudicated Facts Concerning Sarajevo, 26 June 2008;
Decision on Prosecution’s Motion for Judicial Notice of Facts and Documents Relevant to the Zagreb Crime
Base, 2 September 2008; Decision on Second Motion for Judicial Notice of Facts Relevant to the Sarajevo
Crime Base, 17 September 2008; Decision on Prosecution’s Motion for Judicial Notice of Facts Relevant to the
Srebrenica Crime Base, 22 September 2008.
Karemera et al. June 2006 Appeal Decision, para. 42.
See D. Milo{evi} June 2007 Appeal Decision, paras 16.
See e.g. Ex. P708, Minutes from the 43rd Session of SDC, 29 August 1995; Ex. P709, Stenographic Transcript of
the 14th Session of the SDC, 11 October 1993; Ex. P726, Minutes from the 63rd Session of the SDC, 27 March
1997; Ex. P778, Stenographic Transcript of the 25th Session of the of the SDC, 30 August 1994.
Defence Final Brief, para. 43.
Defence Final Brief, para. 44.
17
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68.
In its decision of 21 December 2009 admitting these documents into evidence, the Trial
Chamber addressed the Defence’s objections regarding their authenticity.120 The Trial Chamber has
carefully considered them in light of all the evidence adduced at trial, as well as the relevant
context, when deciding on the appropriate weight. In some instances it has decided to disregard
them.
(o) Mladi} Notebook Excerpts
69.
On 29 March 2010, the Serbian Government handed over to the Prosecution the Mladi}
Notebooks.121 The Trial Chamber has admitted into evidence several excerpts of the notebooks.122
In its Final Brief, the Defence submits that the content of the Mladi} Notebooks must be viewed
with extreme caution, particularly in cases where the Prosecution introduced portions thereof
without any corroboration. The Defence further submits that in cases where the Mladi} Notebooks
“reflect a fact” or the purpose of their usage is to prove acts and conduct or establish the knowledge
of the Accused, the Trial Chamber should not rely on them devoid of any corroborating evidence.123
70.
In assessing the Mladi} Notebooks, the Trial Chamber finds that although some of the
excerpts were not testified to by a viva voce witness or otherwise corroborated, the Mladi}
Notebooks are generally reliable and an authentic contemporaneous record of the events that
occurred. The Trial Chamber recalls in this respect that it gave the Defence the possibility to recall
certain witnesses to address the issues raised in the Mladi} Notebooks.124 The Trial Chamber has
carefully considered them in light of all the evidence adduced at trial and given them appropriate
weight.
120
121
122
123
124
Decision Regarding Outstanding Documents Marked for Identification, 21 December 2009 (confidential),
paras 30-46. See also Republic of Serbia’s Request for Protective Measures, 26 September 2008 (confidential),
para. 15.
These were notebooks/diaries kept by General Ratko Mladi} during the period of the war in the former
Yugoslavia. They were seized from his family premises and handed over to the Prosecution, see Order on
Protective Measures for Disclosure Batch 410, 13 April 2010 (confidential).
Decision on Motion to Reopen the Prosecution Case and Tender Documents through the Bar Table,
4 November 2010.
Defence Final Brief, para. 46.
Decision on Motion to Reopen the Prosecution Case and Tender Documents through the Bar Table,
4 November 2010, para. 14.
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II. APPLICABLE LAW
A. General Requirements of Article 3 of the Statute
71.
Mom~ilo Peri{i} is charged with violations of the laws and customs of war pursuant to
Article 3 of the Statute, namely three counts of murder125 and two counts of attacks on civilians.126
In accordance with the Tribunal’s jurisprudence, for Article 3 to apply, the following preliminary
requirements must be met.
1. Existence of an Armed Conflict and Nexus Between the Alleged Acts of the Perpetrator and the
Armed Conflict
72.
The first requirement is that an armed conflict, either of international or non-international
character,127 existed at the time material to the indictment.128 According to the Appeals Chamber, an
“armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed force between States or protracted armed
violence between governmental authorities and organised armed groups or between such groups
within a State”.129 Until a general conclusion of peace or a peaceful settlement is reached,
international humanitarian law continues to apply “in the whole territory of the warring States or, in
the case of internal conflicts, the whole territory under the control of a party, whether or not actual
combat takes place there”.130
73.
A further requirement of Article 3 is that there be a sufficient link between the armed
conflict and the perpetrator’s alleged conduct.131 The alleged crime does not need to have been
committed at a time when, or in a place where, actual fighting was taking place.132 It is sufficient
that the alleged crimes were closely related to hostilities occurring in other parts of territories
controlled by the parties to the conflict.133 However, it is essential that a Trial Chamber establish the
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
Indictment, Counts 2, 6, 10.
Indictment, Counts 4, 8.
Tadi} October 1995 Appeal Jurisdiction Decision, para. 137; ^elebi}i et al. Appeal Judgement, paras 140, 150.
Tadi} October 1995 Appeal Jurisdiction Decision, para. 70.
Ibid.
Tadi} October 1995 Appeal Jurisdiction Decision, para. 70. See also Kunarac et al. Appeal Judgement, paras 57,
64. In para. 64, the Appeals Chamber held that “the Prosecutor did not have to prove that there was an armed
conflict in each and every square inch of the general area. The state of armed conflict is not limited to the areas
of actual military combat but exists across the entire territory under the control of the warring parties”.
Tadi} October 1995 Appeal Jurisdiction Decision, para. 70; Tadi} Trial Judgement, paras 572-573. The nexus
requirement serves to distinguish war crimes from purely domestic crimes and also prevents purely random or
isolated criminal occurrences from being characterised as war crimes, Bo{koski and Tar~ulovski Trial
Judgement, para. 293.
Kunarac et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 57. The Appeals Chamber in the Tadi} case held that international
humanitarian law applies “in the whole territory of the warring States or, in the case of internal conflicts, the
whole territory under the control of a party, whether or not actual combat takes place there”, Tadi} October
1995 Appeal Jurisdiction Decision, para. 70 (emphasis added). See also Kordi} and ^erkez Appeal Judgement,
para. 319.
Kunarac et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 57.
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existence of a geographical and temporal link between the crimes ascribed to the accused and the
armed conflict.134 The armed conflict “need not have been causal to the commission of the crime,
but the existence of an armed conflict must, at a minimum, have played a substantial part in the
perpetrator’s ability to commit it, his decision to commit it, the manner in which it was committed
or the purpose for which it was committed”.135
2. The Tadi} Conditions
74.
In the Tadi} Jurisdiction Decision, the Appeals Chamber held that “Article 3 is a general
clause covering all violations of humanitarian law not falling under Article 2 or covered by Articles
4 or 5”136 and that it “functions as a residual clause designed to ensure that no serious violation of
international humanitarian law is taken away from the jurisdiction of the International Tribunal”.137
75.
For criminal conduct to fall under Article 3 of the Statute, four conditions, commonly
referred to as the “Tadi} conditions”, must be met:
76.
(i)
The violation must constitute an infringement of a rule of international humanitarian law;
(ii)
The rule must be customary in nature, or, if it belongs to treaty law, the required conditions
must be met;
(iii)
The violation must be “serious”, that is to say, it must constitute a breach of a rule
protecting important values, and the breach must involve grave consequences for the
victim; and
(iv)
The violation of the rule must entail, under customary or conventional law, the individual
criminal responsibility of the person breaching the rule.138
The crime of murder is proscribed by Article 3(1)(a) common to the four Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949 (“Common Article 3”). It is settled jurisprudence of the Tribunal
that Article 3 of the Statute encompasses violations of Common Article 3.139 The Appeals Chamber
has held that Common Article 3 “is indeed regarded as being part of customary international law,
and serious violations thereof would at once satisfy the four requirements”.140
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
Staki} Appeal Judgement, para. 342.
Staki} Appeal Judgement, para. 342; Kunarac et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 58; Bo{koski and Tar~ulovski Trial
Judgement, para. 293.
Tadi} October 1995 Appeal Jurisdiction Decision, para. 89.
Tadi} October 1995 Appeal Jurisdiction Decision, para. 91. Article 3 thus refers to a broad category of offences,
providing a merely illustrative list in the article itself, Kunarac et al. Trial Judgement, para. 401. See also Tadi}
October 1995 Appeal Jurisdiction Decision, para. 87.
Kunarac et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 66; Tadi} October 1995 Appeal Jurisdiction Decision, para. 94.
^elebi}i Appeal Judgement, para. 136; Tadi} October 1995 Appeal Jurisdiction Decision, paras 87, 89;
Krnojelac Trial Judgement, para. 52.
Kunarac et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 68, referring to Tadi} October 1995 Appeal Jurisdiction Decision,
paras 98, 134; ^elebi}i Appeal Judgement, para. 125.
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77.
The crime of attacks on civilians is proscribed by Article 51(2) of Additional Protocol I and
Article 13(2) of Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions of 1949. These articles both
provide, in relevant part, that “[t]he civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall
not be made the object of attack”. The Appeals Chamber held that the principles contained in
Article 51(2) of Additional Protocol I and Article 13(2) of Additional Protocol II have attained the
status of customary international law.141 Furthermore, the jurisprudence of the Tribunal has
repeatedly held that “attacks against civilians undoubtedly breach rules protecting important values
and involves grave consequences for the victim”.142 The Appeals Chamber also held that
“[c]ustomary international law establishes that a violation of these principles entails individual
criminal responsibility”.143 The Trial Chamber therefore finds that in regard to the crime of attacks
on civilians all four Tadi} conditions are met in the present case.
3. Status of the Victims
78.
Violations of Common Article 3 must have been committed against “[p]ersons taking no
active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and
those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention or any other cause”.144 The perpetrator
must have or should have been aware of this fact.145 The legal test for determining whether the
victim was taking an active part in hostilities was first adopted in the Tadić Trial Judgement, when
the Trial Chamber noted that “[i]t is sufficient to examine the relevant facts of each victim and to
ascertain whether, in each individual’s circumstances, that person was actively involved in
hostilities at the relevant time”.146 The Appeals Chamber further clarified the concept of active
participation in hostilities, holding that the victim, at the time of the alleged offence, must not have
been “participating in acts of war which by their nature or purpose are intended to cause actual
harm to the personnel or equipment of the enemy’s armed forces”,147 adding that the status
determination is to be done on a case-by-case basis.148
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
Bla{ki} Appeal Judgement, para. 157; Strugar November 2002 Appeal Decision, para. 9. See also Tadi} October
1995 Appeal Jurisdiction Decision, para. 127; Kupre{ki} et al. Trial Judgement, para. 521.
Marti} Trial Judgement, para. 45. See also Gali} Trial Judgement, para. 45; Strugar Trial Judgement, para. 221.
Strugar November 2002 Appeal Decision, para. 10.
Common Article 3. See also ^elebići Appeal Judgement, para. 420.
Halilovi} Trial Judgement, para. 36; Kraji{nik Trial Judgement, para. 847.
Tadi} Trial Judgement, para. 616. See also Halilovi} Trial Judgement, paras 33-34. Relevant factors to be
considered in this respect include the activity, whether or not the victim was carrying weapons, clothing, age and
gender of the victims at the time of the alleged offence, Ori} Trial Judgement, para. 258; Marti} Trial
Judgement, para. 47; Gali} Trial Judgement, para. 50.
Strugar Appeal Judgement, para. 178.
Ibid.
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B. General Requirements of Article 5 of the Statute
79.
Mom~ilo Peri{i} is charged with crimes against humanity under Article 5 of the Statute,
namely three counts of murder,149 three counts of inhumane acts,150 one count of persecution on
political, racial or religious grounds151 and one count of extermination.152
1. Requirements of Article 5 of the Statute
80.
In order to constitute a crime against humanity under Article 5 of the Statute, it is required
that (i) there was an armed conflict, and (ii) the acts of the perpetrator were geographically and
temporally linked with the armed conflict.153
81.
Moreover, it is required that the acts of the perpetrator be part of a widespread or systematic
attack “directed against any civilian population”.154 This requirement encompasses the five
elements listed below.
82.
There must have been an “attack”.155 An “attack” may be defined as a course of conduct
involving the commission of acts of violence.156 In the context of crimes against humanity, an
“attack” is distinct from the concept of “armed conflict” and not limited to the use of armed force.
Rather, it may encompass any mistreatment of the civilian population.157 The attack may precede,
outlast or continue during the armed conflict and need not be part of it.158
83.
The attack must have been directed against the civilian population.159 This means that the
civilian population must be the primary object of attack.160 It is not a requirement that the attack be
against the whole civilian population. However, a Trial Chamber must be satisfied that the attack
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
Indictment, Counts 1, 5, 9.
Indictment, Counts 3, 7, 11.
Indictment, Count 12.
Indictment, Count 13.
Kunarac et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 83; Tadi} Appeal Judgement, paras 249, 251. This is a jurisdictional
limitation on the Tribunal which is not part of the customary law definition of crimes against humanity, Tadi}
October 1995 Appeal Jurisdiction Decision, para. 141; Tadi} Appeal Judgement, para. 251.
Bla{ki} Appeal Judgement, para. 98; Kunarac et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 85.
Kunarac et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 85.
Krnojelac Trial Judgement, para. 54; Kunarac et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 89, affirming Kunarac et al. Trial
Judgement, para. 415.
Kunarac et al. Appeal Judgement, paras 86, 89, affirming Kunarac et al. Trial Judgement, para. 416.
See Kunarac et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 86; Tadi} Appeal Judgement, para. 251.
Kunarac et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 85.
Marti} Appeal Judgement, para. 305; Kunarac et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 91, affirming Kunarac et al. Trial
Judgement, para. 421. The Appeals Chamber in Kunarac et al. indicated that the relevant factors to be
considered in this regard include: “the means and method used in the course of the attack, the status of the
victims, their number, the discriminatory nature of the attack, the nature of the crimes committed in its course,
the resistance to the assailants at the time and the extent to which the attacking force may be said to have
complied or attempted to comply with the precautionary requirements of the laws of war”, Kunarac et al. Appeal
Judgement, para. 91.
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was in fact directed against a civilian population, rather than against a limited and randomly
selected number of individuals.161
84.
A population may qualify as “civilian” even if individuals who do not fall within the
definition of civilians are among it.162 In order to determine whether the presence of non-civilians
deprives the population of its civilian character, the number of non-civilians, as well as whether
they are on leave or laid down their arms, must be examined.163
85.
The requirement under Article 5 that an attack be directed against a civilian population does
not mean that the individual victims of criminal acts committed within the attack must be civilians
only.164 The jurisprudence of the Tribunal does not suggest that a Trial Chamber is required to
determine whether every single individual victim of the alleged crimes against humanity is a
“civilian” under international humanitarian law.165 As a consequence, persons hors de combat may
also fall under the protection of Article 5 of the Statute.166
86.
The attack must also be widespread or systematic.167 “Widespread” means that the attack is
large in scale with a large number of victims, while “systematic” refers to the organised nature of
the attack.168 It is settled jurisprudence that the existence of a plan need not be proven.169
87.
The acts of the perpetrator must form part of the attack.170 However, they need not be
committed in the midst of that attack. A crime which is committed before or after the main attack
against the civilian population or away from it could still, if sufficiently connected, be part of that
attack for the purpose of Article 5.171
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
Marti} Appeal Judgement, para. 305; Kunarac et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 90.
See Article 50(3) of Additional Protocol I; Gali} Appeal Judgement, paras 136-137, 144; Kordi} and ^erkez
Appeal Judgement, paras 50, 97; Bla{ki} Appeal Judgement, paras 113, 115. The Appeals Chamber held “that
the definition of civilian contained in Article 50 of Additional Protocol I reflects the definition of civilian for the
purpose of applying Article 5 of the Statute”, Marti} Appeal Judgement, para. 302. See also Gali} Appeal
Judgement, para. 144, fn. 437; Kordi} and ^erkez Appeal Judgement, para. 97; Bla{ki} Appeal Judgement,
paras 110-114. As regards the definition of civilians, see also infra para. 92.
See Gali} Appeal Judgement, paras 136-137, 144; Bla{ki} Appeal Judgement, paras 113, 115.
Marti} Appeal Judgement, paras 305, 307.
Marti} Appeal Judgement, para. 308.
Marti} Appeal Judgement, para. 311.
Kunarac et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 85.
Gali} Trial Judgement, para. 146; Kunarac et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 94. Whether the attack was
widespread or systematic must be ascertained in light of the means, methods, patterns, resources, participation of
officials or authorities, and result of the attack upon that population, Kunarac et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 95.
See Kunarac et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 98; Bla{ki} Appeal Judgement, para. 120, also holding that the
existence of a plan “may be evidentially relevant in proving that an attack was directed against a civilian
population and that it was widespread or systematic”.
Mrk{i} and [ljivan~anin Appeal Judgement, para. 41; Kunarac et al. Appeal Judgement, paras 85, 99-100; Tadi}
Appeal Judgement, paras 248, 255.
Kunarac et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 100.
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88.
The perpetrator must know that there is an attack directed against the civilian population
and that his acts are part of that attack, or at least he must take the risk that his acts form part
thereof.172 However, knowledge of the details of the attack is not necessary.173 Neither is it required
that the perpetrator share the purpose or goal behind the attack.174
C. Attacks on Civilians
89.
Peri{i} is charged with two counts of attacks on civilians, a violation of the laws or customs
of war pursuant to Article 3 of the Statute (Counts 4 and 8). The crime of attacks on civilians is
based upon Article 51(2) of Additional Protocol I and Article 13(2) of Additional Protocol II both
of which provide, in their relevant parts, that “[t]he civilian population as such, as well as individual
civilians, shall not be made the object of attack”.175
1. Actus Reus
90.
The actus reus of the crime of attacks on civilians is conducting an attack directed against
the civilian population or individual civilians causing death or serious injury to body or health.176
91.
The term “attack” is defined under Article 49 of Additional Protocol I as “acts of violence
against the adversary, whether in offence or in defence”.177
92.
Article 50 of Additional Protocol I178 defines a “civilian” as “any person who does not
belong to one of the categories of persons referred to in Article 4(A)(1), (2), (3) and (6) of the Third
Geneva Convention and in Article 43 of Additional Protocol I”. The term “civilian” is defined
negatively as anyone who is not a member of the armed forces or of an organised military group
belonging to a party to the conflict.179 Members of the armed forces and members of militias or
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
Bla{ki} Appeal Judgement, para. 124; Kordi} and ^erkez Appeal Judgement, para. 99; Kunarac et al. Appeal
Judgement, paras 99, 102; Tadi} Appeal Judgement, para. 248.
Kunarac et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 102.
Kunarac et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 103, also providing that it is the attack, not the acts of the perpetrator,
which must be directed against the target population.
See Article 51(2) of Additional Protocol I; Article 13(2) of Additional Protocol II.
D. Milo{evi} Trial Judgement, para. 942; Gali} Trial Judgement, paras 53, 56.
Kordi} and ^erkez Appeal Judgement, para. 47; Marti} Trial Judgement, para. 68; Gali} Trial Judgement, para.
52.
In interpreting Article 50 of Additional Protocol I in the context of Article 3 of the Statute, the Trial Chamber
has referred to the jurisprudence concerning the definitions of a “civilian” and a “civilian population” in the
context of Article 5 of the Statute and in light of the following Appeals Chamber holdings: Bla{ki} Appeal
Judgement, para. 110 (stating that “Article 50 of Additional Protocol I contains a definition of civilians and
civilian populations, and the provisions in this article may largely be viewed as reflecting customary law”);
Marti} Appeal Judgement, para. 299 (holding that “while certain terms have been defined differently in
international humanitarian law and in the context of crimes against humanity, the fundamental character of the
notion of civilian in international humanitarian law and international criminal law militates against giving it
differing meanings under Article 3 and Article 5 of the Statute”).
Gali} Trial Judgement, para. 47; D. Milo{evi} Trial Judgement, para. 945.
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volunteer corps forming part of such armed forces cannot claim civilian status. Neither can
members of organised resistance groups.180 The Appeals Chamber has held that:
[T]he specific situation of the victim at the time the crimes are committed may not be
determinative of his civilian or non-civilian status. If he is indeed a member of an armed
organization, the fact that he is not armed or in combat at the time of the commission of crimes,
does not accord him civilian status.181
93.
The protection from attack afforded to civilians is suspended when and for such time they
directly take part in hostilities.182 In such cases, they become a legitimate target. Taking “direct”
part in the hostilities entails engaging in acts of war that by their nature or purpose are likely to
cause actual harm to the personnel or matériel of the enemy armed forces.183
94.
The presence of individual combatants within the population being attacked does not
necessarily deprive the population of its characterisation as civilian.184 The Appeals Chamber has
held that “in order to determine whether the presence of soldiers within a civilian population
deprives the population of its civilian character, the number of soldiers, as well as whether they are
on leave, must be examined”.185
95.
In determining whether the attack was directed against civilians or the civilian population,
the Trial Chamber is entitled to base itself on a case-by-case analysis, taking into account various
factors, including:
[T]he means and method used in the course of the attack, the status of the victims, their number,
[…] the nature of the crimes committed in its course, the resistance to the assailants at the time and
the extent to which the attacking force may be said to have complied or attempted to comply with
the precautionary requirements of the laws of war.186
In addition, the distance between the victims and the source of fire, the ongoing combat activity at
the time and location of the incident, the presence of military activities or facilities in the vicinity of
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
Bla{ki} Appeal Judgement, para. 113; Marti} Appeal Judgement, para. 292. See also Article 4(A) of the Third
Geneva Convention.
Marti} Appeal Judgement, para. 295; Gali} Appeal Judgement, fn. 437; Bla{ki} Appeal Judgement, para. 114.
See also ICRC Commentary on Additional Protocols, para. 1676 (with respect to Article 43(2) of Additional
Protocol I).
Article 51(3) of Additional Protocol I; Article 13(3) of Additional Protocol II; D. Milo{evi} Trial Judgement,
para. 947; Gali} Trial Judgement, para. 48.
D. Milo{evi} Trial Judgement, para. 947; Gali} Trial Judgement, para. 48; ICRC Commentary on Additional
Protocols, para. 1944 (with respect to Article 51(3) of Additional Protocol I).
Gali} Appeal Judgement, para. 136; Bla{ki} Appeal Judgement, paras 113, 115; Kordi} and ^erkez Appeal
Judgement, para. 50.
Gali} Appeal Judgement, para. 137; Bla{ki} Appeal Judgement, para. 115; ICRC Commentary on Additional
Protocols, para. 1922 (with respect to Article 50(2) and (3) of Additional Protocol I).
Gali} Appeal Judgement, para. 132; Bla{ki} Appeal Judgement, para. 106; Kunarac et al. Appeal Judgement,
para. 91.
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the incident, the victims’ appearance, including their age, gender, clothing and activity may also be
relevant.187
96.
In customary international law, there is an absolute prohibition against targeting of civilians
which may not be derogated from due to military necessity.188 However, this does not exclude the
possibility of civilian casualties incidental to an attack aimed at legitimate military targets provided
they are proportionate to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated prior to the attack.189
97.
Indiscriminate attacks, that is to say, attacks which strike civilians or civilian objects and
military objectives without distinction, may qualify as direct attacks on civilians.190 In this regard, a
direct attack against civilians can be inferred from the indiscriminate character of the weapon
used.191 An attack which may cause civilian casualties disproportionate to the concrete and direct
military advantage anticipated is to be considered as indiscriminate.192 Such an attack may also give
rise to the inference that civilians were the object of attack.193
98.
The parties to a conflict have an obligation “to remove civilians, to the maximum extent
feasible from the vicinity of military objectives and to avoid locating military objectives within or
near densely populated areas”.194 However, “the failure of a party to abide by this obligation does
not relieve the attacking side of its duty to abide by the principles of distinction and proportionality
when launching an attack”.195
99.
Finally, the attack in question must have resulted in death or serious injury to body or health
within the civilian population.196
2. Mens Rea
100.
In order to satisfy the mens rea required for the crime of attacks on civilians, the Prosecution
must establish that the perpetrator wilfully made the civilian population or individual civilians the
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
Strugar Appeal Judgement, para. 271; Gali} Appeal Judgement, para. 133.
Gali} Appeal Judgement, para. 130; Kordi} and ^erkez Appeal Judgement, para. 54 (as revised by the Kordi}
and ^erkez Appeal Judgement Corrigendum of 26 January 2005); Bla{ki} Appeal Judgement, para. 109.
Gali} Appeal Judgement, para. 190; Marti} Trial Judgement, para. 69. See also Strugar Appeal Judgement,
para. 179. Military objectives that may be lawfully attacked are “those objects which by their nature, location,
purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or
neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage”, Article 52(2) of
Additional Protocol I; Kordić and ^erkez Appeal Judgement, para. 53.
Gali} Appeal Judgement, para. 132, affirming Gali} Trial Judgement, para. 57. See also Threat or Use of
Nuclear Weapons, ICJ Advisory Opinion, para. 78.
Gali} Appeal Judgement, para. 132; Gali} Trial Judgement, fn. 101.
See Gali} Trial Judgement, para. 58; Article 51(5)(b) of Additional Protocol I.
Gali} Appeal Judgement, para. 132, affirming Gali} Trial Judgement, para. 60.
Gali} Appeal Judgement, para. 194.
Gali} Appeal Judgement, para. 194, affirming Gali} Trial Judgement, para. 61.
Kordi} and ^erkez Appeal Judgement, paras 55-67; D. Milo{evi} Trial Judgement, para. 942; Gali} Trial
Judgement, paras 43, 56; Bla{ki} Trial Judgement, para. 180; Article 85(3) of Additional Protocol I.
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object of attack.197 The concept of “wilfulness” encompasses both the notions of direct intent and
indirect intent, that is, the concept of recklessness, excluding mere negligence.198
101.
It must also be proven that the perpetrator was aware or should have been aware of the
civilian status of the persons attacked.199 International humanitarian law dictates that if there is
doubt about a person’s status, he shall be considered a civilian.200 In the context of a criminal trial,
it is the Prosecution that must prove that “in the given circumstances a reasonable person could not
have believed that the individual he or she attacked was a combatant”.201 The intent to target
civilians can be proved through inferences from direct or circumstantial evidence.202 The Appeals
Chamber further held that “[t]here is no requirement of the intent to attack particular civilians;
rather it is prohibited to make the civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, the
object of an attack”.203
D. Murder
102.
In addition to the general requirements of Articles 3 and 5 of the Statute set out above, the
elements of the crime of murder are the following:
i.
the death of a victim;
ii.
the death was the result of an act or omission of the perpetrator; and
iii.
the perpetrator intended to kill the victim or wilfully harm or inflict serious injury with
the reasonable knowledge that the attack was likely to result in death.204
103.
The actus reus of murder requires that the victim died as a result of an act or omission of the
perpetrator.205 Proof beyond reasonable doubt that the person was murdered does not require
197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205
Strugar Appeal Judgement, para. 270; Gali} Appeal Judgement, para. 140; Article 85(3)(a) of Additional
Protocol I.
Marti} Trial Judgement, para. 72. See also Strugar Appeal Judgement, para. 270; Gali} Appeal Judgement,
para. 140, affirming to Gali} Trial Judgement, para. 54; D. Milo{evi} Trial Judgement, para. 951; ICRC
Commentary on Additional Protocols, para. 3474 (with respect to Article 85(3) of Additional Protocol I).
Gali} Appeal Judgement, para. 140, affirming Gali} Trial Judgement, para. 55.
Article 50(1) of Additional Protocol I. ICRC Commentary on Additional Protocols, para. 1920 stating that the
presumption of civilian status applies to “persons who have not committed hostile acts, but whose status seems
doubtful because of the circumstances. They should be considered to be civilians until further information is
available, and should therefore not be attacked”. See also D. Milo{evi} Appeal Judgement, para. 60.
Gali} Appeal Judgement, para. 140, affirming Gali} Trial Judgement, para. 55. See also Bla{ki} Appeal
Judgement, para. 111; Kordi} and ^erkez Appeal Judgement, para. 48.
D. Milo{evi} Appeal Judgement, paras 66-67; Strugar Appeal Judgement, para. 271.
Strugar Appeal Judgement, para. 271.
Kvo~ka et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 261. See also Kordi} and ^erkez Appeal Judgement, para. 37; ^elebi}i
Appeal Judgement, para. 423.
See Kvo~ka et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 259.
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retrieval of the victim’s dead body.206 The death may be established by circumstantial evidence,
provided it is the only reasonable inference that can be drawn from the evidence.207
104.
The mens rea for murder includes both direct and indirect intent. Direct intent requires the
perpetrator’s desire to cause the death of the victim as a result of his act or omission, whereas
indirect intent comprises the perpetrator’s knowledge that the death of the victim was the probable
consequence of his act or omission.208 Negligence and gross negligence cannot be construed as
indirect intent.209
E. Extermination
105.
Peri{i} is charged with extermination, as a crime against humanity under Article 5(b) of the
Statute (Count 13).
106.
Extermination is the act of killing on a large scale.210 The jurisprudence of the Tribunal has
consistently held that, apart from the question of scale, the core elements of murder and
extermination are the same.211 The actus reus consists of “any act, omission or combination thereof
that contributes directly or indirectly to the killing of a large number of individuals”.212 It also
includes subjecting “a widespread number of people, or the systematic subjection of a number of
people, to conditions of living that would lead to their deaths”.213
107.
The requirement of killings on a large scale does not suggest a numerical minimum,214 nor a
precise identification of certain named or described persons; it suffices to establish that killings
occurred on a mass scale.215 An assessment of whether this requirement has been met must be made
206
207
208
209
210
211
212
213
214
215
See Kvo~ka et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 260; Marti} Trial Judgement, para. 59; Krnojelac Trial Judgement,
para. 326; Tadi} Trial Judgement, para. 240.
Kvo~ka et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 260. See also Deli} Trial Judgement, para. 47; Marti} Trial Judgement,
para. 59; Br|anin Trial Judgement, paras 383-385; Krnojelac Trial Judgement, paras 326-327; Tadi} Trial
Judgement, para. 240; Halilovi} Trial Judgement, para. 37.
See Kvo~ka et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 259; Deli} Trial Judgement, para. 48; Strugar Trial Judgement,
para. 235; Krsti} Trial Judgement, para. 495; ^elebi}i Trial Judgement, para. 435.
Deli} Trial Judgement, para. 48; Marti} Trial Judgement, para. 60; Ori} Trial Judgement, para. 348; Staki} Trial
Judgement, para. 587. See also Strugar Trial Judgement, paras 235-236; Br|anin Trial Judgement, para. 386.
Staki} Appeal Judgement, para. 259, citing Ntakirutimana and Ntakirutimana Appeal Judgement, para. 516. See
also Seromba Appeal Judgement, para. 190.
Krajišnik Trial Judgement, para. 716; Blagojević and Joki} Trial Judgement, para. 571; Brñanin Trial
Judgement, para. 388. See also Marti} Trial Judgement, para. 62. For the elements of murder, see supra paras
102-104.
Seromba Appeal Judgement, para. 189, citing Br|anin Trial Judgement, para. 389; Vasiljevi} Trial Judgement,
para. 229.
Staki} Appeal Judgement, para. 259; Ntakirutimana and Ntakirutimana Appeal Judgement, para. 522.
Br|anin Appeal Judgement, para. 471; Staki} Appeal Judgement, para. 260; Ntakirutimana and Ntakirutimana
Appeal Judgement, para. 516. By way of illustration, the Trial Chamber in Kraji{nik found that incidents
involving less than thirty killings fulfilled the element of mass scale, considering the surrounding circumstances,
Kraji{nik Trial Judgement, para. 720.
Staki} Appeal Judgement, para. 260 citing Ntakirutimana and Ntakirutimana Appeal Judgement, para. 521;
Br|anin Appeal Judgement, para. 471.
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on the basis of a case-by-case analysis of all relevant factors.216 It is not necessary that a large
number of killings occurred during a single incident in a concentrated place over a short period. It
may also be found “on an accumulation of separate and unrelated incidents, meaning on an
aggregated basis”.217 The Trial Chamber further notes that the elements of the crime of
extermination neither require the existence of a “vast scheme of collective murder”.218
108.
The mens rea for extermination is that “the accused intended, by his acts or omissions,
either killing on a large scale, or the subjection of a widespread number of people, or systematic
subjection of a number of people, to conditions of living that would lead to their deaths”.219
F. Other Inhumane Acts
109.
Peri{i} is charged with inhumane acts, as crimes against humanity punishable under Article
5(i) of the Statute. These include injuring and wounding civilians (Counts 3 and 7) and inflicting
serious injuries, wounding and forcible transfer (Count 11).
110.
“Other inhumane acts” is a category of crimes against humanity recognised as forming part
of customary international law.220 It functions as a residual category for serious crimes that are not
otherwise enumerated in Article 5 of the Statute, but which require proof of the same chapeau
elements.221
111.
According to the Appeals Chamber, serious physical and mental injury or wounding is an
“inhumane act” within the meaning of Article 5 of the Statute.222 To establish the actus reus “the
victim must have suffered serious bodily or mental harm” and the suffering must be the result of an
act of the perpetrator.223 The degree of severity must be assessed on a case by case basis with due
regard for the individual circumstances.224
216
217
218
219
220
221
222
223
224
Marti} Trial Judgement, para. 63; Staki} Trial Judgement, para. 640; Br|anin Trial Judgement, para. 391;
Blagojevi} and Joki} Trial Judgement, para. 573. The relevant factors include “the time and place of the killings,
the selection of the victims, and the manner in which they were targeted”, Kraji{nik Trial Judgement, para. 716.
See also Nahimana et al. Trial Judgement, para. 1061.
Marti} Trial Judgement, para. 63; Br|anin Trial Judgement, para. 391. See also Staki} Trial Judgement,
para. 640.
Staki} Appeal Judgement, paras 258-259. See also Krsti} Appeal Judgement, para. 225.
Staki} Appeal Judgement, para. 259, citing Ntakirutimana and Ntakirutimana Appeal Judgement, para. 522.
Staki} Appeal Judgement, para. 315. The crime of other inhumane acts has been included in the following
international legal instruments: Article 6(c) of the Nuremberg Charter; Article 5(c) of the Tokyo Charter;
Article II(c) of Control Council Law No. 10. Convictions have been entered on this ground. The Appeals
Chamber also noted “that numerous human rights treaties also prohibit inhuman and degrading treatment”,
including the ICCPR and the ECHR, Staki} Appeal Judgement, fn. 649. See also Kordi} and ^erkez Appeal
Judgement, para. 117.
Galić Trial Judgement, para. 152. See also Kordi} and Čerkez Appeal Judgement, para. 117.
Bla{ki} Trial Judgement, para. 239. See also Kordić and Čerkez Appeal Judgement, para. 117.
Kordić and Čerkez Appeal Judgement, para. 117.
Ibid.
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112.
The mens rea for the crime of inhumane acts is satisfied if, at the time of the act or
omission, the perpetrator had direct or indirect intent to inflict, by act or omission, serious physical
or mental suffering or to commit a serious attack on the victim’s human dignity.225 Indirect intent
requires that the perpetrator knew that his or her act or omission was likely to cause serious physical
or mental suffering or a serious attack upon human dignity and was reckless thereto.226
113.
Forcible transfer is considered in the jurisprudence of the Tribunal to constitute “other
inhumane acts”.227 Forcible transfer entails the forcible displacement of persons from the area in
which they are lawfully present, without grounds permitted under international law.228
114.
The actus reus of forcible transfer is the forced displacement of persons within national
boundaries.229 The element that the displacement be forced requires that the victims had no genuine
choice in their displacement.230 Fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological oppression, and
other such circumstances may create an environment where there is no choice but to leave, thus
amounting to the forced displacement of persons.231 In situations where the victims have consented,
or even requested, their removal, that consent “must be real in the sense that it is given voluntarily
and as a result of the individual’s free will, assessed in the light of surrounding circumstances”.232
Consequently, the trier of fact must consider the prevailing situation and atmosphere, as well as all
relevant circumstances, including in particular the victims’ vulnerability, when assessing whether
the displaced victims had a genuine choice to remain or leave.233
115.
International law recognises limited circumstances under which involuntary displacements
are permitted on humanitarian grounds.234 Thus, in cases where displacements are permitted on
humanitarian grounds, the act of displacement cannot constitute the actus reus of forcible
225
226
227
228
229
230
231
232
233
234
Krnojelac Trial Judgement, para. 132; Vasiljevi} Trial Judgement, para. 236; Kayishema and Ruzindana Trial
Judgement, para. 153. See also Kordi} and ^erkez Appeal Judgement, para. 117.
D. Milo{evi} Trial Judgement, para. 935; Blagojevi} and Joki} Trial Judgement, para. 628; Krnojelac Trial
Judgement, para. 132; Vasiljevi} Trial Judgement, para. 236; Gali} Trial Judgement, para. 154; Kayishema and
Ruzindana Trial Judgement, para. 153.
Staki} Appeal Judgement, para. 317; Kupre{ki} et al. Trial Judgement, para. 566; Kordi} and ^erkez Trial
Judgement, para. 270.
Kraji{nik Trial Judgement, para. 723.
Staki} Appeal Judgement, para. 317.
Staki} Appeal Judgement, para. 279; Krnojelac Appeal Judgement, para. 229.
Staki} Appeal Judgement, para. 281.
Staki} Appeal Judgement, para. 279. See also Krnojelac Appeal Judgement para. 229.
Blagojevi} and Joki} Trial Judgement, para. 596.
Article 49(2) of Geneva Convention IV, which is applicable to international armed conflict, provides that “the
Occupying Power may undertake total or partial evacuation of a given area if the security of the population or
imperative military reasons so demand”. Similarly, Article 17 of Additional Protocol II, which is applicable to
non-international armed conflict, provides that “[t]he displacement of the civilian population shall not be ordered
for reasons related to the conflict unless the security of the civilians involved or imperative military reasons so
demand”. See also Marti} Trial Judgement, para. 109.
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transfer.235 However, displacements for humanitarian reasons are not justifiable where the
humanitarian crisis that caused the displacement is itself the result of the accused’s own unlawful
activity.236
116.
The mens rea of forcible transfer is that the perpetrator must intend to displace the victims
within the relevant national border.237 It is not necessary that the perpetrator intends the
displacement to be permanent.238
G. Persecutions
117.
Peri{i} is charged with persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds, as a crime
against humanity under Article 5(h) of the Statute (Count 12), including murder, cruel and
inhumane treatment and forcible transfer.
118.
The crime of persecutions consists of an act or omission which:
(a) discriminates in fact and which denies or infringes upon a fundamental right laid down in
international customary or treaty law (actus reus); and
(b) was carried out deliberately with the intention to discriminate on political, racial or religious
grounds (mens rea).239
119.
The acts underlying the crime of persecutions can include those listed under the other sub-
headings of Article 5 of the Statute or provided for elsewhere in the Statute,240 as well as other acts
that are not explicitly mentioned in the Statute.241 The Trial Chamber notes in this respect that the
underlying act itself need not constitute a crime in international law.242 However, not any denial or
infringement of a fundamental right, committed with the requisite discriminatory intent, is serious
enough to constitute the crime of persecution as a crime against humanity.243 In order to amount to
persecutions, acts not enumerated as a crime under the Statute must be of equal gravity to the
crimes listed in Article 5 of the Statute, whether considered in isolation or in conjunction with other
235
236
237
238
239
240
241
242
243
Staki} Appeal Judgement, paras 286-287.
Staki} Appeal Judgement, para. 287.
Staki} Appeal Judgement, para. 317.
Staki} Appeal Judgement, paras 278, 317.
Staki} Appeal Judgement, para. 327; Kvo~ka et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 320; Kordi} and ^erkez Appeal
Judgement, para. 101; Bla{ki} Appeal Judgement, para. 131; Vasiljevi} Appeal Judgement, para. 113; Krnojelac
Appeal Judgement, para. 185. Notwithstanding the conjunctive “and” in the text of Article 5(h) of the Statute, it
is well established in the jurisprudence of the Tribunal that each of the three grounds listed (political, racial or
religious) is in itself sufficient to qualify an act as persecution, Tadi} Trial Judgement, para. 713. See also
Bla{ki} Appeal Judgement, para. 164; Krnojelac Appeal Judgement, para. 184.
Br|anin Appeal Judgement, para. 296; Krnojelac Appeal Judgement, para. 219.
Br|anin Appeal Judgement, para. 296. See also Kvo~ka et al. Appeal Judgement, paras 321-323.
Br|anin Appeal Judgement, para. 296; Kvo~ka et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 323.
Kordi} and ^erkez Appeal Judgement, para. 103; Bla{ki} Appeal Judgement, para. 139.
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acts.244 In order to apply the standard of gravity, these acts should be examined in their context and
with consideration of their cumulative effect.245
120.
According to the jurisprudence of the Tribunal, the act of murder, cruel and inhumane
treatment as well as forcible transfer, charged by the Prosecution under Count 12 of the Indictment,
may constitute underlying acts of the crime of persecution.246
121.
The mens rea for persecutions requires a specific intent to discriminate on political, racial or
religious grounds.247 This intent must be aimed at a group, rather than an individual; thus, the mens
rea “is the specific intent to cause injury to a human being because he belongs to a particular
community or group”.248 It is the requirement that the underlying act be committed on
discriminatory grounds that distinguishes persecution from other crimes against humanity.249 There
is no requirement that the perpetrator possess a “persecutory intent” over and above a
discriminatory intent.250
122.
The discriminatory intent may, for example, be inferred from the discriminatory nature of an
attack characterised as a crime against humanity, provided that the circumstances surrounding the
commission of the alleged acts substantiate the existence of such a specific intent.251 Circumstances
that may be taken into consideration when inferring discriminatory intent include “the systematic
nature of the crimes committed against a racial or religious group and the general attitude of the
alleged perpetrator as demonstrated by his behaviour”.252 Generally, such “specific intent in general
can only be inferred from objective facts and the general conduct of an accused seen in its
entirety”.253
123.
The Prosecution charges Perišić with the crime of murder as a crime against humanity under
Counts 1, 5 and 9, and as a violation of the laws or customs of war under Counts 2, 6 and 10
244
245
246
247
248
249
250
251
252
253
Brñanin Appeal Judgement, para. 296. See also Simi} Appeal Judgement, para. 177; Naletili} and Martinovi}
Appeal Judgement, para. 574; Kvo~ka et al. Appeal Judgement, paras 321-323.
Naletili} and Martinovi} Appeal Judgement, para. 574; Kvo~ka et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 321. For
examples of acts not listed in Article 5 of the Statute which were still found to amount to sufficient gravity to
constitute persecution, considering their context and cumulative effect, see Kvo~ka et al. Appeal Judgement,
paras 322-325; Krnojelac Appeal Judgement, para. 199.
See e.g. Kordi} and ^erkez Appeal Judgement, para. 106; Bla{ki} Appeal Judgement, paras 143, 151-153, 155;
Vasiljevi} Appeal Judgement, para. 143; Krnojelac Appeal Judgement, para. 188.
Staki} Appeal Judgement, para. 328; Kvo~ka et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 460; Bla{ki} Appeal Judgement,
para. 164; Kordi} and ^erkez Appeal Judgement, para. 110; Vasiljevi} Appeal Judgement, para. 113; Krnojelac
Appeal Judgement, para. 184.
Kordi} and ^erkez Appeal Judgement, para. 111; Bla{ki} Appeal Judgement, para. 165.
Marti} Trial Judgement, para. 115; Kupre{ki} et al. Trial Judgement, para. 607.
Kordi} and ^erkez Appeal Judgement, para. 111; Bla{ki} Appeal Judgement, para. 165.
See Naletili} and Martinovi} Appeal Judgement, paras 131, 146; Kvo~ka et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 366;
Kordi} and ^erkez Appeal Judgement, para. 110; Bla{ki} Appeal Judgement, para. 164; Krnojelac Appeal
Judgement, 184.
Kvo~ka et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 460; Krnojelac Appeal Judgement, para. 184.
Kordi} and ^erkez Appeal Judgement, para. 715.
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pursuant to Articles 5 and 3 of the Statute respectively.254 Common Article 3(1) (a) of the Geneva
Conventions provides the basis for the inclusion of murder under Article 3 of the Statute.255
H. Individual Criminal Responsibility
1. Responsibility Under Article 7(1) of the Statute – Aiding and Abetting
124.
The Prosecution charges Mom~ilo Peri{i} with aiding and abetting the planning, preparation
or execution of the crimes alleged in Counts 1 to 4 and 9 to 13 of the Indictment pursuant to Article
7(1).256
125.
Article 7(1) of the Statute provides:
A person who planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the
planning, preparation or execution of a crime referred to in articles 2 to 5 of the present Statute,
shall be individually responsible for the crime.
(a) Aiding and Abetting
(i) Actus Reus
126.
“Aiding and abetting” consists of acts or omissions directed at providing practical
assistance, encouragement or moral support to the perpetration of the crime, which have a
substantial effect on the perpetration of the crime.257 The Appeals Chamber expressly stated that
“specific direction” is not a requisite element of the actus reus of aiding and abetting.258 There is no
requirement of a cause-effect relationship between the conduct of the aider and abettor and the
commission of the crime or that such conduct served as a condition precedent to the commission of
254
255
256
257
258
Indictment, pp 14, 17, 21.
^elebi}i Appeal Judgement, paras 136, 419-420; Tadi} October 1995 Appeal Jurisdiction Decision, paras 87, 89;
Ori} Trial Judgement, para. 344; Deli} Trial Judgement, para. 43; Krnojelac Trial Judgement, para. 52. Common
Article 3: “[T]he following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever [...]: (a)
violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture; [...]”
(emphasis added).
Indictment, pp 14, 21.
Mrk{i} and [ljivan~anin Appeal Judgement, para. 81; Karera Appeal Judgement, para. 321; Blagojevi} and
Joki} Appeal Judgement, para. 127; Bla{ki} Appeal Judgement, para. 45; Simi} Appeal Judgement, para. 85. See
also Ori} Appeal Judgement, para. 43. For a thorough analysis of the actus reus of aiding and abetting, see
Furund`ija Trial Judgement, paras 192-235.
Mrk{i} and [ljivan~anin Appeal Judgement, para. 159. The Appeals Chamber in Blagojevi} and Joki} held that
“specific direction” has not always been included as element of the actus reus of aiding and abetting and that this
may be explained that “such a finding will often be implicit in the finding that the accused has provided practical
assistance to the principal perpetrator which had a substantial effect on the commission of the crime” considered
that “to the extent that specific direction forms an implicit part of the actus reus of aiding and abetting, where the
accused knowingly participated in the commission of an offence and his or her participation substantially
affected the commission of that offence, the fact that his or her participation amounted to no more than his or her
‘routine duties’ will not exculpate the accused”, Blagojevi} and Joki} Appeal Judgement, paras 182, 185-189.
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the crime.259 The actus reus of aiding and abetting a crime may occur before, during, or after the
principal crime has been committed260 and at a location which is removed from that where the
principal crime is committed.261
127.
The aider and abettor is always an accessory to the crime perpetrated by another person, the
principal.262 For an accused to be liable for aiding and abetting, the underlying crime must
ultimately be committed by the principal perpetrator. It is however not necessary that the latter be
identified or tried, even in cases of crimes requiring specific intent.263 It is also not necessary that
the principal perpetrator be aware of the aider and abettor’s contribution to the crime.264
128.
The determination of whether conduct substantially assists the commission of a crime
requires a fact-based inquiry.265 The Appeals Chamber has determined that the actus reus of aiding
and abetting may be satisfied by a commander permitting the use of resources under his or her
control, including personnel, to facilitate the perpetration of a crime.266 Furthermore, the fact that
the aider and abettor’s conduct amounted to no more than his “routine duties” does not exculpate
him, if such conduct substantially contributed to the commission of the crime.267
(ii) Mens Rea
129.
The requisite mental element of aiding and abetting is knowledge that the acts performed
assist the commission of the specific crime of the principal perpetrator.268 The aider and abettor
must be aware of the “essential elements” of the crime committed by the principal perpetrator,
including the state of mind of the principal perpetrator.269 It is not required, however, that the aider
and abettor share the mens rea required for such crime.270
130.
259
260
261
262
263
264
265
266
267
268
269
270
As consistently confirmed by the Appeals Chamber:
Mrk{i} and [ljivan~anin Appeal Judgement, para. 81; Blagojevi} and Joki} Appeal Judgement, paras 127, 134;
Simi} Appeal Judgement, para. 85; Bla{ki} Appeal Judgement, para. 48. See also Nahimana et al. Appeal
Judgement, para. 482.
Mrk{i} and [ljivan~anin Appeal Judgement, para. 81; Blagojevi} and Joki} Appeal Judgement, para. 127; Simi}
Appeal Judgement, para. 85; Bla{ki} Appeal Judgement, para. 48.
Mrk{i} and [ljivan~anin Appeal Judgement, para. 81; Bla{ki} Appeal Judgement, para. 48.
Tadi} Appeal Judgement, para. 229.
Milutinovi} et al. Trial Judgement, para. 92.
Tadi} Appeal Judgement, para. 229; Milutinovi} et al. Trial Judgement, para. 94.
Blagojevi} and Joki} Appeal Judgement, para. 134.
Blagojevi} and Joki} Appeal Judgement, para. 127. Krsti} Appeal Judgement, paras 137, 138, 144.
Blagojevi} and Joki} Appeal Judgement, para. 189.
Seromba Appeal Judgement, para. 56; Blagojevi} and Joki} Appeal Judgement, para. 127; Ntagerura et al.
Appeal Judgement, para. 370; Simi} Appeal Judgement, para. 86; Bla{ki} Appeal Judgement, paras 45-46;
Vasiljevi} Appeal Judgement, para. 102.
Blagojevi} and Joki} Appeal Judgement, para. 221. See also Ori} Appeal Judgement, para. 43. It is not required
that the accused knew the precise crime that was intended and committed by the principal, see Bla{ki} Appeal
Judgement, para. 50.
Blagojevi} and Joki} Appeal Judgement, para. 221 (emphasis added).
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₣Iğt is not necessary that the aider and abettor knows either the precise crime that was intended or
the one that was, in the event, committed. If he is aware that one of a number of crimes will
probably be committed, and one of those crimes is in fact committed, he has intended to facilitate
the commission of that crime, and is guilty as an aider and abettor.271
131.
In addition, the Appeals Chamber recently recalled that it rejected an elevated mens rea
requirement for aiding and abetting, namely the proposition that the aider and abettor needs to have
intended to provide assistance.272
132.
In cases of specific intent crimes, the aider and abettor must know of the principal
perpetrator’s specific intent.273
(iii) Omission
133.
As anticipated earlier, the actus reus may, under certain circumstances, take the form of an
omission.274 The Appeals Chamber has consistently indicated that an accused may incur criminal
responsibility under Article 7(1) for omission where there is a legal duty to act.275 The Appeals
Chamber in Mrk{i} and [ljivan~anin recently found that the Trial Chamber in that case “properly
considered aiding and abetting by omission as a recognised mode of liability under the International
Tribunal’s jurisdiction”.276
134.
The actus reus and mens rea requirements in order to enter a conviction for aiding and
abetting by omission are the same as for aiding and abetting by a positive act.277 It follows that the
actus reus will be fulfilled when it is established that, given the circumstances of the case, the
failure to discharge a legal duty to act was directed to assist, encourage or lend moral support to the
perpetration of the crime and had a substantial effect on the realisation of that crime.278 As to the
mens rea, “the aider and abettor must know that his omission assists in the commission of the crime
271
272
273
274
275
276
277
278
Simi} Appeal Judgement, para. 86; Mrk{i} and [ljivan~anin Appeal Judgement, para. 49. See also Bla{ki}
Appeal Judgement, para. 49, citing Furund`ija Trial Judgement, para. 246; Ndindabahizi Appeal Judgement,
para. 122.
Mrk{i} and [ljivan~anin Appeal Judgement, para. 159. See also Bla{ki} Appeal Judgement, para. 49, citing
Vasiljevi} Appeal Judgement, para. 102; Blagojevi} and Joki} Appeal Judgement, para. 222.
Blagojevi} and Joki} Appeal Judgement, para. 127; Simi} Appeal Judgement, para. 86. See also Krsti} Appeal
Judgement, paras 140-141.
Bla{ki} Appeal Judgement, paras 47, 663.
Mrk{i} and [ljivan~anin Appeal Judgement, paras 134-135; Ori} Appeal Judgement, para. 43; Br|anin Appeal
Judgement, para. 274; Gali} Appeal Judgement, para. 175; Bla{ki} Appeal Judgement, paras 47, 663-664;
Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 482. As to the legal duty to act, the Appeals Chamber has, for instance,
held that the breach of a legal duty imposed by the laws and customs of war gives rise to individual criminal
responsibility, Mrk{i} and [ljivan~anin Appeal Judgement, paras 93-94, 151.
Mrk{i} and [ljivan~anin Appeal Judgement, para. 135.
See Mrk{i} and [ljivan~anin Appeal Judgement, paras 49, 81, 93-94, 146, 156; Ori} Appeal Judgement,
para. 43; Brñanin Appeal Judgement, para. 274.
Mrk{i} and [ljivan~anin Appeal Judgement, paras 49, 146.
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of the principal perpetrator and must be aware of the essential elements of the crime which was
ultimately committed by the principal perpetrator”.279
135.
The Appeals Chamber held that this form of liability necessarily and implicitly requires that
the accused had the ability to act, i.e. that “there were means available to the accused to fulfil [his
legal] duty”.280
(iv) “Tacit Approval and Encouragement”
136.
An accused may incur criminal responsibility for aiding and abetting, “when it is established
that his conduct amounted to tacit approval and encouragement of the crime and that such conduct
substantially contributed to the crime”.281 The Appeals Chamber in Br|anin drew a distinction
between aiding and abetting by omission where there is a legal duty to act and aiding and abetting
by tacit approval and encouragement.282 The criminal responsibility for “tacit approval and
encouragement” is based not on a duty to act, but on “the encouragement and support that might be
afforded to the principals of the crime from such an omission”.283 In cases where criminal
responsibility was found, the accused held a position of authority over the principal perpetrator and
was present at the scene of the crime. Such combination allowed the inference that his nonintervention amounted to tacit approval and encouragement.284 The contribution of the accused does
not need to be tangible and his presence does not need to be a conditio sine qua non to the
commission of the crime by the principal perpetrator, provided he is aware of the possible effect of
his presence on the commission of the crime.285
2. Responsibility Under Article 7(3) of the Statute – Superior Responsibility
137.
The Prosecution charges Mom~ilo Peri{i} with superior responsibility pursuant to Article
7(3) of the Statute for failing to prevent or punish his subordinates, including the military personnel
of the Army of the Republika Srpska (“VRS”) and the Army of the Serbian Krajina (“SVK”), for
the commission of the crimes alleged in Counts 1 to 13 of the Indictment.
279
280
281
282
283
284
285
Mrk{i} and [ljivan~anin Appeal Judgement, paras 49, 146.
Mrk{i} and [ljivan~anin Appeal Judgement, para. 154.
Brñanin Appeal Judgement, para. 273. See also Kayishema and Ruzindana Trial Judgement, paras 201-202;
Aleksovski Trial Judgement, para. 87; Akayesu Trial Judgement, para. 706.
Brñanin Appeal Judgement, paras 273-274; Ntagerura et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 338. See also Aleksovski
Trial Judgement, para. 87; Akayesu Trial Judgement, para. 706.
Brñanin Appeal Judgement, para. 273. See also Kayishema and Ruzindana Appeal Judgement, paras 201-202,
affirming Kayishema and Ruzindana Trial Judgement, para. 202; Akayesu Trial Judgement, para. 705.
Brñanin Appeal Judgement, para. 273; Kayishema and Ruzindana Trial Judgement, para. 200; Furund`ija Trial
Judgement, paras 207-209.
Kayishema and Ruzindana Appeal Judgement, para. 201, affirming Kayishema and Ruzindana Trial Judgement,
paras 200-201.
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138.
Article 7(3) of the Statute reads as follows:
The fact that any of the acts referred to in articles 2 to 5 of the present Statute was committed by a
subordinate does not relieve his superior of criminal responsibility if he knew or had reason to
know that the subordinate was about to commit such acts or had done so and the superior failed to
take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators
thereof.
Article 7(3) of the Statute is applicable to all acts referred to in Articles 2 to 5 of the Statute and
applies to both international and non-international armed conflicts.286 Superior responsibility
applies to every superior at every level.287 This also includes responsibility, for example, for
military troops who have been temporarily assigned to a military commander,288 if the troops were
under the effective control of that commander at the time when the acts charged in the indictment
were committed.289 Furthermore, “commission” by a subordinate as used in Article 7(3) must be
understood in a broad sense, to encompass all modes of liability listed in Article 7(1).290 The
superior does not need to know the exact identity of those subordinates who committed the crimes,
to be held responsible under Article 7(3) of the Statute.291
139.
With regard to the nature of superior responsibility in international law, this Trial Chamber
concurs with the Halilović Trial Chamber, which, having examined in detail the development of the
notion of command responsibility with a view to determining its nature, held that “command
responsibility is responsibility for [the] omission” to prevent or punish crimes committed by
subordinates,292 and that the gravity to be attached to the superior’s omission is to be considered in
proportion to the gravity of the crime committed by the subordinate.293
(a) The Elements of Superior Responsibility
140.
It is firmly established in the jurisprudence of the Tribunal that for a superior to be held
responsible under Article 7(3) of the Statute, the following elements must be established:
i. the existence of a superior-subordinate relationship;
286
287
288
289
290
291
292
293
See e.g. Had`ihasanovi} and Kubura Appeal Jurisdiction Decision, para. 31.
See Kunarac et al. Trial Judgement, para. 398.
Kunarac et al. Trial Judgement, para. 399.
Kunarac et al. Trial Judgement, para. 399, citing ^elebi}i Appeal Judgement, paras 197-198, 256.
Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgement, paras 485-486; Ori} Appeal Judgement, para. 21; Blagojevi} and Joki}
Appeal Judgement, paras 280-282.
Blagojevi} and Joki} Appeal Judgement, para. 287; Deli} Trial Judgement, para. 56; Ori} Trial Judgement,
para. 305. The Appeals Chamber held that “notwithstanding the degree of specificity with which the culpable
subordinates must be identified, in any event, their existence as such must be established. If not, individual
criminal liability under Article 7(3) of the Statute cannot arise”, Ori} Appeal Judgement, para. 35.
Halilovi} Trial Judgement, para. 54; Had`ihasanovi} and Kubura Trial Judgement, paras 75, 191. See also Ori}
Trial Judgement, para. 293.
Halilovi} Trial Judgement, para. 54. “₣Tğhe gravity of the failure to prevent or punish is in part dependent on the
gravity of the underlying subordinate crimes”, Čelebici Appeal Judgement, para. 741.
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ii. the superior knew or had reason to know that the criminal act was about to be or had been
committed; and
iii. the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the criminal act or
punish the perpetrator thereof.294
(i) Superior-Subordinate Relationship
141.
The superior’s position of command over the perpetrators of the crimes is the legal basis
upon which rests the commander’s duty to act in order to prevent or punish the crimes of his
subordinates and the corollary liability for a failure to do so.295
142.
The existence of a superior-subordinate relationship depends on two factors: i) whether at
the time of the commission of the crimes296 the perpetrators were subordinates of the superior and
ii) whether the latter exercised effective control over them.297
143.
The subordination does not need to be direct or formal.298 A superior may be held
responsible pursuant to Article 7(3) whether he was a de jure or de facto commander, as long as by
virtue of his position, he was “senior in some sort of formal or informal hierarchy to the
perpetrator”299 and exercised effective control over such subordinate.300
144.
Effective control is defined as the superior’s material ability to prevent or punish criminal
conduct of his subordinates. However that control is exercised, this is the threshold to be reached in
establishing a superior-subordinate relationship for the purpose of Article 7(3).301
145.
As a matter of law, it is immaterial whether effective control descends from the superior to
the subordinate perpetrator through intermediary subordinates. Likewise, it is immaterial whether
the subordinate is found to have participated in the crimes through intermediaries as long as his
criminal responsibility is established beyond reasonable doubt.302
294
295
296
297
298
299
300
301
302
Bla{ki} Appeal Judgement, para. 484. See also Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 484; D. Milo{evi}
Appeal Judgement, para. 280.
Aleksovski Appeal Judgement, para. 76; ^elebi}i Appeal Judgement, para. 191.
See Had`ihasanovi} and Kubura Appeal Jurisdiction Decision, para. 51.
See ^elebi}i Appeal Judgement, para. 303; Halilovi} Appeal Judgement, para. 59.
Ibid.
Halilovi} Appeal Judgement, para. 59. See also ^elebi}i Appeal Judgement, paras 193, 195. A superior vested
with de jure authority who does not have effective control over his or her subordinates would therefore not incur
criminal responsibility pursuant to the doctrine of superior responsibility, whereas a de facto superior who lacks
formal letters of appointment or commission but, in reality, has effective control over the perpetrators of
offences would incur criminal responsibility where he failed to prevent or punish such criminal conduct, see
^elebi}i Appeal Judgement, para. 197. See also Strugar Trial Judgement, para. 363; High Command Case,
pp 543-544.
See ^elebi}i Appeal Judgement, paras 192-198.
Halilovi} Appeal Judgement, para. 59; ^elebi}i Appeal Judgement, para. 256.
Ori} Appeal Judgement, para. 20.
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146.
The Appeals Chamber in ^elebi}i held that a court may presume that the possession of de
jure power over a subordinate may result in effective control unless proof of the contrary is
produced. However, as clarified by the Appeals Chamber in Hadžihasanovi} and Kubura:
₣Tğhe Appeals Chamber in ^elebi}i did not reverse the burden of proof. It simply acknowledged
that the possession of de jure authority constitutes prima facie a reasonable basis for assuming that
an accused has effective control over his subordinates. Thus, the burden of proving beyond
reasonable doubt that the accused had effective control over his subordinates ultimately rests with
the Prosecution.303
147.
Cooperation in itself and/or the mere ability to exercise influence over subordinates is not
sufficient to establish effective control.304
148.
The indicators of effective control are more a matter of evidence than of law305 and are
“limited to showing that the accused had the power to prevent, punish, or initiate measures leading
to proceedings against the alleged perpetrators where appropriate”.306 Factors indicative of an
individual’s position of authority and effective control may include: the procedure used for
appointment of an accused,307 his official position,308 his ability to issue orders and whether these
are in fact followed,309 the power to order combat action and re-subordinate units,310 the availability
of material and human resources,311 the authority to apply disciplinary measures,312 the authority to
promote, demote or remove particular soldiers313 and the capacity to intimidate subordinates into
compliance.314 The Appeals Chamber in Ori} held that the subordinate’s erratic behaviour cannot
be taken into account, when it is established that the superior-subordinate relationship exists.
However, if the existence of such relationship is not clear, then it may be relevant to take into
303
304
305
306
307
308
309
310
311
312
313
314
Had`ihasanovi} and Kubura Appeal Judgement, para. 21. See also Ori} Appeal Judgement, paras 91-92;
Blagojevi} and Joki} Appeal Judgement, para. 302; Halilovi} Appeal Judgement, para. 85.
Had`ihasanovi} and Kubura Appeal Judgement, para. 214.
Strugar Appeal Judgement, para. 254; Bla{ki} Appeal Judgement, para. 69. See also ^elebi}i Appeal Judgement,
para. 206; Aleksovski Appeal Judgement, paras 73-74.
Bla{ki} Appeal Judgement, para. 69; See also Aleksovski Appeal Judgement, para. 76.
Halilovi} Trial Judgement, para. 58.
Halilovi} Trial Judgement, para. 58; Kordi} and ^erkez Trial Judgement, para. 418. The Appeals Chamber
recognised that the de jure position of a superior may be a prima facie indicium of effective control unless proof
to the contrary is produced, see ^elebi}i Appeal Judgement, para. 197; Had`ihasanovi} and Kubura Appeal
Judgement, para. 21; Ori} Appeal Judgement, para. 91.
Strugar Appeal Judgement, para. 256; Halilovi} Appeal Judgement, para. 207; Bla{ki} Appeal Judgement,
para. 69, where the Appeals Chamber endorsed “the Appellant’s argument that to establish that effective control
existed at the time of the commission of subordinates’ crimes, proof is required that the accused was not only
able to issue orders but that the orders were actually followed”. See also D. Milo{evi} Appeal Judgement,
para. 280; Had`ihasanovi} and Kubura Appeal Judgement, para. 199; Kordi} and ^erkez Trial Judgement,
para. 421.
See Strugar Trial Judgement, paras 393-397.
See Muvunyi Trial Judgement, para. 497.
See Strugar Trial Judgement, paras 406, 408; ^elebi}i Trial Judgement, para. 767.
See Strugar Trial Judgement, paras 411, 413; ^elebi}i Trial Judgement, para. 767.
Tamba Brima et al. Trial Judgement, para. 788.
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account the erratic behaviour of the subordinate to determine whether the superior had effective
control over him.315
(ii) Mental Element: “Knew or Had Reason to Know”
149.
Article 7(3) of the Statute does not impose strict liability on the superior who has failed to
prevent or punish the crimes committed by his subordinates.316 Rather, the superior will incur
individual criminal responsibility if it is proven that: (i) the superior had actual knowledge that his
subordinates were committing or about to commit crimes within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, or
(ii) the superior had in his possession information which would at least put him on notice of the risk
of such offences, and alert him to the need for additional investigation to determine whether such
crimes were about to be, or had been, committed by his subordinates.317 The Appeals Chamber
recently reiterated that “it is not necessary for the accused to have had the same intent as the
perpetrator of the criminal act”.318 When assessing the mental element required under Article 7(3),
the Trial Chamber should take into account the specific circumstances of the case.319
a. Actual Knowledge
150.
A superior’s actual knowledge that his subordinates were committing or were about to
commit a crime may be established by direct or circumstantial evidence, but it may not be
presumed.320 Factors which the Trial Chamber takes into consideration include, but are not limited
to: the number, type and scope of illegal acts committed by the subordinates, the time during which
the illegal acts occurred, the number and types of troops and logistics involved, the geographical
location, whether the occurrence of the acts is widespread, the tactical tempo of operations, the
modus operandi of similar illegal acts, the officers and staff involved, and the location of the
315
316
317
318
319
Ori} Appeal Judgement, para. 159.
See ^elebi}i Appeal Judgement, para. 239.
^elebi}i Appeal Judgement, para. 223. It is not necessary that the accused had the same intent as the perpetrator,
Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 865.
D. Milo{evi} Appeal Judgement, para. 280.
Hadžihasanovi} and Kubura Appeal Judgement, para. 28, fn. 77. The Appeals Chamber held that “an assessment
of the mental element required by Article 7(3) of the Statute should be conducted in the specific circumstances
of each case, taking into account the specific situation of the superior concerned at the time in question”,
^elebi}i Appeal Judgement, para. 239. See also the ILC comment on Article 6 of the ILC Draft Code of Crimes
against the Peace and Security of Mankind: “Article 6 provides two criteria for determining whether a superior is
to be held criminally responsible for the wrongful conduct of a subordinate. First, a superior must have known or
had reason to know in the circumstances at the time that a subordinate was committing or was going to commit a
crime. This criterion indicates that a superior may have the mens rea required to incur criminal responsibility in
two different situations. In the first situation, a superior has actual knowledge that his subordinate is committing
or is about to commit a crime […]. In the second situation, he has sufficient relevant information to enable him
to conclude under the circumstances at the time that his subordinates are committing or are about to commit a
crime”, ILC Report, pp 37-38, quoted in ^elebi}i Appeal Judgement, para. 234.
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superior at the time.321 Physical proximity to, or distance from the scene of the crimes may be taken
into consideration when assessing the superior’s actual knowledge of those crimes.322
b. “Had Reason to Know”
151.
A superior will be considered to have “had reason to know” when, in the absence of actual
knowledge, sufficiently alarming information was available to him which would have put him on
notice of offences that were about to, or had been, committed by his subordinates.323
152.
The information needs to be available to the superior, but it is not required that he actually
acquainted himself with the information.324 Furthermore, it does not need to be detailed. Even
general information, which would put the superior on notice of possible unlawful acts by his
subordinates, is sufficient to trigger the superior’s duty to act.325 It is not necessary that the superior
be on notice of a “strong risk” that his subordinates would commit crimes,326 what is required is that
he possessed information sufficiently alarming to justify further inquiry.327 It should be noted that a
superior cannot incur criminal responsibility for neglecting to acquire knowledge of the acts of his
subordinates, unless sufficiently alarming information is available to him.328
153.
The Appeals Chamber also held that the superior’s actual knowledge of crimes previously
committed by a group of subordinates and his failure to punish them, is not, by itself, sufficient to
conclude that the commander knew that similar offences would be committed by the same
perpetrators. However, depending on the circumstances of the case, such failure may be relevant to
determine whether “a superior possessed information that was sufficiently alarming to put him on
notice of the risk that similar crimes might subsequently be carried out by subordinates and justify
320
321
322
323
324
325
326
327
328
Strugar Trial Judgement, para. 368; Had`ihasanovi} and Kubura Trial Judgement, para. 94; ^elebi}i Trial
Judgement, para. 386. See also Brñanin Trial Judgement, para. 278; Krnojelac Trial Judgement, para. 94; Kordi}
and ^erkez Trial Judgement, para. 427.
^elebi}i Trial Judgement, para. 386. See also Kordi} and ^erkez Trial Judgement, para. 427.
See Aleksovski Trial Judgement, para. 80.
See Strugar Appeal Judgement, paras 298-299; Had`ihasanovi} and Kubura Appeal Judgement, para. 27, citing
^elebi}i Trial Judgement, para. 383; Bla{ki} Appeal Judgement, para. 62, citing ^elebi}i Appeal Judgement,
para. 241.
^elebi}i Appeal Judgement, para. 239.
Strugar Appeal Judgement, para. 298; Had`ihasanovi} and Kubura Appeal Judgement, para. 28. The
Commentary to Additional Protocol I refers to “reports addressed (to the superior), ₣…ğ the tactical situation, the
level of training and instruction of subordinate officers and their troops, and their character traits” as potentially
constituting the information referred to in Article 86(2) of Additional Protocol I, Čelebići Appeal Judgement,
para. 238 (emphasis added), citing ICRC Commentary on Additional Protocols, para. 3545.
See Strugar Appeal Judgement, para. 304.
See Strugar Appeal Judgement, para. 298.
^elebi}i Appeal Judgement, para. 232. See also Bla{ki} Appeal Judgement, para. 406; Had`ihasanovi} and
Kubura Trial Judgement, para. 96.
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further inquiry”.329 The Appeals Chamber further stressed that “a superior’s failure to punish a
crime of which he has actual knowledge is likely to be understood by his subordinates at least as
acceptance, if not encouragement, of such conduct with the effect of increasing the risk of new
crimes being committed”.330
(iii) Failure to Prevent or Punish
154.
Article 7(3) contains two distinct and separate legal obligations: (i) to prevent the
commission of the crime, and (ii) to punish the perpetrators thereof.331 The duty to prevent arises
when the superior acquires actual or constructive knowledge that a crime is about to be or is being
committed.332 The duty to punish arises where the superior obtains the requisite knowledge only
after the commission of the crime.333 Failure to take the necessary and reasonable measures to
prevent a crime of which a superior knew or had reason to know cannot be cured by subsequently
punishing the subordinate for the crime.334
155.
Although the powers and duties of civilian and military representatives of a State are
established by the national law of that State, a Trial Chamber must evaluate the superior’s duty to
act in view of international law.335 The superior therefore cannot be relieved of his duty to act under
international law by reference to domestic laws.
a. Duty to Prevent
156.
The duty to prevent crimes rests on a superior at any stage before the commission of a crime
by a subordinate if the superior acquires knowledge, or has reason to know, that the crime is about
to be committed.336
157.
What the duty to prevent will encompass will depend on the superior’s material power to
intervene in a specific situation.337 In establishing individual responsibility of superiors, military
329
330
331
332
333
334
335
Had`ihasanovi} and Kubura Appeal Judgement, para. 30. According to the Appeals Chamber, finding that a
“superior’s failure to punish a crime of which he has knowledge automatically constitutes sufficiently alarming
information under the “had reason to know” standard, irrespective of the circumstances of the case” would
amount to an error of law, Had`ihasanovi} and Kubura Appeal Judgement, para. 31.
Had`ihasanovi} and Kubura Appeal Judgement, para. 30.
The failure to punish and failure to prevent involve different crimes committed at different times: the failure to
punish concerns past crimes committed by subordinates, whereas the failure to prevent concerns future crimes of
subordinates, Bla{ki} Appeal Judgement, para. 83. See also Had`ihasanovi} and Kubura Appeal Judgement,
para. 259; Kordi} and ^erkez Appeal Judgement, paras 445-446.
See Bla{ki} Appeal Judgement, para. 83; Kordi} and ^erkez Trial Judgement, paras 445-446.
Ibid.
Bla{ki} Trial Judgement, para. 336. See also Strugar Trial Judgement, para. 373; Had`ihasanovi} and Kubura
Trial Judgement, para. 126.
Had`ihasanovi} and Kubura Trial Judgement, paras 137-138, citing ICRC Commentary on Additional
Protocols, para. 3537 (with respect to Article 86 of Additional Protocol I).
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tribunals set up after World War II considered a non-exhaustive list of factors such as the superior’s
failure to: secure reports that military actions have been carried out in accordance with international
law,338 issue orders aiming at bringing the relevant practices into accord with the rules of war,339
take disciplinary measures to prevent the commission of atrocities by the troops under their
command,340 protest against or criticise criminal action,341 and insist before a superior authority that
immediate action be taken.342 In the Tokyo Judgement, it was found that a superior’s duty may not
be discharged by the issuance of routine orders but that more active steps may be required.343
b. Duty to Punish
158.
The duty to punish includes at least an obligation to investigate (or have investigated)
possible crimes with the view to establishing the facts.344 Once the facts are established, if the
superior has no power to sanction the perpetrators himself, he has the obligation to report the crimes
to the competent authorities.345 The obligation on the part of the superior is to take active steps to
ensure that the perpetrators are brought to justice.346 The thoroughness of the investigation and
whether the superior has called for a report on the incident may be relevant in this respect.347
336
337
338
339
340
341
342
343
344
345
346
347
See Kordić and Čerkez Trial Judgement, para. 445; Strugar Trial Judgement, para. 416.
Strugar Trial Judgement, para. 374.
Strugar Trial Judgement, para. 374; Had`ihasanovi} and Kubura Trial Judgement, para. 153. See also Hostage
Case, p. 1290.
Had`ihasanovi} and Kubura Trial Judgement, para. 153; Strugar Trial Judgement, para. 374. See also Hostage
Case, p. 1311.
Hadžihasanovi} and Kubura Trial Judgement, para. 153; Strugar Trial Judgement, para. 374. See also Tokyo
Judgement, p. 452.
Hadžihasanovi} and Kubura Trial Judgement, para. 153; Strugar Trial Judgement, para. 374. See also High
Command Case, p. 623.
Hadžihasanovi} and Kubura Trial Judgement, para. 153; Strugar Trial Judgement, para. 374. See also Tokyo
Judgement, pp 447-448.
Tokyo Judgement, p. 452: “The duty of an Army commander in such circumstances is not discharged by the
mere issue of routine orders […]. His duty is to take such steps and issue such orders as will prevent thereafter
the commission of war crimes and to satisfy himself that such orders are being carried out”; Hadžihasanovi} and
Kubura Trial Judgement, para. 153; Strugar Trial Judgement, para. 374.
Bo{koski and Tar~ulovski Trial Judgement, para. 418; Mrk{i} et al. Trial Judgement, para. 568; Strugar Trial
Judgement, para. 376; Limaj et al. Trial Judgement, para. 529.
Halilovi} Appeal Judgement, para. 182, affirming Halilovi} Trial Judgement, paras 97, 100; Mrk{i} et al. Trial
Judgement, para. 568; Limaj et al. Trial Judgement, para. 529; Kordi} and ^erkez Trial Judgement, para. 446.
See also Bo{koski and Tar~ulovski Trial Judgement, para. 418; Bla{ki} Trial Judgement, para. 335; Strugar Trial
Judgement, para. 376. The military commander will normally only have a duty to start an investigation, see
ICRC Commentary on Additional Protocols, para. 3562 (with respect to Article 87(2) of Additional Protocol I).
Furthermore, the Appeals Chamber in Blaski} noted that the duty of the commander to report to competent
authorities is specifically provided for under Article 87(1) of Additional Protocol I, Bla{ki} Appeal Judgement,
para. 69.
See e.g. High Command Case, p. 623.
Strugar Trial Judgement, para. 376. It is a matter of fact as to whether the efforts made by a commander to
investigate crimes were sufficient to meet the standard of “necessary and reasonable measures” within the
meaning of Article 7(3), see e.g. Bla{ki} Trial Judgement, paras 488-495. Further guidance as to the duty to
punish is provided by Article 87(3) of Additional Protocol I, which requires a military commander, who is aware
that his subordinates have committed a breach of the Geneva Conventions or the Protocol, “where appropriate, to
initiate disciplinary or penal action” against them. The ICRC Commentary to Additional Protocol I suggests that
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159.
The superior is required to take an “important step in the disciplinary process”.348 However,
he does not have to be the person who dispenses the punishment and he may “discharge his duty to
punish by reporting the matter to the competent authorities”.349 Finally, the superior has a duty to
exercise all measures possible under the circumstances.350
c. Necessary and Reasonable Measures
160.
The superior’s duty to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent or punish,
rests upon his possession of effective control. It follows that whether the superior had the “explicit
legal capacity” to take such measures is immaterial if it is proven that he had the material ability to
act, i.e. effective control.351 The determination of what constitutes “necessary and reasonable
measures” to prevent the commission of crimes or to punish the perpetrators thereof is not a matter
of substantive law but of evidence and depends on the circumstances surrounding each particular
situation.352 A superior is not required to perform the impossible and will be liable for a failure to
take such measures that are “within his material possibility”.353 The Appeal Chamber held that
necessary measures are those “appropriate for the superior to discharge his obligation (showing that
he genuinely tried to prevent or punish)” and reasonable measures are those “reasonably falling
within the material powers of the superior”.354 Whether the measures were disciplinary, criminal, or
a combination of both, cannot in and of itself be determinative of whether a superior has discharged
his duty.355 What is relevant is whether the superior took measures to punish the perpetrators which
were “necessary and reasonable” in the circumstances of the case.356
348
349
350
351
352
353
354
355
356
this action may include informing their superior officers of the situation: “drawing up a report in the case of a
breach, […] proposing a sanction to a superior who has disciplinary power, or – in the case of someone who
holds such power himself – exercising it, within the limits of his competence, and finally, remitting the case to
the judicial authority where necessary with such factual evidence as it was possible to find”, ICRC Commentary
on Additional Protocols, para. 3562 (with respect to Article 87(2) of Additional Protocol I).
See Kvo~ka et al. Trial Judgement, para. 316.
Had`ihasanovi} and Kubura Appeal Judgement, para. 154.
Krnojelac Trial Judgement, para. 95; Deli} Trial Judgement, para. 76.
Deli} Trial Judgement, para. 76. See also Bo{koski and Tar~ulovski Trial Judgement, para. 415.
Had`ihasanovi} and Kubura Appeal Judgement, paras 33, 142. See also Bla{ki} Appeal Judgement, paras 72,
417; ^elebi}i Trial Judgement, para. 394.
Bla{ki} Appeal Judgement, para. 417, citing ^elebi}i Trial Judgement, para. 395.
Ori} Appeal Judgement, para. 177; Halilovi} Appeal Judgement, para. 63.
Had`ihasanovi} and Kubura Appeal Judgement, para. 33.
Had`ihasanovi} and Kubura Appeal Judgement, para. 142.
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III. GENERAL OVERVIEW OF EVENTS IN CROATIA AND BIH
BETWEEN 1990 AND 1995
161.
The purpose of this part of the judgement is to provide a short account of the background to
the conflict in the SFRY.
162.
Prior to its dissolution, the SFRY consisted of six republics - Bosnia and Herzegovina
(“BiH”), Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia - and two autonomous regions,
Kosovo and Vojvodina.357 With the death of Josip Broz Tito on 4 May 1980, the unity of the oneparty federal state started to weaken.358 By the late 1980s, the League of Communists lost its
leading political role. In June 1991, the SFRY began to disintegrate. On 25 June 1991, Slovenia and
Croatia declared their independence from the SFRY, which led to the outbreak of the war.359 While
the conflict ended in Slovenia, clashes in Croatia escalated into full war as from summer 1991. In
1992, conflict also erupted in BiH.360
A. Croatia
163.
In April and May 1990, multi-party elections were held and, as a result, the Serbian
Democratic Party ("SDS") gained power in the municipalities of Benkovac, Donji Lapac, Gratac,
Glina, Korenica, Knin, Obrovac, and Vojnić.361 In July 1990, a Serbian Assembly was established
in Srb, north of Knin, and moved to declare the sovereignty and autonomy of the Serb people in
Croatia.362 The executive body of the Serbian Assembly, the Serbian National Council, called for a
referendum on the autonomy of Serbs in Croatia,363 which was held from 19 August 1990 to 2
September 1990, and resulted in a 97.7% vote for autonomy.364 On 21 December 1990, the Serbian
Autonomous District (“SAO”) of Krajina was established.365
164.
On 12 May 1991, SAO Krajina held a referendum on whether its people favoured the
“accession of the SAO Krajina to the Republic of Serbia and remaining of Krajina in Yugoslavia
357
358
359
360
361
362
363
364
365
Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts I, 1.
Ex. P375, Expert Report of Patrick Treanor Entitled: Belgrade Leadership and Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia,
1 September 2008, p. 7.
Ex. P350, Report by Robert Donia on the Origins of RS, 30 July 2002, p. 16.
Ex. P375, Expert Report of Patrick Treanor Entitled: Belgrade Leadership and Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia,
1 September 2008, p. 16; Ex. P350, Report by Robert Donia on the Origins of RS, 30 July 2002, pp 30-32.
Defence Agreed Facts, 123.
Defence Agreed Facts, 124.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ex. P375, Expert Report of Patrick Treanor Entitled: Belgrade Leadership and Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia, 1
September 2008, paras 33-34. See also Defence Agreed Facts, 125; Patrick Treanor, T. 991; Mile Novakovi},
T. 13037-13038; Ex. P157, Statute of the SAO Krajina, 19 December 1990.
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with Serbia, [Montenegro] and others who want to preserve Yugoslavia”,366 resulting in a 99.8%
approval.367 On 19 May 1991, a separate referendum was held in Croatia, except in predominantly
Serb areas, leading 94.1% of voters to favour Croatian independence.368 Ten days after the
referendum, on 29 May 1991, the SAO Krajina Assembly adopted a constitutional law describing
the SAO Krajina as a subject of political and territorial autonomy within federal Yugoslavia.369 On
25 June 1991, Croatia declared independence.370
165.
The spring of 1991 saw the beginning of several ongoing clashes between Croatian armed
forces and the forces of the SAO Krajina, including in Kijevo, Drni{, Hrvatska Dubica, Saborsko
and [kabrnja.371 In the summer of 1991, the conflict in Vukovar was partly initiated by a JNA
attempt to “deblock” its local barracks, which were being blockaded by Croatian paramilitaries.372
166.
On 23 November 1991, the Vance Plan was signed by the President of Croatia, Franjo
Tuñman, the President of Serbia, Slobodan Milošević and the SFRY Federal Secretary for Defence
General, Veljko Kadijević.373 The Vance Plan made provisions for the deployment of UNPROFOR
forces in the Krajina, Western Slavonia and Eastern Slavonia, for demilitarisation, and for the
eventual return of refugees.374 On 21 February 1992, the United Nations Security Council
(“UNSC”) adopted Resolution 743, implementing the Vance Plan and establishing the UN
Protection Force (“UNPROFOR”), resulting in the deployment of forces to certain areas of Croatia
designated as “United Nations Protected Areas” (“UNPAs”).375 The UNPAs were areas where intercommunal tensions had previously led to armed conflict.376 In April 1992, UNPROFOR troops
began arriving in the UNPAs.377
167.
In December 1991, the SAO Krajina was joined by two other SAOs on Croatian territory
(SAO Slavonia, Baranja and Western Srem as well as the SAO Western Slavonia).378 As a result, on
19 December 1991, the Republic of Serbian Krajina (“RSK”) was formed.379
366
367
368
369
370
371
372
373
374
375
376
377
378
Patrick Treanor, T. 995-996, 999; Ex. P161, Decision on Calling a Referendum on the Accession of SAO
Krajina to the Republic of Serbia and on Remaining in Yugoslavia, 30 April 1991, pp 2-3. See also Defence
Agreed Facts, 129.
Patrick Treanor, T. 995-996. See also Defence Agreed Facts, 129.
Patrick Treanor, T. 1000. See also Defence Agreed Facts, 129.
Patrick Treanor, T. 1000-1001; Ex. P162, Constitutional Law of the SAO Krajina, 29 May 1991.
Patrick Treanor, T. 983-984, 1309, 1311, 1396. See also Defence Agreed Facts, 131; Mile Novakovi}, T. 13037.
Defence Agreed Facts, 133.
Mile Novakovi}, T. 13030-13031.
Defence Agreed Facts, 133. See also Patrick Treanor, T. 1007; Mile Novakovi}, T. 13041.
Ibid.
Ex. P375, Expert Report of Patrick Treanor Entitled: Belgrade Leadership and Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia, 1
September 2008, p. 39. See also Mile Novakovi}, T. 13041.
Defence Agreed Facts, 136. See also Mile Novakovi}, T. 13042.
Defence Agreed Facts, 137.
Patrick Treanor, T. 1015.
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168.
In October 1992, RSK established its military force, the Serbian Army of Krajina
(“SVK”).380
169.
In January 1994, elections were held in RSK and Milan Marti} was elected President.381 The
Zagreb Peace Agreement between Croatia and RSK was signed in March 1994.382 This led to an
economic agreement, signed in Knin in December 1994, and an agreement to re-open a highway
from Belgrade to Zagreb that had been closed since August 1991.383
170.
In January 1995, President Tuñman announced that he would refuse the extension of
UNPROFOR’s mandate in Croatia after the end of March 1995.384 At one point, RSK authorities
shut down the highway through Western Slavonia that had been opened pursuant to the December
1994 agreement.385 Shortly afterwards, in the early morning hours of 1 May 1995, Croatian forces
launched a military offensive known as Operation Flash.386 On 2 and 3 May 1995, the SVK shelled
Zagreb using Orkan rockets.387 Negotiations to find a peaceful settlement led to an agreement
reached on 3 May 1995.388 Operation Flash ended around 4 May 1995, with RSK losing control
over Western Slavonia.389
171.
On 3 August 1995, negotiations were held in Geneva between Croatia and RSK.390 The next
day, however, Croatian forces launched Operation Storm against RSK and by 10 August 1995,
seized all of the territory held by RSK, except for the area of Eastern Slavonia.391 The RSK
leadership fled to RS and the FRY.392 In 1996, the area of Eastern Slavonia was peacefully
reintegrated into Croatia.393
379
380
381
382
383
384
385
386
387
388
389
390
391
392
393
Patrick Treanor, T. 1015; Ex. P375, Expert Report of Patrick Treanor Entitled: Belgrade Leadership and Serbs in
Croatia and Bosnia, 1 September 2008, para. 40; Ex. P166, Constitution of the RSK, 2 January 1992, Article 1.
See also Morten Torkildsen, T. 1462-1463; Defence Agreed Facts, 135.
See Ex. P1782, Decree on Appointment by RSK President, 26 October 1992. See also MP-16, T. 5134-5135
(closed session); Mile Novaković, T. 13063. In November 1992, Special Police Forces (“PJM”) units, which
were under the command of the MUP, and the Territorial Defence (“TO”) were disbanded and incorporated in
the SVK, Mile Novaković, T. 13372-13375.
Patrick Treanor, T. 1026; Ex. P170, Press Release on Election of Milan Marti} as a President of the RSK,
25 January 1994. See also Defence Agreed Facts, 122, 140.
Its three essential objectives were: (i) end of hostilities, (ii) establishing of an economic relationship, and (iii)
finding a political solution to the crisis between the RSK and the Republic of Croatia, MP-80, T. 8636-8637
(closed session).
Patrick Treanor, T. 1238; MP-80, T. 8637-8639, 8644 (closed session).
Patrick Treanor, T. 1238.
Ibid.
Defence Adjudicated Facts, 14.
See infra section V.B.
Defence Adjudicated Facts, 14.
Ibid.
Mile Novakovi}, T. 13292.
Patrick Treanor, T. 1238; Mile Novakovi}, T. 13289, 13295; MP-80, T. 8256-8257 (closed session).
Sini{a Borovi}, T. 14009.
Sini{a Borovi}, T. 14029-14030; Mile Novakovi}, T. 13298.
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B. Bosnia and Herzegovina
172.
As of 1991, the population of BiH was 43.7% Muslim, 31.3% Serb, 17.3% Croat and 7.7%
Yugoslav or other.394 On 21 February 1990, the Assembly of BiH adopted legislation permitting the
establishment of political parties,395 and scheduled multi-party elections for 18 November 1990.396
Three main political parties emerged, established principally along ethnic lines: the Serb
Democratic Party (“SDS”), led by Radovan Karad`i}; the Party of Democratic Action (“SDA”), led
by Alija Izetbegovi}; and the Croatian Democratic Union (“HDZ”), led by Stjepan Kljuji}.397
173.
The multi-party elections were held as scheduled, and resulted in sweeping victories for the
SDS, SDA and HDZ.398 The parties agreed that the position of President of the BiH Assembly
should be allotted to Momčilo Krajišnik of the SDS.399 Alija Izetbegovi} of the SDA was then
elected President of the BiH Presidency, a post he held throughout the course of the war,400 while
the position of Prime Minister went to Jure Pelivan of the HDZ.401
174.
It quickly became clear that the SDS, SDA and HDZ held starkly differing views, especially
regarding the future of the BiH state. In particular, while the SDA advocated the independence and
sovereignty of BiH, the SDS wished for BiH to remain within the federal state of Yugoslavia.
175.
At a meeting of the BiH Assembly on 14-15 October 1991, SDS President Radovan
Karad`i} gave a speech in which he threatened that Muslims would disappear from BiH if they
declared independence from the SFRY.402 At the same meeting, Assembly delegates of the SDA
and HDZ voted in favour of a memorandum on sovereignty proposed by the SDA; “[a] measure
bitterly opposed by SDS delegates” who had departed prior to the vote.403 The voting took place in
394
395
396
397
398
399
400
401
402
403
Ex. P347, Map on Ethnic Distribution in Bosnia. See also Robert Donia, T. 1710-1711, 1752-1753; Patrick
Treanor, T. 1035.
Ex. P350, Report by Robert Donia on the Origins of RS, 30 July 2002, p. 18.
Ex. P350, Report by Robert Donia on the Origins of RS, 30 July 2002, p. 19.
Ex. P375, Expert Report of Patrick Treanor Entitled: Belgrade Leadership and Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia,
1 September 2008, para. 52. See also Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts I, 3.
Ex. P375, Expert Report of Patrick Treanor Entitled: Belgrade Leadership and Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia,
1 September 2008, para. 52; Patrick Treanor, T. 1034-1035, 1302-1303; Ex. P350, Report by Robert Donia on
the Origins of RS, 30 July 2002, pp 20, 23; Ex. P348, Report of Robert Donia on the Making of the Sarajevo
Siege, 1 December 2006, p. 2.
Ex. P375, Expert Report of Patrick Treanor Entitled: Belgrade Leadership and Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia,
1 September 2008, para. 52; Patrick Treanor, T. 1035; Ex. P350, Report by Robert Donia on the Origins of RS,
30 July 2002, p. 22.
Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts I, 4; Ex. P375, Expert Report of Patrick Treanor Entitled: Belgrade Leadership and
Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia, 1 September 2008, para. 52; Patrick Treanor, T. 1302-1303; Ex. P350, Report by
Robert Donia on the Origins of RS, 30 July 2002, p. 23.
Patrick Treanor, T. 1034-1035; Ex. P350, Report by Robert Donia on the Origins of RS, 30 July 2002, p. 22.
Ex. P350, Report by Robert Donia on the Origins of RS, 30 July 2002, p. 34.
Ex. P375, Expert Report of Patrick Treanor Entitled: Belgrade Leadership and Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia,
1 September 2008, para. 59; Patrick Treanor, T. 1054; Ex. P350, Report by Robert Donia on the Origins of RS,
30 July 2002, pp 33-34; Ex. P348, Report of Robert Donia on the Making of the Sarajevo Siege,
1 December 2006, p. 9; Robert Donia, T. 1651-1652; Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts I, 7.
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the absence of SDS delegates.404 Ten days later, SDS delegates responded by founding the
“Assembly of the Serbian People in BiH” (renamed “Assembly of Republika Srpska” in the late
summer of 1992) and electing Mom~ilo Kraji{nik as its President.405 This body then adopted a
decision proclaiming the formation of the Republic of the Serbian People of BiH.406
176.
On 9 and 10 November 1991, a plebiscite was held in BiH asking voters if they wished to
remain in the SFRY. Voters were segregated by ethnicity and non-Serbs were given different
ballots.407 Few non-Serbs took part in the plebiscite, while a vast majority of Bosnian Serbs voted in
favour of remaining in the SFRY.408
177.
In the last months of 1991, the Arbitration Commission of the Conference on Yugoslavia
(“Badinter Commission”) was established by the European Community (“EC”) to offer
recommendations from a legal perspective on the independence of individual republics.409 The
Badinter Commission was instructed to invite and assess applications from any Yugoslav republic
seeking independence.410 On 20 December 1991, the BiH Presidency, over the dissent of its SDS
members, voted to apply to the Badinter Commission for recognition as an independent state.411
178.
On 9 January 1992, the Assembly of the Serbian People in BiH declared the formation of
the Serbian Republic of BiH (“SerBiH”).412 The republic aimed to include all Serbian autonomous
districts in BiH, as well as any “other Serbian ethnic entities in BiH, including areas in which the
404
405
406
407
408
409
410
411
412
Ex. P375, Expert Report of Patrick Treanor Entitled: Belgrade Leadership and Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia,
1 September 2008, para. 59; Ex. P350, Report by Robert Donia on the Origins of RS, 30 July 2002, pp 33-34;
Ex. P348, Report of Robert Donia on the Making of the Sarajevo Siege, 1 December 2006, p. 9; Robert Donia,
T. 1651-1652.
Ex. P179, Decision on Foundation of the Assembly of Serbian People in BiH, 24 October 1991; Ex. P375,
Expert Report of Patrick Treanor Entitled: Belgrade Leadership and Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia,
1 September 2008, para. 61; Patrick Treanor, T. 1060; Ex. P350, Report by Robert Donia on the Origins of RS,
30 July 2002, p. 34; Ex. P348, Report of Robert Donia on the Making of the Sarajevo Siege, 1 December 2006,
p. 10; Robert Donia, T. 1665-1666.
Ex. P375, Expert Report of Patrick Treanor Entitled: Belgrade Leadership and Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia,
1 September 2008, paras 61, 67.
Ex. P350, Report by Robert Donia on the Origins of RS, 30 July 2002, p. 35.
Patrick Treanor, T. 1067, 1315-1316; Ex. P350, Report by Robert Donia on the Origins of RS, 30 July 2002,
p. 34; Robert Donia, T. 1665-1666.
Ex. D15, Opinions of the Badinter Commission, pp 1-2; Ex. P348, Report of Robert Donia on the Making of the
Sarajevo Siege, 1 December 2006, p. 17; Robert Donia, T. 1839-1845; Patrick Treanor, T. 1073-1074, 13121313.
Ex. P348, Report of Robert Donia on the Making of the Sarajevo Siege, 1 December 2006, p. 17; Ex. P350,
Report by Robert Donia on the Origins of RS, 30 July 2002, p. 35.
Ex. P348, Report of Robert Donia on the Making of the Sarajevo Siege, 1 December 2006, p. 17; Ex. P350,
Report by Robert Donia on the Origins of RS, 30 July 2002, p. 35. See also Defence Agreed Facts, 33.
Ex. P182, Declaration on the Proclamation of the Republic of the Serbian People of BiH, 9 January 1992;
Ex. P375, Expert Report of Patrick Treanor Entitled: Belgrade Leadership and Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia,
1 September 2008, para. 67; Patrick Treanor, T. 1072-1073; Ex. P348, Report of Robert Donia on the Making of
the Sarajevo Siege, 1 December 2006, pp 17-18; Ex. P350, Report by Robert Donia on the Origins of RS,
30 July 2002, p. 35. See also Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts I, 10.
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Serbian people are in a minority because of genocide…committed during World War Two”.413 The
Assembly’s declaration also stated that the republic should form part of the federal state of
Yugoslavia.414
179.
The conclusions of the Badinter Commission, which were released at the same time as the
declaration of a SerBiH state, found that BiH had not yet fulfilled the conditions for recognition,
and recommended a referendum to determine the will of its people regarding independence.415 In
response, the Assembly of BiH voted, over the objection of SDS delegates, to hold a referendum.416
180.
On 21 February 1992, with the political situation growing increasingly tense, the UNSC
passed Resolution 743, establishing UNPROFOR to “create the conditions of peace and security
required for the negotiation of an overall settlement of the Yugoslav crisis”.417
181.
On 28 February 1992, hours before the referendum was set to begin, the Assembly of the
Serbian People in BiH adopted a constitution for SerBiH.418 The referendum then proceeded with
the majority of Bosnian Serbs boycotting the proceedings while Bosnian Muslims and Croats voted
overwhelmingly for independence.419
182.
On 6 and 7 April 1992, the EC and the United States recognised the independence of BiH.420
The Assembly of the Serbian People in BiH immediately declared the independence of SerBiH.421
These events led to a surge in violence between opposite factions in Sarajevo.422 Serb forces started
laying siege to Sarajevo, which would persist until November 1995.423
413
414
415
416
417
418
419
420
421
422
423
Ex. P182, Declaration on the Proclamation of the Republic of the Serbian People of BiH, 9 January 1992;
Ex. P375, Expert Report of Patrick Treanor Entitled: Belgrade Leadership and Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia,
1 September 2008, para. 67; Patrick Treanor, T. 1072-1073.
Ibid.
Ex. D15, Opinions of the Badinter Commission, pp 5-7; Patrick Treanor, T. 1074; Ex. P348, Report of Robert
Donia on the Making of the Sarajevo Siege, 1 December 2006, p. 18.
Ex. P348, Report of Robert Donia on the Making of the Sarajevo Siege, 1 December 2006, p. 18; Ex. P350,
Report by Robert Donia on the Origins of RS, 30 July 2002, p. 35.
Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts I, 13.
Ex. P183, Constitution of the Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 28 February 1992; Patrick Treanor,
T. 1076-1077; Ex. P375, Expert Report of Patrick Treanor Entitled: Belgrade Leadership and Serbs in Croatia
and Bosnia, 1 September 2008, paras 68-69. See also Defence Agreed Facts, 47.
Ex. P348, Report of Robert Donia on the Making of the Sarajevo Siege, 1 December 2006, p. 18. See also
Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts I, 14.
Patrick Treanor, T. 1097; Ex. P348, Report of Robert Donia on the Making of the Sarajevo Siege,
1 December 2006, p. 18.
Ex. P375, Expert Report of Patrick Treanor Entitled: Belgrade Leadership and Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia,
1 September 2008, para. 70; Patrick Treanor, T. 1098-1099. See also Defence Agreed Facts, 46.
Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts I, 25-32.
Robert Donia, T. 1879; Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts I, 25-32; Ex. P348, Report of Robert Donia on the Making of
the Sarajevo Siege, 1 December 2006, p. 38; Ex. P632, Transcript of Milan Mandilović in Prosecutor v. Galić,
T. 1010-1011; Ex. P520, Transcript of Mesud Jusufovi} from Prosecutor v. Gali}, T. 6517, 6523-6524. See infra
para. 306.
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183.
The FRY, consisting of Serbia and Montenegro, was created with the proclamation of a new
constitution on 27 April 1992.424 The BiH Presidency ordered the JNA to withdraw from its
claimed territory. When the JNA declined to do so, the special police of the BiH Ministry of Interior
(“MUP”) and other units loyal to the BiH Government surrounded several JNA facilities in
Sarajevo.425 A number of clashes ensued, resulting in casualties.426
184.
On 12 May 1992, the Assembly of the Serbian People in BiH adopted the six strategic goals
of the Bosnian Serbs introduced by Radovan Karadži}.427 The first goal was separating Bosnian
Serbs from the other two national communities—the Bosnian Muslims and the Bosnian Croats.428
The second was the establishment of a corridor between Semberija and Krajina.429 The third was
the establishment of a corridor in the Drina Valley.430 The fourth was the establishment of external
borders to the Serb entity on the Una and Neretva Rivers.431 The fifth concerned the division of the
city of Sarajevo into Serbian and Muslim parts, and the implementation of effective state
424
425
426
427
428
429
430
431
Ex. P1186, Constitution of the FRY (Excerpt), 27 April 1992.
Defence Agreed Facts, 144.
Ibid.
Ex. P188, Minutes of the 16th Session of the Assembly of the Serbian People in BiH, 12 May 1992; Ex. P339,
Minutes of the 16th Session of the Assembly of the Serbian People in BiH, 12 May 1992; Patrick Treanor,
T. 1099; Robert Donia, T. 1687; Ex. P375, Expert Report of Patrick Treanor Entitled: Belgrade Leadership and
Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia, 1 September 2008, para. 71; Ex. P348, Report of Robert Donia on the Making of
the Sarajevo Siege, 1 December 2006, p. 24.
Ex. P188, Minutes of the 16th Session of the Assembly of the Serbian People in BiH, 12 May 1992, p. 13;
Ex. P339, Minutes of the 16th Session of the Assembly of the Serbian People in BiH, 12 May 1992, p. 13; Patrick
Treanor, T. 1100. Mom~ilo Kraji{nik highlighted that it was the most important and overriding goal, Ex. P188,
Minutes of the 16th Session of the Assembly of the Serbian People in BiH, 12 May 1992, p. 49; Ex. P339,
Minutes of the 16th Session of the Assembly of the Serbian People in BiH, 12 May 1992, p. 52.
Ex. P188, Minutes of the 16th Session of the Assembly of the Serbian People in BiH, 12 May 1992, p. 13;
Ex. P339, Minutes of the 16th Session of the Assembly of the Serbian People in BiH, 12 May 1992, p. 13;
Ex. P187, Map Depicting the Six Strategic Objectives; Ex. D14, Map Marked by Robert Donia; Ex. P338, Map
Marked by Robert Donia, red mark. The Krajina area comprised Serb-dominated municipalities in the west of
BiH, and the area of Semberija was Bosnian Serb-controlled territory in the northeast of BiH. This corridor was
vital to keeping “the two large wings [...] of Bosnian Serb-controlled territory contiguous with one another”,
Robert Donia, T. 1690, 1711-1712, 1831-1835. The corridor lies along the southern bank of the Sava River,
which was the northern boundary of Bosnia and was the only land route connecting the eastern part of the
SerBiH with the western part of the SerBiH. The corridor therefore was important as the land route linking
Serbia with many portions of RSK in Croatia, Patrick Treanor, T. 1100-1101, 1108. On cross-examination,
Robert Donia agreed with the Defence that the idea of the corridor would also have protected a Serb village
located on the border with Croatia that had been previously attacked by the Croatian ZNG, Robert Donia,
T. 1836-1837.
Ex. P188, Minutes of the 16th Session of the Assembly of the Serbian People in BiH, 12 May 1992, p. 13;
Ex. P339, Minutes of the 16th Session of the Assembly of the Serbian People in BiH, 12 May 1992, p. 14;
Ex. P187, Map Depicting the Six Strategic Objectives; Ex. P338, Map Marked by Robert Donia, blue mark. The
Drina River has been historically the border between Serbia and BiH, in this case portions of the SerBiH. A
corridor in the Drina Valley would have linked the north-eastern part of the SerBiH with its south-eastern part in
BiH, Patrick Treanor, T. 1101-1102, 1108-1109; Robert Donia, T. 1691-1693, 1713.
Ex. P188, Minutes of the 16th Session of the Assembly of the Serbian People in BiH, 12 May 1992, p. 13;
Ex. P339, Minutes of the 16th Session of the Assembly of the Serbian People in BiH, 12 May 1992, p. 14;
Ex. P187, Map Depicting the Six Strategic Objectives. This goal specifies two other portions of the SerBiH’s
external border, namely, the Una River in the north-western region of BiH. Part of BiH is on the western bank of
the Una, that is the left bank. The Una flowed north through BiH into the Sava River. The Neretva is in the
south. It flows through Mostar down to the sea. The establishment of a border on the Neretva would have given
the SerBiH control of the whole of the eastern BiH, Patrick Treanor, T. 1102-1103, 1109.
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governments in each of these constituent states.432 The sixth and final goal was to secure access to
the sea for the Serb entity.433 The Bosnian Serb army, later known as the VRS, was established on
the same day.434
185.
The six strategic goals were communicated to the VRS, which regarded them as “a general
guideline on which [the VRS] planned the actual operations and concerted battles”.435 These goals
were kept secret436 until November 1993, when an abbreviated version was published in the RS
Official Gazette.437
186.
On 15 May 1992, the UNSC passed a resolution demanding a halt to “all forms of outside
interference from outside of Bosnia-Herzegovina”, as well as the complete withdrawal of all foreign
forces from BiH, including the JNA and elements of the Croatian Army.438
187.
Although the FRY had officially withdrawn the JNA from BiH by 19 May 1992,439 the
UNSC found that the situation on the ground reflected continued JNA involvement. It consequently
condemned the FRY authorities for failing to take effective measures towards implementing the
UNSC Resolution. On 30 May 1992, the UNSC reinforced sanctions against the FRY.440
188.
On 8 June 1992, the UNSC issued Resolution 758, which broadened the mandate and
strength of UNPROFOR and authorised the deployment of UN Military Observers (“UNMOs”).441
432
433
434
435
436
437
438
439
440
441
According to Radovan Karad`i}, “[t]he battle in Sarajevo and for Sarajevo, seen strategically and tactically, is as
of decisive importance because it does not allow the establishment of even the illusion of a state. Alija does not
have a state while we have part of Sarajevo”, Ex. P188, Minutes of the 16th Session of the Assembly of the
Serbian People in BiH, 12 May 1992, pp 13-14; Ex. P339, Minutes of the 16th Session of the Assembly of the
Serbian People in BiH, 12 May 1992, p. 14; Ex. P187, Map Depicting the Six Strategic Objectives; Patrick
Treanor, T. 1103-1104, 1109.
Ex. P188, Minutes of the 16th Session of the Assembly of the Serbian People in BiH, 12 May 1992, p. 14;
Ex. P339, Minutes of the 16th Session of the Assembly of the Serbian People in BiH, 12 May 1992, p. 14;
Ex. P187, Map Depicting the Six Strategic Objectives; Patrick Treanor, T. 1105, 1109.
Ex. P189, Amendments to the Constitution of the SerBiH, 12 May 1992, pp 1-3; Ex. P190, Decision on
Formation of the Army of SerBiH, 12 May 1992; Patrick Treanor, T. 1099; Ex. P375, Expert Report of Patrick
Treanor Entitled: Belgrade Leadership and Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia, 1 September 2008, para. 73; Petar
[krbi}, T. 11633; Stojan Mal~i}, T. 11188; Defence Agreed Facts, 97. See infra paras 262-264.
Ex. P149, Status of Combat Readiness of the VRS for 1992, p. 159, reporting, inter alia, that the VRS Main
Staff “translated the [strategic goals] into general and individual missions of the [VRS]”; Robert Donia, T. 17051706.
Patrick Treanor, T. 1115. See Ex. P188, Minutes of the 16th Session of the Assembly of the Serbian People in
BiH, 12 May 1992, p. 38.
Ex. P334, Excerpt of the RS’s Official Gazette reporting the “Strategic Goals”, 26 November 1993; Robert
Donia, T. 1687; Patrick Treanor, T. 1118-1119.
Ex. P375, Expert Report of Patrick Treanor, para. 162; Patrick Treanor, T. 1164-1165, 1329; Ex. P201, UNSC
Resolution 752, 15 May 1992.
Pursuant to an order of the Presidency of the SFRY of 4 May 1992, the JNA was to withdraw from the territory
of BiH and cross into the SFRY within 15 days, Stamenko Nikoli}, T. 10458; Ex. P75, \or|e \uki}, Statement
of 4/29 February 1996, p. 3; MP-5, T. 2366-2367, 2435, 2493-2494, 2498. See also infra para. 263.
Ex. P202, UNSC Resolution 757, 30 May 1992.
Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts I, 36.
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UNPROFOR was tasked, among other things, with protecting the Sarajevo airport and helping
humanitarian aid reach the population.442
189.
In August 1992, the SerBiH was constitutionally renamed Republika Srpska (“RS”).443
Radovan Karadži} was elected President of RS on 17 December 1992.444
190.
In March 1993, there was a surge in VRS operations in eastern Bosnia, which resulted in a
flood of refugees into Srebrenica and a dire humanitarian situation.445 On 16 April 1993, the UNSC
adopted Resolution 819, declaring Srebrenica a “safe area” to be free from armed attack or any
other hostile act.446 The UNSC extended the “safe area” designation to the towns of Tuzla, Žepa,
Biha} and Gora`de on 6 May 1993.447
191.
In the summer of 1994, international diplomats attempted to end the Bosnian war by
engaging in direct negotiations with the relevant parties.448 These efforts produced a peace proposal
that included a map demarcating a division of Bosnian territory between the Bosnian Serbs and
Bosnian Muslims.449 The Bosnian Serbs rejected the peace plan.450 In August 1994, the FRY opted
to impose sanctions on RS due to its rejection of the plan. These sanctions included a blockade of
their common border and the imposition of a trade embargo on all shipments into RS, except for
food, clothes and medication.451
192.
At the end of 1994, a four-month ceasefire was declared in BiH.452 It expired in April 1995
after attempts to extend it failed.453 Over the next few months, the safe areas of Srebrenica and Žepa
were forcibly overtaken by Bosnian Serb forces.454
193.
In early August 1995, Slobodan Milo{evi} issued a public appeal for peace to Ratko Mladi}
and Alija Izetbegovi}. The United States government became involved in the peace initiative, as
Richard Holbrooke, the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, engaged in
442
443
444
445
446
447
448
449
450
451
452
453
Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts I, 37.
Patrick Treanor, T. 1124. See also Defence Agreed Facts, 46.
Ex. P192, Decision on the Proclamation of the Election of the President of RS, 17 December 1992; Patrick
Treanor, T. 1123.
Pyers Tucker, T. 9119-9122, 9129; Ex. P2246, Expert Report of Richard Butler “Srebrenica Military Narrative
(Revised) – Operation Krivaja 95”, 1 November 2000, p. 19.
Ex. P208, UNSC Resolution 819, 16 April 1993, p. 2. See also Ex. P2246, Expert Report of Richard Butler
“Srebrenica Military Narrative (Revised) – Operation Krivaja 95”, 1 November 2000, p. 19; Ex. P892,
(confidential); Ex. P2462, Report of the UNSC Mission Established Pursuant to Resolution 819, 30 April 1993.
Patrick Treanor, T. 1193-1194; Ex. P212, UNSC Resolution 824, 6 May 1993.
Carl Bildt, T. 14253-14254.
Ibid.
Carl Bildt, T. 14254.
Miodrag Simi}, T. 10182-10183; Ex. P222, Press Article Published in Borba, 5 August 1994. See also Petar
Škrbić, T. 11938. See also infra paras 867, 872.
Patrick Treanor, T. 1238.
Ibid.
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shuttle diplomacy between the various capitals in the region.455 During this period, FRY leaders
began meeting with their RS counterparts to develop a common position regarding the forthcoming
peace negotiations.456 They formed a joint peace negotiation delegation, composed of
representatives from the FRY and RS, and agreed that Slobodan Milo{evi} would have the deciding
vote in the case of a disagreement within the delegation.457
194.
These negotiations culminated in the Dayton Accords, which ended the war in BiH. The
Accords were signed preliminarily at the end of November 1995, followed by an official signing in
Paris in December 1995.458
454
455
456
457
458
Ibid.
Patrick Treanor, T. 1252.
Ibid.
Patrick Treanor, T. 1258; Ex. P232, Notes of Meeting Held in Dobanovci, 30 August 1995, pp 18-19.
Patrick Treanor, T. 1389-1390.
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IV. POLITICAL ENTITIES AND STRUCTURE OF THE ARMIES
A. Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
195.
The FRY was established on 27 April 1992 with the approval of a new Constitution
superseding the prior SFRY Constitution.459 The new Constitution provided that the FRY was a
sovereign federal state and consisted of Serbia and Montenegro and the provinces of Kosovo and
Vojvodina.460
196.
The FRY was organised on the principle of separation of powers, between the legislature,
executive and judiciary. Principal federal organs of the FRY included the Federal Assembly, FRY
President, Federal Government, the Supreme Defence Council (“SDC”) and the Chief of General
Staff of the Yugoslav Army (“VJ”).461 The federal judicial organs were the Federal Court, Federal
Public Prosecutor and a Constitutional Court.462
197.
In addition to the Constitution, provisions regulating the functioning and composition of
these organs were laid down in the Law on the Defence and the Law on the VJ, both of which were
temporarily enacted in October 1993 by the FRY Assembly, and subsequently finalised on 18 May
1994.463 Based on these legal provisions, the Trial Chamber will now turn to describe the structures
and functioning of the federal organs which are relevant to the case, namely, the SDC, the FRY
President, the Chief of the VJ General Staff and the MOD.
B. Organs of the FRY
1. The Supreme Defence Council
198.
According to the Constitution of the FRY, the SDC was formally composed of the President
of the FRY and the Presidents of the Republics of Serbia and Montenegro.464 In practice, the SDC
459
460
461
462
463
464
Patrick Treanor, T. 1126, 1328; Ex. P375, Expert Report of Patrick Treanor, para. 79; Miodrag Star~evi},
T. 5432.
Patrick Treanor, T. 1126, 1328; Ex. P229, FRY Constitution, 27 April 1992, Articles 133-134. On 4 July 1992,
Badinter Commission stated that the SFRY no longer existed and concluded that the FRY was a new state
which, however, “cannot be considered the sole successor to SFRY”, Ex. P375, Expert Report of Patrick
Treanor, para. 169. Opinion n. 9 stated that the successor states to the SFRY must together settle all aspects of
succession by agreement and peacefully settle all disputes relating to succession which could not be resolved by
agreement, Robert Donia, T. 1857-1860; Ex. D15, Opinions of the Badinter Commission, pp 15-21.
Ex. P375, Expert Report of Patrick Treanor, para. 79.
Ibid.
Patrick Treanor, T. 1152; Ex. P197, Law on the VJ, 18 May 1994, Article 4; Ex. P375, Expert Report of Patrick
Treanor, paras 92-93. As regards the entry into force of the Law on the VJ, Miodrag Star~evi} explained that it
was adopted by the Chamber of Citizens (the lower house of parliament) in October 1993. However, because the
Chamber of Republics (the upper house of parliament) had made amendments to the draft law, a reconciled text
was only passed in May 1994. Nevertheless, it had legal force already as of October 1993, Miodrag Star~evi},
T. 5436-5437.
Ex. P229, FRY Constitution, 27 April 1992, Article 135; Patrick Treanor, T. 1128.
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meetings were also attended by other high-level federal officials, such as the FRY Prime Minister,
the FRY Minister of Defence, the Chief of the VJ General Staff and, occasionally, high-ranking
military officers.465
199.
The President of the FRY presided over the SDC.466 The Law on Defence empowered the
SDC to adopt the plan for the defence of the country, which “all subjects of the national defence”,
including the VJ, should pursue.467
200.
In its work, the SDC made use of reports, analyses and other materials prepared by the
MOD, the VJ General Staff and other state organs.468 According to the Rules of Procedure adopted
by the SDC in 1992,469 the SDC had to conduct its work in sessions, and adopt final decisions when
the majority of SDC members were present. Decisions were approved by consensus, and the FRY
President would issue the appropriate orders in his name.470 The Rules of Procedure of the SDC
also provided for the possibility to make decisions and reach conclusions without holding a session,
“on the basis of consultations among the [SDC] members”.471
201.
Minutes were kept of sessions of the SDC.472 Those minutes, as well as the material for
discussion and the stenographic records, constituted archival material.473
202.
On 30 June 1992, the SDC held its first session presided over by Dobrica ]osi} as FRY
President.474 From that moment on, regular sessions of the SDC were held throughout the war. The
Trial Chamber has carefully analysed the minutes and stenographic notes of the SDC sessions
admitted into evidence related to the period of the Indictment. Among the topics discussed in these
sessions were the military and political situation in the FRY, the logistic assistance to the VRS and
SVK, military budget and military personnel issues. The details of these sessions will be discussed
in subsequent parts of the Judgement addressing these relevant topics.
465
466
467
468
469
470
471
472
473
474
Patrick Treanor, T. 1128.
Ex. P229, FRY Constitution, 27 April 1992, Article 135.
Miodrag Star~evi}, T. 6894; Ex. P1183, Decree on the Proclamation of the Law on Defence, 27 May 1994.
Patrick Treanor, T. 1129-1130; Ex. P707, Rules of Procedure of the SDC, 23 July 1992, Article 2.
Ex. P707, Rules of Procedure of the SDC, 23 July 1992.
Patrick Treanor, T. 1129-1130.
Ex. P707, Rules of Procedure of the SDC, 23 July 1992, Article 7. Sessions could be convened by the Chairman
of the SDC at his own initiative or at the proposal of other members of the SDC who could also put forward
agenda proposals, Ex. P707, Rules of Procedure of the SDC, 23 July 1992, Article 4.
Ex. P707, Rules of Procedure of the SDC, 23 July 1992, Article 8.
Patrick Treanor, T. 1129; Ex. P375, Expert Report of Patrick Treanor Entitled: Belgrade Leadership and Serbs in
Croatia and Bosnia, 1 September 2008, paras 85-86.
Ex. P375, Expert Report of Patrick Treanor Entitled: Belgrade Leadership and Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia, 1
September 2008, paras 82-83.
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2. The FRY President
203.
According to the Law on the VJ, the FRY President commands the Army in war and peace,
in conformity with the decisions of the SDC475 and shall:
1) establish the principles of internal organisation, the development and equipping of the Army;
2) determine the system of command in the Army and oversee its implementations;
3) decide on the deployment of the Army and approve the plan for its use;
4) regulate and order readiness of the Army in case of an imminent threat of war, state of war, or
state of emergency;
5) provide guide-lines for arrangements relating to mobilisation and issue orders for the
mobilisation of the Army;
6) issue basic regulations and other acts related to the deployment of the Army;
7) adopt rules regulating the internal order and relations in the performance of military service;
and
8) perform other duties relating to the command over the Army in accordance with federal
law.476
204.
The FRY President was also vested with the power to exceptionally promote a professional
officer to the rank of general at the proposal of the Chief of the VJ General Staff,477 and decided on
other promotions.478 According to Article 136 of the Constitution, the FRY President should
“appoint, promote and dismiss from service Army officers stipulated by federal law as well as the
presidents and judges of military courts and military prosecutors”.479
475
476
477
478
479
Ex. P197, Law on the VJ, 18 May 1994, Article 4; Patrick Treanor, T. 1152. As noted by Miodrag Star~evi}, the
constitution explicitly set forth that the chain of command ran from the President down to the Chief of the VJ
General Staff and then to the lower level units, Miodrag Star~evi}, T. 5433.
Ex. P197, Law on the VJ, 18 May 1994, Article 4.
Ex. P197, Law on the VJ, 18 May 1994, Article 46. In applying this provision, the President of the FRY, Zoran
Lili}, promoted Ratko Mladi} to the rank of Colonel General, Miodrag Star~evi}, T. 5497-5498 (private session);
Ex. P1902, FRY Presidential Decree Promoting Lieutenant General Ratko Mladi} to the Rank of Colonel
General, 16 June 1994. As regards the procedure of personnel promotions, the Assistant Commander for
Personnel Administration of the VJ General Staff would prepare orders and decrees about promotion to the ranks
of generals and submit them to the head of the “Military Office” of the FRY President. The Military Office
would then take those decrees to the President, Sini{a Borovi}, T. 13922, 13973.
Ex. P197, Law on the VJ, 18 May 1994, Article 151.
Ex. P229, FRY Constitution, 27 April 1992, Article 136.
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3. Chief of the VJ General Staff
205.
The Chief of the VJ General Staff was directly subordinated to the FRY President.480 Since
the FRY President commanded the army pursuant to decisions taken by the SDC, the Chief of the
VJ General Staff was also subordinated to the SDC.481
206.
The VJ General Staff was the “highest professional and staff organ” for the preparation and
utilisation of the VJ in peace and war.482 The Chief of the VJ General Staff could engage the VJ in
combat operations only pursuant to a decision to do so from the FRY President as Supreme
Commander.483 He could, however, decide on the preparation and deployment of VJ units along the
FRY borders.484 In this regard, Mladen Mihajlovi} testified that the role of the Chief of the VJ
General Staff was to prepare the army, including material and equipment, for combat readiness, if it
was necessary to defend the country.485
207.
Moreover, the Law on the VJ establishes that the Chief of the General Staff acts in
“accordance with the basic principles of organisation, development and establishment of the Army
and the documents issued by the President of the Republic”.486 Within this framework the Chief of
the General Staff shall:
1) determine the organisation, plan of development, and establishment of the commands, units,
and institutions of the Army;
2) determine the plan of recruitment and maintenance of manpower levels for the Army and the
numerical distribution of recruits in the Army;
3) issue regulations on the training of the Army;
4) determine plans for the education and advanced training of professional and reserve
commanding officers;
5) perform other duties as stipulated by this Law.487
480
481
482
483
484
485
486
487
Miodrag Star~evi}, T. 5441-5442. According to Miodrag Starčević, in light of the principle of unity of command
in the VJ, there was a “direct relationship” in the command between the President of the FRY and the Chief of
the VJ General Staff.
Miodrag Star~evi}, T. 5441-5442.
Ex. P197, Law on the VJ, 18 May 1994, Article 5; Miodrag Star~evi}, T. 5439-5440.
Miodrag Simi}, T. 10123-10126. The witness testified that Ex. P2714, Order of the Chief of the VJ General
Staff, 5 May 1995 was in keeping with the power of the Chief of the VJ General Staff, Miodrag Simi}, T. 10125.
See also Ex. D236 (under seal).
Miodrag Simi}, T. 10131-10132. In this regard, Simi} testified about an order by the Chief of the VJ General
Staff to establish and deploy VJ Combat Groups along the FRY border on security grounds, Miodrag Simi},
T. 10126.
Mladen Mihajlovi}, T. 3960-3961.
Ex. P197, Law on the VJ, 18 May 1994, Article 5.
Ibid.
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208.
According to Article 6 of the Law on the VJ, the Chief of the VJ General Staff issued
orders, rules, commands, instructions or other acts for the execution of “enactments” of the FRY
President, “as well as the duties stipulated by [the Law on the VJ]”.488
209.
The Chief of the VJ General Staff and the commanding officers of units or institutions
designed by him had the power to appoint “officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers” with
the exception of “generals and commanding officers performing duties for which the rank of
general had been determined”.489 The Chief of the VJ General Staff could, however, make
proposals for approval by the FRY President for the promotion of a professional officer to the rank
of general.490 He could also transfer officers up to and including the rank of colonel, decide on the
assignment of professional members of the VJ to duties outside the VJ and decide on termination of
service of officers up to and including the rank of colonel.491
210.
In the first half of 1993, the Chief of the VJ General Staff was General Života Pani}.492 On
26 August 1993, Života Pani} replaced Mile Mr{ki} as the Chief of the VJ Special Forces Corps
and Mom~ilo Peri{i} became the Chief of the VJ General Staff.493
4. Cabinet of the Chief of the VJ General Staff
211.
work.
The Chief of the VJ General Staff had a deputy and a cabinet which assisted him with his
494
The cabinet included the Chef de Cabinet, the deputy Chef de Cabinet, and various other
officers and assistants including, inter alia, an adjutant of the Chief of the VJ General Staff, legal
and finance officers, as well as an information analyst.495
212.
The basic duties of the Chef de Cabinet included facilitating the work of the Chief of the VJ
General Staff, which included receiving and sending out mail, processing and analysing documents,
as well as all the organisational aspects related to the work of the Chief of the VJ General Staff.496
488
489
490
491
492
493
494
495
496
Ex. P197, Law on the VJ, 18 May 1994, Article 6; Miodrag Star~evi}, T. 5441-5442.
Ex. P197, Law on the VJ, 18 May 1994, Article 16.
Ex. P197, Law on the VJ, 18 May 1994, Article 46. See also Ex. P197, Law on the VJ, 18 May 1994,
Article 152. As noted by Miodrag Star~evi}, Article 152 defines the duties of the Chief of the VJ General Staff
and the commanding officers of units or institutions designated by him, Miodrag Star~evi}, T. 5443.
Ex. P197, Law on the VJ, 18 May 1994, Article 152; Miodrag Star~evi}, T. 5537.
MP-11, T. 8929.
MP-11, T. 8929-8930. See Ex. P351, Organisational Chart of the Special Unit Corps in December 1993,
19 November 2008. P751, Minutes from the 12th Session of the SDC held on 23 and 25 August 1993, p. 2.
Mladen Mihajlovi}, T. 3877; Miodrag Simi}, T. 9947.
Sini{a Borovi}, T. 13905-13906.
Sini{a Borovi}, T. 13904-13905, 13911, 14087,14180-14181.
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The cabinet of the Chief of the VJ General Staff was also often responsible for relaying orders of
the Chief of the VJ General Staff.497
213.
Through the so-called “managerial information system”, the office monitored various issues
from the printing of the daily newsletter about the situation in the units and the reserves to
monitoring resources and finances.498 On average the office received between 50 and 300
documents of all kinds daily.499
5. Structure of the VJ General Staff
214.
The VJ General Staff was made up of sectors, departments, administrations and other units.
According to an organisational chart dated 15 June 1993, the following organs were directly
subordinated to the Chief of the VJ General Staff: the Sector for Operations; the Sector for
Organization, Recruitment and Information; the Logistics Sector; the Personnel Administration;
Information and Morale Department; the Security Administration; the Intelligence Administration;
and VJ Inspection.500 Each organ was commanded by an Assistant to the Chief of the VJ General
Staff.501 Among the functions of an Assistant was the provision of advice to the Chief of the VJ
General Staff about their sector without having, however, any command over VJ units.502
215.
In December 1993, due to a reorganisation of the General Staff,503 the Intelligence
Administration, previously an autonomous and independent organ, became the so called “2nd
Administration” within the Sector for Operational and Staff Affairs.504 According to the new
organisation, the following organs were directly subordinated to the VJ General Staff: the Sector for
Operational and Staff Affairs; the Sector for Land Forces; the Sector for Air Force and AntiAircraft Defence; the Navy Sector; the Sector for Communications, Information and Electronic
Operations; the Sector for Manning, Mobilization and Systemic Issues; the Logistics Sector; the
Administration for Information and Political and Propaganda Activities; the Security
Administration and the VJ Inspectorate.505
497
498
499
500
501
502
503
504
505
See Ex. P865, Dispatch of the Cabinet of the VJ Chief the General Staff, 6 May 1995; Ex. P876, Order of the VJ
General Staff on the Issuance of Materiel, 10 May 1994; Ex. P951, Coded Dispatch from the Cabinet of the
Chief the VJ General Staff, 7 October 1995.
Sini{a Borovi}, T. 13911.
Ibid.
Miodrag Simi}, T. 9939; Ex. D195, First Organisational Chart of the VJ General Staff, 15 June 1993
Mladen Mihajlovi}, T. 3878.
Ibid.
Miodrag Simi}, 9946-9947; Ex. D196, Second Organisational Chart of the VJ General Staff, 22 December 1993.
Miodrag Simi}, T. 9946-9947, 9959; Ex. D196, Second Organisational Chart of the VJ General Staff,
22 December 1993.
Ex. D195, First Organisational Chart of the VJ General Staff, 15 June 1993.
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216.
The Sector for Operational and Staff Affairs was composed of a “1st Administration” which
had the basic functions, inter alia, of “planning the engagement and combat readiness of the VJ”;
“planning the development of the VJ”; ensuring the “State border security” and maintaining a
“system of command and operations duty”.506 Within this administration, there was also an
Operations Centre, which collected and analysed information received from lower units deployed in
the FRY, and from other federal organs within the FRY.507 During the time relevant to the
Indictment, the Chief of the 1st Administration was Miodrag Simi}.508
217.
The Intelligence Administration, or the “2nd Administration”, was within the Sector for
Operational and Staff Affairs.509 It was on 24-hour duty and responsible for intelligence support for
the VJ, gathering information with indicators of possible aggression against the FRY.510 Siniša
Borovi} testified that the Intelligence Administration was headed by General Krga.511
218.
The Security Administration included a counter-intelligence office whose function was the
detection, monitoring, and prevention of all the factors that could threaten the VJ, such as activities
of foreign intelligence agencies, terrorism or crime.512 It was also responsible for verifying the
authenticity and reliability of intelligence that came through its administration.513 During the time
relevant to the Indictment, the Security Administration was headed by Colonel Aleksander
Dimitrijevi}.514
219.
The Logistics Sector of the VJ General Staff supplied the army with equipment and other
military materials.515 It comprised, inter alia, a technical department (“Technical Administration”),
an Operations Centre, and a planning organ.516 It was initially under the command of Borislav
506
507
508
509
510
511
512
513
514
515
516
Miodrag Simi}, T. 9962-9964; Ex. D200, Chief of the VJ General Staff Order on the Competences of
Organisational Units of the VJ General Staff in Peacetime, 25 July 1994; Miodrag Simi}, T. 9972-9973;
Ex. D202, VJ General Staff Work Plan for 1995 by Chief of the VJ General Staff 1st Administration, 22
December 1994.
Miodrag Simi}, T. 9968, 10011. See infra paras 1394-1395.
Miodrag Simi}, T. 9962.
Miodrag Simi}, T. 9946-9947, 9959; Ex. D196, Second Organisational Chart of the VJ General Staff, 22
December 1993.
Ex. D200, Chief of the VJ General Staff Order on the Competences of Organisational Units of the VJ General
Staff in Peacetime, 25 July 1994; Miodrag Simić, T. 10012; Branko Gajić, T. 10791-10792. See infra paras
1396-1399.
Siniša Borovi}, T. 13932.
Branko Gajić, T. 10808.
Branko Gajić, T. 10803; Ex. D89, Rules of Service of Security Organs in the JNA, 1984, para. 29. See infra
paras 1400-1403.
Miodrag Simi}, T. 9948.
Mladen Mihajlovi}, T. 3879-3880.
Ibid.
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\uki}. However, after the transformations which took place in the second half of 1993,
Milovanovi} and [ljivi} were at the head of the Logistics Sector in sequence.517
(a) Collegium
220.
The VJ General Staff had a collegium, which was an advisory body convened from time to
time to consider certain issues.518 The Chief of the VJ General Staff presided over the collegium
which included the heads of the various sectors and independent administrations and occasionally
their closest associates.519
221.
The collegium was convened generally on a weekly basis, but, if the need arose, meetings
were held even more frequently.520 In addition to the regular meetings of the collegium, there were
also the meetings of the so-called expanded collegium of the Chief of the VJ General Staff.521 Such
meetings would be attended by the various army commanders.522 They were held around twice a
year.523
222.
The collegium discussed general issues, dealing, in particular, with the military and political
situation prevailing in the area, work plans and various specific problems.524 At the beginning of
each collegium meeting, the Chief of the VJ General Staff was informed about the tasks issued
during the previous collegium meeting and how they were implemented.525 Individual participants
took the floor in a certain order and were given a certain time to brief the Chief of the VJ General
Staff and present proposals to him.526 The meeting of the collegium ended with the Chief of General
Staff issuing tasks and setting out deadlines for implementing them.527 The tasks were issued orally
and subsequently processed in writing528 and minutes were kept.
517
518
519
520
521
522
523
524
525
526
527
528
Miodrag Simi}, T. 9948.
Mladen Mihajlovi}, T. 3882. As explained by Miodrag Simi}, when Peri{i} became Chief of the VJ General
Staff, the collegium replaced the “Staff of the Supreme Commander”, Miodrag Simi}, T. 9978-9980; Ex. P727,
Order from Office of Chief of General Staff on Organisation and Method of Work of the Chief of the General
Staff and VJ Supreme Command Staff, 15 October 1993.
Mladen Mihajlovi}, T. 3882-3883, stating that in the absence of the Chief of the VJ General Staff, his deputy
attended the collegium meetings. Sini{a Borovi} also testified that the Chef de Cabinet attended the collegium
meetings, having the right to participate in the discussion, Sini{a Borovi}, T. 13930-13931.
Sini{a Borovi}, T. 13930.
Sini{a Borovi}, T. 13930-13931.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Mladen Mihajlovi}, T. 3883. Sini{a Borovi} testified that the independent administrations chiefs would submit
questions to the office of the Chief of General Staff which they wished to be included on the agenda of the
collegium meetings, Sini{a Borovi}, T. 13935.
Sini{a Borovi}, T. 13933.
According to Mladen Mihajlovi}, generally, Peri{i} accepted those proposals, Mladen Mihajlovi}, T. 3883-3884,
3957-3958; Sini{a Borovi}, T. 13931-13932.
Sini{a Borovi}, T. 13932.
Sini{a Borovi}, T. 13933. See Ex. P2891, Record of the Collegium of the VJ General Staff, 29 December 1995;
Ex. P2204, Transcript of the Collegium of the Chief of the VJ General Staff, 18 September 1995.
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6. Ministry of Defence
(a) Structure
223.
With the adoption of the FRY Constitution the MOD replaced the Federal Secretariat for
National Defence.529 In the SFRY, the Federal Secretariat was superior to the General Staff.530 With
the establishment of the FRY, the General Staff became independent of the MOD and the
relationship between the two was based on coordination rather than a superior-subordinate
relationship.531
224.
Several administrations or sectors were subordinated to the MOD.532 Among these organs
was the “Sector for System and Status Issue and Legal Affairs”, “Finance and Budget
Administration” and “Material, Financial, and Market Inspection Sector”.533
225.
The Sector for System and Status Issue and Legal Affairs was responsible for regulating the
status of soldiers in the VJ, housing policy, the education of soldiers, salaries, allowances and other
benefits in the VJ.534
226.
The Finance and Budget Administration was responsible for “monitoring the
implementation of the military budget and in this regard, for proposing all necessary measures to
ensure financial discipline and the regular flow of funds from the federal budget”.535 It reported to
the FRY Defence Minister and had to comply with the laws and regulations of the FRY Ministry of
Finance.536
227.
The Material, Financial, and Market Inspection Sector carried out inspections regarding the
storage, use, and disposition of the assets of the VJ. More specifically, it controlled the financial
operations and checked the contracts involving procurement of material including food.537 This
529
530
531
532
533
534
535
536
537
Stamenko Nikoli}, T. 10409, 10412.
Stamenko Nikoli}, T. 10411; Ex. D239, Diagram Showing the Structure of the MOD, 9 June 1992. See also
Miodrag Simi}, T. 9923, 9938.
Ibid.
Stamenko Nikoli}, T. 10410-10411; Ex. D239, Diagram Showing the Structure of the MOD, 9 June 1992.
Stamenko Nikoli}, T. 10408-10409, 10411, 10416-10417; Ex. D240, Rules on the Responsibilities of the
Organisational Units in the MOD, 21 September 1992.
Ibid.
Stamenko Nikoli}, T. 10420; Ex. D240, Rules on the Responsibilities of the Organisational Units in the MOD,
21 September 1992, Article 4. See also Borivoje Jovanić, T. 11400-11401.
Borivoje Jovanić, T. 11400-11401.
Stamenko Nikoli}, T. 10427, 10432; Ex. D240, Rules on the Responsibilities of the Organisational Units in the
MOD, 21 September 1992, Article 26.
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organ was also obliged to inspect the final calculation of the salaries in the Finance and Budget
Administration at the accounting centre of the MOD.538
228.
The accounting centre in the MOD, directly connected to the Finance and Budget
Administration, was responsible for collecting all relevant data on professional members of the
army, calculating the salaries according to the specific regulations, as well as issuing salaries
through GIRO accounts and settling payments to army suppliers.539
(b) Functions of the MOD
229.
SDC.
Under the FRY Constitution the Minister of Defence was not a formal member of the
540
Nevertheless, he took part in the work of the SDC when matters of exceptional importance
in the domain of his ministry were discussed.541
230.
The MOD was in charge of the implementation of the defence plan enacted by the SDC.542
The Minister of Defence was entitled to adopt all kinds of enactments, orders and decisions related
to the implementation of the defence policy.543 Proposals for such enactments as well as regulations
to be adopted were submitted to the Minister of Defence by the specific organisational sectors.544
231.
The MOD was also obliged to implement decisions and enactments rendered by the
President of FRY, the SDC, and the federal government.545 The MOD was responsible for carrying
out inspections to check whether the enactments and laws relating to the defence of the country
were being implemented in line with the law and the decisions of the SDC.546 If in the course of
such inspection the MOD found out that there had been a breach of law, it would submit its report
to the Minister of Defence as the person in charge of adopting certain measures as provided by the
538
539
540
541
542
543
544
545
546
Stamenko Nikoli}, T. 10428.
Stamenko Nikoli}, T. 10422, 10425-10427, 10763-10764; Ex. D240, Rules on the Responsibilities of the
Organisational Units in the MOD, 21 September 1992, Articles 7, 10. See Ex. P756, Minutes from the 25th
Session of the SDC held on 30 August 1994; Ex. P749, Minutes from the 36th Session of the SDC held on 12
May 1995; Stamenko Nikoli}, T. 10766-10768 (private session). See also Ex. D504, Witness Statement of Dane
Ajdukovi}, 26 November 2009 and 11 September 2010, para. 22.
Stamenko Nikoli}, T. 10441.
Stamenko Nikoli}, T. 10441. Witness Dane Ajdukovi}, in his position as Chief of the Finance and Budget
Administration of the MOD, for instance, attended meetings of the SDC on financial matters, roughly every two
months, Ex. D504, Witness Statement of Dane Ajdukovi}, 26 November 2009 and 11 September 2010, para. 27.
Ex. P1183, Decree on the Proclamation of the Law on Defence, 27 May 1994, Article 43.
Stamenko Nikoli}, T. 10436; Miodrag Star~evi}, T. 5433-5444.
Stamenko Nikoli}, T. 10436; Ex. P1183, Decree on the Proclamation of the Law on Defence, 27 May 1994,
Article 43.
Stamenko Nikoli}, T. 10437; Ex. P1183, Decree on the Proclamation of the Law on Defence, 27 May 1994,
Article 44.
Stamenko Nikoli}, T. 10438-10439; Ex P1183, Decree on the Proclamation of the Law on Defence, 27 May
1994, Article 44.
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law.547 The Minister of Defence was responsible to the Prime Minister who in turn answered to the
Assembly.548
(c) The Role of the MOD in the Military Budget
232.
The MOD was also responsible for executing the military budget, which included funds for
both the MOD and the VJ.549 The military budget was a part of the federal budget prepared by the
Federal Assembly.550
233.
The MOD was responsible for proposing and submitting a national defence budget to the
FRY Assembly.551 This included a recommendation on the yearly budget for the VJ.552 In preparing
the national defence budget, the Minister of Defence received budget proposals from the Chief of
the VJ General Staff and the offices of the MOD.553 The Minister of Defence reviewed the budget
proposals and, in particular with regard to the VJ budget plan, the MOD would discuss with the VJ
General Staff whether the amount sought was realistic and thus would likely be approved by the
FRY Assembly.554
234.
Generally, the needs of the army constituted around 85-90% of this budget, whereas the rest
covered the needs of the MOD.555 After the Minister of Defence’s endorsement of the proposed
budget, it was then submitted to the federal government, which then established the final budget
proposal to submit to the Federal Assembly for final approval.556 The annual budget of the MOD
547
548
549
550
551
552
553
554
555
556
Stamenko Nikoli}, T. 10438-10440.
Stamenko Nikoli}, T. 10440-10441.
Borivoje Jovanić, T. 11393-11395. The federal budget was the only source of funding for the VJ, Borivoje
Jovanić, T. 11454-11456. See also Ex. D504, Witness Statement of Dane Ajdukovi}, 26 November 2009 and 11
September 2010, para. 17, stating that the Law on the VJ and the Law on Defence separated the organisational
structures of the VJ and the MOD, imposing a separation between command and administrative functions
resulting in the MOD retaining control over the planning and financing of the VJ.
Stamenko Nikoli}, T. 10422, 10618-10619, 10624. See also Ex. P197, Law on the VJ, 18 May 1994,
Article 337.
Stamenko Nikolić, T. 10432.
Stamenko Nikolić, T. 10433.
When proposing a military budget, the VJ General Staff, at the request of the Finance and Budget
Administration, would submit its requirements with regard to assets that had to be included in the
budget, Stamenko Nikoli}, T. 10433, 10619. See also Ex. D504, Witness Statement of Dane Ajdukovi}, 26
November 2009 and 11 September 2010, p. 4, para. 20, stating that before drawing up the plan, which was to be
submitted to the Federal Assembly, the General Staff would send the draft plan to the relevant administrations of
the MOD which, together with the General Staff, would harmonise the proposals in order to reach an agreement
on the finalisation of the plan based on the needs and priorities of the VJ, and would then send it to the Federal
Government, which in turn would submit the agreed proposal to the Federal Assembly for adoption. The
coordinator of all these discussions was the Finance and Budget Administration.
Stamenko Nikoli}, T. 10623-10625.
Stamenko Nikoli}, T. 10623-10624, 10763.
Stamenko Nikoli}, T. 10433, 10621-10622, 10625-10626.
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approved by the Federal Assembly, detailed the amounts which were to be allocated to the VJ and
the MOD.557
C. Units of the VJ
235.
The FRY Constitution provided that the FRY should have an army, composed of Yugoslav
citizens and which should “defend [FRY] sovereignty, territory, independence and constitutional
order”.558
236.
On 20 May 1992, the FRY Presidency adopted a decision on renaming the JNA as the Army
of Yugoslavia (“VJ”).559 The Law on the VJ came into force in October 1993;560 Article 346
provides that JNA members became VJ members as of the date the law came into force.561
237.
Article 135 of the FRY Constitution provides that in peacetime and wartime the VJ was
under the command of the FRY President, in accordance with decisions of the SDC.562 Under the
Constitution, the SDC could reach command decisions to be implemented by the FRY President.563
238.
The VJ was divided into the following services: the Land Forces, the Air Forces and Anti-
aircraft Defence and the Navy. These were in turn divided into “combat arms and supporting arms”
and those, in turn, were divided into sections and specialist services.564
239.
Within the VJ, special military formations were also established, such as the Special Units
Corps (“KSJ”).565 The KSJ was directly subordinated to the Chief of the VJ General Staff.566 The
KSJ consisted of the Guards Motorised Brigade (“Guards Brigade”),567 72nd Special Brigade, 63rd
Parachute Brigade, 1st Armoured Brigade and Headquarters Support Units.568
557
558
559
560
561
562
563
564
565
566
567
568
Stamenko Nikoli}, T. 10626.
Ex. P1186, Constitution of the FRY (Excerpt), 27 April 1992, Doc ID 0471-5722, p. 27.
Ex. P375, Expert Report of Patrick Treanor, para. 81; Patrick Treanor, T. 1157. See also Miodrag Starčević,
T. 6863; Ex. P199, Minutes of the 197th Session of SFRY Presidency, 4 May 1992, pp 4-5.
Miodrag Star~evi} T. 5436-5437.
Ex. P197, Law on the VJ, 18 May 1994, Article 346; Miodrag Starčević, T. 6893-6894.
Ex. P1186, Constitution of the FRY (Excerpt), 27 April 1992, Doc ID 0471-5722, p. 27; Miodrag Starčević,
T. 6908. See also P197, Law on the VJ, 18 May 1994, Article 4.
Ex. P197, Law on the VJ, 18 May 1994, Article 4; Miodrag Starčević, T. 6913.
Ex. P197, Law on the VJ, 18 May 1994, Article 2.
Borivoje Te{i}, T. 1994.
Borivoje Te{i}, T. 1896-1897; Ex. P351, Organisational Chart of the Special Units Corps in December 1993, 19
November 2008; Borivoje Te{i}, T. 1993; Miodrag Simi}, T. 10145-10146: MP-11, T. 8928, testifying that the
Chief of the General Staff in order to use such unit had to have an approval of the “[MOD] directly from the
President himself”, see MP-11, T. 8928; Borivoje Te{i}, T. 1992-1993.
Prior to the transformation of the JNA into the VJ, the Guards Brigade was an independent unit under the MOD,
see Borivoje Te{i}, T. 1888.
Miodrag Simi}, T. 10145-10146; Ex. P351, Organisational Chart of the Special Units Corps in December 1993,
19 November 2008.
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1. The Guards Brigade
240.
The Guards Brigade consisted of six battalions (1st Guards Motorised Battalion, 2nd Guards
Motorised Battalion, 25 Military Police Battalion, Anti-Aircraft Defence Light Self-Propelled
Artillery Rocket Battalion, Anti-Aircraft Howitzer Battalion 122mm and Logistic Battalion), two
companies (Communications Company and Engineering Company) and three platoons (Atomic
Biological Chemical Defence Platoon, Military Police Special Purposes Platoon and Special
Transportation Platoon).569 The duties of the Guards Brigade were primarily related to security
rather than to combat activities.570 During peacetime, the Guards Brigade had three main duties –
training, securing combat readiness and “protocol duties”, which involved providing security to
installations or residencies; whereas in war time, its main duty was to provide security to the
Supreme Command.571
241.
In 1993, the Guards Brigade numbered about 1600 members.572 Based on the selection
criteria for its officers, it was considered an elite unit.573 Witness Borivoje Teši} testified that in
December 1993, he was an operations officer within the staff of the Guards Brigade, and also that,
at one point, Major Paunovi} was an operations officer in the Guards Brigade.574
2. The 72nd Special Brigade
242.
The 72nd Brigade was an elite military unit made up of “contract soldiers” to conduct special
operations.575 The 72nd Brigade was composed of three battalions: a military police battalion for
special operations which was headquartered on Mount Avala, about 30 kilometres from Belgrade, a
sabotage battalion located in Pan~evo as well as an assault battalion based in Vukovine.576 Each
battalion had two professional companies consisting of professional soldiers, and one company of
regular conscripts maintaining the compound.577 Some training of the military police battalion took
569
570
571
572
573
574
575
576
577
Borivoje Te{i}, T. 1995-1996, 2030; Ex. P352, Organisational Chart of the Guards Motorised Brigade in
December 1993, 19 November 2008.
Borivoje Te{i}, T. 1994.
Borivoje Te{i}, T. 1993-1994.
Borivoje Te{i}, T. 1995.
Borivoje Te{i}, T. 1995-1996, 2030.
Borivoje Te{i}, T. 1902, 1904.
MP-11, T. 8927, 8929, 8934-8935, 8972. According to Te{i}, two categories of soldiers existed in the VJ:
regular soldiers and contract soldiers. The contract soldiers were persons who, upon finishing their military
service, signed a contract for a certain period of time. They would receive a regular monthly salary, Borivoje
Te{i}, T. 1997.
MP-11, T. 8931, 8973, 8995-8996. The military police battalion was under the command of Aleksandar
Živkovi}. The battalion was made up of three companies – each from 30-50 up to 120 soldiers; one commanded
by Captain Vojnovi} and one by Lieutenant Alimpi}, MP-11, T. 8975. See MP-11, T. 8987; Zlatko Danilovi},
T. 11027-11028.
Zlatko Danilovi}, T. 11028.
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place at Bubanj Potok, about 15 kilometres from Avala, as well as parachute training at Ni{.578
Teši} testified that, at one point, Miodrag Pani} was commander of the 72nd Brigade.579
D. Military Judicial System in the FRY
1. Structure and jurisdiction
(a) Military courts
243.
The dissolution of the SFRY and the establishment of the FRY brought about a
reorganisation of the military judicial system.580 The FRY had independent judicial organs with
offices in Belgrade, Tivat and in Ni{.581 According to witness Radomir Gojović, those organs did
not have any functional relationship with the military judiciary in RS and the RSK.582
244.
The military courts had jurisdiction over military personnel for all criminal offences and
over civilians or other non-military personnel for specific criminal offences listed in the Law on
Military Courts.583
245.
The military courts applied the SFRY Criminal Code which remained in force in the FRY as
well as the “Regulations on the Application of International Laws of War in the Armed Forces of
the SFRY (“Regulations”). The latter included, inter alia, a provision on command responsibility
with respect to war crimes584 and regulated committing, organising, inciting or assisting in the
commission of a crime according to international humanitarian law.585 The Trial Chamber also
notes that a breach of the Regulations in some less serious cases was characterised as a violation of
military discipline under the Law on the VJ.586
578
579
580
581
582
583
584
585
586
Zlatko Danilovi}, T. 11031.
Borivoje Teši}. T. 1902.
Radomir Gojović, T. 12897-12898; Ex. P1187, Decree on Promulgation of the Law on Military Courts, 27
February 1995, Article 2.
Radomir Gojović, T. 12897-12898; Ex. P1187, Decree on Promulgation of the Law on Military Courts, 27
February 1995, Article 8.
Radomir Gojović, T. 12897-12898, 12931, Ex. P1187, Decree on Promulgation of the Law on Military Courts,
27 February 1995, Article 2.
Radomir Gojović, T. 12895, 12899; Ex. P1187, Decree on Promulgation of the Law on Military Courts, 27
February 1995, Article 9.
The Regulations stated that: “An officer shall be personally liable for violations of the laws of war if he knew or
could have known that units subordinate to him or other units or individuals were planning the commission of
such violations, and, at a time when it was still possible to prevent their commission, failed to take measures to
prevent such violations. That officer shall also be held personally liable who, aware that violations of the laws of
war have been committed, fails to institute disciplinary or criminal proceedings against the offender or if the
instituting does not fall within his jurisdiction, fails to report the violation to his superior officer”, Ex. P2304,
Regulations on the Application of International Laws of War in the Armed Forces of the SFRY, Article 21.
Radomir Gojović, T. 12964-12965; Miodrag Star~evi}, T. 5530-5531, referring to Articles 20 and 21 of the
Regulations.
Miodrag Star~evi}, T. 5528-5533.
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246.
Military judges were appointed by decree of the FRY President, upon proposal of the
Minister of Defence.587
(b) Military disciplinary courts
247.
All disciplinary violations were dealt with by military disciplinary courts.588 A violation of
military discipline consisted of behaviour that was contrary to the obligation of performance of
military duty stipulated by the law, the rules of service, and other regulations, orders and other
documents of superior officers concerning service.589
248.
The Law on the VJ defined disciplinary infractions and offences and the procedures
applicable in addressing these disciplinary breaches. The Law on the VJ regulated, inter alia, the
composition of the military disciplinary courts, as well as the authority and procedure for superior
officers to deal with disciplinary offences.590
249.
More specifically, the military disciplinary courts had jurisdictions over two types of
breaches of military discipline: disciplinary infractions, which were minor violations of military
discipline, and disciplinary offences which were serious violations of the law governing military
discipline.591 Radomir Gojović further explained that one act might constitute both a disciplinary
violation and a crime.592 In this case, parallel proceedings – disciplinary and criminal – could be
undertaken and the military authority could pass a sentence for disciplinary offences independently
of the criminal proceeding.593
250.
In the case of a disciplinary infraction, the sanction that could be imposed included military
detention for up to 20 days, loss of rank and decrease of pay between 5% and 10% for up to two
months.594 As regards disciplinary offences, the measures that could be imposed included
suspension of promotion, decrease in pay between 10% and 20% for a period between one and 12
months, a prison term for up to 20 days, dismissal from duty for a military commander with a ban
587
588
589
590
591
592
593
594
Radomir Gojović, T. 12897-12899; Ex. P1187, Decree on Promulgation of the Law on Military Courts, 27
February 1995, Article 26.
Miodrag Star~evi}, T. 5540.
Ex. P197, Law on the VJ, 18 May 1994, Article 160.
Ex. P197, Law on the VJ, 18 May 1994, Articles 159-206.
Radomir Gojović, T. 12925-12926; Ex. P197, Law on the VJ, 18 May 1994, Article 159.
Radomir Gojović, T. 12926. See e.g. Ex. P2417, Judgement of the Military Disciplinary Court Relating to Zoran
Anti}, 23 September 1995, p. 6; Ex. P2420, Judgement of the Military Disciplinary Court Relating to Nedeljko
Vuji}, 20 September 1995, p. 7.
Radomir Gojović, T. 12926, testifying that this would, however, be an exception, which was to be invoked only
if specific military interests existed.
Ex. P197, Law on the VJ, 18 May 1994, Article 163.
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on reinstatement to this duty between one and three years, loss of the right to serve as a professional
soldier, and loss of rank.595
251.
In the case of a disciplinary infraction, the statute of limitations was three months from the
day it was committed.596 With regard to a disciplinary offence, the statute of limitations was six
months from the day a superior learned of its commission.597 In the case of a disciplinary offence
that also constituted a criminal act, the statute of limitations in the Criminal Code for the criminal
act was applied. The Criminal Code provided for the inapplicability of the statute of limitations
where the underlying disciplinary offence was a violation of international humanitarian law.598
252.
The military disciplinary courts existed at two levels: military disciplinary courts of first
instance and higher military disciplinary court.599 Military disciplinary courts of first instance were
established at the level of the General Staff and Commands of the Army, Air Force and AntiAircraft Defence, and the Navy.600 The higher military disciplinary court, charged with appeals, was
established at the General Staff.601
253.
The Chief of the VJ General Staff appointed the military disciplinary presidents, judges,
prosecutors and their deputies, as well as the registrars of the military disciplinary courts for terms
of two years.602
2. The procedure for criminal and disciplinary violations
254.
In relation to war crimes, a VJ officer who learned of a violation of the laws of war, should
“order that the circumstances and facts surrounding the violation be investigated and the necessary
evidence collected”.603 The VJ officer should also forward such information to the Military
Prosecutor.604 Any senior or commanding officer had to prevent further violations and was also
under an obligation “to take measures to make sure that the perpetrator of a crime […] should be
taken into custody to prevent him from absconding”.605
595
596
597
598
599
600
601
602
603
604
605
Ex. P197, Law on the VJ, 18 May 1994, Article 164.
Ex. P197, Law on the VJ, 18 May 1994, Article 166.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ex. P197, Law on the VJ, 18 May 1994, Article 177.
Miodrag Star~evi}, T. 5553-5554; Ex. P197, Law on the VJ, 18 May 1994, Articles 177-178.
Ex. P197, Law on the VJ, 18 May 1994, Articles 177-178, 183.
Ex. P197, Law on the VJ, 18 May 1994, Article 179.
Radomir Gojović, T. 12966; Ex. P2304, Regulations on the Application of International Laws of War in the
Armed Forces of the SFRY, Article 36.
Miodrag Star~evi}, T. 5531-5532, 5552-5553, 6796; Ex. P2304, Regulations on the Application of International
Laws of War in the Armed Forces of the SFRY, Article 36.
Radomir Gojović, T. 12916; Miodrag Star~evi}, T. 5531-5532; Ex. P2304, Regulations on the Application of
International Laws of War in the Armed Forces of the SFRY, Article 36.
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255.
Once the Military Prosecutor received information as to the commission of a crime, he or
she would then assess if there were grounds to initiate further proceedings and to move the case
before the investigative judge.606 The Military Prosecutor could request an investigation through
certain state organs including military police and security organs.607
256.
The Chief of the VJ General Staff could set up a commission with the task of preparing a
report on the circumstances surrounding a violation of the laws of war.608 The Chief of the VJ
General Staff could also vest the commission with specific tasks such as establishing individual
responsibility for the violations, proposing initiatives for the prevention of future similar violations,
and taking disciplinary measures against those responsible of the violations.609 However, the
official investigation rested within the purview of the Military Courts.610
257.
Proceedings against a perpetrator of a disciplinary offence could be brought before a
military disciplinary court by a senior officer holding the position of, at least, regiment
commander.611 In the FRY MOD, that was either the Federal Minister of Defence and commanding
officers of the units directly subordinated to him; whereas in the VJ, it was at least an Army
commander, naturally also including the Chief of the VJ General Staff.612
258.
In this regard, witness Miodrag Star~evi} testified that Peri{i} was responsible for initiating
investigations of General Staff officers directly subordinated to him without there being an
intermediary superior.613 Likewise, if Peri{i}’s subordinates failed to initiate a disciplinary
investigation for a known violation, he could initiate such an investigation.614
259.
Depending on the outcome of the investigation, the officer who initiated the proceedings
would stay the proceedings, pronounce a disciplinary sentence or forward the case to the competent
officer who would file charges against the violator before the military disciplinary court.615
3. Jurisdiction over crimes committed abroad
260.
The Trial Chamber heard evidence that the Law on the VJ was binding upon the members of
the Personnel Centres (“PCs”).616 Furthermore, Defence witness Radomir Gojović testified that a
606
607
608
609
610
611
612
613
614
615
Miodrag Star~evi}, T. 5546.
Radomir Gojović, T. 12895, 12899; Ex. P1187, Decree on Promulgation of the Law on Military Courts, 27
February 1995; Ex. P1188, Decree on Promulgation of the Law on the Military Prosecutor, 27 February 1995.
Radomir Gojović, T. 12966-12969, 12986-12987.
Radomir Gojović, T. 12969-12970.
Radomir Gojović, T. 12966, 12968-12969.
Ex. P197, Law on the VJ, 18 May 1994, Article 180.
Ex. P197, Law on the VJ, 18 May 1994, Article 181; Radomir Gojović, T. 12930, 12959-12961.
Miodrag Star~evi}, T. 5545.
Ibid.
Miodrag Star~evi}, T. 5545-5546, 5554; Ex. P197, Law on the VJ, 18 May 1994, Article 180.
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VJ superior officer was required to carry out necessary inquiries and take the necessary measures in
case of war crimes being committed by a VJ unit deployed outside the FRY territory.617 Once the
offender was in the custody of the FRY organs, the superior officer also had a duty to report to the
Military Prosecutor, who was in charge of the criminal proceedings.618
261.
Peri{i}’s ability to initiate disciplinary investigations against some VJ members serving in
the VRS or the SVK through the 30th and the 40th PCs will be discussed in detail in a different part
of the Judgement.619
E. Structure and Organisation of the Army of Republika Srpska (“VRS”)
1. Establishment of the VRS
262.
The VRS was formally established on 12 May 1992 at the 16th Session of the Assembly of
the Serb People of BiH620 and was abolished on 31 December 2001.621 On 12 May 1992, the
Constitution was also amended to vest the President of the Republic with the power to lead the
VRS, in peace as well as in war time.622
263.
The VRS was created by combining what remained of the JNA after its withdrawal from the
BiH623 with the various “Territorial [Defence] (TO), municipal and paramilitary units that were then
fighting in Bosnia”.624 General Kadijević, a Chief of Staff in the JNA in 1992, commented on the
role of the JNA in the creation of the VRS: “The JNA commands and units constituted the
backbone of the [VRS], with its entire arsenal of weapons and military equipment”.625
616
617
618
619
620
621
622
623
624
625
See e.g. MP-5, T. 2423. See also infra paras 772, 774.
Radomir Gojović, T. 12982-12983. See also Radomir Gojovi}. T. 12931; Dušan Kovačević, T. 12729.
Radomir Gojović, T. 12983.
See infra paras 1674-1700.
Ex. P189, Amendments to the Constitution of the SerBiH, 12 May 1992, pp 1-3 (particularly Amendment II,
amending Article 110); Ex. P190, Decision on Formation of the Army of SerBiH, 12 May 1992; Patrick Treanor,
T. 1099; Ex. P375, Expert Report of Patrick Treanor Entitled: Belgrade Leadership and Serbs in Croatia and
Bosnia, 1 September 2008, para. 73; Petar [krbi}, T. 11633; Stojan Mal~i}, T. 11188; Defence Agreed Facts, 97;
Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts I, 44.
Petar Škrbić, T. 11693.
Ex. P189, Amendments to the Constitution of the SerBiH, 12 May 1992, p. 2 (Amendment III, amending
Article 111); Patrick Treanor, T. 1120, 1325.
Pursuant to an order of the SFRY Presidency of 4 May 1992 the JNA was to withdraw from the territory of BiH
and cross into the SFRY within 15 days, Stamenko Nikoli}, T. 10458; Ex. P75, \or|e \uki}, Statement of 4/29
February 1996, p. 3; MP-5, T. 2366-2367, 2435, 2493-2494, 2498; Stamenko Nikoli}, T. 10458. See also Stojan
Mal~i}, T. 11213-11214; Ex. D292, List of VRS Officers, 25 June 1992; Ex. P2249, Expert Report of Richard
Butler “VRS Main Staff Command Responsibility”, 9 June 2006, para. 1.12.
Ex. P2249, Butler Report VRS Main Staff Command Responsibility Report, 9 June 2006, para. 1.0; Ex. P2244,
Butler Report VRS Corps Command Responsibility Report, 5 April 2000, para. 1.0. See also Ex. P2249, Expert
Report of Richard Butler “VRS Main Staff Command Responsibility”, 9 June 2006, paras 1.5-1.9; Richard
Butler, T. 6680, 6684.
Ex. P343, Excerpt of the Book “My View on the Break-Up” of General Kadijevi}, 1993, Doc ID 0035-9426,
p. 1.
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264.
Right after its establishment, the VRS did not have specific uniforms, but from June 1992 a
decision was made whereby the insignia of a tri-colour flag were to be worn on the sleeves and the
hats.626
2. Hierarchy in the VRS
265.
On 1 June 1992, the Presidency of RS adopted the Law on the VRS.627 The Law provided
that the VRS operated under the principle of unity or singleness of command628 and defined its
objective as defending the “sovereignty, territory, independence and constitutional order” of RS.629
It also stipulated that the President of RS was Commander-in-Chief of the Army and held the
authority to, inter alia, establish a system of VRS command and to appoint, promote or discharge
military officers within the VRS.630 In addition, the Law on the VRS stipulated that the Commander
of the Main Staff would command the Army in compliance with the authority delegated to him by
the President.631 Based on the principle of unity of command, the Commander of the VRS Main
Staff was directly subordinated to the Commander-in-Chief.632
266.
During the period relevant to the Indictment, Radovan Karad`i} was the Commander-in-
Chief of the VRS633 and Ratko Mladi} was the Commander of the Main Staff.634
(i) RS Supreme Command
267.
While the President of RS was the Commander-in-Chief of the VRS,635 the broader issues
related to strategic aims of war were however dealt with by the Supreme Command.636 The body
626
627
628
629
630
631
632
633
634
Stojan Mal~i}, T. 11210.
Ex. P191, Law on the VRS, 1 June 1992; MP-5, T. 2482; Patrick Treanor, T. 1122; Ex. P375, Expert Report of
Patrick Treanor Entitled: Belgrade Leadership and Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia, 1 September 2008, para. 75.
Ex. P191, Law on the VRS, 1 June 1992, Articles 1, 173. See also Richard Butler, T. 6701-6702; Ex. P2248,
Expert Report of Richard Butler “VRS Brigade Command Responsibility”, 31 October 2002, p. 7.
Ex. P191, Law on the VRS, 1 June 1992, Articles 1, 173; MP-5, T. 2483; Ex. P375, Expert Report of Patrick
Treanor Entitled: Belgrade Leadership and Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia, 1 September 2008, para. 75; Stojan
Mal~i}, T. 11221-11222. See also Miodrag Star~evi}, T. 6887.
Ex. P191, Law on the VRS, 1 June 1992, Article 174; Ex. P375, Expert Report of Patrick Treanor Entitled:
Belgrade Leadership and Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia, 1 September 2008, para. 75. See also Robert Donia,
T. 1773; MP-5, T. 2436; Defence Agreed Facts, 2. The Trial Chamber notes that “commander-in-chief” and
“supreme commander” are used interchangeably in the exhibits, reports and testimonies. The Trial Chamber
decided to adopt the expression “Commander-in-Chief”.
Ex. P191, Law on the VRS, 1 June 1992, Articles 174-175; Ex. P375, Expert Report of Patrick Treanor Entitled:
Belgrade Leadership and Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia, 1 September 2008, para. 75.
Richard Butler, T. 6698-6699; Defence Adjudicated Facts II, 73.
Ex. P2249, Expert Report of Richard Butler “VRS Main Staff Command Responsibility”, 9 June 2006, para. 2.1;
Stamenko Nikoli}, T. 10549. Karad`i} was succeeded by Biljana Plavši} in November-December 1996, Petar
[krbi}, T. 11799, 11809.
Ex. P190, Decision on Formation of the Army of SerBiH, 12 May 1992; Aernout van Lynden, T. 526, 555-556;
Ex. P375, Expert Report of Patrick Treanor Entitled: Belgrade Leadership and Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia, 1
September 2008, para. 73; Patrick Treanor, T. 1110, 1121, 1324-1325; Robert Donia, T. 1688-1689; MP-433,
T. 2191; MP-5, T. 2436-2437; Ex. P75, \or|e \uki}, Statement of 4/29 February 1996, p. 1; Stamenko Nikoli},
T. 10549; Defence Adjudicated Facts, 3; Aernout van Lynden, T. 526, 555-556. As of the end of April 1992,
Ratko Mladi} was the Chief of Staff of the 2nd JNA Military District, Patrick Treanor, T. 1121.
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was created in November 1992 and consisted of the President of the RS, the Vice President, the
Speaker of the Assembly, the Minister of Defence and the Minister of the Interior.637
268.
Although the Minister of Defence was a member of the Supreme Command, he was not in
the VRS chain of command.638 The role of the MOD was to manage the “activities that were
necessary to ensure the viability of the Army as an effective institution” and the administration of
the Military Court System.639
(ii) Main Staff
269.
The Main Staff was the highest military organ in the VRS and operated under the direction
of the RS Supreme Command.640
270.
The Main Staff made operational, logistical, security and administrative decisions for the
VRS, as well as decisions aimed at harmonising military activities “with the ongoing political and
diplomatic efforts undertaken by [other] branches of the RS government”.641
a. Organisation
271.
According to Butler’s expert report, the nucleus of the Main Staff of the VRS originated
from the components and personnel of the former JNA 2nd Military District.642 It was “modelled to
closely parallel the staff organisation of the former JNA corps”.643
635
636
637
638
639
640
641
642
Ex. P191, Law on the VRS, 1 June 1992, Article 174; Ex. P375, Expert Report of Patrick Treanor Entitled:
Belgrade Leadership and Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia, 1 September 2008, para. 75; Ex. P2249, Expert Report of
Richard Butler “VRS Main Staff Command Responsibility”, 9 June 2006, para. 2.1; Defence Adjudicated Facts
I, 1, 89; Richard Butler, T. 6698. See also Robert Donia, T. 1773; MP-5, T. 2436.
Ex. P375, Expert Report of Patrick Treanor Entitled: Belgrade Leadership and Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia,
1 September 2008, para. 2.1.
Ex. P2249, Expert Report of Richard Butler “VRS Main Staff Command Responsibility”, 9 June 2006, para. 2.1;
Petar [krbi}, T. 11737; Dušan Kovačević, T. 12588; Ex. D408, Decision on the Establishment of the Supreme
Command of the VRS, 30 November 1992.
Ex. P2249, Expert Report of Richard Butler “VRS Main Staff Command Responsibility”, 9 June 2006, para. 2.2.
The MOD would manage activities such as the administration and mobilisation of reserve soldiers, their pay and
benefits under the law, the mobilisation of state-owned assets and resources to support the VRS requirements
and management budgetary issues, Ex. P2249, Expert Report of Richard Butler “VRS Main Staff Command
Responsibility”, 9 June 2006, para. 2.2. See also Defence Agreed Facts, 95.
Ex. P2249, Expert Report of Richard Butler “VRS Main Staff Command Responsibility”, 9 June 2006, para. 2.0;
Richard Butler, T. 6688. See also Ex. D395, Transcript of Interview with \or|e \uki}, 29 February 1996, p. 2.
It ceased to operate on 25 December 1996, Petar [krbi}, T. 11697. The Main Staff went under the code number
3500 in peace time and 7501 in war time, Ex. P291, Order on the Organisation, Establishment and Command of
the VRS, 16 June 1992, p. 1; Stojan Mal~i}, T. 11199-11200, 11276.
Ex. P2249, Expert Report of Richard Butler “VRS Main Staff Command Responsibility”, 9 June 2006, para. 2.3.
See also Ex. D395, Transcript of Interview with \or|e \uki}, 29 February 1996, p. 2.
Ex. P2249, Expert Report of Richard Butler “VRS Main Staff Command Responsibility”, 9 June 2006, para. 2.4.
See also Ex. P78, \or|e \uki}, Supplementary Statement on Planning Offensives on the Territory of the RBiH,
4/29 February 1996, p. 1; Ex. P2244, Expert Report of Richard Butler “VRS Corps Command Responsibility”,
5 April 2000, para. 1.1.
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272.
The VRS Main Staff leadership was comprised of the Commander of the Main Staff, the
Chief of Staff of the Main Staff, the Assistant Commander for Morale, Religious and Legal Affairs,
the Assistant Commander for Logistics and the Assistant Commander for Intelligence and Security.
The Chief of Staff of the Main Staff managed the work of the Main Staff and ensured that it was
coordinated with the work of the other sectors.644
273.
At the time relevant to the Indictment, Ratko Mladi}’s645 subordinates were: Manojlo
Milovanovi} as the Chief of Staff and Deputy Commander, when necessary;646 Milan Gvero as
Assistant Commander for Morale, Legal and Religious Affairs who also served as the principal
representative of the Main Staff to the Assembly of Serbian People in BiH, once General Mladić
had withdrawn from attending the sessions in 1993;647 \or|e \uki} as Assistant Commander for
Logistics648 and Zdravko Tolimir as Assistant Commander for Intelligence and Security.649 In
addition, Ljubi{a Beara was the head of Security within the Intelligence and Security sector;650
Mi}o Grubor was Chief of Mobilisation Organisation;651 and Radivoje Miletić was Chief of
Administration for Operations and Staff Affairs in the Operations Sector652 and later Chief of
Operations and Training of the VRS Main Staff in March 1995.653
274.
The Main Staff was initially located in the former JNA premises in Crna Rijeka. In
December 1992, however, when the personnel level increased, a rear command post of the Main
Staff was created in the Hotel Gora in Han Pijesak.654 In July 1995, the Main Staff’s headquarters
were in Han Pijesak and the forward command post (“IKM”) was in Bijeljina. As of 11 July 1995,
643
644
645
646
647
648
649
650
651
652
653
654
Ex. P2249, Expert Report of Richard Butler “VRS Main Staff Command Responsibility”, 9 June 2006, para. 2.5.
Ex. P2249, Expert Report of Richard Butler “VRS Main Staff Command Responsibility”, 9 June 2006, paras 2.0,
2.6.
Ex. P2249, Expert Report of Richard Butler “VRS Main Staff Command Responsibility”, 9 June 2006, para. 2.0.
See also Ex. D395, Transcript of Interview with \or|e \uki}, 29 February 1996, p. 2; Ex. P190, Decision on
Formation of the Army of SerBiH, 12 May 1992; Aernout van Lynden, T. 526, 555-556; Ex. P375, Expert
Report of Patrick Treanor Entitled: Belgrade Leadership and Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia, 1 September 2008,
para. 73; Patrick Treanor, T. 1110, 1324-1325; Robert Donia, T. 1688-1689; MP-433, T. 2191; MP-5, T. 24362437.
Ex. D395, Transcript of Interview with \or|e \uki}, 29 February 1996, p. 2; Ex. P2249, Expert Report of
Richard Butler “VRS Main Staff Command Responsibility”, 9 June 2006, para. 2.6.
Robert Donia, T. 1688; Ex. D395, Transcript of Interview with \or|e \uki}, 29 February 1996, p. 2; Ex. P2249,
Expert Report of Richard Butler “VRS Main Staff Command Responsibility”, 9 June 2006, para. 2.6.
Ex. D395, Transcript of Interview with Dor|e \uki}, 29 February 1996, p. 2; Petar [krbi}, T. 11758.
Ex. D395, Transcript of Interview with Dor|e \uki}, 29 February 1996, p. 2; Ex. P2249, Expert Report of
Richard Butler “VRS Main Staff Command Responsibility”, 9 June 2006, para. 4.4.
Srebrenica Adjudicated Facts, 84, 104. See also Ex. P1953, Excerpt from Personnel File of Ljubi{a Beara.
Ex. D395, Transcript of Interview with \or|e \uki}, 29 February 1996, p. 2; Ex. P2249, Expert Report of
Richard Butler “VRS Main Staff Command Responsibility”, 9 June 2006, para. 2.6.
Petar Škrbić, T. 11766.
Ex. P2249, Expert Report of Richard Butler “VRS Main Staff Command Responsibility”, 9 June 2006,
para. 3.10.
Stojan Mal~i}, T. 11192-11193. See also Defence Agreed Facts, 3.
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the IKM of the Main Staff was co-located with the IKM of the Drina Corps in the Bratunac Brigade
command post.655
b. Decision Making Process
275.
As a rule the meetings of the VRS Main Staff were chaired by the VRS Main Staff
Commander.656 Decisions were taken by Mladi} and at times by Milovanovi}, Tolimir and Mileti}.
Accordingly, they were always made on the basis of General Mladi}’s ideas.657
276.
According to the VRS Main Staff “Analysis of the combat readiness and activities of the
[VRS] in 1992”, decisions on the engagement of the VRS were taken at meetings of the Main Staff,
with the active participation of the Chief of Staff, the Assistant Commanders, the heads of
departments and the heads of combat arms, as well as a number of commanding officers.658 The
VRS Main Staff issued directives for the use of the armed forces, which would also allow “the
creative potentials of the commanders and their bodies in the subordinate commands to come to full
expression”.659 The evidence however shows that in fact Mladi} ran the VRS on a “centralised
orders-based system”.660 According to Rupert Smith, Mladi} issued very detailed orders which gave
very little latitude at the operational level.661 Another witness stated that in relation to specific
operations to be carried out by individual corps most of the time Mladi} would issue orders directly
during a visit to the relevant Corps.662 On such occasions, Mladi} often participated in and
monitored the works of the commands, and frequently took direct command over the operations.663
3. VRS Units
277.
The VRS consisted of five combat Corps formations, each of which consisted of about
25.000 to 50.000 soldiers. Each corps had five to seven brigades, which consisted of 3.000 to 5.000
655
656
657
658
659
660
661
662
663
Defence Agreed Facts, 3; Milenko Jevñevi}, T. 11067.
Ex. P149, Analysis of the Combat Readiness and Activities of the VRS in 1992, April 1993, p. 8.
Ex. D398, Transcript of Interview with \or|e \uki}, 29 February1996, p. 3.
Ex. P149, Analysis of the Combat Readiness and Activities of the VRS in 1992, April 1993, p. 8.
Ex. P149, Analysis of the Combat Readiness and Activities of the VRS in 1992, April 1993, p. 8. See also
Ex. P78, \or|e \uki} Supplementary Statement on Planning Offensives on the Territory of the RBiH, pp 1-2.
Ex. P2357, Transcript of Rupert Smith from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 3301.
Rupert Smith, T. 6373; Ex. P2362, Transcript of Rupert Smith from Prosecutor v. Popovi} et al., T. 1757717579; Ex. P2357, Transcript of Rupert Smith from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 3298-3303. See e.g.
Ex. P2358, Order of General Mladi}, 23 January 1995.
Ex. P78, \or|e \uki} Supplementary Statement on Planning Offensives on the Territory of the RBiH, p. 4.
For example during the operations in Gora`de, Igman, Srebrenica, @epa and Biha}, Ex. P78, \or|e \uki},
Supplementary Statement on Planning Offensives on the Territory of the RBiH, p. 4.
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soldiers; each brigade was divided into battalions of 500 to 700 soldiers and each battalion was
divided into five or six companies with approximately 100 soldiers.664
278.
The VRS operated in almost all respects in the same manner as the former JNA665 and its
five Corps were geographically based and assumed the formations as the former JNA Corps.666
These Corps were formally established in June 1992667 and were the 1st Krajina Corps (formerly the
JNA 5th Corps), the 2nd Krajina Corps (formerly the JNA 10th Corps), the East Bosnia Corps
(formerly the JNA 17th Corps), the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps (formerly the JNA 4th Corps), the
Herzegovina Corps (consisting of elements of the former JNA 9th Corps).668 The Drina Corps was
formed at a later stage, on 1 November 1992.669 The Corps were subordinated to the Main Staff.670
279.
In addition, there were a few independent units,671 such as the 10th Reconnaissance Sabotage
Detachment672 and the 65th Protection Regiment subordinate to the VRS Main Staff.673
280.
The Corps had a similar structure as the Main Staff, with a Corps Commander and Corps
Chief of Staff,674 who also held the position of Deputy Commander,675 as well as three Assistant
Commanders with responsibility, respectively, for Intelligence and Security, Rear (Logistics)
Services and Morale, Legal and Religious Affairs.676
281.
The Chief of Staff was the “principal advisor to the Corps Commander, and the primary
facilitator through which [sic] the Commander’s intent, orders and directives [were] organized and
processed for execution by the Corps Staff and subordinate unites”.677 He was the only one who, in
664
665
666
667
668
669
670
671
672
673
674
675
676
677
Richard Butler, T. 6688-6689. See also Stamenko Nikoli}, T. 10552, stating that the numerical strength of the
VRS was between 200.000 and 250.000 troops.
Richard Butler, T. 6531. See also Srebrenica Adjudicated Facts, 1.
Ex. P2244, Expert Report of Richard Butler “VRS Corps Command Responsibility”, 5 April 2000, figure 1, p. 1;
Ex. D395, Transcript of Interview with \or|e \uki}, 29 February 1996, p. 2.
Ex. D290, Order on the Establishment of the VRS, 16 June 1992; D291, Order on the Organisation,
Establishment and Command of the VRS, 16 June 1992. See also Richard Butler, T. 6680.
Ex. P2244, Expert Report of Richard Butler “VRS Corps Command Responsibility”, 5 April 2000, para. 1.0;
Ex. P2249, Expert Report of Richard Butler “VRS Main Staff Command Responsibility”, 9 June 2006, para. 1.0;
Ex. D290, Order on the Establishment of the VRS, 16 June 1992; Ex. D291, Order on the Organisation,
Establishment and Command of the VRS, 16 June 1992; Stojan Mal~i}, T. 11196-11199. See also Stojan Mal~i},
T. 11198-11199, stating that the Corps retained the same structure as that described in Ex. D290 until the end of
the war. See also Ex. D395, Transcript of Interview with \or|e \uki}, 29 February 1996, p. 2.
Ex. P2244, Expert Report of Richard Butler “VRS Corps Command Responsibility”, 5 April 2000, para. 1.0;
Ex. D395, Transcript of Interview with \or|e \uki}, 29 February 1996, p. 2.
Ex. P2244, Expert Report of Richard Butler “VRS Corps Command Responsibility”, 5 April 2000, para. 1.0.
Petar Škrbić, T. 11715; Ex. D341, Order on the Promotion of Senior Officers, 7 October 1993.
Petar Škrbić, T. 11970.
Richard Butler, T. 6692.
Ex. P2244, Expert Report of Richard Butler “VRS Corps Command Responsibility”, 5 April 2000, paras 2.0-2.9.
Ex. P2244, Expert Report of Richard Butler “VRS Corps Command Responsibility”, 5 April 2000, para. 2.10.
Ex. P2244, Expert Report of Richard Butler “VRS Corps Command Responsibility”, 5 April 2000, para. 3.0.
Ex. P2244, Expert Report of Richard Butler “VRS Corps Command Responsibility”, 5 April 2000, para. 2.5. As
such, the Corps Staff under the Chief of Staff “is responsible for reviewing and understanding the assigned
directives received by the Superior Command or the Corps Commander”, Ex. P2244, Expert Report of Richard
Butler “VRS Corps Command Responsibility”, 5 April 2000, para. 2.8.
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keeping with the Commander’s decisions, had the right to give orders to the subordinates.678 The
Chief of Staff also directed the Corps Staff, dealing with all day-to-day administration of the Corps’
activities.679
282.
The brigade leadership included a Brigade Commander680 and a Brigade Chief of Staff who
also acted as Deputy Commander.681 The VRS brigades’ leadership also included assistant
commanders for Intelligence and Security, Rear (Logistics) Services and of Morale, Legal and
Religious Affairs.682
a. Drina Corps
283.
The VRS Main Staff established the Drina Corps on 1 November 1992.683 The personnel
that formed the Drina Corps mostly came from the East Bosnia Corps and the Sarajevo-Romanija
Corps, as well as from the VRS Main Staff.684 Its headquarters was established in Han Pijesak and
later moved to Vlasenica.685 The Drina Corps’ area of responsibility covered east BiH on the border
with FRY along the Drina River and covered, inter alia, the municipalities of Zvornik, Bratunac,
Vlasenica, Srebrenica, Han Pijesak and @epa.686
284.
Milenko @ivanovi} assumed the command of the Drina Corps at the time of its formation in
November 1992.687 Radislav Krsti} was the Chief of Staff from August 1994 and became Corps
Commander in the early evening hours of 13 July 1995.688 With Krsti}’s appointment, Svetozar
Andri} was appointed as the Chief of Staff.689
678
679
680
681
682
683
684
685
686
687
688
Ex. P2244, Expert Report of Richard Butler “VRS Corps Command Responsibility”, 5 April 2000, para. 2.5.
Ex. P2244, Expert Report of Richard Butler “VRS Corps Command Responsibility”, 5 April 2000, para. 3.3.
Ex. P2248, Expert Report of Richard Butler “VRS Brigade Command Responsibility”, 31 October 2002,
paras 2.0-2.14.
Ex. P2248, Expert Report of Richard Butler “VRS Brigade Command Responsibility”, 31 October 2002,
paras 2.15-2.18.
Ex. P2248, Expert Report of Richard Butler “VRS Brigade Command Responsibility”, 31 October 2002,
paras 3.9-3.23.
Richard Butler, T. 6693; Stojan Mali~i}, T. 11199. See also Srebrenica Adjudicated Facts, 1.
Richard Butler, T. 6693-6694. For example, before becoming the Drina Corps Commander, @ivanovi} was the
chief of artillery for the Main Staff, Richard Butler, T. 6694. See also Defence Agreed Facts, 100.
Its code number was 3676, Ex. P2249, Expert Report of Richard Butler “VRS Main Staff Command
Responsibility”, 9 June 2006, para. 3.2; Stojan Mal~i}, T. 11332-11333; Srebrenica Adjudicated Facts, 1.
Ex. P564, Map of Bosnia-Herzegovina; Ex. P2400, Map Depicting the Area of Srebrenica; MP-14, T. 3512
(closed session).
Ex. P2246, Expert Report of Richard Butler “Srebrenica Military Narrative (Revised) – Operation Krivaja 95”, 1
November 2000, para. 2.2; Srebrenica Adjudicated Facts, 92; Richard Butler, T. 6575.
Ex. P2246, Expert Report of Richard Butler “Srebrenica Military Narrative (Revised) – Operation Krivaja 95”, 1
November 2000, para. 2.2; Srebrenica Adjudicated Facts, 93-96. The first order which Krsti} issued as the
commander of the Drina Corps was on 13 July 1995 at around 20:00 hours, Richard Butler, T. 6529; Ex. P2245,
Expert Report of Richard Butler “Srebrenica Military Narrative – Operation Krivaja 95”, 15 May 2000, p. 16.
See also Ex. P2407, Handover of the Drina Corps Command Duties, 13 July 1995; Richard Butler, T. 6531,
6635; Ex. P2408, Order of the Drina Corps Commander, Radislav Krsti}, on Searching of the Terrain, 13 July
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285.
Vujadin Popovi} was Assistant Commander for Security; Slobodan Cerovi} was Assistant
Commander for Morale, Legal and Religious Affairs; and Lazar A}amovi} was Assistant
Commander for Rear Services (Logistics).690
286.
The Drina Corps consisted of the 1st Zvornik Infantry Brigade, the 1st Vlasenica Light
Infantry Brigade, the 1st Sekovi}i (or Bira~) Infantry Brigade, the 1st Mili}i Light Infantry Brigade,
the 1st Bratunac Light Infantry Brigade, the 2nd Romanija Motorized Brigade, the 1st Podrinje Light
Infantry Brigade, the 5th Podrinje Light Infantry Brigade, the 5th Mixed Artillery Regiment, the 5th
Military Police Battalion, the 5th Engineer Battalion, the 5th Communications Battalion, the 1st
Skelani Separate Infantry Battalion,691 the Vlasenica Brigade692 as well as a unit called Drina
Wolves.693
287.
From 12 December 1992 until November 1996, Vinko Pandurevi} was the Commander of
the Zvornik Brigade.694 Dragan Obrenovi} was the Chief of Staff, Dragan Joki} the Chief of
Engineering and Drago Nikoli} the Assistant Commander for Security.695
288.
The Bratunac Light Infantry Brigade was formally organised on 14 November 1992 with
Borivoje Te{i} appointed as its first Commander.696 On 25 May 1995, Vidoje Blagojevi} was
appointed as the Commander of the Bratunac Brigade and retained such position until mid-1996.697.
Momir Nikolić was Assistant Commander for Security and Intelligence.698
689
690
691
692
693
694
695
696
697
698
1995. @ivanovi} was appointed to new duties within the VJ-VRS, Richard Butler, T. 6633; Ex. P2407, Handover
of the Drina Corps Command Duties, 13 July 1995.
Ex. P2246, Expert Report of Richard Butler “Srebrenica Military Narrative (Revised) – Operation Krivaja 95”, 1
November 2000, paras 2.2-2.3; Richard Butler, T. 6560.
Ex. P2246, Expert Report of Richard Butler “Srebrenica Military Narrative (Revised) – Operation Krivaja 95”, 1
November 2000, para. 2.4; Srebrenica Adjudicated Facts, 97.
Ex. P2246, Expert Report of Richard Butler “Srebrenica Military Narrative (Revised) – Operation Krivaja 95”, 1
November 2000, para. 2.6; Richard Butler, T. 6533.
Ex. P2246, Expert Report of Richard Butler “Srebrenica Military Narrative (Revised) – Operation Krivaja 95”,
1 November 2000, p. 33.
Ex. P2387, Video, 11 July 1995, showing Captain Milan Jolovi}, Commander of the Drina Wolves at a road
towards Srebrenica, Richard Butler, T. 6537.
Ex. P2246, Expert Report of Richard Butler “Srebrenica Military Narrative (Revised) – Operation Krivaja 95”, 1
November 2000, para. 2.8; Srebrenica Adjudicated Facts, 98.
Srebrenica Adjudicated Facts, 98-101; Ex. P2246, Expert Report of Richard Butler “Srebrenica Military
Narrative (Revised) – Operation Krivaja 95”, 1 November 2000, para. 2.8.
Ex. P2246, Expert Report of Richard Butler “Srebrenica Military Narrative (Revised) – Operation Krivaja 95”, 1
November 2000, para. 1.11.
Srebrenica Adjudicated Facts, 102-103; Ex. P2246, Expert Report of Richard Butler “Srebrenica Military
Narrative (Revised) – Operation Krivaja 95”, 1 November 2000, para. 5.2.8. Colonel Blagojevi} remained in
command and control of all units of the Bratunac Brigade including those members of the security organ, as well
as the Bratunac Brigade Military Police, between 11 July 1995 and 1 November 1995, Srebrenica Adjudicated
Facts, 103.
Ex. P2512, Momir Nikoli} Statement of Facts and Acceptance of Responsibility, 6 May 2003, p. 1; Ex. P2246,
Expert Report of Richard Butler “Srebrenica Military Narrative (Revised) – Operation Krivaja 95”, 1 November
2000, para. 2.8.
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289.
The Drina Wolves Unit was an elite combat formation, which was formally subordinated to
the Zvornik Infantry Brigade.699 It was considered as the assault battalion of the Drina Corps and
was known as a unit with the best-trained and fittest soldiers in the Drina Corps.700
b. Sarajevo-Romanija Corps (“SRK”)
290.
The SRK was located in the greater Sarajevo area,701 with its headquarters based at
Lukavica.702 The SRK’s main forces were positioned around the inner ring of Sarajevo, in particular
in the area of Ilidža, Ned`arići and Grbavica.703 Until the end of 1992, seven SRK brigades were
positioned in that part of the confrontation lines constituting the “inner ring”, whose length was
some 55 kilometres.704 Auxiliary forces of the SRK were positioned on the so-called exterior ring of
the Sarajevo front, whose length was approximately 180 kilometres.705 In 1992, the SRK held the
Lukavica barracks, Ned`arići, Mojmilo hill and the airport - the latter until July 1992 when it was
taken over by UNPROFOR.706 By late 1992, the SRK was “fully dedicated to maintaining the
blockade around Sarajevo”.707
291.
Stanislav Gali} was the Commander of the SRK708 from 10 September 1992 until 10 August
1994. He was succeeded by Dragomir Milo{evi}, his Chief of Staff from 6 July 1993.709 Milo{evi}
retained command of the SRK until on or about 21 November 1995.710 As SRK Corps Commander,
both Gali} and Milo{evi} were immediately subordinated to the Commander of the VRS Main
Staff711 and the Commander-in-Chief of the VRS.712
699
700
701
702
703
704
705
706
707
708
709
710
711
712
Richard Butler, T. 6537.
Ibid.
Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts I, 47. The SRK was specifically responsible for the following areas: the south of
Sarajevo, including Lukavica, Vraca, Grbavica, Zlati{te, parts of Dobrinja and the area up to Mount Trebevi},
the hills south and south-west of Sarajevo, the Rajlovac area in the north-west of Sarajevo towards Mrkovi}i,
including [picasta Stijena, also known as Sharpstone, the north-east of Sarajevo and the area of Pale, Sarajevo
Adjudicated Facts III, 9.
Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts III, 86; Ex. P564, Map of Bosnia-Herzegovina; MP14, T. 3523 (closed session).
Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts III, 49.
Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts III, 50.
Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts I, 51.
Aernout Van Lynden, T. 473-474; Ex. P1, Photograph of Sarajevo. See also Ex. P115, Transcript of Azra Šišić
in Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 2833; Ex. P489, Transcript of Youssef Hajir from Prosecutor v. Gali}, T. 1679;
Azra [i{i}, T. 770; Ex. P1518, Map of Sarajevo.
Ex. P2499, Expert Report of Richard Butler “VRS Main Staff Command Responsibility”, 9 June 2006, para. 3.1.
Robert Donia, T. 1702-1703.
Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts II, 4; Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts III, 2-3.
Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts III, 1.
Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts II, 2; Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts III, 4.
Sarajevo Adjudicated Fact II, 3.
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4. Judicial Military System
292.
The Trial Chamber took judicial notice of the fact that in July 1995, a functioning judicial
system existed within the VRS to address criminal or disciplinary matters related to members of the
VRS. 713
293.
The Law on the VRS regulated the criminal and disciplinary liability of its members and the
duty of VRS senior or superior officers to ensure proper military conduct through disciplinary
measures and court-martials.714 With specific reference to criminal offences, the Law on the VRS
stipulated that provisions of the “Criminal Law and other laws” were applicable to the military
personnel.715 The SFRY Criminal Law, which was in force in the RS in 1995, prohibited violations
of international humanitarian law. This prohibition was directed at all RS citizens, including
members of the VRS. Moreover, pursuant to an order of 13 May 1992 by President Radovan
Karadžić, the VRS was required to comply with the obligations under international humanitarian
law.716 Accordingly, if a commander in the VRS became aware of a violation of international law of
war, he had a duty to report that up the chain of command. If a violation was reported to the corps
commander, the commander was obliged to initiate proceedings and send a report to the military
prosecutor. Information on such violations was also included in regular reports.717
F. STRUCTURE AND ORGANISATION OF THE SERBIAN ARMY OF KRAJINA
(“SVK”)
1. Establishment of the SVK
294.
The RSK’s armed forces known as the Serbian Army of Krajina (“SVK”), was established
on 18 May 1992,718 and existed, save for its 11th Corps that outlived the RSK, until 8 August 1995
when the RSK fell.719
295.
On 20 April 1993, the RSK Supreme Defence Council was established, which was
composed of the President of the RSK, the Prime Minister, the Minister of Defence, the Minister of
713
714
715
716
717
718
719
Defence Agreed Facts, 5. See also Ex. D104, Decree on the Proclamation of the Law on Military Courts in RS,
30 December 1993; Ex. D105, The Law on the Implementation of the Law on Military Courts and the Law on
the Military Prosecutor’s Office During a State of War, RS, 2 November 1994.
Ex. P191, Law on the VRS, 1 June 1992, Articles 62-99; Defence Agreed Facts, 5.
Ex. P191, Law on the VRS, 1 June 1992, Article 62.
Defence Agreed Facts, 5.
Defence Adjudicated Facts II, 91. The Trial Chamber is mindful that the adjudicated fact refers to the
commander’s obligation in the SRK. However, the Trial Chamber is also satisfied that the obligation was not
limited to the SRK, but extended to all the Corps of the VRS. See Ex. P191, Law on the VRS, Article 62.
Defence Agreed Facts, 138. See also MP-16, T. 5134-5135 (closed session); Mile Novaković, T. 13063, 1337213375.
MP-80, T. 8456-8257 (closed session). See also Rade Orli}, T. 5754; Patrick Treanor, T. 1238.
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the Interior, and the Commander of the SVK.720 The President of the RSK, as Supreme
Commander, led the SVK in peacetime and wartime in accordance with the RSK Constitution721
and decisions adopted by the Supreme Defence Council, and presided over the Supreme Defence
Council. The Supreme Defence Council was mandated to “adopt decisions on the readiness,
mobilisation and deployment of the SVK and on other matters in accordance with the Constitution
and the law”.722
296.
The Law on the SVK was adopted on 22 April 1993 and provided that the SVK operated
under the principle of unity or singleness of command and defined its objective as “defending
sovereignty, territory, independence of Republic of Serbian Krajina”.723
2. The Main Staff
297.
On 26 October 1992, Milan Novakovi} was appointed to the post of Commander of the
Main Staff of the SVK by the President of the RSK, Goran Had`i}.724 He was replaced on
22 February 1994 by Milan ^eleketi} who was appointed by Milan Marti}.725 On 18 May 1995, the
resignation of Milan Čeleketi} was approved by the Assembly726 and Mile Mrk{i} took up the post
of Commander of the Main Staff of the SVK.727
298.
Directly subordinated to the Commander of the Main Staff of the SVK were departments of
security,728 intelligence affairs, morale, religious and legal affairs, department of mobilisation and
personnel affairs, rear services, development and finance and anti-aircraft and air defence.729
299.
In May 1994, Du{an Smiljani} was appointed to the post of Assistant Commander for
Security and Intelligence Sector of the SVK.730 On 3 July 1994, Rade Orli} became the Chief of the
720
721
722
723
724
725
726
727
728
Defence Agreed Facts, 139.
According to the RSK Constitution, under his initiative or under the government's proposal during a state of war,
or imminent threat of war, the President adopted acts about issues from the Assembly's jurisdiction and was
required to submit them before the Assembly as soon as the assembly was able to meet, Ex. P166, Constitution
of the RSK, 2 January 1992, Article 78(7).
Defence Agreed Facts, 139; Patrick Treanor, T. 1016-1018; Ex. P166, Constitution of the RSK, 2 January 1992,
Article 78.
Ex. D170, Law on the SVK, 22 April 1993, Articles 3, 281.
Ex. P1782, Decree on Appointment of Novaković by SRK President, 26 October 1992. See also Stamenko
Nikoli}, T. 10549; Milan Novakovi}, T. 13002.
Patrick Treanor, T. 1026-1027, 1370-1371; Ex. P171/P1972, Decree of the President of the RSK on
Appointment of Milan ^eleketi} as a Commander of the SVK Main Staff, 22 February 1994; Ex. P1973, Report
on Milan ^eleketi}’s Taking on Duty, 22 February 1994; Milan Novakovi}, T. 13003, 13005. See also Rade
Orli}, T. 5728, 5758; Jo`ef Poje, T. 3087. After that, until the fall of the RSK, Milan Novakovi} held a post of
the deputy/assistant supreme commander for national security and international relations, Milan Novakovi},
T. 13007.
MP-80, T. 8616 (closed session); Ex. P1975, Report on Milan Čeleketić Handing Over Duty as SVK
Commander to Mile Mrkšić.
Patrick Treanor, T. 1027; Rade Ra{eta, T. 5906.
Rade Rašeta, T. 5949-5951; Ex. D89, Rules of Service of Security Organs in the JNA, 1984, Articles 16-18, 3031, 57(2).
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Intelligence Department of the SVK.731 On 19 December 1994, Rade Ra{eta became the Chief of
the Security Department of the SVK Main Staff.732
300.
In 1994, Borislav \uki} was the Chief of Staff of the Main Staff of the SVK.733 As of May
1995, this post was held by Dušan Lončar.734
3. SVK Units
301.
The SVK was comprised of six Corps, namely the 7th, 11th, 15th, 18th, 21st and 39th Corps.735
The 7th Corps was headquartered in Knin,736 had approximately 13,000 soldiers and its area of
responsibility covered the area of North Dalmatia.737 The zone of responsibility of the 11th Corps
covered Eastern Slavonija, Western Srem and Baranja.738 The 11th Corps had between 17,500 and
25,000 troops.739 The 15th Corps had 10,000 soldiers and covered the area of Titova Korenica. The
18th Corps numbered 9,000 troops and covered the area of Okučani.740 The 21st Corps was
responsible for the area around Vojnić and had around 11,000 troops. Finally, the 39th Corps
covered the area of Glina and had about 12,000 troops.741 As of 5 May 1995, additionally to the
aforementioned Corps, the SVK consisted of the 75th Mixed Artillery Brigade, 75th Logistic Base,
44th Rocket Brigade, 105th Aviation Brigade and 107th Training Centre.742
729
730
731
732
733
734
735
736
737
738
739
740
741
742
MP-80, T. 8303 (closed session); Ex. P495, Various Documents Concerning SVK, p. 4.
Ex. D88, Decision of General Milan Čeleketi} on the Promotion of Du{an Smiljani} to Commander for Security
and Intelligence of the SVK, 26 May 1994; Rade Orli}, T. 5770.
Rade Orli}, T. 5737, 5759, 5761; Ex. D86, Order Appointing Rade Orli} as Chief of the Intelligence Department
of the SVK, 3 July 1994. Orli}’s subordinate was Lieutenant-Colonel Knežević, Chief of the Intelligence Centre,
Rade Orli}, T. 5765-5766.
Rade Ra{eta, T. 5903; Ex. P2336, Correspondence from Main Staff of the SVK Relating to the Situation on the
Field, 26 May 1995.
Rade Ra{eta, T. 5907.
Rade Orli}, T. 5734; Ex. P495, Various Documents Concerning SVK. See MP-80, T. 8561 (closed session).
MP-80, T. 8512-8516 (closed session); Mile Novakovi}, T. 13080.
See Ex. D171, Minutes of RSK SDC, 1 July 1994, showing that in July 1994, Colonel Poznanovi} was assigned
to the post of the commander of the 7th Corps.
MP-80, T. 8512-8516 (closed session). See also Ex. P2625, SVK Summary for the Coordination of Tasks in the
VJ General Staff, 17 February 1994.
MP-80, T. 8513, 8522 (closed session); Ex. D165, Order to form SVK in Eastern Slavonija, Western Srem and
Baranja, 8 December 1992.
MP-80, T. 8455, 8513 (closed session).
See MP-80, T. 8544 (closed session), testifying that in February 1994, Bogdan Sladojevi} became the
commander of the 18th Corps; Ex. P1895, Order by VJ General Staff Personnel Administration, 9 February 1994.
See Ex. P2336, Correspondence from Main Staff of the SVK relating to the Situation on the Field, 26 May 1995,
showing that as of 1 May 1995, the Commander of the 39th Corps of the SVK was Colonel @arko Ga~i}. See also
Ex. P2816, SVK Combat Report Sent to Chief of VJ General Staff, 9 September 1994.
MP-80, T. 8304 (closed session); Ex. D184, Report on the Situation of the SVK, 5 May 1995. See also Ex. P495,
Various Documents Concerning SVK, pp 1, 4.
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4. Judicial Military System
302.
The Trial Chamber heard evidence that the SVK had its own military courts functioning
pursuant to the Law on Defence.743 Some evidence also shows that on 7 July 1994, the RSK
President issued two decrees appointing judges to the military tribunals, which were to be
established in Glina, Knin and Vukovar.744 However, according to witness Rade Rašeta, the military
judiciary in the SVK was “non-existent”.745 It follows, according to the witness, that provisions
such as Article 43 of the Rules of Service of Security Organs in the Armed Forces of the SFRY,
which provided for the arrest and hand over of a person to a military court or a military institution,
remained only on paper.746
743
744
745
746
Stamenko Nikoli}, T. 10786.
MP-80, T. 8575-8577 (closed session); Ex. D168, Presidential Decree signed by Milan Martić on Establishment
of Military Tribunals, 7 July 1994; Ex. D169, Presidential Decree signed by Milan Martić on Appointment of
Military Prosecutors, 7 July 1994. See also MP-80, T. 8806-8812 (closed session); Ex. P2623, SVK Request
from General Staff of VJ to Provide Legal Personnel, 13 April 1993; Ex. P2624, Letter from Hadžić to
Milošević, 4 June 1993.
Rade Rašeta, T. 6018.
Ibid.
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V. FINDINGS ON THE CRIMES
A. Sarajevo
1. The City of Sarajevo
303.
The city of Sarajevo lies alongside the Miljacka River and is situated in a natural valley
surrounded on all sides by high hills allowing it to be overlooked with ease.747 Before the conflict, it
consisted of ten municipalities: Stari Grad (Old Town), Centar (Centre), Novo Sarajevo, Novi Grad,
Vogošća, Ilidža, Pale, Ilijaš, Hadžići and Trnovo.748 By 1992, Sarajevo had grown into an important
political, cultural, industrial and commercial centre of BiH.749
304.
Before the conflict, the population of the city approximated over half a million residents,
with the following ethnic distribution: 49.4% Bosnian Muslims, 27.8% Bosnian Serbs and 7.1%
Bosnian Croats.750
2. The Siege Unfolds
(a) Basics of the Siege
305.
One of the six strategic objectives of the Bosnian Serb leadership was to partition Sarajevo
into Serbian and Muslim sectors and establish a separate state authority for each sector.751 The
demographics of the city, however, demonstrate that while the urban part of Sarajevo was ethnically
mixed, the surrounding hills were largely inhabited by Serbs.752 Therefore, any concept of partition
would more likely result in the encirclement of a predominately Muslim centre surrounded by
Serbian areas.753 Such a reality was in fact discussed at the RS Assembly.754 In addition, the
Bosnian Serb leaders viewed the siege of Sarajevo as necessary to prevent the functioning of the
747
748
749
750
751
752
753
754
Aernout van Lynden, T. 465; Ex. P2383, Map Marked by Mirsad Ku~anin; Ex. P28, Annotated Map of Sarajevo;
Ex. P476, Report on Market Firing Incident Involving Mortars in the Sarajevo Area Dated 28 August 1995, 3
August 2006, p. 6.
Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts I, 19. See also Ex. P2377, Witness Statement of Mirsad Ku~anin, 4 September 2000,
p. 2; Ex. P2378, Transcript of Mirsad Ku~anin from Prosecutor v. Gali}, 27 February 2002, T. 4499-4500.
Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts I, 18.
Ex. P2325, Expert Report of Ewa Tabeau, Population Losses in the “Siege” of Sarajevo, 10 September 1992 to
10 August 1994, 10 May 2002, p. 26. See also Ex. P348, Report of Robert Donia on the Making of the Sarajevo
Siege, 1 December 2006, p. 7 (presenting similar figures).
Ex. P188, Minutes of the 16th Session of the Assembly of the Serbian People in BiH, 12 May 1992, pp 13-14;
Ex. P334, Excerpt of the RS’s Official Gazette Reporting the “Strategic Goals”, 26 November 1993. See supra
paras 184-185.
Robert Donia, T. 1742; Ex. P344, Transcript of the 17th Session of the RS Assembly, 26 July 1992, p. 15.
Robert Donia, T. 1743; Ex. P344, Transcript of the 17th Session of the RS Assembly, 26 July 1992, p. 15.
Ex. P344, Transcript of the 17th Session of the RS Assembly, 26 July 1992, p. 15. See also Robert Donia,
T. 1745-1747; Ex. P345, Intercepted Telephone Conversation Between Radovan Karadži} and Slobodan
Milo{evi}, 9 September 1991; Ex. P346, Intercepted Telephone Conversation Between Radovan Karadži} and
Nikola Koljevi}, 9 September 1991.
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government of BiH, and as a “critical collective hostage”, to be used to attain significant
concessions from the BiH Government and from the international community.755
(b) Chronology of the Siege
306.
Tensions between Serbs and Muslims in Sarajevo mounted between February and March
1992, resulting in the establishment of barricades and checkpoints by both sides.756 The EC
recognition of BiH as an independent state on 7 April 1992757 sparked a wave of violence within
Sarajevo.758 This marked the start of the siege of Sarajevo, which is estimated to have lasted from
April 1992 to November 1995.759
307.
As of June 1992, heavy shelling and sniping from the SRK against the whole of the city
were daily events.760 Between September and December 1992, Sarajevo was exposed to intense
shelling.761 This prompted the UNSC in December 1992 to strongly condemn the attacks on
Sarajevo and demand their immediate cessation.762 In August 1993, a Demilitarised Zone (“DMZ”)
was established in Sarajevo based upon an agreement between UNPROFOR, the ABiH and the
VRS.763 Nevertheless, the violence in Sarajevo continued unabated throughout 1993 until February
1994.764 This led the UNSC to again strongly condemn the violence and demand the “immediate
end to attacks against Sarajevo which have resulted in a high number of civilian casualties,
seriously disrupted essential services and aggravated an already severe humanitarian situation”.765
308.
Following the shelling of the Markale market in February 1994,766 a Total Exclusion Zone
(“TEZ”) was created within a 20 kilometre radius from the city centre.767 This stipulated that all
weapons of a calibre higher than 12.7mm be removed from the zone, or turned over to designated
755
756
757
758
759
760
761
762
763
764
765
766
767
Robert Donia, T. 1740-1741; Ex. P344, Transcript of the 17th Session of the RS Assembly, 26 July 1992, pp 1516.
Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts I, 16, 23.
Patrick Treanor, T. 1097; Ex. P348, Report of Robert Donia on the Making of the Sarajevo Siege, 1 December
2006, p. 21.
Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts I, 25-32.
Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts I, 25-32; Ex. P348, Report of Robert Donia on the Making of the Sarajevo Siege, 1
December 2006, p. 38; Ex. P632, Transcript of Milan Mandilović in Prosecutor v. Galić, T. 1011-1012;
Ex. P520, Transcript of Mesud Jusufovi} from Prosecutor v. Gali}, T. 6517, 6523-6524.
John Wilson, T. 857-858; Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts I, 154,155. See also Ex. P1536, Letter of the UN Secretary
General to the President of the UNSC along with Final Report of the UN Commission of Experts Established
Pursuant to UNSC Resolution 780 (1992), 27 May 1994, para. 202.
Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts I, 160, 162.
Ex. P2455, Note of the President of the UNSC, 9 December 1992.
MP-72, T. 4282, 4354 (closed session); Ex. P1516 (under seal).
Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts I, 159-162; MP-408, T. 6154 (closed session).
Ex. P2475, Note of the President of the UNSC, 7 January 1994, p. 1.
See Scheduled Incident A3.
MP-72, T. 4289-90, 4351-4352, 4356 (closed session); MP-408, T. 6149-6150 (closed session).
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UN Weapons Collection Points.768 Despite the creation of the TEZ, there were instances of large
calibre weapons being used by the VRS.769
309.
In August 1994, UNPROFOR responded to more frequent instances of sniping against the
population of Sarajevo by negotiating an anti-sniping agreement between the VRS and the ABiH.770
A few days after the agreement was signed, D. Milo{evi} reported to UNPROFOR that he had
issued an order to the SRK troops to stop all sniping activity in the city of Sarajevo.771 The sniping
against civilians by the SRK, however, did not fully stop.772
310.
Shelling and sniping intensified again between November and December 1994 and between
April and May 1995, despite a ceasefire being in effect.773 During these periods, the firing of small
arms reached 3,000 rounds per day at times.774 Although both sides kept weapons inside the city in
violation of the TEZ, MP-72 observed that the VRS had “far more” large calibre weapons than the
ABiH, even after the TEZ was established.775 Witnesses also testified that the shelling and sniping
against the population in Sarajevo by the SRK was often linked to events occurring elsewhere in
BiH, such as an ABiH attack against the VRS outside of Sarajevo and the crisis in Gora`de in April
1994.776
311.
In May 1995, the situation in Sarajevo deteriorated.777 TEZ violations increased and after a
day marked by an intense artillery exchange, it was clear that any ceasefire was “really over”.778 Per
Anton Brennskag, a Sector Sarajevo UNMO, testified that in June 1995, the SRK fired up to 150
artillery and mortar rounds per day in Sarajevo, hitting both military and civilian targets.779 During
the same time, UNPROFOR reported that their personnel and locations were being targeted by Serb
mortar fire.780 On 16 June 1995, the ABiH launched an attack to break the encirclement of Sarajevo,
768
769
770
771
772
773
774
775
776
777
778
779
780
.
MP-72, T. 4289 (closed session).
MP-72, T. 4289-4290, 4351-4352, 4356 (closed session).
MP-408, T. 6162-6163 (closed session); Ex. P1521, Anti-Sniping Agreement, 14 August 1994; Ex. P2342,
Excerpt from SRK Order on the Implementation of the Anti-Sniping Agreement, 18 August 1994.
Ex. P2342, Excerpt from SRK Order on the Implementation of the Anti-Sniping Agreement, 18 August 1994.
MP-408, T. 6165 (closed session); MP-72, T. 4322-4323 (closed session).
MP-72, T. 4298, 4303, 4306 (closed session); Hubertus J.W. Bruurmijn, T. 2632.
MP-72, T. 4298 (closed session).
MP-72, T. 4298-4299, 4304, 4356 (closed session).
Ex. P2316 (under seal), para. 66; MP-408, T. 6153-6155, 6157 (closed session).
Ex. P2348, Statement of Rupert Smith, 14 August 1996, para. 59. See also Ex. P2361, Transcript of Rupert
Smith from Prosecutor v. Popovi} et al., T. 17508; Hubertus J.W. Bruurmijn, T. 2633-2634.
Hubertus J.W. Bruurmijn, T. 2633. See also Ex. P2348, Statement of Rupert Smith, 14 August 1996, para. 52.
Per Anton Brennskag, T. 3346.
See Ex. D24, Excerpt of UNPROFOR Report, 2 July 1995, pp 1, 3 (stating that Serb attacks on UNPROFOR
have significantly increased in the past week. Serb gunners fired three shells at Sarajevo’s PTT building, the
headquarters of UNPROFOR’s Sector Sarajevo. A Serb mortar also destroyed an UNPROFOR vehicle in the
northern part of the city); Ex. P2316 (under seal), p. 25.
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which after initial success failed, causing heavy casualties for the ABiH.781 The siege ended in
November 1995.782
(c) Comparison of Forces During the Siege
312.
Following the initial six weeks of fighting in 1992, confrontation lines changed very little
during the remainder of the conflict.783 The SRK had its headquarters in Lukavica784 and was
positioned around the so-called inner ring of Sarajevo, which was about 55 kilometres long, while
auxiliary SRK forces were positioned along the so-called exterior ring of the Sarajevo front, which
was about 180 kilometres long.785 In particular, along the inner ring, the SRK controlled-areas
included Ilidža, Ne|arići, part of Grbavica, Vraca, Mount Trebevi} and [picasta Stijena.786
313.
The 1st Corps of the ABiH was headquartered in the centre of Sarajevo787 and had
approximately 40,000 to 45,000 soldiers.788 At the end of 1994, the total number fell to between
35,000 and 40,000.789 The ABiH controlled part of Mount Igman,790 Mount @u}791 the eastern part
of the city of Sarajevo, including very densely-populated parts, such as the area of Stari Grad and
Centar, part of Grbavica, and the southwestern part of the city, Hrasnica, Sokolović, Kolonija,
Dobrinja and Butmir, and the hills in the north of Sarajevo.792 In the Grbavica area, the Miljacka
River constituted the northern confrontation line, with the ABiH positioned north of the river and
the SRK south of the river.793
781
782
783
784
785
786
787
788
789
790
791
792
793
Martin Bell, T. 3169, 3187; Ex. P2348, Statement of Rupert Smith, 24 August 1996, para. 68.
Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts III, 10, 82. See also Ex. P348, Report of Robert Donia on the Making of the Sarajevo
Siege, 1 December 2006, p. 38.
Per Anton Brennskag, T. 3334-3335; Martin Bell, T. 3169-3170, 3176; Ex. P515, Map Marked by Martin Bell;
Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts I, 156; Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts II, 10; Defence Adjudicated Facts I, 10.
Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts III, 86.
Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts I, 50-51.
Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts I, 47, 49-50, 73-74, 76, 156, 157; Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts III, 9-10; Martin Bell,
T. 3171-3176; Ex. P515, Map Marked by Martin Bell.
Defence Adjudicated Facts II, 82; MP-72, T. 4312 (closed session); MP-408, T. 6192 (closed session).
Defence Adjudicated Facts II, 83.
Defence Adjudicated Facts II, 84. The Trial Chamber notes that there is an apparent discrepancy between the
Adjudicated Facts from the Gali} and D. Milo{evi} Trial Judgements with regard to the number of 1st ABiH
Corps in the city of Sarajevo. The D. Milo{evi} Trial Judgement states that the 1st Corps totalled 75,000 soldiers,
of which 40,000-45,000 were in Sarajevo, and that the number fell to 35,000-40,000 at the end of 1994 (Defence
Adjudicated Facts II, 83-84). The Gali} Trial Judgement, on the other hand, states that the 75,000 soldiers were
all stationed around Sarajevo, with “[a]pproximately half of them were positioned in the city itself, while the
other half was positioned along the confrontation lines outside the city” (Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts I, 53).
Considering the context of the Gali} Trial Judgement, particularly the footnote to said adjudicated facts, the Trial
Chamber notes that this number included the part of the 1st Corps positioned on the outer ring of Sarajevo and
that the number of soldiers estimated to be in the city was also between 33,000 and 50,000, which is consistent
with the adjudicated facts from the D. Milo{evi} Trial Judgement. See Defence Final Brief, para. 556.
In 1994, the ABiH controlled 80% of Mount Igman, DefenceAdjudicated Facts II, 88.
Defence Adjudicated Facts II, 90.
Defence Agreed Facts, 149, 151-159.
Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts I, 75; Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts III, 23; Defence Agreed Facts, 150; Defence
Adjudicated Facts II, 86. See also Ex. P2316 (under seal), para. 127.
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314.
In describing the ABiH soldiers’ presence in Sarajevo, Martin Bell testified that “[t]hey
were deployed obviously […] round the edges. ₣…ğ you would sometimes find them billeted in
schools, but you were not aware of a -- living in a city with […] a standing army in it”. He further
stated that Sarajevo “looked like a ruined city, but […] not a militarised one in any obvious way”.794
315.
The SRK was regarded as militarily superior to the ABiH in terms of artillery and quantities
of heavy weaponry, such as tanks, armoured personnel carriers and rockets.795 MP-72 testified that
proportionately, the SRK had “far more weapons, far more sort of large calibre weapons than the
[ABiH]” and that “far more weapons [were] fired by the Serbs”.796
316.
In terms of artillery, the SRK used almost predominantly 120mm and 150mm mortar shells,
but there is evidence they also possessed 81mm or 82mm shells.797 In 1995, the SRK also started
using modified air-bombs.798 The SRK also relied heavily on sniper units799 equipped with
precision rifles that could hit targets up to 800 metres away.800
317.
In contrast, the ABiH was generally more lightly equipped,801 though towards the end of the
war it did find ways of acquiring more anti-tank weapons.802 The ABiH was known to mainly use
81mm mortars,803 but was not in possession of modified air-bombs.804
318.
Though both sides were involved in sniping, MP-409 stated that the VRS used more snipers
throughout the course of the conflict.805
794
795
796
797
798
799
800
801
802
803
804
805
Martin Bell, T. 3189. Martin Bell also added that the ABiH soldiers were underestimated by the VRS since
many of them did not have proper military equipment, e.g. were wearing sneakers, Martin Bell, T. 3222.
Martin Bell, T. 3187. See also Ex. P2316 (under seal), para. 127 (SRK had 155mm guns, multiple rocket
launchers, surface to air missiles, 122mm KREMA rockets).
MP-72, T. 4356 (closed session). See also Pyers Tucker, T. 9111-9113.
John Wilson, T. 859; Ex. P2290, Transcript of Harry Konings from Prosecutor v. D. Milošević, 12 March 2007,
T. 3561; Ex. P2316 (under seal), para. 127. The Defence also points out that both the ABiH and the SRK
possessed 60mm and 105mm mortars, Defence Final Brief, para. 559, citing to Ex. D66, Memorandum from
UNPROFOR, 12 October 1994; Ex. D64, UNPROFOR Letter on Exchange of Fire between BiH and Serb
Forces, 17 November 1994; Ex. P2316 (under seal), para. 127. The Trial Chamber notes however that Ex. D66,
shows only that the ABiH possessed a 60mm mortar, but is silent as regards the SRK.
Martin Bell, T. 3187-3188.
Ex. P2316 (under seal), para. 130; Aernout van Lynden, T. 523-524; Thorbjørn Øvergård, T. 2951-2957.
Ex. P493, Report of Patrick van der Weijden: “Milošević case Sniping Incident in Sarajevo 94-95”,
19 February 2007, Appendix A. See also Ex. P2316 (under seal), para. 90.
Martin Bell, T. 3186-3187. See also Ex. P137, Witness Statement of General John Wilson, 5 June 1995 and
19 December 2002, para. 47 (stating that the ABiH possessed 81 mm mortars but had limited tanks and lacked
light and heavy artillery).
Martin Bell, T. 3187.
Thorbjørn Øvergård, T. 2986-2987; Ex. P481, Statement of Thorbjørn Øvergård, 30 April 1996, para. 13;
Ex. P137, Witness Statement of General John Wilson, 5 June 1995 and 19 December 2002, para. 47; John
Wilson, T. 858.
Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts III, 7-8. See also Hubertus J.W. Bruurmijn, T. 2642; Per Anton Brennskag, T. 3365;
Nedžib Ðozo, T. 4540.
MP-409, T. 5703 (closed session).
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3. Methods of Warfare
(a) Overview
319.
The SRK subjected the city of Sarajevo to extensive gunfire and heavy shelling throughout
the conflict without sparing civilian residential areas.806 In addition, the city’s natural topography,
such as ridges and high-rise buildings, provided vantage-points for the SRK to target civilians
moving around the city.807 Mladi} – described by a witness as the “strategist” of the siege – stated
that he held “the city in his palm”.808
320.
Martin Bell described the siege as if “the Great War were being refought in a modern urban
environment”.809 During the war, the civilian population was deliberately targeted and subjected to
immense hardships that served no military purpose.810 No civilian activity and no area of Sarajevo
seemed to be safe from sniping or shelling attacks from SRK-held territory.811 Civilians were
targeted during funerals, in ambulances, in hospitals, on trams, on buses, when driving or cycling, at
home, while tending gardens or fires or clearing rubbish in the city, in gathering points, such as
markets, sports events or while queuing for food and water.812 The Sarajevo State Hospital received
more than 100 patients every day and the ratio of civilian to military patients was about 4:1.813
321.
The “endless” killing of civilians and the deprivation of water, food, electricity, gas,
medicines and humanitarian aid all had a devastating effect on Sarajevo’s residents.814 They lived
under the daily threat of injury and death from shells and sniper fire.815 Whenever they ventured out
806
807
808
809
810
811
812
813
814
815
John Wilson, T. 860; Muhamed Sacirbey, T. 7179; Ex. P2343, Witness Statement of Ijaz Hussain Malik,
10 August 1996, p. 2; Ex. P2344, Transcript of Ijaz Hussain Malik from Prosecutor v. D. Milošević, 27 April
2007, T. 5411-5413; Ex. P1112, Borba Article Reproducing the Report of the UN War Crimes Commission for
Former Yugoslavia, 14 July 1994, p. 60; Ex. P137, Witness Statement of General John Wilson, 5 June 1995 and
19 December 2002, para. 52; Ex. P2377, Witness Statement of Mirsad Ku~anin, 4 September 2000, p. 4;
Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts I, 56-57, 59, 61, 132; Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts III, 11.
Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts I, 142, 153-155; Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts III, 27.
Ex. P10, SkyNews Video Clip; MP-72, T. 4319-4320 (closed session).
Martin Bell, T. 3169.
Ex. P377, Witness Statement of Morten Hvaal, 14-15 February 2001, para. 4. See also Ex. P520, Transcript of
Mesud Jusufovi} from Prosecutor v. Gali}, T. 6527-6528; Martin Bell, T. 3169; Ex. P2377, Witness Statement
of Mirsad Ku~anin, 4 September 2000, p. 4; Morten Hvaal, T. 2276; Ex. P376, Witness Statement of Morten
Hvaal, 28 March 1995, para. 27; Ex. P379, Transcript of Morten Hvaal in Prosecutor v. Gali}, T. 2354;
Ex. P378, Transcript of Morten Hvaal in Prosecutor v. Gali}, T. 2276.
Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts I, 132, 149.
Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts I, 62, 68-72, 133-134, 136-137; Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts III, 12-19; John Wilson,
T. 860; Aernout Van Lynden, T. 485-486, 497; Ex. P411, Statement of Muradif Čelik, 1 September 2000, p. 4;
Ex. P377, Witness Statement of Morten Hvaal, 14-15 February 2001, para. 63.
Ex. P631, Transcript of Milan Mandilović in Prosecutor v. D. Milošević, T. 571-572; Ex. P632, Transcript of
Milan Mandilović in Prosecutor v. Galić, T. 1022.
Ex. P645, Witness Statement of Ned`ad Vejzagi}, para. 63. See also MP-433, T. 2109-2110 (closed session);
Ex. P125, Witness Statement of Anña Gotovac, 17 May 2006, para. 5; Pyers Tucker, T. 9118.
See Ex. P121, Witness Statement of Azra Šišić, 23 February 1996, para. 2; Ex. P115, Transcript in Prosecutor v.
D. Milo{evi}, T. 2831; Ex. P489, Transcript of Youssef Hajir from Prosecutor v. Gali}, T. 1684.
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to get food or water, they would strive to find sheltered areas and would stay behind containers as
much as possible to shield themselves from sniper fire and shells.816
322.
The physical damage to Sarajevo was immense, extending from housing blocks to hospitals
and religious and historical buildings.817 The damage was also exacerbated by the fact that the SRK
used phosphorus incendiary shells that could set an entire building on fire.818 Attempts to extinguish
fires caused by the shellings often proved ineffective, as the water supply was often interrupted and
the fire fighters themselves were often subjected to gunfire.819
(b) Shelling
323.
There is evidence that on average, the SRK fired more than 100 rounds of artillery, mortar
and modified air bombs in Sarajevo on any single day.820 The shelling throughout the siege
involved over 2 million shells and was highly organised.821 General John Wilson, Chief of UNMO
until November 1992, personally observed shelling in Sarajevo and testified that as of June 1992,
heavy shelling was a daily event and directed at the entire city.822 A 1994 report of a UN
Commission of Experts cited estimates by UNPROFOR and city officials that the daily shelling
ranged from 200 to 300 impacts of a quiet day to 800 to 1,000 on an active day.823
324.
Mortars were very precise, both in terms of direction and radius of impact, with a margin of
error of less than 40 metres.824 In contrast, modified air bombs were notoriously imprecise, as
guiding systems could not be attached to these bombs. It was therefore impossible to direct them or
adequately predict where they would impact.825 The SRK used two types of modified air-bombs to
shell Sarajevo: the FAB-100 and the FAB-250.826 Defence witness Ivan Ðukić, a technical engineer
816
817
818
819
820
821
822
823
824
825
826
Ex. P24 (under seal), para. 10.
Ex. P2377, Witness Statement of Mirsad Ku~anin, 4 September 2000, p. 3; Ex. P2381, Transcript of Mirsad
Ku~anin from Prosecutor v. S. Milo{evi}, 12 November 2003, T. 28951-28952; Mesud Jusufovi}, T. 3235, 3237;
Ex. P520, Transcript of Mesud Jusufovi} from Prosecutor v. Gali}, T. 6532. See also Ex. P521, List of High
Profile Facilities Set on Fire by Shelling During the War; Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts I, 141.
Ex. P520, Transcript of Mesud Jusufovi} from Prosecutor v. Gali}, T. 6530; Martin Bell, T. 3187-3188.
Ex. P520, Transcript of Mesud Jusufovi} from Prosecutor v. Gali}, T. 6524, 6527-6529, 6536-6537.
Ex. P66, Transcript of Thomas Knustad from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 1992-1993.
Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts I, 32-34. See also Ex. P2316 (under seal), pp 17-24.
John Wilson, T. 857-858
Ex. P1536, Letter of the UN Secretary General to the President of the UNSC along with Final Report of the UN
Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to UNSC Resolution 780 (1992), 27 May 1994, para. 188.
Ex. P478, Report on Firing Incident Involving Mortars in the Sarajevo Area Dated 18 June 1995,
21 December 2006, p. 2; Ex. P461 (under seal), T. 2416.
Ex. P479, Transcript of Thorbjørn Øvergård from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 643-644; Ex. P480, Transcript
of Thorbjørn Øvergård from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 643-644, 696; Ex. P66, Transcript of Thomas
Knustad from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 1990-1992; Per Anton Brennskag, T. 3355; MP-409, T. 5633
(closed session); Hubertus J.W Bruuirmijn, T. 2641-2645, 2687-2688, 2698-2699; Ekrem Suljević, T. 4736;
Martin Bell, T. 3188-3189; Ex. P461 (under seal), T. 2421-2422, 2643-2645, 2687-2688, 2698-2699; MP-14,
T. 3665 (closed session); Ex. D94, UNPROFOR Report Regarding BiH Mandate, 28 June 1995, p. 1.
Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts III, 5, 7-8 (FAB is an abbreviation for a contact fuse airbomb with the numerical
designation for the kilogram weight of the bomb); MP-014, T. 3653, 3666 (closed session); Ex. P479, Transcript
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who was involved in the development on the modified air-bomb, testified that the use of modified
air bombs in an urban environment was “totally inappropriate”.827 Similarly, UNMO Thomas
Knustad stated that the use of modified air bombs served no military purpose.828
325.
SRK mortar positions included Mrkovići, Trebević, Zlatište, Vraca,829 Gravica Brdo,
Nedžarići barracks, Paljevo plateau and from within the Polinje area.830 In particular, Sarajevo Old
Town was targeted from the south-western side of Mount Trebević.831 The Nedžarići barracks
provided a strong vantage point for the shelling of the Alipašino Polje area.832 Shells fired from
Mrkovići would more commonly target the upper part of Sarajevo in the Stari Grad and Centar
municipalities.833 Hrasnica, Butmir and Skolovići were shelled primarily from SRK positions
between Ilidža/Blažuj and the Lukavica barracks.834 The lower part of Sarajevo was a clear target
from the Paljevo plateau.835 The centre of Sarajevo was a target from the Polinje area.836 Lastly, the
827
828
829
830
831
832
833
834
835
836
of Thorbjørn Øvergård from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 643-644; Ex. P480, Transcript of Thorbjørn
Øvergård from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 696; Hubertus J.W. Bruurmijn, T. 2643-2645, 2687-2688, 26982699; Ex. D94, BH Mandate, 28 June 1995, p. 1.
Ivan Ðoki}, T. 14489-14490, 14494.
Ex. P66, Transcript of Thomas Knustad from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 1990-1992. See also Hubertus J.W.
Bruurmijn, T. 2643, 2687-2688.
Ex. P2383, Map Marked by Mirsad Ku~anin; Ex. P2379, Transcript of Mirsad Ku~anin from Prosecutor v.
Gali}, 28 February 2002, T. 4592, 4594, 4603; Ex. P2381, Transcript of Mirsad Ku~anin from Prosecutor v.
S. Milo{evi}, 12 November 2003, T. 28926; Ex. P2376, Witness Statement of Mirsad Ku~anin,
12 November 1995, p. 7.
Ex. P2379, Transcript of Mirsad Ku~anin from Prosecutor v. Gali}, 28 February 2002, T. 4589, 4600-4601.
Other SRK positions included: Burije, the Meljine church, Krivoglavći, Blagovac, Kromolj, Lukavica barracks
and the Rajlovac barracks. See also Ex. P2383, Map Marked by Mirsad Ku~anin.
Ex. P2383, Map Marked by Mirsad Ku~anin; Ex. P2379, Transcript of Mirsad Ku~anin from Prosecutor v.
Gali}, 28 February 2002, T. 4591, 4602; Ex. P2381, Transcript of Mirsad Ku~anin from Prosecutor v. S.
Milo{evi}, 12 November 2003, T. 28926; Ex. P2376, Witness Statement of Mirsad Ku~anin, 12 November 1995,
p. 7. See also Ex. P2380, Transcript of Mirsad Ku~anin from Prosecutor v. Gali}, 1 March 2002, T. 4748.
Ex. P2383, Map Marked by Mirsad Ku~anin; Ex. P2379, Transcript of Mirsad Ku~anin from Prosecutor v.
Gali}, 28 February 2002, T. 4595, 4603; Ex. P2381, Transcript of Mirsad Ku~anin from Prosecutor v. S.
Milo{evi}, 12 November 2003, T. 28927; Ex. P2376, Witness Statement of Mirsad Ku~anin, 12 November 1995,
p. 7.
Ex. P2383, Map Marked by Mirsad Ku~anin; Ex. P2379, Transcript of Mirsad Ku~anin from Prosecutor v.
Gali}, 28 February 2002, T. 4590, 4600, 4602; Ex. P2381, Transcript of Mirsad Ku~anin from Prosecutor v.
S. Milo{evi}, 12 November 2003, T. 28925; Ex. P2376, Witness Statement of Mirsad Ku~anin,
12 November 1995, p. 7. See also Ex. P2380, Transcript of Mirsad Ku~anin from Prosecutor v. Gali},
1 March 2002, T. 4747-4748.
Thorbjørn Øvergård, T. 2954-2956; Ex. P484, Map Marked by Thorbjørn Øvergård, mark B; Ex. P481,
Statement of Thorbjørn Øvergård, 30 April 1996, para. 3; Ex. P485, Map Marked by Thorbjørn Øvergård, mark
LB; Ex. P479, Transcript of Thorbjørn Øvergård from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 639.
Ex. P2383, Map Marked by Mirsad Ku~anin; Ex. P2379, Transcript of Mirsad Ku~anin from Prosecutor v.
Gali}, 28 February 2002, T. 4594-4596, 4605; Ex. P2381, Transcript of Mirsad Ku~anin from Prosecutor v. S.
Milo{evi}, 12 November 2003, T. 28928; Ex. P2376, Witness Statement of Mirsad Ku~anin, 12 November 1995,
p. 7.
Ex. P2383, Map Marked by Mirsad Ku~anin; Ex. P2379, Transcript of Mirsad Ku~anin from Prosecutor v.
Gali}, 28 February 2002, T. 4597, 4606; Ex. P2381, Transcript of Mirsad Ku~anin from Prosecutor v. S.
Milo{evi}, 12 November 2003, T. 28928; Ex. P2376, Witness Statement of Mirsad Ku~anin, 12 November 1995,
p. 7. See also Ex. P2380, Transcript of Mirsad Ku~anin from Prosecutor v. Gali}, 1 March 2002, T. 4750.
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entire area of Dobrinja in Sarajevo was targeted from a VRS strong-hold in Gravica Brdo and
Nedžarići.837
326.
The SRK shelling of Sarajevo was indiscriminate and resulted in mostly civilian victims.838
Shelling targets generally had no clear military value839 and included apartment blocks, schools,
hospitals, food queues and historical buildings.840 The Holiday Inn, for example, came under
frequent shelling between the period 10 September 1992 and mid-1994.841
(c) Sniping
327.
Expert witness Van der Weijden explained that conventionally, the traditional military
sniper operates in a shooter/spotter team in order to maximise the accuracy of the shot. The term
“sniper”, however, has evolved and is now commonly used to refer to shooters who operate alone.
Particularly, since the siege of Sarajevo, the term sniper is used to indicate a shooter who fires at
whoever he gets in his sight.842
328.
There is evidence that between late 1994 and early 1995, VRS snipers began to utilise 12.7
calibre M87 machine guns,843 instead of the conventional 7.92 calibre Zastava M76 or 7.62 calibre
SVD Dragunov.844 While the M87 machine gun had the capacity to cover a larger effective range, it
was notorious for its indiscriminate destructiveness and lack of precision.845 According to Van der
Weijden, the 7.92 or 7.62 calibre guns also lacked precision when the range sought extended
beyond 800 metres.846 He also testified that, with regard to targets travelling in trams, it would be
837
838
839
840
841
842
843
844
845
846
Ex. P2383, Map Marked by Mirsad Ku~anin; Ex. P2379, Transcript of Mirsad Ku~anin from Prosecutor v.
Gali}, 28 February 2002, T. 4594, 4603; Ex. P2381, Transcript of Mirsad Ku~anin from Prosecutor v. S.
Milo{evi}, 12 November 2003, T. 28926; Ex. P2376, Witness Statement of Mirsad Ku~anin, 12 November 1995,
p. 7.
Thorbjørn Øvergård, T. 2954-2956; Ex. P481, Statement of Thorbjørn Øvergård, 30 April 1996, para. 3;
Ex. P479, Transcript of Thorbjørn Øvergård from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 639; Ex. P2307, Witness
Statement of Nefa [ljivo, 27 April 2006, p. 2. See also Thorbjørn Øvergård, T. 2981; Ex. P520, Transcript of
Mesud Jusufovi} from Prosecutor v. Gali}, T. 6524.
John Wilson, T. 860.
See Mesud Jusufovi}, T. 3237; Ex. P520, Transcript of Mesud Jusufovi} from Prosecutor v. Gali}, T. 6532;
Ex. P521, List of High Profile Facilities Set on Fire by Shelling During the War; Ex. P125, Witness Statement of
Anña Gotovac, 17 May 2006, para. 6 (the apartment building of Gotovac’s brother-in-law, Trg Heroja, was
destroyed and burned by shelling in 1992); Ex. P37, Witness Statement of Enes Ja{arevi}, 10 March 1997,
para. 3 (stating that in September 1993, a Serbian tank positioned in Gavrica Brdo fired a shell into his
apartment, killing his 11 year-old son); Ex. P57, Witness Statement of Ramiz Hod`i}, 22 November 1995, p. 3;
Ex. P61, Witness Statement of Ðula Leka, 25 February 1996, para. 1.
Ex. P520, Transcript of Mesud Jusufovi} from Prosecutor v. Gali}, T. 6533.
Ex. P493, Report of Patrick van der Weijden: “Milo{evi} case Sniping Incident in Sarajevo 94-95”,
2 February 2009, p. 3.
Ex. P481, Statement of Thorbjørn Øvergård, 30 April 1996, para. 3. See also Ex. P479, Transcript of Thorbjørn
Øvergård from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 627-628.
Ex. P493, Report of Patrick van der Weijden: “Milo{evi} case Sniping Incident in Sarajevo 94-95”, dated
2 February 2009, Appendix A.
Ibid.
Ibid.
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“almost impossible” for SRK snipers to accurately distinguish between military and civilian
personnel, and furthermore, that a shot should never be taken when the target cannot be identified
“because of the risk of shooting a non-combatant”.847
329.
According to Derviša Selmanović, every hill around Sarajevo was used as a vantage point
for Serb snipers to shoot into the city.848 Areas that became known as notorious sniper positions
from which civilians were targeted included Grbavica, the Jewish Cemetery, the Orthodox Church,
the School for the Blind and the areas of Neñarići, Špicasta Stijena, Mount Trebević and Baba
Stijena.849 According to Ku~anin, sniping fire frequently originated from Grdonj Brdo,850
Sedrenik,851 Gornji Kova~i}i,852 the Ozrenska Street,853 Zagorska Street,854 Milinkladska Street,855
Miroslava Krleze Street856 and Kromolj.857 In Ku~anin’s view, the largest number of sniping attacks
against the city came from the “Death Sowers” in Osmi}e,858 and from the Vraca area.859
847
848
849
850
851
852
853
854
855
856
857
858
Patrick Van der Weijden, T. 3066; Ex. P493, Report of Patrick van der Weijden: “Milo{evi} case Sniping
Incident in Sarajevo 94-95”, dated 2 February 2009, p. 66.
Ex. P111, Witness Statement of Derviša Selmanović, 20 April 2006, p. 3.
Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts I, 120, 122, 124, 125-127, 143-144, 146, 148; MP-432, T. 5283-5284 (closed
session); Ex. P129, Witness Statement of Alen Gičević, 15 November 1995, p. 3; Ex. P2383, Map Marked by
Mirsad Ku~anin; Ex. P2379, Transcript of Mirsad Ku~anin from Prosecutor v. Gali}, 28 February 2002,
T. 4588-4635; Ex. P2381, Transcript of Mirsad Ku~anin from Prosecutor v. S. Milo{evi}, 12 November 2003,
T. 28923-28934; Ex. P2376, Witness Statement of Mirsad Ku~anin, 12 November 1995, pp 8-9; Ex. P111,
Witness Statement of Derviša Selmanović, 20 April 2006, p. 3; Derviša Selmanović, T. 718.
Ex. P2383, Map Marked by Mirsad Ku~anin; Ex. P2379, Transcript of Mirsad Ku~anin from Prosecutor v.
Gali}, 28 February 2002, T. 4606-4607; Ex. P2381, Transcript of Mirsad Ku~anin from Prosecutor v. S.
Milo{evi}, 12 November 2003, T. 28929; Ex. P2376, Witness Statement of Mirsad Ku~anin, 12 November 1995,
p. 8.
Ibid.
Ex. P2383, Map Marked by Mirsad Ku~anin; Ex. P2379, Transcript of Mirsad Ku~anin from Prosecutor v.
Gali}, 28 February 2002, T. 4609; Ex. P2381, Transcript of Mirsad Ku~anin from Prosecutor v. S. Milo{evi},
12 November 2003, T. 28930.
Ex. P2383, Map Marked by Mirsad Ku~anin (the line with no. 6 indicates the road); Ex. P2379, Transcript of
Mirsad Ku~anin from Prosecutor v. Gali}, 28 February 2002, T. 4622, 4630, 4631; Ex. P2381, Transcript of
Mirsad Ku~anin from Prosecutor v. S. Milo{evi}, 12 November 2003, T. 28932; Ex. P2376, Witness Statement
of Mirsad Ku~anin, 12 November 1995, p. 9.
Ex. P2383, Map Marked by Mirsad Ku~anin (the line with no. 7 on top indicates the street); Ex. P2379,
Transcript of Mirsad Ku~anin from Prosecutor v. Gali}, 28 February 2002, T. 4630; Ex. P2381, Transcript of
Mirsad Ku~anin from Prosecutor v. S. Milo{evi}, 12 November 2003, T. 28932; Ex. P2376, Witness Statement
of Mirsad Ku~anin, 12 November 1995, p. 9.
Ex. P2383, Map Marked by Mirsad Ku~anin (the line marked with no. 7 indicates the street); Ex. P2379,
Transcript of Mirsad Ku~anin from Prosecutor v. Gali}, 28 February 2002, T. 4630; Ex. P2381, Transcript of
Mirsad Ku~anin from Prosecutor v. S. Milo{evi}, 12 November 2003, T. 28932.
Ex. P2383, Map Marked by Mirsad Ku~anin (the line marked with no. 9 indicates the street); Ex. P2379,
Transcript of Mirsad Ku~anin from Prosecutor v. Gali}, 28 February 2002, T. 4632; Ex. P2381, Transcript of
Mirsad Ku~anin from Prosecutor v. S. Milo{evi}, 12 November 2003, T. 28933; Ex. P2376, Witness Statement
of Mirsad Ku~anin, 12 November 1995, p. 9.
Ex. P2383, Map Marked by Mirsad Ku~anin; Ex. P2378, Transcript of Mirsad Ku~anin from Prosecutor v.
Gali}, 27 February 2002, T. 4552; Ex. P2379, Transcript of Mirsad Ku~anin from Prosecutor v. Gali}, 28
February 2002, T. 4597, 4606; Ex. P2381, Transcript of Mirsad Ku~anin from Prosecutor v. S. Milo{evi}, 12
November 2003, T. 28929; Ex. P2376, Witness Statement of Mirsad Ku~anin, 12 November 1995, p. 7;
Ex. P2382, Transcript of Mirsad Ku~anin from Prosecutor v. S. Milo{evi}, 13 November 2003, T. 28957-28958.
Ex. P2383, Map Marked by Mirsad Ku~anin; Ex. P2379, Transcript of Mirsad Ku~anin from Prosecutor v.
Gali}, 28 February 2002, T. 4606-4607; Ex. P2381, Transcript of Mirsad Ku~anin from Prosecutor v. S.
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330.
The Trial Chamber heard numerous witnesses regarding the frequent and indiscriminate
nature of sniping in Sarajevo during the course of the conflict,860 and moreover, took judicial notice
of the fact that between September 1992 and August 1994, civilians were shot nearly every day as
VRS gunners fired indiscriminately into the city.861 Several witnesses testified that all of the
intersections along the main streets of Sarajevo were well-known targets.862 Marshall Tito
Boulevard was known as “Sniper Alley”863 and other locations, such as the areas of Zamario Street,
Džemala Bijedi}a Street, Ivana Krndelja and Miljenka Cvitković Streets were commonly
targeted.864 Trams were commonly shot at on Zmaja od Bosne Street around the Holiday Inn, where
they were forced to slow down by a switch in the tracks at a point in the line of sight of VRS
snipers positioned on the south bank of the Miljacka river or in the Metalka building.865
331.
The area from Tršćanska Street, known as the “running street”, all the way up to the
Bratstvo-Jedinstvo bridge was notoriously dangerous for civilians.866 Another notable target was
“Igman Road”, a road which ran over Mount Igman through Hrasnica into Sarajevo.867 This road
was used to transport supplies into Sarajevo868 and according to Turković, there were no ABiH
859
860
861
862
863
864
865
866
867
868
Milo{evi}, 12 November 2003, T. 28929; Ex. P2376, Witness Statement of Mirsad Ku~anin, 12 November 1995,
p. 8.
Ex. P2383, Map Marked by Mirsad Ku~anin (the cross no. 1 marks the police station); Ex. P2379, Transcript of
Mirsad Ku~anin from Prosecutor v. Gali}, 28 February 2002, T. 4609, 4612; Ex. P2381, Transcript of Mirsad
Ku~anin from Prosecutor v. S. Milo{evi}, 12 November 2003, T. 28930.
See John Wilson, T. 860; MP-432, T. 5283-5284 (closed session); Ex. P631, Transcript of Milan Mandilović in
Prosecutor v. D. Milošević, T. 575; Ex. P103, Witness Statement of Sabina Šabanić, 16 November 1995, p. 2;
Ex. P104, Witness Statement of Sabina Šabanić, 22 May 1996, p. 2; MP-72, T. 4303 (closed session); Ex. P411,
Statement of Muradif Čelik, 1 September 2000, p. 4.
Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts I, 154-155. See also Ex. P1536, Letter of the UN Secretary General to the President
of the UNSC, 27 May 1994, para. 202.
Ex. P38, Witness Statement of Enes Ja{arevi}, 19 May 2006, para. 6; Ex. P39, Transcript of Enes Ja{arevi} from
Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 3004; Ex. P130, Witness Statement of Alen Gičević, 21 April 2006, p. 2 (stating
that intersections in the municipalities of Novo Sarajevo, Centar and Stari Grad were notorious targets); Ex. P97,
Witness Statement of Fikreta Pa~ariz, 24 April 2006, p. 2; Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts I, 135; Sarajevo
Adjudicated Facts III, 24.
Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts I, 145; Defence Adjudicated Facts II, 86.
Ex. P2383, Map Marked by Mirsad Ku~anin (the circle with the letter Z in the centre indicates the targeted area);
Ex. P2379, Transcript of Mirsad Ku~anin from Prosecutor v. Gali}, 28 February 2002, T. 4631; Ex. P2381,
Transcript of Mirsad Ku~anin from Prosecutor v. S. Milo{evi}, 12 November 2003, T. 28932-28933.
Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts III, 20-23, 52-54. See also Ex. P32 Witness Statement of Slavica Livnjak, 2425 April 2006, p. 2; Ex. P520, Transcript of Mesud Jusufovi} from Prosecutor v. Gali}, p. 19; MP-432, T. 53295330 (private session); Ex. P31, Witness Statement of Slavica Livnjak, 20 November 1995, p. 2.
Ex. P2383, Map Marked by Mirsad Ku~anin; Ex. P2379, Transcript of Mirsad Ku~anin from Prosecutor v.
Gali}, 28 February 2002, T. 4616; Ex. P2381, Transcript of Mirsad Ku~anin from Prosecutor v. S. Milo{evi},
12 November 2003, T. 28931-28932; Ex. P2376, Witness Statement of Mirsad Ku~anin, 12 November 1995,
p. 9.
Thorbjørn Øvergård; T. 2954; Ex. P484, Map Marked by Thorbjørn Øvergård, mark IR; Ex. P479, Transcript of
Thorbjørn Øvergård from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 650.
Ex. P479, Transcript of Thorbjørn Øvergård from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 650; Ex. P481, Statement of
Thorbjørn Øvergård, 30 April 1996, para. 14.
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positions along the Igman Road.869 Thorbjørn Øvergård and his team in Hrasnica observed civilians
being fired upon from the SRK-held area of Ilidža as they travelled on this road.870
332.
Bruurmijn testified that the majority of the sniping victims he examined were children or
elderly people who were clearly non-combatants.871 In an effort to protect the population,
UNPROFOR eventually placed metal barriers and barricades at important intersections and
crossroads around Sarajevo.872
333.
Significantly, MP-72 testified that the sniping of civilians was a “permanent threat” and, as
such, was part of the overall strategy of the Bosnian Serbs to terrorise the civilian population of
Sarajevo.873
334.
The Trial Chamber will now examine the specific Scheduled Shelling and Sniping Incidents,
representative of the alleged unlawful killings, inhumane acts and attacks against the civilian
population in Sarajevo.
869
870
871
872
873
Vekaz Turkovi}, T. 3124; Ex. P504, Map Marked by Vekaz Turkovi}.
Thorbjørn Øvergård, T. 2954; Ex. P479, Transcript of Thorbjørn Øvergård from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi},
T. 651; Ex. P481, Statement of Thorbjørn Øvergård, 30 April 1996, para. 14.
Hubertus J.W. Bruurmijn, T. 2632-2633.
Ex. P631, Transcript of Milan Mandilović in Prosecutor v. D. Milošević, T. 575-576; Ex. P632, Transcript of
Milan Mandilović in Prosecutor v. Galić, T. 1034-1035. See also Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts I, 146; Sarajevo
Adjudicated Facts III, 28; Aernout Van Lynden, T. 499.
MP-72, T. 4303 (closed session).
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4. Scheduled Shelling Incidents
(a) 22 January 1994 (Incident A1)
(i) Indictment
22 January 1994: Three mortar shells landed in the area of Alipa{ino Polje, the first in a park
behind, and the second and third in front of residential apartment buildings at 3, Geteova Street
(previously Centinjska Street) and at 4, Bosanka Street (previously Klara Cetkin Street), where
children were playing. The second and third shells killed six children under the age of 15 years
and wounded one adult and at least three such children. The origin of fire was from VRS-held
territory approximately to the west.874
(ii) Incident
335.
The Trial Chamber took judicial notice of the following facts. Around noon on 22 January
1994, three mortar shells (two 82mm and one 120mm calibre) were fired into the residential
neighbourhood of Alipa{ino Polje in the west of Sarajevo875 and six children were killed by the
explosions and another three children, including Muhamed Kapetanović, and Goran Todorovi},
who were ten and 12 years old at the time were wounded.876 One adult (Witness AI in the Gali}
case) was also seriously injured.877
336.
At the time of the explosion, some of the children were playing in a parking lot near to No. 2
Centinjska Street,878 others were playing in Klara Cetkin Street879 and Witness AI was walking
along Klara Cetkin Street in Alipašino Polje where he/she lived.880
337.
The three shells were fired from VRS positions somewhere to the west of A1ipa{ino Polje881
and no military activity was underway in the neighbourhood, nor were any soldiers to be seen,882
and the military facility called Kulin Ban (at a distance of at least 150 metres from the impact site)
was not the intended target of this attack.883
874
875
876
877
878
879
880
881
882
883
Scheduled Incident A1.
Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts I, 197. See also Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts I, 190-195; Ex. P540, Map of Sarajevo
Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts I, 182, 186, 196-197; Ex. P422, Extract from the Sarajevo Clinical Centre Reception
and Triage Block for 1 June 1993, 12 July 1993, 22 January 1994 and 5 February 1994, p. 34. See also Ex. P419,
Statement of Faris Gavrankapetanovi}, 11 October 2001; Ex. P420, Statement of Faris Gavrankapetanovi},
13 December 2001.
Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts I, 196-197; Ex. P422, Extract from the Sarajevo Clinical Centre Reception and
Triage Block for 1 June 1993, 12 July 1993, 22 January 1994 and 5 February 1994, p. 34. See also Ex. P419,
Statement of Faris Gavrankapetanovi}, 11 October 2001; Ex. P420, Statement of Faris Gavrankapetanovi},
13 December 2001.
Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts I, 183,185-186.
Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts I, 184.
Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts I, 188-189.
Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts I, 205.
Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts I, 198-199. Witness AI testified that the morning had been exceptionally peaceful,
with no shooting, Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts I, 187.
Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts I, 206.
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(iii) Findings
338.
Considering that such adjudicated facts have not been rebutted during the trial,884 the Trial
Chamber finds beyond a reasonable doubt that on 22 January 1994 at around noon, three mortar
shells exploded in the residential neighbourhood of Alipa{ino Polje, killing six children, seriously
injuring another three children and one adult. The evidence establishes that all the victims of the
attack, except for one, were children. The Trial Chamber finds that the only reasonable inference to
be drawn from the evidence is that all the victims were civilians not taking part in hostilities at the
time the incident occurred. The shells also fell in a civilian area with no military activities in the
vicinity.
339.
The Trial Chamber is also satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the shells originated
from VRS-held territory.
(b) 4 February 1994 (Incident A2)
(i) Indictment
4 February 1994: A salvo of three 120mm mortar shells hit civilians in the Dobrinja residential
area. The first landed in front of an apartment building at Oslobodilaca Sarajeva Street. The
second and third landed among persons trading at a market in an open area to the rear of the
apartment building at Mihajla Pupina Street and Oslobodilaca Sarajeva Street. Eight people,
including 1 child under the age of 15 years, were killed and at least 18 people, including 2 such
children, were wounded. The origin of fire was from VRS-held territory, approximately to the
east.885
(ii) Incident
340.
The Trial Chamber took judicial notice of the following facts. On 4 February l994, at around
11:00 hours., three mortar shells struck a residential neighbourhood in Dobrinja, in the south-west
of the city adjacent to the Sarajevo Airport,886 exploding near the apartment buildings at Mihajla
Pupina and Oslobodilaca Sarajeva Streets, next to the underground garage.887 At least eight people
including a child were killed by shells and at least 18 people were wounded including two
children,888 Eldar Hafizovi} who was 17 years old at the time and Sabahudin Ljusa who was
884
885
886
887
888
See also Defence Final Brief, para. 525, where the Defence states that it does not contest those facts.
Scheduled Incident A2.
Ex. P122, Map Marked by Azra [i{i}; Azra Šišić, T. 749.
Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts I, 224; Ex. P540, Map of Sarajevo; Ex. P449 (under seal), p. 2; Ex. P447 (under
seal), p. 3.
Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts I, 224. See also Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts I, 208-220.
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11 years old.889 The Trial Chamber also took judicial notice of the fact that the eight victims killed
by the shells were civilians.890
(iii) Investigation
341.
The investigation team was comprised of ballistic experts, Zlatko Me|edovi} and Mirza
Slabjica, and two forensic technicians, including Sead Be{i}.891 Based on the spray of fragments on
the site, the team concluded that the shells were fired from a 120mm mortar from the VRS-held
positions at Lukavica.892
342.
Me|edovi} testified that between the site of the incident and the lines held by the VRS there
were only one or two buildings.893 The Trial Chamber further took judicial notice of the fact that
Sabahudin Ljusa did not see any soldiers or military personnel,894 there were no ABiH military
units close to the site on that day895 and that the Territorial Defence office based in a small room at
no. 6 Oslobodilaca Sarajeva Street was not the target of the attack.896
(iv) Findings
343.
Considering that such adjudicated facts have not been rebutted during the trial, the Trial
Chamber finds beyond a reasonable doubt that on 4 February l994 at 11:00 hours, three mortar
shells struck a residential neighbourhood in Dobrinja killing at least eight people including a child
and injuring at least 18 people including two children.
344.
The Trial Chamber finds that the attack occurred in a civilian area with no military activities
in the vicinity.897 The Trial Chamber also finds that the only reasonable inference to be drawn from
the evidence is that the victims of this attack were civilians not taking part in hostilities at the time
the incident occurred. Furthermore, the Trial Chamber notes that many of the victims were engaged
in casual civilian activities.
345.
The Defence challenges the evidence of MP-228 insofar as it relates to the source of fire. It
points out that MP-228’s uncorroborated findings contain just conclusions and do not include any
specific evidence on the angle of descent, range of fire, the charge of the shell or other criteria
889
890
891
892
893
894
895
896
897
Ex. P2330, Annex to the Expert Report of Ewa Tabeau, List of Casualties of the Sarajevo Siege,
10 September 1992 – 10 October 1994, pp 386, 529.
Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts I, 224.
Ex. P70, Witness Statement of Zlatko Me|edovi}, 20 November 1995, pp 1, 3; Ex. P449 (under seal), p. 2.
Ex. P447 (under seal), p. 3. See Ex. P449 (under seal), p. 2.
Ex. P70, Witness Statement of Zlatko Me|edovi}, 20 November 1995, p. 3.
Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts I, 221.
Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts I, 222.
Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts I, 223, 226.
Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts I, 208-2011, 212-220, 224.
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necessary to determine the origin of fire.898 The Defence submits that the mere establishing of the
direction of fire is not conclusive of the origin of fire as any position along the axis of fire could be
a potential source of fire for the shell.899 It further points out in this respect that the evidence of MP238, a member of the Bosnian unit charged with the ballistics investigations, suggests that the
location of the ABiH forces in the line of fire was not considered as an essential factor in
establishing the origin of fire with regard to another shelling incident.900
346.
The Defence also specifically challenges the credibility of MP-228. It argues that as an
employee of the Bosnian Government, he had “no interest in concluding that anyone other than the
SRK was responsible for firing the shells” since “it benefited the Bosnian Government to exploit
the situation to obtain favourable responses from the international community”.901
347.
Finally, according to the Defence, the fact that this incident was omitted in the indictment
against Ratko Mladi} and Radovan Karad`i} may lead to the “most reasonable” inference that the
Prosecution investigators were unable to reach the conclusion that Bosnian Serbs were
responsible.902
348.
The Chamber notes that MP-228, in concluding that the shells originated in the SRK held
territory, does not give any details on how, having established the direction of fire, his team reached
the conclusion as to the origin of fire. The Chamber however finds the Defence’s credibility
challenge to MP-228 to be speculative and that the fact that certain elements were not taken into
account in another investigation has limited weight in the present considerations.903 Consequently,
the Trial Chamber has no reason to doubt the conclusions reached by MP-228.
349.
The Trial Chamber therefore finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the shells fired were the
120mm mortar shells fired from the VRS-held positions at Lukavica.
(c) 5 February 1994 (Incident A3)
(i) Indictment
5 February 1994: A 120mm mortar shell hit a crowded open air market called “Markale” situated
in a civilian area of Old Town Sarajevo, killing at least 60 people and wounding over 140 people.
The origin of fire was VRS-held territory approximately to the north/north east.904
898
899
900
901
902
903
904
Defence Final Brief, para. 527.
Defence Final Brief, para. 530.
Defence Final Brief, para. 528.
Ibid.
Defence Final Brief, para. 529.
See also infra para. 408.
Scheduled Incident A3.
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(ii) Incident
350.
Markale market was an open air market where vendors sold their goods.905 It was located in
the city centre, approximately 100 metres from the City Market on Mula-Mustafe Ba{eskije
Street.906
351.
On 5 February 1994, between 12:00-12:30 hours, a projectile exploded in Markale
market.907
352.
On that day, Muradif ^elik, who was retired at the time, was looking after one of the stalls
on the market.908 When the shell exploded, he was wounded by shrapnel, mainly in his right leg and
shoulder.909 He was taken to Ko{evo Hospital and then transferred to State Hospital where he
stayed for two months and ten days. He underwent plastic surgery for his leg,910 but the medical
staff was unable to remove the shrapnel from of his shoulder.911
353.
Ezrema Boškailo was shopping at the Markale market when the explosion of the projectile
knocked her over.912
354.
Documentary evidence as well as the facts adjudicated in the Gali} case show that, overall,
the shell fired on 5 February 1994 killed over 60 persons and wounded over 140.913
355.
The Trial Chamber took judicial notice of the fact that the 120mm mortar was deliberately
fired from SRK-controlled territory,914 from the direction north-northeast of the market or at a
bearing of approximately 18 degrees.915 Although the Defence has not explicitly challenged these
adjudicated facts,916 it nevertheless led evidence that can be treated as rebuttal evidence in this
respect. The Trial Chamber notes that Ex. D666, a report of the UN Investigation Team established
905
906
907
908
909
910
911
912
913
914
915
Mesud Jusufovi}, T. 3274 (private session); Ex. P524, Transcript of Sead Bešić from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi},
T. 2577.
Ex. P526, Criminal Investigation File of Sarajevo Police Redarding Scheduled Incident A9, 28 August 1995,
p. 2; Ex. P67, UNPROFOR Investigation Report on Scheduled Incident A9 (Markale Market, 28 August 1995),
p. 7. See also Sead Be{i}, T. 3289-3290. See infra para. 437.
Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts I, 243. See also MP-408, T. 6150, 6156 (closed session).
Ex. P412, Statement of Muradif Čelik, 7 January 2002, p. 2; Ex. P417 (under seal).
Ex. P414 (under seal), pp 6, 9, 27. See Ex. P423, Medical Documentation, p. 6.
Ex. P412, Statement of Muradif Čelik, 7 January 2002, p. 2; Ex. P417 (under seal).
Ex. P412, Statement of Muradif Čelik, 7 January 2002, p. 2; Ex. P416 (under seal), p. 4.
Adjudicted Facts I, 229.
Ex. P2330, Annex to the Expert Report of Ewa Tabeau, List of Casualties of the Sarajevo Siege, 10 September
1992 – 10 October 1994; Ex. P423, Medical Documentation (listing 127 wounded people admitted to hospital on
5 February 1994 (including 91 people admitted at around 12:35 hours) together with the diagnosis etc. and the
names of 13 people transferred to another clinic); Ex. P424, Medical Documentation; Ex. P414 (under seal);
Ex. P422, Extract from the Sarajevo Clinical Centre Reception and Triage Block for 1 June 1993, 12 July 1993,
22 January 1994 and 5 February 1994 (91 people admitted around 12:35 hours); Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts I,
231, 250.
Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts I, 248.
Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts I, 245-246.
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to investigate this incident, stated that it could not establish the exact origin of fire and consequently
which side of the conflict fired the shell.917 However, these findings were taken into account by the
Trial Chamber in Gali} while reaching its conclusion that the VRS fired the shell. The Trial
Chamber therefore finds that Ex. D666 cannot be seen as rebutting the adjudicated facts from the
Gali} Trial Judgement that identify the origin of fire. Similarly, the Trial Chamber finds that Ex.
D566, a report sent from the commander of the SRK to the VRS Main Staff on 5 February 1994,
denying responsibility for this incident, does not have sufficient weight to rebut the Gali}
adjudicated facts.
356.
The Trial Chamber further took judicial notice of the fact that there was no military
objective in the area of the Markale market918 and that the shell was deliberately aimed at
civilians.919
(iii) Findings
357.
The Trial Chamber finds beyond a reasonable doubt that on 5 February 1994, a 120mm
mortar shell exploded in the Markale market killing at least 60 persons and wounding over 140
others. A cross-checking of the information contained in the list of people wounded that day in the
Stari Grad area of Sarajevo with the information stemming from the lists of people admitted to local
hospitals, including the exact time of admission and age of patients, allows for a finding that at least
45 people killed and 82 people wounded in the 5 February 1994 incident were civilians not taking
part in hostilities.920 In reaching this finding, the Trial Chamber has also considered the location and
the function played by the Markale market as a civilian public place.
358.
The Trial Chamber is satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the shells originated from
VRS-held territory and were deliberately aimed at civilians.
916
917
918
919
920
Defence Final Brief, para. 531.
See Ex. D666, UNPROFOR Report on the Markale Market Shelling, 5 February 1994, p. 11.
Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts I, 239-241.
Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts I, 250.
The list of victims in Sarajevo lists several people killed that day either in other parts of Sarajevo or does not
specify the location; several names also seem to be duplicates; some names appearing on the medical lists do not
appear on the list of victims in Sarajevo, Ex. P2330, Annex to the Expert Report of Ewa Tabeau, List of
Casualties of the Sarajevo Siege, 10 September 1992 – 10 October 1994; Ex. P423, Medical Documentation;
Ex. P424, Medical Documentation; Ex. P414 (under seal); Ex. P422, Extract from the Sarajevo Clinical Centre
Reception and Triage Block for 1 June 1993, 12 July 1993, 22 January 1994 and 5 February 1994.
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(d) 22 December 1994 (Incident A4)
(i) Indictment
22 December 1994: Two 76mm shells in quick succession hit a flea market in the old commercial
quarter of Ba{~ar{ija in Old Town. Two persons were killed and seven were injured. The origin of
fire was Trebevi}, VRS positions.921
(ii) The Flea Market in the Old Town of Sarajevo
359.
The flea market is located behind the national library in the Ba{}ar{ija neighbourhood of the
Old Town Sarajevo, between the Petra Ko~i}a and the Danila Ili}a Streets.922 The area of the flea
market is a densely populated civilian area.923 In December 1994, there were no military
installations in the vicinity of the market, though Witness Ekrem Suljevi} testified that uniformed
individuals could be found at the market. 924
(iii) Incident
360.
On 22 December 1994, at around 9:10 hours, two shells exploded in rapid succession in the
flea market.925 At that time, there were between 30 and 50 people in the area.926 Several eyewitnesses described the incident.927 Muradif ^elik, for instance, stated that he was at the flea market
that morning928 and heard the explosion of the first shell before it threw him to the ground.929 When
he got up, he ran to a nearby building.930 He also looked at the site of the explosion and saw smoke
and heard screams of the wounded.931 Ramiz Hod`i}, wounded in the first explosion, stated that he
heard a second explosion less than one minute after the first.932 He then saw many people running
921
922
923
924
925
926
927
928
929
930
931
932
Scheduled Incident A4.
Ekrem Suljevi}, T. 4742-4743, 4745; Ex. P415, Report by CSB Sarajevo on Shelling Incident of 22 December
1994, p. 17 B/C/S, numbers 1 and 2 and pp 59, 61, 63 (drawings of the two streets). See also Ex. C2 (under seal),
pp 164-165.
Ekrem Suljevi}, T. 4743. See this market marked on the map in Ex. P415, Report by CSB Sarajevo on Shelling
Incident of 22 December 1994, p. 18 B/C/S.
Ekrem Suljevi}, T. 4744-4745; Ex. P532 (under seal), para. 6. The closest military facility to the flea market was
the command post of the former JNA which was located rather far away on the other side of the river, Ex. P532
(under seal), para. 6.
Ex. P415, Report by CSB Sarajevo on Shelling Incident of 22 December 1994, pp 1, 17-29; Ex. P57, Witness
Statement of Ramiz Hod`i}, 22 November 1995, p. 2. See also Defence Adjudicated Facts, 37.
Ex. P415, Report by CSB Sarajevo on Shelling Incident of 22 December 1994, pp 1, 17-29.
Ex. P415, Report by CSB Sarajevo on Shelling Incident of 22 December 1994, pp 17-29.
Muradif ^elik was working at that time at the flea market and was there to arrange the goods on the counter,
Ex. P415, Report by CSB Sarajevo on Shelling Incident of 22 December 1994, p. 27.
Ibid.
Ibid. Another five or six other people entered the building with Muradif ^elik. Some of them were wounded,
ibid.
Ex. P415, Report by CSB Sarajevo on Shelling Incident of 22 December 1994, p. 27. See also in corroboration
of Muradif ^elik’s evidence the other statements of eye-witnesses reported in Ex. P415, Report by CSB Sarajevo
on Shelling Incident of 22 December 1994, pp 17-29.
Ex. P57, Witness Statement of Ramiz Hod`i}, 22 November 1995, p. 2.
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away and heard the sound of ambulance sirens.933 Shortly after, the police arrived and secured the
area.934
361.
After receiving first aid, the wounded were transported to the hospital as soon as possible.935
The explosions resulted in the killing of Mirsad Deli} and Hasan Hand`i}.936 The following seven
people were also injured, three of them seriously: Envera Sadovi}, Samir Mujkovi}, Rasim Krka,
Ramiz Hod`i}, Salih Luk{ija, Remzija Kihi} and Imet Pa}ariz.937 One of the injured, Ramiz Hod`i},
provided a statement to the Prosecution that he was wounded mainly on his right thigh by a large
piece of shrapnel caused by the first of the two explosions.938 Ramiz Hod`i} was treated at the
hospital in the aftermath of the explosion. A large piece of shrapnel was removed from his thigh.
Several small pieces of shrapnel however remained in his leg.939 In November 1995, Ramiz Hod`i}
was still suffering the consequences of these injuries.940
(iv) Investigation
362.
An on-site investigation was conducted by the Security Service Centre (“CSB”) in Sarajevo
which compiled a report that included photographs of the scene and an analysis of the bomb
fragments.941 The investigation team, including a ballistic expert, calculated the azimuth as 159
degrees and established that the two shells came from the south, that is, from the direction of Mount
Trebevi}, which was VRS-held territory at that time.942 It was also established that the first shell fell
933
934
935
936
937
938
939
940
941
942
Ibid.
Ex. P415, Report by CSB Sarajevo on Shelling Incident of 22 December 1994, p. 27.
Ex. P415, Report by CSB Sarajevo on Shelling Incident of 22 December 1994, p. 27. Some of the victims were
transported by taxi, Ex. P57, Witness Statement of Ramiz Hod`i}, 22 November 1995, p. 2.
Mirsad Deli} and Hasan Hand`i} were killed by shell fragments from the explosion, Ex. P415, Report by CSB
Sarajevo on Shelling Incident of 22 December 1994, pp 1-3 and pp 45-46 BCS (photographs of the victims).
Ex. P415, Report by CSB Sarajevo on Shelling Incident of 22 December 1994, pp 1-3, 14-15, also containing
medical documentation for some of the above victims and at pp 17-29 reporting statements of the injured persons
and eye-witnesses. See also Ex. P2227 (under seal); Ex. P2225 (under seal); Ex. P58 (under seal): Ex. P2221
(under seal); Ex. P2222 (under seal); Ex. P2226 (under seal).
Ex. P57, Witness Statement of Ramiz Hod`i}, 22 November 1995, p. 2; Ex. P58 (under seal). See also
Ex. P2222 (under seal). Ramiz Hod`i} stated that, at the moment of the explosion, he was talking with a person
called “Krka”, who also was severely wounded, Ex. P57, Witness Statement of Ramiz Hod`i}, 22 November
1995, p. 2.
Ex. P57, Witness Statement of Ramiz Hod`i}, 22 November 1995, p. 2; Ex. P58, Medical Documentation,
22 December 1994.
Ex. P57, Witness Statement of Ramiz Hod`i}, 22 November 1995, p. 2.
Ex. P532 (under seal), para. 4. The on-site investigation team consisted of ten officers and included an
investigating judge, officials from the homicide department and crime forensic technicians of the CSB, as well as
officials from the crime prevention unit of Stari Grad, Nedžib Ðozo, T. 4524, 4541-4542; Ex. P415, Report by
CSB Sarajevo on Shelling Incident of 22 December 1994, p. 2; Ex. P533 (under seal), para. 2; Ex. P534 (under
seal).
Ex. P532 (under seal), para. 5; Ekrem Suljevi}, T. 4747. Suljevi} clarified that the axis of symmetry was
determined on the spot (with the use of the traces left, the impressions left by the fragments etc.), and these data
were transferred to the map in order to be able to show the precise trajectory of the projectile. The map became
an element of the report, Ekrem Suljevi}, T. 4746-4747, 4772-4773, 4785, 4798, 4806. See also Defence
Adjudicated Facts, 42, 44, stating that “[t]he UNMO report concurred with the KDZ on the direction of fire,
determining that the direction of fire was 160 degrees, which was south, southeast of the impact site”.
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“on a curb of the D. Ili}a [Street] in front of stalls while the other fell just outside the entrance door
of a consignment shop at P. Ko~i}a Street 3”.943
363.
Based on the crater analysis and fragments found on the scene, the CSB investigative team
concluded that two 76mm shells with UTI M68 fuses had been fired from a gun or cannon.944 A
parallel investigation on the incident was also conducted by UNPROFOR.945 While UNPROFOR
generally agreed with the findings made by the CSB, it concluded that the two projectiles were fired
from an 82mm mortar.946
(v) Findings
364.
The Trial Chamber finds beyond a reasonable doubt that on 22 December 1994 at about
9:10 hours, two shells exploded in rapid succession at the flea market in Ba{~ar{ija, killing two
people and injuring seven. The Trial Chamber also finds that the shells were 76mm with UTI M68
fuses and not 82mm, as concluded by the UNPROFOR team. Ekrem Suljevi} testified that the fuses
UTI M68, fragments which were found on the site, were not used in 82mm mortar shells.947
Furthermore, the witness testified that mortar shells, unlike artillery shells, normally have a
stabiliser or a fin attached to them to maintain the direction of the projectile. In that incident,
however, no stabilisers related to 82mm mortar shells were found on the ground.948
365.
The Trial Chamber also finds that the only reasonable inference to be drawn from the
evidence is that all the victims were civilians not taking part in hostilities at the time the incident
occurred. The Trial Chamber bases its finding on: (i) the evidence that the flea market was a very
densely populated civilian area and there were no military installations or activities around; (ii) the
report of the civilian police stating that the victims were “civilians”; and (iii) the statements of eye-
943
944
945
946
947
948
Ex. P415, Report by CSB Sarajevo on Shelling Incident of 22 December 1994, p. 3 and the photos included
therein (pp 21-44, BCS). The places where the two projectiles impacted were marked on a drawing which was
included in the CBS report, Ekrem Suljevi}, T. 4742, 4745; Ex. P415, Report by CSB Sarajevo on Shelling
Incident of 22 December 1994, p. 17 B/C/S, numbers 1-2.
Ekrem Suljevi}, T. 4759, 4781, 4784, 4786-4787, 4791, 4793-4794, 4798; Ex. P2217, Report of the MUP of
BiH on On-Site Investigation Concerning 22 December 1994 Shelling 22 December 1994, p. 2; Ex. D74, Picture
Depicting a Fuse. The Witness also testified that a similar gun (a mountain gun) was used in other incidents
involving the shelling of Sarajevo, including the medical centre, Ekrem Suljevi}, T. 4781.
Ekrem Suljevi}, T. 4795. See also Defence Adjudicated Facts, 38.
Ekrem Suljevi}, T. 4795.
Ekrem Suljevi}, T. 4751, 4793. The investigators were using a military book published by the Federal Secretariat
for National Defence of the former Yugoslavia with a detailed description of the shells and what type of fuses
are used for which type of shell, Ekrem Suljevi}, T. 4763, 4804.
Ekrem Suljevi}, T. 4752-4753. The witness also noted that it could be excluded that the fin penetrated into the
ground as it hit a hard surface (asphalt or concrete), Ekrem Suljevi}, T. 4753. See also Defence Adjudicated
Facts, 40.
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witnesses and injured referring to the civilian status of the victims and the fact that the victims were
engaged, on the day of the incident, in civilian activities and had civilian clothes.949
366.
As to the question whether the shells originated from VRS-held positions, the evidence
shows that both VRS and ABiH forces were present in the area of Mount Trebevi}. In this regard,
Suljevi} testified that the confrontation line between VRS and ABiH forces was located in the area
of Mount Trebevi}.950 Suljevi} was also unable to determine the origin of fire –which is essential in
this specific case - but only “believed” that this came from “the region that was controlled by the
Army of Republika Srpska”.951 No evidence was adduced in relation to the charge of the shells,
which would have provided an indication as to the distance travelled by the shells.952 The Trial
Chamber is therefore satisfied that the shells were launched from the direction of Mount Trebevi},
but cannot conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the two shells which hit the flea market
originated from VRS-held positions.
(e) 24 May 1995 (Incident A5)
(i) Indictment
24 May 1995: A missile projectile landed and exploded on the asphalt of Safeta Zajke Street,
killing two and injuring five people. The projectile came from the south east, direction
Lukavica.953
(ii) Incident
367.
Safeta Zajke Street is located in the Novi Grad municipality of Sarajevo, near the railway
technical school and across the railway tracks behind the television building.954 In May 1995, Anña
Gotovac lived at 43 Safeta Zajke Street, 100-150 metres away from the television building.955 A
power transformer station, the Novi Grad municipal building and a wire factory were also
949
950
951
952
953
954
955
In this regard, the Trial Chamber notes that one victim, Mirsad Deli}, on the day of the incident, wore an
uniform which, however, belonged to the civilian police and not to the military, Ex. P415, Report by CSB
Sarajevo on Shelling Incident of 22 December 1994, pp 1-3 and pp 45-46 BCS (photos of the victims).
Ekrem Suljevi}, T. 4747; Ex. P415, Report by CSB Sarajevo on Shelling Incident of 22 December 1994, p. 13
B/C/S, showing a map of Sarajevo with the area indicating the direction of fire. See also Defence Adjudicated
Facts, 46 stating that “[b]oth ^olina Kapa, an ABiH-held territory, and Vidikovac, an SRK-held territory, are
located at Trebevi} at a close proximity to the line of fire identified by the witness”; D73, Map of Sarajevo
Marked by Ekrem Suljevi}.
Ekrem Suljevi}, T. 4747-4749. See also Defence Adjudicated Facts, 43, stating that “[t]he KDZ investigative
team did not calculate the distance from which the shell was fired or the angle of dissent”.
See Defence Adjudicated Facts, 47-48, the latter stating that “[t]he charge ₣of a mortar shellğ determines the
speed, and thus, the distance travelled by the shell. The best evidence for that comes from the depth of the crater
and the composition of the ground”. See also Defence Adjudicated Facts, 50.
Scheduled Incident A5.
Ex. P125, Witness Statement of Anña Gotovac, 17 May 2006, para. 2; Ex. C2 (under seal), pp 193-194.
Ex. P126, Transcript of Anña Gotovac in Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 4465; Anña Gotovac, T. 786.
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nearby.956 This area was not normally targeted by sniper fire, although it was constantly shelled.957
ABiH units were positioned on Mount @u~ approximately two kilometres from Safeta Zajke
Street.958 An|a Gotovac testified that she never saw any military activities in her street or
neighbourhood.959
368.
On 24 May 1995, at about 10:00 hours, Anña Gotovac was outside her house sitting at a
table in front of her garage.960 She heard a noise, first quite soft and then louder, that sounded like a
low-flying plane.961 Before she had a chance to look, there was an explosion.962 She grabbed the
table, but the force of the explosion pulled it out of her hands, knocked her over,963 and utterly
destroyed the roof of her house.964 Gotovac then heard screams after the explosion.965
369.
Anña Gotovac was wounded by a piece of shrapnel which penetrated her left shoulder and
lodged near her eighth rib.966 Taken to the State Hospital by a neighbour, she underwent surgery to
remove the shrapnel.967 After the surgery, she was discharged but needed daily after-care for two
months.968 Gotovac also testified that another individual lost his legs, and a neighbour was wounded
in the same incident.969
370.
Anña Gotovac does not know where the projectile came from, however, she was told that
the projectile came from Hresa, or possibly Trebevi}.970 She believes that the television building
was hit by another projectile that same day.971
956
957
958
959
960
961
962
963
964
965
966
967
968
969
970
971
Anña Gotovac, T. 786.
Anña Gotovac, T. 784-785; Ex. P125, Witness Statement of Anña Gotovac, 17 May 2006, para. 3. Before the
incident of 24 May 1995, her house had not been directly hit; however throughout the war, shells were
constantly exploding nearby, Ex. P125, Witness Statement of Anña Gotovac, 17 May 2006, para. 5.
Transcript of MP-228, 19 January 2009, T. 2727; Ex. P458, CSB Official Report, 26 May 1995, p. 3; Ex. P451,
Transcript of MP-228 in Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, 18 April 2007, T. 4683.
Ex. P125, Witness Statement of Anña Gotovac, 17 May 2006, para. 4; Ex. P126, Transcript of Anña Gotovac in
Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 4455.
Ex. P124, Witness Statement of Anña Gotovac, 12 March 1997, para. 3.
Ex. P124, Witness Statement of Anña Gotovac, 12 March 1997, para. 3; Anña Gotovac, T. 784.
Ex. P124, Witness Statement of Anña Gotovac, 12 March 1997, para. 3. See also Ex. P37, Witness Statement of
Enes Ja{arevi}, 10 March 1997, para. 4; Ex. P38, Witness Statement of Enes Ja{arevi}, 19 May 2006, para. 3;
Ex. P39, Transcript of Enes Ja{arevi} from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 2994-2995.
Ex. P124, Witness Statement of Anña Gotovac, 12 March 1997, para. 3.
Ex. P126, Transcript of Anña Gotovac in Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 4454; Ex. P124, Witness Statement of
Anña Gotovac, 12 March 1997, para. 3. Gotovac’s husband was still in the house, and was shouting because he
was unable to get out, Ex. P124, Witness Statement of Anña Gotovac, 12 March 1997, para. 3.
Ex. P124, Witness Statement of Anña Gotovac, 12 March 1997, para. 3.
Ex. P124, Witness Statement of Anña Gotovac, 12 March 1997, para. 3; Ex. P126, Transcript of Anña Gotovac
in Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 4454-4455.
Ibid.
Ex. P124, Witness Statement of Anña Gotovac, 12 March 1997, para. 3; Ex. P127 (under seal).
Ex. P124, Witness Statement of Anña Gotovac, 12 March 1997, para. 3.
Ex. P124, Witness Statement of Anña Gotovac, 12 March 1997, para. 4; Anña Gotovac, T. 782.
Ex. P125, Witness Statement of Anña Gotovac, 17 May 2006, para. 2. See infra paras 378-385.
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371.
The explosion in Safeta Zajke Street killed Ai{a Hrustan and Ivo Mileti}972 and wounded
Franjo Toli}, D`emal Kukuljac, Igor Vu~i~evi}, An|a Gotovac and Dra`en Gelo.973 Witness MP228, a member of the CSB, testified that all the victims were civilians.974 He inferred the status of
victims, inter alia, from their age and clothing.975
(iii) Investigation
372.
In the early afternoon of 24 May 1995, the CSB and members of the Department for
Forensic and Anti-Terrorism (“KSZ”) conducted an investigation on the incident.976 Upon his
arrival at the scene, a member of the CSB took photographs, marked pieces of evidence with
numbers and prepared a sketch of the site.977 Fragments and other material collected were
transmitted to the Crime Prevention and Detection Unit of the MUP for expert analysis.978
373.
According to the report prepared by the CSB, the team concluded that the projectile was
fired from the south-east, the Lukavica area held by the VRS.979 Such conclusion was based on the
fact that fragments of the projectile were embedded in the asphalt at a certain angle and the
projectile had made a funnel-shaped crater in a south-easterly direction.980
374.
The CSB report also concluded that the extensive damage caused by the explosion could not
have been caused by a mortar shell, tank shell or by a shell fired from a gun.981 The expert report of
the Crime Prevention and Detection Unit of the MUP reached the conclusion that the bomb used
was most likely a Fugasno Avio Bombes 250 (“FAB 250”),982 propelled by four 122mm rocket
972
973
974
975
976
977
978
979
980
981
982
Ex. P2234 (under seal). See also Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts III, 30.
Ex. P458, CSB Official Report, 26 May 1995; Ex. P448 (under seal), para. 12. See Ex. P2230 (under seal);
Ex. P2231 (under seal). See also Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts III, 30.
Ex. P451, Transcript of MP-228 in Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, 18 April 2007, T. 4626.
Ex. P451, Transcript of MP-228 in Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, 18 April 2007, T. 4657-4658.
Ex. P451, Transcript of MP-228 in Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, 18 April 2007, T. 4626; Ex. P448 (under seal),
p. 3; Ex. P454, Sketch of Location of Shelling Incident at Safeta Zajke Street, 24 May 1995; Ex. P455, CSB
Report on Forensic on-site Investigation, 26 May 1995, p. 2.
Ex. P451, Transcript of MP-228 in Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, 18 April 2007, T. 4624; Ex. P448 (under seal),
p. 3; Ex. P454, Sketch of Location of Shelling Incident at Safeta Zajke Street, 24 May 1995; Ex. P455, CSB
Report on Forensic on-site Investigation, 26 May 1995, p. 2.
Ex. P461 (under seal), T. 2471, 2473. See also Ex. P452, Forensic Report, 5 June 1995. A short description of
the event as well as of each single piece found on the scene accompanied the transmission of the material,
Ex. P461 (under seal), T. 2474-2475. See also Ex. P452, Forensic Report, 5 June 1995, p. 1.
Ex. P455, CSB Report on Forensic on-site Investigation, 26 May 1995, p. 1; Ex. P458, CSB Official Report, 26
May 1995; Ex. P451, Transcript of MP-228 from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, 18 April 2007, T. 4628-4631;
Thorbjorn Overgard, T. 2950-2951; Ex. P37, Witness Statement of Enes Ja{arevi}, 10 March 1997, para. 4. See
also Ex. P448 (under seal), p. 4; Ex. P38, Witness Statement of Enes Ja{arevi}, 19 May 2006, para. 3; Ex. P39,
Transcript of Enes Ja{arevi} from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 2994; Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts III, 31-32.
Ex. P451, Transcript of MP-228 in Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, 18 April 2007, T. 4629. MP-228 testified that
while the investigation team of the CBS would normally include ballistic experts, whose task would be to give
the final opinion regarding the line of fire, there were none present for that incident, Ex. P451, Transcript of MP228 in Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, 18 April 2007, T. 4629.
Ex. P451, Transcript of MP-228 in Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, 18 April 2007, T. 4683.
MP-238, T-2736; Ex. P461 (under seal), T. 2473. See also Ex. P452, Forensic Report, 5 June 1995, p. 2;
Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts III, 29.
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motors attached to the air-bomb by a metal sheath.983 This was supported by the fact that the items
that were collected at the scene included large pipes and pieces of tin, which are usually found
where a modified air bomb explodes.984
375.
MP-238, a member of the KSZ, testified that the Bosnian government forces did not possess
modified air bombs.985 Furthermore, the witness testified that the ABiH did not have the rocket
engines which were necessary to launch modified air bombs.986
(iv) Findings
376.
The Trial Chamber finds beyond a reasonable doubt that on 24 May 1995, at about 10:00
hours, a modified air bomb, model FAB 250, landed and exploded in Safeta Zajke Street, Novi
Grad municipality, killing two and injuring five. The Trial Chamber also finds that the only
reasonable inference to be drawn from the evidence is that all the victims were civilians and not
taking part in hostilities at the time the incident occurred. The Trial Chamber also notes the
testimony of MP-228, according to which the victims were civilians and the shell fell in a
residential area with only family houses, killing and injuring people inside.
377.
The Trial Chamber also finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the shells originated from
VRS-held territory.
(f) 24 May 1995 (Incident A6)
(i) Indictment
24 May 1995: A modified air-bomb landed at Majdanska Street. Two civilians were killed and at
least six were wounded. The origin of fire was determined as coming from the south-east, the VRS
territory of Pavlovac.987
(ii) Incident
378.
On 24 May 1995, Enes Ja{arevi}, an electrician, was working at the Otoka transformer
station, located behind the municipality building of Novi Grad in Sarajevo and 100-150 metres
983
984
985
986
987
This bomb, which was intended to be dropped from planes, had been modified with the addition of rocket motors
known as Grad which allowed the launching of those bombs from the ground, Ex. P461 (under seal), T. 2473;
Ex. P452, Forensic Report, 5 June 1995, p. 2.
Ex. P452, Forensic Report, 5 June 1995, p. 1. The investigation team found “parts of the detonator of the aerial
bomb, the tin-plate connecting the VBR rockets to the aerial bomb, also a large number of other parts and
shrapnel from the aerial bomb and the VBR rocket”, Ex. P458, CSB Official Report, 26 May 1995. See also
Ex. P448 (under seal), para. 14; Ex. P453, Photographs, 24 May 1995.
Ex. P461 (under seal), T. 2477, testifying that the majority of the weapons were handed over by the JNA to the
VRS when they withdrew from Bosnia.
Ex. P461 (under seal), T. 2476-2477.
Scheduled Incident A6.
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away from the TV building, which is across Majdanska Street.988 A primary school and the Opacno
residential buildings were located nearby.989 There were no military positions anywhere near the
transformer station,990 nor had Ja{arevi} noticed any military personnel or military activity in the
vicinity on that day.991
379.
At around 10:00 hours, an air bomb fell. Ja{arevi} heard an unusual sound of something
flying over from the direction of Lukavica and a subsequent explosion “somewhere behind the TV
building”.992 After 14:00 hours, a second air bomb exploded when Ja{arevi} had just left the
transformer building with his foreman, Sulejman Praško, and a colleague, Salko Slato.993 The
foreman had remained behind while the two other men were some 10 metres from the gate.994 The
bomb exploded behind them, inside the transformer fence, hitting the bottom of a pylon, which
collapsed.995 The explosion threw the men to the middle of the street.996 Ja{arevi} saw the air bomb
flying from the direction of Mojmilo Hill, although he could not say exactly from where it
originated. 997
380.
As a result of the explosion, Sulejman Praško, who had remained behind,998 died instantly,
although Ja{arevi} could not see any apparent injuries from a quick look at him.999 Salko Slato was
988
989
990
991
992
993
994
995
996
997
998
999
Ex. P37, Witness Statement of Enes Ja{arevi}, 10 March 1997, para. 4; Ex. P38, Witness Statement of Enes
Ja{arevi}, 19 May 2006, para. 4; Ex. P39, Transcript of Enes Ja{arevi} from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 2988;
Ex. P43, Photographs (Scheduled Incident A6 - Majdanska Street, 24 May 1995). The buildings were marked by
Ja{arevi} in an aerial image of the area, Ex. P52, Aerial View of Sarajevo Marked by Enes Ja{arevi}; Enes
Ja{arevi}, T. 662-663.
Ex. P52, Aerial View of Sarajevo Marked by Enes Ja{arevi}; Enes Ja{arevi}, T. 662-663.
Ex. P38, Witness Statement of Enes Ja{arevi}, 19 May 2006, para. 4; Ex. P39, Transcript of Enes Ja{arevi} from
Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 2991-2992.
Enes Ja{arevi}, T. 663.
Ex. P37, Witness Statement of Enes Ja{arevi}, 10 March 1997, para. 4; Ex. P38, Witness Statement of Enes
Ja{arevi}, 19 May 2006, para. 3. Ex. P39, Transcript of Enes Ja{arevi} from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 2994.
The Trial Chamber has already found that this bomb fell in Safeta Zajke Street, see supra para. 376.
Ex. P39, Transcript of Enes Ja{arevi} from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 2990, 2995; Ex. P37, Witness
Statement of Enes Ja{arevi}, 10 March 1997, para. 4; Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts III, 33.
Ex. P37, Witness Statement of Enes Ja{arevi}, 10 March 1997, para. 4; Ex. P38, Witness Statement of Enes
Ja{arevi}, 19 May 2006, para. 5; Ex. P39, Transcript of Enes Ja{arevi} from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 2996.
Ex. P38, Witness Statement of Enes Ja{arevi}, 19 May 2006, para. 3; Ex. P39, Transcript of Enes Ja{arevi} from
Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 2997-2998. The bomb also damaged the office building but without destroying it
completely.
Ex. P37, Witness Statement of Enes Ja{arevi}, 10 March 1997, para. 5. See also Ex. P39, Transcript of Enes
Ja{arevi} from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 2996; Ex. P44, Photographs (Scheduled Incident A6 - Majdanska
Street, 24 May 1995).
Ex. P37, Witness Statement of Enes Ja{arevi}, 10 March 1997, para. 4; Ex. P39, Transcript of Enes Ja{arevi}
from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 2999; Ex. P44, Photographs (Scheduled Incident A6 - Majdanska Street,
24 May 1995).
Ex. P39, Transcript of Enes Ja{arevi} from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 2996.
Ex. P37, Witness Statement of Enes Ja{arevi}, 10 March 1997, para. 7; Ex. P38, Witness Statement of Enes
Ja{arevi}, 19 May 2006, para. 5. Ex. P39, Transcript of Enes Ja{arevi} from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 2998.
Ex. P2233 (under seal). See also Ex. P49, Photographs (Scheduled Incident A6 - Majdanska Street, 24 May
1995).
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hit in the back and Ja{arevi} was injured in his legs and right arm. Jašarevi} was eventually brought
to the State Hospital in Marin Dvor.1000
381.
A report prepared by the CSB indicated that, in addition to Sulejman Praško, another person,
Nezir Huseinovi}, was killed.1001 Six people were injured, namely, Salko Slato, Enes Ja{arevi},
Fatima Konakovi}, Goran Jeli~i}, Lucija Juri{i} and Mira Lovri}.1002
(iii) Investigation
382.
According to a CSB report on the incident, the second bomb made a crater which was about
five metres long, 1.5 metres wide and 1.5 metres deep. Based on the analysis of the crater, which
was facing south, it was concluded that the second bomb had been fired from the same place as the
bomb which fell in Safeta Zajke Street, that is, Lukavica.1003 Witness MP-228, a crime technician
who participated in the investigation, stated that the projectile came from the south-east, a hill
named Pavlovac.1004
383.
The CSB report also concluded that the projectile consisted of a modified aerial bomb with
multiple rocket-launchers (“VBR rockets”), similar to the one which exploded in Safeta Zajke
Street.1005 Witness MP-228 testified that he assumed that it was a modified air-bomb in light of the
devastation caused by the explosion, which included a large hole in the ground and vast damage to
surrounding buildings.1006 The forensic section of the MUP which conducted an expert analysis on
the traces of the explosion confirmed that the pieces found on the site of the explosion “probably”
belong to a FAB-250 aircraft bomb propelled by five 122mm GRAD type rockets.1007
(iv) Findings
384.
The Trial Chamber finds beyond a reasonable doubt that on 24 May 1995 at about 14:00
hours, a modified air bomb, FAB-250, exploded at Majdanska Street, killing two individuals and
1000
1001
1002
1003
1004
1005
1006
1007
Ex. P37, Witness Statement of Enes Ja{arevi}, 10 March 1997, paras 6-7; Ex. P38, Witness Statement of Enes
Ja{arevi}, 19 May 2006, para. 6; Ex. P39, Transcript of Enes Ja{arevi} from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 29972998.
Ex. P50, Photographs (Scheduled Incident A6 - Majdanska Street, 24 May 1995).
Ex. P458, CSB Official Report, 26 May 1995, p. 3.
Ex. P458, CSB Official Report, 26 May 1995, pp 2-3. See also Ex. P44, Photographs (Scheduled Incident A6 Majdanska Street, 24 May 1995).
Ex. P451, Transcript of MP-228 in Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, 18 April 2007, T. 4637, 4689; Ex. P448 (under
seal), p. 4.
Ex. P458, CSB Official Report, 26 May 1995, p. 2.
Ex. P451, Transcript of MP-228 from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, 18 April 2007, T. 4638; Ex. P458, CSB
Official Report, 26 May 1995, p. 2; Ex. P44, Photographs (Scheduled Incident A6 - Majdanska Street, 24 May
1995).
Ex. P457, Criminal Investigation File Relating to the Shelling of Majdanska Street, 6 June 1995.
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injuring six others.1008 The Trial Chamber also finds that the only reasonable inference to be drawn
from the evidence is that all the victims were civilians not taking part in hostilities at the time the
incident occurred. The bomb fell inside the area of the transformer building, which is a civilian
object, with no military personnel or military activity inside or in the proximity of that building.
Furthermore, the victims were employees at the transformer building and/or engaged in civilian
activities.1009
385.
The Trial Chamber also finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the shell was launched from
south or south-east, where the VRS held their positions.1010
(g) 18 June 1995 (Incident A7)
(i) Indictment
18 June 1995: A 120mm mortar shell struck civilians at a water distribution centre in Marka
Ore{kovi}a Street, Dobrinja. Seven persons were killed and twelve injured. The origin of the fire
was Ned`ari}i, VRS territory.1011
(ii) The Water Distribution Pump at the Simon Bolivar Elementary School in Dobrinja
386.
The Simon Bolivar Elementary School is located on Marka Ore{kovi}a Street1012 in
Dobrinja.1013 Sometime in May 1992, it was shelled and burned down.1014 Thereafter a water-pump
was installed in a hall within the ruins of the school building, which provided some shelter for
people to queue in safety for water distribution.1015 The water-pump was actually in open air.1016
1008
1009
1010
1011
1012
1013
1014
1015
1016
See Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts III, 33, stating that “a FAB-250 modified air bomb exploded on Majdanska
Street in the afternoon of 24 May 1995”.
Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts III, 34, stating that “two civilians were killed, and six civilians were injured, five of
them seriously, as a result of the explosion on Majdanska Street”.
Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts III, 35-36, stating that “Lukavica and Pavlovac were both controlled by the SRK”
and that “the modified air bomb that exploded in Majdanska Street originated from SRK-held territory”.
Scheduled Incident A7.
Ex. P120, Official Report of the Ministry of the Interior, 22 June 1995, p. 1. See also Ex. P115, Transcript of
Azra Šišić from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 2830.
Ex. P122, Map Marked by Azra [i{i}; Azra Šišić, T. 749.
Ex. P461 (under seal), T. 2460; Ex. P115, Transcript of Azra Šišić from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 28322833; Ex. P489, Transcript of Youssef Hajir from Prosecutor v. Gali}, T. 1681; Ex. P120, Official Report of the
Ministry of the Interior, 22 June 1995, p. 1.
Ex. P461 (under seal), T. 2459-2460; Ex. P115, Transcript of Azra Šišić from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi},
T. 2837.
Azra [i{i}, T. 768; Ex. P115, Transcript of Azra Šišić from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 2837, 2844; Ex. P121,
Witness Statement of Azra Šišić, 23 February 1996, para. 4; Ex. P461 (under seal), T. 2459. See also Ex. P120,
Official Report of the Ministry of the Interior, 22 June 1995, p. 1. On both sides of the hall there were concrete
walls and on the left side, when looking northwards from the entrance, there was a 4 metre high wall which
separated the hall from the gym, Ex. P120, Official Report of the Ministry of the Interior, 22 June 1995, pp 1-2.
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According to Azra [i{i}, the Simon Bolivar Elementary School water-pump was the safest in
Dobrinja.1017
387.
According to Azra [i{i}, Muharem, a man who lived in the neighbourhood, was put in
charge of the water-pump by the civil protection unit.1018
(iii) Incident
388.
A few days before 18 June 1995, the people from the neighbourhood heard that water would
be distributed, so they reserved their place in the line by placing their jerry-cans in line at the
school.1019 On 17 June 1995, there was too much shelling on Dobrinja to open the water
distribution.1020 The following morning, however, was quiet1021 and [i{i} heard that water would be
distributed that day, so she decided to go to the school.1022
389.
On 18 June 1995, a clear day, the police were present at the school in the morning, advising
people to avoid gathering all around the water pump, but rather to go there one at a time.1023 There
were about 50 to 70 people present at the water-line in the Simon Bolivar School.1024 Amongst them
were mostly women and children, but also some men.1025 At about 11:40 hours,1026 a mortar shell
hit the Simon Bolivar School1027 and exploded above people’s heads.1028
1017
1018
1019
1020
1021
1022
1023
1024
1025
1026
1027
1028
Azra [i{i}, T. 768; Ex. P115, Transcript of Azra Šišić from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 2837, 2840, 2844.
According to [i{i} the Simon Bolivar School was never shelled between May 1992 and 18 June 1995, Azra
[i{i}, T. 768-769.
According to Azra [i{i}, Muharem had been put in charge of the water-pump by the civil protection unit,
Ex. P121, Witness Statement of Azra Šišić, 23 February 1996, para. 7; Ex. P115, Transcript of Azra Šišić from
Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 2836, 2849.
Ex. P121, Witness Statement of Azra Šišić, 23 February 1996, para. 6; Ex. P115, Transcript of Azra Šišić from
Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 2834.
Ibid.
Ex. P115, Transcript of Azra Šišić from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 2840.
Ex. P115, Transcript of Azra Šišić from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 2834; Ex. P121, Witness Statement of
Azra Šišić, 23 February 1996, paras 6-7.
Ex. P121, Witness Statement of Azra Šišić, 23 February 1996, para. 10; Ex. P115, Transcript of Azra Šišić from
Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 2835, 2854. The witness was not absolutely sure whether it was the police or
civilian protection who warned them, Ex. P115, Transcript of Azra Šišić from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T.
2854.
Ex. P115, Transcript of Azra Šišić from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 2835. See also Ex. P121, Witness
Statement of Azra Šišić, 23 February 1996, para. 10.
Ibid.
Ex. P120, Official Report of the Ministry of the Interior, 22 June 1995, p. 2; Ex. P543, UNMO HQ Daily
Situation Report, 19 June 1995, p. 8; Ex. P468, Report on Simon Bolivar Elementary School Incident, 29 June
1995, p. 1. See also Ex. P115, Transcript of Azra Šišić from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 2839.
Defence Adjudicated Facts, 52; Ex. P121, Witness Statement of Azra Šišić, 23 February 1996, para. 10;
Ex. P115, Transcript of Azra Šišić from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 2836; Ex. P120, Official Report of the
Ministry of the Interior, 22 June 1995, pp 1-2; Ex. P460 (under seal), para. 12; Ex. P461 (under seal), T. 2460,
2464. See also MP-238, T. 2768, 2770; Ex. P478, Report on Firing Incident Involving Mortars in the Sarajevo
Area Dated 18 June 1995, 21 December 2006, pp 11, 13.
Ex. P461 (under seal), T. 2459 [about 10 cm above people’s heads], 2464 [2.5-3 meters above the ground];
Ex. P120, Official Report of the Ministry of the Interior, 22 June 1995, p. 2 [4 meters from the ground]; Ex.
P478, Report on Firing Incident Involving Mortars in the Sarajevo Area Dated 18 June 1995, 21 December 2006,
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390.
People were thrown on the ground by the explosion and were screaming.1029 [i{i} was
wounded on her right thigh and heel,1030 but she managed to reach her apartment building. From
there, she was brought to the near-by Dobrinja Hospital, where she was treated.1031
391.
Other wounded persons were taken to the Dobrinja Hospital.1032 At least one person, Re{ad
Imamovi}, died in the blast1033 and others died at the hospital,1034 including Azra [i{i}’s 19 year old
neighbour, Kenan ^izmi}.1035
392.
The following persons died as a result of the explosion: Bahrija Sijer~i}, Kenan ^izmi}, Izet
Kadi}, Re{ad Imamovi}, Sulejman Mehmedovi}, Safet Lon~ar and Nura Lon~ar.1036
393.
The persons who were injured as a result of the explosion were: Emira Novi}, Edin Smaji},
Mutimir Miu{kovi}, Afan Kalabi}, Azra [i{i}, Omer Mu{anovi}, Hasnija Begi}, Suada Sinanovi},
Muharem Mistri}, Bosa [u}ur, Muniba Ali} and Vladimir Milojevi}.1037
394.
According to one of the witnesses, all the victims were civilians.1038 There were neither
military facilities near the school,1039 nor combat positions or activities at the time the incident
occurred.1040 However, the command post of the Dobrinska Brigade of the ABiH was located at
about 150 metres from the Dobrinja Hospital, on the same street as the hospital.1041
1029
1030
1031
1032
1033
1034
1035
1036
1037
1038
1039
1040
1041
pp 11, 13 [3.2 meters from the ground on top of a wall]. See also Ex. P115, Transcript of Azra Šišić from
Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 2836; Ex. P121, Witness Statement of Azra Šišić, 23 February 1996, para. 10.
Ex. P121, Witness Statement of Azra Šišić, 23 February 1996, paras 11-13; Azra [i{i}, T. 772: Ex. P115,
Transcript of Azra Šišić from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 2856.
Ex. P121, Witness Statement of Azra Šišić, 23 February 1996, para. 15; Ex. P115, Transcript of Azra Šišić from
Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 2838-2839; Ex. P120, Official Report of the Ministry of the Interior, 22 June
1995, p. 2.
Ex. P121, Witness Statement of Azra Šišić, 23 February 1996, paras 15-17; Ex. P115, Transcript of Azra Šišić
from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 2838-2839. [i{i}’s apartment building and the Dobrinja Hospital were close
to the Simon Bolivar School, Ex. P115, Transcript of Azra Šišić in Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 2842-2843;
Ex. P117, Photograph marked by Azra Šišić in Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}.
Ex. P121, Witness Statement of Azra Šišić, 23 February 1996, para. 17; Ex. P115, Transcript of Azra Šišić from
Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 2842; Ex. P488 (under seal), pp 17-19. See also Ex. P487, Statement of Youssef
Hajir 17 June 2008, para. 3; MP-238, T. 2769-2770.
Ex. P121, Witness Statement of Azra Šišić, 23 February 1996, para. 19; Ex. P115, Transcript of Azra Šišić from
Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 2839.
Ex. P121, Witness Statement of Azra Šišić, 23 February 1996, para. 17; Ex. P115, Transcript of Azra Šišić from
Prosecutor v D. Milo{evi}, T. 2839; Ex. P488 (under seal), pp 21-34.
Ex. P115, Transcript of Azra Šišić from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 2839, 2841; Ex. P121, Witness Statement
of Azra Šišić, 23 February 1996, para. 17.
Ex. P120, Official Report of the Ministry of the Interior, 22 June 1995, p. 2; Ex. P488 (under seal), pp 21-34.
Ex. P120, Official Report of the Ministry of the Interior, 22 June 1995, pp 2-3; Ex. P488 (under seal), pp 17-19.
Ex. P461 (under seal), T. 2460; Ex. P120, Official Report of the Ministry of the Interior, 22 June 1995, p. 2
Ex. P461(under seal), T. 2460.
Ex. P120, Official Report of the Ministry of the Interior, 22 June 1995, p. 3.
Youssef Hajir, T. 2994; Ex. P117, Photograph Marked by Azra Šišić in Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}. For the
position of the confrontation lines, see Ex. P1518, Map of Sarajevo.
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(iv) Investigation
395.
On 18 June 1995, at 14:00 hours, a team consisting of seven Bosnian officials conducted the
on-site investigation at the Simon Bolivar School. It included members of the local police, the CSB,
Anti-Bomb-Squad (“KDZ”) and forensic officials, and a judge of the High Court of Sarajevo.1042
According to the official report of the CSB, the site was secured by the local police.1043 The team
found that the shell had exploded on the west wall of the Simon Bolivar School at about four meters
from the ground.1044 Traces of shrapnel could be seen on the surrounding walls, and pools of blood,
tissue, brain parts, fragments of human skulls were found around the water-pump.1045
396.
The team collected material from the scene, including the tail fin and several pieces of shell
shrapnel.1046 The tail fin of the projectile was found on the other side of the wall from where the
shell impacted.1047 It belonged to a 120mm mortar shell1048 and bore the markings “MK, M74
KV9307” in Cyrillic, indicating that this shell had been manufactured in July 1993 in the Kru{ik
factory,1049 a military production complex in Valjevo, Serbia.1050
397.
Because the shell hit the wall rather than a flat surface, it was impossible to determine the
angle of descent of the projectile.1051 However, based on the impact point on the west wall1052 and
1042
1043
1044
1045
1046
1047
1048
1049
1050
1051
1052
Ex. P120, Official Report of the Ministry of the Interior, 22 June 1995, p. 1; MP-238, T. 2767-2768.
Ex. P120, Official Report of the Ministry of the Interior, 22 June 1995, p. 1.
Ex. P120, Official Report of the Ministry of the Interior, 22 June 1995, p. 2. See also MP-238, T. 2768-2769;
Ex. P461 (under seal), T. 2459, 2464; Defence Adjudicated Facts, 52.
Ex. P120, Official Report of the Ministry of the Interior, 22 June 1995, p. 2; Ex. P461 (under seal), T. 2459,
2465; MP-238, T. 2769. The victims sustained most of their injuries to the upper bodies, because the explosion
occurred at 3 to 4 meters above the ground, causing the shrapnel to “[blow] off peoples’heads”, Ex. P461 (under
seal), T. 2465. See also Ex. P461 (under seal), T. 2459, 2464; MP-238, T. 2769. The death certificates of the
victims, show that most died as a result of head injuries, Ex. P488 (under seal), pp 21-34.
Ex. P120, Official Report of the Ministry of the Interior, 22 June 1995, p. 2; Ex. P460 (under seal), para. 12(a);
Ex. P468, Report on Simon Bolivar Elementary School Incident, 29 June 1995, p. 1; MP-238, T. 2769.
Ex. P120, Official Report of the Ministry of the Interior, 22 June 1995, p. 2; Ex. P461 (under seal), T. 2461,
2464; Ex. P460 (under seal), para. 12(a). MP-238 explained that, as the shell ignited at the level of the gym
window, the vacuum caused by the explosion drew the tail fin inside the gym, MP-238, T. 2749.
Ex. P120, Official Report of the Ministry of the Interior, 22 June 1995, p. 2; Ex. P468, Report on Simon Bolivar
Elementary School Incident, 29 June 1995, p. 2; Ex. P460 (under seal), para. 12.b; Ex. P478, Report on Firing
Incident Involving Mortars in the Sarajevo Area Dated 18 June 1995, 21 December 2006, p. 8.
Ex. P460 (under seal), para. 12(b); Ex. P468, Report on Simon Bolivar Elementary School Incident, 29 June
1995, p. 2. See also Ekrem Suljevi}, T. 4759-4760; Ex. P656, Report of MUP Sarajevo, KDZ Regarding
Explosions which Occurred on 22 May 1995, p. 2.
MP-238, T. 2785-2786.
Ex. P461(under seal), T. 2460. See also Ex. P478, Report on Firing Incident Involving Mortars in the Sarajevo
Area Dated 18 June 1995, 21 December 2006, pp 9-11.
Ex. P460 (under seal), paras 12(a), 12(f); Ex. P2376, Witness Statement of Mirsad Ku~anin, 12 November 1995,
p. 4; Ex. P120, Official Report of the Ministry of the Interior, 22 June 1995, p. 2. In describing the incident site,
the Official Report of the MUP, reads that “[o]n the left side when looking from the entrance northwards, there is
a 4 m high wall which separates [the pump] area from the gym”. The crater where the shell exploded was
observed “on the left wall 4 m above the ground”, Ex. P120, Official Report of the Ministry of the Interior, 22
June 1995, pp 1-2 (emphasis added). MP-238 testified that the impact point was close to the window edge on the
outside of the gym wall on the side facing Ned`ari}i, Ex. P460 (under seal), para. 12; Ex. P461 (under seal),
T. 2460, 2464.
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on the explosion traces on the walls,1053 the team established that the shell had been fired from a
north-westerly direction at 320 degrees.1054 MP-238 stated that the range of a 120mm mortar shell
was about “a couple of kilometres”.1055 On the axis of the azimuth, at a distance of about 1500
meters,1056 was the Serbian held area of Ned`ari}i, which the team identified as the origin of the
fire.1057
398.
A team of UNMOs arrived at the Simon Bolivar School about one and half hours after the
impact, when the Bosnian police had already left the site.1058 As the tail fin had been removed and
the victims taken to the Dobrinja Hospital,1059 they could not conduct a “proper investigation” or
confirm the findings of the Bosnian police as to the origin of fire.1060 Captain Hansen, one of the
UNMOs, however, stated that judging by the impact marks on the wall the shell was fired from the
north-west.1061 The UNMOs were also taken to the Dobrinja Hospital, where a Bosnian official
showed them the tail fin of the shell. Captain Hansen confirmed it was “definitely” the tail fin of a
120mm shell. Although he had no way of verifying whether it was the same tail fin removed from
the scene, he could see “no reason to lie about this”.1062
399.
During cross-examination, MP-238 was confronted with Captain Hansen’s statement that
given the location of the confrontation line, the mortar shell could have been fired by either the
ABiH or SRK.1063 The witness excluded the possibility that the shell could have been fired from
ABiH positions, as these were too close to the school.1064
400.
On the evening of 18 June 1995, a news report on the BiH television reported that the shell
had been fired from the Lukavica Barracks, which was to the east of the impact area and also held
1053
1054
1055
1056
1057
1058
1059
1060
1061
1062
1063
Ex. P120, Official Report of the Ministry of the Interior, 22 June 1995, p. 2; Ex. P461 (under seal), T. 2460; MP238, T. 2781.
Ex. P461 (under seal), T. 2460-2461; Ex. P2376, Witness Statement of Mirsad Ku~anin, 12 November 1995,
p. 4; Ex. P468, Report on Simon Bolivar Elementary School Incident, 29 June 1995, p. 2; Ex. P460 (under seal),
para. 12; MP-238, T. 2770. See also Ex. P478, Report on Firing Incident Involving Mortars in the Sarajevo Area
Dated 18 June 1995, 21 December 2006, pp 11-12.
MP-238, T. 2773. See also Ex. P478, Report on Firing Incident Involving Mortars in the Sarajevo Area Dated
18 June 1995, 21 December 2006, p. 11, stating that the range of the 120 mm mortar shell goes from about 300
meters to 6200 meters.
Ex. P468, Report on Simon Bolivar Elementary School Incident, 29 June 1995, p. 2. But see MP-238, T. 27732774. On this occasion the witness states that Ned`ari}i was at a couple of hundred metres from the Simon
Bolivar School. He however clarified that he did not mean 200 meters, but “a bit more than that” and referred
back to a map he had used during his investigation, MP-238, T. 2774.
Ex. P468, Report on Simon Bolivar Elementary School Incident, 29 June 1995, p. 2; Ex. P460 (under seal),
para. 12(f); Ex. P120, Official Report of the Ministry of the Interior, 22 June 1995, p. 2; Ex. P461 (under seal),
T. 2461.
MP-238, T. 2767. The UNMOs were accompanied there by a “Bosnian official”, MP-238 T. 2768; Ex. D512,
Witness Statement of Thomas Hansen, p. 5.
MP-238, T. 2769; Ex D512, Witness Statement of Thomas Hansen, p. 5.
Ex D512, Statement of Witness Thomas Hansen, pp 5-6; MP-238, T. 2770-2771.
Ex D512, Statement of Witness Thomas Hansen, pp 5-6; MP-238, T. 2769-2770, 2773.
Ex D512, Statement of Witness Thomas Hansen, p. 6; MP-238, T. 2771.
MP-238, T. 2767-2770, 2773; Ex D512, Statement of Witness Thomas Hansen, pp 5-6.
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by the VRS at the time.1065 Having heard such news, on the following day, two of the Bosnian
investigators returned to the incident site to re-examine the scene.1066 They confirmed the finding
made the previous day and unequivocally excluded the possibility that the shell could have been
fired from the Lukavica barracks,1067 as the shell would have had to turn around in the air to cause
impact on the west side of the wall.1068
401.
A UNMO situation report dated 19 June 1995 stated that on 18 June 1995, at 11:46
hours,
1069
the UNMO team OP4 stationed on the hillside at Vitkovac,1070 observed one explosion in
Dobrinja with the origin of fire in the Bosnian Serb held area.1071 The situation report did not
identify the exact location where the fire originated. Yet, it included the information that the
UNMO team could observe that the round was fired from the Bosnian Serb held area.1072
402.
The expert report of Richard Higgs, which is based on the official report of the Bosnian
authorities, as well as on two witness statements,1073 confirmed that the round came from a westerly
direction.1074 Based on the pictures and sketches of the scene, Higgs noted that the buildings around
the school eliminate certain options and that “the enclosed nature of the incident scene and the
position of the strike on the wall only leaves [sic] one direction that the round could have been fired
from”.1075 The expert found the investigation methodology used by the Bosnian authorities to be
correct, but stressed that the bearing of 320 should be considered an approximation and that given
the absence of the angle of descent, the issue of the range is much more difficult to calculate.
According to the expert, Ned`ari}i was therefore the “most likely firing position”, the fire would
have been more accurate from there and the school can be seen from that position. The expert,
however, did not exclude that the fire could have come from further away.1076
1064
1065
1066
1067
1068
1069
1070
1071
1072
1073
1074
1075
1076
MP-238, T. 2773.
Ex. P2376, Witness Statement of Mirsad Ku~anin, 12 November 1995, p. 4; MP-238, T. 2750, 2766; Ex. P460
(under seal), para. 12(d).
MP-238, T. 2750; Ex. P460 (under seal), paras 12(d)-12(f); Ex. P2376, Witness Statement of Mirsad Ku~anin,
12 November 1995, p. 4.
MP-238, T. 2750; Ex. P460 (under seal), paras 12(f)-12(g); Ex. P2376, Witness Statement of Mirsad Ku~anin,
12 November 1995, p. 4.
MP-238, T. 2750; Ex. P460 (under seal), paras 12(f)-12(g).
Ex. P543, UNMO HQ Daily Situation Report, 19 June 1995, p. 8.
Per Anton Brennskag, T. 3333-3334.
Ex. P543, UNMO HQ Daily Situation Report, 19 June 1995, p. 8; Per Anton Brennskag, T. 3353.
Per Anton Brennskag, T. 3353; Ex. P543, UNMO HQ Daily Situation Report, 19 June 1995, p. 8.
Ex. P478, Report on Firing Incident Involving Mortars in the Sarajevo Area Dated 18 June 1995,
21 December 2006, p. 7.
Ex. P478, Report on Firing Incident Involving Mortars in the Sarajevo Area Dated 18 June 1995,
21 December 2006, p. 8.
Ex. P478, Report on Firing Incident Involving Mortars in the Sarajevo Area Dated 18 June 1995,
21 December 2006, pp 8-9.
Ex. P478, Report on Firing Incident Involving Mortars in the Sarajevo Area Dated 18 June 1995,
21 December 2006, p. 10.
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(v) Findings
403.
The Trial Chamber finds beyond a reasonable doubt that on 18 June 1995 at about 11:40
hours, a 120mm mortar shell exploded at the Simon Bolivar School in Dobrinja, killing 7 and
injuring 12 individuals.
404.
The Trial Chamber also finds that the only reasonable inference that can be drawn from the
evidence is that all the victims were civilians not taking part in hostilities at the time. The mortar
shell hit the Simon Bolivar School, a civilian building used solely as a water distribution point for
the inhabitants of Dobrinja and the victims were all neighbours engaged in a civilian activity, i.e.
standing in line for their turn to fetch water. Furthermore, the Trial Chamber notes the testimony of
MP-238 and the findings of the CSB report, according to which the victims were civilians.
405.
Regarding the origin of the fire, the Defence submits that it cannot be reached beyond a
reasonable doubt that the VRS fired the shell.1077 The Defence also argues that the provenance of
the manufacture of the shell from Valjevo, Serbia, cannot support the CSB investigators’
conclusion, as the ABiH recovered and fired VRS 120mm mortar shells.1078 In addition, the
Defence argues that it is equally plausible that the ABiH fired the shell “in the midst of the
campaign to break-out of Sarajevo”, but that the CSB investigating team had no interest in
concluding that anyone other than the SRK was responsible for firing the shells”, rather they
reached an “unproved assumption that the SRK was responsible”.1079
406.
The Trial Chamber finds that these arguments – individually or collectively – do not raise
any reasonable doubt as to the origin of the fire.
407.
MP-238 testified that it was impossible for the mortar to have been fired by ABiH as its
position was too close to the impact site.1080 This is supported by the expert opinion of Higgs that
Ned`ari}i was the most likely firing position, but that the shell “could have still come from further
away”1081
408.
The Defence asserts that MP-238 did not take into account the proximity of the
confrontation line during the investigation “as it was not an essential factor”. The Trial Chamber
notes that the witness testified that he used a map which shows exactly the confrontation line, so he
1077
1078
1079
1080
1081
Defence Final Brief, para. 540, citing to the testimony of Hansen and Higgs. See supra paras 398, 402.
Defence Final Brief, para. 541 citing to the testimony of MP-238.
Defence Final Brief, para. 544.
MP-238, T. 2773.
Ex. P478, Report on Firing Incident Involving Mortars in the Sarajevo Area Dated 18 June 1995,
21 December 2006, p. 12 (emphasis added).
118
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was aware of its distance to the impact site. The Trial Chamber is satisfied therefore that MP-238
took into consideration the confrontation line in making his determination as to the origin of fire.1082
409.
By the same token, the Trial Chamber is also not persuaded that the CSB failed to perform a
professionally objective investigation. To the contrary, the evidence shows that the methodology
used by the Bosnian investigators was correct.1083
410.
Finally, The Trial Chamber is mindful of having taken judicial notice of the Dragomir
Milo{evi} Trial Judgement finding that “[o]n the basis of the evidence in its totality [as admitted in
the Milo{evi} case] the [Milo{evi}] Trial Chamber is not satisfied that the mortar was launched from
SRK-held territory”. However, this Trial Chamber notes that the evidence led in this case partially
differs from that led in the Milo{evi} case.1084 In particular, the differing evidence before this Trial
Chamber includes the testimony of Per Anton Brennskag of the OP4 in relation to the UNMO
Situation Report of 19 June 1995 identifying the origin of the fire in the SRK-held territory and the
additional investigative evidence of Mirsad Ku~anin.1085
411.
In conclusion, the Trial Chamber finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the shell which
exploded at the Simon Bolivar School in Dobrinja was fired from the SRK-held area of Ned`ari}i.
412.
The Defence also avers – as an alternative argument – that the Prosecution failed to prove
that the intent was to target civilians.1086 The Defence argues that the shell was fired amid an
ongoing battle with a major ABiH offensive unfolding for the “break-out” of Sarajevo. The Defence
also refers to the vicinity of the confrontation lines and an ABiH command post.1087
413.
The Trial Chamber finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the VRS deliberately fired the shell
on the Simon Bolivar School in Dobrinja and rejects the Defence argument based on the following
considerations.
414.
The evidence shows that the ABiH launched an attack in Sarajevo on 16 June 1995 and that
on 18 June 1995 ingoing and outgoing firing was recorded around Sarajevo before and after the
time of the incident.1088 The evidence also generally shows that Sarajevo was constantly shelled
1082
1083
1084
1085
1086
1087
1088
MP-238, T. 2774, specifically saying that the map was used in a previous case, where he drew the exact location
of the confrontation lines.
See supra paras 395-397, 402.
Decision on Motion for Reconsideration of the Trial Chamber’s Decision of 4 May 2010 Concerning
Adjudicated Facts, 15 October 2010.
See supra para. 401.
Defence Final Brief, para. 543.
Ibid.
Ex. D24, UNPROFOR Weekly Situation Report, 2 July 1995; P2348, Statement of Rupert Smith, 14 August
1996, para. 68.
119
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through the conflict.1089 On that day, however, the situation in Dobrinja was quiet and that’s why –
according to witnesses’ testimony – the water was distributed.1090 The UNMO’s Situation Report
also recorded the impact of one shell in Dobrinja on 18 June 1995 as the only firing activity of that
day.1091 In addition, as noted by the expert witness, the school was visible from the SRK
position.1092
415.
Finally, the Trial Chamber has received evidence that mortars are very accurate weapons,
with an accuracy margin of less than 40 metres.1093 Evidence also shows that the confrontation lines
and the ABiH command post were at about 200 and 150 metres respectively from the school.1094
Since there was no ongoing combat in that area at the time of the incident, the Trial Chamber is not
satisfied that the Defence argument raises a reasonable doubt as to the intent of the attack.
(h) 1 July 1995 (Incident A8)
(i) Indictment
1 July 1995: At about 2130 hours, a rocket projectile with a concussion warhead exploded in
Buni}ki Potok street. Thirteen people were injured. The projectile came from Ilid`a.1095
(ii) Hrasnica
416.
Hrasnica is a neighbourhood on the outskirts of Sarajevo, located at the foot of Mt. Igman,
south-west of the airport.1096 In July 1995, Hrasnica and Mt. Igman were held by the ABiH,
whereas the areas to the north-west and to the south-east of Hrasnica were held by the VRS.1097 The
so-called “Igman Road” or “Blue Road” ran across Mt. Igman, descending down to Hrasnica and
1089
1090
1091
1092
1093
1094
1095
1096
1097
See supra paras 319-326.
See supra para. 388.
See also Prosecution Final Brief, para. 355.
Ex. P478, Report on Firing Incident Involving Mortars in the Sarajevo Area Dated 18 June 1995,
21 December 2006, p. 10.
See supra para. 324; Ex. P478, Report on Firing Incident Involving Mortars in the Sarajevo Area Dated 18 June
1995, 21 December 2006, p. 2.
See supra para. 394. The HQ were at 150 meters from the hospital on the same street, as can be seen from the
photo of the area, the hospital is the first building on that street, Ex. P117, Photograph Marked by Azra Šišić in
Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}.
Scheduled Incident A8.
Ex. P444, Map of Sarajevo Marked by Hubertus J.W. Bruurmijn; Ex. P503, Map marked by Vekaz Turkovi};
Ex. P500, Investigation Report, 4 July 1995, p. 1; Ex. P95, Statement of Fikreta Pa~ariz to the BiH Authorities,
27 July 1995; Ex. P98, Witness Statement of Zejna [ljivo, 27 July 1995. See also Ex. P443, UNMO Report on
1 July 1995 Attack (Scheduled Incident A8).
Ex. P1518, Map of Sarajevo; Vekaz Turkovi}, T. 3121; Hubertus J.W. Bruurmijn, T. 2648; Ex. P2307, Witness
Statement of Nefa [ljivo, 27 April 2006, p. 2.
120
Case No.: IT-04-81-T
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continuing to Sarajevo. It connected the city to the rest of the ABiH held territory beyond Mt.
Igman and was used to transport supplies to Hrasnica and Sarajevo.1098
(iii) Incident
417.
On the evening of 1 July 1995 at about 21:30 hours, Zejna [ljivo, a 65-year old housewife,
was in the kitchen of her house on Buni}ki Potok Street 233 in Hrasnica, together with her
daughters Nefa1099 and Jasmina, her son-in-law Ned`ad and her four-year old granddaughter
Emira.1100 Suddenly, they heard a loud hissing sound,1101 which Nefa [ljivo recognised as that of a
missile being launched.1102 As they all ran to the kitchen door there was a loud explosion1103 which
shattered the windows and collapsed parts of the house.1104 Zejna [ljivo, Jasmina and Emira were
injured on their heads, Ned`ad broke his wrist or fingers, and Nefa suffered some light injuries on
her back.1105 They all managed to get out of the debris of the house and reach the Hrasnica hospital,
where their wounds were treated.1106 Upon returning to the house, they found a large crater in front
of the house, where the garage used to stand.1107 The house was no longer habitable due to the
damage.1108 The neighbouring houses also sustained heavy damage1109 and about 50 houses in the
surrounding area showed signs of the explosion.1110
1098
1099
1100
1101
1102
1103
1104
1105
1106
1107
1108
1109
1110
Thorbjørn Øvergård; T. 2954, 2966; Ex. P484, Map Marked by Thorbjørn Øvergård, mark “IR”; Ex. P479,
Transcript of Thorbjørn Øvergård from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 650; Ex. P1518, Map of Sarajevo.
At the time of the incident she was a university student, Nefa [ljivo, T. 5593.
Ex. P99, Witness Statement of Zejna [ljivo, 8 March 1997, p. 2; Ex. P2306, Witness Statement of Nefa [ljivo,
8 March 1997, pp 2, 6; Ex. P2307, Witness Statement of Nefa [ljivo, 27 April 2006, p. 2.
Ex. P98, Witness Statement of Zejna [ljivo, 27 July 1995; Ex. P99, Witness Statement of Zejna [ljivo,
8 March 1997, p. 2; Ex. P2306, Witness Statement of Nefa [ljivo, 8 March 1997, pp 2, 6.
Ex. P2306, Witness Statement of Nefa [ljivo, 8 March 1997, p. 2.
Ex. P98, Witness Statement of Zejna [ljivo, 27 July 1995; Ex. P99, Witness Statement of Zejna [ljivo,
8 March 1997, p. 2; Ex. P2306, Witness Statement of Nefa [ljivo, 8 March 1997, pp 2, 6; Ex. P2307, Witness
Statement of Nefa [ljivo, 27 April 2006, p. 2. See also Ex. P96, Witness Statement of Fikreta Pačari},
8 March 1997, p. 2; Ex. P95, Statement of Fikreta Pa~ariz to the BiH Authorities, 27 July 1995.
Ex. P99, Witness Statement of Zejna [ljivo, 8 March 1997, p. 2; Ex. P2306, Witness Statement of Nefa [ljivo,
8 March 1997, p. 2; Ex. P441, Photograph Marked by Hubertus J.W. Bruurmijn, photograph of 1 July Attack
(Scheduled Incident A8). See also Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts III, 38.
Ex. P98, Witness Statement of Zejna [ljivo, 27 July 1995; Ex. P99, Witness Statement of Zejna [ljivo,
8 March 1997, p. 2; Ex. P2306, Witness Statement of Nefa [ljivo, 8 March 1997, p. 2.
Ex. P98, Witness Statement of Zejna [ljivo, 27 July 1995; Ex. P99, Witness Statement of Zejna [ljivo,
8 March 1997, pp 2, 6.
Ex. P2306, Witness Statement of Nefa [ljivo, 8 March 1997, pp 2, 6; Ex. P98, Witness Statement of Zejna
[ljivo, 27 July 1995, p. 1; Ex. P99, Witness Statement of Zejna [ljivo, 8 March 1997, p. 2; Ex. P95, Statement
of Fikreta Pa~ariz to the BiH Authorities, 27 July 1995, p. 1; Hubertus J.W. Bruurmijn, T. 2648-2650; Ex. P443,
UNMO Report on 1 July 1995 Attack (Scheduled Incident A8); Ex. P442, Photographs, 1 July 1995 Attack
(Scheduled Incident A8).
Ex. P2306, Witness Statement of Nefa [ljivo, 8 March 1997, pp 2, 6; Ex. P99, Witness Statement of Zejna
[ljivo, 8 March 1997, p. 2; Ex. P95, Statement of Fikreta Pa~ariz to the BiH Authorities, 27 July 1995, p. 1.
Ex. P98, Witness Statement of Zejna [ljivo, 27 July 1995; Ex. P99, Witness Statement of Zejna [ljivo,
8 March 1997, p. 2; Ex. P2306, Witness Statement of Nefa [ljivo, 8 March 1997, pp 3, 6. See also Ex. P2343,
Witness Statement of Ijaz Husasin Malik, 10 August 1996, p. 3.
Ex. P2306, Witness Statement of Nefa [ljivo, 8 March 1997, pp 3, 6.
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418.
At the time of the explosion, Fikreta Pa~ariz, a 37-year old saleswoman, was on the ground
floor of her house on Buni}ki Potok Street 26 with her husband, Hamo Pa~ariz, and their two
children.1111 They also heard a loud approaching sound of “something flying through the air”.1112
After a few seconds of silence, there was a “horrifying” explosion1113 and they were hit by careering
pieces of glass, ceiling and furniture.1114 Fikreta Pa~ariz was wounded on her face and head by
hurtling pieces of glass,1115 while her husband was thrown against the wall.1116 Hamo’s father,
Duran Pa~ariz, who was on the upper floor of the house with his wife, was injured to the head, leg,
arm and buttocks.1117 His wife was in shock, but unharmed.1118 Hamo brought Duran and Fikreta to
Hrasnica hospital, where they were treated.1119 When they returned home, they assessed that the
house was uninhabitable and also noted that many of the surrounding houses had also been
extensively damaged.1120 Many of the neighbours were injured in the explosion and two weeks
later, Duran Pa~ariz succumbed to his injuries.1121
419.
Adjacent to Zejna [ljivo’s house, five members of an UNMO team were accommodated on
the first floor of a residential building.1122 The team members were: Captain Frank Melum from
Norway, Major Ijaz Hussain Malik from Pakistan, Squadron Leader Kamal Mortuza from
Bangladesh, Captain Francisco Silva from Brazil and Captain Mark Hache from Canada.1123
1111
1112
1113
1114
1115
1116
1117
1118
1119
1120
1121
1122
1123
Ex. P95, Statement of Fikreta Pa~ariz to the BiH Authorities, 27 July 1995; Ex. P97, Witness Statement of
Fikreta Pačariz, 24 April 2006, p. 2.
Ex. P96, Witness Statement of Fikreta Pačariz, 8 March 1997, p. 2; Ex. P97, Witness Statement of Fikreta
Pačariz, 24 April 2006, p. 2. According to Frikreta Pa~ariz, it was clear that it came from the direction of Ilid`a,
a VRS held territory. See also Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts III, 38.
Ex. P95, Statement of Fikreta Pa~ariz to the BiH Authorities, 27 July 1995; Ex. P96, Witness Statement of
Fikreta Pačariz, 8 March 1997, p. 2; Ex. P97, Witness Statement of Fikreta Pačariz, 24 April 2006, p. 2.
Ex. P95, Statement of Fikreta Pa~ariz to the BiH Authorities, 27 July 1995; Ex. P97, Witness Statement of
Fikreta Pačariz, 24 April 2006, p. 2.
Ex. P96, Witness Statement of Fikreta Pačariz, 8 March 1997, p. 2; Ex. P95, Statement of Fikreta Pa~ariz to the
BiH Authorities, 27 July 1995; Ex. P97, Witness Statement of Fikreta Pačariz, 24 April 2006, p. 2.
Ex. P97, Witness Statement of Fikreta Pačariz, 24 April 2006, p. 2.
Ex. P95, Statement of Fikreta Pa~ariz to the BiH Authorities, 27 July 1995; Ex. P96, Witness Statement of
Fikreta Pačariz, 8 March 1997, p. 2; Ex. P97, Witness Statement of Fikreta Pačariz, 24 April 2006, p. 2.
Ex. P95, Statement of Fikreta Pa~ariz to the BiH Authorities, 27 July 1995.
Ex. P95, Statement of Fikreta Pa~ariz to the BiH Authorities, 27 July 1995; Ex. P97, Witness Statement of
Fikreta Pačariz, 24 April 2006, p. 3.
Ex. P95, Statement of Fikreta Pa~ariz to the BiH Authorities, 27 July 1995; P97, Witness Statement of Fikreta
Pačariz, 24 April 2006, p. 3.
Ex. P96, Witness Statement of Fikreta Pačariz, 8 March 1997, p. 2.
Hubertus J.W. Bruurmijn, T. 2651; Ex. P442, Photographs, 1 July 1995 Attack (Scheduled Incident A8);
Ex. P500, Investigation Report, 4 July 1995, p. 3; Ex. P99, Witness Statement of Zejna [ljivo, 8 March 1997,
p. 2; Ex. P2307, Witness Statement of Nefa [ljivo, 27 April 2006, p. 2; Ex. P2308, Transcript of Nefa [ljivo
from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 4509; Ex. P2344, Transcript of Ijaz Hussain Malik from Prosecutor v.
D. Milošević, 27 April 2007, T. 5413.
Ex. P443, UNMO Report on 1 July 1995 Attack (Scheduled Incident A8), p. 1. See also Ex. P2344, Transcript of
Ijaz Hussain Malik from Prosecutor v. D. Milošević, 27 April 2007, T. 5413-5418; Ex. P2343, Witness
Statement of Ijaz Husasin Malik, 10 August 1996, p. 3.
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Malik described that he heard a whistling sound of something “big” approaching.1124 After a
420.
few seconds of silence, there was a loud explosion outside the house.1125 The blast shattered the
windows and caused some of the doors to fly off their hinges.1126 Malik was hit by a window
thrown off its frame, injuring his right arm, eye and forehead. As he fell, he also wounded his left
leg.1127
421.
Kamal Mortuza was also injured in the incident.1128 He and Malik both received first aid
from the other UNMOs and were then taken to Hrasnica hospital.1129 The following morning they
were both transferred to the French hospital in Sarajevo and from there they were eventually
discharged.1130
422.
Documentary evidence shows that between 21:40 hours and 21:50 hours on that evening,
the Hrasnica hospital admitted and subsequently treated the following 13 persons for wounds
suffered in the explosion on Buni}ki Potok Street: Enes Kadi}, Ned`ad Bostand`i}, Emira Kadi},
Jasmina Bostand`i}, Emira Bostand`i}, Nefa [ljivo, Zejna [ljivo, Duran Pa~ariz, Fikreta Pa~ariz,
Hata Mulaosmanovi}, Naza Pamuk, Kemal Mortuza and “Husein Ijaz”.1131
(iv) Investigation
423.
Later on the same evening, the Hrasnica local police arrived at the scene and secured the
impact site in front of Zejna [ljivo’s house.1132 The local police also found damage to the house and
property of Alija Kustur, on Alekse [anti}a Street no. 50, at about 150 metres from where the
explosion occurred.1133
1124
1125
1126
1127
1128
1129
1130
1131
1132
1133
Ex. P2343, Witness Statement of Ijaz Husasin Malik, 10 August 1996, p. 3; Ex. P2344, Transcript of Ijaz
Hussain Malik from Prosecutor v. D. Milošević, 27 April 2007, T. 5414.
Ex. P2343, Witness Statement of Ijaz Husasin Malik, 10 August 1996, p. 3; Ex. P2344, Transcript of Ijaz
Hussain Malik from Prosecutor v. D. Milošević, 27 April 2007, T. 5414; Ex. P443, UNMO Report on 1 July
1995 Attack (Scheduled Incident A8), p. 1.
Ex. P443, UNMO Report on 1 July 1995 Attack (Scheduled Incident A8), p. 1.
Ex. P2343, Witness Statement of Ijaz Husasin Malik, 10 August 1996, p. 3; Ex. P2344, Transcript of Ijaz
Hussain Malik from Prosecutor v. D. Milošević, 27 April 2007, T. 5414-5415.
Ex. P2343, Witness Statement of Ijaz Husasin Malik, 10 August 1996, p. 3; Ex. P2344, Transcript of Ijaz
Hussain Malik from Prosecutor v. D. Milošević, 27 April 2007, T. 5415; Ex. P443, UNMO Report on 1 July
1995 Attack (Scheduled Incident A8), p. 1.
Ex. P2343, Witness Statement of Ijaz Husasin Malik, 10 August 1996, p. 3; P443, UNMO Report on 1 July 1995
Attack (Scheduled Incident A8), p. 1. See also Hubertus J.W. Bruurmijn, T. 2652.
Ex. P2343, Witness Statement of Ijaz Husasin Malik, 10 August 1996, p. 3. See also Ex. P443, UNMO Report
on 1 July 1995 Attack (Scheduled Incident A8), p. 1.
Ex. P500, Investigation Report, 4 July 1995, pp 1-3. See also Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts III, 39.
Hubertus J.W. Bruurmijn, T. 2653; Ex. P443, UNMO Report on 1 July 1995 Attack (Scheduled Incident A8),
pp 2-3; Ex. P500, Investigation Report, 4 July 1995, p. 3.
Ex. P500, Investigation Report, 4 July 1995, pp 1, 4; Vekaz Turkovi}, T. 3142-3144; Ex. P443, UNMO Report
on 1 July 1995 Attack (Scheduled Incident A8), p. 3. See also Ex. P499, Transcript of Vekaz Turkovi} from
Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 5207.
123
Case No.: IT-04-81-T
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424.
The following morning, on 2 July 1995, at about 8:00 hours, an investigating team
composed of one investigative judge, three CSB forensic inspectors and two members of the KDZ,
arrived at the scene on Buni~ki Potok Street.1134 The investigators, including Vekaz Turkovi},
examined the crater, measured all the traces and took photographs of the site.1135
425.
The investigating team established that the crater was located in front of Zejna [ljivo’s
house at Buni}ki Potok Street no. 233, where the garage used to be, at a distance of 4.90 metres
from the front of the house.1136 The investigators noted that the house, which was built of “solid
materials”, was completely destroyed1137 and that the surrounding houses were heavily damaged,
including those of Fikreta Pa~ariz1138 and Enes Kadi}. In the latter, the UNMOs were
accommodated.1139 According to the report on the investigations, it was concluded that the
explosion was caused by a “concussion warhead rocket projectile” fired from the north, from the
surrounding VRS-held area of Ilid`a.1140
426.
The investigating team then moved to the impact site on Alekse [anti}a Street no. 50, which
is about 150 metres from the impact site at Buni}ki Potok Street.1141 There, they found another
crater and rocket motor parts.1142 According to the report, on 1 July 1995 at 21:30 hours, a projectile
fired from the VRS positions in Ilid`a1143 had hit the northern top part of the house underneath the
roof before it landed in the garden, on the south eastern side of the house.1144
427.
Vekaz Turkovi}, one of the investigators, testified that initially the team believed that there
had been two modified air bombs, one that had exploded in Buni}ki Potok Street and the other that
had landed at Alekse [anti}a Street without exploding.1145 However, the investigators did not find a
second warhead when investigating the site at Alekse [anti}a Street. As a consequence, they
concluded that the damage at both locations had been caused by one modified air bomb, which
1134
1135
1136
1137
1138
1139
1140
1141
1142
1143
1144
1145
Ex. P500, Investigation Report, 4 July 1995, p. 3; Hubertus J.W. Bruurmijn, T. 2654.
Ex. P500, Investigation Report, 4 July 1995, p. 4; Ex. P501, Report of Vekaz Turkovi}, 13 July 1995; Ex. P502,
Photographs of Site Investigation, 2 July 1995, pp 3-4; Ex. P442, Photographs, 1 July 1995 Attack (Scheduled
Incident A8).
Ex. P500, Investigation Report, 4 July 1995, p. 3.
Ex. P500, Investigation Report, 4 July 1995, p. 3; Ex. P442, Photographs, 1 July 1995 Attack (Scheduled
Incident A8).
Ex. P500, Investigation Report, 4 July 1995, p. 4.
Ex. P500, Investigation Report, 4 July 1995, p. 3; Ex. P442, Photographs, 1 July 1995 Attack (Scheduled
Incident A8).
Ex. P500, Investigation Report, 4 July 1995, p. 3; Vekaz Turkovi}, T. 3120. The aggressor’s positions being the
VRS positions, Vekaz Turkovi}, T. 3120; Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts III, 40-41.
Ex. P500, Investigation Report, 4 July 1995, p. 4.
Ex. P500, Investigation Report, 4 July 1995, p. 4; Ex. P502, Photographs of Site Investigation, 2 July 1995, pp 23.
Ex. P500, Investigation Report, 4 July 1995, p. 4; Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts III, 40-41.
Ex. P500, Investigation Report, 4 July 1995, p. 4; Ex. P502, Photographs of Site Investigation, 2 July 1995, pp 13.
Ex. P499, Transcript of Vekaz Turkovi} from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 5207.
124
Case No.: IT-04-81-T
6 September 2011
29109
ricocheted twice, first on the upper corner of the house and then in the garden, before finally
landing and exploding on the garage of Zejna [ljivo’s house on Buni}ki Potok Street.1146 According
to the report, the concussion warhead projectile got “unfastened from the rest of the projectile”.1147
428.
According to Turkovi}, the investigating team was able to determine the direction of fire
(i.e. the Ilid`a area) from an analysis of the distance between the two points of ricochet. According
to the witness, “it [was] a simple finding using basic human knowledge without any expertise”.1148
429.
While the local police conducted their investigation, UNMOs Captain Melum and Major
Bruurmijn also conducted their own investigation.1149 In line with previous training they had
received,1150 they examined the crater and its environs and used a compass to establish the origin of
the projectile.1151
430.
At the impact site, Melum and Bruurmijn found the projectile only,1152 whereas the local
police had already seized the propulsion system composed of six rockets of two different calibres
(128mm and 122mm),1153 found approximately 150 metres away.1154 Major Bruurmjin saw the
rockets later at the local police station.1155
431.
Based on the analysis of the crater, the warhead and the propulsion system, the UNMO
investigating team concluded that the explosion of 1 July 1995 at Buni}ki Potok Street had been
caused by a 231-kilogram air bomb consisting of a concussion projectile with a delayed fuse1156
attached to two sets of three rockets each. The bomb had been launched from a rail from a direction
between 280 and 320 degrees.1157 The UNMOs also established that the location where the
1146
1147
1148
1149
1150
1151
1152
1153
1154
1155
1156
1157
Ex. P499, Transcript of Vekaz Turkovi} from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 5207; Vekaz Turkovi}, T. 3119.
Ex. P500, Investigation Report, 4 July 1995, p. 4; Ex. P499, Transcript of Vekaz Turkovi} from Prosecutor v.
D. Milo{evi}, T. 5207.
Vekaz Turkovi}, T. 3119-3120, 3144. See also Vekaz Turkovi}, T. 3155-3156.
Hubertus J.W. Bruurmijn, T. 2654, 2693. Major Bruurmijn was one the UNMO duty officer who responded to
Captain Melum’s call for support the evening of the incident, Hubertus J.W. Bruurmijn, T. 2648-2649; Ex. P443,
UNMO Report on 1 July 1995 Attack (Scheduled Incident A8), pp 1-2. See also MP-238, T. 2767-2770.
Hubertus J.W. Bruurmijn, T. 2631.
Hubertus J.W. Bruurmijn, T. 2654, 2658.
Hubertus J.W. Bruurmijn, T. 2658; Ex. P443, UNMO Report on 1 July 1995 Attack (Scheduled Incident A8),
p. 6.
Hubertus J.W. Bruurmijn, T. 2658; Ex. P443, UNMO Report on 1 July 1995 Attack (Scheduled Incident A8),
pp 6-7.
Hubertus J.W. Bruurmijn, T. 2658, 2693-2694; Ex. P443, UNMO Report on 1 July 1995 Attack (Scheduled
Incident A8), p. 6.
Ibid.
Ex. P443, UNMO Report on 1 July 1995 Attack (Scheduled Incident A8), p. 6; Hubertus J.W. Bruurmijn,
T. 2697. See also Ex. P443, UNMO Report on 1 July 1995 Attack (Scheduled Incident A8), p. 1; Sarajevo
Adjudicated Facts III, 38.
Ex. P443, UNMO Report on 1 July 1995 Attack (Scheduled Incident A8), p. 6; Hubertus J.W. Bruurmijn,
T. 2658, 2699.
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propulsion system was found was within the same direction range of 280 and 320 degrees.1158
Based on these factors, Major Bruurmijn identified the Ilidža area, which was then held by the
VRS, as the source of fire.1159
432.
While the UNMO team was not allowed by the local police to investigate the impact site at
Alekse [anti}a Street, Major Bruurmijn had the opportunity to discuss their findings with the local
investigators.1160 Initially, the local police were persuaded that a distinct unexploded modified air
bomb had caused the damage there. Major Bruurmijn indicated to them that an UNMO observation
post had observed only one projectile. He also stressed the local police’s own finding that no
warhead had been found at the Alekse [anti}a Street site and no rockets had been found at the
Buni}ki Potok Street site. As a consequence, the conclusion he shared with the local police was that
the parts retrieved at the two sites belonged to the same air bomb which had most likely fallen apart
in flight. Major Bruurmijn considers the theory of a double ricochet adduced by the local police to
be less probable than the theory that the air bomb fell apart in flight. However, in light of the fact
that he could not investigate the impact site at Alekse [anti}a Street, he could not exclude the
ricochet theory.1161
(v) Possible Military Targets
433.
Nefa [ljivo testified that he could not recall there being any military activity on
1 July 19951162 and that there were no ABiH military installations or targets near his house.1163 He
clarified that there were some ABiH soldiers in the area of Hrasnica, but not where the modified air
bomb landed.1164 Similarly, he testified that during his stay in Hrasnica, approximately every two
days, the witness saw groups of three to four ABiH soldiers.1165 On the top of Mt. Igman, he
suspected there to be an ABiH base. Soldiers from this base, upon the end of their shifts, descended
to Hrasnica to their families.1166 Major Bruurmijn also stated that, as far as he was aware, there
were no military targets in the area where the explosion occurred. According to him, the only place
of any military significance would have been the Famos factory, where he had heard that the
1158
1159
1160
1161
1162
1163
1164
1165
1166
Hubertus J.W. Bruurmijn, T. 2660, 2663; Ex. P443, UNMO Report on 1 July 1995 Attack (Scheduled Incident
A8), p. 6.
Hubertus J.W. Bruurmijn, T. 2663-2664; Ex. P444, Map of Sarajevo Marked by Hubertus J.W. Bruurmijn,
showing the area on the map. The witness stressed that the crater analysis of a propelled projectile, however,
cannot establish the point of departure or the distance travelled, but only the direction of the origin of fire,
T. 2686-2688, 2698. See also Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts III, 40-41.
Hubertus J.W. Bruurmijn, T. 2694.
Hubertus J.W. Bruurmijn, T. 2694, 2703-2704.
Ex. P2308, Transcript of Nefa [ljivo from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 4509.
Ex. P2308, Transcript of Nefa [ljivo from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 4509; Ex. P2307, Witness Statement of
Nefa [ljivo, 27 April 2006, p. 2.
Nefa [ljivo, T. 5590.
Ijaz Hussain Malik, T. 6539-6243.
Ijaz Hussain Malik, T. 6240-6241.
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Bosnian Muslims produced ammunitions or weapons.1167 The Trial Chamber notes that the Famos
factory is located about one kilometre from Hrasnica.1168
434.
Thorbjørn Øvergård, another UNMO based in Hrasnica until 1 May 1995,1169 testified that
the ABiH 4th Motorised Brigade had its headquarters in the centre of Hrasnica.1170 He, however,
also stated that the centre of Hrasnica was a “residential civilian area”.1171 Furthermore, when faced
with the information that the 4th Motorised Brigade consisted of 3,000 to 3,500 military men,
Thorbjørn Øvergård answered that he had never seen so many soldiers in Hrasnica.1172
(vi) Findings
435.
The Trial Chamber finds beyond a reasonable doubt that on 1 July 1995 at about 21:30
hours, a modified air bomb exploded at Buni}ki Potok Street, injuring 13 persons. The Trial
Chamber finds that the bomb fell in a civilian area of Hrasnica with no military activities nearby.
The only reasonable inference is that all the victims were civilians not taking part in hostilities at
the time. The Trial Chamber bases its conclusion on the fact that (i) the air bomb landed in a
residential area and (ii) the victims included a housewife, a student, a business woman, three
children, pensioners and UNMOs.
436.
The Trial Chamber notes that the evidence shows two alternative explanations of the manner
of the shell explosion: one based on the double ricochet theory; the other that the bomb
disassembled in flight, losing its propulsion system on Alekse [anti}a Street at about 150 metres
from where it finally landed and exploded. The Trial Chamber is unable to reach a conclusion
beyond a reasonable doubt on this issue as both explanations, based on the evidence, appear
plausible. Regardless of which of the two explanations is correct, the Trial Chamber is however
satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the modified air bomb originated from the VRS held
territory of Ilid`a.1173
1167
1168
1169
1170
1171
1172
1173
Hubertus J.W. Bruurmijn, T. 2664-2665.
The Famos factory is located immediately to the right of Hrasnica, Thorbjørn Øvergård; T. 2956-2957;
Ex. P485, Map Marked by Thorbjørn Øvergård, mark “F”.
Thorbjørn Øvergård, T. 2950; Ex. P481, Witness Statement of Thorbjørn Øvergård, 30 April 1996, para. 1.
Thorbjørn Øvergård, T. 2965, 2980-2981, also stating that the headquarters of the 4th Motorised Brigade was
located in a basement of a big building for civilians; Ex. P481, Witness Statement of Thorbjørn Øvergård, 30
April 1996, para. 13; Ex. D34, Map Marked by Thorbjørn Øvergård. The Trial Chamber notes that the distance
between the headquarters of the 4th Motorised Brigade and the incident scene is of about 1 km, Ex. D34, Map
Marked by Thorbjørn Øvergård; Ex. P2383, Map Marked by Mirsad Ku~anin.
Ex. P481, Witness Statement of Thorbjørn Øvergård, 30 April 1996, para. 13.
Thorbjørn Øvergård, T. 2965.
See also Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts III, 40-42.
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(i) 28 August 1995 (Incident A9)
(i) Indictment
28 August 1995: A 120mm mortar shell landed in Mula-Mustafe Ba{eskije Street outside the
entrance to the City Market. At least 35 persons were killed and 78 were injured. The origin of the
fire was Trebevi}, VRS territory.1174
(ii) The City Market
437.
The indoor city market of Sarajevo (“City Market”) is located in a building in the city
centre, on Mula-Mustafe Ba{eskije Street.1175 The City Market is approximately100 metres from the
Markale open market.1176 At the time, the Sarajevo police had warned people not to gather in public
places due to the risk of shelling and sniping attacks. In spite of this warning, Markale was one of
the places where people would gather in large groups.1177
(iii) Incident
438.
On the morning of 28 August 1995, \ula Leka, a 65 years old pensioner, was shopping for
groceries in the city centre with her husband Ahmed.1178 At about 11:00 hours, they were in the
vicinity of the City Market and as they approached the corner of the market building, a shell landed
and exploded in front of the entrance to the City Market.1179 \ula Leka was standing at about five to
seven metres from the impact point1180 and the blast knocked her down to the pavement.1181 She
was wounded on the left arm and breast.1182 Around her, she saw injured persons lying on the street
moaning in pain or crying for help.1183 \ula Leka also saw a lot of dead persons covered in blood
on the street,1184 including her brother-in-law at about 10 metres from her.1185 At that moment, she
did not know where her husband was.1186 A taxi drove her to Ko{evo Hospital where she was
1174
1175
1176
1177
1178
1179
1180
1181
1182
1183
1184
1185
1186
Scheduled Incident A9.
Ex. P526, Criminal Investigation File of Sarajevo Police Regarding Scheduled Incident A9, 28 August 1995,
p. 2.
Sead Be{i}, T. 3289-3290. See also Ex. P67, UNPROFOR Investigation Report on Scheduled Incident A9
(Markale Market, 28 August 1995), p. 7. See supra para. 350.
Ned`ib \ozo, T. 4574-4576; Ex. P1937, Witness Statement of Nedžib Ðozo, 22 November 1995, p. 3.
Ex. P62, Witness Statement of Ðula Leka, 29 August 1995. See also Ex. P61, Witness Statement of Ðula Leka,
25 February 1996, p. 2.
Ex. P62, Witness Statement of Ðula Leka, 29 August 1995. See also Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts III, 43.
Ex. P61, Witness Statement of Ðula Leka, 25 February 1996, p. 2.
Ex. P62, Witness Statement of Ðula Leka, 29 August 1995.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ex. P62, Witness Statement of Ðula Leka, 29 August 1995; Ex. P61, Witness Statement of Ðula Leka,
25 February 1996, p. 2; Ex. P2294, Video of victims being removed from the site of Scheduled Incident A9
(Markale Market, 28 August 1995).
Ex. P61, Witness Statement of Ðula Leka, 25 February 1996, p. 2.
Ibid.
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treated for her wounds.1187 She was then transferred to the Thorax Surgery Clinic of the Clinical
Centre of Sarajevo University,1188 where she remained for another four to five days.1189 While at the
Ko{evo hospital, \ula Leka noted that the hospital was “very busy because of the large number of
wounded people”.1190
439.
According to \ula Leka, the city centre where the shell landed was a strictly civilian area,
with no military activity.1191
(iv) Investigation
a. Introduction
440.
The incident at the City Market became commonly known as Markale II, to distinguish it
from an earlier incident of a similar scale which occurred on 5 February 1994 at the nearby open
market.1192 The mortar impact on the City Market was observed from the UNMO observation post 1
(“OP-1”), situated at ^olina Kapa, south of Sarajevo on the hills overlooking the city.1193 Within
one hour after the explosion, three separate investigations were initiated by French UNPROFOR
engineers, UNMO team and Bosnian police.1194
441.
Later the same day, a follow-up investigation and analysis of all the evidence, including the
findings of the UNPROFOR and UNMO teams, as well as the OP-1 observation, was also carried
out by a senior UNPROFOR intelligence officer (“UNPROFOR G-2”)1195 on instructions of Lt.
1187
1188
1189
1190
1191
1192
1193
1194
1195
Ex. P61, Witness Statement of Ðula Leka, 25 February 1996, p. 2; Ex. P62, Witness Statement of Ðula Leka,
29 August 1995.
Ex. P62, Witness Statement of Ðula Leka, 29 August 1995.
Ex. P61, Witness Statement of Ðula Leka, 25 February 1996, p. 2. See also Ex. P637, Medical Certificates from
Koševo Hospital, 28 August 1995, p. 2.
Ex. P62, Witness Statement of Ðula Leka, 29 August 1995. See also Ex. P635, Medical Record from Koševo
State Hospital, 28 August 1995; Ex. P637, Medical Certificates from Koševo Hospital, 28 August 1995;
Ex. P638, Medical Record from Koševo Hospital, 28 August 1995; Ex. P640, Medical Record from Koševo
Hospital, 30 August 1995; Ex. P643, Medical Record from Koševo Hospital, 28 August 1995.
Ex. P61, Witness Statement of Ðula Leka, 25 February 1996, p. 2.
See supra paras 350-358; Ex. P2357, Transcript of Rupert Smith from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 3335.
Ex. P64, Witness Statement of Thomas Knustad, 21 May 1996, p. 3; Ex. P66, Transcript of Thomas Knustad
from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 1987-1988. OP-1 is marked with a cross to the south of Sarajevo in a map
annexed to Ex. P64, Witness Statement of Thomas Knustad, 21 May 1996, p. 7. See also Harry Konings,
T. 5340, 5344; Ex. P. 2297, Photograph of Sarajevo Marked by Harry Konings; Ex. P2298, Map Marked by
Harry Konings: Ex. D70, Map of Sarajevo Marked by Mirza Sablji}a.
See infra paras 444-455.
Ex. P67, UNPROFOR Investigation Report on Scheduled Incident A9 (Markale Market, 28 August 1995), p. 2;
Ex. P2356, Report of Markale II Incident, 29 August 1995; Ex. P2357, Transcript of Rupert Smith from
Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 3335-3336. G-2 stands for the intelligence officer for the UNPROFOR
Headquarters, Ex. P2349, Transcript of Rupert Smith from Prosecutor v. S. Milo{evi}, 9 October 2003,
T. 27330-27331; Harry Konings, T. 5368.
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General Rupert Smith, the UNPROFOR Commander for BiH. The conclusions of the UNPROFOR
G-2 were included in one final report.1196
b. UNMO Observation Post 1
442.
The OP-1 comprised an observation post proper1197 and a house about 150 metres downhill,
where the UNMOs would sleep, when at the post, but not on duty.1198 Both locations had a strategic
view over all the city of Sarajevo.1199 OP-1 was run by members of the UNMO team Sarajevo
Central 1 (“SC-1”),1200 which had its team base in Sedrenik1201 and at the time was under the
command of Lt. Col. Harry Konings.1202
443.
At about 9:00 hours on 28 August 1995, UNMOs Thom Knustad from Norway1203 and Paul
Conway from Ireland assumed their duties at OP-1.1204 It was a bright, sunny morning1205 and
Knustad was sitting outside the house1206 while Conway was at the observation post.1207 At about
11:00 hours, Knustad saw a smokestack1208 coming up from what he instantly identified as the
Markale area and then heard the impact about five to six seconds later.1209 Knustad joined Conway
1196
1197
1198
1199
1200
1201
1202
1203
1204
1205
1206
1207
1208
1209
Ex. P2349, Transcript of Rupert Smith from Prosecutor v. S. Milo{evi}, 9 October 2003, T. 27330-27331. See
also Ex. P2357, Transcript of Rupert Smith from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 3336; Ex. P67, UNPROFOR
Investigation Report on Scheduled Incident A9 (Markale Market, 28 August 1995), p. 2.
Ex. P2299, Photograph of Observation Post 1 in Sarajevo.
Ex. P64, Witness Statement of Thomas Knustad, 21 May 1996, p. 3.
Ex. P64, Witness Statement of Thomas Knustad, 21 May 1996, p. 3; Ex. P66, Transcript of Thomas Knustad
from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 1994; Harry Konings, T. 5345; Ex. P1518, Map of Sarajevo. See also Ex.
D97, Map of Sarajevo.
Harry Konings, T. 5341; Ex. P2290, Transcript of Harry Konings from Prosecutor v. D. Milošević, 12 March
2007, T. 3552.
Harry Konings, T. 5402; Ex. P2290, Transcript of Harry Konings from Prosecutor v. D. Milošević, 12 March
2007, T. 3552. See also Ex. P2297, Photograph of Sarajevo Marked by Harry Konings. Sedrenik, in the northeast part of Sarajevo, Ex. P2290, Transcript of Harry Konings from Prosecutor v. D. Milošević, 12 March 2007,
T. 3552.
Harry Konings, T. 5383; Ex. P2290, Transcript of Harry Konings from Prosecutor v. D. Milošević, 12 March
2007, T. 3552.
Ex. P64, Witness Statement of Thomas Knustad, 21 May 1996, p. 3; Ex. P2290, Transcript of Harry Konings
from Prosecutor v. D. Milošević, 12 March 2007, T. 3585.
Ex. P64, Witness Statement of Thomas Knustad, 21 May 1996, p. 3; Ex. P66, Transcript of Thomas Knustad
from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 1993-1994.
Ex. P66, Transcript of Thomas Knustad from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 1993-1994. See also Ex. P2290,
Transcript of Harry Konings from Prosecutor v. D. Milošević, 12 March 2007, T. 3584; Harry Konings, T. 5365.
Ex. P66, Transcript of Thomas Knustad from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 1996-1997; Ex. P64, Witness
Statement of Thomas Knustad, 21 May 1996, p. 3.
Ex. P64, Witness Statement of Thomas Knustad, 21 May 1996, p. 3; Ex. P66, Transcript of Thomas Knustad
from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 1997. See also Ex. P2299, Photograph of Observation Post 1 in Sarajevo.
“Smokestack is the smoke that would develop from an impact of, for example, a mortar grenade or an artillery
grenade, mainly grey towards black of colour”, Ex. P66, Transcript of Thomas Knustad from Prosecutor v.
D. Milo{evi}, T. 1995. See also Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts III, 43.
Sound travels at about 300 metres per second, Ex. P66, Transcript of Thomas Knustad from Prosecutor v.
D. Milo{evi}, T. 1995-1996. See also Ex. P64, Witness Statement of Thomas Knustad, 21 May 1996, p. 3.
130
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at the observation post,1210 where they recorded the incident in the log book kept there and Conway
immediately reported the incident to the UNMO headquarters at the PTT building.1211
1210
1211
Ex. P64, Witness Statement of Thomas Knustad, 21 May 1996, p. 3; Ex. P66, Transcript of Thomas Knustad
from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 1997.
Ibid.
131
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c. UNMO and UNPROFOR Investigations
444.
Lt. Col. Konings,as UNMO’s team leader was informed of the explosion via UNMO radio
as he was driving to SC-1, on his way back from the UNMO Headquarters.1212 A few minutes after
he reached the team base in Sedrenik, the local police called him requesting assistance for the
investigation. Konings and two colleagues, Captain Carbonel from Spain and Lt. Higgs from the
United Kingdom, picked up the CSB officers from the police station and arrived at the scene of the
incident about 30 to 40 minutes after the explosion.1213
445.
Upon arrival at the City Market, they observed layers of broken glass, many blood pools and
body parts on the street.1214 The dead bodies, however, had already been removed from the
scene.1215 A team of UNPROFOR French officers was already active on the scene and some
members of the Sarajevo police were also present.1216 The UNMOs, the French UNPROFOR and
the CSB police carried out parallel, but separate investigations.1217
446.
The UNMO team and the French UNPROFOR engineers processed the scene by performing
the crater analysis and calculating the azimuth bearing independently of each other.1218 The crater
was located in front of the entrance of the City Market building,1219 whereas the tail fin of the shell
was found a little further away from the crater1220 and was identified as that of a 120mm mortar
projectile.1221
1212
1213
1214
1215
1216
1217
1218
1219
1220
1221
Ex. P2290, Transcript of Harry Konings from Prosecutor v. D. Milošević, 12 March 2007, T. 3565. See also
Harry Konings, T. 5354.
Ex. P2290, Transcript of Harry Konings from Prosecutor v. D. Milošević, 12 March 2007, T. 3566; Ex. P2292,
UNMO Investigation Report on Scheduled Incident A9 (Markale Market, 28 August 1995), pp 1, 3; Ex. P526,
Criminal Investigation File of Sarajevo Police RegardingScheduled Incident A9, 28 August 1995, pp 1, 6;
Ex. P524, Transcript of Sead Bešić from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 2569-2570.
Ex. P2290, Transcript of Harry Konings from Prosecutor v. D. Milošević, 12 March 2007, T. 3566.
Ex. P2290, Transcript of Harry Konings from Prosecutor v. D. Milošević, 12 March 2007, T. 3581; Ex. P2294,
Video of victims being removed from from the site of the on Scheduled Incident A9 (Markale Market, 28 August
1995); Ex. P526, Criminal Investigation File of Sarajevo Police Regarding Scheduled Incident A9, 28 August
1995, pp 2, 7.
Ex. P67, UNPROFOR Investigation Report on Scheduled Incident A9 (Markale Market, 28 August 1995), pp 23, 6-8; P2290, Transcript of Harry Konings from Prosecutor v. D. Milošević, T. 3567, 3578; Ex. P526, Criminal
Investigation File of Sarajevo Police Regarding Scheduled Incident A9, 28 August 1995, pp 1, 6; Ex. P2294,
Video of victims being removed from from the site of the on Scheduled Incident A9 (Markale Market, 28 August
1995). See also Ex. P461 (under seal), T. 2413; Ex. P460 (under seal), para. 26.c.
Ex. P2290, Transcript of Harry Konings from Prosecutor v. D. Milošević, 12 March 2007, T. 3569, 3578-3579;
Harry Konings, T. 5353. See also Ex. P523, Witness Statement of Sead Bešić, 25 April 2006, p. 2.
Ex. P2290, Transcript of Harry Konings from Prosecutor v. D. Milošević, 12 March 2007, T. 3578-3579.
Ex. P2292, UNMO Investigation Report on Scheduled Incident A9 (Markale Market, 28 August 1995), p. 3;
Ex. P2294, Video of victims being removed from the site of Scheduled Incident A9 (Markale Market, 28 August
1995).
Ex. P2290, Transcript of Harry Konings from Prosecutor v. D. Milošević, 12 March 2007, T. 3569-3570.
Ex. P2322, Report on Investigation of Markale II Incident, 6 September 1995, pp 1, 9; Ex. P67, UNPROFOR
Investigation Report on Scheduled Incident A9 (Markale Market, 28 August 1995), p. 6.
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Case No.: IT-04-81-T
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447.
According to Konings, the imprint of the crater in the asphalt was very clear and it was
immediately recognised as one from a mortar projectile – which can be distinguished from any
other artillery projectile1222 – caused by a 120mm mortar shell.1223 Based on the shrapnel dispersion
pattern of the crater, the UNMOs concluded that the mortar projectile had been fired from a
southern direction at an azimuth bearing of approximately 170 degrees.1224 The French
UNPROFOR also reached the conclusion that the mortar shell had been fired from a southerly
direction, specifically from a bearing of 2850 milliéms, which corresponds to about 160 degrees.1225
The French UNPROFOR then measured the distance between the crater and the wall of the City
Market building.1226 This data was used to calculate the minimum angle at which the mortar shell
impacted on the asphalt, which resulted in 67 degrees.1227
448.
The azimuth bearing and the estimated angle of impact, however, were insufficient to
determine with precision the firing position, as the distance a mortar projectile can travel varies
depending on the propulsion charge used.1228 As the latter was unknown, neither the UNMO team
nor the UNPROFOR team could establish the exact origin of fire.1229 The UNPROFOR team,
however, estimated that the mortar shell could have been fired with small charge from a distance of
500 to 600 metres, or with a stronger charge from a greater distance up to 5,000 metres. The latter
1222
1223
1224
1225
1226
1227
1228
1229
Ex. P2290, Transcript of Harry Konings from Prosecutor v. D. Milošević, 12 March 2007, T. 3570. For a
detailed discussion on the importance of this distinction see Harry Konings, T. 5369, 5373.
Ex. P526, Criminal Investigation File of Sarajevo Police Regarding Scheduled Incident A9, 28 August 1995
(BCS version), p. 37; Harry Konings, T. 5369; Ex. P2290, Transcript of Harry Konings from Prosecutor v. D.
Milošević, 12 March 2007, T. 3581; Ex. P2292, UNMO Investigation Report on Scheduled Incident A9
(Markale Market, 28 August 1995), p. 3; Ex. P67, UNPROFOR Investigation Report on Scheduled Incident A9
(Markale Market, 28 August 1995), p. 6.
Ex. P2290, Transcript of Harry Konings from Prosecutor v. D. Milošević, 12 March 2007, T. 3573; Ex. P2291,
Transcript of Harry Konings from Prosecutor v. D. Milošević, 13 March 2007, T. 3599; Ex. P2292, UNMO
Investigation Report on Scheduled Incident A9 (Markale Market, 28 August 1995), p. 3; Sarajevo Adjudicated
Facts III, 44.
Ex. P2294, Video of victims being removed from the site of the on Scheduled Incident A9 (Markale Market,
28 August 1995), at 6:00 minutes; Ex. P67, UNPROFOR Investigation Report on Scheduled Incident A9
(Markale Market, 28 August 1995), p. 7; Ex. P2291, Transcript of Harry Konings from Prosecutor v. D.
Milošević, 13 March 2007, T. 3596-3597; Ex. P2292, UNMO Investigation Report on Scheduled Incident A9
(Markale Market, 28 August 1995), p. 3. See also Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts III, 44.
Ex. P2290, Transcript of Harry Konings from Prosecutor v. D. Milošević, 12 March 2007, T. 3579.
Ex. P2290, Transcript of Harry Konings from Prosecutor v. D. Milošević, 12 March 2007, T. 3575-3576;
Ex. P2292, UNMO Investigation Report on Scheduled Incident A9 (Markale Market, 28 August 1995), p. 3;
Ex. P2322, Report on Investigation of Markale II Incident, 6 September 1995, p. 8; Ex. P2316 (under seal),
p. 23; Ex. P2302, UNMO Patrol Report on Scheduled Incident A9 (Markale Market, 28 August 1995), pp 1-3;
Harry Konings, T. 5363.
Ex. P2316 (under seal), p. 23; Ex. P2290, Transcript of Harry Konings from Prosecutor v. D. Milošević, 12
March 2007, T. 3575, 3583-3584, 3586; Ex. P2291, Transcript of Harry Konings from Prosecutor v.
D. Milošević, 13 March 2007, T. 3600. See also Ex. P476, Report on Market Firing Incident Involving Mortars
in the Sarajevo Area Dated 28 August 1995, 3 August 2006, p. 13.
Ex. P2292, UNMO Investigation Report on Scheduled Incident A9 (Markale Market, 28 August 1995), p. 1;
Ex. P67, UNPROFOR Investigation Report on Scheduled Incident A9 (Markale Market, 28 August 1995), p. 17.
See also Ex. P2316 (under seal), p. 23.
133
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option placed the origin of fire on Mt. Trebevi}, behind the confrontation lines,1230 which were at
about 1,050 metres from the impact point.1231
449.
After filing his report, Konings spoke with OP-1 observers Thomas Knustad and Paul
Conway.1232 The morning of the incident was sunny, there was no wind and the observers had good
visibility on almost the entire city.1233 The two observers did not hear any mortar being fired until
they saw the smokestack from the market area and subsequently heard the impact.1234 Konings
testified that an outgoing 120mm round makes a “loud bang”, creates a flash and smoke, which in
his professional opinion could not be missed on a clear and quiet day such as 28 August 1995.
According to him, this specific mortar round must then have been fired from farther away behind
the mountain ridge, which muffled the sound.1235 Knustad, who also had expertise in artillery,
confirmed this reasoning and stated that he would not have heard the round being fired from behind
the VRS line “due to the configuration of the terrain and the way the sound would move behind the
hill, behind [his] position”.1236 Based on those observations in conjunction with his own findings
during the investigations, Konings concluded that the firing position was located in the VRS-held
territory.1237
1230
1231
1232
1233
1234
1235
1236
1237
Ex. P2316 (under seal), p. 22; Ex. P2322, Report on Investigation of Markale II Incident, 6 September 1995,
pp 1-9; Ex. P67, UNPROFOR Investigation Report on Scheduled Incident A9 (Markale Market, 28 August
1995), p. 3. See also Ex. P2290, Transcript of Harry Konings from Prosecutor v. D. Milošević, 12 March 2007,
T. 3586; Ex. P2291, Transcript of Harry Konings from Prosecutor v. D. Milošević, 13 March 2007, T. 3600;
Ex. P476, Report on Market Firing Incident Involving Mortars in the Sarajevo Area dated 28 August 1995, 3
August 2006, p. 13.
Ex. P67, UNPROFOR Investigation Report on Scheduled Incident A9 (Markale Market, 28 August 1995), p. 3.
See also Ex. P66, Transcript of Thomas Knustad from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 2001-2002; Ex. P69, Map
of Sarajevo Area Marked by Thomas Knustad in Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}; Ex. P1518, Map of Sarajevo.
Ex. P2299, Photograph of Observation Post 1 in Sarajevo, marked by Harry Konings.; Ex. P2290, Transcript of
Harry Konings from Prosecutor v. D. Milošević, 12 March 2007, T. 3584-3585. See also Harry Konings, T. 5346
Harry Konings, T. 5364-5365; Ex. P2290, Transcript of Harry Konings from Prosecutor v. D. Milošević,
12 March 2007, T. 3584-3586; Ex. P2299 Photograph of Observation Post 1 in Sarajevo.
Ex. P66, Transcript of Thomas Knustad from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 2004-2006; Ex. P64, Witness
Statement of Thomas Knustad, 21 May 1996, p. 3; Ex. P2290, Transcript of Harry Konings from Prosecutor v.
D. Milošević, 12 March 2007, T. 3585.
Harry Konings, T. 5363-5367; Ex. P2290, Transcript of Harry Konings from Prosecutor v. D. Milošević,
12 March 2007, T. 3584-3586; Ex. P2291, Transcript of Harry Konings from Prosecutor v. D. Milošević, 13
March 2007, T. 3602-3603; Ex. P66, Transcript of Thomas Knustad from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 20042006, 2048-2049; Ex. P64, Witness Statement of Thomas Knustad, 21 May 1996, p. 3; Ex. P2356, Report of
Markale II Incident, 29 August 1995; Ex. P2349, Transcript of Rupert Smith from Prosecutor v. S. Milo{evi},
9 October 2003, T. 27330, 27406; Ex. P2357, Transcript of Rupert Smith from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi},
T. 3337-3338.
Ex. P66, Transcript of Thomas Knustad from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 2004-2006; Ex. P64, Witness
Statement of Thomas Knustad, 21 May 1996, p. 3. See also Ex. P2356, Report of Markale II Incident, 29 August
1995; Ex. P2349, Transcript of Rupert Smith from Prosecutor v. S. Milo{evi}, 9 October 2003, T. 27330, 27406;
Ex. P2357, Transcript of Rupert Smith from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, 9 October 2003, T. 3337-3338.
Harry Konings, T. 5411-5412.; Ex. P2290, Transcript of Harry Konings from Prosecutor v. D. Milošević,
12 March 2007, T. 3583-3586. See also Ex. P2356, Report of Markale II Incident, 29 August 1995; Ex. P2349,
Transcript of Rupert Smith from Prosecutor v. S. Milo{evi}, 9 October 2003, T. 27330, 27406; Ex. P2357,
Transcript of Rupert Smith from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 3337-3338; Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts III, 44,
47.
134
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450.
In addition, at the time of the incident, the mortar-locating Cymbaline radar used by
UNPROFOR G-2 was operating in the area.1238 The radar was set on a direction arc and elevation
that would have detected the trajectory of any mortar fired within a range of 950 metres or less.1239
The analysis of the data collected from the radar showed that a mortar shell fired from a distance of
900 metres from the impact zone would have reached a height on its trajectory which would have
been registered by the radar beam. For the mortar shell which hit the City Market to pass undetected
by the radar, its trajectory must have been lower than the radar beam, which meant that the shell
had been fired from a position at a range between 1,550 and 3,500 metres, depending on the
propulsion charge.1240
451.
Based on the findings of the UNMO and UNPROFOR investigations, the observation of
Knustad and Conway, as well as the data collected by radar, the UNPROFOR G-2 report submitted
to Smith concluded that the firing position of the mortar shell was located in the VRS held territory,
probably Lukavica, at a distance of between 3,000 to 5,000 metres.1241
d. Local Police Investigations
452.
The local police investigation team consisted of the investigative judge of the High Court in
Sarajevo, a prosecutor from the High Public Prosecutor’s Office in Sarajevo, KDZ officers and
CSB police and forensic officers.1242 Upon their arrival at the scene, the team noted that most of the
bodies had been removed and all the injured persons had been taken to hospital.1243 The CSB police
officers observed the crater caused by the mortar which was on one lane of the road, close to the
1238
1239
1240
1241
1242
1243
Ex. P67, UNPROFOR Investigation Report on Scheduled Incident A9 (Markale Market, 28 August 1995), p. 3;
Ex. P2316 (under seal), p. 23; Ex. P2356, Report of Markale II Incident, 29 August 1995.
Ex. P67, UNPROFOR Investigation Report on Scheduled Incident A9 (Markale Market, 28 August 1995), p. 3.
See also Ex. P2316 (under seal), p. 23; Ex. P2356, Report of Markale II Incident, 29 August 1995.
Ex. P67, UNPROFOR Investigation Report on Scheduled Incident A9 (Markale Market, 28 August 1995), p. 3;
Ex. P2356, Report of Markale II Incident, 29 August 1995; Ex. P2349, Transcript of Rupert Smith from
Prosecutor v. S. Milo{evi}, 9 October 2003, T. 27330; Ex. P2357, Transcript of Rupert Smith from Prosecutor v.
D. Milo{evi}, T. 3335-3338. But see Ex. P2316 (under seal), p. 23, stating that the radars were not very effective.
Ex. P2356, Report of Markale II Incident, 29 August 1995.
Ex. P524, Transcript of Sead Bešić in Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, 20 February 2007, T. 2569-2570; Ex. P526,
Criminal Investigation File of Sarajevo Police Regarding Scheduled Incident A9, 28 August 1995, pp 1, 6. See
also Ex. P462, Transcript of MP-238 from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, 19 February 2007, T. 2562; Ex. P2290,
Transcript of Harry Konings from Prosecutor v. D. Milošević, 12 March 2007, T. 3568.
Ex. P523, Witness Statement of Sead Bešić, 25 April 2006, p. 2; Ex. P526, Criminal Investigation File of
Sarajevo Police Regarding Scheduled Incident A9, 28 August 1995, p. 7; Ex. P2294, Video of victims being
removed from the site of Scheduled Incident A9 (Markale Market, 28 August 1995).
135
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pavement.1244 The scene was secured by them and access was allowed only to the local and
international investigative teams.1245
453.
Although the scene had been slightly altered by the removal of killed and injured
persons,1246 the crater itself had not been altered. As one of the witnesses explained, the crater was
in the asphalt and could have been modified only with the use of heavy machinery over a significant
span of time, which could not have gone unnoticed by those present at the scene.1247 In fact, the
crater itself remained unchanged for many years after the event.1248 The buildings surrounding the
impact area were visibly damaged around a radius of about 50-60 metres on both sides of the
street.1249 Sead Be{i}, one of the CSB forensic officers, commenced the examination of the scene,
took photographs, collected evidence and made a free-hand sketch of the scene.1250
454.
The stabiliser fin from the projectile was found at about 20 metres from the crater. It was
slightly damaged either by the explosion itself or by the cars that passed by the impact zone
area.1251 It was collected and analysed together with numerous shell fragments of different sizes.1252
The investigators established that the stabiliser was that of a 120 mm light contact fuse mortar shell.
Moreover, based on the inscription “MK K 74 KB 9307” it had on the back, they were also able to
determine that the mortar shell had been manufactured in July 1993 in the Kru{nik factory.1253
1244
1245
1246
1247
1248
1249
1250
1251
1252
1253
Ex. P461 (under seal), T. 2418-2420. See also Ex. P463, Photograph of impact site marked by witness MP-238,
Ex. P464, Photograph of Impact Site Marked by Witness MP-238, 19 February 2007; Ex. P526, Criminal
Investigation File of Sarajevo Police Regarding Scheduled Incident A9, 28 August 1995, (BCS version), pp 37,
40.
Ex. P523, Witness Statement of Sead Bešić, 25 April 2006, p. 2; Ex. P526, Criminal Investigation File of
Sarajevo Police Regarding Scheduled Incident A9, 28 August 1995, pp 1, 7, 14.
Ex. P526, Criminal Investigation File of Sarajevo Police Regarding Scheduled Incident A9, 28 August 1995,
p. 2.
Ex. P461 (under seal), T. 2418-2419, 2429.
Ex. P461 (under seal), T. 2419.
Ex. P526, Criminal Investigation File of Sarajevo Police Regarding Scheduled Incident A9, 28 August 1995, p. 9
and p. 68 (BCS version).
Ex. P522, Witness Statement of Sead Bešić, 28 November 1997, pp 3, 15-19; Ex. P524. Transcript of Sead Bešić
from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, 20 February 2007, T. 2572, 2585-2586; Ex. P526, Criminal Investigation File
of Sarajevo Police Regarding Scheduled Incident A9, 28 August 1995, pp 8, 13-14, 24-26 and 34-56 (BCS
version). See also Ex. P528, Sketch Regarding Scheduled Incident A9 Marked by Sead Be{ić; Sead Be{i},
T. 3282-3283.
Ex. P524, Transcript of Sead Bešić from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 2582-2584; Ex. P526, Criminal
Investigation File of Sarajevo Police Regarding Scheduled Incident A9, 28 August 1995 (BCS version), pp 5760.
Ex. P526, Criminal Investigation File of Sarajevo Police Regarding Scheduled Incident A9, 28 August 1995
(BCS version), pp 61-63.
Ex. P526, Criminal Investigation File of Sarajevo Police Regarding Scheduled Incident A9, 28 August 1995,
pp 7, 16-17; Ex. P460 (under seal), para. 26(a); Ex. P465, Criminal Investigation File, 29 August 1995, pp 2-5;
Ex. P690, Expert Analysis Regarding Shelling in Sarajevo on 28 August 1995, 29 August 1995, pp 2-4. See also
Ex. P526, Criminal Investigation File of Sarajevo Police Regarding Scheduled Incident A9, 28 August 1995
(BCS version), pp 60, 62; Ex. P2290, Transcript of Harry Konings from Prosecutor v. D. Milošević, 12 March
2007, T. 3571-3572; Ex. P67, UNPROFOR Investigation Report on Scheduled Incident A9 (Markale Market, 28
August 1995), p. 6. The UNPROFOR French engineers further reported that the ammunition was unmarked,
unpainted and with a brushed steel finish, based on which they assessed that it was of Serb manufacture and
136
Case No.: IT-04-81-T
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455.
As for the crater analysis, based on the features of the shrapnel traces, which were most
intense and deep on the southerly side,1254 the KDZ and forensic officers established that the mortar
shell had been fired from the southern bearing of 170 degrees, with an error margin of five
degrees.1255 The KDZ officers then calculated the angle of impact of the shell on the street 1256 based
on the fuse crater, the distance between the crater and the City Market building and the height of the
building.1257 They established that the minimum angle of descent was 67 degrees and that therefore
the shell had impacted the surface at an angle of approximately 70 degrees.1258 In the absence of
information as to the charge used to fire the mortar projectile, however, the investigators could not
make any firm determination of the distance the shell had been fired from and its exact point of
origin.1259
e. Casualties
456.
On the same day, after the investigations at the impact scene were concluded, the CSB team
and the UNMOs went to Ko{evo and State hospitals to determine how many casualties had been
caused by the explosions at the City Market.1260 According to the official note drafted by the CSB
investigative team on the same day, 33 dead bodies were taken to Ko{evo hospital and 2 to the State
hospital, for a total of 35 fatalities. Fifty-seven injured persons were admitted to Ko{evo hospital
and 21 to State hospital.1261 The following day, additional three persons wounded in the explosion
succumbed to their injuries,1262 bringing the total number of fatal casualties to 38.
1254
1255
1256
1257
1258
1259
1260
1261
matched the ammunition commonly used by the VRS, Ex. P67, UNPROFOR Investigation Report on Scheduled
Incident A9 (Markale Market, 28 August 1995), pp 3, 6; Ex. P2322, Report on Investigation of Markale II
Incident, 6 September 1995, pp 1, 9.
Ex. P461 (under seal), T. 2427, 2429; Ex. P524, Transcript of Sead Bešić in Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi},
20 February 2007, T. 2578-2580. See also Ex. P463, Photograph of Impact site marked by witness MP-238,
19 February 2007; Ex. P464, Photograph of Impact Site Marked by Witness MP-238, 19 February 2007.
MP-238, T. 2744-2746; Ex. P461 (under seal), T. 2426-2429, 2435; Ex. P524, Transcript of Sead Bešić in
Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, 20 February 2007, T. 2578-2580; Ex. P463, Photograph of Impact Site Marked by
Witness MP-238; Ex. P464, Photograph of Impact Site Marked by Witness MP-238, 19 February 2007;
Ex. P526, Criminal Investigation File of Sarajevo Police Regarding Scheduled Incident A9, 28 August 1995, pp
18-21; Ex. P465 Criminal Investigation File, 29 August 1995, p. 5; Ex. P690, Expert Analysis Regarding
Shelling in Sarajevo on 28 August 1995, 29 August 1995. See also Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts III, 44.
Ex. P461 (under seal), T. 2427.
Ex. P461 (under seal), T. 2427, 2435-2436, 2453-2456; Ex. P466, Extract from Criminal Investigation Fire,
29 August 1995; Ex. P467, Diagram and Estimates of Missile Bomb Impact, 29 August 1995; Ex. P526,
Criminal Investigation File of Sarajevo Police Regarding Scheduled Incident A9, 28 August 1995, pp 22-23.
Ex. P461 (under seal), T. 2427, 2435-2436, 2453-2456; Ex. P466, Extract from Criminal Investigation Fire,
29 August 1995; Ex. P467, Diagram and Estimates of Missile Bomb Impact, 29 August 1995; Ex. P526,
Criminal Investigation File of Sarajevo Police Regarding Scheduled Incident A9, 28 August 1995, pp 22-23.
Ex. P461 (under seal).
Ex. P526, Criminal Investigation File of Sarajevo Police Regarding Scheduled Incident A9, 28 August 1995,
pp 8-9; Ex. P68, UNMO Patrol Report on Scheduled Incident A9 (Markale Market, 28 August 1995), pp 1-2;
Ex. P2290, Transcript of Harry Konings from Prosecutor v. D. Milošević, 12 March 2007, T. 3581-3582;
Ex. P67, UNPROFOR Investigation Report on Scheduled Incident A9 (Markale Market, 28 August 1995), p. 14;
Ex. P2292, UNMO Investigation Report on Scheduled Incident A9 (Markale Market, 28 August 1995), p. 2.
Ex. P526, Criminal Investigation File of Sarajevo Police Regarding Scheduled Incident A9, 28 August 1995,
pp 7-9. See also Ex. P68, UNMO Patrol Report on Scheduled Incident A9 (Markale Market, 28 August 1995),
137
Case No.: IT-04-81-T
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457.
As a result of the investigations, it was established that the following persons died as a result
of the explosion:1263 Samir Topuzovi},1264 Senad Muratovi},1265 Hajrudin Hozo,1266 Muhamed
Kuki},1267 Zeno Ba{evi},1268 Salko Durakovi},1269 Najla Fazli},1270 Husein Bekte{evi},1271 Ilija
Keranovi},1272 Ismet Klari},1273 Meho Ze~o,1274 Jasmina Hod`i},1275 Mejra Cocali},1276 Salko
Ali},1277 Bla`enka Smoljan,1278 Omer Ajanovi},1279 Vehid Komar,1280 Adnan Ibrahimagi},1281
1262
1263
1264
1265
1266
1267
1268
1269
1270
1271
1272
1273
1274
1275
1276
1277
1278
1279
1280
1281
p. 2; Ex. P2292, UNMO Investigation Report on Scheduled Incident A9 (Markale Market, 28 August 1995),
p. 2; Ex. P633, Medical Records from the Sarajevo State Hospital, 28 August 1995; Ex. P634, Medical
Certificates and Records from the Sarajevo State Hospital, 28 August 1995; Ex. P635, Medical Record from
Koševo State Hospital, 28 August 1995; Ex. P636, Medical Record from Koševo State Hospital, 28 August
1995; Ex. P637, Medical Record from Koševo State Hospital, 28 August 1995; Ex. P638, Medical Record from
Koševo Hospital, 28 August 1995; Ex. P639, Medical Certificates from Koševo Hospital, 30 August 1995;
Ex. P640, Medical Record from Koševo Hospital, 30 August 1995; Ex. P641, Medical Record from Koševo
Hospital, 3 September 1995; Ex. P642, Medical Record from Koševo Hospital, 29 August 1995; Ex. P643,
Medical Record from Koševo Hospital, 28 August 1995; Ex. P644, Autopsy Record from Koševo Hospital,
28 August 1995; Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts III, 45.
Ex. P526, Criminal Investigation File of Sarajevo Police Regarding Scheduled Incident A9, 28 August 1995,
p. 12.
Ex. P526, Criminal Investigation File of Sarajevo Police Regarding Scheduled Incident A9, 28 August 1995,
pp 3, 9.
Ex. P644, Autopsy Record from Koševo Hospital, 28 August 1995, p. 1; Ex. P526, Criminal Investigation File of
Sarajevo Police Regarding Scheduled Incident A9, 28 August 1995, (BCS version), pp 77-78.
Ex. P644, Autopsy Record from Koševo Hospital, 28 August 1995, p. 2; Ex. P526, Criminal Investigation File of
Sarajevo Police Regarding Scheduled Incident A9, 28 August 1995, (BCS version), pp 79-80.
Ex. P644, Autopsy Record from Koševo Hospital, 28 August 1995, p. 3; Ex. P526, Criminal Investigation File of
Sarajevo Police Regarding Scheduled Incident A9, 28 August 1995, (BCS version), pp 81-82.
Ex. P644, Autopsy Record from Koševo Hospital, 28 August 1995, p. 4; Ex. P526, Criminal Investigation File of
Sarajevo Police Regarding Scheduled Incident A9, 28 August 1995, (BCS version), pp 83-84.
Ex. P644, Autopsy Record from Koševo Hospital, 28 August 1995, p. 5; Ex. P526, Criminal Investigation File of
Sarajevo Police Regarding Scheduled Incident A9, 28 August 1995, (BCS version), pp 85-86.
Ex. P644, Autopsy Record from Koševo Hospital, 28 August 1995, p. 6; Ex. P526, Criminal Investigation File of
Sarajevo Police Regarding Scheduled Incident A9, 28 August 1995, (BCS version), pp 87-88.
Ex. P644, Autopsy Record from Koševo Hospital, 28 August 1995, p. 7; Ex. P526, Criminal Investigation File of
Sarajevo Police Regarding Scheduled Incident A9, 28 August 1995, (BCS version), pp 89-90.
Ex. P644, Autopsy Record from Koševo Hospital, 28 August 1995, p. 8; Ex. P526, Criminal Investigation File of
Sarajevo Police Regarding Scheduled Incident A9, 28 August 1995, (BCS version), pp 91-92.
Ex. P644, Autopsy Record from Koševo Hospital, 28 August 1995, p. 9; Ex. P526, Criminal Investigation File of
Sarajevo Police Regarding Scheduled Incident A9, 28 August 1995, (BCS version), pp 93-94.
Ex. P644, Autopsy Record from Koševo Hospital, 28 August 1995, p. 10; Ex. P526, Criminal Investigation File
of Sarajevo Police Regarding Scheduled Incident A9, 28 August 1995, (BCS version), pp 95-96.
Ex. P644, Autopsy Record from Koševo Hospital, 28 August 1995, p. 11; Ex. P526, Criminal Investigation File
of Sarajevo Police Regarding Scheduled Incident A9, 28 August 1995, (BCS version), pp 97-98.
Ex. P644, Autopsy Record from Koševo Hospital, 28 August 1995, p. 12; Ex. P526, Criminal Investigation File
of Sarajevo Police Regarding Scheduled Incident A9, 28 August 1995, (BCS version), pp 99-100.
Ex. P637, Medical Certificates from Koševo Hospital, 28 August 1995, p. 1; Ex. P644, Autopsy Record from
Koševo Hospital, 28 August 1995, p. 13; Ex. P526, Criminal Investigation File of Sarajevo Police Regarding
Scheduled Incident A9, 28 August 1995, (BCS version), pp 101-102.
Ex. P644, Autopsy Record from Koševo Hospital, 28 August 1995, p. 14; Ex. P526, Criminal Investigation File
of Sarajevo Police Regarding Scheduled Incident A9, 28 August 1995, (BCS version), pp 103-104.
Ex. P644, Autopsy Record from Koševo Hospital, 28 August 1995, p. 15; Ex. P526, Criminal Investigation File
of Sarajevo Police Regarding Scheduled Incident A9, 28 August 1995, (BCS version), pp 105-106.
Ex. P644, Autopsy Record from Koševo Hospital, 28 August 1995, p. 16; Ex. P526, Criminal Investigation File
of Sarajevo Police Regarding Scheduled Incident A9, 28 August 1995, (BCS version), pp 107-108.
Ex. P644, Autopsy Record from Koševo Hospital, 28 August 1995, p. 17; Ex. P526, Criminal Investigation File
of Sarajevo Police Regarding Scheduled Incident A9, 28 August 1995, (BCS version), pp 109-110.
Ex. P644, Autopsy Record from Koševo Hospital, 28 August 1995, p. 18; Ex. P526, Criminal Investigation File
of Sarajevo Police Regarding Scheduled Incident A9, 28 August 1995, (BCS version), pp 112-113.
138
Case No.: IT-04-81-T
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29095
Mirsad Kova~evi},1282 Hidajet Ali},1283 Hamid Smailhod`i},1284 Goran Poturkovi},1285 Meho
Hercegli},1286 Mesudija Kerovi},1287 Vera Brutus,1288 Hajrudin [atrovi},1289 Ajdin Vukoti},1290
Ibrahim Hajvaz,1291 Sevda Brkan,1292 Halida ^epi},1293 Pa{a Crn~alo,1294 Sabaheta Vukoti},1295
Ha{im Kurtovi},1296 Esad ]orambegi},1297 Merima @iga,1298 Osman Mahmutovi}, Rijad Gorvo and
Alija D`evlan.1299
458.
The persons who were injured in the explosion and known by name were:1300 Ethem
Husovi},1301 Rasim Fara~, Osman Levanta,1302 Feriz Kanli},1303 Mirza Hod`i},1304 Ned`ad Korjeni},
1282
1283
1284
1285
1286
1287
1288
1289
1290
1291
1292
1293
1294
1295
1296
1297
1298
1299
1300
1301
1302
Ex. P644, Autopsy Record from Koševo Hospital, 28 August 1995, p. 19; Ex. P526, Criminal Investigation File
of Sarajevo Police Regarding Scheduled Incident A9, 28 August 1995, (BCS version), pp 114-115.
Ex. P644, Autopsy Record from Koševo Hospital, 28 August 1995, p. 20; Ex. P526, Criminal Investigation File
of Sarajevo Police Regarding Scheduled Incident A9, 28 August 1995, (BCS version), pp 116-117.
Ex. P644, Autopsy Record from Koševo Hospital, 28 August 1995, p. 21; Ex. P526, Criminal Investigation File
of Sarajevo Police Regarding Scheduled Incident A9, 28 August 1995, (BCS version), pp 118-119.
Ex. P644, Autopsy Record from Koševo Hospital, 28 August 1995, p. 22; Ex. P526, Criminal Investigation File
of Sarajevo Police Regarding Scheduled Incident A9, 28 August 1995, (BCS version), pp 120-121.
Ex. P644, Autopsy Record from Koševo Hospital, 28 August 1995, p. 23; Ex. P526, Criminal Investigation File
of Sarajevo Police Regarding Scheduled Incident A9, 28 August 1995, (BCS version), pp 122-123.
Ex. P644, Autopsy Record from Koševo Hospital, 28 August 1995, p. 24; Ex. P526, Criminal Investigation File
of Sarajevo Police Regarding Scheduled Incident A9, 28 August 1995, (BCS version), pp 124, 126.
Ex. P644, Autopsy Record from Koševo Hospital, 28 August 1995, p. 25; Ex. P526, Criminal Investigation File
of Sarajevo Police Regarding Scheduled Incident A9, 28 August 1995, (BCS version), pp 125, 127.
Or Hajro [atrovi}, Ex. P644, Autopsy Record from Koševo Hospital, 28 August 1995, p. 26; Ex. P526, Criminal
Investigation File of Sarajevo Police Regarding Scheduled Incident A9, 28 August 1995, (BCS version), pp 128129.
Ex. P644, Autopsy Record from Koševo Hospital, 28 August 1995, p. 27; Ex. P526, Criminal Investigation File
of Sarajevo Police Regarding Scheduled Incident A9, 28 August 1995, (BCS version), pp 130-131.
Ex. P644, Autopsy Record from Koševo Hospital, 28 August 1995, p. 28; Ex. P526, Criminal Investigation File
of Sarajevo Police Regarding Scheduled Incident A9, 28 August 1995, (BCS version), pp 132-133.
Ex. P644, Autopsy Record from Koševo Hospital, 28 August 1995, p. 29; Ex. P526, Criminal Investigation File
of Sarajevo Police Regarding Scheduled Incident A9, 28 August 1995, (BCS version), pp 134-135.
Ex. P644, Autopsy Record from Koševo Hospital, 28 August 1995, p. 30; Ex. P526, Criminal Investigation File
of Sarajevo Police Regarding Scheduled Incident A9, 28 August 1995, (BCS version), pp 136-137.
Ex. P644, Autopsy Record from Koševo Hospital, 28 August 1995, p. 31; Ex. P526, Criminal Investigation File
of Sarajevo Police Regarding Scheduled Incident A9, 28 August 1995, (BCS version), pp 138-139.
Ex. P644, Autopsy Record from Koševo Hospital, 28 August 1995, pp 32-33; Ex. P526, Criminal Investigation
File of Sarajevo Police Regarding Scheduled Incident A9, 28 August 1995, (BCS version), pp 140-141.
Or Na{im Kurtovi}, Ex. P644, Autopsy Record from Koševo Hospital, 28 August 1995, p. 34; Ex. P526,
Criminal Investigation File of Sarajevo Police Regarding Scheduled Incident A9, 28 August 1995, (BCS
version), pp 142-143.
Or ]oranbegi}, Ex. P644, Autopsy Record from Koševo Hospital, 28 August 1995, p. 35; Ex. P526, Criminal
Investigation File of Sarajevo Police Regarding Scheduled Incident A9, 28 August 1995, (BCS version), pp 144145.
Ex. P644, Autopsy Record from Koševo Hospital, 28 August 1995, p. 36; Ex. P526, Criminal Investigation File
of Sarajevo Police Regarding Scheduled Incident A9, 28 August 1995, (BCS version), pp 146-147. The UNMOs
initially confirmed 31 killed persons and 79 injured (with 64 names provided by the Ministry of Health, Ex. P67,
UNPROFOR Investigation Report on Scheduled Incident A9 (Markale Market, 28 August 1995), p. 17; Ex. P68,
UNMO Patrol Report on Scheduled Incident A9 (Markale Market, 28 August 1995), p. 2; Ex. P2292, UNMO
Investigation Report on Scheduled Incident A9 (Markale Market, 28 August 1995), p. 2.
Ex. P526, Criminal Investigation File of Sarajevo Police Regarding Scheduled Incident A9, 28 August 1995,
p. 12; Ex. P644, Autopsy Record from Koševo Hospital, 28 August 1995, pp 39, 42, 43.
Ex. P526, Criminal Investigation File of Sarajevo Police Regarding Scheduled Incident A9, 28 August 1995,
pp 4-5, 9-11.
Ex. P639, Medical Certificates from Koševo Hospital, 30 August 1995, p. 2; Ex. P526, Criminal Investigation
File of Sarajevo Police Regarding Scheduled Incident A9, 28 August 1995, pp 4-5, 9-11.
See Ex. P638, Medical Record from Koševo Hospital, 28 August 1995, p. 1; Ex. P526, Criminal Investigation
File of Sarajevo Police Regarding Scheduled Incident A9, 28 August 1995, pp 4-5, 9-11.
139
Case No.: IT-04-81-T
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29094
Razija ^oli},1305 \ula Leka,1306 Bilal Habibovi},1307 Ajkuna Cocali}, Alma Halilovi}, Dario Blauhi,
Rada Laubuh, Muho Kadri},1308 Nihada Had`ijahi}, Kosa Pe~anac, Minela Satara, Mensuda
Klari},1309 Adisa Duran,1310 Aziz Had`i}, Violeta Dudi}, a child named Berina, Salko Kurtovi},1311
^arim Terzi}, Mejra Marevac, [emsa Bunjo, Sabaheta Kafr~, Indira Svoboda, Samir Borovac,
Jusuf Ha{imbegovi}, Fatima ^ulesker,1312 Rasim Koso,1313 Hasena Kaljanac, Ismet [vraka,1314
Andrea Svoboda,1315 Janja Pa{i},1316 Amerisa Ahmetovi}, Pelka Ja~imovi}, Mustafa Karkelja,1317
Ned`ad Mango, Muhidin Begi},1318 Ferida Hajri}, [emsa Bunjo, Zijad Bejti},1319 Samir
Marevac,1320 Asim D`evla, D`evad Hod`i},1321 Murat Zahiragi}, Mehmed Ahmetovi},1322 Andrija
Simunovi}, Ru`a Gali},1323 Izet Hard`ela{, Fehim Zolota, Amir Trnka, Ferida Bajri},1324 Suada
1303
1304
1305
1306
1307
1308
1309
1310
1311
1312
1313
1314
1315
1316
1317
1318
1319
1320
1321
1322
1323
1324
See Ex. P636, Medical Certificates from Koševo Hospital, 28 August 1995, p. 2; Ex. P526, Criminal
Investigation File of Sarajevo Police Regarding Scheduled Incident A9, 28 August 1995, pp 4-5, 9-11.
Ex. P638, Medical Record from Koševo Hospital, 28 August 1995, p. 5; Ex. P526, Criminal Investigation File of
Sarajevo Police Regarding Scheduled Incident A9, 28 August 1995, pp 4-5, 9-11.
Ex. P637, Medical Certificates from Koševo Hospital, 28 August 1995, p. 3; Ex. P526, Criminal Investigation
File of Sarajevo Police Regarding Scheduled Incident A9, 28 August 1995, pp 4-5, 9-11.
Or Dzula Leko, Ex. P637, Medical Certificates from Koševo Hospital, 28 August 1995, p. 2; Ex. P526, Criminal
Investigation File of Sarajevo Police Regarding Scheduled Incident A9, 28 August 1995, pp 4-5, 9-11.
Ex. P638, Medical Record from Koševo Hospital, 28 August 1995, p. 6; Ex. P526, Criminal Investigation File of
Sarajevo Police Regarding Scheduled Incident A9, 28 August 1995, pp 4-5, 9-11.
Ex. P638, Medical Record from Koševo Hospital, 28 August 1995, p. 4; Ex. P526, Criminal Investigation File of
Sarajevo Police Regarding Scheduled Incident A9, 28 August 1995, pp 4-5, 9-11.
Ex. P636, Medical Certificates from Koševo Hospital, 28 August 1995, p. 3; Ex. P526, Criminal Investigation
File of Sarajevo Police Regarding Scheduled Incident A9, 28 August 1995, pp 4-5, 9-11.
Ex. P637, Medical Certificates from Koševo Hospital, 28 August 1995, p. 5; Ex. P526, Criminal Investigation
File of Sarajevo Police Regarding Scheduled Incident A9, 28 August 1995, pp 4-5, 9-11.
Ex. P634, Medical Certificates and Records from the Sarajevo State Hospital, 28 August 1995, pp 15-16. The
name of the victim is spelled as “Salko” in the English translation of Ex. P526, and Ex. P634, p. 15, whereas the
BCS version of Ex. P526 and Ex. P634 refer to “Halko”, Ex. P526, Criminal Investigation File of Sarajevo
Police Regarding Scheduled Incident A9, 28 August 1995, pp 4, 10; Ex. P526, Criminal Investigation File of
Sarajevo Police Regarding Scheduled Incident A9, 28 August 1995 (BCS version), pp 2, 12. See also Ex. P526,
Criminal Investigation File of Sarajevo Police Regarding Scheduled Incident A9, 28 August 1995, pp 4-5, 9-11.
Ex. P638, Medical Record from Koševo Hospital, 28 August 1995, p. 3; Ex. P526, Criminal Investigation File of
Sarajevo Police Regarding Scheduled Incident A9, 28 August 1995, pp 4-5, 9-11.
Ex. P636, Medical Certificates from Koševo Hospital, 28 August 1995, p. 1; Ex. P526, Criminal Investigation
File of Sarajevo Police Regarding Scheduled Incident A9, 28 August 1995, pp 4-5, 9-11.
Ex. P641, Medical Record from Koševo Hospital, 3 September 1995, p. 2.
Ex. P642, Medical Record from Koševo Hospital, 29 August 1995.
Ex. P637, Medical Certificates from Koševo Hospital, 28 August 1995, p. 4; Ex. P526, Criminal Investigation
File of Sarajevo Police Regarding Scheduled Incident A9, 28 August 1995, pp 4-5, 9-11.
Ex. P638, Medical Record from Koševo Hospital, 28 August 1995, p. 8; Ex. P526, Criminal Investigation File of
Sarajevo Police Regarding Scheduled Incident A9, 28 August 1995, pp 4-5, 9-11.
Ex. P526, Criminal Investigation File of Sarajevo Police Regarding Scheduled Incident A9, 28 August 1995,
pp 4-5, 9-11.
Ex. P640, Medical Record from Koševo Hospital, 30 August 1995, p. 1.
Ex. P635, Medical Record from Koševo State Hospital, 28 August 1995; Ex. P526, Criminal Investigation File
of Sarajevo Police Regarding Scheduled Incident A9, 28 August 1995, pp 4-5, 9-11.
Ex. P639, Medical Certificates from Koševo Hospital, 30 August 1995, p. 1; Ex. P526, Criminal Investigation
File of Sarajevo Police Regarding Scheduled Incident A9, 28 August 1995, pp 4-5, 9-11.
Ex. P638, Medical Record from Koševo Hospital, 28 August 1995, p. 2; Ex. P526, Criminal Investigation File of
Sarajevo Police Regarding Scheduled Incident A9, 28 August 1995, pp 4-5, 9-11.
Ex. P643, Medical Record from Koševo Hospital, 28 August 1995.
Ex. P636, Medical Certificates from Koševo Hospital, 28 August 1995, pp 4-5; Ex. P526, Criminal Investigation
File of Sarajevo Police Regarding Scheduled Incident A9, 28 August 1995, pp 4-5, 9-11.
140
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Dizdarevi}, Omer Zec,1325 Suzana Sand`aktarevi},1326 Zaim Ka{iri},1327 Omer Begi}, Senad
Skenderovi},1328 Mahit Kurtovi},1329 Emira Guberovi},1330 Damir Muja~i},1331 Mirsad Ademovi},
Ned`ad Trhulj, Halmija Crn~alo,1332 Hamza Tunovi}, Selver Stomovljak,1333 Sabit Tahirovi}, Hako
Tahirovi}, Nazif Sijam},1334 Ibrahim Mu{a,1335 [ukrija Ferovi}1336 and Merd`ana Obrali}.1337
459.
According to the CSB investigative team, the neighbourhood where the shell landed was in
the middle of the city and was a civilian area without any military activity and the victims were
mainly civilian.1338
f. Follow up to Investigation
460.
On 29 August 1995, the CSB investigating team had a lengthy meeting in relation to the
City Market incident to which Konings was invited as the UNMO team representative.1339 The CSB
1325
1326
1327
1328
1329
1330
1331
1332
1333
1334
1335
1336
1337
1338
1339
Ex. P634, Medical Certificates and Records from the Sarajevo State Hospital, 28 August 1995, p. 6; Ex. P526,
Criminal Investigation File of Sarajevo Police Regarding Scheduled Incident A9, 28 August 1995, pp 4-5, 9-11.
Civilian, Ex. P634, Medical Certificates and Records from the Sarajevo State Hospital, 28 August 1995, p. 7;
Ex. P526, Criminal Investigation File of Sarajevo Police Regarding Scheduled Incident A9, 28 August 1995,
pp 4-5, 9-11.
Or Zaim Ko{ari}, Ex. P634, Medical Certificates and Records from the Sarajevo State Hospital, 28 August 1995,
p. 3; Ex. P526, Criminal Investigation File of Sarajevo Police Regarding Scheduled Incident A9, 28 August
1995, pp 4-5, 9-11.
“OS” probably member of the “Armed Forces of Defence Forces”, Ex. P634, Medical Certificates and Records
from the Sarajevo State Hospital, 28 August 1995, p. 10; Ex. P526, Criminal Investigation File of Sarajevo
Police Regarding Scheduled Incident A9, 28 August 1995, pp 4-5, 9-11.
Ex. P634, Medical Certificates and Records from the Sarajevo State Hospital, 28 August 1995, p. 8; Ex. P526,
Criminal Investigation File of Sarajevo Police Regarding Scheduled Incident A9, 28 August 1995, pp 4-5, 9-11.
Ex. P633, Medical Records from the Sarajevo State Hospital, 28 August 1995, p. 1; Ex. P526, Criminal
Investigation File of Sarajevo Police Regarding Scheduled Incident A9, 28 August 1995, pp 4-5, 9-11.
Child born in 1984, Ex. P634, Medical Certificates and Records from the Sarajevo State Hospital, 28 August
1995, p. 12; Ex. P526, Criminal Investigation File of Sarajevo Police Regarding Scheduled Incident A9, 28
August 1995, pp 4-5, 9-11.
Or Hilmija Trncalo, Ex. P634, Medical Certificates and Records from the Sarajevo State Hospital, 28 August
1995, p. 17; Ex. P526, Criminal Investigation File of Sarajevo Police Regarding Scheduled Incident A9, 28
August 1995, pp 4-5, 9-11.
Or Selver Stomornjak, Ex. P633, Medical Records from the Sarajevo State Hospital, 28 August 1995, p. 2;
Ex. P526, Criminal Investigation File of Sarajevo Police Regarding Scheduled Incident A9, 28 August 1995,
pp 4-5, 9-11.
Or Nazif Sijami}, Ex. P634, Medical Certificates and Records from the Sarajevo State Hospital, 28 August 1995,
p. 5; Ex. P526, Criminal Investigation File of Sarajevo Police Regarding Scheduled Incident A9, 28 August
1995, pp 4-5, 9-11.
Ex. P634, Medical Certificates and Records from the Sarajevo State Hospital, 28 August 1995, p. 11; Ex. P526,
Criminal Investigation File of Sarajevo Police Regarding Scheduled Incident A9, 28 August 1995, pp 4-5, 9-11.
Ex. P634, Medical Certificates and Records from the Sarajevo State Hospital, 28 August 1995, p. 2; Ex. P526,
Criminal Investigation File of Sarajevo Police Regarding Scheduled Incident A9, 28 August 1995, pp 4-5, 9-11.
Child born in 1984, Ex. P634, Medical Certificates and Records from the Sarajevo State Hospital, 28 August
1995, p. 1; Ex. P526, Criminal Investigation File of Sarajevo Police Regarding Scheduled Incident A9,
28 August 1995, pp 4-5, 9-11.
Ex. P532 (under seal), para. 9. See also Ex. P631, Transcript of Milan Mandilović from Prosecutor v.
D. Milošević, T. 573-574; Ex. P2220, Transcript of Bakir Nakaš from Prosecutor v. D. Milošević, T. 1106-1107;
Ex. P633, Medical Records from the Sarajevo State Hospital, 28 August 1995, p. 1. See also Sarajevo
Adjudicated Facts III, 46.
Harry Konings, T. 5359-5360; MP-193, T. 3307-3310 (private session); Ex. P2290, Transcript of Harry Konings
from Prosecutor v. D. Milošević, 12 March 2007, T. 3591, 3593; Ex. P68, UNMO Patrol Report on Scheduled
Incident A9 (Markale Market, 28 August 1995), p. 1; Ex. P2292, UNMO Investigation Report on Scheduled
141
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team discussed the investigation findings and tried to establish what had happened on 28 August
1995.1340 In his testimony, Konings stressed that the UNMOs did not take part in the discussion and
that there was no exchange of investigative notes and that each team compiled its own separate
report on the incident.1341 Rather, he participated in the meeting as an observer, “listening and
comparing the data” that had been collected by the UNMOs the day before to that collected by the
CSB police, which he found to be identical.1342 During the meeting, Konings informed the CSB
team of what had been observed on the morning of 28 August 1995 from the UNMO OP-1
stationed on ^olina Kapa.1343
g. Expert Report
461.
The expert report of Richard Higgs confirms that the mortar shell was fired from a direction
of about 170-175 degrees and that the angle of descent was closer to 70 degrees, as determined by
the Bosnian authorities.1344 According to the expert, at said angle of descent the origin of fire can be
placed at a range of 900, 1,600, 2,400 or 3,000 metres, depending on the propulsion charge used.1345
Considering where these ranges plot on the map within the azimuth of 175 degrees and, in
particular, that the UNMOs from OP-1 did not hear any mortar being fired, the expert excluded the
possibility that this mortar shell had been fired from a range of 900 or 1,600 metres.1346 The range
of 2,400 metres instead, put the firing point in a position and elevation consistent with the angle of
1340
1341
1342
1343
1344
1345
1346
Incident A9 (Markale Market, 28 August 1995), p. 1; Ex. P67, UNPROFOR Investigation Report on Scheduled
Incident A9 (Markale Market, 28 August 1995), p. 18; Ex. P526, Criminal Investigation File of Sarajevo Police
Regarding Scheduled Incident A9, 28 August 1995, p. 12.
Harry Konings, T. 5359-5360; Ex. P67, UNPROFOR Investigation Report on Scheduled Incident A9 (Markale
Market, 28 August 1995), p. 18;
Harry Konings, T. 5353, 5360-5362. See also Ex. P2290, Transcript of Harry Konings from Prosecutor v.
D. Milošević, 12 March 2007, T. 3578-3579, 3593; Ex. P523, Witness Statement of Sead Bešić, 25 April 2006,
p. 2.
Harry Konings, T. 5362; Ex. P526, Criminal Investigation File of Sarajevo Police Regarding Scheduled Incident
A9, 28 August 1995, p. 12; Ex. P2302, UNMO Patrol Report on Scheduled Incident A9 (Markale Market, 28
August 1995), p. 2.
Harry Konings, T. 5363-5364. See also Ex. P2302, UNMO Patrol Report on Scheduled Incident A9 (Markale
Market, 28 August 1995), p. 2; Ex. P526, Criminal Investigation File of Sarajevo Police Regarding Scheduled
Incident A9, 28 August 1995, p. 12; Ex. P64, Witness Statement of Thomas Knustad, 21 May 1996, p. 3; MP193, T. 3310 (private session).
Ex. P476, Report on Market Firing Incident Involving Mortars in the Sarajevo Area Dated 28 August 1995,
3 August 2006, pp 10-13. The expert also states that from the evidence that has been shown to him, there is no
reason to disbelieve the reports from the Bosnian authorities, UNMO and UNPROFOR, Ex. P476, Report on
Market Firing Incident Involving Mortars in the Sarajevo Area Dated 28 August 1995, 3 August 2006 p. 9. See
also Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts III, 44.
Ex. P476, Report on Market Firing Incident Involving Mortars in the Sarajevo Area Dated 28 August 1995,
3 August 2006, p. 13.
Ex. P476, Report on Market Firing Incident Involving Mortars in the Sarajevo Area Dated 28 August 1995,
3 August 2006, pp 13-14. The expert noted that at both a distance of 900 or 1600 metres the firing point would
still be in the area of the confrontation line and the firing would be easily heard by the UN observers, Ex. P476,
Report on Market Firing Incident Involving Mortars in the Sarajevo Area Dated 28 August 1995, 3 August 2006,
p. 14.
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descent as well as with the effects seen at the impact site.1347 The expert therefore concluded that
the most likely fire position was situated at 2,400 metres to the south of the impact area.1348
h. Allegations of Staged Incident
462.
Soon after the incident, allegations emerged that the shelling at the City Market had been
staged and the evidence planted on the scene.1349 However, according to Konings this was
impossible.1350 Earlier that morning, at about 8:30-9:00 hours,1351 Konings had driven past City
Market coming from the SC-1 team base in Sedrenik on his way to the UNMO headquarters in the
PTT building.1352 He noted that there had been a lot of civilians on the streets and sidewalks near
the entrance of the City Market, trading or selling goods as well as the usual police patrols and
“some” military men, but he did not observe any crater on the road and he did not think it was
possible to create an artificial one in about two hours.1353 He also excluded the possibility that any
other type of explosive had been detonated on the spot, as the crater he analysed, as well as the
damage around it, was a “perfect” example of a 120mm mortar shell impact.1354 Finally, he
excluded the possibility that dead bodies from previous incidents had been planted on the scene, as
the bodies he examined at the morgue had fresh wounds and it was clear that they had recently been
killed.1355 Konings also stated that he did not believe it was possible to stage such chaos.1356 The
Trial Chamber finds the explanation provided by Konings on this issue to be credible and
convincing.
463.
Another witness testified that he was about 50 metres from the City Market when he heard
the explosion and was at the scene five to ten minutes later. He stated that when he arrived at the
1347
1348
1349
1350
1351
1352
1353
1354
1355
1356
Ex. P476, Report on Market Firing Incident Involving Mortars in the Sarajevo Area Dated 28 August 1995,
3 August 2006, p. 13.
Ex. P476, Report on Market Firing Incident Involving Mortars in the Sarajevo Area Dated 28 August 1995,
3 August 2006, pp 13-14.
Ex. P2290, Transcript of Harry Konings from Prosecutor v. D. Milošević, 12 March 2007, T. 3588-3590;
Ex. P66, Transcript of Thomas Knustad from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 2005-2007; MP-193, T. 3311-3312
(private session); Ex. P2316 (under seal), pp 21-22. See also Ned`ad Vejzagi}, T. 4091.
Ex. P2290, Transcript of Harry Konings from Prosecutor v. D. Milošević, 12 March 2007, T. 3588-3590.
Harry Konings, T. 5354.
Harry Konings, T. 5354, 5402; Ex. P2290, Transcript of Harry Konings from Prosecutor v. D. Milošević,
12 March 2007, T. 3552, 3555, 3587. See also Ex. P2297, Photograph of Sarajevo Marked by Harry Konings.
Ex. P2290, Transcript of Harry Konings from Prosecutor v. D. Milošević, 12 March 2007, T. 3589.
Harry Konings, T. 5369, 5373; Ex. P2290, Transcript of Harry Konings from Prosecutor v. D. Milošević,
12 March 2007, T. 3570, 3581.
Harry Konings, T. 5388-5389; Ex. P2292, UNMO Investigation Report on Scheduled Incident A9 (Markale
Market, 28 August 1995); Ex. P2290, Transcript of Harry Konings from Prosecutor v. D. Milošević, 12 March
2007, T. 3557-3558, 3581-3582.
Ex. P2290, Transcript of Harry Konings from Prosecutor v. D. Milošević, 12 March 2007, T. 3589.
143
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scene he saw “a great mess, and it was all intensely quiet […] and still it was very agitated”.1357 He
also did not think it possible to stage such scene.1358
464.
On 28 and 29 August 1995, General Rupert Smith had several telephone conversations with
General Ratko Mladi} in relation to the incident. Mladi} stated that no fire orders had been issued to
his units on that day and that all his positions had been checked and he was sure that none of them
had fired. Rather, he claimed that the incident had been orchestrated by the ABiH.1359 Smith,
however, informed Mladi} that “it was now beyond a reasonable doubt that the shells had come
from the [VRS] territory and that the investigation revealed that the firing point had been
approximately 3,5 – 4 km south west of the impact point”.1360
i. Investigation into Other Mortar Shell Impacts in the Same Area
465.
Ned`ib \ozo, a police officer from the Stari Grad station in Sarajevo, testified that about
one or two months prior to the shelling of 28 August 1995, the area had been targeted by mortar fire
on two occasions.1361 On the first occasion, one or two mortar shells fired from the VRS held
territory of Barice and Markovići to the north1362 landed and exploded near the Markale open
market, injuring some children.1363 On the second occasion a salvo of three mortar shells exploded,
within half an hour of each other,1364 the first about 300 metres from the Markale City Market,
killing a young man,1365 the second about 200 metres from the Markale City Market,1366 in front of
the Stari Grad municipality building, injuring several persons1367 and the third about 30 metres from
the Markale City Market,1368 killing one person and injuring several.1369 The investigations
established that the shots were fired from the direction of the VRS held territory of Lukavica or
1357
1358
1359
1360
1361
1362
1363
1364
1365
1366
1367
1368
1369
Ex. P2317 (under seal), T. 5336. See also Ex. P2316 (under seal), p. 22.
Ex. P2316 (under seal), p. 22.
Ex. P2348, Statement of Rupert Smith, 14 August 1996, paras 108-109; Ex. P2370, Note of Meetings of Rupert
Smith of 14-29 August 1995, 22 August 1995, p. 9.
Ex. P2370, Note of Meetings of Rupert Smith of 14-29 August 1995, 22 August 1995, p. 9; Ex. P2348,
Statement of Rupert Smith, 14 August 1996, para. 109; Ex. P2356, Report of Markale II, 29 August 1995;
Ex. P67, UNPROFOR Investigation Report, 28 August 1995.
Ex. P1937, Witness Statement of Ned`ib Ðozo, 22 November 1995, p. 2; Ned`ib \ozo, T. 4528-4529;
Ex. P1936, Transcript of Ned`ib Ðozo from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, 14 March 2007, T. 3682.
Nedžib Ðozo, T. 4530-4531, 4565. See also Ex. P1937, Witness Statement of Nedžib Ðozo, 22 November 1995,
p. 3.
Ned`ib \ozo, T. 4530; Ex. P1942, Map of Sarajevo with Shelling Sites Marked by Ned`ib Ðozo, 18 March
2009.
Nedžib Ðozo, T. 4536. See also Ex. P1937, Witness Statement of Nedžib Ðozo, 22 November 1995, p. 2.
Nedžib Ðozo, T. 4532; Ex. P1943, Map of Sarajevo with Shelling Sites Marked by Ned`ib Ðozo,18 March
2009, (Mark no. 1).
Nedžib Ðozo, T. 4534; Ex. P1943, Map of Sarajevo with Shelling Sites Marked by Ned`ib Ðozo,18 March
2009, (Mark no. 2).
Nedžib Ðozo, T. 4533; Ex. P1943, Map of Sarajevo with Shelling Sites Marked by Ned`ib Ðozo,18 March 2009
(Mark no. 2).
Nedžib Ðozo, T. 4533, 4535, 4567-4568; Ex. P1943, Map of Sarajevo with Shelling Sites Marked by Ned`ib
Ðozo,18 March 2009, (Mark no. 3).
Nedžib Ðozo, T. 4533.
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Vraca, on the slopes of Mt. Trebevi}.1370 Considering that these three mortar shells landed in the
same line of direction towards the Markale Market, 1371 the witness concluded that the aim of these
shellings was to adjust the sighting of the mortar in order to target the Markale City Market.1372
466.
On 28 August 1995, the City Market shelling incident was preceded by four mortar shell
impacts in the vicinity.1373 The investigations established that 120mm mortar shells had been used
in all four cases from the south, at a bearing between 220 and 240 degrees,1374 which suggested that
the point of origin of these four shells was different from that which hit the City Market.1375
(v) Findings
467.
The Trial Chamber finds beyond a reasonable doubt that on 28 August 1995 shortly after
11:00 hours, a 120mm mortar shell hit the entrance of the City Market on Mula-Mustafe Ba{eskije
street killing 38 persons and injuring 75 persons. The Trial Chamber also finds that the mortar shell
was fired from the VRS-held territory on the slopes of Mt. Trebevi}.1376 Finally, no military
activities were taking place in the area of the City Market and the persons present at the market
were buying, selling or trading goods, in no way engaged in activities that could be perceived as
military. In addition, the evidence shows that all the victims, except one, wore civilian clothes.1377
The Trial Chamber therefore finds that the only reasonable inference to be drawn from the evidence
is that the great majority of the victims were civilians not taking part in hostilities at the time the
crime occurred.
1370
1371
1372
1373
1374
1375
1376
1377
Nedžib Ðozo, T. 4537, 4565, 4567. See also Ex. P1937, Witness Statement of Nedžib Ðozo, 22 November 1995,
p. 2.
Ex. P1937, Witness Statement of Nedžib Ðozo, 22 November 1995, p. 2; Ex. P1943, Map of Sarajevo with
Shelling Sites Marked by Ned`ib Ðozo,18 March 2009.
Nedžib Ðozo, T. 4535-4537, 4564; Ex. P1937, Witness Statement of Nedžib Ðozo, 22 November 1995, p. 3.
Harry Konings, T. 5356-5359; Ex. P2301, Map of Sarajevo Marked by Harry Konings; Ex. P2292, UNMO
Investigation Report on Scheduled Incident A9 (Markale Market, 28 August 1995), p. 3; Ex P68, UNMO Patrol
Report on Scheduled Incident A9 (Markale Market, 28 August 1995), p. 3; Ex. P526, Criminal Investigation File
of Sarajevo Police Regarding Scheduled Incident A9, 28 August 1995, pp 11, 38; Ex. P67, UNPROFOR
Investigation Report on Scheduled Incident A9 (Markale Market, 28 August 1995), pp 17-20; Ex. P532 (under
seal), para. 8; Ex. P2301, Map of Sarajevo Marked by Harry Konings. See also Ex. P2317 (under seal), T. 5338,
5342; Ex. P460 (under seal), para. 26; Ex. P2348, Statement of Rupert Smith, 14 August 1996, para. 105.
Ex P68, UNMO Patrol Report on Scheduled Incident A9 (Markale Market, 28 August 1995), p. 3; Ex. P67,
UNPROFOR Investigation Report on Scheduled Incident A9 (Markale Market, 28 August 1995), pp 18-19.
Ex. P2291, Transcript of Harry Konings from Prosecutor v. D. Milošević, 13 March 2007, T. 3600-3601; Harry
Konings, T. 5408-5409. See also Ex. P464, Photograph of Impact Site Marked by Witness MP-238; Ex. P476,
Report on Market Firing Incident Involving Mortars in the Sarajevo Area Dated 28 August 1995, 3 August 2006,
pp 6, 9, 13-14.
Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts III, 47-48.
Ex. P526, Criminal Investigation File of Sarajevo Police Regarding Scheduled Incident A9, 28 August 1995,
(BCS version), pp 81-82.
145
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5. Scheduled Sniping Incidents
(a) 3 September 1993 (Incident B1)
(i) Indictment
3 September 1993: Nafa Tari}, a woman aged 35 years, and her daughter Elma Tari}, aged 8
years, were shot by a single bullet while walking together in Ivana Krndelja Street in the centre of
Sarajevo. The bullet wounded the mother in her left thigh and wounded the daughter on her right
hand and in her abdomen.1378
(ii) Findings
468.
The Trial Chamber has taken judicial notice of adjudicated facts related to this incident.1379
Considering that the adjudicated facts have not been rebutted during the trial, the Trial Chamber
finds beyond a reasonable doubt that on 3 September 1993, Nafa and Elma Tari}, civilians not
taking part in hostilities, were deliberately targeted and injured by a shot fired from an SRKcontrolled position.
(b) 2 November 1993 (Incident B2)
(i) Indictment
2 November 1993: Two men were wounded by a burst of gunfire while they were working
clearing rubbish along Bra}e Ribara Street, presently Porodice Ribar Street, in the Hrasno area of
Sarajevo. Ramiz Veli}, aged 50 years, was wounded in his left forearm, and Milan Risti}, aged 56
years, was wounded in his right arm and both legs.1380
(ii) Incident
469.
The Trial Chamber has taken judicial notice of adjudicated facts related to this incident.1381
Considering that the adjudicated facts have not been rebutted during the trial, the Trial Chamber
finds beyond a reasonable doubt that on 2 November 1993, Ramiz Veli}, a civilian not taking part
in the hostilities, was deliberately targeted from an SRK-controlled position in Vrace. The Trial
Chamber notes that the facts proposed for judicial notice in relation to this incident made no
reference to Milan Risti}, because no finding in relation to his wounding was made by the Gali}
Trial Chamber. Considering that no evidence was led in relation to Milan Risti}, the Trial Chamber
finds that the allegation regarding him has not been proved.
1378
1379
1380
1381
Indictment, Scheduled Incident B1.
Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts I, 251-256, 258-260.
Indictment, Scheduled Incident B2.
Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts I, 261-265.
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(c) 6 January 1994 (Incident B3)
(i) Indictment
6 January 1994: Sanija D`evlan, a woman aged 32 years, was shot and wounded in her buttocks
while riding a bicycle across a bridge in Nikole Demonja Street, Dobrinja.1382
(ii) Findings
470.
The Trial Chamber has taken judicial notice of adjudicated facts related to this incident.1383
Considering that the adjudicated facts have not been rebutted during the trial, the Trial Chamber
finds beyond a reasonable doubt that on 6 January 1994, D`evlan was shot and wounded from an
SRK-controlled area.1384 The Trial Chamber also finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the victim
was a civilian not taking part in hostilities.
(d) 19 June 1994 (Incident B4)
(i) Indictment
19 June 1994: Witness B-1173, a woman aged 31 years, and her son, aged 4 years, were lightly
wounded in their legs by a shot that penetrated a crowded tram in which they were travelling. The
tram was travelling west on Zmaja od Bosne Street towards Alpa{ino Polje. Witness B-1174, a
man aged 36 years, sustained a slight leg wound and witness B-1175, a woman aged 23 years, was
wounded in her left armpit in the same attack. The tram was near the Holiday Inn hotel at the time
of the incident.1385
(ii) Findings
471.
The Trial Chamber has taken judicial notice of adjudicated facts related to this incident.1386
Considering that such adjudicated facts have not been rebutted during the trial, the Trial Chamber
finds beyond a reasonable doubt that, on 19 June 1994, a tram was deliberately targeted from an
SRK-controlled territory in the area of the Jewish Cemetery, resulting in the wounding of three
persons on board the tram. The Trial Chamber also finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the victims
were civilians not taking part in hostilities.
1382
1383
1384
1385
1386
Indictment, Scheduled Incident B3.
Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts I, 266-270.
Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts I, 268, 270.
Indictment, Scheduled Incident B4.
Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts I, 278-280.
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(e) 26 June 1994 (Incident B5)
(i) Indictment
26 June 1994: Sanela Muratović, a girl aged 16 years, was shot and wounded in her right shoulder
while walking with a girlfriend on Ðure Jakšića Street, presently Adija Mulabegovića, in the west
end of Sarajevo.1387
(ii) Findings
472.
The Trial Chamber took judicial notice of adjudicated facts related to this incident.1388
Considering that such adjudicated facts have not been rebutted, the Trial Chamber finds beyond a
reasonable doubt that, on 26 June 1994, Sanela Muratović was deliberately shot and wounded by
fire originating from territory held by the SRK and that the victim was a civilian not taking part in
hostilities.
(f) 22 July 1994 (Incident B6)
(i) Indictment
22 July 1994: Witness B-1177, a boy aged 13 years, was shot and wounded in his abdomen while
window-shopping with his mother and sister in Miljenka Cvitkovića Street, presently Ferde
Hauptmana, in the Čengić Vila area of Sarajevo.1389
(ii) Incident
473.
The Trial Chamber took judicial notice of adjudicated facts related to this incident.1390 These
adjudicated facts have not been rebutted during the trial.
474.
Mirsad Kučanin, who at the time relevant to the indictment worked as the criminal inspector
at the Centre for Security Service in Sarajevo, gave evidence about the investigation into this
incident.1391
475.
On 22 July 1994 at about 17:00 hours, Ku~anin was informed via radio of an incident on the
Miljenka Cvitkovi}a Street, where one person was wounded.1392 When Ku~anin arrived at the site
of the incident, he learned that a child had been injured with a firearm and had already been taken to
1387
1388
1389
1390
1391
1392
Indictment, Scheduled Incident B5.
Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts I, 281-287.
Indictment, Scheduled Incident B6. See the Prosecution’s “Revised List of Witnesses pursuant to Rule 73bis
Decision dated 15 May 2007”, 20 June 2007 (confidential), p. 7, showing that pseudonyms AG and B-1177
relate to the same person.
Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts I, 288-298.
Ex. P2376, Witness Statement of Mirsad Ku~anin, 12 November 1995, p. 2.
Ex. P2376, Witness Statement of Mirsad Ku~anin, 12 November 1995, p. 2; Ex. P2384, Official Note, 22 July
1994; Ex. P2378, Transcript of Mirsad Ku~anin from Prosecutor v. Gali}, 27 February 2002, T. 4507-4508.
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hospital.1393 Although the direct responsibility for the investigation lay with the local police,
Ku~anin, as the most experienced officer present, remained at the location throughout the whole
procedure in order to provide assistance and instructions on how to document the scene.1394 The
local police were almost immediately joined by an UNPROFOR team.1395
476.
The bullet used by the sniper was a 7.62 mm rifle bullet.1396 The Centre for Security Service
in Sarajevo calculated the trajectory of the bullet based on the position of the holes left by the bullet
on the sunshade and window.1397 Using a special ballistic devise, the investigators were able to
identify the “Pr`ulj house” on Zagorska street, in the VRS-held territory, as the origin of fire.1398
(iii) Findings
477.
The Trial Chamber finds beyond a reasonable doubt that on 22 July 1994, B-1177, a boy
aged 13 at the time, was deliberately wounded in his abdomen while window-shopping in Sarajevo.
The Trial Chamber also finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the victim was a civilian not taking
part in hostilities and that the fire originated from territory held by the VRS.
(g) 8 November 1994 (Incident B7)
(i) Indictment
8 November 1994: Fata Guta, a woman aged 54 years, was shot and wounded in the hand while
she was going with jerri-cans to collect water from the Mošćanica spring in Gazin Han, to the east
of Sarajevo.1399
478.
The Trial Chamber was informed by the Prosecution on 8 April 2010 that it withdrew this
incident.1400 Therefore the Trial Chamber will not make any finding in relation to this incident.
1393
1394
1395
1396
1397
1398
1399
1400
Ex. P2378, Transcript of Mirsad Ku~anin from Prosecutor v. Gali}, 27 February 2002, T. 4508-4509;
Ex. P2379, Transcript of Mirsad Ku~anin from Prosecutor v. Gali}, 28 February 2002, T. 4662.
Ex. P2378, Transcript of Mirsad Ku~anin from Prosecutor v. Gali}, 27 February 2002, T. 4508-4510;
Ex. P2379, Transcript of Mirsad Ku~anin from Prosecutor v. Gali}, 28 February 2002, T. 4642. See also
Ex. P2376, Witness Statement of Mirsad Ku~anin, 12 November 1995, p. 2.
Ex. P2384, Official Note, 22 July 1994; Ex. P2378, Transcript of Mirsad Ku~anin from Prosecutor v. Gali}, 27
February 2002, T. 4510.
Ex. P2378, Transcript of Mirsad Ku~anin from Prosecutor v. Gali}, 27 February 2002, T. 4516.
Ex. P2376, Witness Statement of Mirsad Ku~anin, 12 November 1995, p. 2.
Ex. P2378, Transcript of Mirsad Ku~anin from Prosecutor v. Gali}, 27 February 2002, T. 4512-4513;
Ex. P2384, Official Note, 22 July 1994; Ex. P2385, BiH File of Sniper Activities from Zagorska Street, 22 July
1994, p. 2. The house Pr`ulj house is located on a hill, at about 300 meters “as the crow flies”, Ex. P2379,
Transcript of Mirsad Ku~anin from Prosecutor v. Gali}, 28 February 2002, T. 4659, 4662. See also Ex. P2382,
Transcript of Mirsad Ku~anin from Prosecutor v. S. Milo{evi}, 13 November 2003, T. 28961-28962.
Indictment, Scheduled Incident B7.
Response to Defence Motion for Judicial Notice of Adjudicated Facts, 8 April 2010, para. 10(c). See also
Submission of Revised Witness List, with Confidential Annex A, 29 September 2008, Annex A.
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(h) 23 November 1994 (Incident B8)
(i) Indictment
23 November 1994: Hafiza Kara~i}, a woman aged 31 years and Sabina [abani}, a woman aged
26 years, were both wounded in the right shoulder when the tram they were travelling on came
under fire on Zmaj od Bosne, between the Technical School and Marshal Tito Barracks.1401
(ii) Location of the Sniping Incident
479.
The tram route at the Zmaja od Bosne Street between the Technical School and the Marshal
Tito Barracks was separated from the Miljacka River by a strip of land controlled by the ABiH.1402
The Miljacka River was the borderline separating both warring factions.1403 On the other bank of
the Miljacka River was the Grbavica neighbourhood, held by the VRS.1404 There were four
skyscrapers which were notorious sniper locations.1405 This area was known to be the “most
dangerous location of Sarajevo” and several people had previously been wounded on the same
stretch of road where the tram was hit.1406 The tram authorities had instructed all their drivers to
drive as fast as possible when they got to this area.1407
(iii) Incident
480.
In the afternoon of 23 November 1994, a cold but clear day, tram 263 being driven by Huso
Palo was the subject of sniper fire while it travelled westwards from the old town going towards
Otoka, a new part of the town of Sarajevo, at the Zmaja od Bosne Street between the Technical
School and Marshal Tito Barracks.1408 No soldiers were on the tram, and there were no soldiers or
any ABiH vehicles in the area.1409
481.
It was dangerous to walk home for the snipers were always active,1410 thus Sabina [abani}, a
26-year old resident of Sarajevo,1411 left work a bit early in order to catch the last tram which left
1401
1402
1403
1404
1405
1406
1407
1408
1409
1410
Indictment, Scheduled Incident B8.
Ex. P102, Transcript of Sabina [abani} from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 1472-1473. See also Afeza Kara~i},
T. 3386.
Ex. P102, Transcript of Sabina [abani} from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 1470.
Sabina [abani}, T. 697-698.
Ex. P102, Transcript of Sabina [abani} from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 1453-1454; Sabina [abani}, T. 684685, 705; Ex. P103, Witness Statement of Sabina [abani}, 16 November 1995, para. 10.
Sabina Šabanić, T. 696-697.
Ex. P2338, Witness Statement of Huso Palo, 24 February 1996, p. 1.
Ex. P2338, Witness Statement of Huso Palo, 24 February 1996, p. 1; Ex. P1946, Report on Scheduled Incident
B8, 24 November 1994, p. 1; Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts III, 51; Mirza Sablji}a, T. 4597-4598. See Ex. P102,
Transcript of Sabina [abani} from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 1461; Ex. P103, Witness Statement of Sabina
[abani}, 16 November 1995, para. 4; Sabina [abani}, T. 682, 698-699; Ex. D48, Witness Statement of Afeza
Kara~i}, 20 May 2006, para. 2. See also Ex. D49, Witness Statement of Afeza Karačić, 15 November 1995.
Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts III, 50. See also Ex. P104, Witness Statement of Sabina Šabanić, 22 May 1996,
para. 5.
Ex. P104, Witness Statement of Sabina [abani}, 22 May 2006, para. 3.
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the centre at 16:00 hours.1412 The tram was hit at an intersection,1413 when turning towards the new
railway station,1414 as it approached the front of Marshal Tito Barracks, not far from the Holiday Inn
hotel.1415 [abani} did not hear any shot or windows being broken.1416 The passengers were in panic
and wanted to get off the tram, but for safety reasons, the tram proceeded to a sheltered area behind
the museum and Marshal Tito Barracks.1417
482.
As [abani} got off the tram alongside all other passengers, she began to lose consciousness
and realised that she had been shot at.1418 There was blood on her coat and she was unable to move
her arm.1419 The bullet entered Šabanić’s right shoulder, two inches below the top of her right
shoulder, and exited at the back.1420
483.
Despite the fact that [abani} did not hear the sound of the bullets which hit the tram,1421 she
believed the shots came from the four sky-scrapers in Grbavica, as they were notorious sniper
locations.1422 Further, she also believed the shots came from that direction for she was standing in
the tram, facing Grbavica.1423
484.
Afeza Kara~i}, a.k.a. “Hafiza”, a 31-year old and resident of Sarajevo,1424 took the same
tram.1425 Kara~i} was facing the back of the tram and was holding on to a pole of the tram when she
1411
1412
1413
1414
1415
1416
1417
1418
1419
1420
1421
1422
1423
1424
1425
Ex. P1946, Report on Scheduled Incident B8, 24 November 1994, p. 1
Ex. P104, Witness Statement of Sabina [abani}, 22 May 2006, para. 2.
Exs P101, P105-P109, Photographs Marked by Sabina Šabanić; Ex. P102, Transcript of Sabina [abani} from
Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 1459-1461; Sabina Šabanić, T. 702-703.
Ex. P2340, Transcript of Huso Palo from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, 6 February 2007, T. 1536.
Ex. P493, Report of Patrick van der Weijden, 2 February 2009, p. 24; Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts III, 52.
Ex. P102, Transcript of Sabina [abani} from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 1448, 1450. [abani} initially stated
that she did hear the breaking of the windows on the tram, Ex. P103, Witness Statement of Sabina Šabanić, 16
November 1995, para. 4. In response to questioning from the Defence about the inconsistency between her
statements, the witness confirmed that she corrected the mistake in her first statement and said she did not hear
the window break on the tram, Ex. P102, Transcript of Sabina Šabanić from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 14591460; Sabina Šabanić, T. 702-703.
Ex. P102, Transcript of Sabina [abani} from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 1448, 1467-1470; Ex. P103, Witness
Statement of Sabina [abani}, 16 November 1995, paras 4-6; Exs P101, P105, Photographs Marked by Sabina
Šabanić.
Ex. P102, Transcript of Sabina [abani} from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 1450; Ex. P103, Witness Statement
of Sabina [abani}, 16 November 1995, para. 5.
Ex. P102, Transcript of Sabina [abani} from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 1450.
Ex. P102, Transcript of Sabina Šabanić from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 1458; Ex. P103, Witness Statement
of Sabina Šabanić, 16 November 1995, para. 7.
Ex. P102, Transcript of Sabina [abani} from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 1448, 1450.
Ex. P102, Transcript of Sabina Šabanić from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 1453-1454; Sabina Šabanić, T. 684685, 705 where she corrected her testimony in relation to the number of skyscrapers. See Sabina Šabanić, T. 693696, stating that it was “common knowledge” that they were snipers positions in those buildings; Sabina
Šabanić, T. 699-700. See also Ex. P103, Witness Statement of Sabina Šabanić, 16 November 1995, para. 10;
Ex. P104, Witness Statement of Sabina Šabanić. 22 May 2006, para. 6.
Ex. P102, Transcript of Sabina Šabanić from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 1455-1456; Ex. P103, Witness
Statement of Sabina Šabanić, 16 November 1995, para. 10.
Ex. P1946, Report on Scheduled Incident B8, 24 November 1994, p. 1.
Afeza Kara~i}, T. 3387-3388, 3397; Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts III, 49.
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was hit by sniper fire.1426 The bullet entered her right shoulder and exited just above her right
elbow.1427 As Kara~i} and all other passengers exited the tram, she stepped over a dead body.1428
485.
[abani} and Kara~i} were taken by the UNPROFOR soldiers to the Ko{evo Hospital
Trauma Clinic for surgery.1429 While in hospital, [abani} met another injured woman who told her
that she and her husband were in the same tram and that her husband had been killed.1430 [abani}
stayed in hospital for four days and her arm was immobilised for a period of ten days since the
bullet had passed straight through her right shoulder without hitting the bone.1431
486.
Kara~i} immediately underwent surgery and spent three to four days in intensive care.1432
She underwent another surgery three months later,1433 and as a result of her injuries was declared 80
per cent disabled.1434
487.
Palo, the tram driver, stated that although he was not sure where the shots were fired
from,1435 he believed that the origin of the fire was from the left of the tram, coming from one of the
skyscrapers in Grbavica, which were approximately 200-300 metres from where the tram was
hit.1436 The Trial Chamber also took judicial notice of the fact that the origin of the fire was either
the high-rise buildings on Lenjinova Street or the Metalka building, both of which were held by the
VRS.1437
(iv) Investigation
488.
The investigation of this incident was carried out by the Sarajevo High Court Investigating
Judge Izet Ba`darevi} and a team of six experts, including ballistic and forensic officers.1438 Upon
arriving at the scene, the investigating team observed that the tram was no longer there and had
1426
1427
1428
1429
1430
1431
1432
1433
1434
1435
1436
1437
1438
Afeza Kara~i}, T. 3389-3390.
Ibid.
Afeza Kara~i}, T. 3389.
Afeza Kara~i}, T. 3389, 3394-3395; Ex. P103, Witness Statement of Sabina Šabanić, 16 November 1995,
para. 6; Ex. P1946, Report on Scheduled Incident B8, 24 November 1994, p. 1.
Sabina Šabanić, T. 703-704; Ex. P102, Transcript of Sabina Šabanić from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 1484.
Ex. P103, Witness Statement of Sabina Šabanić, 16 November 1995, para. 7. See also Sarajevo Adjudicated
Facts III, 55.
Afeza Kara~i}, T. 3395; Ex. P548, Medical Record of Afeza Kara~i}, 25 November 1994.
Afeza Kara~i}, T. 3396; Ex. P549, Medical Record of Afeza Kara~i}, 6 March 1995.
Ex. D48, Witness Statement of Afeza Kara~i}, 20 May 2006, para. 2. See also Ex. D49, Witness Statement of
Afeza Kara~i}, 15 November 1995, p. 2; Ex. P548, Medical Record of Afeza Kara~i}, 25 November 1994.
Kara~i}’s radial nerve was cut off, and she initially could not move her arm at all. However, she has recently
been able to regain some form of mobility of her arm, Afeza Kara~i}, T. 3396.
Ex. P2340, Transcript of Huso Palo from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, 6 February 2007, T. 1539, 1547.
Ex. P2337, Statement of Huso Palo, 24 November 1994, p. 1; Ex. P2338, Statement of Huso Palo, 24 February
1996, p. 2; Ex. P2340, Transcript of Huso Palo from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, 6 February 2007, T. 1535,
1539, 1547.
Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts III, 53-54.
Ex. P1946, Report on Scheduled Incident B8, 24 November 1994, p. 1.
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been driven to the tram depot.1439 Thus the tram was not inspected on the spot, but rather at the tram
depot.1440
489.
The report states that the tram was hit by one shot coming from the direction of
Grbavica.1441 Mirza Sabljica – a ballistics expert from the CSB in Sarajevo who participated in the
investigation of the sniping incident – pointed out that although it was not possible to ascertain the
exact place from which the bullet was fired, the investigation team was able to establish that the
bullet had been fired from the area of Grbavica.1442 He stated that looking in the direction in which
the tram was travelling; the bullet came in from the left.1443 Witness MP-432 also stated that the
bullet entered the tram through an open window on the left hand side of the tram.1444 The
investigating team was unable to establish the angle at which the bullet entered the tram due to the
lack of entry damage on the outer wall of the tram.1445
490.
According to Sabljica, the bullet fragmented as it hit the upper right hand side corner of an
inner window frame of the tram, thereby leaving two bullet traces at about 157 cm from the floor
and at 7 cm distance from each other and wounding persons on board.1446 According to witness MP432 who was part of the investigation team, it was very likely that the bullet first hit the persons
before leaving traces on the body of the tram.1447 He explained that fragmenting bullets may
fragment at a given moment on their own, without the need for a direct impact.1448 He added that
although in this case, the investigating team did not find evidence that the bullet used was a
fragmenting one it considered it very likely that it was.1449
491.
Patrick van der Weijden, a military sniper expert witness, concluded in his report that the
gun-fire originated from the Metalka building to the south of the Miljacka River.1450 Further, van
der Weijden believed that the weapon used would most likely have been a machine-gun mounted on
1439
1440
1441
1442
1443
1444
1445
1446
1447
1448
1449
1450
Ibid.
Ex. P1946, Report on Scheduled Incident B8, 24 November 1994, p. 1; MP-432, T. 5325.
Ex. P1946, Report on Scheduled Incident B8, 24 November 1994, p. 1; MP-432, T. 5288. See also Sarajevo
Adjudicated Fact III, 52-53.
Mirza Sabljica, T. 4602-4603; Ex. P1946, Report on Scheduled Incident B8, 24 November 1994, p. 1
Mirza Sabljica, T. 4602.
MP-432, T. 5330.
Mirza Sabljica, T. 4627, 4629. See also Ex. P1946, Report on Scheduled Incident B8, 24 November 1994, p. 1.
Mirza Sabljica, T. 4602; MP-432, T. 5295; Mirza Sabljica, T. 4601; Ex. P1946, Report on Scheduled Incident
B8, 24 November 1994, p. 1; Mirza Sabljica, T. 4628.
MP-432, T. 5296.
MP-432, T. 5297.
Ibid.
Ex. P493, Report of Patrick van der Weijden, 2 February 2009, p. 25; Mirza Sabljica, T. 4596, 4610.
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a bipod or tripod.1451 According to the expert witness, a machine gun would have a better effect
against a moving target, like a tram, in comparison to a sniper rifle.1452
(v) Findings
492.
The Trial Chamber finds beyond a reasonable doubt that on 23 November 1994 at around
16:00 hours, Afeza Kara~i} and Sabina [abani} were each deliberately wounded on the right
shoulder when the tram they were travelling on came under fire on Zmaja od Bosne Street, between
the Technical School and Marshal Tito Barracks. The Trial Chamber also finds that Afeza Kara~i}
and Sabina [abani} were civilians not taking part in hostilities. The sniping fire came from the
direction of the Metalka building to the south of the Miljacka River, which was under the control of
VRS forces. The shot was fired by a member of the VRS.1453
(i) 10 December 1994 (Incident B9)
(i) Indictment
10 December 1994: Dervi{a Selmanovi}, a woman aged 49 years, was shot and wounded in the
right knee while she was gathering firewood in the backyard of a house in Sedrenik Street, in the
north east of Sarajevo.1454
(ii) Location of the Sniping Incident
493.
Sedrenik Street is located in a residential area in the north-east of Stari Grad municipality in
Sarajevo.1455 It is overlooked by the [picasta Stijena hill,1456 which at the relevant time was
occupied by the VRS.1457 [picasta Stijena was a notorious sniper position of the VRS.1458 The
ABiH had trenches facing [picasta Stijena in particular and the Barice neighbourhood towards the
north in general.1459
1451
1452
1453
1454
1455
1456
1457
1458
1459
Ex. P493, Report of Patrick van der Weijden, 2 February 2009, p. 25.
Ibid.
Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts III, 56.
Indictment, Scheduled Incident B9.
Ex. P1939, Report on Scheduled Incident B9, 14 December 1994, 14 December 1994.
Ex. P1936, Transcript of Ned`ib \ozo from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, 14 March 2007, T. 3684; Ex. P1937,
Witness Statement of Ned`ib Dozo, 22 November 1995, para. 7.
Ex. P1936, Transcript of Ned`ib \ozo from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, 14 March 2007, T. 3684-3685. See
Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts III, 57.
Ex. P1937, Witness Statement of Ned`ib \ozo, 22 November 1995, para. 6; Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts III, 57.
Ex. P1936, Transcript of Ned`ib \ozo from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, 14 March 2007, T. 3689.
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(iii) Incident
494.
During the conflict, sniping from [picasta Stijena occurred practically on a daily basis for a
prolonged period of time.1460 In order to enable the inhabitants of Sedrenik to move about freely
despite the constant sniping, members of the civilian protection hung out blankets and the like to
prevent the snipers from [picasta Stijena from seeing through.1461
495.
Although Dervi{a Selmanovi}, a 49-year old resident of Sarajevo, was employed as a cook
assistant in the ABiH,1462 she always dressed in civilian clothes and walked to and from her place of
work, which was located near the Ko{evo Hospital.1463 Selmanovi} had gone to a friend’s house in
the Sedrenik neighborhood, where she had once lived.1464 There were no military facilities or
activities in the vicinity and no fighting was going on between the warring parties.1465 Some houses
were exposed to [picasta Stijena and were under constant fire from the snipers.1466
496.
On the morning of 10 December 1994, a partly overcast day with little fog and little sun,1467
there was sniper activity in the Sedrenik area. Around 11:00 hours, when it stopped, Selmanovi}
went out into the yard of her friend’s house with the intention of collecting some firewood to take
home.1468 As she got to the firewood, she suddenly felt a sharp pain in her right knee and a burning
sensation going down her leg.1469 Although Selmanovi} did not immediately realise that she had
been hit by a sniper bullet, she instinctively sought shelter behind the house while “another 20 to 30
1460
1461
1462
1463
1464
1465
1466
1467
1468
1469
Ex. P112, Transcript of Dervi{a Selmanovi} from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 1596; Ex. P1936, Transcript of
Ned`ib \ozo from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, 14 March 2007, T. 3695.
Ex. P1936, Transcript of Ned`ib \ozo from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, 14 March 2007, T. 3695.
Ex. P111, Witness Statement of Dervi{a Selmanovi}, 20 April 2006, paras 5-6; Ex. P1939, Report on Scheduled
Incident B9, 14 December 1994.
Dervi{a Selmanovi}, T. 718, 737. She also stated that although she was given some form of a uniform as a cook
assistant, she never wore it and was advised by the ABiH officials not to wear a uniform traveling to and from
work, Ex. P111, Witness Statement of Dervi{a Selmanovi}, 20 April 2006, paras 7-8. See also Sarajevo
Adjudicated Facts III, 62.
Ex. P1940, Official Note, 12 March 1995, p. 1; Ex. P112, Transcript of Dervi{a Selmanovi} from Prosecutor v.
D. Milo{evi}, T. 1589, 1601.
Ex. P112, Transcript of Dervi{a Selmanovi} from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 1586; Ex. P111, Witness
Statement of Dervi{a Selmanovi}, 20 April 2006, para. 12; Ex. P1937, Witness Statement of Ned`ib \ozo, 22
November 1995, para. 7.
Ex. P112, Transcript of Dervi{a Selmanovi} from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 1594; Ex. P1940, Official Note,
12 March 1995, p. 1. Because of the sniping, the inhabitants were forced to enter their houses through abnormal
means such as through the window or by a ladder, Ex. P1937, Witness Statement of Ned`ib \ozo, 22 November
1995, para. 6.
Ex. P112, Transcript of Dervi{a Selmanovi} from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 1586, 1607; Ex. P111, Witness
Statement of Dervi{a Selmanovi}, 20 April 2006, para. 10.
Ex. P1940, Official Note, 12 March 1995, p. 1; Ex. P111, Witness Statement of Dervi{a Selmanovi}, 20 April
2006, para. 10.
Ex. P111, Witness Statement of Dervi{a Selmanovi}, 20 April 2006, para. 10; Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts III,
58, 60. See also Ex. P1939, Report on Scheduled Incident B9, 14 December 1994.
155
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bullets” were fired at the house.1470 The Trial Chamber took judicial notice of the fact that the bullet
was fired by a member of the VRS from the VRS-controlled area of Špicasta Stijena.1471
497.
A neighbour, Ibro Bundo, helped her get to his house, where he tried to stop the bleeding
from her wound by tying a piece of cord around her leg.1472 According to Selmanovi}, the
ambulance that was called was unable to arrive at the scene of the incident due to the constant
sniper fire from [picasta Stijena.1473 An UNPROFOR patrol, which was nearby, helped transport
her to the intersection between Sedrenik Street and R. Goru{anovi}a Street, where an ambulance
was waiting.1474 She was then taken to the Ko{evo Hospital, where she received treatment for her
wound and was sent home the same day.1475 It was established that a bullet had struck her knee
from the inside and exited on the outside of her leg.1476
(iv) Investigation
498.
On 10 December 1994, at around 12:00 hours, the Stari Grad Police Station was notified of
a person being wounded as a result of a gunshot fired from [picasta Stijena.1477 An investigation
team, made up of the duty officer at the police station of Stari Grad, a technician and a ballistics
expert, was sent to the scene.1478 However, due to constant gunshot fire from [picasta Stijena, the
on-site investigation was not very detailed.1479 A neighbour provided the name of the victim and
pointed out where she was wounded.1480 Derviša Selmanović had already been taken to hospital.1481
499.
Subsequently, the investigation team spoke with the victim’s doctor at the hospital.1482 The
information received that Selmanović had been hit on her left leg is reflected in the on-site
1470
1471
1472
1473
1474
1475
1476
1477
1478
1479
1480
1481
1482
Ex. P1940, Official Note, 12 March 1995.
Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts III, 59, 61.
Ex. P111, Witness Statement of Dervi{a Selmanovi}, 20 April 2006, para. 10; Ex. P1940, Official Note, 12
March 1995, p. 1.
Ex. P1940, Official Note, 12 March 1995, p. 1; Ex. P111, Witness Statement of Dervi{a Selmanovi}, 20 April
2006, para. 10.
Ex. P111, Witness Statement of Dervi{a Selmanovi}, 20 April 2006, para. 10; Ex. P1940, Official Note, 12
March 1995, p. 1. See also Ex. P112, Transcript of Dervi{a Selmanovi} from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi},
T. 1604.
Ex. P111, Witness Statement of Dervi{a Selmanovi}, 20 April 2006, para. 10; Ex. P1940, Official Note, 12
March 1995, p. 1.
Ex. P110, Witness Statement of Dervi{a Selmanovi}, 27 February 1996, para. 3. See Ex. P112, Transcript of
Dervi{a Selmanovi} from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 1590.
Ex. P1937, Witness Statement of Ned`ib \ozo, 22 November 1995, para. 3; Ex. P1936, Transcript of Ned`ib
\ozo from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 3683-3684.
Ex. P1936, Transcript of Ned`ib \ozo from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 3685.
Ex. P1939, Report on Scheduled Incident B9, 14 December 1994. See Ex. P1936, Transcript of Ned`ib \ozo
from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 3684; Ex. P1937, Witness Statement of Ned`ib \ozo, 22 November 1995,
para. 4.
Ex. P1936, Transcript of Ned`ib \ozo from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 3686; Ex. P1937, Witness Statement
of Ned`ib \ozo, 22 November 1995, para. 4.
Ex. P1936, Transcript of Ned`ib \ozo from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 3686.
Ex. P1937, Witness Statement of Ned`ib \ozo, 22 November 1995, para. 4.
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investigation report.1483 About three months later, when the victim was able to be interviewed by
the Stari Grad police, it was established that she was actually wounded on her right leg.1484 In a
video-recording made by the Prosecution in June 2006, Selmanovi} stated that the shooting came
from her right side and that she was hit on the outside of her right leg.1485 However, testifying in
another case before the Tribunal in February 2007, she corrected that statement by admitting that
she had been confused during the 2006 video-recording when pointing to her right to show the
direction from which the sniping fire came.1486 She confirmed that the shooting actually came from
her left side and that she was hit on the inner side of her right leg.1487
500.
Patrick van der Weijden, an expert witness in this case, stated that the impact site was about
900 to 1100 metres away from the likely source of the gunfire.1488 According to van der Weijden,
the VRS was in possession of weapons capable of firing from this distance.1489
501.
Van der Weijden believed that from the assumed firing position, the sniper would have been
able to observe movement at the impact site with his naked eye. However, for targeting,
magnification would probably have been necessary.1490 He was of the opinion that the sniper used a
machine-gun, likely fitted with a tripod for better accuracy, coupled with the aid of a lens.1491
Further, he believed that even if the sniper could not identify the target as being a civilian from the
colour of the clothing, he still could have identified Selmanović by the way she was moving and the
activity she was carrying out.1492
502.
According to Ned`ib \ozo, a Sarajevo police officer who investigated the sniping incident,
it was “impossible” that the shooting came from the soldiers of the ABiH1493 because from their
trenches there was no line of sight to where Selmanovi} was injured.1494 Moreover, Ðozo testified
1483
1484
1485
1486
1487
1488
1489
1490
1491
1492
1493
1494
Ex. P1936, Transcript of Ned`ib \ozo from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 3691. The duty officer at the Stari
Grad police station on 10 December 1994, pointed out that when information – such as where a victim was
wounded – was obtained it would be entered into the log-book, which was kept by the shift commander of the
Stari Grad police station. If that information later turned out to be incorrect, the log-book would not be corrected,
Ned`ib \ozo, T. 4552-4554.
Ex. P1936, Transcript of Ned`ib \ozo from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, 14 March 2007, T. 3691; Ned`ib \ozo,
T. 4522-4524.
Ex. P114, Video Clip.
Ex. P112, Transcript of Dervi{a Selmanovi} from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 1590-1593, 1606; Dervi{a
Selmanovi}, T. 733-736.
Ibid.
Ex. P493, Report of Patrick van der Weijden, 2 February 2009, p. 45. However, this was an estimated guess on
the map because the conditions were too cloudy for a proper measuremenT. From the location van der Weijden
visited later, which could not have been more than 100 metres away from the incident site, the distance was
1,100 metres, Patrick van der Weijden, T. 3030.
Patrick van der Weijden, T. 3030; Ex. P493, Report of Patrick van der Weijden, 2 February 2009, p. 58.
Patrick van der Weijden, T. 3030.
Ibid.
Patrick van der Weijden, T. 3043.
Ex. P1936, Transcript of Ned`ib \ozo from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, 14 March 2007, T. 3690.
Ibid.
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that the ABiH unit was made up of locals who would not be shooting at their relatives and
neighbours.1495
(v) Findings
503.
The Trial Chamber finds beyond a reasonable doubt that on 10 December 1994 at around
11:00 hours, Dervi{a Selmanovi} was deliberately injured by a sniper bullet on the inner side of her
right leg. In spite of her occupation as a cook assistant in the ABiH, the Trial Chamber is also
satisfied that the victim was a civilian not taking part in hostilities at the time the sniping occurred.
The Trial Chamber is further satisfied that the sniper shot originated from the [picasta Stijena hill,
which was a notorious sniper position of the VRS.
(j) 27 February 1995 (Incident B10)
(i) Indictment
27 February 1995: Senad Ke{mer, a man aged 31 years, Alma Čehagić, a woman aged 19 years,
Alija Holjan, a man aged 55 years, and others, were shot and wounded while traveling in a
westbound tram on Zmaj od Bosne. The tram was near the Tito barracks at the time.1496
(ii) Incident
504.
Witness MP-229, a tram driver, stated that on 27 February 1995, there was a cease-fire in
place between the VRS and the ABiH.1497 It was a day with good visibility and fine weather.1498
505.
At around 12:30 hours on that day, MP-229 was driving a tram from the centre of Sarajevo
to the depot, moving westwards.1499 Alma Mulaosmanovi}-^ehaji} (also known as Alma ^ehaji}),
Alija Holjan and Senad Kešmer were among the passengers of the tram.1500 The tram was crowded,
all the seats were taken and some passengers were standing.1501 The passengers of the tram were
civilian men, women and children1502 and one soldier, who was standing next to MP-229.1503
1495
1496
1497
1498
1499
1500
1501
1502
1503
Ibid.
Indictment, Scheduled Incident B10; Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts III, 64, 66.
Ex. P22 (under seal), para. 5; Ex. P30, Transcript of MP-229 from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 1624.
Ex. P24 (under seal), para. 4.
Ex. P22 (under seal), para. 3; Ex. P23 (under seal), para. 1; Ex. P29, Transcript of MP-229 from Prosecutor v.
D. Milo{evi}, T. 1616; Ex. P30, Transcript of MP-229 from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 1629.
Ex. P13, Witness Statement of Alma Mulaosmanovi}-^ehaji}, 22 February 1996, para. 2; Ex. P2312, Witness
Statement of Alija Holjan, 22 February 1996, p. 2; Ex. P2313, Witness Statement of Alija Holjan, 25 April 2006,
paras 9-10; Ex. P59, Witness Statement of Senad Ke{mer, 22 February 1996, p. 2. During her oral testimony, the
witness stated that in the Indictment, her maiden name is mistakenly spelt as ^ehagi}, while in fact her maiden
name is ^ehaji}, Alma Mulaosmanovi}-^ehaji}, T. 587.
Ex. P24 (under seal), para. 6; Ex. P30, Transcript of MP-229 from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 1624.
Ex. P13, Witness Statement of Alma Mulaosmanovi}-^ehaji}, 22 February 1996, para. 2. See also Ex. P15,
Transcript of Alma Mulaosmanovi}-^ehaji} from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 1656-1657.
Ex. P24 (under seal), para. 6; Ex. P30, Transcript of MP-229 from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 1623.
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506.
Shortly after the tram left the stop close to the Marshal Tito barracks, it came under fire. As
the passengers heard the shots and the sound of broken glass, they ducked for cover.1504 The first
shots hit the rear of the tram, and as the tram kept on moving, the bullets started to hit its front
part.1505 MP-229 noticed that one woman lying on the floor was bleeding from her leg.1506
507.
Mulaosmanovi}-^ehaji}, who was standing near the third tram door and was facing the
direction of the Marshal Tito barracks, explained that due to overcrowding, not all the passengers
could take cover on the floor.1507 As a result, some, including her, could only kneel down.1508 The
witness sustained a bullet wound to her arm below her left elbow. The wound was an entry and exit
wound showing that the bullet came from her back and exited towards her front.1509
508.
Senad Ke{mer, who was standing in the front part of the tram with his back to the south,
upon hearing the shots turned his body sideways, in order to achieve minimal exposure of his body
surface to fire.1510 Nevertheless, Ke{mer was hit by a piece of metal that entered the left side of his
head. He could not, however, determine whether it was a bullet or a metal part of the tram.1511
Ke{mer noticed an elderly woman near him who was wounded in the stomach.1512 A girl was
wounded on the arm, and Ke{mer believed she was taken to hospital.1513
509.
Alija Holjan, who was sitting on the right hand side in the middle of the tram, was hit on his
right shoulder at the level of the shoulder blade.1514 He also saw an elderly woman, who was sitting
1504
1505
1506
1507
1508
1509
1510
1511
1512
1513
1514
Ex. P29, Transcript of MP-229 from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 1616; Ex. P30, Transcript of MP-229 from
Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 1620-1625; Alma Mulaosmanovi}-^ehaji}, T. 599-600; Ex. P24 (under seal),
para. 4; Ex. D1, Map Marked by Alma Mulaosmanovi}-^ehaji}; Ex. P14, Witness Statement of Alma
Mulaosmanovi}-^ehaji}, 20 March 2006, para. 9; Ex. P15, Transcript of Alma Mulaosmanovi}-^ehaji} from
Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 1658, 1662; Ex. P20, Statement of Alma Mulaosmanovi}-^ehaji} to Sarajevo
Security Service Centre, 14 April 1995.
Ex. P59, Witness Statement of Senad Ke{mer, 22 February 1996, para. 2; Ex. P60, Report of Sniping Incident
B10, 27 February 1995, pp 3, 7.
Ex. P22 (under seal), para. 3. See also Ex. P30, Transcript of MP-229 from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 1626.
Ex. P14, Witness Statement of Alma Mulaosmanovi}-^ehaji}, 20 March 2006, para. 9; Ex. P13, Witness
Statement of Alma Mulaosmanovi}-^ehaji}, 22 February 1996, para. 2; Alma Mulaosmanovi}-^ehaji}, T. 600,
604; Ex. P15, Transcript of Alma Mulaosmanovi}-^ehaji} from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 1652, 1658;
Ex. P20, Statement of Alma Mulaosmanovi}-^ehaji} to Sarajevo Security Service Centre, 14 April 1995.
Ex. P14, Witness Statement of Alma Mulaosmanovi}-^ehaji}, 20 March 2006, para. 9; Ex. P13, Witness
Statement of Alma Mulaosmanovi}-^ehaji}, 22 February 1996, para. 2; Ex. P15, Transcript of Alma
Mulaosmanovi}-^ehaji} from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 1658.
Alma Mulaosmanovi}-^ehaji}, T. 600-601; Ex. P15, Transcript of Alma Mulaosmanovi}-^ehaji} from
Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 1654, 1656; Ex. P14, Witness Statement of Alma Mulaosmanovi}-^ehaji}, 20
March 2006, para. 9.
Ex. P59, Witness Statement of Senad Ke{mer, 22 February 1996, p. 2. See also Ex. P28, Annotated Map of
Sarajevo.
Ex. P59, Witness Statement of Senad Ke{mer, 22 February 1996, p. 2.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ex. P2314, Witness Statement of Alija Holjan, 14 April 1995; Ex. P2312, Witness Statement of Alija Holjan,
22 February 1996, p. 2; Ex. P2313, Witness Statement of Alija Holjan, 25 April 2006, para. 10.
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in front of him, who was wounded.1515 The witness stated that he was aware of four other persons
injured during the shooting and that a woman who had been wounded to her leg subsequently died
at the hospital.1516
510.
Without stopping, MP-229 drove the tram for another 50 metres. At a sheltered place close
to the university’s Faculty of Natural Sciences and Mathematics and the police station, MP-229
opened the doors to let the passengers disembark.1517
(iii) Aftermath of the Incident
511.
After the incident, some wounded passengers, including Mulaosmanovi}-^ehaji} and
Holjan, were transported to the first aid station near the tram stop.1518 From there, Mulaosmanovi}^ehaji} went home and on the following day, she underwent treatment at a hospital.1519 From the
first aid station, Holjan was discharged to recuperate at home.1520 He still suffers from the
consequences of his wound and was declared “20% invalid”.1521 Kešmer went to the hospital where
he was told that his wound was not serious and was discharged.1522 About three months later, he
pulled a piece of metal from near his temple.1523
512.
MP-229 gave evidence that she found 30 bullet holes and marks on the left hand side of the
tram, just below and on the windows.1524 According to MP-229, the shots were fired from the VRSheld territory of Grbavica. However, MP-229 conceded that the exact origin of the shots was
difficult to determine.1525
1515
1516
1517
1518
1519
1520
1521
1522
1523
1524
1525
Ex. P2312, Witness Statement of Alija Holjan, 22 February 1996, p. 2; Ex. P2314, Witness Statement of Alija
Holjan, 14 April 1995.
Ex. P2313, Witness Statement of Alija Holjan, 25 April 2006, para. 11; Ex. P2312, Witness Statement of Alija
Holjan, 22 February 1996, p. 2.
Ex. P14, Witness Statement of Alma Mulaosmanovi}-^ehaji}, 20 March 2006, para. 9; Ex. P13, Witness
Statement of Alma Mulaosmanovi}-^ehaji}, 22 February 1996, para. 2; Ex. P15, Transcript of Alma
Mulaosmanovi}-^ehaji} from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 1653; Ex. P2312, Witness Statement of Alija
Holjan, 22 February 1996, p. 2. See also Ex. P24 (under seal), para. 5; Ex. P30, Transcript of MP-229 from
Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 1620, 1631, 1634; Ex. P22 (under seal), para. 3.
Ex. P13, Witness Statement of Alma Mulaosmanovi}-^ehaji}, 22 February 1996, para. 2; Ex. P14, Witness
Statement of Alma Mulaosmanovi}-^ehaji}, 20 March 2006, para. 9; Ex. P15, Transcript of Alma
Mulaosmanovi}-^ehaji} from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 1658; Ex. P2314, Witness Statement of Alija
Holjan, 14 April 1995; Ex. P2312, Witness Statement of Alija Holjan, 22 February 1996, p. 2.
Ex. P14, Witness Statement of Alma Mulaosmanovi}-^ehaji}, 20 March 2006, para. 9; Ex. P20, Statement of
Alma Mulaosmanovi}-^ehaji} to Sarajevo Security Service Centre, 14 April 1995.
Ex. P2314, Witness Statement of Alija Holjan, 14 April 1995.
Ex. P2313, Witness Statement of Alija Holjan, 25 April 2006, para. 16.
Ex. P59, Witness Statement of Senad Ke{mer, 22 February 1996, p. 2.
Ibid.
Ex. P22 (under seal), para. 4; Ex. P24 (under seal), para. 5; Ex. P30, Transcript of MP-229 from Prosecutor v.
D. Milo{evi}, T. 1626.
Ex. P22 (under seal), para. 3; Ex. P23 (under seal), para. 2; Ex. P24 (under seal), para. 5; Ex. P25, Annotated
map of Sarajevo, 6 February 2007; Ex. P30, Transcript of MP-229 from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 1620,
1635; Ex. D2, Map Marked by MP-229.
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513.
The eye-witnesses and victims of this incident stated that the shots were fired from the
direction of the skyscrapers in Grbavica 1526
514.
MP-229 testified that the only military facilities in the area were the Marshal Tito
barracks.1527 According to her, it was impossible that somebody could have been shooting at the
barracks and hit the tram instead.1528 Mulaosmanovi}-^ehaji} stated that she did not remember
seeing any ABiH soldiers or installations in the surrounding area on that day,1529 nor was she aware
of any combat activity.1530
(iv) Investigation
515.
Mirza Sabljica, who worked as a ballistics expert with the Sarajevo CSB, testified that
shortly after the incident had taken place, he participated in an on-site investigation. From witness
statements, his team was able to establish that the tram was hit as it began to move westbound from
the tram station in front of the Marshal Tito barracks in the direction of Novi Grad.1531 Five persons,
including Mulaosmanovi}-^ehaji}, Holjan and Kešmer were wounded in the incident.1532 Sabljica
testified that his team found eight bullet marks on the tram.1533 Five of the bullets were found in the
front section of the tram, and the other three in the middle section.1534 In conjunction with the
ballistic examination, Sabljica’s team determined that the fire originated from the fourth high-rise
building on Lenjinova Street in Grbavica.1535
1526
1527
1528
1529
1530
1531
1532
1533
1534
1535
Ex. P59, Witness Statement of Senad Ke{mer, 22 February 1996, p. 2. See also Ex. P2312, Witness Statement of
Alija Holjan, 22 February 1996, p. 2; Ex. P2313, Witness Statement of Alija Holjan, 25 April 2006, para. 10;
Alma Mulaosmanovi}-^ehaji}, T. 600-601; Ex. D1, Map Marked by Alma Mulaosmanovi}-^ehaji}, mark G;
Ex. P15, Transcript of Alma Mulaosmanovi}-^ehaji} from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 1653-1655; Ex. P16,
Map Marked by Alma Mulaosmanovi}-^ehaji} from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}; Ex. P17, Photo Marked by
Alma Mulaosmanovi}-^ehaji} from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}; Ex. P13, Witness Statement of Alma
Mulaosmanovi}-^ehaji}, 22 February 1996, para. 3; Ex. P14, Witness Statement of Alma Mulaosmanovi}^ehaji}, 20 March 2006, para. 8.
Ex. P2313, Witness Statement of Alija Holjan, 25 April 2006, para. 13.
Ex. P24 (under seal), para. 7.
Ex. P15, Transcript of Alma Mulaosmanovi}-^ehaji} from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 1656.
Ex. P15, Transcript of Alma Mulaosmanovi}-^ehaji} from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 1656. But see Ex. P19,
Report from the HQ ABiH Command to UNPROFOR Zagreb, 27 February 1995, p. 2. See also Ex. P19, pp 9,
23, which estimates the origin of fire to be the area of the Vrbanja bridge, where there was fire-fighting between
two warring factions. As regards the location of the Vrbanja bridge, see Ex. D1, Map Marked by Alma
Mulaosmanovi}-^ehaji}, mark X; Ex. P18, Photo Marked by Alma Mulaosmanovi}-^ehaji} in Prosecutor v.
D. Milo{evi}, blue mark X; Ex. P15, Transcript of Alma Mulaosmanovi}-^ehaji} from Prosecutor v.
D. Milo{evi}, T. 1677.
Mirza Sabljica, T. 4604-4605; Ex. P1949, Report on Scheduled Incident B10, 27 February 1995, p. 5.
Ex. P1949, Report on Scheduled Incident B10, 27 February 1995, p. 3.
Mirza Sabljica, T. 4607.
Ex. P1949, Report on Scheduled Incident B10, 27 February 1995, p. 4. The Trial Chamber notes that MP-229
gave evidence about finding “30 bullet holes”. The Trial Chamber is satisfied that the evidence shows that the
tram had several bullet holes, though it cannot make any determination as to the exact number, see supra
para. 512.
Mirza Sabljica, T. 4606-4607, 4609; Ex. P1949, Report on Scheduled Incident B10, 27 February 1995, pp 4-6.
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516.
In approximately March 1996, when the conflict had ended and the siege was lifted, Sabljica
visited each of the four high-rise buildings in Grbavica on Lenjinova Street, pursuant to orders of an
investigating judge and the chief of the crime prevention police.1536 On the higher floors of the
buildings in question, Sabljica found that five or six identical apartments had been redesigned to
serve as sniper nests.1537 The outer wall facing the Miljacka River in each of these apartments had
small conical openings, in order to provide the sniper with a good view of the target, combined with
the safety of the apartment.1538 Sabljica established that these conical openings provided a view of
the complete stretch of the tram tracks from the Holiday Inn to the Faculty of Natural Sciences and
Mathematics.1539
(v) Findings
517.
The Trial Chamber finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the tram, driven on 27 February
1995 by MP-229, was deliberately hit by sniper fire near the Marshal Tito barracks. As a result,
Mulaosmanovi}-^ehaji} and Alija Holjan sustained serious wounds, while Senad Kešmer was
lightly wounded. The Trial Chamber is also satisfied that the only reasonable inference to be drawn
from the evidence is that the victims were civilians not taking part in hostilities. The Trial Chamber
also reached the only reasonable conclusion that the shots were fired from one of the high-rise
buildings located on Lenjinova Street in Grbavica, which was under the control of the VRS at the
relevant time.
(k) 3 March 1995 (Incident B11)
(i) Indictment
3 March 1995: Azem Agović, a man aged 46 and Alen Gičević, a man aged 33 years, were shot
and wounded while traveling in an eastbound tram on Zmaj od Bosne. The tram was near the
Holiday Inn at the time.1540
(ii) Incident
518.
On 3 March 1995, it was the Muslim holiday of Bajram.1541 It was a bright and sunny
day.1542 The trams in Sarajevo were allowed to run due to a cease-fire reached between the ABiH
1536
1537
1538
1539
1540
1541
1542
Mirza Sabljica, T. 4609-4610.
Mirza Sabljica, T. 4611.
Mirza Sabljica, T. 4611-4612.
Mirza Sabljica, T. 4612.
Indictment, Scheduled Incident B11.
Ex. P536, Witness Statement of Azem Agovi}, 21 November 1995, p. 2; Ex. P537, Witness Statement of Azem
Agovi}, 21 April 2006, para. 8; Ex. P130, Witness Statement of Alen Gičević, 21 April 2006, para. 8.
Ex. P32, Witness Statement of Slavica Livnjak, 24/25 April 2006, paras 6, 8; Ex. P33, Transcript of Slavica
Livnjak from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 863.
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and the VRS.1543 On that day, Slavica Livnjak was driving a tram from the depot eastwards towards
Ba{~ar{ija.1544 The tram was crowded and contained about 100 passengers.1545 Alen Gičević, his
girlfriend and Azem Agović were among the tram passengers.1546 Gičević had been a member of
the ABiH but was demobilised nine months before.1547 Gi~evi} was standing on the right-hand side
of the tram, near the third door, facing the Faculty of Philosophy, the Jewish Cemetery and
Vrača.1548 Agović was sitting in the middle, facing the rear of the tram.1549
519.
At about 12:15 hours while travelling on Zmaja od Bosne street, the tram approached the
area next to the Holiday Inn, where the tracks make a double ‘S’-shaped curve which forces trams
to slow down.1550 Livnjak estimated that at this point she was driving at the speed of approximately
20-25 kilometres an hour.1551 At once, she saw that the tram ahead of hers was hit in the rear by
sniper fire, and shortly afterwards, her own tram was hit as well on its right side, in an area between
the third door and the middle joint of the tram.1552
520.
Gičević testified that he heard two or three shots and the sound of breaking glass before he
noticed that other passengers took cover on the floor of the tram, screaming in panic.1553 He then
felt severe pain in his right knee and noticed that he was bleeding.1554 Gi~evi} also saw that one
1543
1544
1545
1546
1547
1548
1549
1550
1551
1552
1553
1554
Slavica Livnjak, T. 644; Ex. P32, Witness Statement of Slavica Livnjak, 24/25 April 2006, paras 6, 8; Ex. P33,
Transcript of Slavica Livnjak from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 863. See also Ex. P536, Witness Statement of
Azem Agovi}, 21 November 1995, p. 2.
Slavica Livnjak, T. 644; Ex. P32, Witness Statement of Slavica Livnjak, 24/25 April 2006, para. 8; Alen
Gičevi}, T. 797; Ex. P128, Transcript of Alen Gičevi} from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 1556; Ex. P129,
Witness Statement of Alen Gičević, 15 November 1995, p. 2.
Ex. P31, Witness Statement of Slavica Livnjak, 20 Nocember 1995, para. 3.
Azem Agovi}, T. 3322, 3324; Ex. P536, Witness Statement of Azem Agovi}, 21 November 1995, p. 2;
Ex. P537, Witness Statement of Azem Agovi}, 21 April 2006, paras 8-9; Ex. P129, Witness Statement of Alen
Gičević, 15 November 1995, p. 2; Ex. P130, Witness Statement of Alen Gičević, 21 April 2006, para. 9.
Ex. P128, Transcript of Alen Gičevi} from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 1571-1572.
Alen Gičevi}, T. 809; Ex. P128, Transcript of Alen Gičevi} from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 1556; Ex. P129,
Witness Statement of Alen Gičević, 15 November 1995, p. 2; Ex. P131, Map Marked by Alen Gičevi} in
Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}; Ex. P132, Photograph marked by Alen Gičevi} in Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi};
Ex. P134, Photograph marked by Alen Gičevi} in Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}.
Ex. P535, Transcript of Azem Agovi} from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 2052; Ex. P536, Witness Statement of
Azem Agovi}, 21 November 1995, p. 2. See also Ex. P537, Witness Statement of Azem Agovi}, 21 April 2006,
para. 9.
Ex. P32, Witness Statement of Slavica Livnjak, 24/25 April 2006, para. 7; Ex.P34, Photograph Marked by
Slavica Livnjak in Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}; Ex. P35, Photograph Marked by Slavica Livnjak in Prosecutor v.
D. Milo{evi}; Azem Agovi}, T. 3321-3322, 3325; Ex. P536, Witness Statement of Azem Agovi},
21 November 1995, p. 2; Ex. P537, Witness Statement of Azem Agovi}, 21 April 2006, para. 9; Ex. P535,
Transcript of Azem Agovi} from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 2052; Ex. D43, Aerial View of Sarajevo Marked
by Azem Agovi}; Ex. P128, Transcript of Alen Gičevi} from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 1559; Sarajevo
Adjudicated Facts III, 71. See also Ex. P130, Witness Statement of Alen Gičević, 21 April 2006, para. 9;
Ex. P128, Transcript of Alen Gičevi} from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 1559.
Ex. P31, Witness Statement of Slavica Livnjak, 20 November 1995, para. 3.
Slavica Livnjak, T. 649; Ex. P33, Transcript of Slavica Livnjak from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 865.
Alen Gičević, T. 808-810; Ex. P128, Transcript of of Alen Gičevi} from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 15731574, 1580; Ex. P129, Witness Statement of Alen Gičević, 15 November 1995, p. 2; Ex. P130, Witness
Statement of Alen Gičević, 21 April 2006, para. 9.
Ex. P128, Transcript of Alen Gičevi} from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 1557; Ex. P130, Witness Statement of
Alen Gičević, 21 April 2006, para. 9; Ex. P129, Witness Statement of Alen Gičević, 15 November 1995, p. 2.
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man, who was sitting to his right, between the door and the middle joint of the tram, was bleeding
and holding his arms crossed over his stomach.1555
521.
Agović testified that after hearing the shots, he felt severe pain, as he realised that a bullet
had entered his body above his left hip and exited at his right hip.1556 He saw that a young man and
a child had also been wounded.1557 Slavica Livnjak heard that passengers were injured in the rear of
the tram and later saw two injured passengers, a young and an old man.1558
522.
The tram continued its ride and finally stopped when it reached a safer area at Marin Dvor,
behind some containers next to the Executive Council Building and a tobacco factory.1559
(iii) Aftermath and Investigation
523.
Agović, whose entire abdomen was open, was taken to the Koševo hospital, where he
underwent a lengthy and complex surgery, following which he remained in intensive care for 16
days.1560
524.
With the help of his girlfriend, Gi~evi} walked for about 100 metres towards a taxi, which
took him to the State Hospital, where he was treated.1561 Two operations were necessary for the
doctors to remove a bullet jacket from the bone above his knee.1562 Gi~evi} spent 15 days in the
hospital before being discharged.1563
525.
MP-229, a tram driver who arrived at the scene with her tram shortly after the incident,1564
testified that after her arrival, shots were fired from the direction of Grbavica, which were returned
by UNPROFOR.1565 The exchange of fire went on for some fifteen minutes, in the course of which
1555
1556
1557
1558
1559
1560
1561
1562
1563
1564
1565
Ex. P128, Transcript of Alen Gičevi} from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 1580; Ex. P129, Witness Statement of
Alen Gičević, 15 November 1995, para. 9.
Ex. P535, Transcript of Azem Agovi} from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 2053-2054; Ex. P536, Witness
Statement of Azem Agovi}, 21 November 1995, p. 2; Ex. P537, Witness Statement of Azem Agovi},
21 April 2006, para. 9.
Ex. P536, Witness Statement of Azem Agovi}, 21 November 1995, p. 2; Ex. P537, Witness Statement of Azem
Agovi}, 21 April 2006, para. 9.
Ex. P32, Witness Statement of Slavica Livnjak, 24/25 April 2006, para. 9.
Ex. P32, Witness Statement of Slavica Livnjak, 24/25 April 2006, para. 9; Ex. P536, Witness Statement of Azem
Agovi}, 21 November 1995, p. 2; Ex. P537, Witness Statement of Azem Agovi}, 21 April 2006, para. 10; Azem
Agovi}, T. 3318; Ex. P538, Azem Agovi}’s Letter of Admission into the Medical Centre; Ex. P129, Witness
Statement of Alen Gičević, 15 November 1995, p. 2; Ex. P130, Witness Statement of Alen Gičević,
21 April 2006, paras 8-9.
Azem Agovi}, T. 3319; Ex. P536, Witness Statement of Azem Agovi}, 21 November 1995, p. 2; Ex. P537,
Witness Statement of Azem Agovi}, 21 April 2006, para. 10; Ex. P538, Azem Agovi}’s Letter of Admission into
the Medical Centre; Ex. P539, Medical Documentation of Azem Agovi}.
Ex. P129, Witness Statement of Alen Gičević, 15 November 1995, p. 2; Ex. P130, Witness Statement of Alen
Gičević, 21 April 2006, p. 3.
Ex. P129, Witness Statement of Alen Gičević, 15 November 1995, p. 2.
Ex. P130, Witness Statement of Alen Gičević, 21 April 2006, para. 9.
Ex. P22 (under seal), para. 6.
Ex. P22 (under seal), para. 7; Ex. P25, Annotated Map of Sarajevo.
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a French UNPROFOR soldier was wounded.1566
526.
Gičević, Agović and Livnjak estimated that the shots came from the south, from either the
Metalka building in Grbavica or from the Jewish Cemetery, located behind Grbavica.1567
527.
The investigation conducted by the Sarajevo CSB also came to the conclusion that the shots
were fired from the area of Grbavica.1568 The investigation team found that “a single bullet” hit the
tram, coming from the right side of the tram with a trajectory angle of 80 degrees in relation to the
right side of the tram and 4 degrees in relation to the ground.1569 The team also found that the bullet
hit the back part of the tram, 84.5 centimetres from the centre of the tram and 153.5 centimetres
from the ground.1570 The internal damage to the tram was located at the back part of the tram, 6.5
centimetres from the centre of the tram.1571
528.
In November 2006, expert witness Patrick van der Weijden visited the location.1572 He
concluded that the Metalka building in Grbavica was the most likely source of the gun-fire. Van der
Weijden explained that the gun-fire could not have originated from the Jewish cemetery since the
line of sight to the incident site was blocked by several high buildings.1573
529.
Van der Weijden then visited the Metalka building and measured the distance from the
building to the incident site which he found to be 312 metres.1574 Using a stop watch, van der
Weijden concluded that the time the tram would have been in view of the sniper was eight
seconds.1575
530.
Van der Weijden testified that in his view, the weapon used in this incident was probably a
machine-gun and not a sniper rifle because there were several people injured in the incident and,
although it would be possible for a sniper to fire several shots in rapid succession, it would be much
1566
1567
1568
1569
1570
1571
1572
1573
1574
1575
Ex. P22 (under seal), para. 7.
Azem Agovi}, T. 3321-3322, 3325; Ex. P535, Transcript of Azem Agovi} from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi},
T. 2052; Ex. P537, Witness Statement of Azem Agovi}, 21 April 2006, para. 9; Ex. D43, Aerial View of
Sarajevo Marked by Azem Agovi}; Ex. P32, Witness Statement of Slavica Livnjak, 24/25 April 2006, para. 9;
Ex. P128, Transcript of Alen Gičevi} from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 1559; Ex. P130, Witness Statement of
Alen Gičević, 21 April 2006, paras 8-9.
Ex. P71, Witness Statement of Zlatko Me|edovi}, 5 September 2000, p. 3; Ex. P73, Report on Scheduled
Incident B11, 3 March 1995, p. 1; Ex. P74, Official Report Authored by the Security Services Centre, 3 March
1995, Doc ID 0069-3743, p. 1.
Ex. P72, Report on Scheduled Incident B11, 10 March 1995, pp 2-3; Ex. P73, Report on Scheduled Incident
B11, 3 March 1995, Doc ID 0061-5440.
Ex. P72, Report on Scheduled Incident B11, 10 March 1995. See also Ex. P73, Report on Scheduled Incident
B11, 3 March 1995, Doc ID 0069-3743, p. 2.
Ex. P72, Report on Scheduled Incident B11, 10 March 1995, p. 2.
Patrick van der Weijden, T. 3018. See also Ex. P493, Report of Patrick van der Weijden, 2 February 2009,
pp 31-34.
Patrick van der Weijden, T. 3023.
Patrick van der Weijden, T. 3020-3021; Ex. P493, Report of Patrick van der Weijden, 2 February 2009, p. 31.
Ex. P493, Report of Patrick van der Weijden, 2 February 2009, p. 33.
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easier to do so with a machine-gun.1576 Finally, Van der Weijden testified that he is not aware of
trams being used for military purposes in Bosnia during the conflict.1577
531.
Gi~evi} and Agović both testified that at the time, there were no military institutions,
military vehicles or any other military equipment present in the vicinity where the incident took
place.1578 The military facility closest to the incident site is the Marshal Tito barracks,
approximately one kilometre away.1579 The Trial Chamber took judicial notice of the fact that both
Gi~evi} and Agović were civilians and that visibility was sufficient for a shooter to identify the
victims as civilians.1580
(iv) Findings
532.
The Trial Chamber finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the tram, driven on 3 March 1995
by Slavica Livnjak, was deliberately hit by sniper fire in front of the Holiday Inn. The Trial
Chamber also notes that the evidence shows that generally the trams were civilian vehicles not used
for military purposes. The Trial Chamber is therefore satisfied that the only reasonable inference to
be drawn from the evidence is that the victims were civilians not taking part in hostilities. The Trial
Chamber also concludes that the shots were fired from the Metalka building in Grbavica, which was
under the control of the VRS at the relevant time.
(l) 3 May 1995 (Incident B12)
(i) Indictment
3 May 1995: Šemša Čovrk, a woman aged 27 years, was shot and wounded in the abdomen while
walking on Josipa Kraša Street in Novi Grad.1581
533.
The Trial Chamber was informed by the Prosecution on 8 April 2010 that it withdrew this
incident.1582 Therefore the Trial Chamber will not make any finding in relation to this incident.
6. Conclusion
534.
The Prosecution submits that “from May 1992 through November 1995, the SRK carried
out a protracted campaign of artillery and mortar shelling and sniping on the civilian areas and
1576
1577
1578
1579
1580
1581
1582
Patrick van der Weijden, T. 3022.
Patrick van der Weijden, T. 3024.
Ex. P130, Witness Statement of Alen Gičević, 21 April 2006, para. 11; Ex. P537, Witness Statement of Azem
Agovi}, 21 April 2006, para. 12.
Ibid.
Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts III, 70, 74.
Indictment, Scheduled Incident B12.
Response to Defence Motion for Judicial Notice of Adjudicated Facts, 8 April 2010, para. 10(c).
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population of Sarajevo” which includes the crimes alleged in the Indictment.1583 It also submits that
the campaign was: (i) widespread as it resulted in the killings of “thousands of lives and the
wounding of thousands more”; and (ii) systematic as the SRK “purposefully planned and attacked
civilians in an assault spanning over three years”.1584
535.
Furthermore, the Prosecution submits that the campaign “was planned, instigated, ordered,
committed and aided by”, inter alia, Stanislav Gali}, Dragomir Milo{evi}, ^edo Sladoje and Ratko
Mladi}.1585
536.
The Defence does not dispute that civilians in Sarajevo – on both sides of the confrontation
lines – were targeted during the conflict period. However, it is the Defence position that “these
findings benefit from over fifteen years of investigation, examination, and litigation” and that a
conclusion about the campaign “could not be reached with such ease during the conflict”.1586 The
Defence also argues that – against the backdrop of substantial “propaganda”, “the perception of a
biased international community, and a pitched battle for the city itself” – it was reasonable to
believe at the time that there was no such campaign and that “civilian casualties were legitimate
collateral damage to an on-going conflict”.1587 The Defence also emphasises that a “propaganda
war” unfolded in Sarajevo with the media presenting only “one side of the story”.1588 Hence, it is
the Defence position that Serbs considered the media to be “unreliable and biased” and distrusted an
international community which lacked impartiality during the conflict.1589
537.
The Trial Chamber has to determine, at this juncture, whether the evidence is sufficient to
establish beyond a reasonable doubt that there was a campaign of shelling and sniping on the
civilian population as alleged in the Indictment.1590 In this context, the Trial Chamber finds that the
question raised by the Defence on what was “reasonable to believe” or “perceived” at the time of
the shelling is immaterial. The Trial Chamber however deems that such question might be relevant
to the issue of whether Peri{i} had any knowledge with respect to the events in Sarajevo. It will thus
address this issue in the section of the Judgement devoted to the Accused’s individual criminal
responsibility.1591
1583
1584
1585
1586
1587
1588
1589
1590
1591
Prosecution Final Brief, para. 386
Ibid.
Prosecution Final Brief, para. 387.
Defence Final Brief, para. 554.
Ibid.
Defence Final Brief, paras 566-567.
Defence Final Brief, paras 567, 831. See Defence Final Brief, paras 569-572, also arguing that the mandate of
the UNPROFOR proved unworkable and that weapons were introduced by the ABiH through areas controlled by
the UNPROFOR, hidden as “humanitarian aid”.
Indictment, paras 40-42.
See infra section VI.J.3.
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538.
Numerous adjudicated facts admitted in this case show that between September 1992 and
August 1994, “civilians were shot at almost every day”1592 and were directly or indiscriminately
attacked from SRK-controlled territory,1593 and that the attacks on civilians “had no discernible
significance in military terms”.1594 Attacks on civilians were numerous1595 and “as a result and at a
minimum, hundreds of civilians were killed and thousands of others were injured”.1596 It is also
adjudicated that “the sniping and shelling of civilians was carried out pursuant to a deliberate
campaign of attacking civilians”.1597 The attacks on civilians from SRK-controlled territory
continued from August 1994 through 21 November 1995.1598
539.
It is also adjudicated that such campaign “emanated from a higher authority or at least had
its approval”,1599 that “General Gali} acted in furtherance of a strategy to attack the civilian
population of Sarajevo”1600 and that Dragomir Milo{evi} was directly involved in the shelling
involving modified air bombs and mortars fired by the SRK.1601
540.
The adjudicated facts admitted in this case are further buttressed by the evidence received
from witnesses and documentary evidence on the siege of Sarajevo.1602 The Trial Chamber also
recalls its findings on the incidents scheduled in the Indictment showing specific instances where
the SRK deliberately fired at the civilian population.1603
541.
The Defence submits several arguments to rebut the existence of a campaign of sniping and
shelling against civilians. The Trial Chamber dismisses these arguments for the reasons given
below.
542.
The Defence argues that there were “often instances of intense fighting” between the SRK
and the ABiH and this “may have resulted in collateral damage to civilians and civilian areas”.1604
The Defence also points out that Sarajevo’s neighbourhoods “maintained a sizeable military
presence”.1605 The Defence also argues that there were several allegations that the ABiH or the BiH
1592
1593
1594
1595
1596
1597
1598
1599
1600
1601
1602
1603
1604
1605
Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts I, 154. See also Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts I, 176.
Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts I, 155,158.
Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts I, 174; Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts III, 83.
Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts I, 173. Attacks on civilians occurred with greater frequency in some periods, but
very clearly the message which they carried was that no Sarajevo civilian was safe anywhere, at any time of day
or night, Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts I, 175.
Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts I, 164.
Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts II, 23, 25.
Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts III, 82.
Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts II, 23, 25.
Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts II, 27.
Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts III, 94-99.
See supra paras 305-333.
See supra paras 338-339, 343-344, 357-358, 364-366, 376-377, 384-385, 403-415, 435-436, 467-468, 470-472,
477, 492, 503, 517, 532.
Defence Final Brief, para. 561.
Defence Final Brief, para. 560.
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government violated the laws of war. Notably, that they: (i) were accused of shelling and sniping
against their own civilians and blamed the VRS;1606 (ii) used civilian buildings or areas to fire shells
on Serbian-controlled areas;1607 (iii) used vehicles painted in the same colour as UNPROFOR;1608
and (iv) according to rumours, “planted bodies at crime scenes” to give “further credence to the
notion of the propaganda war being waged by the Bosnian Government”.1609
543.
The Trial Chamber dismisses the argument that intense fighting between the SRK and the
ABiH “may have resulted” in collateral damage to civilians as it is speculative.1610 Furthermore, the
Trial Chamber finds that the Scheduled Incidents discussed above show a targeted aim at the
victims while there were no hostilities, rather than a collateral damage. The Trial Chamber also
finds speculative the other Defence arguments insofar as they refer to “accusations” or “rumours”.
544.
With respect to the Defence argument regarding the ABiH military presence in Sarajevo’s
neighbourhoods, the Trial Chamber recalls the evidence demonstrating that the SRK shelled often
civilian areas despite the absence of any military activity or presence.1611
545.
Furthermore, the accusation that the ABiH shelled its own civilians – even if proven – is
related to isolated events that took place in early 1995. Similarly, the Defence allegations that the
ABiH used civilian or UNPROFOR buildings or areas to fire shells on Serb-controlled areas refer to
isolated incidents concentrated in January 1993,1612 November 19941613 and June 1995.1614 The
Trial Chamber finds therefore that these arguments related to the involvement of the ABiH in the
conflict do not rebut the evidence on the existence of widespread sniping and shelling attacks
carried out by the SRK throughout the Indictment period.1615
1606
1607
1608
1609
1610
1611
1612
1613
1614
1615
Defence Final Brief, para. 566.
Defence Final Brief, para. 573.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Defence Final Brief, para. 461 (emphasis added). See also Defence Final Brief, para. 544.
See supra paras 319-323, 326 and section V.A.4.
Ex. D655, UNPROFOR Letters of Protests, 21 January 1993, p. 3; Ex. D656, UNPROFOR Letter,
20 January 1993.
Ex. D64, UNPROFOR Letter on Exchange of Fire between BiH and Serb Forces, 17 November 1994. This letter
states that the ABiH fired four mortar rounds on that evening from the area “bounded” by the Presidency, the
Residency and the Ko{evo Hospital. MP-072 further explained that the report localised the zone of the mortar
installation by providing a perimeter with perfectly identifiable points (the Presidency, the Residency and the
Ko{evo Hospital), MP-72, T. 4392. See also Defence Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts I, 13
Ex. D94, UNPROFOR Report regarding BiH Mandate, 28 June 1995; Ex. D24, UNPROFOR Weekly Situation
Report, 2 July 1995, pp 3-4. The Trial Chamber notes that this incident occurred in the context of the ABiH
operation which attempted to break the siege of Sarajevo, see supra para. 311.
An investigation by UNPROFOR in early 1995 concluded that a sniper position located in the former parliament
building controlled by ABiH forces had, in some instances, targeted their own civilians. In fact, the investigators
hypothesised that in all likelihood this was the work of “renegade elements” in the ABiH who were determined
to generate media coverage of the conflict, MP-072, T. 4368-4369; Ex. D63, Newspaper Article, 1 August 1995,
p. 2.
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546.
The Defence also submits that the Tabeau report on the number of persons killed and
wounded in Sarajevo between 1992 and 1995 gives no indication on the origin of fire and supports
the assertion that it was “reasonable not to believe that a campaign to shell and snipe civilians
existed during the Indictment period”.1616 The Defence also points out that the numbers of
casualties reported in the Tabeau report represent all ethnicities.1617
547.
The Trial Chamber notes that the Tabeau report refers to the fact that the number of civilian
casualties representing all ethnicities decreased between 1993 and 1995, when Peri{i} became Chief
of the VJ General Staff.1618 According to Tabeau, 4,043 civilians were killed during the entire siege,
but only 949 civilians were killed during Peri{i}’s tenure as Chief of the General Staff.1619 The Trial
Chamber finds that these numbers, in light of the entire evidence of this case, do not contradict the
existence of a widespread or systematic attack against the civilian population during the Indictment
period.1620
548.
The Trial Chamber also finds that the Defence’s argument that UNPROFOR could not
confirm the number of casualties because the Bosnian Government often restricted the international
community’s access to hospitals,1621 has little or no weight in the determination of the existence of a
campaign of shelling and sniping against the civilian population.
549.
In sum, the Trial Chamber is satisfied that the evidence presented on the siege of Sarajevo
shows beyond a reasonable doubt that from September 1992 to November 1995, the SRK launched
a campaign against the civilian population of Sarajevo characterised by a widespread and
systematic shelling and sniping which resulted in the killings of hundreds of civilians and the
wounding of thousands of others.
7. Identity of the Principal Perpetrators
550.
The Prosecution alleges that the crimes committed by the SRK from September 1992 to
November 1995 were in part planned, instigated, ordered, committed, and aided and abetted by
members of the 30th PC, including Ratko Mladi}, Stanislav Gali}, Dragomir Milo{evi} and ^edo
Sladoje.1622
1616
1617
1618
1619
1620
1621
1622
Defence Final Brief, paras 575-576.
Defence Final Brief, para. 575.
Ex. P2331, Expert Report of Ewa Tabeau, 18 August 2003, p. 9, Tables A3 and A4.
Ewa Tabeau, T. 5795. According to the Tabeau report, 4,043 civilians were killed during the entire siege,
Ex. P2331, Expert Report of Ewa Tabeau, 18 August 2003, p. 9, Table A4.
Ex. P2331, Expert Report of Ewa Tabeau, 18 August 2003, p. 9, Tables A3 and A4.
Defence Final Brief, para. 577.
Indictment, para. 43; Prosecution Final Brief, para. 387.
170
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551.
The Trial Chamber heard evidence that the SRK was a disciplined corps, with a rigid
command structure, and that its commanders strictly executed the orders coming from the VRS
Commander, Ratko Mladi}.1623 According to Rupert Smith, Mladi} held a tight control over the
VRS, from the Main Staff to the lower units.1624 He issued detailed orders to his corps, leaving little
room for latitude at the operational level.1625 Smith stated that when an order was given at the top of
the chain of command “you saw that it was executed at the bottom”.1626 At the same time, if an
event had happened on the ground, “you could be confident that it was reported up to the top of
command”.1627 MP-72 testified that Mladi} was the strategist of the siege of Sarajevo.1628
552.
In addition, the Trial Chamber has taken judicial notice of the fact that Stanislav Gali} was
the commander of the SRK from 10 September 1992 until 10 August 1994 and he reported directly
to Ratko Mladi}.1629 Throughout his tenure, he was present in the Sarajevo war theatre, in close
proximity to the confrontation lines, and actively monitored the situation.1630 Gali} was in charge of
continuing the planning and execution of the encirclement of Sarajevo.1631
553.
Gali} was fully apprised of the sniping and shelling directed at civilians taking place in the
city of Sarajevo and its surroundings.1632 Gali} issued orders to target the civilian population and
the sniping and shelling of civilians was widespread and conducted over a long period of time by
SRK troops.1633 The sniping and shelling of civilians was carried out pursuant to a deliberate
campaign, which must have emanated from a higher authority or at least had its approval.1634 Gali}
acted in furtherance of a strategy to attack the civilian population of Sarajevo.1635
554.
The Trial Chamber has further taken judicial notice of the fact that Dragomir Milo{evi} was
Commander of the SRK from 10 August 1994 until 21 November 1995 and was directly
1623
1624
1625
1626
1627
1628
1629
1630
1631
1632
1633
1634
1635
MP-408, T. 6160-6161, 6184, 6224 (closed session); Ex. P2316 (under seal), p. 32; Ex. P2317 (under seal),
T. 5346; MP-72, T. 4336 (closed session); Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts II, 15.
Ex. P2357, Transcript of Rupert Smith from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 3298-3303; Ex. P2362, Transcript of
Rupert Smith from Prosecutor v. Popovi} et al., T. 17577-17579.
Rupert Smith, T. 6372-6373; Ex. P2362, Transcript of Rupert Smith from Prosecutor v. Popovi} et al.,
T. 17577-17579; Ex. P2357, Transcript of Rupert Smith from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 3298-3303. See
Ex. P2358, Order of General Mladi}, 23 January 1995. See also supra paras 275-276.
Ex. P2362, Transcript of Rupert Smith from Prosecutor v. Popovi} et al., T. 17578.
Ibid.
MP-72, T. 4319-4320; Ex. P10, SkyNews Video Clip; MP-72, T. 4319 (closed session). See also supra para.
319; Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts II, 23.
Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts II, 1-2.
Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts II, 9, 11. See also Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts II, 10, 12.
Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts II, 5.
Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts II, 19. See also Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts II, 16-17; Ex. P2316 (under seal), p. 32;
Ex. P2317 (under seal), T. 5346.
Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts II, 21-22.
Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts II, 23.
Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts II, 27.
171
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subordinated to Mladi}.1636 He regularly toured the confrontation lines and held a tight chain of
command within the SRK.1637 He continued to implement the pattern of sniping and shelling
initiated under Gali} throughout his tenure as SRK commander.1638 Dragomir Milo{evi} was in
command and control of his troops who carried out the campaign of sniping and shelling, and was
aware that crimes were committed.1639 Finally, from 6 August 1995 until 10 September 1995, the
SRK Chief of Staff ^edo Sladoje was in charge of the SRK and “issued orders in lieu of Dragomir
Milo{evi}”.1640
555.
The Trial Chamber is satisfied that, through the Indictment period, the SRK were under the
effective control of its commander, i.e. Stanislav Gali} from 10 September 1992 until 10 August
1994, Dragomir Milo{evi} from 10 August 1994 until 21 November 1995 and ^edo Sladoje from 6
August 1995 until 10 September 1995. The Trial Chamber is also satisfied that in turn during his
tenure as VRS Commander, Mladi} had effective control over his subordinates in the VRS,
including the SRK.
8. Legal Findings
556.
The Indictment charges the Accused with murder and attacks on civilians as a violation of
the laws or customs of war (Counts 2 and 4), and murder and inhumane acts as a crime against
humanity (Counts 1 and 3).
(a) Crimes under Article 3 of the Statute
557.
It is not disputed that an armed conflict existed in Sarajevo between the ABiH and the VRS
during the Indictment period and that the crimes which Peri{i} is charged with were closely related
to the conflict and committed against the civilian population of Sarajevo during that period.1641
558.
The Trial Chamber finds that the attacks by sniping and shelling were conducted against the
civilian population and individual civilians not taking part in hostilities. These acts resulted in death
or serious injury within the civilian population. The Trial Chamber further finds that these acts were
carried out by SRK forces and wilfully directed against civilians, that is, either deliberately against
civilians or through recklessness.
1636
1637
1638
1639
1640
1641
Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts III, 1, 3-4.
Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts III, 90, 104-105.
Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts III, 112-113.
Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts III, 98-100, 110-111.
Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts III, 96-97.
See Prosecution Final Brief, para. 386; Defence Final Brief, paras 556-563. See supra paras 306, 311, 534, 536.
172
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559.
The Trial Chamber is therefore satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the crimes of
murder and attacks on civilians for Counts 2 and 4 have been established for the Scheduled
Incidents described in Schedules A and B of the Indictment, save for Scheduled Incidents A4, B7
and B12.
(b) Offences under Article 5 of the Statute
560.
The Trial Chamber finds that the crimes committed in Sarajevo during the Indictment period
formed part of an attack directed against the civilian population and that this attack was widespread
and systematic. The Trial Chamber is also satisfied that the crimes committed by the SRK formed
part of that attack and that the perpetrators knew of the attack and that the crimes were part of it.
561.
The Trial Chamber is further satisfied that murder and inhumane acts falling within the
meaning of Article 5 of the Statute for Counts 1 and 3 were committed in Sarajevo during the
Indictment period.
562.
The Trial Chamber therefore finds that key VRS officers, including Mladi}, Gali} and
Dragomir Milo{evi} were involved in the commission of the crimes in Sarajevo by devising and
implementing a campaign of sniping and shelling on civilians, which was an integral part to the
siege of Sarajevo. The Trial Chamber found that the crimes committed by VRS members, under the
effective control of these VRS officers, constituted murder and attacks on civilians as violation of
the laws or customs of war (Counts 2 and 4), and murder and inhumane acts as crimes against
humanity (Counts 1 and 3). The Trial Chamber is therefore satisfied that these key officers and their
subordinates committed the charged crimes.
563.
The issue of whether the Accused bears responsibility for these crimes will be addressed
separately.
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B. ZAGREB
1. Lead-up to Shelling
564.
The Trial Chamber took judicial notice of the following facts. In the early morning hours of
1 May 1995, armed forces of Croatia launched a military offensive known as Operation Flash.1642
Two Croatian guard brigades, one regular HV brigade, and special police forces took part in the
operation.1643 Negotiations to find a peaceful settlement took place during the operation, and
agreements were reached on 3 May 1995.1644 Operation Flash ended around 4 May 1995 with the
RSK losing control over Western Slavonia1645 and a large part of the Serb population fleeing the
area.1646
565.
On 1 May 1995, a meeting was held between, inter alia, the President of the RSK, Milan
Marti}, the Commander of the Main Staff of the SVK, Milan ^eleketi}, the Prime Minister, and
other ministers of the RSK government. The meeting concerned the proposal of the RSK SDC to
deal with the situation that had arisen in Western Slavonia resulting from Operation Flash during
the morning of that day. Both peaceful solutions involving negotiations and a surrender of Western
Slavonia, and non-peaceful solutions were discussed and Milan Marti}, Milan ^eleketi}, and the
most senior officers of the SVK Main Staff were in favour of the latter.1647
566.
At 13:00 hours on 1 May 1995, Milan ^eleketi}, in the presence of, inter alia, Milan Marti},
ordered artillery fire on Sisak, south-east of Zagreb.1648 The same day, Milan ^eleketi} ordered the
M-87 Orkan unit of the SVK to be alert and ready for engagement on his order and directed them to
march from the Knin area to take up positions in Vojni}, 50 kilometres south of Zagreb, by 14:00
hours that day.1649 Artillery fire on Sisak was opened at 17:00 hours that day.1650 The reason for it
was to retaliate against the attack of the Croatian forces in Western Slavonia.1651
1642
1643
1644
1645
1646
1647
1648
1649
1650
1651
Defence Adjudicated Facts I, 14.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Defence Adjudicated Facts I, 14. See Ex. D444, Map Marked by Mile Novaković, under 2; Mile Novakovi},
T. 13512-13513.
Defence Adjudicated Facts I, 14.
Zagreb Adjudicated Facts, 1. See also Rade Ra{eta, T. 5993-5994.
Zagreb Adjudicated Facts, 2; Rade Ra{eta, T. 5943-5946. See also Ex. P2336, Correspondence From the SVK
Main Staff Relating to the Situation on the Field, 26 May 1995, p. 1; Ex. P2334, Report From the SVK Main
Staff to the VJ General Staff Regarding the Course of the War, 2 May 1995.
Zagreb Adjudicated Facts, 5.
Zagreb Adjudicated Facts, 3. See MP-80, T. 8442-8444, 8756-8758, 8766 (closed session); Ex. P2336,
Correspondence from the SVK Main Staff Relating to the Situation on the Field, 26 May 1995, p. 1; Ex. P2334,
Report From the SVK Main Staff to the VJ General Staff Regarding the Course of the War, 2 May 1995.
Zagreb Adjudicated Facts, 4.
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2. Shelling on 2 May 1995
567.
The Trial Chamber took judicial notice of the following facts. On 2 May 1995, rockets
struck the centre of Zagreb, including: Strossmayer Square, Matica Hrvatska Street, Petrinjska
Street, Boskovi}eva Street and Mrazovi}eva Street as well as Dra{kovi}eva Street, the intersection
of Vla{ka and Dra{kovi}eva Streets and a school building in Kri`ani}eva Street, the village of Ple{o
near Zagreb/Ple{o airport, and the airport itself.1652
568.
Five people were killed as a result of this shelling. Damir Dra~i}’s injuries were sustained
while he was in his car.1653 The body of Damir Dra~i} was found lying on the sidewalk at Vla{ka
Street.1654 Ana Muteveli} was killed when a tram was hit at the intersection of Dra{kovi}eva and
Vla{ka Streets.1655 The body of Stjepan Krhen was found in the courtyard of No. 41 Vla{ka
Street.1656 Stjepan Krhen had sustained several injuries on his body, his chest, and his legs, and had
succumbed to his wounds immediately.1657 Ivanka Kova~ died at the trauma clinic in Dra{kovi}eva
Street from the injuries she sustained some 700 metres from the hospital.1658 The cause of Ivanka
Kova~’s death was determined as blast wounds inflicted to the head, body and extremities.1659 Ivan
Brodar was injured on Dra{kovi}eva Street and died as a result of his injuries on 3 May 1995.1660
Ivan Brodar was aged 77 at the time of the shelling, and suffered multiple traumas to the head,
chest, and lower extremities.1661 The report prepared by the Croatian Ministry of Health states that
four victims of this shelling were civilians and one was a member of the military.1662 The Trial
Chamber finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the four civilian victims of the attack were not taking
active part in hostilities.
1652
1653
1654
1655
1656
1657
1658
1659
1660
1661
1662
Zagreb Adjudicated Facts, 8. See also Ex. P286, Photograph Album of 2 May 1995 Rocket Attack, Petrinjska
Street, Zagreb; Ex. P287, Photograph Album of 2 May 1995 Rocket Attack, Strossmayer Square, Zagreb;
Ex. P288, Photograph Album of 2 May 1995 Rocket Attack, Matica Hrvatska Street, Zagreb; Ex. P289,
Photograph Album of 2 May 1995 Rocket Attack, Kri`ani} Street, Zagreb; Ex. P291, Photograph Album of
2 May 1995 Rocket Attack, Velika Gorica Territory, Ple{o Airport; Ex. P292, Photograph Album of 2 May 1995
Rocket Attack, Velika Gorica Territory, Ple{o Neighbourhood; Ex. P293, Photograph Album of 2 May 1995
Rocket Attack, Dra{kovi}eva and Vla{ka Streets, Zagreb; Ex. P302, Map of Zagreb Centre; Ex. P303, Site
Documentation and Maps of the Rocket Attacks on the City of Zagreb on 2 and 3 May 1995; Ex. P304,
Annotated Site Documentation Map of the Rocket Attacks on the City of Zagreb on 2 and 3 May 1995;
Ex. P306, On-Site Investigation Report by the Zagreb Police Administration 2 May 1995.
Zagreb Adjudicated Facts, 11.
Zagreb Adjudicated Facts, 10.
Zagreb Adjudicated Facts, 12.
Zagreb Adjudicated Facts, 13.
Zagreb Adjudicated Facts, 14.
Zagreb Adjudicated Facts, 15.
Zagreb Adjudicated Facts, 16; Ex. P299, Autopsy Report of Ivanka Kova~, p. 1.
Zagreb Adjudicated Facts, 17.
Zagreb Adjudicated Facts, 18; Ex. P300, Autopsy Report of Ivan Brodar, pp 5-6; Ex. P301, Report by Zagreb
County Court Appointed Expert Josip [kavi}.
Ex. C3, Report on Civilian Victims in the Attack on Zagreb, 2-3 May 1995, p. 3.
175
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569.
As a result of the shelling on 2 May 1995 at least 146 people were injured.1663 According to
the report prepared by the Croatian Ministry of Health, the vast majority of victims of this shelling
were civilians.1664 At the time that this issue was adjudicated by the Marti} Trial Chamber in 2007,
many of those who were injured still suffered from the injuries sustained on that day.1665 The Trial
Chamber also finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the civilian victims of the attack were not taking
active part in hostilities.
3. Shelling on 3 May 1995
570.
The Trial Chamber took judicial notice of the following facts. At midday on 3 May 1995,
Zagreb was again shelled by Orkan rockets on the following locations: Ma`urani}eva Square,
Marshall Tito Square where the Croatian National Theatre was located, and Klaićeva Street
Children’s Hospital.1666
571.
As a result of the shelling on Zagreb on 3 May 1995, two people died. Luka Skra~i} suffered
a blast wound to the head with an alien object lodged in his brain and was in a coma on 3 May
1995.1667 Luka Skra~i} eventually died as a result of pneumonia which he developed from having
suffered blast wounds on 3 May 1995.1668 Ivan Markulin, a bomb disposal technician and police
officer, died when the bomblet he was trying to deactivate exploded outside Klai}eva Street
Children’s Hospital.1669 The Trial Chamber also finds that Ivan Markulin, although a police officer,
was not taking active part in hostilities at the time of his death.
572.
As a result of the shelling on Zagreb on 3 May 1995, 54 people were injured.1670 According
to the report prepared by the Croatian Ministry of Health, the vast majority of victims of this
shelling were civilians.1671 The Trial Chamber also finds that the civilian victims of the attack were
not taking active part in hostilities.
1663
1664
1665
1666
1667
1668
1669
1670
1671
Zagreb Adjudicated Facts, 38. See Zagreb Adjudicated Facts, 9, 37.
Ex. C3, Report on Civilian Victims in the Attack on Zagreb, 2-3 May 1995, p. 3.
Zagreb Adjudicated Facts, 19.
Zagreb Adjudicated Facts, 39. See Ex. P290, Photograph Album of 3 May 1995 Rocket Attack, Žitnjak-Martinci
Village, Zagreb; Ex. P302, Map of Zagreb Centre; Ex. P297, Photograph Album of 3 May 1995 Rocket Attack,
Zagreb Pediatric Hospital; Ex. P303, Site Documentation and Maps of the Rocket Attacks on the City of Zagreb
on 2 and 3 May 1995; Ex. P307, Report of the Zagreb Police Administration, 17 May 1995.
Zagreb Adjudicated Facts, 43.
Zagreb Adjudicated Facts, 41-42.
Zagreb Adjudicated Facts, 44.
Zagreb Adjudicated Facts, 58. See Zagreb Adjudicated Facts, 57.
Ex. C3, Report on Civilian Victims in the Attack on Zagreb, 2-3 May 1995, p. 3.
176
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4. Who Ordered the Shelling of Zagreb?
573.
There is evidence that, according to the military structure at the time, the order to shell
Zagreb on 2 and 3 May 1995 was within the purview of either the Commander of the SVK Main
Staff or a Corps Command.1672 The Trial Chamber has also heard evidence that, as a rule, the
command over the artillery is in the hands of the commander of a joint tactical and operational unit,
either directly or through the chief of artillery.1673 A SVK document analysing the combat readiness
of the artillery in April 1995, expressly indicated that “the utilisation of the Orkan rocket system
[should] be approved exclusively by the commander of the [Main Staff of the] SVK”.1674 Rade
Ra{eta, Chief of Security of the SVK Main Staff, confirmed that the Orkan rocket squad was under
the command of Milan ^eleketi}, as Commander of the Main Staff of the SVK.1675 Facts which
were adjudicated in the Marti} case also support this evidence.1676
574.
The Trial Chamber also took judicial notice of the facts showing that on several occasions
Marti} himself had admitted to ordering the shelling of Zagreb.1677
575.
Milan Marti} admitted on television to having ordered the shelling of Zagreb on 2 and 3
May 1995.1678 On 3 May 1995, Milan Marti} stated:
As a counter measure to what Tudjman did to you here, we have shelled all their cities: Sisak
several times and Karlovac, Zagreb yesterday and today. This was done for you. […] Today, an
ultimatum followed if they continue to attack our besieged forces, we will continue to attack
Zagreb and destroy their cities.1679
Milan Marti} threatened to resume the shelling of Zagreb if their conditions were not met, and
spoke of "massive rocket attacks on Zagreb which would leave 100,000 people dead”.1680
1672
1673
1674
1675
1676
1677
1678
1679
1680
Jo`ef Poje, T. 3087, 3106; Ex. P497, Expert Report of Jo`ef Poje, pp 61-63. See also MP-80, T. 8704-8705,
8755-8756 (closed session); Rade Ra{eta, T. 6007; Ex. P2336, Correspondence From the SVK Main Staff
Relating to the Situation on the Field, 26 May 1995, p. 1; Ex. P2334, Report From the SVK Main Staff to the VJ
General Staff Regarding the Course of the War, 2 May 1995, pp 5-6; Mile Novakovi}, T. 13279-13280, 1340813409.
Jo`ef Poje, T. 3076-3077. See also Ex. P497, Expert Report of Jo`ef Poje, p. 55.
Ex. P495, Various Documents Concerning SVK, p. 11. See also Jo`ef Poje, T. 3085. According to the February
1995 directive of the Main Staff of the SVK, the Orkan rocket system was labelled as part of the Main Staff
Artillery Group, Ex. P494, Directive of the Supreme Commander of the SVK on the Use of SVK,
February 1995, p. 13. Finally, according to the 1 May 1995 order redeploying the Orkan rocket system to the
area of Vojni}, this weapon was to be under the direct command of the Commander of the Main Staff of the
SVK or Colonel Dilas, Ex. P496, Order of Milan ^eleketi} on Raising of Combat Readiness, 1 May 1995; Jo`ef
Poje, T. 3086-3087.
Rade Ra{eta, T. 5941-5942.
Zagreb Adjudicated Facts, 7; Defence Adjudicated Facts I, 15.
Defence Adjudicated Facts I, 20.
Zagreb Adjudicated Facts, 65.
Zagreb Adjudicated Facts, 60; Ex. P235, Video Clip with Speech of Milan Martić in Western Slavonia.
Defence Adjudicated Facts I, 16.
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576.
In a conversation on 3 May 1995 between Slobodan Milo{evi} and Borislav Mikeli}, the
Prime Minister of the RSK, Slobodan Milo{evi} said that Milan Marti} was “boasting about having
shelled Zagreb”.1681 In a radio interview on 5 May 1995, Milan Marti} stated: “That order was
given by me, personally, as a retaliation to Franjo Tu|man and his staff for the order he had given
to commit aggression against the Western Slavonia […]”.1682
577.
At a meeting in Knin on 5 May 1995 with UN Special Envoy, Yasushi Akashi, Milan
Marti} stated in response to Yasushi Akashi’s condemnation of the rocket attacks on Zagreb that
“[h]ad I not ordered the rocket attacks [...] they would have continued to bomb our cities”.1683
578.
In an article in Agence France Press published on 6 May 1995, Milan Marti} is reported as
saying: “I personally gave the order to bombard Zagreb as a response to (Croatian President) Franjo
Tu|man and the Croatian leadership behind the aggression on Western Slavonia and crimes on
civilians”.1684
579.
In an interview published on 16 May 1995, Milan Marti} is reported as saying that he felt
justified in ordering the rocket attacks because he was aiming at a military installation.1685
580.
Further according to one testimony, the decision to shell Zagreb was made by Milan Marti}
in response to Croatian attack on Western Slavonia.1686
581.
The RSK Commission charged with determining responsibility for the fall of Western
Slavonia found that:
[T]he course of events in Western Slavonia required of the SVK Main Staff to intervene in order
to provide assistance to the 18th Corps […] however, no opinions were sought from the
commanding officers of the SVK Main Staff. Decisions were made by the Commander and the
President and stances and orders were given on the telephone (there are no written orders).1687
582.
Rade Ra{eta confirmed that members of the Main Staff were not consulted about the
decision to shell Zagreb.1688 The RSK Fact-Finding Commission on the Causes and Manner of the
Fall of Western Slavonia found that among those responsible for the fall of Western Slavonia was
1681
1682
1683
1684
1685
1686
1687
1688
Zagreb Adjudicated Facts, 61.
Zagreb Adjudicated Facts, 62. See also Ex. P2823, International Herald Tribune Interview with Marti}, 16 May
1995.
Zagreb Adjudicated Facts, 64.
Zagreb Adjudicated Facts, 63. See also Ex. P2823, International Herald Tribune Interview with Marti}, 16 May
1995.
Defence Adjudicated Facts I, 16.
MP-80, T. 8442-8443 (closed session).
Defence Adjudicated Facts I, 17.
Ibid.
178
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the President of the RSK, Milan Marti}, for exceeding his authority as set by the constitution by
blocking and preventing the work of the SDC.1689
583.
The Trial Chamber recalls that according to the RSK Constitution, the President led the
SVK in times of peace and war in accordance with the Constitution and the decisions of the
SDC.1690 Accordingly, any decision to shell Zagreb should have been taken by a collegiate – the
SDC.1691 However, the Trial Chamber took judicial notice of the adjudicated facts showing that
Milan Marti} and Milan Čeleketi} circumvented the SDC.1692 According to Rade Ra{eta, the
decisions to shell Zagreb on 2 and 3 May 1995 were not taken by the SDC but by the SVK Main
Staff Commander and the President of the RSK.1693 This is further supported by reports of, inter
alia, the RSK Fact-Finding Commission on the Causes and Manner of the Fall of Western
Slavonia.1694 Additional evidence suggests that Milan Čeleketi} received this order from Milan
Marti} and executed it as an order coming from the Commander in Chief of the SVK.1695
584.
Additionally, the Trial Chamber also notes that in a Serbian newspaper “Argument” article
published on 24 March 1995, Milan Čeleketi} is reported as saying:
In case of the Ustasha aggression, we will certainly not miss the opportunity to hit them where it
hurts the most. We know their weak spots and where it hurts the most. Weak points are city
squares and we know who goes there – civilians. I have already said this and was criticised a little.
Well now, they may ask which squares and in which cities. I shall reply that that’s a military
secret. We shall make a decision about it and I think we will be precise.
It is hard to say these words because there are, as I said, civilians in the squares, innocent people.
However, if we are in war (and we are waging a filthy war for which they are first and foremost to
blame), then there will be no mercy.1696
At the same time, the Trial Chamber recalls that one of the witnesses testified that the words of
Milan Čeleketi} were twisted by a journalist and that an erratum to this effect was subsequently
published.1697
585.
The Trial Chamber finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the order to shell Zagreb on 2 and 3
May 1995 was given by Milan Marti}. In reaching its conclusion the Trial Chamber relied on Milan
Marti}’s repetitive admissions that it was him who issued the order to use Orkan-rockets against
Zagreb. This finding is additionally supported by circumstantial evidence concerning Milan
1689
1690
1691
1692
1693
1694
1695
1696
1697
Defence Adjudicated Facts I, 17.
Defence Adjudicated Facts I, 18.
Ibid. See also supra para. 295.
Defence Adjudicated Facts I, 18.
Defence Adjudicated Facts I, 18; Rade Ra{eta, T. 6006-6007.
Defence Adjudicated Facts I, 18.
MP-80, T. 8453-8454, 8486, 8706, 8754-8755, 8767, 8798 (closed session). See also Ex. D183, Letter of
Resignation of Milan Čeleketić, 15 May 1995.
Ex. P2497, Interview with Milan Čeleketi} in “Argument”, 24 March 1995, p. 6.
MP-80, T. 8778-8781 (closed session).
179
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Marti}’s position as President of the RSK and the Supreme Commander of the SVK, and his active
involvement in the SVK response to the HV attack on 1 May 1995, including his presence when the
order to shell Sisak on that day was issued. The Trial Chamber also finds that this order was further
executed by the Commander of the Main Staff of the SVK, Milan Čeleketi}. Čeleketi}’s order in
turn was executed by the crew of the Orkan rocket system.
5. Weaponry Used
586.
The M-87 Orkan is a self-propelled long-range multiple rocket launching system.1698 The
evidence shows that the SVK had only one Orkan system at its disposal, which remained in the
territory of the RSK after the JNA’s withdrawal from Croatia in 1992.1699
587.
The 262 mm M87 Orkan rocket is a projectile which, on ignition of the rocket motor, after
4.3 seconds flies like a conventional projectile which cannot be guided in flight.1700 The maximum
range of the Orkan rocket is 50 kilometres.1701
588.
The R-262mm rocket for the Orkan M-87 rocket system could carry two types of cluster
warheads – anti-tank shells or shaped-charge and fragmentation bomblets. The latter type contained
288 shaped-charge and fragmentation bomblets, each containing 420 pellets of 3 mm diameter,
which are ejected by a pyrotechnic charge at a height of 800-1,000 metres. Before the ejection of
the bomblets, the warhead’s aluminium lining is cut by four detonation blades. The bomblets
dispersion area is about 2 hectares, and the lethal range of each pellet is about 10 metres.1702
589.
According to the expert witness Jo`ef Poje, the Orkan rocket system had a high dispersion
pattern – the dispersion impact of the Orkan rocket fired from a distance of between 40 and 45 km
would be around 1.3 square km (for the range of 40 km the dispersion pattern would be + - 692
metres by bearing and + - 636 metres by range).1703 Jo`ef Poje opines that the purpose of the
shelling was “most probably to terrorise and fire on the population, their property, and their
infrastructure”.1704 He explained that “even if there were military targets in the city of Zagreb, due
to the city’s population density and its characteristics, the use of [the Orkan rockets] for targets had
no sense. […] [I]t was known that there would be a lot of casualties among the civilians”.1705 He
1698
1699
1700
1701
1702
1703
1704
1705
Zagreb Adjudicated Facts, 6.
MP-80, T. 8704 (closed session); Milan Novakovi}, T. 13408, 13437, 13440-13441.
Correction of the trajectory in flight is not possible, nor can the rocket be guided to the target in any other way,
Ex. P497, Expert Report of Jo`ef Poje, p. 17.
Ex. P497, Expert Report of Jo`ef Poje, p. 47.
Ex. P497, Expert Report of Jo`ef Poje, pp 23, 36, 44. See also Milan Novakovi}, T. 13406.
Jo`ef Poje, T. 3107; Ex. P497, Expert Report of Jo`ef Poje, pp 65-66.
Jo`ef Poje, T. 3084. See also Ex. P497, Expert Report of Jo`ef Poje, p. 67.
Jo`ef Poje, T. 3088. See also Jo`ef Poje, T. 3084, 3096, 3107; Ex. P497, Expert Report of Jo`ef Poje, pp 38, 47,
61, 67-68; Milan Novakovi}, T. 13406-13408.
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also added that even if the order to use the Orkan in shelling Zagreb came from Milan Marti}, the
latter should have been advised by the Commander of the SVK Main Staff or the Chief of Artillery
as to the appropriateness of the use of such a weapon in the circumstances and the possible
consequences.1706
590.
The Trial Chamber finds that due to its characteristics, especially its high dispersion pattern,
the Orkan rocket system is an indiscriminate weapon. It follows that its use in a densely populated
civilian area cannot but result in the infliction of severe civilian casualties.
6. Legal Findings
591.
The Indictment charges the Accused with murder and attacks on civilians as a violation of
the laws or customs of war (Counts 6 and 8), and murder and inhumane acts as a crime against
humanity (Counts 5 and 7).
(a) Crimes under Article 3 of the Statute
592.
It is not disputed that an armed conflict existed in Croatia and the RSK between the Croatian
forces and the SVK during the Indictment period and that the crimes which Peri{i} is charged with
were closely related to the conflict and committed against the civilian population of Zagreb during
that period.1707
593.
The Trial Chamber finds that the attacks with the use of the Orkan rocket system were
conducted against the civilian population and individual civilians not taking active part in
hostilities. These acts resulted in death and serious injury within the civilian population. The Trial
Chamber further finds that these acts were carried out by SVK forces and wilfully directed against
civilians, that is, either deliberately against civilians or through recklessness.
594.
The Trial Chamber is therefore satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the crimes of murder
and attacks on civilians for Counts 6 and 8 have been established for the Scheduled Incidents
described in Schedule C of the Indictment.
(b) Crimes under Article 5 of the Statute
595.
The Trial Chamber finds that the crimes committed in Zagreb during the Indictment period
formed part of an attack directed against the civilian population and that this attack – due to its
1706
1707
Jo`ef Poje, T. 3094-3095.
See supra section III. See also Prosecution Final Brief, paras 439-440; Defence Final Briefs, paras 579-580.
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large-scale and organised nature - was widespread and systematic. The Trial Chamber is also
satisfied that the SVK knew of the existence of such attack and that the crimes were part of it.
596.
The Trial Chamber is further satisfied that murder and inhumane acts falling within the
meaning of Article 5 of the Statute were committed in Zagreb during the Indictment period.
597. The issue of whether Peri{i} bears responsibility for these crimes will be addressed
separately.
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C. SREBRENICA
1. Srebrenica from 1992 to 6 July 1995
(a) Srebrenica in the Beginning of the War
598.
On 12 May 1992, Radovan Karadžić gave a speech at the 16th Session of the Assembly of
the Serbian People in BiH and identified six strategic objectives of the Serbian people in BiH.1708
As discussed earlier in the Judgement, the first strategic objective was the “demarcation of the state
as separate from the other two national communities”.1709 The third strategic goal related to the
areas of Srebrenica and Žepa, its aim being to establish a corridor in the Drina River valley and
eliminate the Drina River as a border between the Serbian states.1710
599.
Between May and June 1992, the VRS launched a series of attacks against ABiH forces in
the area encompassing the eastern enclaves of Srebrenica, Goražde and Žepa. Heavy fighting in this
area continued during 1992, eventually leading to a flood of refugees into the enclaves. The VRS
offensive resulted in the surrounding of Srebrenica and ultimately, in its isolation, as the Bosnian
Serbs prevented food and supplies from entering the area.1711
600.
On 19 November 1992, General Ratko Mladić issued VRS Operational Directive 4 which,
in relevant part, ordered the Drina Corps to:
defend […] Zvornik and the corridor, while the rest of its forces in the wider Podrinje region shall
exhaust the enemy, inflict the heaviest possible losses on him and force him to leave the Bira~,
@epa, and Goražde areas together with the Muslim population. First offer the able-bodied and
armed men to surrender, and if they refuse, destroy them.1712
(b) UN Intervention and “Safe Area” Designation
601.
UNPROFOR Commander in BiH from 1992 to 1993, General Philippe Morillon, visited
Srebrenica in March 1993.1713 His visit corresponded with a surge in VRS operations in eastern
1708
1709
1710
1711
1712
1713
Ex. P188, Minutes of the 16th Session of the Assembly of the Serbian People in BiH, 12 May 1992, pp 13-14.
Ex. P188, Minutes of the 16th Session of the Assembly of the Serbian People in BiH, 12 May 1992, p. 13. See
also Patrick Treanor, T. 1102; Robert Donia, T. 1691; Ex. P187, Map Depicting the Six Strategic Objectives;
Ex. P338, Map Marked by Robert Donia. See also supra para. 184.
Ex. P188, Minutes of the 16th Session of the Assembly of the Serbian People in BiH, 12 May 1992, p. 13;
Ex. P334, Excerpt of the RS’s Official Gazette reporting the “Strategic Goals”, 26 November 1993, wherein the
third strategic goal is defined as the “establishment of a corridor in the Drina [R]iver valley, and the eradication
of the Drina River as a border between the Serbian states”. See also Patrick Treanor, T. 1101-1102; Robert
Donia, T. 1691; Ex. P187, Map Depicting the Six Strategic Objectives; Ex. P338, Map Marked by Robert Donia.
Pyers Tucker, T. 9119-9122, 9129.
Ex. P866, VRS Main Staff Operational Directive 4, 19 November 1992, p. 5. These instructions are related to a
task set out in the previous Operational Directive 3 of 3 August 1992, which is listed in Directive 4 as not having
been carried out: “[t]he enemy groups in the wider area of Gora`de, @epa, Srebrenica and Cerska have not been
totally routed”; Ex. P866, VRS Main Staff Operational Directive 4, 19 November 1992, p. 3.
Pyers Tucker, T. 9088-9092.
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Bosnia, which resulted in a flood of thousands of additional refugees into Srebrenica.1714 The
humanitarian situation was desperate.1715 After he was prevented from leaving Srebrenica by
panicked residents, General Morillon told the assembled crowd that the town was under the
protection of the UN.1716
602.
On 16 April 1993, the UNSC endorsed General Morillon’s statement by adopting
Resolution 819, declaring that “all parties and others treat Srebrenica and its surroundings as a ’safe
area’ that should be free from armed attack or any other hostile act”.1717 The Resolution also
demanded that the FRY immediately cease the supply of military arms, equipment and services to
Bosnian Serb paramilitary units in Bosnia.1718 On 6 May 1993, the UNSC created two additional
UN protected enclaves in Žepa and Goražde.1719 The same day, UNPROFOR negotiated a ceasefire agreement between the ABiH and the VRS for the UN protected enclaves.1720
603.
Both sides violated the cease-fire agreement,1721 and in fact, the Srebrenica enclave was
never demilitarised.1722 However, despite these violations, a two-year period of relative stability
followed the establishment of the enclave as a safe area before it disintegrated in 1995.1723
604.
In January 1995, an UNPROFOR battalion from the Netherlands, colloquially referred to as
“DutchBat”, under the command of Colonel Karremans, was assigned to the Srebrenica enclave.1724
Rupert Smith, UNPROFOR Commander in BiH beginning in January 1995, held a series of
1714
1715
1716
1717
1718
1719
1720
1721
1722
1723
Pyers Tucker, T. 9119-9122, 9129; Ex. P2246, Expert Report of Richard Butler “Srebrenica Military Narrative
(Revised) – Operation Krivaja 95”, 1 November 2000, p. 18.
Tucker described the appalling state of the refugees in Srebrenica. Heavy fighting continued at the time, and
between 10 and 20 people died every night and graves were dug every morning in the cemetery. Tucker
described a rubbish pile next to the hospital which at night was frozen and unrecognisable, but during the day
revealed “cut off arms, legs, hands, fingers”. For Tucker, people living alongside this pile exemplified that “the
people in Srebrenica had given up hope and basic human decency and basic human respect and basic hygiene”,
Pyers Tucker, T. 9135-9140, 9185-9186.
Pyers Tucker, T. 9202.
Ex. P208, UNSC Resolution 819, 16 April 1993, p. 2. See also Ex. P2246, Expert Report of Richard Butler
“Srebrenica Military Narrative (Revised) – Operation Krivaja 95”, 1 November 2000, p. 19; Ex. P892 (under
seal); Ex. P2462, Report of the SC Mission Established Pursuant to Resolution 819, 30 April 1993.
Ex. P208, UNSC Resolution 819, 16 April 1993, p. 2.
Ex. P212, UNSC Resolution 824, 6 May 1993.
Ex. P2246, Expert Report of Richard Butler “Srebrenica Military Narrative (Revised) – Operation Krivaja 95”,
1 November 2000, p. 19.
Defence Adjudicated Facts I, 3. See also Defence Adjudicated Facts I, 2, stating: “[t]here was a consistent refusal
by the Bosnian Muslims to abide by the agreement to demilitarise the ‘safe area’. Bosnian Muslim helicopters
flew in violation of the no-fly zone; the ABiH opened fire toward Bosnian Serb lines and moved through the
‘safe area’; the 28th Division was continuously arming itself; and at least some humanitarian aid coming into the
enclave was appropriated by the ABiH. To the Bosnian Serbs it appeared that Bosnian Muslim forces in
Srebrenica were using the ‘safe area’ as a convenient base from which to launch offensives against the VRS and
that UNPROFOR was failing to take any action to prevent it. General Halilovi} admitted that Bosnian Muslim
helicopters had flown in violation of the no-fly zone and that he had personally dispatched eight helicopters with
ammunition for the 28th Division”.
Defence Adjudicated Facts II, 4; Richard Butler, T. 6731. See also Defence Adjudicated Facts I, 1.
Defence Adjudicated Facts I, 3.
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meetings with RS President Radovan Karad`i} during April and early May 1995.1725 Karad`i}
asserted that the VRS would not respect the UN safe areas, claiming that they were illegal under
international law.1726 As a result of these meetings, Rupert Smith understood that the Bosnian Serbs
were planning to put pressure on the safe areas and to control the UN and NATO forces by
restricting their freedom of movement and access to supplies.1727 Pyers Tucker further testified that
Muslim commander Nasir Orić was vehemently opposed to demilitarisation and was launching
offensive actions from inside the enclave.1728
(c) Lead-up to the Military Offensive on Srebrenica
605.
On 8 March 1995, as pressure mounted to end the war, Karadžić issued Directive 7 to the
VRS, outlining the strategic objectives for the VRS in the enclave. Directive 7 ordered the VRS
Drina Corps: “₣bğy planned and well-thought out combat operations, create an unbearable situation
of total insecurity with no hope of further survival or life for the inhabitants of Srebrenica and
Žepa”.1729 The directive also indicated that “in case the UNPROFOR forces leave Žepa and
Srebrenica, the Drina Corps Command shall plan an operation ₣…ğ with the task of breaking up and
destroying the Muslim forces in these enclaves and definitively liberating the Drina Valley
region”.1730 Karadži} further directed the troops to block UN aid convoys, as follows:
₣tğhe relevant State and military organs responsible for work with UNPROFOR and humanitarian
organisations shall, through planned and unobtrusively restrictive issuing of permits, reduce and
limit the logistics support of UNPROFOR to the enclaves and the supply of material resources to
the Muslim population, making them dependent on our good will while at the same time avoiding
condemnation by the international community and international public opinion.1731
606.
On 31 March 1995, the VRS Main Staff issued Directive 7/1, signed by General Mladić.1732
Directive 7/1 was issued “on the basis of Directive No. 7” and ordered VRS forces to, inter alia,
engage in “active combat operations […] around the [Srebrenica and Žepa] enclaves”.1733
607.
On 2 July 1995, Milenko @ivanovi}, Commander of the Drina Corps, issued an order,
“Krivaja 95”, to his subordinate units, the Bratunac Brigade, the Zvornik Brigade, the Mili}i
1724
1725
1726
1727
1728
1729
1730
1731
1732
1733
MP-277, T. 2607 (closed session); Ex. P383, Transcript of Eelco Koster from Prosecutor v. Karad`i} and
Mladi} Rule 61 Hearing, T. 32.
Ex. P2348, Statement of Rupert Smith, 14 August 1996, paras 42-56.
Ex. P2348, Statement of Rupert Smith, 14 August 1996, para. 44; Rupert Smith, T. 6311; Ex. P2361, Transcript
of Rupert Smith from Prosecutor v. Popovi} et al., T. 17488-17489; Ex. P2365, Notes of a Meeting between
Karad`i} and Rupert Smith, 5 April 1995.
Ex. P2361, Transcript of Rupert Smith from Prosecutor v. Popovi} et al., T. 17490.
Pyers Tucker, T. 9305.
Ex. P903, RS Supreme Command Directive 7, 8 March 1995, p. 10; Srebrenica Adjudicated Facts I, 6.
Ex. P903, RS Supreme Command Directive 7, 8 March 1995, p. 11.
Ex. P903, RS Supreme Command Directive 7, 8 March 1995, p. 14.
Ex. P904, Directive for Further Operations 7/1, 31 March 1995.
Ex. P904, Directive for Further Operations 7/1, 31 March 1995, p. 4.
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Brigade and parts of the Skelani Brigade, to prepare for active combat operations.1734 General
Krsti}, Chief of Staff of the Drina Corps, was ordered to command the operation.1735 The order did
not include taking the town of Srebrenica, based on an assessment by the VRS Command that the
conditions were not right at that moment to capture Srebrenica town.1736 However, the plan for
Krivaja 95 was to reduce the “safe area” of Srebrenica to its urban centre and to move towards the
larger VRS goal of plunging the Bosnian Muslim population into a humanitarian crisis and
ultimately eliminating the enclave.1737
2. The Take-Over of Srebrenica
608.
The VRS offensive on Srebrenica began in earnest on 6 July 1995,1738 when ABiH positions
near Srebrenica, as well as certain UNPROFOR OPs, came under artillery fire by the VRS.1739 On 8
July 1995, the VRS attacked the southern edge of Srebrenica, pushing back the defending ABiH
forces, and causing the DutchBat personnel to abandon their OPs.1740
609.
On the evening of 8 July 1995, the shelling of the town intensified and many civilians
entered Srebrenica from nearby villages in the southern part of the enclave.1741 On 9 July 1995, the
VRS advanced to just south of Srebrenica town and captured approximately 30 DutchBat personnel
and four armoured personnel carriers (“APCs”).1742 They were detained at the Hotel Fontana in
Bratunac.1743 The remaining DutchBat personnel withdrew to the enclave.1744 With all of the
southern DutchBat OPs either captured or abandoned, the road to Srebrenica town was open.1745
1734
1735
1736
1737
1738
1739
1740
1741
1742
1743
1744
1745
Ex. P2246, Expert Report of Richard Butler “Srebrenica Military Narrative (Revised) – Operation Krivaja 95”,
1 November 2000, p. 21. See also Defence Adjudicated Facts I, 4, 5.
Defence Adjudicated Facts I, 6.
Defence Adjudicated Facts I, 7.
Srebrenica Adjudicated Facts, 9. See also Defence Adjudicated Facts I, 8: [t]he plan specifically directed the
Drina Corps to “split apart the enclaves of @epa and Srebrenica and to reduce them to their urban areas”. The
plan also refers to “reducing the enclaves in size” and specified that the Drina Corps was to “improve the tactical
positions of the forces in the depth of the area, and to create conditions for the elimination of the enclaves”;
Momir Nikolić, T. 7871-7872; Ex. P2513, Supplementary Statement of Momir Nikoli}, 16 April 2009, p. 1;
Ex. D134, Order by Drina Corps Command, 2 July 1995, pp 1, 3.
Srebrenica Adjudicated Facts, 10.
Ex. P2348, Statement of Rupert Smith, 14 August 1996, para. 73; Ex. P2246, Expert Report of Richard Butler
“Srebrenica Military Narrative (Revised) – Operation Krivaja 95”, 1 November 2000, p. 35; Ex. P858, FRY
Mission New York Diplomatic Cable Regarding Informal Consultations of the UNSC on Srebrenica,
10 July 1995.
Ex. P2348, Statement of Rupert Smith, 14 August 1996, para. 73; Ex. P2246, Expert Report of Richard Butler
“Srebrenica Military Narrative (Revised) – Operation Krivaja 95”, 1 November 2000, p. 30; Ex. P858 (under
seal).
Ex. P2348, Statement of Rupert Smith, 14 August 1996, para. 73.
Ibid.
Ex. P2246, Expert Report of Richard Butler “Srebrenica Military Narrative (Revised) – Operation Krivaja 95”,
1 November 2000, p. 35; Richard Butler, T. 6564-6565. See Ex. P2392, Video, 11 July 1995, showing Dutch
soldiers held at the Hotel Fontana; Ex. P896 (under seal).
Ex. P2246, Expert Report of Richard Butler “Srebrenica Military Narrative (Revised) – Operation Krivaja 95”,
1 November 2000, p. 36.
Ex. P2348, Statement of Rupert Smith, 14 August 1996, para. 74; Ex. P2246, Expert Report of Richard Butler
“Srebrenica Military Narrative (Revised) – Operation Krivaja 95”, 1 November 2000, p. 36.
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After the VRS succeeded in pushing back the ABiH and UNPROFOR forces in the “safe area”,
Karad`i} issued a new order authorising the VRS Drina Corps to capture the town of Srebrenica.1746
610.
On 10 July 1995, the VRS advanced towards Srebrenica, pushing the remaining DutchBat
troops back to town.1747 Later that day, an estimated several thousand civilians from the southern
portions of the enclave fled to the town of Srebrenica.1748 During the evening hours of 10 July 1995,
additional VRS reinforcements, including the 10th Sabotage Detachment, arrived south of the
Srebrenica enclave.1749
611.
Late that evening, DutchBat Commander Lieutenant Colonel Karremans informed the
mayor of Srebrenica about major NATO air strikes planned for the next morning, 11 July 1995.1750
The Bosnian Muslim military leaders, unconvinced that such air strikes could stop the advancement
of the VRS, decided to leave Srebrenica town and moved towards the northwest corner of the
enclave.1751
612.
While a group of Bosnian Muslims, primarily consisting of women, children and elderly
men moved to the UN compounds in Srebrenica and Poto~ari,1752 a second group, primarily
military-aged men and ABiH members, began to assemble in the north-western part of the
Srebrenica enclave, close to the villages of Šušnjari and Jaglići.1753 This area was known as the
departure point of the most direct route leading from the enclave to ABiH-held territory near
Tuzla.1754 It has been estimated that between 10,000 and 15,000 people joined this convoy and
attempted to escape Srebrenica along this route.1755
1746
1747
1748
1749
1750
1751
1752
1753
1754
1755
Ex. P2246, Expert Report of Richard Butler “Srebrenica Military Narrative (Revised) – Operation Krivaja 95”,
1 November 2000, p. 36, referring to a VRS Main Staff order dated 9 July 1995.
Ex. P2246, Expert Report of Richard Butler “Srebrenica Military Narrative (Revised) – Operation Krivaja 95”,
1 November 2000, p. 36; Ex. P2348, Statement of Rupert Smith, 14 August 1996, para. 74.
Ex. P2348, Statement of Rupert Smith, 14 August 1996, para. 74. See also Ex. P2351, Code Cable from Akashi,
11 July 1995; Ex. P2512, Momir Nikoli} Statement of Facts and Acceptance of Responsibility, 6 May 2003,
para. 2.
Dra`en Erdemovi}, T. 7949. See also Ex. P2246, Expert Report of Richard Butler “Srebrenica Military Narrative
(Revised) – Operation Krivaja 95”, 1 November 2000, pp 36-37.
Ex. P2246, Expert Report of Richard Butler “Srebrenica Military Narrative (Revised) – Operation Krivaja 95”,
1 November 2000, p. 37. See also Ex. P2349, Transcript of Rupert Smith from Prosecutor v. S. Milo{evi},
T. 27315; Ex. P2350, Code Cable from Akashi, 11 July 1995, referring to “close air support to be used”.
Richard Butler, T. 6549; Ex. P2246, Expert Report of Richard Butler “Srebrenica Military Narrative (Revised) –
Operation Krivaja 95”, 1 November 2000, p. 37.
Richard Butler, T. 6553; Ex. P2246, Expert Report of Richard Butler “Srebrenica Military Narrative (Revised) –
Operation Krivaja 95”, 1 November 2000, p. 37.
Ex. P2246, Expert Report of Richard Butler “Srebrenica Military Narrative (Revised) – Operation Krivaja 95”,
1 November 2000, p. 38.
Ibid.
Ibid.
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613.
On the morning of 11 July 1995, NATO air strikes did not materialise for various
reasons.1756 At approximately 14:30 hours, two NATO F-16 planes bombed VRS tanks advancing
towards Srebrenica; however, the attacks were halted due to poor visibility and following the VRS
threat to kill the DutchBat soldiers being held hostage.1757 By 16:00 hours, DutchBat soldiers took
all of the remaining Bosnian Muslims from Srebrenica to a UN compound near Potočari.1758
614.
In the early evening hours of 11 July 1995, General Mladić, accompanied by Drina Corps
Commander Milenko @ivanovi}, Chief of Staff of the Drina Corps, General Krstić, and other VRS
officers, took a triumphant walk through the streets of an almost deserted Srebrenica town.1759
3. 11 July 1995: Refugees Flee to the Potočari Compound
615.
During the VRS attack on the enclave on 11 July 1995 and into the morning hours of 12
July 1995, Muslim refugees began to arrive in Potočari.1760 The Potočari compound was manned by
approximately 30 soldiers, including Lieutenant Eelco Koster, a DutchBat logistics officer, and his
unit, and they were tasked with taking care of the refugees.1761 Following Koster’s request for
reinforcements, additional soldiers arrived in Potočari, increasing the total number of soldiers at the
compound to 50 or 60.1762
616.
According to Koster, refugees arrived at the Potočari compound from Srebrenica either on
foot or in UN vehicles, and were primarily women, children and elderly.1763 They appeared to be
terrified and were looking for help.1764 Initially, the refugees were not allowed inside the compound,
and were directed into large buildings of a former bus shelter outside.1765 Later that day, when the
1756
1757
1758
1759
1760
1761
1762
1763
1764
1765
Ex. P2246, Expert Report of Richard Butler “Srebrenica Military Narrative (Revised) – Operation Krivaja 95”,
1 November 2000, p. 37, referring to the report of the Dutch MOD, Debriefing on Srebrenica, 4 October 1995,
pp 32-36.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Srebrenica Adjudicated Facts, 13. A video from 11 July 1995 shows the following military commanders
entering, or present around, the town of Srebrenica: Ratko Mladi}, Milenko @ivanovi} (then Commander of the
Drina Corps), Vinko Pandurevi} (Commander of the Zvornik Infantry Brigade), Radislav Krsti} (then Chief of
Staff of the Drina Corps), members of the 10th Sabotage Detachment Colonel Mirko Trvi} (Commander of the
2nd Romanija Motorised Brigade), Vujadin Popovi} (Assistant Commander for Security in the Drina Corps),
Colonel Svetozar Andri} (then Commander of the 1st Birač Brigade of the Drina Corps) and Milorad Pelemi{
(Commander of the 10th Sabotage Detachment), Ex. P2390, Video, 11 July 1995. See also Richard Butler,
T. 6554-6555, 6557-6560; Ex. P2246, Expert Report of Richard Butler “Srebrenica Military Narrative (Revised)
– Operation Krivaja 95”, 1 November 2000, p. 32.
Ex. P383, Transcript of Eelco Koster from Prosecutor v. Karad`i} and Mladi} Rule 61 Hearing, T. 32. Koster
counted thousands of people arriving, primarily women, children and older men, T. 44. See also Ex. P2246,
Expert Report of Richard Butler “Srebrenica Military Narrative (Revised) – Operation Krivaja 95”,
1 November 2000, p. 45.
Ex. P383, Transcript of Eelco Koster from Prosecutor v. Karad`i} and Mladi} Rule 61 Hearing, T. 32.
Ex. P383, Transcript of Eelco Koster from Prosecutor v. Karad`i} and Mladi} Rule 61 Hearing, T. 35.
Ex. P383, Transcript of Eelco Koster from Prosecutor v. Karad`i} and Mladi} Rule 61 Hearing, T. 33-34.
Ex. P383, Transcript of Eelco Koster from Prosecutor v. Karad`i} and Mladi} Rule 61 Hearing, T. 32.
Ex. P383, Transcript of Eelco Koster from Prosecutor v. Karad`i} and Mladi} Rule 61 Hearing, T. 33; Ex. P386,
Video Clip.
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crowd started to increase in size, Koster’s unit allowed people into the compound in groups of
25.1766
617.
Koster explained that because the road from Srebrenica to Potočari was in direct sight and
line of fire of the VRS, the DutchBat personnel created a side opening in the fence so that the
refugees could enter the compound out of the view of the VRS.1767 Between 4,000 to 5,000 Bosnian
Muslim refugees were brought inside, while the rest remained outside the compound, protected only
by a demarcation line of red and white tape put up by DutchBat personnel.1768
618.
The sick and wounded were provided with first aid, as well as food and water.1769 The
situation was dire, as it was tremendously hot and the DutchBat personnel were short of medical
equipment and food.1770 Information regarding the exact number of refugees in Poto~ari varies from
source to source, but general indications are that a total of 25,000 to 35,000 refugees fled to
Poto~ari.1771
619.
VRS forces were positioned between 300 and 500 meters from the Poto~ari compound and
were firing in the direction of the refugees and over their heads, causing panic among them.1772
Koster testified that during the day, his men were fired upon by the VRS with mortar fire from
approximately 50 metres away.1773
4. The Establishment of Serb Authority over Srebrenica Municipality
620.
On 11 July 1995, Radovan Karad`i}, in his capacity as RS President, issued two orders
related to Srebrenica: 1) appointing Miroslav Deronji} to serve as the “Civilian Commissioner for
the Serbian Municipality of Srebrenica”;1774 and 2) ordering the formation of a Public Security
Station for Serb Srebrenica.1775 Both orders stated that citizens who engaged in combat operations
1766
1767
1768
1769
1770
1771
1772
1773
1774
1775
Ex. P383, Transcript of Eelco Koster from Prosecutor v. Karad`i} and Mladi} Rule 61 Hearing, T. 33.
Ibid.
Ex. P383, Transcript of Eelco Koster from Prosecutor v. Karad`i} and Mladi} Rule 61 Hearing, T. 38.
Ex. P383, Transcript of Eelco Koster from Prosecutor v. Karad`i} and Mladi} Rule 61 Hearing, T. 35, 46;
Ex. P428 (under seal), T. 963.
Ex. P383, Transcript of Eelco Koster from Prosecutor v. Karad`i} and Mladi} Rule 61 Hearing, T. 35-36, 46;
Ex. P428 (under seal), T. 963.
Richard Butler, T. 6574; Ex. P2246, Expert Report of Richard Butler “Srebrenica Military Narrative (Revised) –
Operation Krivaja 95”, 1 November 2000, p. 38; Ex. P428 (under seal), T. 962-963, 979, estimating the number
of refugees at between 25,000 and 30,000.
Ex. P428 (under seal), T. 963.
Ex. P383, Transcript of Eelco Koster from Prosecutor v. Karad`i} and Mladi} Rule 61 Hearing, T. 36.
Ex. P83, Transcript of Miroslav Deronji} from Prosecutor v. Krstić (Appeal), T. 113-114; Ex. P86, Decision on
Appointment of the Civilian Commissioner for the Srebrenica Municipality, 11 July 1995; Ex. P2246, Expert
Report of Richard Butler “Srebrenica Military Narrative (Revised) – Operation Krivaja 95”, 1 November 2000,
p. 39.
Ex. P2246, Expert Report of Richard Butler “Srebrenica Military Narrative (Revised) – Operation Krivaja 95”,
1 November 2000, p. 39.
189
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against the VRS were to “be treated as prisoners of war”, while the remainder were free to choose
their place of residence or emigration.1776
621.
On 14 July 1995, Radovan Karad`i} and Miroslav Deronji} held a private meeting, after
which Karad`i} met with Bosnian Serbs from Srebrenica and discussed the establishment of a War
Presidency for the town.1777 At this time, the appointment of Deronji} to the position of civilian
commissioner was revoked and the War Presidency was established.1778 Deronji} was appointed
President of the War Presidency.1779
622.
On 14 July 1995, Karad`i} declared “a state of war” in the Srebrenica-Skelani municipality.
On 28 July 1995, the “state of war” was expanded to include the entire territory of the RS.1780
5. Hotel Fontana Meetings
623.
On the evening of 11 July 1995, two meetings were held at the Hotel Fontana in Bratunac
between representatives from the DutchBat and the VRS.1781 The first meeting was attended, inter
alia, by Lieutenant Colonel Karremans, on behalf of the DutchBat, and by General Mladi}, MajorGeneral Živanović, Colonel Janković and Momir Nikoli}, on behalf of the VRS.1782 The meeting
was video-recorded and lasted approximately one hour.1783 It began with angry remarks by Mladi}
about the NATO air strikes.1784 During the meeting, Mladi} inquired whether buses could be
provided to them through the UNPROFOR Chief of Staff in Sarajevo.1785 The meeting ended with
Mladi}’s request that the DutchBat representatives arrange for Bosnian Muslim civilian and
military representatives to attend a meeting the same evening at 23:00 hours.1786
1776
1777
1778
1779
1780
1781
1782
1783
1784
1785
1786
Ex. P86, Decision on Appointment of the Civilian Commissioner for the Srebrenica Municipality, 11 July 1995;
Ex. P2246, Expert Report of Richard Butler “Srebrenica Military Narrative (Revised) – Operation Krivaja 95”,
1 November 2000, p. 39.
Ex. P80, Witness Statement of Miroslav Deronji}, 25 November 2003, para. 215; Ex. P82, Transcript of
Miroslav Deronji} from Prosecutor v. S. Milo{evi}, T. 29735; Ex. P87, Decision on Appointment of the War
Presidency of the Srebrenica Municipality, 14 July 1995.
Ex. P80, Witness Statement of Miroslav Deronji}, 25 November 2003, para. 215; Ex. P82, Transcript of
Miroslav Deronji} from Prosecutor v. S. Milo{evi}, T. 29735; Ex. P86, Decision on Appointment of the Civilian
Commissioner for the Srebrenica Municipality, 11 July 1995; Ex. P87, Decision on Appointment of the War
Presidency of the Srebrenica Municipality, 14 July 1995.
Ex. P80, Witness Statement of Miroslav Deronji}, 25 November 2003, para. 215; Ex. P87, Decision on
Appointment of the War Presidency of the Srebrenica Municipality, 14 July 1995.
Ex. P1624, Decision of Radovan Karad`i} on Proclaiming a State of War in the RS, 28 July 1995.
Ex. P2391, Video, 11 July 1995; Ex. P2512, Momir Nikoli} Statement of Facts and Acceptance of
Responsibility, 6 May 2003, para. 3.
Ex. P2512, Momir Nikoli} Statement of Facts and Acceptance of Responsibility, 6 May 2003, para. 3;
Ex. P2391, Video, 11 July 1995.
Ibid.
Ex. P2391, Video, 11 July 1995; Ex. P2246, Expert Report of Richard Butler “Srebrenica Military Narrative
(Revised) – Operation Krivaja 95”, 1 November 2000, p. 40.
Ibid.
Ibid.
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624.
Karremans returned to the Hotel Fontana at 23:00 hours for a second meeting with the VRS
commanders, accompanied by a Bosnian Muslim representative, Nesib Mand`i}.1787 Also present at
the meeting were Miroslav Deronjić and Ljubisav Simić, Mayor of Bratunac.1788 The meeting was
video-recorded in part.1789 During the meeting, Mladić placed a broken signboard stating
“Municipal Assembly of Srebrenica” on the table in front of everyone.1790 The participants in the
meeting interpreted the gesture to mean that the protected area of Srebrenica was taken and that the
civilian population could no longer stay there.1791 Mladi} promised that everyone, regardless of
their age and sex, would be evacuated according to their wishes.1792 Mladi} further addressed Nesib
Mand`i} personally, stating in a threatening language:
I need to have a clear position of the representatives of your people on whether you want to
survive, stay, or disappear, and I am prepared to receive a delegation tomorrow of responsible
people from the Muslim side here, at 1000 hours, with whom I can discuss the salvation of your
people from the enclave, the former enclave of Srebrenica.1793
625.
The next morning, 12 July 1995, a follow-up and final meeting between the DutchBat and
VRS was held at the Hotel Fontana.1794 The purpose of the meeting was discussed very early that
morning, between 07:00 and 07:30 hours, between Mladi}, Deronji},1795 Ljubisav Simi}, President
of the Bratunac municipality,1796 and Dragomir Vasi}, Chief of the Security Centre in Zvornik.1797
At 10:00 hours, the DutchBat officers arrived together with Nesib Mand`i} and two additional
Bosnian Muslim representatives for the Potočari refugees: Ibro Nuhanovi} and Ćamila
Omanovi}.1798 From the Bosnian Serb side, the participants included, inter alia, Mladi}, Krsti},
Vujadin Popovi},1799 Jankovi}, Svetozar Kosori}, Drina Corps Chief of Intelligence, Momir
1787
1788
1789
1790
1791
1792
1793
1794
1795
1796
1797
1798
1799
Ex. P428 (under seal), T. 964-965, 968-969; MP-277, T. 2620 (closed session); Ex. P2246, Expert Report of
Richard Butler “Srebrenica Military Narrative (Revised) – Operation Krivaja 95”, 1 November 2000, p. 40.
Ex. P2246, Expert Report of Richard Butler “Srebrenica Military Narrative (Revised) – Operation Krivaja 95”,
1 November 2000, pp 40-41; Ex. P437, Video Clip of Second Hotel “Fontana” Meeting, 10 July 1995.
Ex. P428 (under seal), T. 970-971; Ex. P437, Video Clip of Second Hotel “Fontana” Meeting, 10 July 1995.
Ex. P428 (under seal), T. 975; Ex. P435 (under seal).
Ex. P428 (under seal), T. 975.
Ex. P429 (under seal), T. 990-991.
Ex. P428 (under seal), T. 977-978.
Ex. P429 (under seal), T. 986; Ex. P2512, Momir Nikoli} Statement of Facts and Acceptance of Responsibility,
6 May 2003, para. 4.
Ex. P80, Witness Statement of Miroslav Deronji}, 25 November 2003, para. 191.
Ex. P80, Witness Statement of Miroslav Deronji}, 25 November 2003, para. 191. See also Ex. P81, Transcript of
Miroslav Deronji} from Prosecutor v. S. Milo{evi}, T. 29706, mentioning Ljubo Simi} as the President of the
Bratunac Municipality.
Ex. P80, Witness Statement of Miroslav Deronji}, 25 November 2003, para. 191.
Ex. P83, Transcript of Miroslav Deronji} from Prosecutor v. Krstić (Appeal), T. 126; Ex. P438, Video Clip of
Third Hotel “Fontana” Meeting, 12 July 1995, at 2:19, 3:46; Ex. P436, Statement by Representatives of the
Civilian Authorities of Srebrenica Enclave, 17 July 1995.
Ex. P438, Video of Third Hotel “Fontana” Meeting, 12 July 1995, at 1.50.27.6. See also Srebrenica Adjudicated
Facts, 97, noting that Popovi} was Assistant Commander for Security for the Drina Corps.
191
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Nikoli}, Bratunac Brigade Assistant Commander for Intelligence and Security, as well as Deronji}
and Miroslav Simi}.1800
626.
At the meeting, Mladić insisted that he wanted “absolute cooperation from the civilian
population”, and that for their survival, all of the “armed men who attacked and committed crimes”
must hand over their weapons. While specifically addressing the representatives of the Bosnian
Muslim population, Mladić repeated that they “can choose to stay, or leave if ₣theyğ wish₣edğ”.1801
The Bosnian Muslim representatives made it clear that they wanted to leave Srebrenica, and be
escorted by the DutchBat forces to safety.1802
627.
The meeting finished between 11:00 and 11:30 hours.1803 Deronji} testified that the meeting,
recorded by TV cameras, was “some kind of […] smoke screen for the public”, because most of the
contacts with Bosnian Muslims and most decisions had been made outside of this meeting.1804
6. Transfer of Population
(a) Organisation of Buses
628.
Shortly after the 12 July 1995 meeting at the Hotel Fontana, VRS personnel, as well as the
RS MUP Special Police, started to arrive in Potočari to search and secure the area.1805 On the
morning of 12 July 1995, VRS and RS civilian authorities began to mobilise buses.1806
629.
General Krsti}, working in close co-operation with military officials of the VRS Main Staff
and the Drina Corps, played a significant role in organising the transportation operation.1807 General
1800
1801
1802
1803
1804
1805
1806
Ex. P429 (under seal), T. 987, 989; Ex. P83, Transcript of Miroslav Deronji} from Prosecutor v. Krstić (Appeal),
T. 126; Momir Nikoli}, T. 7827.
Dragomir Vasi}, T. 6498; Ex. P438, Video Clip of Third Hotel “Fontana” Meeting, 12 July 1995, at 4:53.
Ex. P80, Witness Statement of Miroslav Deronji}, 25 November 2003, paras 192-193; Ex. P83, Transcript of
Miroslav Deronji} from Prosecutor v. Krstić (Appeal), T. 127-128, 163. See also Ex. P438, Video Clip of Third
Hotel “Fontana” Meeting, 12 July 1995.
Ex. P429 (under seal), T. 990; Ex. P438, Video Clip of Third Hotel “Fontana” Meeting, 12 July 1995, showing
some of the attendees at the meeting on 12 July 1995 in Bratunac, as identified by the witness.
Ex. P83, Transcript of Miroslav Deronji} from Prosecutor v. Krstić (Appeal), T. 127, 163. See also Ex. P93,
Video Clip of a Meeting; Ex. P94, Video Still of a Meeting at the Fontana Hotel; Ex. P438, Video Clip of Third
Hotel “Fontana” Meeting, 12 July 1995, 4:32.
Ex. P2246, Expert Report of Richard Butler “Srebrenica Military Narrative (Revised) – Operation Krivaja 95”,
1 November 2000, p. 44.
Ex. P2348, Statement of Rupert Smith, 14 August 1996, para. 74; Ex. P2246, Expert Report of Richard Butler
“Srebrenica Military Narrative (Revised) – Operation Krivaja 95”, 1 November 2000, p. 45; Ex. P429 (under
seal), T. 991-992; Ex. P280, Notes of Intercepted Conversation at 09:15 Hours, in which an unknown person
reported to Lieutenant Colonel Krsmanovi} about issues surrounding obtaining buses and fuel. See also Ex. P80,
Witness Statement of Miroslav Deronji}, 25 November 2003, para. 196, stating that a request was sent to every
company in the Bratunac area, Zvornik, and the Ljubivoja municipality in Serbia, and was even broadcast on the
radio, for available buses or vehicles to evacuate the civilian population from the enclave to Bosnian Muslimheld territory. Deronji} stated he spent the rest of the day “preparing a gathering for the Serbs, former residents
of Srebrenica, and organising buses to evacuate the population”, Ex. P80, Witness Statement of Miroslav
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Krsti} ordered the procurement of buses for the transportation of the Bosnian Muslim population
from Potočari on 12 and 13 July 1995, including an order for 50 buses to arrive in Srebrenica from
nine different municipalities.1808 Three additional orders regarding transport were issued by the RS
MOD.1809
630.
Buses and trucks were assembled from, inter alia, Ilija{, Pale, Sokolac, Bratunac, and
Bratkovi}i and ordered to arrive at Bratunac stadium on 12 July 1995.1810 There was a serious
shortage of fuel in RS and other areas; thus, obtaining enough fuel to support the movement of the
entire civilian population out of Poto~ari presented a critical issue.1811 The Bratunac Brigade
Command logistically supported the transportation operation by disbursing and accounting for fuel;
ultimately, a minimum of 4,700 litres of diesel fuel was provided to the transportation fleet
assembled in Poto~ari on 12 July 1995.1812 Krsti} also issued orders to his subordinates regarding
securing the road along which the buses would travel to Kladanj, as well as to secure the location
where the Bosnian Muslims would disembark.1813
631.
As the buses arrived in Poto~ari, a number of VRS officers, including Mladi}, @ivanovi},
Krsti}, as well as a number of other Main Staff and Drina Corps personnel, arrived at the Poto~ari
compound to personally observe the situation.1814 RS Municipal Police and RS Special Police units
were also present.1815 At least two video cameras filmed these events on 12 July 1995.1816
1807
1808
1809
1810
1811
1812
1813
1814
Deronji}, 25 November 2003, para. 196. See also Ex. P260, Intercepted Conversation at 11:27 hours, wherein
Krsti} requested that the buses should start moving right away.
Srebrenica Adjudicated Facts, 17.
Srebrenica Adjudicated Facts, 16; Ex. P2246, Expert Report of Richard Butler “Srebrenica Military Narrative
(Revised) – Operation Krivaja 95”, 1 November 2000, p. 46. In addition, General Krsti} issued an order at 12:10
hours for buses to start moving immediately, Ex. P260, Intercepted Conversation at 11:27 Hours; Richard Butler,
T. 6587-6588; Srebrenica Agreed Facts, 16, 18. See also Ex. P261, Notes of Intercepted Conversation at 12:00
Hours, showing that Krsti} was involved in gathering buses and fuel for the transportation of the Bosnian
Muslim population from Poto~ari on 12 July 1995.
Ex. P2246, Expert Report of Richard Butler “Srebrenica Military Narrative (Revised) – Operation Krivaja 95”,
1 November 2000, p. 45. The RS MOD and the VRS, including the Drina Corps, issued a series of orders
concerning the assembling of buses in Bratunac, Richard Butler, T. 6583. Colonel Pandurevi}, the commander of
the Zvornik Brigade, sent a regular combat report to the Command of the Drina Corps affirming that “pursuant
to [their] order”, several buses and trucks were sent to Bratunac, Ex. P2394, Regular Combat Report of the 1st
Zvornik Brigade to the Command of the Drina Corps, 12 July 1995. According to Butler, the order to send
vehicles must have been given by the Drina Corps Command, Richard Butler, T. 6582-6583.
Ex. P261, Intercepted Conversation at 12:00 Hours; Richard Butler, T. 6586.
Richard Butler, T. 6585. See also Ex. P280, Intercepted Conversation at 09:15 Hours, stressing the lack of fuel.
Ex. P2246, Expert Report of Richard Butler “Srebrenica Military Narrative (Revised) – Operation Krivaja 95”,
1 November 2000, p. 46. See also Ex. P261, Intercepted Conversation at 12:00 Hours, showing that Krsti} was
involved in gathering buses and fuel for the transportation of the Muslim population from Poto~ari on
12 July 1995.
Srebrenica Adjudicated Facts, 16; Ex. P262, Intercepted Conversation at 13:05 Hours, showing that Krsti} told
an officer in the Vlasenica Brigade of the Drina Corps to have the MUP secure the road from Vlasenica to the
tunnel between the RS and BiH lines, since that was where the Muslims would be disembarking.
Ex. P2246, Expert Report of Richard Butler “Srebrenica Military Narrative (Revised) – Operation Krivaja 95”,
1 November 2000, p. 47; Srebrenica Adjudicated Facts, 14-15; Ex. P429 (under seal), T. 991; Ex. P383,
Transcript of Eelco Koster from Prosecutor v. Karad`i} and Mladi} Rule 61 Hearing, T. 37-38. Even before
193
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(b) Separation of Refugees
632.
The Trial Chamber took judicial notice of the fact that the separation of refugees was part of
a plan devised and implemented by the Bosnian Serb forces to transport all of the Bosnian Muslim
women, children and elderly out of the enclave.1817 According to Momir Nikoli}, on the morning of
12 July 1995 in front of the Hotel Fontana, Colonel Popovi} informed him that all Bosnian Muslim
women, children and men unfit for military service would be transported to Bosnian Muslimcontrolled territory, while the “able-bodied Bosnian Muslim men will all have to be killed”.1818
Nikoli} received similar information from Colonel Kosori} and was informed that he would be
involved in the separation of the able-bodied Bosnian Muslim men from the group.1819
633.
Between 12:00 and 13:00 hours on 12 July 1995, Mladić arrived in Potočari and entered the
area occupied by the crowd of refugees.1820 After Mladić's departure, VRS personnel began
separating the Bosnian Muslim men from the women, children and elderly.1821 Nikoli} participated
in the separation process, along with other members of the Bratunac Brigade.1822 The presence of
armed members of the Bratunac Brigade contributed to the atmosphere of fear and terror in
Potočari.1823
634.
At approximately 16:00 hours on 12 July 1995, VRS soldiers, including General Mladić,
arrived at Koster’s position at the Potočari compound with additional jeeps and civilian vehicles.1824
Koster asked Mladi} what he was planning to do, but Mladi} did not reply and walked past the
demarcation tape towards the refugees.1825 Koster asked Mladi} several times to go to the
1815
1816
1817
1818
1819
1820
1821
1822
1823
1824
1825
12:00 hours on that day, the VRS soldiers mingled with the Bosnian Muslim population and started removing
some of them from the group, Ex. P429 (under seal), T. 994.
Ex. P2395, Video, July 1995; Ex. P2396, Video, July 1995; Ex. P2397, Video, July 1995; Ex. P2246, Expert
Report of Richard Butler “Srebrenica Military Narrative (Revised) – Operation Krivaja 95”, 1 November 2000,
p. 47, in which Richard Butler identified General Mladi}, as well as members of the 2nd Battalion of the Bratunac
Light Infantry Brigade, who were present while the refugees were embarking the buses in Poto~ari. Butler also
recognised members of the Vlasenica Light Infantry Brigade and the Mili}i Light Infantry Brigade present
during the disembarking of refugees in Ti{}a and Luke, Richard Butler, T. 6592-6595; Ex. P2395, Video, July
1995 at 00:37, concerning the Bratunac Brigade Military Police Platoon, which belonged to the Bratunac Light
Infantry Brigade; Ex. P2397, Video, July 1995.
Ex. P2395, Video, July 1995; Ex. P2396, Video, July 1995.
Srebrenica Adjudicated Facts, 11.
Ex. P2512, Momir Nikoli} Statement of Facts and Acceptance of Responsibility, 6 May 2003, paras 3-4.
Ex. P2512, Momir Nikoli} Statement of Facts and Acceptance of Responsibility, 6 May 2003, paras 4-5;
Ex. P2513, Supplementary Statement of Momir Nikoli}, 16 April 2009.
Ex. P429 (under seal), T. 991.
Ex. P383, Transcript of Eelco Koster from Prosecutor v. Karad`i} and Mladi} Rule 61 Hearing, T. 40-41; Eelco
Koster, T. 2307; Ex. P387, Video Clip; Ex. P384, Transcript of Eelco Koster from Prosecutor v. Popovi} et al.,
T. 3104.
Momir Nikoli}, T. 7825; Srebrenica Adjudicated Facts, 25-26; Ex. P383, Transcript of Eelco Koster from
Prosecutor v. Karad`i} and Mladi} Rule 61 Hearing, T. 38.
Srebrenica Adjudicated Facts, 21.
Ex. P383, Transcript of Eelco Koster from Prosecutor v. Karad`i} and Mladi} Rule 61 Hearing, T. 39; Ex. P386,
Video Clip.
Ex. P383, Transcript of Eelco Koster from Prosecutor v. Karad`i} and Mladi} Rule 61 Hearing, T. 39.
194
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compound to talk to Colonel Karremans; however, Mladi} refused, stating: “No. I am doing what I
please to do and I am in charge here and nobody tells me what to do, and I am outside here and you
will see what is going to happen”.1826 Mladi} also informed Koster that the DutchBat soldiers would
be better off if they co-operated with him.1827
635.
Outside the gates of the base, Mladić spoke to the crowd gathered at Poto~ari, stating: “[d]o
not panic. You will all be safe. You will all be evacuated to the areas that are under the control of
the BiH army. First the old and the infirm, then mothers with their children, and then everybody
will follow as well”.1828
636.
Later that day, MP-227 observed a long line of buses outside the Potočari base, waiting to
be loaded with women, children and the elderly.1829 The Bosnian Serbs forced them onto the buses,
while kicking and yelling at them.1830 Koster asked General Mladi} what he was going to do and he
replied that he was going to evacuate the refugees to another place.1831
637.
The Bosnian Serbs continued to put more people in the buses and began driving them
away.1832 Koster’s men attempted to escort the buses and trucks.1833 However, at control-points
manned by Bosnian-Serb police or military personnel, the UN soldiers were disarmed, their
vehicles were confiscated and they could no longer accompany the buses outside of the
compound.1834
638.
The Bosnian Muslim men who had been separated from the women, children and elderly in
Poto~ari were first taken to the “White House”, located across the road from the UN compound in
Poto~ari.1835 Their personal belongings were left outside and were subsequently burned.1836 VRS
1826
1827
1828
1829
1830
1831
1832
1833
1834
1835
1836
Ibid.
Ex. P383, Transcript of Eelco Koster from Prosecutor v. Karad`i} and Mladi} Rule 61 Hearing, T. 39, 47.
Ex. P429 (under seal), T. 993.
Ex. P429 (under seal), T. 992. See also Ex. P383, Transcript of Eelco Koster from Prosecutor v. Karad`i} and
Mladi} Rule 61 Hearing, T. 40.
Ex. P384, Transcript of Eelco Koster from Prosecutor v. Popovi} et al., T. 3104. See also Ex. P2512, Momir
Nikoli} Statement of Facts and Acceptance of Responsibility, 6 May 2003, para. 6.
Ex. P383, Transcript of Eelco Koster from Prosecutor v. Karad`i} and Mladi} Rule 61 Hearing, T. 40.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Richard Butler, T. 6597-6598. See also Ex. P2398, Video, July 1995 at 00:22, in which unarmed UN soldiers are
accompanying the refugees to Bosnian-Muslim held territory; Ex. P383, Transcript of Eelco Koster from
Prosecutor v. Karad`i} and Mladi} Rule 61 Hearing, T. 40.
Richard Butler, T. 6605-6609; Ex. P2246, Expert Report of Richard Butler “Srebrenica Military Narrative
(Revised) – Operation Krivaja 95”, 1 November 2000, p. 49; MP-294, T. 9057-9059; Ex. P390, Video Clip,
showing men seated behind a balcony of the “White House”, at 02:29.
Richard Butler, T. 6606; Ex. P390, Video Clip.
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soldiers were responsible for guarding these men, before they were brought to Bratunac.1837 RS
MUP Special Police were also present in the area.1838
639.
While at the Potočari compound, MP-277 witnessed nearby houses torched. He believed it
was to frighten the population and prevent them from returning.1839 He testified that he heard shots
and screams outside the compound during the night of 12 July 1995.1840 During the same evening,
VRS soldiers confiscated weapons and military gear from approximately 30 to 40 DutchBat soldiers
including Koster, at gun point, as they attempted to guard refugees outside the compound.1841
640.
On the morning of 13 July 1995, the loading of bus and truck convoys leaving Poto~ari
resumed at about 07:00 hours.1842 At about 15:00 hours, Belgrade journalist Zoran Petrović filmed
one group of refugees preparing to board the buses.1843 As shown by the video, the VRS was
manning both the separation lines, and guarding access to the buses to ensure that military-aged
Bosnian Muslim males did not board.1844 By 20:00 hours on 13 July 1995, the removal of the
Bosnian Muslim refugee population from the Poto~ari compound was complete.1845 Ultimately,
thousands of Bosnian Muslim civilian women, children and elderly men were bussed out of
Poto~ari and other areas surrounding Srebrenica to non-Serb areas of BiH.1846
641.
The buses transferred the women, children and the elderly from Poto~ari through Bratunac,
along the Bratunac-Konjevi} Polje road, through Mili}i, Vlasenica to Ti{}a.1847 At Ti{}a, the
1837
1838
1839
1840
1841
1842
1843
1844
1845
1846
1847
Ex. P387, Video Clip; Ex. P2512, Momir Nikoli} Statement of Facts and Acceptance of Responsibility,
6 May 2003 para. 4, regarding the intention to transport the Bosnian Muslim men to Bratunac. See also Richard
Butler, T. 6605-6607, stating that the official reason for the detention of captured Bosnian Muslim men was to
screen them for their potential involvement in war crimes against the Serbs, but that there is no evidence that an
investigation was ever carried out among these men; Ex. P2353, Code Cable from Akashi, 12 July 1995, para. 2,
referring to “about 4,000 males of draft age in Bratunac awaiting ‘screening’ by the ‘BSA’, their fate being of
concern to everyone”; Ex. P83, Transcript of Miroslav Deronji} from Prosecutor v. Krstić (Appeal), T. 128, 163,
referring to the fact that Radovan Karad`i} also insisted that if the VRS had information that men who might
have committed war crimes were hiding among Muslim civilians, those men should be detained.
Ex. P387, Video Clip.
Ex. P429 (under seal), T. 994.
Ex. P429 (under seal), T. 995.
Ex. P383, Transcript of Eelco Koster from Prosecutor v. Karad`i} and Mladi} Rule 61 Hearing, T. 42.
Ex. P2246, Expert Report of Richard Butler “Srebrenica Military Narrative (Revised) – Operation Krivaja 95”,
1 November 2000, p. 47; Ex. P257, Intercepted Conversation at 07:00 Hours, in which Janković reported to
General Milenko Živanović that 5,000 Muslims had been transferred and another 10,000 still needed to be
transferred.
Ex. P387, Video Clip.
Ibid.
Ex. P2246, Expert Report of Richard Butler “Srebrenica Military Narrative (Revised) – Operation Krivaja 95”,
1 November 2000, p. 48. See also Ex. P383, Transcript of Eelco Koster from Prosecutor v. Karad`i} and Mladi}
Rule 61 Hearing, T. 43-45.
Srebrenica Agreed Facts, 3.
Richard Butler, T. 6583-6584; Ex. P2397, Video, July 1995.
196
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refugees disembarked and walked through a tunnel to Bosnian-Muslim controlled territory.1848
Thereafter some of the refugees arrived at Bosnian Muslim-held territory in and around Kladanj.1849
(c) Column of Military-Aged Men
642.
The refugees assembled at the UN compound in Poto~ari did not constitute all of the
Bosnian Muslims at the enclave. From the evening of 10 July 1995, ABiH soldiers and Bosnian
Muslim men began to assemble in an area located northwest of Srebrenica at the departure point for
the most direct route to ABiH-held territory near Tuzla.1850 Between 10,000 and 15,000 militaryaged men, including both soldiers and civilians, formed a column and attempted to escape along
this route.1851 The column of the military-aged men heading towards Tuzla is shown on two
videos.1852
643.
On 12 July 1995, the column began to move through former ABiH smuggling routes.1853
The Bosnian Serb military knew this route, and was therefore able to set up ambushes.1854
644.
The largest number of Bosnian Muslim men from the column were captured on 13 July
1995 by MUP units along the Bratunac-Konjevi} Polje road, which ran through Glogova, Kravica
and Sandi}i.1855 Several thousand men were collected at, or near, the Sandici Meadow and the Nova
Kasaba football field,1856 at the intersection of Konjevi} Polje road and a meadow in Jagli}i.1857
1848
1849
1850
1851
1852
1853
1854
1855
1856
Richard Butler, T. 6584. In Ti{}a and Luke the final separation took place; all military-aged men were detained
and brought to a school in Luke, Richard Butler, T. 6595. See also Ex. P2246, Expert Report of Richard Butler
“Srebrenica Military Narrative (Revised) – Operation Krivaja 95”, 1 November 2000, p. 50; Ex. P2397, Video,
July 1995.
Richard Butler, T. 6600; Ex. P2397, Video, July 1995.
Richard Butler, T. 6615. This area covers the villages of [u{njari and Jagli}i, Ex. P2246, Expert Report of
Richard Butler “Srebrenica Military Narrative (Revised) – Operation Krivaja 95”, 1 November 2000, p. 38;
Ex. P80, Witness Statement of Miroslav Deronji}, 25 November 2003, para. 199.
Ex. P80, Witness Statement of Miroslav Deronji}, 25 November 2003, para. 199; Ex. P2246, Expert Report of
Richard Butler “Srebrenica Military Narrative (Revised) – Operation Krivaja 95”, 1 November 2000, p. 38.
See Ex. P2388, Video, July 1995, at 09:47; Ex. P2389, Video, July 1995. See also Richard Butler, T. 6549-6550,
6553.
Richard Butler, T. 6551; Ex. P2388, Video, July 1995; Ex. P2389, Video, July 1995.
Richard Butler, T. 6551; Ex. P2388, Video, July 1995; Ex. P2389, Video, July 1995; Ex. P283, Intercepted
Conversation at 13:45 Hours, in which two Drina Corps officers discuss movement around the area of Konjevi}
Polje and indicate that General Krsti} is the person in charge of the operation.
Richard Butler, T. 6610, 6615. See Ex. P2512, Momir Nikoli} Statement of Facts and Acceptance of
Responsibility, 6 May 2003, para. 9; Ex. P2388, Video, July 1995; Ex. P2389, Video, July 1995; Ex. P2517,
Transcript of Momir Nikoli} from Prosecutor v. Popovi} et al., 22 April 2009, T. 32979, in which Nikoli}
testified that MUP forces were deployed along the Bratunac-Konjevi} Polje road.
Ex. P2512, Momir Nikoli} Statement of Facts and Acceptance of Responsibility, 6 May 2003, paras 7, 9.
Richard Butler, T. 6611, 6636-6638; Ex. P2246, Expert Report of Richard Butler “Srebrenica Military Narrative
(Revised) – Operation Krivaja 95”, 1 November 2000, p. 60; Ex. P273, Intercepted Conversation at 16:02 Hours,
stating that on 13 July 1995 1.500 prisoners were gathered at the stadium. An additional intercepted conversation
seems to show the role of the VRS Chief of Security Beara in the detention and killing of the people in the
soccer field in Nova Kasaba, Ex. P274, Intercepted Conversation at 10:09 Hours. See also Ex. P275, Intercepted
Conversation at 10:09 Hours, in which Colonel Beara stated to Luki} that “400 Balijas have shown up in
Konjevi} Polje”, and to “shove them all on the playground”. In light of the evidence, the Trial Chamber
understands the term “playground” to mean the soccer field at Nova Kasaba.
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645.
According to Richard Butler, the Bosnian Serb military leadership assessed that one third of
the column was armed,1858 but it underestimated the size and the potential threat of this column.1859
Therefore, on 15 and 16 July 1995, additional reinforcements were rushed to the Zvornik battlefield
area.1860 Nevertheless, on 16 July 1995, in accordance with a decision made by Colonel Pandurevi},
the Zvornik Brigade declared a cease-fire for 24 hours and allowed approximately 5,000 men from
the column to pass through the VRS lines into Bosnian-Muslim held territory.1861
646.
The 2nd [ekovi}i Detachment,1862 which formed part of the MUP and was under the
command of Borovčanin,1863 as well as the 1st Special Police Units (“PJP”)1864 and the 65th
Protection Regiment, under the command of Major Zoran Malini},1865 were deployed along
Bratunac-Konjevi} Polje road. 1866
647.
The VRS and the RS Police Units stole and used UN equipment,1867 which may have caused
men from the column to believe they were putting themselves into the custody of the UN when they
were, in fact, surrendering to the Bosnian Serbs.1868
1857
1858
1859
1860
1861
1862
1863
1864
1865
1866
1867
1868
Ex. P2512, Momir Nikoli} Statement of Facts and Acceptance of Responsibility, 6 May 2003, paras 7, 9.
According to an intercepted communication on 13 July 1995 at 17:30 hours between two unidentified
individuals, “there [were] about 6,000 of them”; the participants further referred to the fact that there were three
checkpoints along the road and that at each checkpoint, there were about 1,500 to 2,000 Muslim prisoners. The
three references to checkpoints were: 1) “to the stadium” at Nova Kasaba, 2) “up there where the checkpoint at
the intersection is”, and 3) “halfway between the checkpoint and the loading place”, Ex. P256, Notes of
Intercepted Conversation at 17:30 Hours. See also Richard Butler, T. 6636.
Richard Butler, T. 6552.
Richard Butler, T. 6551. On 14 July 1995, the armed portion of the column broke through the VRS line around
Snagovo, Richard Butler, T. 6643; Ex. P266, Notes of Intercepted Conversation at 21:02 Hours.
Richard Butler, T. 6726.
Richard Butler, T. 6552, 6624-6625, 6630, 6724. See also Ex. P2404, Interim Combat Report of the 1st Zvornik
Brigade to the Command of the Drina Corps, 16 July 1995, in which Pandurevi} informed the Drina Corps
Command about his decision.
Ex. P2401, Video, July 1995 at 01:45, showing two members of the 2nd [ekovi}i Detachment at the Sandi}i
meadow. See also Richard Butler, T. 6612-6613, 6618; Ex. P2401, Video, July 1995 at 02:34; Ex. P2512, Momir
Nikoli} Statement of Facts and Acceptance of Responsibility, 6 May 2003, para. 9, referring to the presence of
MUP forces along the road.
Richard Butler, T. 6612. Borovčanin himself was spotted at the area of the road, Ex. P2401, Video, July 1995 at
12:35, Richard Butler, T. 6619. See also Ex. P2512, Momir Nikoli} Statement of Facts and Acceptance of
Responsibility, 6 May 2003, para. 9.
Richard Butler, T. 6613. Ex. P2512, Momir Nikoli} Statement of Facts and Acceptance of Responsibility,
6 May 2003, para. 9.
Richard Butler, T. 6638-6639, testifying that this unit was active in combat against the column between
Konjevi} Polje and Nova Kasaba, as well as in capturing prisoners and holding them at the soccer field at Nova
Kasaba.
Richard Butler, T. 6620.
Richard Butler, T. 6620; Ex. P2401, Video, at 2.50, 17.5.
Ibid.
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7. Detention and Killings of Bosnian Muslim Men
(a) General
648.
The parties agreed that over a seven-day period from 12 July 1995 until approximately 19
July 1995, VRS and MUP forces participated in a planned and organised mass execution and burial
of thousands of captured Bosnian Muslim men from the Srebrenica enclave. This organised killing
operation occurred in several different locations in and around Srebrenica, Bratunac and
Zvornik.1869 Some Bosnian Muslim men were killed individually or in small groups by the soldiers
who captured them and others were killed where they were temporarily detained.1870 As will be
analysed further below, the victims’ bodies were buried in several areas, some of them close to the
execution sites.
649.
Between August 1995 and October 1995, the VRS reburied many victims of the mass
executions in remote secondary locations to hide the evidence.1871 This reburial operation was
ordered by the VRS Main Staff, directed by Colonel Beara, Chief of Security of the Main Staff, and
Lieutenant Colonel Popovi}, Assistant Commander for Security of the Drina Corps.1872 On the
ground, the operation was carried out by the Bratunac and Zvornik Brigades.1873
650.
Within the Bratunac Brigade, Momir Nikoli}, the Chief of Security and Intelligence, was
tasked with organising the operation;1874 while within the Zvornik Brigade, Assistant Commander
for Security Drago Nikoli}, was in charge of the reburials.1875 The VRS Main Staff provided fuel to
the Zvornik Brigade for the reburial operation and allocated the task of maintaining the records of
fuel distribution to Captain Milorad Trbi}, security officer in the Zvornik Brigade.1876
1869
1870
1871
1872
1873
1874
1875
1876
Srebrenica Agreed Facts, 14. See also Ex. P259, Intercepted Conversation at 09:50 Hours, in which Obrenović
told Krstić that a few more Muslim people were captured, and he responded with “kill them all”.
Srebrenica Agreed Facts, 15.
Srebrenica Agreed Facts, 2; Srebrenica Adjudicated Facts, 83; Richard Butler, T. 6656-6659. See Ex. P2410,
Order of Ratko Mladi} Approving Issuing Fuel for Engineering Works in the ZoR of the Drina Corps,
14 September 1995. See also Ex. P2411, Order of the Logistics Sector of the VRS Main Staff to Issue Fuel to the
Drina Corps Command, 14 September 1995.
Srebrenica Adjudicated Facts, 84, 89, 104; Momir Nikolić, T. 7834.
Srebrenica Adjudicated Facts, 85. See also Ex. P2512, Momir Nikoli} Statement of Facts and Acceptance of
Responsibility, 6 May 2003, para. 13.
Srebrenica Adjudicated Facts, 86.
Srebrenica Adjudicated Facts, 87.
Srebrenica Adjudicated Facts, 88.
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(b) Number of Missing Persons
651.
Helge Brunborg, a demographer and expert witness, testified about the total number of
missing persons involved with the fall of the enclave of Srebrenica.1877 According to Brunborg, as
of 21 November 2005, approximately 7,661 people were identified as missing based on reports
from family members.1878 Brunborg noted, however, that some were never reported by their
relatives as missing, in some cases because the whole family was killed.1879 It follows that the total
number of missing people is probably higher.1880 Based on DNA analysis, 2,694 persons were
found and identified in mass graves in the area of Srebrenica.1881 Brunborg removed 103 people
from this list due to uncertainty as to the date they went missing.1882 Ultimately, Brunborg
concluded that there were 2,591 victims out of the total 7,661 people considered missing.1883 The
Trial Chamber finds Brunborg’s conclusions regarding the number of missing people associated
with the events in Srebrenica to be reliable.
652.
The Trial Chamber will now turn to discuss the detention and killing of Bosnian Muslim
men as charged in the Indictment.
8. Potočari Area (12–17 July 1995)
(a) “Opportunistic” Killings near the UN Compound
653.
The parties agreed that the bodies of nine men were discovered on 12 July 1995 in Budak, in
a field near the river, on the west side of the main road, about 500 metres from the UN
Compound.1884 The parties further agreed that on the morning of the same day, an additional nine or
ten male corpses were found approximately seven hundred meters from the UN Compound. The
1877
1878
1879
1880
1881
1882
1883
1884
Helge Brunborg, T. 2524-2525. See also Ex. P404, Report of Helge Brunborg and Henrik Urdal on the Number
of Missing and Dead from Srebrenica, 12 February 2000. Brunborg used the following sources for his expert
report: the ICRC database of missing persons on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Ante Mortem
database of Physicians for Human Rights, the 1991 census conducted in the former Yugoslavia, and the Voters’
Registers for BiH for 1997 and 1998 prepared by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe,
Helge Brunborg, T. 2526-2527. According to Brunbrog, the 1991 census was primarily a “de jure” census, i.e.
that it included people who were temporarily absent from the region in 1991, Helge Brunborg, T. 2526-2527,
254l.
Helge Brunborg, T. 2540.
Helge Brunborg, T. 2563-2564.
Ex. P404, Report of Helge Brunborg and Henrik Urdal on the Number of Missing and Dead from Srebrenica,
12 February 2000, pp 7-8.
Helge Brunborg, T. 2541-2542, 2573. See also Ex. P406, Addendum on the Number of Missing and Dead from
Srebrenica, 12 April 2003.
Helge Brunborg, T. 2545, 2562-2563. See also Ex. P409, Report by Helge Brunborg, 16 November 2005, p. 2.
Helge Brunborg, T. 2545, 2562-2564. See also Ex. P409, Report by Helge Brunborg, 16 November 2005, p. 6.
Srebrenica Agreed Facts, 4.
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bodies were located behind the “White House” in the vicinity of an electrical station near a
creek.1885
654.
The parties agreed that on 13 July 1995, the bodies of six Bosnian Muslim women and five
Bosnian Muslim men were found in a stream near the Express Bus Company Compound in
Potočari.1886 The same day, one Bosnian Muslim man was taken behind a building near the “White
House” and summarily executed.1887
655.
The Trial Chamber recalls that members of the VRS and MUP were in Poto~ari between 12
and 13 July 1995 and carried out the separation of men from the women, children and elderly.1888
The men were put inside a building called the “White House” before being transported to
Bratunac.1889 There is evidence that on 12 July 1995, VRS soldiers separated Bosnian Muslim men
from the group in Potočari and they were never seen again.1890 Shots and screams were also heard
during the night of 12 July 1995.1891 In light of the overall evidence, the Trial Chamber is satisfied
beyond a reasonable doubt that VRS and/or MUP forces carried out killings of Bosnian Muslims
near the UN Compound, in the area of Budak and near the “White House” building.
(b) Mass Execution near the Cinkara Zinc Factory
656.
Witness MP-443, a Bosnian Muslim man, testified that on 12 July 1995, he watched the
execution of approximately 80 to 100 Bosnian Muslim men, by decapitation, in the open area
between the Cinkara Zinc factory and “Alija’s House”.1892
657.
MP-443 testified that on 11 July 1995, he fled to Potočari when his village was attacked by,
what he described as, “Chetniks”.1893 He spent the first night together with his family and
“thousands of people” in the Cinkara Zinc factory. The following day, 12 July 1995, the situation
appeared to be calmer and people, including the witness, came out of the factory and went into the
woods above Cinkara.1894 At some point, the witness saw “Chetnik” soldiers in military camouflage
uniform approaching.1895 Many of the refugees fled to Cinkara and were followed by the
1885
1886
1887
1888
1889
1890
1891
1892
1893
1894
1895
Srebrenica Agreed Facts, 5.
Srebrenica Agreed Facts, 6.
Srebrenica Agreed Facts, 7.
Ex. P383, Transcript of Eelco Koster from Prosecutor v. Karad`i} and Mladi} Rule 61 Hearing, T. 40-41; Eelco
Koster, T. 2307, Ex. P387, Video Clip; Ex. P384, Transcript of Eelco Koster from Prosecutor v. Popovi} et al.,
T. 3104. See supra paras 628-631, 633.
Eelco Koster, T. 2310; Richard Butler, T. 6605-6609.
Ex. P429 (under seal), T. 994.
Ex. P429 (under seal), T. 995.
MP-443, T. 8877-8878. See Indictment, Schedule D, para. 3.1.
MP-443, T. 8870.
MP-443, T. 8871.
MP-443, T. 8871-8872.
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soldiers.1896 MP-433, and another individual by the name of Džemal Karić, hid in a shed by “Alija’s
House”.1897
658.
From “Alija’s House”, MP-443 observed a group of seven to nine soldiers1898 put planks
together to resemble what he described as a “raft” in the compound between the Cinkara zinc
factory and “Alija’s House”.1899 The soldiers brought a group of four to seven people out of the
factory to the raft.1900 The soldiers forced their heads onto the raft and cut them off with axes.1901
MP-443 counted the bodies as this was happening and arrived at a total of 83 people.1902 The
soldiers then piled the dead bodies onto a truck and covered them with hay.1903 According to MP443, two additional groups of people were taken out of the factory and executed after he and Kari}
stopped counting. MP-443 further stated that all the victims were civilians.1904 The execution
apparently came to an end when an officer arrived and admonished the soldiers for what they were
doing.1905
659.
MP-443 described the soldiers as wearing “multicolour” camouflage military uniforms, and
that they were clean-shaven and belonged to the “Serbian” army.1906 He further testified that: “I
don’t know whether they were from Bosnia or Serbia. I didn’t come close to them…I didn’t know
where they had come from. I didn’t come close to them, I couldn’t tell”.1907
660.
In its Final Brief, the Defence argues that the Prosecution has failed to prove the allegation
in paragraph 3.1 of Schedule D of the Indictment. The Defence submits that none of the forensic
investigation and pathology reports related to sites in Srebrenica tendered by the Prosecution refer
to decapitated heads or bodies and, therefore, that the testimony of MP-443 in this regard is not
corroborated.1908
661.
The Trial Chamber does not find that the fact that the forensic reports in evidence fail to
mention decapitations at Srebrenica grave sites adversely affects this aspect of MP-443’s testimony.
The evidence of a single witness on a material fact does not, as a matter of law, require
1896
1897
1898
1899
1900
1901
1902
1903
1904
1905
1906
1907
MP-443, T. 8872.
MP-443, T. 8872, 8874, 8883-8884; Ex. P2687 (under seal).
MP-443, T. 8874.
MP-443, T. 8874, 8877.
MP-443, T. 8872, 8874, 8876-8878.
MP-443, T. 8874, 8876-8877.
MP-443, T. 8872. It is unclear exactly how the counting process worked. Apparently, the individual who was
with the witness was noting on a pack of cigarettes how many people were in each of the groups the soldiers
drove out of the factory to the execution point, MP-443, T. 8874-8876, 8878.
MP-443, T. 8874.
MP-443, T. 8877.
MP-443, T. 8878-8879. This was not witnessed by MP-443 directly, but he was told by his brother-in-law who
was part of the last group of civilians brought to the execution point, MP-443, T. 8879.
MP-443, T. 8873.
Ibid.
202
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corroboration.1909 However, the Trial Chamber has carefully analysed such evidence before relying
upon it to a decisive extent. The Trial Chamber finds that there is sufficient evidence to establish
beyond a reasonable doubt that on 12 July 1995, at least 83 Bosnian Muslims were decapitated and
executed by a group of soldiers between the Cinkara Zinc factory and Alija’s House. However,
based on MP-443’s testimony which referred generally to “Chetnik” soldiers, as well as further
evidence that paramilitary forces were in the area at this time,1910 the Trial Chamber cannot
conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that this group of soldiers were members of the VRS or the
MUP.
9. Bratunac Area (12-15 July 1995)
(a) General
662.
On 12 and 13 July 1995, a large number of buses and trucks with detained Bosnian Muslims
from several areas, including Poto~ari and Konjevi} Polje, arrived in Bratunac.1911 This included
men detained by the VRS at Poto~ari and along the Bratunac-Kravica-Konjevi} Polje road.1912 The
buses parked in the very centre of the town and the detained men were transferred to a stadium, a
hangar and the Vuk Karad`i} school.1913 Once they were full, the rest of the detainees remained on
the buses parked outside of these locations.1914
663.
The Vuk Karadžić School and the various surrounding buildings were secured by several
units of the VRS and the MUP, as well as members of paramilitary formations.1915
(b) Meetings in Bratunac on 13 July 1995 Discussing the Execution of Prisoners
664.
On 13 July 1995, Dragomir Vasi}, Head of the Public Security Centre in Zvornik, met with
Miodrag Josipovi}, the Chief of the Bratunac Police, at the Bratunac police station. Josipovi}
1908
1909
1910
1911
1912
1913
1914
Defence Final Brief, para. 583.
See Tadi} Appeal Judgement, para. 65; Aleksovski Appeal Judgement, para. 62.
See Srebrenica Adjudicated Facts, 28, referring to the presence of paramilitary forces at the Vuk Karad‘i}
School and surrounding areas.
Ex. P80, Witness Statement of Miroslav Deronji}, 25 November 2003, para. 204; Ex. P2246, Expert Report of
Richard Butler “Srebrenica Military Narrative (Revised) – Operation Krivaja 95”, p. 52. According to Deronji},
thousands of captured Muslims were brought into Bratunac from all areas, even from Mili}i, Ex. P80, Witness
Statement of Miroslav Deronji}, 25 November 2003, para. 205.
Ex. P2511, Transcript of Momir Nikoli} from Prosecutor v. Popovi} et al., 21 April 2009, T. 32928. The
Bosnian Muslim men who had been separated from the women, children and the elderly in Potocari (numbering
approximately 1,000) were transported to Bratunac and subsequently joined by Bosnian Muslim men captured
from the column, Srebrenica Agreed Facts, 8.
Ex. P80, Witness Statement of Miroslav Deronji}, 25 November 2003, para. 204.
Ex. P2246, Expert Report of Richard Butler “Srebrenica Military Narrative (Revised) – Operation Krivaja 95”,
p. 65.
203
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6 September 2011
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informed Vasi} that a large group of Bosnian Muslims had surrendered to the VRS on the BratunacKonjevi} Polje road and had been brought to Bratunac.1916 Josipovi} further informed Vasi} that the
VRS command had ordered that prisoners be put in the school, in the stadium and on buses.1917
Josipovi} noted that there was a problem in guarding these prisoners and as such, they had
assembled all men fit for military service in Bratunac to assist in securing prisoners.1918
665.
Miroslav Deronji} stated that on the evening of 13 July 1995, Ljubiša Beara appeared in his
office, accompanied by several soldiers.1919 Beara stated something to the effect that he had come
because of the captured Bosnian Muslims, and that they should all be killed.1920 This evidence is
corroborated by Momir Nikoli} and Dragomir Vasi}.1921 In fact, Vasi} testified that Beara informed
him that he had received an order from Mladi}, stating that all of the Bosnian Muslim prisoners
should be killed.1922 Nikolić also testified that when he asked Mladi} on 13 July 1995 about the fate
of the captured Bosnian Muslims, Mladić drew his hand across his chest in a gesture that Nikolić
understood to mean that they should be killed.1923
666.
Momir Nikolić also testified about the same meeting in Deronji}’s office. He explained that
on the evening of 13 July 1995, he accompanied Beara to the SDS party offices in Bratunac where
Deronjić’s office was located.1924 Nikoli} waited in one office while Deronji}, Beara and Vasi}
spoke in another.1925
667.
The Trial Chamber notes that it has exercised caution in attributing weight to Miroslav
Deronji}’s evidence on this point because of Rule 92 quater procedures.1926 By the same token, the
1915
1916
1917
1918
1919
1920
1921
1922
1923
1924
1925
1926
Srebrenica Adjudicated Facts, 28-29. Deronji} stated further that a large number of young and older men, who
had been mobilised during the night, were given rifles and told to guard the buses, Ex. P80, Witness Statement
of Miroslav Deronji}, 25 November 2003, para. 204.
Dragomir Vasi}, T. 6478.
Dragomir Vasi}, T. 6479. See also Ex. P2512, Momir Nikoli} Statement of Facts and Acceptance of
Responsibility, 6 May 2003, para. 10.
Dragomir Vasi}, T. 6479.
Ex. P80, Witness Statement of Miroslav Deronji}, 25 November 2003, para. 208; Ex. P82, Transcript of
Miroslav Deronji} from Prosecutor v. S. Milo{evi}, T. 29795-29796; Ex. P83, Transcript of Miroslav Deronji}
from Prosecutor v. Krstić (Appeal), T. 119.
Ex. P80, Witness Statement of Miroslav Deronji}, 25 November 2003, para. 209; Ex. P81, Transcript of
Miroslav Deronji} from Prosecutor v. S. Milo{evi}, T. 29705; Ex. P83, Transcript of Miroslav Deronji} from
Prosecutor v. Krstić (Appeal), T. 119.
Dragomir Vasi}, T. 6481-6482; Ex. P2511, Transcript of Momir Nikoli} from Prosecutor v. Popovi} et al.,
22 April 2009, T. 32933-32934; Ex. P2512, Momir Nikoli} Statement of Facts and Acceptance of
Responsibility, 6 May 2003, para. 10.
Dragomir Vasi}, T. 6481-6482.
Ex. P2511, Transcript of Momir Nikoli} from Prosecutor v. Popovi} et al., 21 April 2009, T. 32933-32934.
Ex. P2511, Transcript of Momir Nikoli} from Prosecutor v. Popovi} et al., 21 April 2009 T. 32939-32942;
Ex. P2512, Momir Nikoli} Statement of Facts and Acceptance of Responsibility, 6 May 2003, para. 10.
Ex. P2511, Transcript of Momir Nikoli} from Prosecutor v. Popovi} et al., 21 April 2009, T. 32939-32942.
The Trial Chamber notes that in its decision pursuant to Rule 92 quater, it admitted Deronji}’s evidence based,
inter alia, on the fact that the Prosecution planned to bring other viva voce and Rule 92 ter witnesses to testify on
the same matters as Deronji} and thus, his evidence would be corroborated. Taking a number of factors into
account, the Trial Chamber found Deronji}’s evidence to be reliable, relevant and of probative value, Decision
204
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Trial Chamber has adopted a very prudent approach to the evidence of Momir Nikoli} and
Dragomir Vasi} because of their involvement in the events in Srebrenica. However, unlike with
Deronji}, the Trial Chamber had the benefit of hearing the testimony of Nikoli} and Vasi}. The
evidence given by these three witnesses is mutually corroborative. Therefore, the Trial Chamber
finds the evidence regarding the involvement of Mladi} and Beara in deciding to kill the Bosnian
Muslim prisoners in Bratunac to be credible and reliable.
(c) Vuk Karad`i} School
668.
The parties agreed that between 12 and 14 July 1995, more than 50 Bosnian Muslim men
were summarily executed in and around the Vuk Karad`i} School.1927 The parties agreed that
between 13 and 15 July 1995, a number of men were taken from the Vuk Karad`i} School and
murdered,1928 and furthermore, that one mentally retarded Bosnian Muslim man, who was detained
in a bus parked in front of the Vuk Karad`i} School, was taken off the bus and executed on 13 July
1995.1929
669.
MP-294, a detainee at the Vuk Karad`i} School on 13 July 1995, testified about the events
that took place there on 13 July 1995. He observed a Bosnian Muslim man being beaten with a rifle,
after which he was taken away and executed.1930 MP-294 also observed Bosnian Muslim men being
removed from the school and heard crying outside, followed by gun shots.1931
670.
The parties agreed that VRS and/or MUP forces planned organised killing operations in
several different locations, including in Bratunac.1932 Based on the foregoing evidence and
considering that members of the VRS and MUP were among those guarding the Bosnian Muslims
in the Bratunac area, the Trial Chamber finds beyond a reasonable doubt that members of the VRS
and/or MUP participated in the detention and the summary execution of Bosnian Muslim men
detained in and around Vuk Karad`i} School.1933
1927
1928
1929
1930
1931
1932
1933
on Prosecution Motions for Admission of Evidence Pursuant to Rule 92 quater, 10 October 2008, (confidential)
paras 47-53.
Srebrenica Agreed Facts, 10.
Srebrenica Agreed Facts, 12.
Srebrenica Agreed Facts, 11.
MP-294, T. 9060-9061.
Ibid.
Srebrenica Agreed Facts, 14.
See Indictment, Schedule D, paras 2, 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 2.4.
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(d) Jadar River (13 July 1995)
671.
In relation to this incident,1934 the Trial Chamber notes that no evidence was led as to the
alleged killing of Bosnian Muslim men on the bank of the Jadar River. Moreover, in its Final Trial
Brief, the Prosecution submits that it did not present evidence on this incident and therefore, no
longer relies on it.1935 Consequently, the Trial Chamber makes no finding in connection with this
incident.
(e) Cerska Valley (13 July 1995)
672.
The parties agreed that in the early afternoon on 13 July 1995, VRS and/or MUP forces
transported approximately 150 Bosnian Muslim men to an area along a dirt road in the Cerska
Valley, about three kilometres from Konjević Polje.1936 There, they summarily executed the
Bosnian Muslim men and, using heavy equipment, covered them with dirt.1937 Intercepted VRS
communications further show that a VRS officer requested a bulldozer or backhoe to be sent to
Konjevi} Polje.1938
673.
Forensic analysis was conducted at the Cerska mass grave, concluding that it contained the
remains of 150 males, ranging in age from 14 to 50 years old; 147 of them were dressed in civilian
clothes.1939 Based on the autopsy results, 149 of the 150 victims died of gunshot wounds.1940
674.
The Trial Chamber is satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that on 13 July 1995, VRS and/or
MUP members executed about 150 Bosnian Muslim men in an area along a dirt road in the Cerska
Valley, and subsequently buried them in a mass grave.1941
(f) Nova Kasaba (13 July 1995)
675.
A group of prisoners captured along the Bratunac-Konjevi} Polje road on 13 July 1995 was
assembled at a football field at Nova Kasaba, approximately five kilometres south of Konjevi}
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939
1940
1941
See Indictment, Schedule D, para. 3.2.
Prosecution Final Brief, para. 418.
Srebrenica Agreed Facts, 16.
Ibid.
Ex. P2246, Expert Report of Richard Butler “Srebrenica Military Narrative (Revised) – Operation Krivaja 95”,
p. 59; Ex. P284, Intercepted Conversation at 13:55 Hours; Ex. P281, Intercepted Conversation at 15:53 Hours,
showing that Colonel Milanovi} Polje was looking for a bulldozer and excavator and asked to send them to
Konjevi} Polje.
Ex. P2651, Expert Report of William Haglund on Forensic Investigation of the Cerska Grave Site - Volume I,
15 June 1998, pp 8-9. Twenty-four of the victims were between 13 and 24 years old, while 126 victims were
25 years or older, Ex. P2633, Expert Report of Jose Pablo Baraybar on the Anthropology Examination of Human
Remains from Eastern Bosnia in 2000, 2 February 2001, p. 5.
Ex. P2651, Expert Report of William Haglund on Forensic Investigation of the Cerska Grave Site - Volume I,
15 June 1998, p. 10.
See Indictment, Schedule D, para. 3.3.
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Polje. They were guarded by soldiers of the Military Police Battalion of the VRS 65th Protection
Regiment.1942
676.
The Trial Chamber also received evidence that at a meeting in Pale on 14 July 1995,
Deronji} provided Karad`i} with his estimates of the number of men captured in Bratunac, as well
as further information regarding his knowledge of “the killings in the school” and “other
liquidations”1943 on “the Konjevi} Polje – Kasaba road”.1944 In particular, Deronji} stated that he
observed a large number of Bosnian Muslims in Kasaba.1945
677.
The Trial Chamber notes that Deronji}’s evidence with respect to these killings is
corroborated by the exhumation and forensic analysis of 33 bodies found in this area. Specifically,
on 27 July 1995, the United States Government took an aerial photograph of an area near Nova
Kasaba, which showed the presence of disturbed earth in four distinct locations. Four undisturbed
graves in the Nova Kasaba area were exhumed in July 1996. The graves, located in two fields,
contained the bodies of 33 male victims. Twenty-seven of the men had their hands tied behind their
backs.1946
678.
In light of the foregoing, the Trial Chamber is satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the
33 Bosnian Muslim male victims found in the primary graves discovered in 1996 were part of the
group of prisoners assembled at the football field at Nova Kasaba. The Trial Chamber is also
satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that they were killed by VRS and/or MUP personnel on 13 July
1995.
(g) Glogova (17–27 July 1995)
679.
The parties agreed that in the year 2000, the bodies of 12 men were found in the “Glogova
L” grave and that the victims had been tied together and shot.1947 However, the Trial Chamber notes
1942
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
Ex. P2246, Expert Report of Richard Butler “Srebrenica Military Narrative (Revised) – Operation Krivaja 95”,
1 November 2000, p. 54; Ex. P273, Intercepted Conversation at 16:02 Hours, referring to a communication
between unidentified parties “X” and “Y”. In the conversation, the two unidentified parties claim that 1500
Muslim males were gathered on the Nova Kasaba football field, where “Malini}’s unit is”. Butler explained that
Major Zoran Malini} was the Commander of the Military Police Battalion of the 65th Protection Regiment at the
time, Richard Butler, T. 6638.
Miroslav Deronji} states that by using the term “liquidate” or “liquidation”, he means “kill” or “killing”,
Ex. P80, Witness Statement of Miroslav Deronji}, 25 November 2003, para. 201.
Ex. P80, Witness Statement of Miroslav Deronji}, 25 November 2003, para. 214.
Ex. P80, Witness Statement of Miroslav Deronji}, 25 November 2003, para. 214; Ex. P83, Transcript of
Miroslav Deronji} from Prosecutor v. Krstić (Appeal), T. 125.
Srebrenica Agreed Facts, 27.
Srebrenica Agreed Facts, 28.
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that no evidence was presented in the case with respect to this incident. Therefore, the Trial
Chamber makes no finding in relation to this incident.1948
(h) Kravica Market (13–14 July 1995)
680.
From the group of prisoners assembled at Nova Kasaba, a group of Bosnian Muslim men
were placed on a large truck on 13 July 1995 and transported to Kravica along the main road
between Konjevi} Polje and Bratunac.1949 The parties agreed that in Kravica, trucks stopped at a
supermarket on 13 July 1995, and that later, the soldiers guarding the truck started mistreating the
detainees inside, hitting them through the canvas of the truck. 1950
681.
Richard Butler noted that the area in and around the municipality of Bratunac was under the
zone of operation of the Bratunac Brigade.1951 There was a significant MUP presence in the
municipality, and particularly along the Bratunac-Sandići road to Konjevi} Polje.1952
682.
In the Indictment, the Prosecution alleges that executions were perpetrated by the VRS
and/or MUP personnel at Kravica Market.1953 The Trial Chamber finds beyond a reasonable doubt
that members of the VRS and/or MUP were responsible for the mistreatment of Bosnian Muslim
detainees in Kravica Market on 13 and 14 July 1995. However, the Trial Chamber notes that no
evidence was presented as to the fate of the Bosnian Muslim detainees at Kravica Market.
Therefore, the Trial Chamber cannot find beyond a reasonable doubt that the detainees were
executed by VRS and/or MUP personnel at Kravica Market on 13 and 14 July 1995.
(i) Kravica Warehouse (13 July 1995)
683.
On 13 July 1995, the Bosnian Muslim men captured from the column and assembled at the
Sandi}i meadow were brought to a large warehouse in the village of Kravica (“Kravica
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
See Indictment, Schedule D, para. 4.2.
Ex. P2246, Expert Report of Richard Butler “Srebrenica Military Narrative (Revised) – Operation Krivaja 95”,
p. 54.
Srebrenica Agreed Facts, 29.
Ex. P2246, Expert Report of Richard Butler “Srebrenica Military Narrative (Revised) – Operation Krivaja 95”,
1 November 200, pp 54, 56.
Ex. P2246, Expert Report of Richard Butler “Srebrenica Military Narrative (Revised) – Operation Krivaja 95”,
1 November 2000, pp 54, 56. As explained by Butler, the presence of police units along the Bratunac-Konjevi}
Polje road 1995 is also detailed by reports of the CJB Chief Dragomir Vasi} to the RS MUP as well as by reports
of the Main Staff Commands, Ex. P2246, Expert Report of Richard Butler “Srebrenica Military Narrative
(Revised) – Operation Krivaja 95”, 1 November 2000, pp 56-57. See also Ex. P2512, Momir Nikoli} Statement
of Facts and Acceptance of Responsibility, 6 May 2003, para. 9; Ex. P2517, Transcript of Momir Nikoli} from
Prosecutor v. Popovi} et al., 22 April 2009, T. 32979, in which he testified that MUP forces were deployed
along the Bratunac-Konjevi} Polje road.
See Indictment, Schedule D, para. 4.3.
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warehouse”).1954 Members of the MUP were responsible for transporting the prisoners.1955 The
executions at the Kravica warehouse complex started around 17:00 hours.1956 The soldiers used
automatic weapons, hand grenades and other weaponry to kill the Bosnian Muslims detained inside
the warehouse.1957 Over 1,000 Bosnian Muslim men were summarily executed.1958 Between 14 and
16 July 1995, several trucks arrived and removed the victims’ bodies and placed them in two large
mass graves in nearby villages, Glogova and Ravnice.1959 Elements of the Bratunac Brigade, as well
as members of the Engineering Company of the Zvornik Brigade, participated in the burial of the
victims.1960
684.
Moreover, Miroslav Deronji} received a report that a large number of Bosnian Muslims had
been killed in an agricultural cooperative in Kravica.1961 The Trial Chamber notes that the evidence
given by Miroslav Deronji} on these killings is corroborated further by expert forensic reports
based on exhumations of the burial sites, as follows.
685.
Exhumations and forensic analysis were conducted both in Glogova and Ravnice. Glogova
was found to be a complex of burial sites.1962 In 1999, bodies were exhumed at five burial sites
(“Glogova 2 to Glogova 6”); another burial site was exhumed in 2000 (“Glogova 1”); and finally,
an additional three were exhumed in 2001 (“Glogova 7 to Glogova 9”).1963 A secondary grave was
found in Zeleni Jadar, a region south of Srebrenica, possibly containing at least some victims from
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
Richard Butler, T. 6621; Ex. P2246, Expert Report of Richard Butler “Srebrenica Military Narrative (Revised) –
Operation Krivaja 95”, 1 November 2000, pp 59-60.
Richard Butler, T. 6621.
Ex. P2246, Expert Report of Richard Butler “Srebrenica Military Narrative (Revised) – Operation Krivaja 95”,
1 November 2000, p. 60.
Srebrenica Agreed Facts, 17.
Srebrenica Agreed Facts, 17. See also Ex. P2402, Video, July 1995, at 02:56, showing part of the execution.
Srebrenica Agreed Facts, 17. See also Ex. P80, Witness Statement of Miroslav Deronji}, 25 November 2003,
para. 228.
Srebrenica Adjudicated Facts, 45-46.
Ex. P80, Witness Statement of Miroslav Deronji}, 25 November 2003, paras 202, 214; Ex. P81, Transcript of
Miroslav Deronji} from Prosecutor v. S. Milo{evi}, T. 29716.
Ex. P2641, Expert Pathology Reports of John Clark on 1999 Exhumations, 1999 p. 20; Ex. P2643, Expert Report
of John Clark on ICTY Operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina 2001 Season – Report of Chief Pathologist,
14 May 2003, p. 12.
Glogova 1 (which forensic expert, John Clark, divided into: “Grave C, E, F, H, K, and L”) contained 191 bodies
and 288 body parts and the victims were between 12 and 75 years old, with the majority being between 30 and
35 years old; all but two of the identified bodies were males. It was also established that they were not wearing
military clothing and almost a quarter of the victims showed signs of burning. In the Glogova 2 to Glogova 9
graves, 126 bodies and 197 body parts were recovered, and the victims were between 25 and 50 years old; all of
the identified bodies were male. It was also established that most of the victims had clear signs of burning. The
victims–to the extent it was possible to ascertain the cause of death–died as a result of gunshot or blast injuries.
As for Glagova Grave L, 12 men were found, tied together in pairs by ligatures around their wrists. All of them
had been killed by a single gunshot wound to the back or side of the head, Ex. P2643, Expert Report of John
Clark on ICTY Operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina 2001 Season – Report of Chief Pathologist, 14 May 2003,
pp 12-26. See also Srebrenica Agreed Facts, 28.
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the Glogova primary site.1964 In 2001, exhumations of secondary graves were conducted in
Visoko.1965
686.
Exhumations of secondary graves were conducted in Ravnice in 2000 and 2001.1966 Ravnice
was only a few kilometres away from the large grave at Glogova and differed from it in that the
bodies in the Glogova grave were not buried in the ground, but rather spread out on a steep, wooded
embankment running down to a stream below.1967
687.
In addition, forensic expert Richard Wright visited a suspected mass grave just west of the
main road at Konjevi} Polje and concluded that the evidence was consistent with there being a mass
grave at this site.1968 Wright also attended a site north of Srebrenica, east of a bus station in
Potočari, and examined the area with a backhoe.1969 He concluded that there had been a large hole
dug in this area and later refilled. Although there were no human remains present, he found small
patches of clay that had likely been in contact with putrefying flesh. Wright determined that
although the evidence recovered from the scene was consistent with the theory that this was a grave
that had been emptied and later refilled, it was not conclusive.1970
688.
The Trial Chamber finds that sufficient evidence was presented to establish beyond a
reasonable doubt that on 13 July 1995, over 1,000 Bosnian Muslim men were detained in a
warehouse in Kravica and summarily executed by VRS and/or MUP members with automatic
weapons, hand grenades and other weapons.1971 In addition, the Trial Chamber finds beyond a
reasonable doubt that the victims of the Kravica execution were buried in the Glogova and Ravnice
mass graves, and in a secondary mass grave in Zeleni Jadar.
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
Ex. P2643, Expert Report of John Clark on ICTY Operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina 2001 Season – Report of
Chief Pathologist, 14 May 2003, p. 23.
Ex. P2643, Expert Report of John Clark on ICTY Operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina 2001 Season – Report of
Chief Pathologist, 14 May 2003, pp 23-24. One hundred and one bodies and 355 body parts were recovered from
the secondary grave. The victims ranged in age from eight to 65 years old, and all but two of the victims were
male. The cause of death for the majority of the victims was gunshot or blast injuries and in several cases, there
was evidence of burning.
Ex. P2643, Expert Report of John Clark on ICTY Operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina 2001 Season – Report of
Chief Pathologist, 14 May 2003, pp 6-8. During the exhumation in Ravnice in 2000 and 2001, 175 bodies and
324 body parts were recovered of victims potentially ranging in age from eight to 90 years old; all but five of the
identifiable bodies were male. Most of the bodies (163 out of 175) showed evidence of gunshot wounds.
Ex. P2643, Expert Report of John Clark on ICTY Operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina 2001 Season – Report of
Chief Pathologist, 14 May 2003, p. 6.
Ex. P2673, Expert Report of Richard Wright on Excavations and Exhumations at Kozluk in 1999,
2 February 2000, p. 16.
Ex. P2673, Expert Report of Richard Wright on Excavations and Exhumations at Kozluk in 1999,
2 February 2000, p. 17.
Ibid.
See Indictment, Schedule D, para. 3.4.
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10. Zvornik Area
(a) Transfer from Bratunac to the Zvornik Municipality
689.
On the morning of 14 July 1995, Bosnian Muslim prisoners were transferred from Bratunac
to Zvornik by members of the Bratunac Brigade Military Police.1972 Momir Nikolić gave the
instructions to the Military Police to escort the buses to Zvornik.1973 The Zvornik Brigade was
aware of plans to transport Bosnian Muslim prisoners into its zone of responsibility.1974 According
to Momir Nikolic, at some point during the evening of 13 July 1995, Colonel Beara ordered him to
inform Drago Nikoli}, the Assistant Commander for Security of the VRS Zvornik Brigade, that he
should prepare for the reception and execution of captured Bosnian Muslim men in Zvornik.1975
690.
On 14 July 1995, Drago Nikolić informed Dragan Obrenović that he had been instructed by
Lieutenant Colonel Popović, Chief of Security of the Drina Corps, to prepare for the arrival of a
large number of prisoners who were being transferred from Bratunac to Zvornik to be executed.1976
Drago Nikolić said that this order came personally from General Mladić and that “everybody knew
about it, including [the] commander [of the Zvornik Brigade], Lieutenant Pandurević”.1977 The
order to execute would be implemented by Colonel Beara and Lieutenant Colonel Popović, with the
involvement of Drago Nikolić.1978 Drago Nikolić then asked Dragan Obrenović to place the
Zvornik Brigade Military Police at his disposal. After informing him that the Military Police were
already deployed, Dragan Obrenović told him he would “see what [he] could do” about at least
placing the Military Police commander and a platoon at Drago Nikolić’s disposal.1979
(b) Orahovac (14 July 1995)
691.
In the early afternoon on 14 July 1995, members of the Bratunac Brigade Military Police
participated in the transfer of hundreds of Bosnian Muslim males from Bratunac to the Grbavci
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
Srebrenica Adjudicated Facts, 30, 33; Srebrenica Agreed Facts, 13. Miroslav Deronji} also stated that when he
returned to Bratunac, he saw that numerous buses carrying captives had driven away. He was told that they had
been taken to Zvornik, Ex. P80, Witness Statement of Miroslav Deronji}, 25 November 2003, para. 216.
Srebrenica Adjudicated Facts, 31. Ex. P2512, Momir Nikoli} Statement of Facts and Acceptance of
Responsibility, 6 May 2003, para. 10.
Srebrenica Adjudicated Facts, 32.
Ex. P2512, Momir Nikoli} Statement of Facts and Acceptance of Responsibility, 6 May 2003, para. 10;
Ex. P2511, Transcript of Momir Nikoli} from Prosecutor v. Popovi} et al., 22 April 2009, T. 32937.
Srebrenica Adjudicated Facts, 34.
Srebrenica Adjudicated Facts, 35, 98.
Srebrenica Adjudicated Facts, 36.
Srebrenica Adjudicated Facts, 37.
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School in Orahovac.1980 These Bosnian Muslim men had been captured from the column of men
retreating from the Srebrenica enclave, or had been separated in Potočari.1981
692.
Soldiers from the Zvornik Brigade command and the 4th Battalion of the Zvornik Brigade
assisted in guarding the prisoners at the Grbavci School in Orahovac.1982 Members of the military
police company of the Zvornik Brigade were present immediately prior to the executions,
presumably to guard the prisoners and then facilitate their transfer to the execution fields.1983
693.
The parties agreed that on 14 July 1995, VRS personnel guarded and blindfolded the
Bosnian Muslim males detained at Grbavci School and transported them to a nearby field; there,
VRS personnel ordered the prisoners off the trucks and summarily executed them with automatic
weapons.1984 Members of the 4th Battalion, as well as members of the security organ of the Zvornik
Brigade, were also present at Orahovac during the executions.1985
694.
The parties agreed that approximately 1,000 Bosnian Muslim males were killed and that on
14 and 15 July 1995, VRS members of the Zvornik Brigade used heavy equipment to bury the
bodies in mass graves at the execution site, while the executions continued.1986 They used
machinery and equipment belonging to the Engineers Company of the Zvornik Brigade to bury the
bodies.1987
695.
On 15 July 1995, Beara contacted General Živanović1988 and General Krstić to request
assistance in the Zvornik Brigade area for “3,500 parcels” that he “ha[d] to distribute and [had] no
solution”.1989
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
Srebrenica Agreed Facts, 18; Srebrenica Adjudicated Facts, 47.
Richard Butler, T. 6638-6639; Srebrenica Agreed Facts, 18.
Srebrenica Adjudicated Facts, 48.
Srebrenica Adjudicated Facts, 49.
Srebrenica Agreed Facts, 18. See also Srebrenica Adjudicated Facts, 53.
Srebrenica Adjudicated Facts, 52-54.
Srebrenica Agreed Facts, 18; Srebrenica Adjudicated Facts, 52, 56. See also Ex. P266, Intercepted Conversation
at 21:02 Hours, wherein Major Dragan Jokić, the Duty Officer of the Zvornik Brigade and Chief of Engineering
for the Zvornik Brigade, reported to Beara that there are huge problems in the Zvornik area “with the people, I
mean, the parcel”. See also Ex. P2403, Interim Combat Report of the 1st Zvornik Brigade to the Command of the
Drina Corps, 15 July 1995, wherein Zvornik Brigade commander Colonel Pandurevi} complained to the Drina
Corps Command that: “₣ağn additional burden for us is the large number of prisoners distributed throughout
schools in the brigade area, as well as obligations of security and sanitary-technical measures in the field”,
referring to guarding the prisoners and burying those who had been executed.
Srebrenica Adjudicated Facts, 55. Dragan Jokić, who at the time functioned as duty officer, told Cvijetin
Ristanović, a member of the Zvornik Brigade Engineering Company, to go to Orahovac while the killings were
ongoing; this was done in the presence of Slavko Bogičević, Deputy Commander of the Engineering Company,
who subsequently instructed Ristanović as to the grave digging at Orahovac. Dragan Jokić knew that Ristanović
was sent to Orahovac specifically in order to dig mass graves for victims of the executions. Moreover, Jokić
provided assistance by telling Ristanović to take the excavator to Orahovac, Srebrenica Adjudicated Facts, 5758.
Ex. P271, Intercepted Conversation at 09:52 Hours; Ex. P272, Intercepted Conversation at 09:54 Hours. These
conversations showed that Beara was looking for General Živanović to assign men to assist with his task.
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696.
On 16 July 1995, Colonel Slobodan Čerovi}, Assistant Commander for Morale, Legal and
religious affairs for the Drina Corps, and Colonel Ljubiša Beara, Chief of Security of the VRS Main
Staff,1990 discussed the fact that “triage has to be done on the prisoners”.1991 Expert witness Butler
testified that the term “triage” in that context is associated with the execution of the prisoners.1992
697.
Deronji} also stated that it was “obvious to [him] that the Muslims who had been taken to
Zvornik had been killed”.1993 Based on these conversations, and in light of the general evidence
showing the presence of thousands of Bosnian Muslim prisoners in the Zvornik Brigade area,1994
the Trial Chamber is satisfied that Beara was referring to the execution of the Bosnian Muslim men
in Orahovac.
698.
The evidence before the Trial Chamber is corroborated by forensic evidence collected from
the mass grave sites at: Lažete (Lažete 1 and Lažete 2),1995 a location near Orahovac, and secondary
graves located along the Hodžici road (Hodžici Road 3, 4, 5).1996
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
Živanović replied that he “can’t order that anymore” and suggested that Beara contact General Krstić’s extension
385 at Zlatar. See also Ex. P264, Intercepted Conversation at 10:00 Hours; Ex. P268, Intercepted Conversation at
09:57 Hours.
See Ex. P258, Intercepted Conversation at 19:19 Hours; Ex. P264, Intercepted Conversation at 10:00 Hours;
Ex. P268, Notes of intercepted conversation at 09:57 Hours. In the telephone conversations, Beara asked General
Krstić to provide reinforcements (“30 men”) and to “give them back tonight”. See also Ex. P285, Intercepted
Conversation at 15:17, referring to a “parcel” to be distributed. The intercept also seems to refer to General
Popovi}, who is called “Pop”.
Richard Butler, T. 6649.
Ex. P269, Intercepted Conversation at 11:11 Hours, wherein Ljubiša Beara, Colonel Cerović and an unidentified
person discussed the “triage”.
Richard Butler, T. 6649.
At the request of a friend from Bratunac, Deronji} called one of the politicians in Zvornik, Jovan Mitrovi}, to
find out what happened to a certain man who had been reportedly taken to Zvornik and killed. “They” informed
Deronji} that it was too late and said something to the effect of: “Don’t ask us that, don’t ask me that, that’s
finished […]”, Ex. P80, Witness Statement of Miroslav Deronji}, 25 November 2003, para. 229.
See Ex. P2403, Interim Combat Report of the 1st Zvornik Brigade to the Command of the Drina Corps,
15 July 1995, referring to about 3,000 men in the Zvornik area. See also Richard Butler, T. 6647-6648; Ex.
P264, Intercepted Conversation at 10:00 Hours.
During the exhumation of Lažete 1, 129 bodies and 14 body parts were recovered. The victims were between the
ages of 15 to 85 years old and all were male. They were not wearing military clothing. Eighty-nine bodies had
blindfolds with clear bullet holes through them, showing that they were blindfolded when killed. A majority of
the bodies (48 out of 55) showed evidence of gunshot injury, primarily in the torso, followed by the legs, the
head and the arms, Ex. P2642, Expert Report of John Clark on ICTY Operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina 2000
Season – Report of Chief Pathologist, 24 February 2001, pp 7-10; Ex. P2671, Expert Report of Fredy Peccerelli
on Lažete 1 Bosnia and Herzegovina Excavation and Exhumation, pp 21-24. At the mass grave site at Lažete 2,
165 victims were found. A total of 104 victims (63%) were recovered with cloth blindfolds; the cause of death
was gunshot wounds, Ex. P2646, Expert Report of William Haglund on Forensic Investigation of the Lazete 2
Grave Site, Volume I, 15 June 1998, pp 10-11. See also Ex. P2642, Expert Pathology Reports of John Clark on
1999 Exhumations, pp 14-16.
Ex. P2674, Expert Report of Richard Wright on Exhumations in Eastern Bosnia in 1998, 12 May 1999, p. 23,
linking the secondary graves located at Hodžici road to Lažete 1 and 2; Ex. P2635, Expert Report of Jose Pablo
Baraybar, January 2004, pp 2, 7-8; Ex. P2631, Expert Report of Jose Pablo Baraybar on the Anthropology
Examination of Human Remains from Eastern Bosnia in 1999, 8 December 1999, pp 4, 8; Ex. P2671, Expert
Report of Fredy Peccerelli on Lazete 1 Bosnia and Herzegovina Excavation and Exhumation, p. 3; Ex. P2665,
Expert Report of Christopher Lawrence on Autopsies of Human Remains from Hodžici Road Site 3, October
1998, pp 2-3; Ex. P2666, Expert Report of Christopher Lawrence on Autopsies of Human Remains from Hodžici
213
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699.
The Trial Chamber is satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that on 14 July 1995, over 1,000
Bosnian Muslim men were detained in Grbavci School near Orahovac, and subsequently
blindfolded and transported to a nearby field, and later executed by VRS members. The Trial
Chamber further finds beyond a reasonable doubt that on 14 and 15 July 1995, members of the VRS
used heavy equipment to bury the bodies near the Lazete execution site. These remains were later
moved to secondary graves along Hodžici Road.1997
(c) Petkovci School and the Dam (14 July 1995)
700.
The parties agreed that on 14 July 1995, VRS and/or MUP personnel transported at least
1,000 Bosnian Muslim males from detention sites in and around Bratunac to the school at Petkovci.
These Bosnian Muslim men had been captured from the column of men retreating from the
Srebrenica enclave or separated in Potočari. On 14 July 1995, and in the early morning hours of 15
July 1995, VRS and/or MUP personnel struck, beat, assaulted and shot with automatic weapons
some of the Bosnian Muslim males detained at the school.1998
701.
The parties agreed that on or around the evening of 14 July 1995 and in the early morning
hours of 15 July 1995, VRS personnel from the 6th Infantry Battalion (Zvornik Brigade) transported
the remaining surviving members of the original group of 1,000 Bosnian Muslim males, from the
school at Petkovci, to an area below the Dam near Petkovci.1999 The men were then assembled
below the Dam and summarily executed by VRS and/or MUP soldiers with automatic weapons.2000
The parties further agreed that on the morning of 15 July 1995, VRS personnel used excavators and
other heavy equipment to bury the victims.2001 The Zvornik Brigade Engineer Company was
assigned to work with earthmoving equipment to assist with the burial of the victims from the
Petkovci Dam.2002
702.
From April to May 1998, an exhumation was conducted at the “Petkovci Dam” site.2003
Forensic evidence also linked five secondary mass graves along “Liplje Road” to the Petkovci Dam
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
Road Site 4, October 1998, p. 6; Ex. P2667, Expert Report of Christopher Lawrence on Autopsies of Human
Remains from Hodžici Road Site 5, October 1998, pp 2-3, 10.
See Indictment, Schedule D, para. 3.5.
Srebrenica Agreed Facts, 19.
Srebrenica Agreed Facts, 20. Drivers and trucks from the 6th Infantry Battalion of the Zvornik Brigade were used
to transport the prisoners from the detention site to the execution site at Petkovci Dam on 15 July 1995,
Srebrenica Adjudicated Facts, 63.
Srebrenica Agreed Facts, 20. See also Richard Butler, T. 6627, 6646.
Srebrenica Agreed Facts, 20.
Srebrenica Adjudicated Facts, 64.
Ex Ex. P2662, Expert Report of Christopher Lawrence on Autopsies of Human Remains from the Dam Site
June 1998, p. 3.
214
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site.2004 Autopsies were carried out in June 1998 on the remains; however, the bodies were largely
fragmented,2005 which is consistent with post-mortem tampering.2006 The grave at the Petkovci Dam
site contained the remains of at least 46 individuals, 15 of whom were identifiable as male.2007
Because of the separation of the body parts, the remains were collected in 91 body bags.2008 Some
of the remains showed evidence of binding, as well as possible blindfolding.2009
703.
Most of the bodies could not be reconstructed.2010 According to the exhumation report from
the site, the fact that 464 skull fragments and 211 shell casings were retrieved from the surface of
the grave is consistent with a number of individuals being shot in the head.2011 However, the
forensic experts could not determine the cause of death for 81 of the body bags, as they contained
incomplete or mixed skeletal remains. 2012
704.
The Trial Chamber is satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that on 14 July 1995, VRS and/or
MUP personnel transported at least 1,000 Bosnian Muslims from the detention sites in and around
Bratunac to the school in Petkovci, and that on 14 and 15 July 1995, some of those men were shot
with automatic weapons by VRS and/or MUP members.2013 The Trial Chamber further finds
beyond a reasonable doubt that between the evening of 14 July 1995 and the early morning on 15
July 1995, the remainder of the Bosnian Muslim men detained in the school were transported from
the Petkovci School to the nearby Dam and were executed by VRS and/or MUP personnel with
automatic weapons. The victims were then buried in mass graves near the Dam and later moved to
secondary graves.2014
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
Ex. P2674, Expert Report of Richard Wright on Exhumations in Eastern Bosnia in 1998, 12 May 1999, p. 20.
The Liplje 2 grave was about 14 kilometres from the Petkovci Dam site and contained the same type of rock
found at the primary grave.
Ex. P2662, Expert Report of Christopher Lawrence on Autopsies of Human Remains from the Dam Site
June 1998, pp 4, 8.
Ex. P2662, Expert Report of Christopher Lawrence on Autopsies of Human Remains from the Dam Site
June 1998, p. 22.
Ex. P2662, Expert Report of Christopher Lawrence on Autopsies of Human Remains from the Dam Site
June 1998, pp 8, 22.
Ibid.
Ex. P2662, Expert Report of Christopher Lawrence on Autopsies of Human Remains from the Dam Site
June 1998, p. 20.
Ex. P2662, Expert Report of Christopher Lawrence on Autopsies of Human Remains from the Dam Site
June 1998, pp 8, 22.
Ex. P2662, Expert Report of Christopher Lawrence on Autopsies of Human Remains from the Dam Site
June 1998, pp 9, 22.
Ex. P2662, Expert Report of Christopher Lawrence on Autopsies of Human Remains from the Dam Site
June 1998, p. 22.
See Indictment, Schedule D, para. 3.6.
See Indictment, Schedule D, para. 3.7.
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(d) Pilica School (14–15 July 1995)
705.
The parties agreed that on 14 and 15 July 1995, VRS and/or MUP personnel transported a
number of Bosnian Muslim males from detention sites in Bratunac to Pilica School.2015 These
Bosnian Muslim men had been captured from the column of men retreating from the Srebrenica
enclave or separated in Potočari.2016 On or about 14 and 15 July 1995, VRS personnel shot and
killed some of the Bosnian Muslim males who had arrived, or were being detained, at the
school.2017
706.
The Trial Chamber is satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that on 14 and 15 July 1995, VRS
personnel shot and killed a number of Bosnian Muslim males detained at Pilica School.2018
(e) Branjevo Military Farm (16 July 1995)
707.
The parties agreed that on 14 July 1995, Bosnian Muslim prisoners from Bratunac were
bussed to a school in the village of Pilica and detained there until 16 July 1995.2019 They were then
taken out of the school and loaded onto buses with their hands tied behind their backs and driven to
the Branjevo Military Farm.2020 Drina Corps Military Police were engaged in guarding the Bosnian
Muslim prisoners in the buses that took them to the execution site at the Branjevo Military Farm.2021
There, groups of ten men at a time were lined up and shot.2022 In total, approximately 1,000 Bosnian
Muslim men were executed.2023 On 17 July 1995, members of the Zvornik Brigade Engineering
Company participated in digging mass graves using its equipment.2024
708.
The evidence reflects that Lieutenant Colonel Vujadin Popovi} was involved in organising
the allocation of fuel to transfer the Bosnian Muslim prisoners to the execution site at Branjevo
Farm.2025 The Trial Chamber is satisfied that Popovi}’s request for fuel and its subsequent delivery
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
2024
2025
Srebrenica Agreed Facts, 21.
Ibid.
Ibid.
See Indictment, Schedule D, para. 3.8.
Srebrenica Agreed Facts, 22.
Srebrenica Agreed Facts, 22-23.
Srebrenica Agreed Facts, 24.
Srebrenica Agreed Facts, 23; Srebrenica Adjudicated Facts, 66. See also Richard Butler, T. 6649.
Srebrenica Adjudicated Facts, 72.
Srebrenica Adjudicated Facts, 71-72; Srebrenica Agreed Facts, 24.
Srebrenica Adjudicated Facts, 65. In an intercepted telephone conversation on 16 July 1995 with a Drina Corps
officer, Popovi} requested 500 liters of fuel, threatening that otherwise, his “work will stop”, Ex. P270,
Intercepted Conversation at 13:58 Hours. A delivery form received by the Drina Corps Command shows that
500 liters of fuel were delivered to Popovi} on 16 July 1995, Ex. P2409, Delivery Sheet of 500 Litres of Fuel to
the Drina Corps Command, 16 July 1995. See also Richard Butler, T. 6651-6652; Ex. P265, Intercepted
Conversation at 21:16 Hours, in which Popović told Ra{ić that he has “finished the job”; Ex. P240, Intercepted
Conversation at 13:58 Hours, 16 July 1995.
216
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was related to the operation of executing and burying the Bosnian Muslim prisoners at Branjevo
Farm.
709.
Dražen Erdemović, a member of the VRS 10th Sabotage Detachment, testified about his
participation in the mass execution, together with other members of his unit.2026 His unit drove from
Vlasenica to Zvornik,2027 where they were ordered to follow a Lieutenant-Colonel (wearing a VRS
uniform and rank insignia) and two policemen whom Erdemovi} assumed belonged to the Drina
Corps.2028 Several minutes after arriving at a farm near Pilica,2029 which Erdemovi} later learned
was Branjevo Military Farm,2030 the Lieutenant-Colonel and the two policemen left and members of
the 10th Sabotage Detachment were told by Brano Gojkovi} that buses with individuals from
Srebrenica would be arriving and that they would have to execute the detainees.2031
710.
The first bus arrived at the farm between 10:00 and 11:00 hours on 16 July 1995, and was
accompanied by two military policemen.2032 The passengers consisted of civilian men between the
ages of 15 and 65. All of them were blindfolded and had their hands bound behind their backs.2033
Subsequently, between 15 and 20 buses arrived at the farm.2034 Erdemovi} believed that all of the
buses were full of passengers.2035 The soldiers followed the same procedure with each bus.2036 The
civilians were taken in groups of ten from the bus to a field beyond the garage.2037 There, they were
lined up with their backs facing the soldiers and were shot.2038 The military policemen stood at the
door of the bus to prevent anyone from escaping.2039
2026
2027
2028
2029
2030
2031
2032
2033
2034
2035
2036
2037
2038
2039
Dra`en Erdemovi}, T. 7961-7969; Srebrenica Adjudicated Facts, 68.
Ex. P2522, Map of the Area of Srebrenica Marked by Dra`en Erdemovi}, which demonstrates the route. See also
Dra`en Erdemovi}, T. 7961.
Dra`en Erdemovi}, T. 7961-7964; Ex. P2523, Photo of a Complex in Zvornik, shows the complex, where the
witness’s unit stopped.
Dra`en Erdemovi}, T. 7964; Ex. P2525, Photograph of a Farm Near to Pilica; Ex. P2527, Photograph of a Farm
Near to Pilica Marked by Dra`en Erdemovi}. Both photographs show the farm, which consisted of two or three
buildings. See also Dra`en Erdemovi}, T. 7964-7965, 7970-7971. In a series of photographs, the witness marked
the location where the buses were parked and where the mass execution took place, Dra`en Erdemovi}, T. 7967;
Ex. P2526, Photograph of a Farm Near to Pilica Marked by Dra`en Erdemovi}; Ex. P2527, Photograph of a
Farm near to Pilica Marked by Dra`en Erdemovi}; Ex. P2528, Photograph of a Farm Near to Pilica Marked by
Dra`en Erdemovi}.
Dra`en Erdemovi}, T. 7971. The Trial Chamber notes that Erdemovi} named the farm as “Branjevo Farm” while
he was shown Ex. P2527, Photograph of a Farm Near to Pilica Marked by Dra`en Erdemovi}, which states in
big letters “Branjevo State Farm”.
Dra`en Erdemovi}, T. 7965.
Dra`en Erdemovi}, T. 7966, 7969. The witness believed that the policemen were from the Drina Corps, but
could not be sure as he did not pay attention to the insignia.
Dra`en Erdemovi}, T. 7966.
Dra`en Erdemovi}, T. 7967.
Dra`en Erdemovi}, T. 7967-7968.
Dra`en Erdemovi}, T. 7968.
See Ex. P2526, Photograph of a Farm Near to Pilica Marked by Dra`en Erdemovi}.
Dra`en Erdemovi}, T. 7968.
Ibid.
217
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711.
In the course of the day, six to ten members of the Bratunac Brigade joined the 10th
Sabotage Detachment to help execute men from Srebrenica.2040 Erdemovi} estimates that the
executions lasted until the afternoon of 16 July 1995 and that approximately 1,000 men were
executed.2041
712.
MP-294, a survivor of the executions at Branjevo Military Farm, testified about what
occurred there on 16 July 1995. MP-294 was transferred from Pilica to Branjevo on a bus with
approximately 50 other men.2042 After watching the soldiers execute the first group of men, MP-294
was led to the execution site with a second group.2043 They were lined up with their backs to the
soldiers, and then ordered to lie down. He heard shots, but was not hit by a bullet; he remained
lying down and witnessed the executions of six or seven more columns of men.2044 After the
executions finished, MP-294 observed between 1,000 and 1,500 dead bodies lying in the field at
Branjevo Military Farm.2045
713.
In its Final Trial Brief, the Defence argues that the Prosecution has failed to prove the
number of persons allegedly killed at Branjevo Military Farm on 16 July 1995 because it did not
present any evidence to corroborate MP-294’s testimony regarding the total number of bodies found
at Branjevo Military Farm.2046
714.
The Trial Chamber is satisfied that MP-294’s evidence regarding the total number of
Bosnian Muslim men killed at Branjevo Military Farm on 16 July 1995 was sufficiently
corroborated by Erdemovi}’s evidence, as well as by evidence of which the Trial Chamber took
judicial notice.2047 Therefore, the Trial Chamber finds beyond a reasonable doubt that on
16 July 1995, over 1,000 Bosnian Muslim men previously detained in the Pilica School were
executed by VRS members at the Branjevo Military Farm, and buried in a mass grave nearby.
(f) Pilica Cultural Centre (16 July 1995)
715.
The parties agreed that on 16 July 1995, VRS and/or MUP personnel, including members of
the Bratunac Brigade, summarily executed approximately 500 Bosnian Muslim men with automatic
2040
2041
2042
2043
2044
2045
2046
2047
Dra`en Erdemovi}, T. 7969. The men wore VRS uniforms; however, one wore U.S. Army pants. The witness
identified them as being members of the Bratunac Brigade because other members of his unit from Vlasenica
recognised them. In a video filmed on 12 July 1995, Erdemovi} recognised one of the members of the Bratunac
Brigade who was present at the farm, Ex. P2393, Video, 12 July 1995 at 01:40 hours; Dra`en Erdemovi},
T. 7970.
Dra`en Erdemovi}, T. 7969.
MP-294, T. 9069.
MP-294, T. 9070-9071.
MP-294, T. 9071-9072.
MP-294, T. 9074.
Defence Final Brief, para. 584.
See Srebrenica Adjudicated Facts, 72; Dra`en Erdemovi}, T. 7969.
218
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weapons inside the Pilica Cultural Centre.2048 These Bosnian Muslim men had been captured from
the column of men retreating from the Srebrenica enclave or separated in Potočari.2049 Dra`en
Erdemovi} testified that following the executions at Branjevo Military Farm, he and other members
of the Bratunac Brigade were asked by his superior officer to participate in additional executions at
the Pilica Culutral Centre.2050 Erdemovi} declined and was taken to a café in Pilica across the road
from the cultural hall.2051 From the cafe, he saw several people in civilian clothes lying on the
ground beside the cultural hall; then he heard gun-fire from the direction of the cultural hall and the
sound of exploding hand-grenades.2052 After the noise stopped, members of the Bratunac Brigade
joined him at the café.2053
716.
At 22:10 hours on 16 July 1995, the Zvornik Brigade’s 1st Battalion, stationed at Branjevo
Military Farm, requested a loader, an excavator and a dump truck to arrive in Pilica at 08:00 hours
on 17 July 1995.2054 On 17 July 1995, VRS personnel retrieved the bodies from the Pilica Cultural
Centre and transferred them to Branjevo Military Farm, where they buried them in a mass grave.2055
On that day, several conversations were intercepted involving Popovi}.2056 In a conversation
recorded at 16:22 hours, Popovi} tells an unknown interlocutor, whom he refers to as “boss”, that
“everything’s OK, that job is done … everything’s been brought to an end, no problems […]”.2057
The Trial Chamber is satisfied that the “job” which Popovi} referred to in this intercept was the
killing and burying of Bosnian Muslim males in the Zvornik area.
717.
The Trial Chamber is satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that on 16 July 1995,
approximately 500 men were summarily executed inside the Pilica Cultural Centre by VRS and/or
MUP forces using automatic weapons. The Trial Chamber further finds beyond a reasonable doubt
2048
2049
2050
2051
2052
2053
2054
2055
2056
2057
Srebrenica Agreed Facts, 25.
Ibid.
Dra`en Erdemovi}, T. 7976.
Dra`en Erdemovi}, T. 7977-7980. Dra`en Erdemovi} testified that after the executions at Branjevo Military
Farm, he was ordered by Lieutenant-Colonel Milorad Pelemi{ of the 10th Sabotage Detachment to go to the
cultural hall in Pilica to execute another 500 men from Srebrenica. The members of the Bratunac Brigade
followed the order, while the members of the 10th Sabotage Detachment refused to follow the order and drove –
as instructed by a VRS Lieutenant-Colonel – to a café, across from the cultural hall in Pilica, Dra`en Erdemovi},
T. 7976-7980. See also Ex. P2529, Photograph of Pilica Marked by Dra`en Erdemovi}.
Dra`en Erdemovi}, T. 7976-7977. See also Ex. P2645, Expert Report of Peter De Bruyn on Forensic Explosive
Analysis on Samples from Different Sites in Srebrenica, 2 March 2000, pp 2-5, wherein in analysing the samples
collected at the Pilica cultural hall, De Bruyn found the presence of explosive residue (TNT); Ex. P2677, Expert
Report of A.D. Kloosterman on the Examination and Recovery of Evidence from Kravica Warehouse, 20
December 1999, p. 21, wherein the expert witness found the presence of human blood in at least a few of the
samples taken from Pilica cultural hall.
Dra`en Erdemovi}, T. 7980.
Srebrenica Adjudicated Facts, 73.
Srebrenica Agreed Facts, 25.
Ex. P276, Intercepted Conversation at 12:44 Hours; Ex. P278, Intercepted Conversation at 16:22 Hours.
Ex. P278, Intercepted Conversation at 16:22 Hours; Richard Butler, T. 6655. See also Ex. P245, Intercepted
Conversation at 16:22 Hours; Ex. P279, Intercepted Conversation at 20:26 Hours, referring to the fact that
Popovi} “went home”.
219
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that the bodies of the victims were then transported to Branjevo Military Farm, where they were
buried in a mass grave.2058
(g) Kozluk (16 July 1995)
718.
The parties agreed that on 15 or 16 July 1995, VRS and/or MUP forces transported
approximately 500 Bosnian Muslim men to an isolated place near Kozluk, a rubbish dump for a
bottling factory, where they were summarily executed with automatic weapons.2059 These Bosnian
Muslim men had been captured from the column of men retreating from the Srebrenica enclave or
separated in Potočari.2060 On 16 July 1995, VRS soldiers buried the victims of these executions in a
mass grave nearby.2061
719.
On 16 July 1995, Dragan Joki} sent members of the Zvornik Brigade Engineering
Company, Milo{ Mitrovi} and Nikola Ricanovi}, as well as an excavator, to report to the
commander of the Zvornik Brigade Engineering Company’s fortification platoon, Damjan
Lazarevi}.2062 Upon their arrival, Lazarević ordered Mitrović to cover bodies placed in already-dug
graves with dirt. Mitrović worked in Kozluk until it was clear that his machine could not finish the
task because it was only operating at 30% capacity and was, in fact, not designed for that type of
work.2063
720.
Forensic investigation and exhumation of bodies at the Kozluk site was conducted in 1999.
The investigation covered four locations (KK1-KK4).2064 As a result of the exhumation, 292 bodies
and 233 body parts were recovered, totaling a minimum of 340 individuals based on
anthropological calculations.2065 Many of the victims were found with blindfolds and ligatures
around their hands, and most of the bodies showed evidence of gunshot injury.2066
721.
Forensic expert Richard Wright identified a secondary grave at Čančići Road 3, derived
from a primary grave in Kozluk.2067 The bodies of at least 160 individuals were exhumed from the
Čančići Road 3 grave.2068
2058
2059
2060
2061
2062
2063
2064
2065
2066
2067
See Indictment, Schedule D, para. 3.10.
Srebrenica Agreed Facts, 26. See also Ex. P2641, Expert Pathology Reports of John Clark on 1999
Exhumations, 1999, p. 6.
Srebrenica Agreed Facts, 26.
Ibid.
Srebrenica Adjudicated Facts, 78.
Srebrenica Adjudicated Facts, 75, 77, 79.
Ex. P2641, Expert Pathology Reports of John Clark on 1999 Exhumations, 1999, p. 1.
Ex. P2641, Expert Pathology Reports of John Clark on 1999 Exhumations, 1999, pp 1, 6.
Ex. P2641, Expert Pathology Reports of John Clark on 1999 Exhumations, 1999, pp 7, 10.
Ex. P2674, Expert Report of Richard Wright on Exhumations in Eastern Bosnia in 1998, 12 May 1999, p. 8;
Ex. P2673, Expert Report of Richard Wright on Excavations and Exhumations at Kozluk in 1999, 2 February
2000, pp 11-12.
220
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722.
Wright concluded that between 451 and 660 executions took place at Kozluk site.2069 Wright
also detailed his findings with respect to shell casings, ligatures, blindfolds and identifying
papers.2070 The presence of certain species of flowers and plants is consistent with the evidence that
the executions occurred in the middle of July.2071
723.
The Trial Chamber is satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that on 15 or 16 July 1995,
approximately 500 Bosnian Muslim males were transported to an isolated place near Kozluk, and
were summarily executed by VRS and/or MUP forces with automatic weapons. The Trial Chamber
further finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the remains were subsequently buried in a mass grave
near the execution site, and were later moved to a secondary mass grave along Čančići Road.2072
(h) Nezuk (19 July 1995)
724.
The parties agreed that on 19 July 1995, VRS personnel under the command of the Zvornik
Brigade captured 11 Bosnian Muslim men from the column and summarily executed them with
automatic weapons; ten of the 11 men were killed near Nezuk.2073
725.
The Trial Chamber is satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that VRS personnel killed 11
Bosnian Muslim men near Nezluk on 19 July 1995.2074
(i) 18 July–1 November 1995
726.
Paragraph 5.2 of Schedule D of the Indictment alleges that “from 18 July through about 1
November, additional members of the Bosnian Muslim column were captured or killed in the
Bratunac Brigade zone by the VRS and MUP forces”.2075 In its Final Trial Brief, the Prosecution
submits that the killings alleged in paragraph 5.2 of the Indictment were confirmed by Momir
Nikoli}.2076 However, the Trial Chamber finds that the evidence provided by Nikoli} is not
2068
2069
2070
2071
2072
2073
2074
2075
2076
Ex. P2664, Expert Report of Christopher Lawrence on Autopsies of Human Remains from Cancari Road Site 3,
August-September 1998, 2. There were 37 ligatures (wrist bindings), and eight blindfolds found. Most victims
suffered gunshot wounds to the torso, followed by wounds to the legs, head and neck, Ex. P2664, Expert Report
of Christopher Lawrence on Autopsies of Human Remains from Čančari Road Site 3, August-September 1998,
2.
Ex. P2673, Expert Report of Richard Wright on Excavations and Exhumations at Kozluk in 1999, 2 February
2000, p. 13.
Ex. P2673, Expert Report of Richard Wright on Excavations and Exhumations at Kozluk in 1999, 2 February
2000, pp 14-15.
Ex. P2673, Expert Report of Richard Wright on Excavations and Exhumations at Kozluk in 1999, 2 February
2000, p. 15.
See Indictment, Schedule D, para. 3.11.
Srebrenica Agreed Facts, 30. See also Srebrenica Adjudicated Facts, 82.
See Indictment, Schedule D, para. 5.1.
Indictment, Schedule D, para. 5.2.
Prosecution Final Brief, para. 435. In relevant part, Nikoli} states that: “₣fğrom 14 July through October 1995,
Bratunac Brigade forces, working with the MUP and other VRS forces continued to capture and execute Muslim
221
Case No.: IT-04-81-T
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sufficiently detailed for an allegation that covers such an extensive period. Therefore, without the
benefit of additional corroborative evidence, the Trial Chamber finds that insufficient evidence was
presented to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that between 18 July and 1 November 1995,
members of the Bosnian Muslim column were captured or killed in the Bratunac Brigade zone by
VRS and MUP forces.
11. Identity of the Principal Perpetrators
727.
The Trial Chamber finds that key VRS officers involved in the commission, planning,
ordering, instigating, or aiding and abetting of the crimes in Srebrenica included: Ratko Mladi},2077
Radivoje Mileti},2078 Milan Gvero,2079 Ljubi{a Beara,2080 Radislav Krsti},2081 Vujadin Popovi},2082
Vidoje Blagojevi},2083 Vinko Pandurevi},2084 Dragan Obrenovi},2085 Drago Nikoli},2086 Momir
Nikoli}2087 and Dragan Joki}.2088 The Trial Chamber is therefore satisfied that the VRS and/or MUP
forces, under the effective control of the aforementioned key officers, committed the charged
crimes.
12. MUP Resubordination to the VRS
728.
The Trial Chamber received evidence that RS law provided for the resubordination of the
RS MUP to the VRS in times of war.2089 This law formed the basis of Richard Butler’s conclusion
2077
2078
2079
2080
2081
2082
2083
2084
2085
2086
2087
2088
2089
prisoners attempting to escape from the Srebrenica and Žepa areas”, Ex. P2512, Momir Nikoli} Statement of
Facts and Acceptance of Responsibility, 6 May 2003, para. 12.
Srebrenica Adjudicated Facts, 91. See supra paras 665-667.
See Ex. P2246, Expert Report of Richard Butler “Srebrenica Military Narrative (Revised) – Operation Krivaja
95”, 1 November 2000, p. 32; Miodrag Simi}, T. 10247, identifying Mileti}’s position in the VRS and that he
was directly subordinate to Mladi}.
See Ex. P2246, Expert Report of Richard Butler “Srebrenica Military Narrative (Revised) – Operation Krivaja
95”, 1 November 2000, p. 31; Petar [krbi}, T. 11603-11604, identifying Gvero’s position in the VRS.
Srebrenica Adjudicated Facts, 84, 89, 104. See supra paras 649, 665-667, 689-690.
Srebrenica Adjudicated Facts, 94, 95, 96. See supra paras 629-631, 695.
Srebrenica Adjudicated Facts, 97. See supra paras 649, 708, 716.
Srebrenica Adjudicated Facts, 102, stating that “₣oğn 25 May 1995, Blagojević was appointed as the Commander
of the Bratunac Brigade. In July 1995, Blagojević held the rank of Colonel. He remained in this position until
mid-1996 when he was re-assigned to the VRS Main Staff, later named the VRS General Staff”; Srebrenica
Adjudicated Facts, 103, stating that “Colonel Blagojević remained in command and control of all units of the
Bratunac Brigade, including those members of the security organ, as well as the Bratunac Brigade Military
Police between 11 July 1995 and 1 November 1995”.
Srebrenica Adjudicated Facts, 98, stating that in July 1995, Lieutenant Colonel Vinko Pandurevi} was the
Commander of the Zvornik Brigade. See supra paras 689-690. See also P2403, Interim Combat Report of the 1st
Zvornik Brigade to the Command of the Drina Corps, 15 July 1995.
Srebrenica Adjudicated Facts, 99, stating that Dragan Obrenovi} was the Chief of Staff of the Zvornik Brigade.
See supra paras 689-690.
Srebrenica Adjudicated Facts, 87, 101. See supra paras 649-650, 690.
Srebrenica Adjudicated Facts, 86. See also Ex. P2512, Momir Nikoli} Statement of Facts and Acceptance of
Responsibility, 6 May 2003, para. 13. See supra paras 649-650, 689.
Srebrenica Adjudicated Facts, 100, stating that Dragan Jokić was the Chief of Engineering of the Zvornik
Brigade and held the rank of Major between 11 July 1995 and 1 November 1995. See supra para. 719.
See Petar [rkbi}, T. 11736-11737, who testified that based on RS law, RS armed forces during the war were
composed of the VRS and MUP.
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that the MUP was under the command of the VRS during the Srebrenica events.2090 This conclusion
is also corroborated by Momir Nikoli} who testified that “all forces that were engaged in the
Srebrenica operation […] were commanded and controlled by the Chief of Staff General Krsti} and
the commander of the Drina Corps”.2091 Based on the evidence before it, the Trial Chamber is
satisfied that, in the area of Srebrenica, the RS MUP operated under the command of the VRS.
13. Legal Findings
729.
The Indictment charges the Accused with murder as a violation of the laws or customs of
war (Count 10) and murder, inhumane acts, persecutions and exterminations as crimes against
humanity (Counts 9, 11, 12 and 13).
(a) General Requirements under Article 3
730.
The Trial Chamber is satisfied that an armed conflict took place in Eastern Bosnia between
the ABiH and the VRS during the Indictment period.2092
731.
The alleged victims of the crimes in this case were Bosnian Muslims captured by VRS
and/or MUP forces in the course, or aftermath, of combat activity.2093 Based on the evidence set out
above regarding the capture, detention and killing of Bosnian Muslims,2094 the Trial Chamber finds
that the underlying crimes alleged in the Indictment were closely related to the armed conflict.
732.
The alleged victims of the crimes were persons taking no active part in hostilities at the time
the relevant crimes were committed.2095 Based on the evidence set out above regarding the capture,
detention and killing of Bosnian Muslims, the Trial Chamber finds that this additional requirement
under Common Article 3 is fulfilled.
733.
The Trial Chamber therefore finds that the general requirements of Article 3 have been met.
(b) General Requirements under Article 5
734.
The Trial Chamber finds that there was a widespread or systematic attack directed against
the Bosnian Muslim civilian population in the area of Srebrenica. As the evidence shows, the attack
2090
2091
2092
2093
2094
2095
Richard Butler, T. 6740-6742.
Ex. P2511, Transcript of Momir Nikoli} from Prosecutor v. Popovi} et al., 21 April 2009, T. 32928.
See supra section III.
See supra paras 632, 648, 662-668, 670.
Ibid.
Ibid.
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was of a large-scale, affecting approximately 35,000 people who lived in the area, and was
organised in nature.2096
735.
The attack was directed against United Nations enclaves, established specifically to protect
civilians, and thus, there can be no doubt that the population of these enclaves was predominantly
civilian. The Trial Chamber finds, therefore, that the attack was directed against a civilian
population within the meaning of Article 5 of the Statute.
736.
The Trial Chamber is also satisfied that the crimes committed by the VRS and/or MUP were
part of that attack, and that the perpetrators knew of the attack and that their acts formed part of it.
737.
The Trial Chamber therefore finds that the general requirements of Article 5 have been met.
(c) Murder
738.
As the Trial Chamber previously noted, the elements of murder are the same under both
Articles 3 and Article 5: the death of the victim, the causation of the death of the victim by the
accused and the mens rea of the perpetrator.2097
739.
Based on the entire evidence in this case, the Trial Chamber has already found that VRS
and/or MUP personnel perpetrated the killings specifically enumerated in Schedule D of the
Indictment, except for scheduled incidents 3.1, 3.2, 4.2, 4.3 and 5.2. The Trial Chamber finds that
the victims of these killings were Bosnian Muslim men who had surrendered or been captured from
the column of men retreating from the Srebrenica enclave or had been separated at Potočari. Hence,
the victims of these killings did not take an active part in the hostilities at the time they were killed
and this was apparent to those involved. The Trial Chamber is also satisfied that the killings were
intentional.
740.
The Trial Chamber is therefore satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the aforementioned
killings constitute murder, both as a crime against humanity and a violation of the laws or customs
of war. Accordingly, the Trial Chamber finds that the crime of murder under Counts 9 and 10 of the
Indictment has been established for the scheduled incidents described in Schedule D, except for
incidents 3.1, 3.2, 4.2, 4.3 and 5.2. The individual criminal responsibility of the Accused for these
crimes is discussed in sections VII-VIII of the Judgement.
2096
2097
See also supra paras 607, 617-618, 628-632, 648-650.
See supra paras 102-104.
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(d) Inhumane Acts (Article 5(i))
741.
Count 11 of the Indictment charges the Accused with inhumane acts, as crimes against
humanity under Article 5(i) of the Statute, including inflicting serious injuries, wounding and
forcible transfer.2098
(i) Inflicting Serious Injuries and Wounding
742.
As the Trial Chamber previously noted, serious physical and mental injury or wounding are
considered “inhumane acts” under Article 5(i) of the Statute.2099 As shown by the factual findings
detailed above, the Bosnian Muslims detained in Potočari and elsewhere were subjected to horrific
and inhumane conditions, as well as physical assaults. These combined circumstances constituted a
serious attack on their human dignity and inflicted on them serious mental and physical suffering
and injury.2100 Based on the factual findings detailed above, the Trial Chamber is satisfied beyond a
reasonable doubt that Bosnian Muslims in the area of Srebrenica suffered serious bodily or mental
harm while in detention or in other locations, and that VRS and/or MUP personnel intentionally
inflicted this suffering.
(ii) Forcible Transfer
743.
The parties agreed that from July 1995 onwards, the Bosnian Muslim civilians who were
bussed out of Poto~ari were not making a free choice to leave the area of the enclave; rather, they
were forcibly transferred from the enclave by the VRS.2101 This is also confirmed by the evidence
analysed above.2102 The evidence is also clear that the perpetrators intended to forcibly transfer the
Bosnian Muslim civilians from Poto~ari.
744.
The Trial Chamber finds beyond reasonable doubt that the elements of the crime of forcible
transfer with regard to the Bosnian Muslim civilians who were transported out of Poto~ari have
been met and that the crime of forcible transfer was committed against them.
745.
The Trial Chamber finds that these acts of forcible transfer are sufficiently serious to
amount to “other inhumane acts” under Article 5(i) of the Statute.
2098
2099
2100
2101
2102
See Indictment, Count 11.
See supra para. 111.
See e.g. Srebrenica Agreed Facts, 19, VRS and/or MUP personnel struck, beat, and assaulted Bosnian Muslim
males detained at Petkovi}i School on 14 and 15 July 1995; Srebrenica Agreed Facts, 29, detailing the
mistreatment by VRS and/or MUP personnel of Bosnian Muslim detainees at Kravica Market.
Srebrenica Agreed Facts, 3a.
See e.g. supra paras 605-607, 615-619, 624.
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746.
In conclusion, the Trial Chamber is satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the crime of
inhumane acts, including inflicting serious injuries, wounding and forcible transfer, as alleged in
Count 11 of the Indictment, has been established.
(e) Persecutions on Political, Racial or Religious Grounds
747.
Count 12 of the Indictment charges the Accused with persecutions on political, racial and
religious grounds, a crime against humanity in violation of Article 5(h) of the Statute, through the
underlying acts of murder, cruel and inhumane treatment and forcible transfer.2103 The underlying
acts of murder and forcible transfer have also been charged as separate crimes, and the elements
have been dealt with separately above. It is, however, still required to determine whether they meet
the requisite criteria for the crime of persecutions.
(i) Underlying Acts
a. Murder
748.
The Trial Chamber recalls that it found that between 12 July 1995 and approximately 19
July 1995, thousands of captured Bosnian Muslim males were killed by VRS and/or MUP forces in
several different locations in and around Srebrenica, Bratunac, and Zvornik.2104 Murder is
enumerated in Article 5 of the Statute and by definition considered to be serious enough to amount
to persecutions.
749.
As to the specific intent of the crime of persecutions, the Trial Chamber has considered the
massive scale of the murder operation aimed at only one ethnic group, the Bosnian Muslims and the
systematic manner in which it was carried out. As such, the Trial Chamber finds that these killings
were committed against the Bosnian Muslims with a discriminatory intent on political, racial or
religious grounds.
b. Cruel and Inhumane Treatment
750.
The Trial Chamber finds that, as described in detail above, the Bosnian Muslims detained in
Potočari and elsewhere suffered serious bodily or mental harm caused by horrific and inhumane
conditions, as well as physical assaults. The Trial Chamber further finds that this cruel and
inhumane treatment is of equal gravity to the crimes listed in Article 5 and constitutes a blatant
2103
2104
See Indictment, Count 12.
See supra paras 648, 655, 670, 674, 678, 688, 699, 704, 706, 714, 717, 723, 725.
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denial of fundamental rights that had a severe impact on the victims. The Trial Chamber therefore
concludes that it amounts to an underlying act of persecutions.
751.
As to specific intent, the Trial Chamber finds that Bosnian Muslim victims were subjected
to cruel and inhumane treatment solely on the basis that they were Bosnian Muslims. The Trial
Chamber concludes that the circumstances surrounding the infliction of the cruel and inhumane
treatment demonstrate that it was carried out with the intention to discriminate against the Bosnian
Muslims on political, racial or religious grounds.
c. Forcible Transfer
752.
The Trial Chamber recalls that it found that the crime of forcible transfer was committed by
the VRS against thousands of Bosnian Muslim civilians who were transported out of Poto~ari in
July 1995.2105
753.
As to specific intent, considering the issuance of Directive 7 and the other circumstances
surrounding the transfer of the Bosnian Muslim civilians, the Trial Chamber is satisfied that the
forcible transfer was carried out with the intent to discriminate against Bosnian Muslims on
political, racial or religious grounds.
(ii) Conclusion
754.
As noted above, the acts of murder, cruel and inhumane treatment and forcible transfer were
committed against the Bosnian Muslims with a discriminatory intent. The Trial Chamber therefore
concludes beyond a reasonable doubt that the underlying acts of murder, cruel and inhumane
treatment and forcible transfer constitute persecutions as defined in Article 5 of the Statute. These
underlying acts of persecution were committed in the context of a widespread and systematic attack
and thus constitute crimes against humanity. Accordingly, the Trial Chamber is satisfied beyond a
reasonable doubt that the crimes of murder, cruel and inhumane treatment and forcible transfer as
underlying acts of persecution, as alleged in Count 12 of the Indictment, have been established.
(f) Extermination
755.
Count 13 of the Indictment charges the Accused with extermination, a crime against
humanity, punishable under Article 5(b) of the Statute.2106
2105
2106
See supra paras 743-746. See also Srebrenica Agreed Facts, 3a.
See Indictment, Count 13.
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756.
The Trial Chamber has found that VRS and/or MUP forces killed thousands of Bosnian
Muslim able-bodied males in and around Srebrenica, Bratunac and Zvornik during the period of the
Indictment.2107 Furthermore, the parties agreed that over the course of the seven-day period between
12 July 1995 and approximately 19 July 1995, VRS and MUP forces participated in a planned and
organised mass execution and burial of thousands of captured Bosnian Muslim men from the
Srebrenica enclave.2108
757.
The Trial Chamber therefore finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the crime of
extermination, as alleged in Count 13 of the Indictment, was committed against the Bosnian
Muslim men who had been separated at Potočari or had surrendered or been captured from the
column of men retreating from the Srebrenica enclave. The Trial Chamber is also satisfied beyond a
reasonable doubt that the VRS and/or MUP had the intent to kill on a massive scale.
758.
In conclusion, the Trial Chamber is satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the crime of
extermination, as alleged in Count 13 of the Indictment, has been established.
759.
The Trial Chamber found that key VRS officers involved in the commission, planning,
ordering, instigating, or aiding and abetting of the crimes in Srebrenica included: Ratko Mladi},
Radivoje Mileti}, Milan Gvero, Ljubi{a Beara, Radislav Krsti}, Vujadin Popovi}, Vidoje
Blagojevi}, Vinko Pandurevi}, Dragan Obrenovi}, Drago Nikoli}, Momir Nikoli} and Dragan
Joki}.2109 The Trial Chamber therefore finds that the conduct of VRS and/or MUP forces, under the
effective control of the these key officers, constituted murder as a violation of the laws or customs
of war (Count 10) and murder, inhumane acts, persecutions and exterminations as crimes against
humanity (Counts 9, 11, 12 and 13). The Trial Chamber found that these key officers and their
subordinates committed the charged crimes.
760. The issue of whether Peri{i} bears responsibility for these crimes will be addressed
separately.
2107
2108
2109
See supra paras 740, 748-749.
Srebrenica Agreed Facts, 14.
See supra para. 727.
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VI. INDIVIDUAL CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY
A. Personnel Assistance - 30th and 40th Personnel Centres
1. Events Leading up to the Formation of the Personnel Centres
761.
When the JNA withdrew from Croatia and BiH, a number of JNA military personnel
remained behind to serve in the SVK and VRS.2110 After the VJ was formed, additional personnel
were dispatched by the VJ to the VRS and SVK.2111 With respect to the military personnel who
remained in BiH, or were sent there by the VJ, the Federal Secretariat of National Defence decided
on 6 May 1992 that they would “retain all rights as other members of the [VJ]”.2112
762.
Notwithstanding this order, the status and rights of these military personnel remained
unregulated.2113 In addition, there was no legal basis specifically regulating the transfer of VJ
military personnel to the VRS and SVK. VJ members were reassigned to these armies pursuant to
Article 271 of the Law on Service in the Armed Forces, which generally provided for the temporary
assignment to other military units or institutions within the JNA.2114 In March 1993, Mladi} sent a
letter to Pani}, then serving as Chief of VJ General Staff, which illustrates the shortcomings of this
arrangement. Mladi} complained that military personnel were leaving the VRS to return to the VJ
without authorisation from the VRS Main Staff, stating that their deployment to the VRS from the
VJ was only temporary.2115 In Mladi}’s words:
2110
2111
2112
2113
2114
2115
Ex. P729, Order of the Federal Secretariat for National Defence on the Status of Military Personnel,
6 May 1992; Ex. D242, Letter from the Federal Secretariat of National Defence to the Presidency of the SFRY,
6 May 1992; Ex. P1872, Set of VJ General Staff and FRY MOD Documents, Doc ID 0630-6544, p. 1;
Ex. P1873, Set of VJ General Staff and FRY MOD Documents, Doc ID 0630-6538, p. 1; Ex. D243, Proposals of
the FRY MOD, 24 August 1993, p. 3; Ex. D245, Report of the Personnel Administration of the VJ General Staff,
24 August 1993, p. 2; Stamenko Nikoli}, T. 10492-10494.
Ex. P1872, Set of VJ General Staff and FRY MOD Documents, Doc ID 0630-6544, p. 1; Ex. P1873, Set of VJ
General Staff and FRY MOD Documents, Doc ID 0630-6538, p. 1; MP-5, T. 2366-2367, 2493-2494. See also
Stojan Mal~i}, T. 11213-11214; Ex. D292, List of VJ Officers, 25 June 1992.
Ex. P729, Order of the Federal Secretariat for National Defence on the Status of Military Personnel, 6 May 1992;
Ex. D242, Letter from the Federal Secretariat of National Defence to the Presidency of the SFRY, 6 May 1992;
Stamenko Nikoli}, T. 10475-10476.
Ex. P1872, Set of VJ General Staff and FRY MOD Documents, Doc ID 0630-6544, p. 1; Ex. P1873, Set of VJ
General Staff and FRY MOD Documents, Doc ID 0630-6538, p. 1; Ex. D243, Proposals of the FRY MOD, 24
August 1993, p. 3; Ex. D245, Report of the Personnel Administration of the VJ General Staff, 24 August 1993,
p. 2; Stamenko Nikoli}, T. 10492-10494.
Ex. P2305, The Law on Service in the Armed Forces, 15 February 1985, Article 271; Stamenko Nikoli},
T. 10527, 10533-10534, 10596, 10651, 10663-10667; Stojan Mal~i}, T. 11317-11318. See also Ex. D255, Order
of the Commander of the SVK on Appointment of Milan Čeleketi}, 27 September 1993; Ex. D113, Document
from the VJ General Staff Relating to the Numerical Strength of Personnel Financed by the VJ, August 1993,
p. 2. Documentary evidence shows that as of 19 May 1993, 1,607 former JNA officers remained in the VRS and
235 in the SVK. From 19 May until 8 October 1993, pursuant to Article 271 of the above mentioned law,
additional 1,023 VJ officers were deployed to the VRS and 747 to the SVK, Ex. P1872, Set of VJ General Staff
and FRY MOD Documents, Doc ID 0630-6547.
Ex. P1529, Letter of Ratko Mladi} to the Chief of the VJ General Staff, 31 March 1993, p. 1.
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The Main Staff of the [VRS], since its establishment, believed that […] the [SVK, VRS and VJ]
were only separate elements of the combat disposition of a single army. We consider this
assumption to be the legal basis for the obligatory engagement of members of the [VJ] regardless
of their place of origin in the units of the [VRS] and its combat operations, and the engagement of
those whose roots are in the [RS] a moral and patriotic act and an obligation.2116
Mladi} therefore asked Pani} to adopt “an enactment making it obligatory for all active military
personnel who come from the former Bosnia and Herzegovina to join the [VRS] at the request of
the Main Staff of the [VRS]”. He also proposed that “[a]ll those who refuse to comply with this
request must be removed from the [VJ] in an appropriate procedure […]”.2117 He also lamented that
military personnel from the former JNA or VJ already serving in the VRS, were penalised in terms
of rights and benefits compared to VJ personnel that remained in the FRY and asked that instead
they be guaranteed equal treatment.2118 There is no evidence as to whether Pani} took any steps in
response to Mladi}’s letter.
763.
After replacing Pani} as Chief of VJ General Staff, Peri{i} took official steps to answer
Mladi}’s request. In late September or early October 1993, Peri{i} sent a proposed order to Lili}
regarding the regulation of the status and dispatch of military personnel to the VRS and SVK.2119
The statement of reasons for this proposal expressly stated that since the withdrawal of the JNA
from the territories of the Former Yugoslavia, three issues remained open: i) the legal status and
rights of JNA military personnel who remained in the VRS and SVK; ii) the fact that there was no
legal basis to temporarily dispatch VJ military personnel to the VRS and SVK; and iii) the
enjoyment of rights (salaries, housing, promotions, personal record in the VJ, etc.) of all of the
above personnel in the VJ and FRY.2120 The statements of reasons also indicated that until then, the
Chief of the VJ General Staff dealt with these issues based on temporary “standpoints”, “without
any legal basis and in a semi legal manner”.2121 The proposal also included termination of service as
a sanction in case of refusal to comply with the transfer order.2122 The proposed order – with a
minor revision and a more detailed statement of reasons – was inserted in the agenda for discussion
at the SDC session of 11 October 1993.2123
2116
2117
2118
2119
2120
2121
2122
2123
Ibid.
Ex. P1529, Letter of Ratko Mladi} to the Chief of the VJ General Staff, 31 March 1993, p. 2.
Ibid.
Ex. P1873, Set of VJ General Staff and FRY MOD Documents, Doc IDs 0630-6535, 0630-6536. See also
Ex. P778, Stenographic Transcript of the 25th Session of the SDC, 30 August 1994, p. 66.
Ex. P1873, Set of VJ General Staff and FRY MOD Documents, Doc ID 0630-6538, p. 1.
Ibid.
Ex. P1873, Set of VJ General Staff and FRY MOD Documents, Doc IDs 0630-6538, p. 2, 0630-6536, p. 2.
The revision was made at the proposal of the Administration for System and Status-Related Issues of the FRY
MOD and concerned the addition of persons born in Bosnia and Croatia who had been dispatched from there to
the JNA for trainings or service in the JNA to the list of those for whom the VJ General Staff had to keep record
of, Ex. P1873, Set of VJ General Staff and FRY MOD Documents, Doc ID 0630-6534, p. 1; Ex. P1872, Set of
230
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764.
In the new statement of reasons, Peri{i} reiterated that there was no “solid legal framework”
for sending VJ personnel outside of the FRY without their consent. As a consequence, this could
expose the VJ to potential litigation and exposure to the “local and foreign public”.2124 In Peri{i}’s
view, the proposed order therefore represented “the only possible solution […] given the current
circumstances, the position of the [FRY and VJ] and fulfilment of the request of the Main Staffs of
the [VRS and SVK]”.2125 He then described the mechanism through which VJ personnel would
serve in the VRS and SVK:
The relevant officer in the [VJ] would make all these persons available and send them to a special
organ of the [VJ] General Staff (Personnel Administration) based in Belgrade. Further procedure
to organise and implement the departure of these persons and resolve their status in service while
they are outside of the [VJ] will be taken over by the authorised organs of the Main Staff of the
[VRS or SVK]. All the rights of these active servicemen and civilians would be fully protected and
enjoyed in the same manner and scope as for other professionals in the [VJ].2126
The most contentious issue was the termination of service of those military personnel who refused
redeployment to the VRS and SVK. As there was no direct legal basis for the said termination,
Peri{i} proposed alternative means to achieve it, including early retirement, termination due to
special needs of service and interests of the VJ or by order of a military disciplinary court for
refusal to carry out an order.2127
765.
During the SDC session of 11 October 1993, Peri{i} presented his proposed order to Zoran
Lili}, Slobodan Milo{evi} and Momir Bulatovi}:
These are personnel issues related to officers in the [VRS] and [SVK]. We have 3,612 people there
whose status has not been regulated under the new law. In order to have a foothold, we have paved
the way for the President of the state, in his capacity as Supreme Commander, to issue an order
regulating their status and that of officers here. And in order to avoid having anyone criticise us,
we have devised a temporary formation in the [VJ]. We appoint them here; they are not actually
here but are performing their duties over where they are stationed. […] We must create a
stronghold so that the General Staff can work on these issues to a certain extent within the spirit of
the law, even though this is not entirely in conformity with the law. But we cannot see a better
solution.2128
766.
Peri{i} then proceeded to explain the issue of ordering VJ officers to perform their duties in
the VRS and SVK in order to meet these armies’ pressing requests for military personnel.
According to Peri{i}, VJ soldiers who refused such a transfer order should be considered
2124
2125
2126
2127
2128
VJ General Staff and FRY MOD Documents, Doc ID 0630-6548, p. 1; Ex. P709, Stenographic Transcript of the
14th Session of the SDC, 11 October 1993, pp 2, 32.
Ex. P1872, Set of VJ General Staff and FRY MOD Documents, Doc ID 0630-6544, p. 2.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ex. P1872, Set of VJ General Staff and FRY MOD Documents, Doc ID 0630-6544, pp 2-3.
Ex. P709, Stenographic Transcript of the 14th Session of the SDC, 11 October 1993, p. 32 (emphasis added).
231
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deserters.2129 Peri{i} also stated that he had found the appropriate solutions to deal with those who
refused to respond to the call, including early retirement:
For instance, if someone doesn’t want to go and has over 30 years of pensionable employment, we
can give him early retirement so that we’re not accepting this. We’ll tell him that he is not
performing his duties in a satisfactory manner and other things, but we won’t write that he did not
want to go there.2130
767.
Momir Bulatovi}, though in favour of obligatory deployment, expressed concern that such a
coercive method would become public and suggested that the order be revised in that regard.2131 To
meet this concern, Peri{i} amended the order and presented the new version at the following SDC
session held on 10 November.2132 Although the new version of the draft order did not contain any
reference to the termination of service of VJ members who refused to transfer to the VRS or SVK,
it suggested that such refusal would have an adverse impact on the future promotion of those
soldiers within the VJ. Peri{i} eventually agreed to delete that part of the draft, accepting
Milo{evi}’s remark that the addition was superfluous, as the power to refuse promotion was already
within Peri{i}’s purview.2133
768.
The SDC members agreed that the order should be kept secret and that no mention should
be made of the fact that “failure to go [to the VRS and SVK] meant termination of service in the
[VJ]”.2134
2. Legal Documents Establishing the Personnel Centres
769.
The final version of the order was eventually signed by Lili} on 10 November 1993 and, in
fact, contained no reference to coercive or punitive measures for those VJ military personnel who
refused to be transferred.2135
770.
2129
2130
2131
2132
2133
2134
2135
The order, due to its importance for the present case, deserves to be quoted in its entirety:
Ex. P709, Stenographic Transcript of the 14th Session of the SDC, 11 October 1993, p. 33. See also Ex. P780,
Stenographic Transcript of the 15th Session of the SDC, 10 November 1993, p. 5.
Ex. P709, Stenographic Transcript of the 14th Session of the SDC, 11 October 1993, p. 35. See also Ex. P1872,
Set of VJ General Staff and FRY MOD Documents, Doc ID 0630-6544, pp 2-3; Ex. P780, Stenographic
Transcript of the 15th Session of the SDC, 10 November 1993, p. 18; Ex. P731, Presidential Order on the
Formation of Special PCs, 10 November 1993.
Ex. P709, Stenographic Transcript of the 14th Session of the SDC, 11 October 1993, pp 33-36. Peri{i} stated
“[j]ust so we do not have to wait for the next Council session, should I throw out everything that pertains to
repressive actions – if they wont go – and leave everything else in the order?”; Lili} responded that the matter
would have to be discussed at the next Council session, ibid., pp 35, 37.
Ex. P780, Stenographic Transcript of the 15th Session of the SDC, 10 November 1993, p. 17.
Ex. P780, Stenographic Transcript of the 15th Session of the SDC, 10 November 1993, p. 20; Ex. P744,
Conclusions from the 15th Session of the SDC, 1 December 1993, p. 2.
Ex. P780, Stenographic Transcript of the 15th Session of the SDC, 10 November 1993, pp 18-21.
Ex. P731, Presidential Order on the Formation of Special PCs, 10 November 1993.
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1.
The General Staff of the [VJ] shall organise and keep a special record of the active-duty
servicemen, contract servicemen and civilian employees of the former JNA […] who
remained in the territory of the [RS] and [RSK], and the professional servicemen and
civilians employed in the [VJ] who were born in the former SFRY […] republics of
Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina and were admitted to military schools or joined the
JNA from these republics.
The individuals mentioned in the previous paragraph shall be dispatched, assigned,
transferred and appointed to appropriate posts by the competent officer in the [VJ],
depending on the needs of service and the individual’s abilities, as per establishment of
personnel centres that will be set up by the Chief of the General Staff of the [VJ].
2.
The General Staff of the [VJ] is under obligation to enable all the other professional
servicemen of the [VJ] to be dispatched, assigned or transferred to the appropriate
personnel centre at their request and with the approval of the head of the personnel
centre, depending on the needs of service.
3.
While performing their duties following the order on dispatch, assignment, transfer and
appointment to a post at a personnel centre, individuals from items 1 and 2 of this Order
shall carry out their professional duties in accordance with the special work plan of the
personnel centre.
Throughout this period, these individuals shall retain all the rights pertaining to their
rank and qualification and retain the salary they had in the post they occupied before the
current assignment or they shall receive the salary envisaged for the new post, whichever
is more favourable for the individual.
4.
To ensure that the special personnel centres operate as planned, the Chief of the General
Staff of the [VJ] shall determine: the organisation and establishment of special personnel
centres; the manner of operation and a plan of activities, the number and makeup of
professional servicemen and civilians who are dispatched, assigned and transferred to
personnel centres; the manner procedure and period of engaging individuals (including
professional officers whose appointment falls within the competence of the FRY
President) according to this plan of activities, and the manner of and procedure for
resolving situations that arise during service and the protection of rights arising from the
service for individuals and members of their families.
The Chief of the General Staff may authorise other officers of the [VJ] to carry out some
assignments from this Order.
5.
771.
For the implementation of all the assignments from this Order that fall within the
competence of the [FRY MOD], ensure full coordination and cooperation between the
General Staff of the [VJ] and this Ministry. 2136
Subsequently on 12 November 1993, Peri{i} issued an order executing Lili}’s order and
delegating that the VJ General Staff Personnel Administration draft instructions on the functioning
of the personnel centres.2137 Peri{i}’s order further delegated that the VJ General Staff Chief of the
Personnel Administration issue orders on the dispatch, deployment, relocation and appointment of
professional soldiers up to the rank of colonel and civilians.2138 As for professional soldiers with the
2136
2137
2138
Ibid.
Ex. P732, Order of the Chief of the VJ General Staff on the PCs, 12 November 1993, pp 2-3, points 3, 9. See
also Stamenko Nikoli}, T. 10542.
Ex. P732, Order of the Chief of the VJ General Staff on the PCs, 12 November 1993, p. 2, point 7. See also
Miodrag Star~evi}, T. 5448-5450.
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rank of general, as well as military judges and prosecutors, the Chief of the Personnel
Administration had to submit his proposals to Peri{i}.2139
772.
On 15 November 1993, the 30th and 40th Personnel Centres (“PCs”) were formally
established.2140 According to Star~evi}, the establishment of the 30th and 40th PCs was in
accordance with Peri{i}’s authority as Chief of the General Staff to establish the organisation of the
army and its units.2141 The 30th PC was in charge of former JNA or VJ officers deployed to the
VRS2142 and the 40th PC managed the officers sent to the SVK.2143 They were also known as
Military Post 3001 and Military Post 4001, respectively,2144 and were directly subordinated to the
Head of the VJ General Staff Personnel Administration.2145 The 30th and 40th PCs were located in
the buildings of the VJ General Staff in Belgrade, on the premises of the Personnel
Administration.2146
773.
On 8 December 1993, the VJ General Staff Instructions on the Functioning and Programme
of Activities of Special PCs (“Instructions”) signed by Peri{i} came into force.2147 According to the
Instructions, the PCs had to form and manage “precise records of status and any changes in the
personal profile of professional soldiers and civilian personnel” in line with Lili}’s order of
10 November 1993.2148 In addition, the PCs were also required to keep record of the personnel who
refused to be transferred to the VRS and SVK.2149
2139
2140
2141
2142
2143
2144
2145
2146
2147
2148
2149
Ex. P732, Order of the Chief of the VJ General Staff on the PCs, 12 November 1993, pp 2-3, point 7.
Ex. P733, Order of the Chief of the VJ General Staff, 15 November 1993.
Miodrag Star~evi}, T. 5445, testifying that Article 5, para. 2, item 1 of the Law on the VJ was the legal basis
upon which new units - 30th and 40th PCs - were created within the VJ; Ex. P197, Law on the VJ, 18 May 1994.
Article 5 of the Law on VJ defines the role and position of the General Staff of the VJ as the highest professional
and staff organ for the preparation and use of the VJ in times of peace and war.
MP-5, T. 2424-2425; MP-14, T. 3507-3508 (closed session); Mladen Mihajlovi}, T. 3976; Branko Gaji},
T. 10903-10904, 10987. See also Stojan Mal~i}, T. 11213-11214; Ex. D241, Order of the SFRY Presidency,
28 April 1992.
MP-5, T. 2424-2425; MP-14, T. 3507-3508 (closed session); Ex. P730, Decision of the FRY SDC, pp 1, 3-4;
Stamenko Nikoli}, T. 10503-10504.
Ex. P733, Order of the Chief of the VJ General Staff, 15 November 1993; MP-5, T. 2376-2377, 2424; MP-80,
T. 8317 (closed session); Miodrag Star~evi}, T. 5449.
Ex. P733, Order of the Chief of the VJ General Staff, 15 November 1993, p. 2, point 3, also stating that the Head
of Personnel Administration “will regulate assignments, deployment and all other issues related to the existence
and functioning of [PCs] in collaboration with the VJ General Staff organs in charge”.
Mladen Mihajlovi}, T. 3924 (private session). It was a branch office of the VJ General Staff made up of about
ten people including officers and civilians, MP-80, T. 8565 (closed session). See Stojan Mal~i}, T. 11244-11245.
Ex. P732, Order of the Chief of the VJ General Staff on the PCs, 12 November 1993, para. 9; Ex. P734, VJ
General Staff Instructions on the PCs, 8 December 1993. See also Ex. P731, Presidential Order on the Formation
of Special PCs, 10 November 1993, para. 4.
Ex. P734, VJ General Staff Instructions on the PCs, 8 December 1993, para. 14.
Ibid.
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774.
All of the records kept by the PCs, including the issues related to status, promotion or the
exercise of the other service rights of members of the PCs, were regulated in line with the law
applicable to the VJ.2150
775.
The Instructions also regulated the “dispatch and transfer” of VJ professional soldiers and
civilian personnel to the 30th and 40th PCs,2151 establishing that while transferred, these servicemen
would retain the position they held prior to their dispatch to the PCs.2152 The Instructions equally
provided that upon receipt of the transfer order, these personnel were to hand over duties and report
“to the relevant [PC] officer […], that is to say to report to any other destination stipulated in the
call-up of the [VJ] General Staff Personnel Administration”.2153
776.
Moreover, the Instructions clearly stated that all of the decisions or orders regulating the
service of these personnel should only be issued orally to the individuals to whom they referred.2154
They prohibited the personnel and command organs, as well as officers, to provide copies,
photocopies or extracts from the decisions or orders to the personnel to whom they referred.2155
Finally, the Instructions provided for the redeployment of professional soldiers and civilian
personnel from the PCs to the VJ.2156
777.
The Trial Chamber finds that Peri{i} had a decisive role in the creation of the PCs. The
evidence set out above shows that he conceived and subsequently carefully implemented the idea to
create such centres to: (i) regularise the status of all former JNA and VJ military personnel who
remained in BiH and Croatia and (ii) to legalise, as far as possible, the deployment of VJ military
personnel to the VRS and SVK. In doing so, Peri{i} intended to meet the requests for military
personnel by the VRS and SVK Main Staffs. The statement of reasons accompanying the proposed
order on the creation of the PCs, as well as the discussions held during the SDC sessions of
11 October and 10 November 1993,2157 conclusively establish that Peri{i} designed the formation of
the PCs. His role in this process was confirmed by Peri{i} himself, who at the SDC session of
30 August 1995 reminded the SDC members that he was the one who “advocated” for the idea of
2150
2151
2152
2153
2154
2155
2156
2157
Ex. P734, VJ General Staff Instructions on the PCs, 8 December 1993, paras 4, 18, 25-32; Miodrag Star~evi},
T. 6921-6922. See also Stamenko Nikoli}, T. 10543-10544.
Ex. P734, VJ General Staff Instructions on the PCs, 8 December 1993, paras 19-24.
Ex. P734, VJ General Staff Instructions on the PCs, 8 December 1993, para. 21.
Ex. P734, VJ General Staff Instructions on the PCs, 8 December 1993, para. 23.
Ex. P734, VJ General Staff Instructions on the PCs, 8 December 1993, para. 12.
Ex. P734, VJ General Staff Instructions on the PCs, 8 December 1993, paras 12-13.
Ex. P734, VJ General Staff Instructions on the PCs, 8 December 1993, para. 33. See also Miodrag Star~evi},
T. 6923-6924.
See Ex. P1872, Set of VJ General Staff and MOD Documents, Doc ID 0630-6544; Ex. P1873, Set of VJ General
Staff and MOD Documents, Doc ID 0630-6538; Ex. P709, Stenographic Transcript of the 14th Session of the
SDC, 11 October 1993; Ex. P780, Stenographic Transcript of the 15th Session of the SDC, 10 November 1993.
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sending all those military personnel who originated from Croatia and the BiH to serve in the SVK
and VRS.2158
3. The Role of the 30th and the 40th PCs and their Secrecy
778.
According to the Prosecution, the structure and purpose of the PCs were an “elaborate
deception”.2159 In the Prosecution’s theory, Peri{i} created the PCs with the excuse of keeping a
record of the members of the former JNA or VJ born in Croatia and Bosnia who joined the SVK or
VRS, while his real purpose was to find a legal cover to dispatch VJ soldiers to participate in the
war in Bosnia and Croatia. According to the Prosecution, it was vital to maintain secrecy over the
true role of the PCs in order to conceal the VJ’s involvement in those conflicts from the local and
international community.2160
779.
The Defence instead contends that the PCs were “administrative bodies” established for the
purpose of registering certain professional officers of the VRS and SVK and that their mandate was
defined by an order of the President of the FRY, Lili}.2161 As regards the secrecy surrounding the
PCs, the Defence states it is normal for matters concerning the army and state security to be treated
with the “highest level of secrecy” in order to safeguard state interests.2162
780.
As detailed in the aforesaid Instructions and as stated by numerous witnesses, the PCs’
functions included the regulation of paperwork and maintenance of records of VJ personnel serving
in the VRS and SVK.2163 These functions allowed their members to enjoy all of the rights and
entitlements of VJ officers and receive salaries commensurate to their ranks.2164 As will be
described in greater detail in the following paragraphs, through the PCs, members could, inter alia,
apply for VJ pension plans, compensation for service in difficult conditions, housing benefits and
education grants.2165
781.
However, the Trial Chamber also received evidence showing that the main purpose of the
PCs was to effectively enable the transfer and assignment of VJ officers to the SVK and VRS2166
2158
2159
2160
2161
2162
2163
2164
2165
2166
Ex. P778, Stenographic Transcript of the 25th Session of the SDC, 30 August 1994, p. 66.
Prosecution Opening Statement, T. 371.
Indictment, para. 11; Prosecution Opening Statement, T. 380-384 (partly closed session); Prosecution Final
Brief, para. 151.
Defence Opening Statement, T. 9884. See Defence Final Brief, paras 249-261.
Defence Final Brief, para. 269.
Ex. P734, VJ General Staff Instructions on the PCs, 8 December 1993, paras 14-18; MP-5, T. 2425-2426;
Milenko Jev|evi}, T. 11077-11078; Stojan Mal~i}, T. 11243-11244, 11274, 11312, 11314; Du{an Kova~evi},
T. 12622.
Ex. P734, VJ General Staff Instructions on the PCs, 8 December 1993, paras 14-18, 21; Stamenko Nikoli},
T. 10535-10537.
See infra section VI.A.8.(b)-(f).
Rade Orli}, T. 5721; Rade Ra{eta, T. 6026; MP-80, T. 8305 (closed session). See also Petar [krbi}, T. 11944.
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and, if necessary, their subsequent redeployment to the VJ.2167 When VJ officers were formally
transferred to either the 30th or 40th PCs in Belgrade, they were, in fact, relocated to positions within
the VRS and SVK respectively.2168 Peri{i} himself explained that “[i]n our orders, for instance, we
write to them: the commander of such and such a unit shall be deployed in a training corps which is
supposed to be here, but in fact he is going over there”.2169 Similarly, at the SDC session held on 10
November 1993, Peri{i} openly stated:
An officer is appointed there [to the PC] as per the formation elements and the like, like in our
case but he in fact works in [RS]. We also have the [PC] which is for the [RSK]. They have all the
rights as if they were in the [VJ] here, with regard to everything, except that they are physically
absent, they’re on the front.2170
782.
As a measure to maintain the secrecy of the VJ involvement in the transfer of VJ officers to
the VRS and SVK from the local and international public, the deployment orders delivered to these
officers would refer to deployment to the PCs in Belgrade, but would not mention the RS or the
RSK.2171
783.
A year later, during the SDC session held on 21 July 1994, Lili} commented: “[W]e have
made very good decisions with regard to transferring officers born in [RS] and [RSK] and the 30th
and 40th staff centre [sic] has been formed for that purpose. This has functioned very well in
practice so far”.2172 At the same session, Peri{i} reported:
As for the [VRS and SVK][…], about 6,800 officers there are taking care of the system, people
and organisation, and fighting successfully. To date, at their request, we have sent a total of 3,795
more on permanent transfer and 187 on rotational basis.2173
784.
Several witnesses testified about covert transfers to the VRS and SVK through the PCs. For
instance, when commenting on Dragomir Milo{evi}’s appointment to the 30th PC, Stamenko
Nikoli} stated that he “was not appointed to the personnel centre. He was sent or seconded to the
VRS through the 30th PC, and that is something that the personnel centre does, and it is part of its
2167
2168
2169
2170
2171
2172
See infra section VI.A.7; Ex. P734, VJ General Staff Instructions on the PCs, 8 December 1993, para. 33; MP-5,
T. 2462; Rade Ra{eta, T. 6026.
MP-80, T. 8305, 8316-8318 (clossed session); Petar [krbi}, T. 11553, 11944; MP-5, T. 2376-2378. MP-5’s
military ID card states that when he was promoted, he was serving at the military post 3001 in Belgrade, whereas
he was in fact working in BiH, MP-5, T. 2387-2388, 2432-2433 (partly private session); Ex. P397 (under seal),
p. 5; Rade Orli}, T. 5721. See e.g. Ex. P1895, Order by VJ General Staff Personnel Administration, 15 February
1994; Ex. P1056, Documents Regarding Assignment of Officers to the VRS Drina Corps, December 1993;
Ex. P2127, Order of the VJ Special Units Corps Command, 5 November 1993; Ex. P2128, Order by VJ General
Staff Personnel Administration, 7 February 1994; Ex. P2129, Order by VJ General Staff Personnel
Administration, 9 February 1994; Ex. P2112, Order by VJ General Staff Personnel Administration, 15 February
1994.
Ex. P709, Stenographic Transcript of the 14th Session of the SDC, 11 October 1993, p. 33.
Ex. P780, Stenographic Transcript of the 15th Session of the SDC, 10 November 1993, p. 19.
Ex. P709, Stenographic Transcript of the 14th Session of the SDC, 11 October 1993, pp 33-34, 36; Ex. P780,
Stenographic Transcript of the 15th Session of the SDC, 10 November 1993, p. 21.
Ex. P785, Stenographic Transcript of the 23rd Session of the SDC, 21 July 1994, p. 20.
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programme”.2174 He also stated that reference to the PCs instead of the VRS or SVK was necessary,
as that information needed to be secret.2175
785.
The Trial Chamber further notes that Exhibit P1523 also illustrates this covert transfer of VJ
officers through the PCs. Exhibit P1523 is an order of the Chief of the Personnel Administration of
the VJ General Staff dated 15 February 1994 which appoints Bogdan Sladojevi} and Milan
^eleketi} to the 11th and 18th Corps, respectively, of the 40th PC.2176 On its face, the order seems to
transfer the two officers to Belgrade-based garrisons, respectively numbered 683 and 669.2177
Stamenko Nikoli} explained that neither the 11th nor the 18th Corps ever existed in the VJ.2178
Instead, both Corps were part of the SVK and the two garrison numbers mentioned in the order
refer, in fact, to the 11th and 18th Corps command in the SVK and not to Belgrade garrisons.2179 In
addition, Nikoli} commented on the date “101193” (10 November 1993) printed in relation to each
officer’s appointment and explained that the date was a code for Lili}’s order of 10 November 1993
regarding the formation of the PCs.2180 The witness added that Sladojevi} had been transferred to
the SVK before 15 February 1994 and that, in his view, the Chief of Personnel Administration
issued the order to bring previous transfer orders in line with Lili}’s order of 10 November 1993.2181
786.
The fact that the PCs were not purely administrative bodies is equally evidenced by Lili}’s
order of February 1994 that the VJ supply the 30th and 40th PCs with weapons and military
equipment. To this end, the order further authorised the Chief of VJ General Staff to reconcile the
needs of the PCs with the means of the VJ and to regulate the supply of weapons and military
equipment to the PCs.2182
2173
2174
2175
2176
2177
2178
2179
2180
2181
2182
Ex. P785, Stenographic Transcript of the 23rd Session of the SDC, 21 July 1994, p. 19.
Stamenko Nikoli}, T. 10667. See Stamenko Nikoli}, T. 10604-10606, 10663-10666; Ex. P2113, Order by VJ
General Staff Personnel Administration, 15 February 1994, p. 3. See also Rodojica Kadijevi}, T. 13711;
Ex. P798, Stenographic Transcript of the 44th Session of the SDC, 12 September 1995, p. 7; Ex. P1894, Order by
VJ General Staff Personnel Administration, 26 September 1994; Ex. P1523, Order by VJ General Staff
Personnel Administration, 15 February 1994; Petar [krbi}, T. 11552-11553, 11944, 11968-11969, 12025-12026;
Ex. P1688, VJ Personnel File of Petar [krbi}, Doc ID 0611-5209, p. 5; Ex. P2115, Order by VJ General Staff
Personnel Administration, 26 September 1994, p. 3; Ex. P2103, Drina Corps Order, 30 August 1995; Branko
Gaji}, T. 11006-11007; Ex. P2128, Order by VJ General Staff Personnel Administration, 7 February 1994, pp 1,
27-28; Ex. D305, Report on Taking Up Duties of Stojan Mal~i}, 7 February 1994; Stojan Mal~i}, T. 1127311275, 11277-11278.
Stamenko Nikoli}, T. 10560, 10638.
Ex. P1523, Order by VJ General Staff Personnel Administration, 15 February 1994, pp 2-3.
Ibid.
Stamenko Nikoli}, T. 10604-10605.
Stamenko Nikoli}, T. 10605-10606. See also MP-80, T. 8317 (closed session).
Stamenko Nikoli}, T. 10604-10605; Ex. P1523, Order by VJ General Staff Personnel Administration,
15 February 1994, p. 2; Ex. P731, Presidential Order on the Formation of Special PCs, 10 November 1993. See
also supra paras 763-770.
Stamenko Nikoli}, T. 10606.
Ex. P1009, Order of the President of the FRY, 18 February 1994.
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787.
In conclusion, the Trial Chamber is satisfied that the PCs’ main function was to regulate the
status of all those former JNA/VJ officers who remained to serve in the SVK and VRS after the
withdrawal of the JNA and to allow the VJ to secretly transfer VJ military personnel to the VRS
and SVK, ensuring that they all continued to enjoy and exercise their rights in the VJ and FRY
while serving in those armies. To this end, the PCs accessory function was to keep record of all
former JNA and VJ personnel serving in the VRS and SVK. The Trial Chamber is equally satisfied
that all the SDC members, as well as Peri{i}, intended to keep this function and the VJ involvement
in the conflicts secret in order to avoid criticism or risking further sanctions from the international
community. As described above, under the cover of a formal appointment to the PCs, VJ personnel
were transferred directly to the VRS and SVK. The need and intention to keep this function secret
was clearly expressed at the SDC session of 11 October 1993 while discussing the order on the
establishment of the PCs. Peri{i} admitted that the establishment of the PCs had been devised in
order to “avoid having anyone criticise us” for the number of former JNA and VJ personnel serving
in the VRS and SVK.2183 Momir Bulatovi} instead expressed his concern that, should the document
fall into anybody’s hands, the FRY would face sanctions “for ten years”.2184 Slobodan Milo{evi}
too stressed that only a single copy of the proposal should stay with Peri{i}.2185 The need to ensure
secrecy was stressed again at the following session of 10 November 1993, when the order was
finalised and eventually signed. Bulatovi} stated that the order should remain confidential “because
this is a very sensitive issue” to which Slobodan Milo{evi} responded “[t]here is only one copy and
General Momo has it”.2186
4. Appointment and Transfers to the VRS and SVK through the Personnel Centres
788.
The Law on the VJ came into force in October 1993 and based on Article 152, Peri{i} and
the commanding officers of the units or institutions designated by him had the authority to “appoint
and transfer professional non-commissioned and commissioned officers up to and including the
rank of colonel and issue decisions on their service”.2187 On 5 May 1994, Peri{i} authorised the
Chief of the VJ General Staff Personnel Administration to:
[A]ppoint professional non-commissioned officers and professional officers up to the rank of
Colonel according to the peacetime establishment and decide on their dismissal from duty;
transfer and assign professional non-commissioned officers and professional officers up to the
rank of Lieutenant-Colonel if those individuals are being transferred or assigned to the military
2183
2184
2185
2186
2187
Ex P709, Stenographic Transcript of the 14th Session of the SDC, 11 October 1993, p. 32.
Ex P709, Stenographic Transcript of the 14th Session of the SDC, 11 October 1993, p. 36.
Ex P709, Stenographic Transcript of the 14th Session of the SDC, 11 October 1993, p. 33.
Ex. P780, Stenographic Transcript of the 15th Session of the SDC, 10 November 1993, p. 21.
Ex. P197, Law on the VJ, 18 May 1994, Article 152(4). The Law on the VJ passed and was published in the
Official Gazette in May 1994. However, it was already in force legally since October 1993, when it was adopted
by the Chamber of Citizens (lower house of Parliament), Miodrag Star~evi}, T. 5436-5437.
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unit or military institution directly subordinate to the General Staff or the General Staff
Organisation unit.2188
789.
These provisions, together with Peri{i}’s order of 12 November 1993,2189 formed the basis
of the orders of appointment and/or transfer of VJ officers to the VRS and SVK after the
establishment of the PCs. These orders were issued by the Chief of the Personnel Administration of
the VJ General Staff, to whom Peri{i} had delegated such authority, or by Peri{i} himself, and
transferred and/or appointed VJ officers to positions within the 30th or 40th PCs.2190 As explained
above, these officers were in fact taking up positions in the VRS and SVK.2191 A number of these
orders were issued to harmonise the status and position of military personnel who remained or were
deployed to the VRS and SVK before the establishment of the PCs.2192
790.
The appointment and/or transfer orders were issued to meet pressing requests from the VRS
and SVK to the VJ for personnel assistance. The evidence shows that the VRS Main Staff requested
military personnel in general2193 and occasionally requested specifically identified officers.2194 For
example, in April 1995, Mladi} requested Peri{i} to send two VJ officers, Colonel Rade Kati} and
Lieutenant Colonel Radoslav Jankovi}, to the VRS;2195 in May 1995, Milovanovi} requested
2188
2189
2190
2191
2192
2193
2194
2195
Ex. D124, Order by Chief of the VJ General Staff, 5 May 1994, paras 7(4)-7(5).
Ex. P197, Law on the VJ, 18 May 1994, Article 152; Ex. P732, Order of the Chief of the VJ General Staff on the
PCs, 12 November 1993. See Ex. D124, Order by Chief of the VJ General Staff, 5 May 1994.
Ex. P732, Order of the Chief of the VJ General Staff on the PCs, 12 November 1993, para. 7; Miodrag Star~evi},
T. 5448-5450. See also supra paras 773-775; Ex. P1524, Order of the Chief of the VJ General Staff Redeploying
Bogdan Sladojevi}, 5 October 1994; Ex. P1690, VJ Personnel File of Du{an Smiljani}, Doc ID 0611-7979, p. 1;
Ex. P1691, VJ Personnel File of Stojan [panovi}, Doc ID 0611-6334, p. 2; Ex. P1686, VJ Personnel File of
Dragan [arac, Doc ID 0611-4956, p. 2; Ex. P1893, VJ Personnel File of Radislav Krsti}, Doc ID 0422-8342,
p. 1. See further for appointments and transfers to the 30th PC: Ex. P2128, Order by VJ General Staff Personnel
Administration, 7 February 1994; Ex. P2129, Order by VJ General Staff Personnel Administration, 9 February
1994; Ex. P2113, Order by VJ General Staff Personnel Administration, 15 February 1994; Ex. P2114, Order by
VJ General Staff Personnel Administration, 26 September 1994; Ex. P2115, Order by VJ General Staff
Personnel Administration, 26 September 1994; Ex. P2116, Order by VJ General Staff Personnel Administration,
26 September 1994; Ex. P2117, Order by VJ General Staff Personnel Administration, 14 December 1994;
Ex. P2118, Order by VJ General Staff Personnel Administration, 14 December 1994; Ex. P2121, Order by VJ
General Staff Personnel Administration, 7 June 1994; Ex. P2122, Order by VJ General Staff Personnel
Administration, 7 June 1994; Ex. P1894, Order by VJ General Staff Personnel Administration, 26 September
1994; Ex. P2125, Order by VJ General Staff Personnel Administration, 6 October 1995; Ex. P2126, Order by VJ
General Staff Personnel Administration, 12 August 1995. For appointments and transfers to the 40th PC see:
Ex. P1523, Order by VJ General Staff Personnel Administration, 15 February 1994; Ex. P1895, Order by VJ
General Staff Personnel Administration, 15 February 1994; Ex. P2127, Order of the VJ Special Units Corps
Command, 5 November 1993. See also infra para811.
See supra para. 787.
Ex. P2128, Order by VJ General Staff Personnel Administration, 7 February 1994; Ex. P2129, Order by VJ
General Staff Personnel Administration, 9 February 1994; Ex. P2113, Order by VJ General Staff Personnel
Administration, 15 February 1994. See also Stojan Mal~i} explaining that these orders were issued a few months
after the official establishment of the PCs on 10 November 1993, as it took a couple of months to set up the
necessary records of the active duty personnel, T. 11273-11274.
Ex. P2725, VRS Proposal for Authorisation to Admit Professional Contract Officers into the VRS, 12 June 1995.
See also Ex. P785, Stenographic Transcript of the 23rd Session of the SDC, 21 July 1994, p. 19.
Ex. P2518, VRS Request for Secondment of Two Officers to the VRS, 23 May 1995; Ex. P2519, VRS Request
for Secondment of Two Officers to the VRS, 25 April 1995.
Ex. P2519, VRS Request for Secondment of Two Officers to the VRS, 25 April 1995.
240
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Lieutenant Colonel Svetozar Kosori} and Lieutenant Colonel Branko Karlica specifically.2196 The
evidence shows that Jankovi} and Kosori} were indeed transferred to the VRS and were later
involved in the attacks against Srebrenica of July 1995.2197
791.
Similarly, in addition to general requests,2198 the SVK also made specific requests to the VJ,
including to Peri{i} personally, for specifically named officers.2199 By way of example, in May
1994, ^eleketi} requested the VJ General Staff to send 60 named officers.2200 On 21 July 1994,
Marti} and ^eleketi} requested 25 combat aviation pilots and 15 helicopter pilots.2201 On 6 October
1995, ^eleketi} requested six named VJ officers for the SVK 1st Light Infantry Brigade.2202 On 8
October 1995, Lon~ar sent a request to Peri{i} personally for named VJ officers for the 11th
Corps.2203
792.
According to MP-80, about ten percent of the SVK officers had their status regulated
through the 40th PC.2204 Rade Rašeta, a JNA and VJ career officer serving in the SVK as a member
of the 40th PC, stated that all members of the SVK Main Staff collegium, which was made up of
inter alia the Chief of the Main Staff, Assistant for Logistics and Assistant for Morale, were
officers assigned to the 40th PC.2205
793.
As for the number of officers transferred to the VRS and SVK, the record of the SDC
session of 11 October 1993 shows that at the time there were 3,612 VJ officers in the VRS and
SVK.2206 A report drafted in 2001 states that at the time of its establishment in 1993, the 30th PC
was comprised of 4,183 men (2,461 professional servicemen and 1,722 civilians).2207 On
2196
2197
2198
2199
2200
2201
2202
2203
2204
2205
2206
2207
Ex. P2518, Request From the VRS Main Staff to the VJ Chief of General Staff Personally for Secondment of
two Officers to the VRS, 23 May 1995.
Ex. P2097, List of Professional Officers Who Reported for Duty in the Drina Corps, 24 August 1995; Ex. P2696,
Excerpt of VJ Personnel File of Radoslav Jankovi}, Doc ID 0422-2995, p. 2; Sini{a Borovi}, T. 14132-14133;
Ex. P437, Video Clip of Second Hotel “Fontana” Meeting, 11 July 1995; Richard Butler, T. 6569; Ex. P2518,
VRS Request for Secondment of Two Officers to the VRS, 23 May 1995; Ex. P2519, VRS Request for
Secondment of Two Officers to the VRS, 25 April 1995. See supra para. 625.
Ex. P1132, Request of the SVK for Military Personnel, 20 June 1993; Ex. D393, Note of the Chief of the VJ
General Staff, 12 September 1993 (stating that the SVK request for volunteers from the VJ will be discussed by
the SDC); Ex P1152, Correspondence Between SVK and VJ Regarding Recruitment of Officers, 17 January
1994. See Ex. P712, Minutes from the 17th Session of the SDC, 14 January 1994, p. 2. See also Ex. P1149,
Correspondence Between the SVK Commander and VJ General Staff on Recruitment of Volunteers on FRY
Territory, 22 February 1995.
Ex. P1133, Request of the RSK President, 21 July 1994, Doc IDs 0118-5617, p. 1, 0118-5625. See also
Ex. P2625, SVK Summary for the Coordination of Tasks in the VJ General Staff, 15 February 1994, p. 14;
Ex. P2146, HV Intelligence Administration Report, 11 July 1995; Ex. P1456, Intelligence Note, 10 July 1995.
Ex. P875, SVK Request for Officers, 14 May 1994.
Ex. P1125, Request by the RSK President to the VJ for Assistance in Recruitment and Materiel, 21 July 1994.
See MP-80, T. 8382-8383 (closed session).
Ex. P2620, SVK Request to VJ Chief of General Staff for Personnel Assistance, 6 October 1995.
Ex. P2779, SVK Request to VJ Chief of General Staff for Personnel Assistance, 8 October 1995.
MP-80, T. 8332 (closed session).
Rade Rašeta, T. 5928. See also Ex. P1132, Request of the SVK for Military Personnel, 20 June 1993.
Ex. P709, Stenographic Transcript of the 14th Session of the SDC, 11 October 1993, p. 32.
Ex. P737, Report of the VJ General Staff Regarding the 30th PC, 17 March 2001, pp 2-3, 17.
241
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10 November 1993, there were 2,477 VJ officers in the VRS, with an additional 205 officers
expected to join a few days later.2208 In May 1994, the 30th PC counted 4,281 men (including
civilian personnel);2209 in June 1994, it counted 4,173 men (military and civilian personnel);2210 in
September 1994 - 4,614 men (including civilian personnel);2211 whereas in 1995 - 4,346 men
(including civilian personnel).2212 By September 1996, the 30th PC counted 3,363 professional
soldiers and 1,730 civilian personnel for a total of 5,093 men.2213
794.
As for the 40th PC, the evidence shows that on 10 November 1993, there were 1,192 VJ
officers in the SVK, with another 561 expected to be dispatched by 16 November 1993.2214 In June
1994, the 40th PC counted 1,474 men (military and civilian personnel);2215 and in 1995, 930 military
personnel (excluding civilian personnel).2216
795.
VJ officers who served in the VRS through the 30th PC included key personnel such as:
Ratko Mladi},2217 Manojlo Milovanovi},2218 \or|e \uki},2219 Radivoje Mileti},2220 Milan
Gvero,2221 Zdravko Tolimir,2222 Milenko @ivanovi},2223 Radislav Krsti},2224 Vinko Pandurevi},2225
2208
2209
2210
2211
2212
2213
2214
2215
2216
2217
2218
2219
2220
2221
2222
2223
2224
2225
Ex. P780, Stenographic Transcript of the 15th Session of the SDC, 10 November 1993, p. 5 (reporting that “2,477
are there, another 2,140 are here and 205 will be leaving on the 16th”).
Ex. P2765, VRS Questions for Coordination with the VJ General Staff, 17 May 1994, pp 5-7.
Ex. P776, Stenographic Transcript of the 21st Session of the SDC, 7 June 1994, p. 46.
The number included 2,634 officers, 1,688 civilians and 292 contract soldiers, Ex. P792, Stenographic Transcript
of the 27th Session of the SDC, 27 September 1994, p. 88.
The numbers included 2,664 professional commissioned and non-commissioned officers, Ex. P794,
Stenographic Transcript of the 31st Session of the SDC, 18 January 1995, p. 45. See also Stamenko Nikoli},
T. 10552-10554, 10678-10679; Ex. D246, Numerical Strength of Professional Soldiers in the 30th and the 40th
PCs in May 1995; Petar [krbi}, T. 11835 (private session); Ex. D352 (under seal), 08:40-09:41.
Ex. P1867, Report by VJ Chief of General Staff to FRY President, 4 September 1996, p. 3. See also Ex. P734,
List of Professional Soldiers from the 30th PC, undated, listing 1,445 professional soldiers who served in the 30th
PC for the duration of the conflict, Bretton Randal, T. 4154-4155.
Ex. P780, Stenographic Transcript of the 15th Session of the SDC, 10 November 1993, p. 5.
Ex. P776, Stenographic Transcript of the 21st Session of the SDC, 7 June 1994, p. 46.
Ex. D246, Numerical Strength of Professional Soldiers in the 30th and the 40th PCs in May 1995, p. 3. See
Stamenko Nikoli}, T. 10554-10555.
Ex. P1902, Decree of the FRY President, 16 June 1994. See also Ex. P1901, VJ Personnel File of Ratko Mladi},
Doc IDs 0422-8234, p. 11, 0422-8331.
Ex. P1697, VJ Personnel File of Manojlo Milovanovi}, Doc. ID 0422-2599.
Ex. P1654, VJ Personnel Administration Documents Concerning \orde \uki}, Docs ID 0611-6883, 0611-6887,
0611-6903.
Ex. P1729, VJ Personnel File of Radivoje Mileti}, Doc ID 0422-2361.
Ex. P1899, VJ Personnel File of Milan Gvero, Doc IDs 0422-3303, pp 10-16, 0422-3321.
Ex. P1787, Excerpt from VJ Personnel File of Zdravko Tolimir, Doc ID 0422-2463; Ex. P2128, Order by VJ
General Staff Personnel Administration, 7 February 1994, p. 4.
Ex. P1696, Decision of FRY President, 10 October 1995.
Ex. P1893, VJ Personnel File of Radislav Kristi}, Doc ID 0422-8341; Ex. P2114, Order by VJ General Staff
Personnel Administration, 26 September 1994, p. 2; Ex. P2117, Order by VJ General Staff Personnel
Administration, 14 December 1994, pp 2-3; Ex. P1894, Order by VJ General Staff Personnel Administration,
26 September 1994.
Ex. P1731, VJ Personnel File of Vinko Pandurevi}, Doc ID 0422-8476, pp 6-7; Ex. P1732, Order by VJ General
Staff Personnel Administration, 7 June 1994; Ex. P2121, Order by VJ General Staff Personnel Administration,
7 June 1994, p. 2.
242
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Vujadin Popovi},2226 Ljubi{a Beara,2227 Vidoje Blagojevi},2228 Dragan Joki},2229 Dragan
Obrenovi},2230 Drago Nikoli},2231 Svetozar Andri},2232 Stanislav Gali},2233 Dragomir Milo{evi}2234
and ^edo Sladoje.2235 In addition, the 30th PC regulated the status of Bogdan Suboti},2236 and Du{an
Kova~evi}, RS Minister of Defence from January 1993 until August 1994.2237
796.
Similarly, key personnel who served in the SVK through the 40th PC included Mile
Novakovi},2238 Milan ^eleketi},2239 Borislav \uki}2240 and Du{an Lon~ar.2241
5. Appointment to SVK and VRS Positions and Temporary Transfers
797.
The evidence shows that VJ officers were transferred and/or appointed to the 30th or 40th
PCs by the VJ, whereas the VRS and SVK appointed these officers to specific posts within these
armies.2242 While accepting this as the general rule, the Prosecution argues that on occasion, the VJ
would also appoint PC members to specific posts within the VRS. The prosecution relies on two
orders of appointment, dated 12 August and 6 October 1995, regarding, inter alia, Vujadin Popovi}
and Dragan Obrenovi}.2243 The Prosecution points out that in these cases, the order of transfer and
2226
2227
2228
2229
2230
2231
2232
2233
2234
2235
2236
2237
2238
2239
2240
2241
2242
2243
Ex. P2115, Order by VJ General Staff Personnel Administration, 26 September 1994, p. 3; Ex. P2116, Order by
VJ General Staff Personnel Administration, 26 September 1994, p. 15; Ex. P1934, VJ Personnel File of Vujadin
Popovi}, Doc ID 0422-8609.
Ex. P1920, VJ Personnel File of Ljubi{a Beara, Doc IDs 0603-0574, 0603-0644.
Ex. P2129, Order by VJ General Staff Personnel Administration, 9 February 1994, p. 37; Ex. P2138, Order on
Promotion, 16 June 1995, p. 3.
Ex. P2129, Order by VJ General Staff Personnel Administration, 9 February 1994, pp 37-38; Ex. P1815, Order
by VJ General Staff, 6 October 1995, pp 29-30.
Ex. P2129, Order by VJ General Staff Personnel Administration, 9 February 1994, p. 35; Ex. P2125, Order by
VJ General Staff Personnel Administration, 6 October 1995, pp 2-3; Ex. P1815, Order by VJ General Staff,
6 October 1995, pp 25-26; Ex. P1897, VJ Personnel File of Dragan Obrenovi}, Doc ID 0611-8718, p. 3.
Ex. P1655, VJ Personnel File of Drago Nikoli}, Doc IDs 0422-8711, 0422-8711.
Ex. P2105, Report on Transfer to the 30th PC, 22 March 1994.
Ex. P1770, Certificate by VRS Main Staff, 18 August 1994.
Ex. P2113, Order by VJ General Staff Personnel Administration, 15 February 1994, pp 3-4; Ex. P1754,
Certificate by VJ General Staff, 13 February 1996; Ex. P1755, Certificate by VJ General Staff, 3 May 1996;
Ex. P1752, Excerpt of VJ Personnel File of Dragomir Milošević.
Ex. P738, List of Professional Soldiers from the 30th PC, undated, p. 2; Ex. P1905, Decree of the FRY President,
16 June 2001, p. 2.
Ex. P1907, VJ Personnel File of Bogdan Suboti}, Doc IDs 0611-5577, 0611-5588. See also Ex. D331, RS
Presidential Decree, 15 June 1992.
Du{an Kovačević, T. 12531; Ex. P1906, VJ Personnel File of Du{an Kova~evi}, Doc IDs 0611-5812, 06115814, 0611-5816, 0611-5818, 0611-5832.
Ex. P1777, VJ Personnel File of Mile Novaković, Doc IDs 0611-7664, 0611-7677; Ex. P1912, Decree of the
FRY President, 22 December 1994; Ex. P1921, Decision of the Military Post 4001 Belgrade, 5 May 1994.
Ex. P1911, VJ Personnel File of Milan ^eleketi}, Doc IDs 0611-7931, 0611-7932.
Ex. P1652, VJ Personnel File of Borislav \uki}, Doc IDs 0611-4266, 0611-4274.
Ex. P1681, VJ Personnel File of Du{an Lon~ar, Doc IDS 0611-4838, 0611-4844.
Ex. P1873, Set of VJ General Staff and MOD Documents, Doc ID 0630-6538, p. 2; Ex. P1872, Set of VJ
General Staff and MOD Documents, Doc ID 0630-6544, p. 2. In its closing arguments, the Prosecution did not
dispute that the “VRS and the SVK made the majority of decisions as to assignment to duty within those
armies”, Prosecution Closing Arguments, T. 14689.
Prosecution Final Brief, para. 183, referring to Ex. P2126, Order by VJ General Staff Personnel Administration,
12 August 1995, pp 13-14; Ex. P1815, Order by VJ General Staff Personnel Administration, 6 October 1995,
pp 25-26.
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appointment of VJ military personnel to the VRS through the PCs included internal appointments to
different units within those armies - namely to the positions of Corps Chief of Security Department,
Security and Intelligence Affairs and Infantry Brigade Chief of Staff, respectively.2244
798.
The Defence disputes the proposition that the VJ could decide on appointments within the
VRS and SVK and submits that such decisions were independently made by these armies.2245
799.
The Trial Chamber notes that both Popovi} and Obrenovi} held the positions of Corps Chief
of Security Department, Security and Intelligence Affairs and Infantry Brigade Chief of Staff,
respectively, before the VJ orders of appointment cited by the Prosecution were issued. The order of
12 August 1995 on Popovi}’s appointment, states that the appointment was effective as of 1
February 1995, “when he assumed duty”.2246 This is reflected in his VJ personnel file.2247 Similarly,
the appointment order of 6 October 1995 relating to Obrenovi} states that his appointment to Chief
of Staff of the Infantry Brigade was effective as of 1 August 1995, “when changes were effected in
the unit establishment”.2248 In addition, Obrenovi} was already “transferred and appointed” to the
same position by VJ order of 9 February 1994, effective as of 10 November 1993.2249 As discussed
above, these orders of February 1994, were issued to harmonise the status of VJ personnel already
serving in the VRS or SVK with Lili}’s order establishing the PCs.2250 The evidence therefore
shows that contrary to the Prosecution position, Popovi} and Obrenovi} were not appointed to those
specific positions within the VRS by VJ order. The Trial Chamber therefore finds that while the VJ
appointed VJ personnel to the 30th and 40th PCs, the appointment to specific posts within the VRS
and SVK was done by those armies.
800.
The Trial Chamber was also presented with evidence of instances in which VJ soldiers were
appointed to the VRS or SVK on a temporary basis through the PCs. These appointments were
made pursuant to Article 58 of the Law of the VJ,2251 which notably states:
If duty so requires, a professional soldier may be temporarily assigned to another unit or institution
for the purpose of carrying out specific tasks. The assignment may last up to a year in the course
of a period of five years. 2252
2244
2245
2246
2247
2248
2249
2250
2251
2252
Prosecution Final Brief, para. 183.
Defence Final Brief, paras 272-301.
Ex. P2126, Order by VJ General Staff Personnel Administration, 12 August 1995, p. 14.
Ex. P1934, VJ Personnel File of Vujadin Popovi}, Doc ID 0422-8609, p. 2.
Ex. P1815, Order by VJ General Staff, 6 October 1995, p. 26.
Ex. P2129, Order by VJ General Staff Personnel Administration, 9 February 1994, p. 35.
See supra para. 785.
Ex. P1527, VJ Order on Temporary Assignments to the 30th PC, 3 July 1995, p. 1; Ex. P2518, VRS Request for
Secondment of Two Officers to the VRS, 23 May 1995.
Ex. P197, Law on the VJ, 18 May 1994, Article 58.
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801.
An example of such a temporary deployment is an order dated 3 July 1995, temporarily
assigning Bogdan Sladojevi} and Momir Vranje{ to the 30th PC. The document states that the
transfers would last one year, in accordance with Article 58(3) of the Law on the VJ, and that upon
termination the two officers were to return to the unit/institution from which they were
transferred.2253 In May 1995, VRS Main Staff requested Peri{i} to dispatch Svetozar Kosori} and
Branko Karlica to the VRS pursuant to Article 58 of the Law on the VJ.2254 Sini{a Borovi} - the
Chef de Cabinet of the Chief of the VJ General Staff from November 1994 until December 19962255
- testified that Kosori} was temporarily seconded to the VRS in accordance with the VRS request,
and assigned to the Intelligence Department in the Drina Corps Command.2256
802.
There is also evidence that some secondments were made directly to the VRS without going
through the 30th PC. For example, in March 1994, Pani}, the Commander of the Special Units
Corps (“SUC”), agreed to send two sergeants to the VRS for one year pursuant to Article 58 of the
Law on the VJ, with the understanding that the two soldiers were not appointed to the 30th PC and
that they would return to the SUC before the expiration of the year in case of engagement of the
SUC in combat.2257 One of these officers was Milorad Pelemi{, who was later involved in the
takeover of Srebrenica in July 1995 as acting Commander of the 10th Sabotage Detachment.2258
6. VJ Officers who Refused to be Transferred to the VRS and SVK
803.
As discussed earlier, the order establishing the PCs did not contain any provision on the
termination of service of VJ members who refused to comply with a transfer order to the PCs.
Peri{i}, however, made it clear that those VJ officers who refused to take up positions in the SVK
or VRS would be in one way or another dismissed from the VJ.2259 This policy did not change over
time and Peri{i} addressed the issue during the SDC meeting of 21 July 1994. In discussing the
potential deployment of 1,143 men to the VRS and SVK, Peri{i} stressed that he could “only
persuade them and they go or force them out of the [VJ] in another way”.2260 The subsequent
discussion between the SDC members shows that they were concerned by possible complaints filed
2253
2254
2255
2256
2257
2258
2259
2260
Ex. P1527, VJ Order on Temporary Assignments to the 30th PC, 3 July 1995, p. 1.
Ex. P2518, VRS Request for Secondment of Two Officers to the VRS, 23 May 1995.
Sini{a Borovi}, T. 13881.
Ex. P2518, VRS Request for Secondment of Two Officers to the VRS, 23 May 1995; Sini{a Borovi}, T. 14153.
Ex. P2111, Temporary Deployment of VJ Soldiers to VRS, 2 March 1994.
Dra`en Erdemovi}, T. 7940; Ex P2390, Video, 11 July 1995, at 13:47 hours (showing Lieutenant Pelemi{ in
Srebrenica, Dra`en Erdemovi}, T. 7959). See supra para. 715, fn. 2051.
See supra paras 764-768. See also Ex. P2127, Order of the VJ Special Units Corps Command, 5 November
1993; Ex. P878, Tasks Set by Momčilo Perišić at the Supreme Staff Command Meeting of 27 September 1993,
27 October 1993, p. 3.
Ex. P785, Stenographic Transcript of the 23rd Session of the SDC, 21 July 1994, p. 20.
245
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by the affected officers.2261 The SDC finally decided that the deployment of VJ officers to the VRS
and SVK should continue, while concluding that it was necessary to maintain the appearance that
these officers were going on a voluntary basis and that Peri{i} would deal with those who
refused.2262
804.
The Trial Chamber notes that several witnesses contested that such practice in fact took
shape. Sini{a Borovi} commented on two requests from the VRS to Peri{i}, dated respectively April
and May 1995, regarding the provision of specific VJ officers.2263 Both requests bear a handwritten
note by Peri{i} stating that a proposal for their deployment should be prepared only after
consultation with the requested officers.2264 Borovi} stated that no VJ officer was ever forced to go
to the VRS.2265 Petar [krbi} testified that in 1992, those JNA/VJ officers who did not leave for the
VRS were “castigated” whereas those that did were “encouraged and respected by their peers”.2266
However, he also testified that until the end of 1993, when he worked in the Administration for
Information of the VJ General Staff, he had not heard of any VJ officer who had been coerced to
join the VRS as a result of threats of punishment, such as early retirement.2267 Branko Gaji} also
insisted that VJ personnel who joined the VRS and the SVK did so only on a voluntary basis.2268
805.
The Trial Chamber, however, notes that contrary to the abovementioned testimony, the
record contains a solid body of evidence showing that officers assigned to the 30th and 40th PCs in
fact did not have much choice in whether they were transferred. For example, on 5 September 1994,
the Chief of the VJ General Staff ordered the deployment of a number of VJ officers to the 40th PC,
but a number of them either refused to obey the order or subsequently and deliberately left the units
of the 40th PC.2269 Documentary evidence shows that these officers were called for an interview
with Peri{i}, following which the majority accepted to be deployed to the 40th PC, while a
procedure for termination of service was initiated against two officers.2270 The document continues
to state that, should these two officers wish to avoid termination of their professional service, they
2261
2262
2263
2264
2265
2266
2267
2268
2269
2270
Ex. P786, Stenographic Transcript of the 37th Session of the SDC, 13 June 1995, p. 34. See also Ex. P785,
Stenographic Transcript of the 23rd Session of the SDC, 21 July 1994, p. 20.
Ex. P785, Stenographic Transcript of the 23rd Session of the SDC, 21 July 1994, p. 20; Ex. P754, Minutes of the
23rd SDC Session held on 21 July 1994, pp 2-3; Ex. P786, Stenographic Transcript of the 37th Session of the
SDC, 13 June 1995, pp 34-36.
Ex. P2518, VRS Request for Secondment of Two Officers to the VRS, 23 May 1995; Ex. P2519, VRS Request
for Secondment of Two Officers to the VRS, 25 April 1995.
Ibid.
Sini{a Borovi}, T. 14002. See Borivoje Te{i}, T. 2001, 2035-2036; Mladen Mihajlovi}, T. 3976. See also
Ex. P1704, Statement by Manojlo Milovanović on Assignment of Duty in BiH, 9 May 1992.
Petar [krbi}, T. 11592-11593.
Petar [krbi}, T. 11600.
Branko Gaji}, T. 10918-10919, 10923-10924, 10949, 10987.
Ex. P2827, List of Officers who Disobeyed Transfer Orders to 40th PC, 26 September 1994; Ex. P1865, Order by
VJ 3rd Army, 7 October 1994, p. 1; Ex. P2826, List of Officers who Disobeyed Transfer Orders to 40th PC, 30
September 1994.
Ex. P1865, Order by VJ 3rd Army, 7 October 1994.
246
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should report to the units of the 40th PC.2271 Nikoli} testified that this suggested that the termination
of their service was initiated because they refused to go to the SVK and the only way to avoid
termination was to accept deployment to the SVK.2272
806.
A letter sent from the Command of the VJ 1st Army to the VJ General Staff Personnel
Administration dated 24 June 1996 is also illustrative of this policy.2273 The letter reports that Dane
Petrovi}’s request for a regular promotion was denied twice because he had refused transfer to the
40th PC in March and June 1995,2274 in line with the Chief of VJ General Staff opinion regarding
the “decelerated movement in the service” of those active servicemen who refused assignments to
the PCs.2275 In July 1996, Peri{i} temporarily relieved Petrovi} from duty, as he had been declared
partially unfit to perform his duties.2276 Petrovi} appealed this decision to the Supreme Military
Court in Belgrade but his appeal was rejected.2277 He therefore decided to appeal to Slobodan
Milo{evi} directly on 24 December 1997.2278 In this latest appeal, he stated that he had originally
been temporarily deployed to the SVK for six months pursuant to Article 271 of the Law on the
Armed Forces of the SFRY in June 1993. Upon his return to the VJ after six months, however, he
found he had been “tricked and deceived” and that he had also been unlawfully denied
promotion.2279
807.
There is also evidence that VRS officer Lieutenant Colonel Erak filed a complaint in late
1994 to the Recruitment and Personnel Affairs Section of the Drina Corps Command regarding his
transfer to the VRS. The complaint reads as follows:
a)
No one asked me for opinion regarding my transfer to the 30th Personnel Centre. I have
been transferred 7 times so far, and I am of opinion that […] I should not have been
transferred to the VRS without my personal consent; I have refused /to be transferred/ and
that is why I did not sign the report about taking charge of the duty […].
b) I have been transferred to the [VRS] in accordance with Article 58 of the Law on VJ, and
on the same ground I should not have and could not have been transferred to the 30th
[PC].2280
2271
2272
2273
2274
2275
2276
2277
2278
2279
2280
Ex. P1865, Order by VJ 3rd Army, 7 October 1994, 7 October 1994, p. 2.
Stamenko Nikoli}, T. 10653-10654. See also Rade Rašeta, T. 5888-5889.
Ex. P2543, Proposal of 1st Army Command to VJ General Staff Concerning Dane Petrovi}, 24 June 1996.
Ex. P2543, Proposal of 1st Army Command to VJ General Staff Concerning Dane Petrovi}, 24 June 1996, p. 2;
Ex. P2552, Appeal of Dane Petrovi} to Slobodan Milo{evi}, 24 December 1997.
Ex. P2543, Proposal of 1st Army Command to VJ General Staff Concerning Dane Petrovi}, 24 June 1996, p. 2.
Ex. P2545, Order of VJ General Staff to Relieve Dane Petrovi} Temporarily of his Duties, 12 July 1996.
Ex. P2546, Charges of Dane Petrovi} before the Supreme Military Court in Belgrade against VJ General Staff,
26 September 1996; Ex. P2549, Judgement of the Supreme Military Court concerning Dane Petrovi}, 23 January
1997.
Ex. P2552, Appeal of Dane Petrovi} to Slobodan Milo{evi}, 24 December 1997.
Ex. P2552, Appeal of Dane Petrovi} to Slobodan Milo{evi}, 24 December 1997, pp 1-3, 6.
Ex. P1896, Minutes from a Meeting Concerning the Transfer of a Soldier to the VRS, 11 September 1994, p. 1.
247
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Erak ultimately requested to be transferred back to his garrison in Zrenjanin.2281 Petar [krbi}
testified that Erak eventually left the VRS without authorisation and was thus considered a
deserter.2282
808.
MP-80 testified that he was not aware of any officers who directly refused to serve in the
SVK or VRS, but many turned to “dishonorable” means to avoid service, such as getting medical
certificates, sick leave or using connections.2283 MP-14, on the other hand, testified that he was not
given any choice in 1992 as to whether he wanted to remain with the JNA or serve in the VRS. In
his words, he was “left […] there without pay […] and told [he] couldn’t go to Serbia”.2284
809.
The Trial Chamber finds that although many VJ officers volunteered or readily accepted to
be transferred to the VRS or SVK, those who refused or were reticent to go were pressured or
coerced to do so by threats of early retirement or termination of service. The Trial Chamber also
finds that the evidence on the creation of the PCs shows that Peri{i} intended the deployment of VJ
officers to the VRS and SVK to be obligatory under threat of termination of service, but decided not
to include any such clause in writing anywhere in order to avoid litigation that would expose the
involvement of the VJ in the conflict in Croatia and BiH.2285
7. Redeployment to the VJ
810.
The VJ General Staff Instructions, issued by Peri{i} on 8 December 1993, provided that VJ
personnel sent to the VRS or SVK through the 30th and 40th PCs could be redeployed to the VJ. It
stated:
In keeping with service requirements, professional soldiers and civilian personnel sent or
transferred to the [PC] may be returned, assigned or transferred to the ₣VJğ units/institutions with
the consent or on the recommendation of the [PC] Main Staff.2286
Such “consent or recommendations” were to be sent to the PC personnel department, which would
then direct the person “to report to his previous unit/institution or transfer, assign or appoint them to
a post (within the purview of the [Chief of the VJ General Staff] and President of the FRY […]) in
the ₣VJğ”.2287
2281
2282
2283
2284
2285
2286
2287
Ex. P1896, Minutes from a Meeting Concerning the Transfer of a Soldier to the VRS, 11 September 1994, p. 2.
See also Ex. P1858, Letter by VRS Main Staff to Drina Corps Command, 9 November 1994.
Petar [krbi}, T. 11698-11699.
MP-80, T. 8318-8319 (closed session). See also in relation to the 30th PC: Ex. P2561, Statement Concerning
Failure to Report to 30th PC, 31 March 1995; Ex. P2562, Order of the VJ General Staff Concerning the
Temporary Assignment to 30th PC, 3 July 1995; Ex. P2563, Official Note, 31 July 1995.
MP-14, T. 3507 (closed session).
See supra para. 764.
Ex. P734, VJ General Staff Instructions on the PCs, 8 December 1993, para. 33.
Ibid.
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811.
The Personnel Administration of the VJ General Staff also issued instructions specifically to
the 40th PC Main Staff, explaining the procedure for the redeployment of members of the 40th PC to
the VJ.2288 According to the instructions, personnel transferred to the 40th PC could only return to
the VJ in order to “meet needs of the service, or due to health requirements of the person or
members of his family”.2289 Furthermore, the requests for such transfer could be submitted “only
through the 40th [PC] Main Staff and with the 40th [PC] Main Staff Commander’s signature”.2290
However, transfers could “be executed only after ₣receiptğ of response – approval from the [VJ]
General Staff Personnel Administration”.2291
812.
The Trial Chamber was presented with several personnel files which included orders from
the VJ redeploying members from service in the PCs to the VJ. For example, Ðuro Vojkovi} was
redeployed from temporary duty in the “11th Corps of the 40th ₣PCğ” to duty in the VJ “due to
special needs of service” by order of the VJ General Staff on 7 April 1994;2292 Radislav Krsti} was
transferred from the 30th PC to the VJ Military Academy by the VJ General Staff on 18 January
1995;2293 Stojan Spanovi} was transferred from his position in the 40th PC as Chief of Staff and
Deputy Commander of the 11th Corps to the VJ 1st Army on 26 May 1996 by the VJ General Staff
“in accordance with the needs of the service”;2294 and Dragan Šarac was transferred by Peri{i} from
his position in the 40th PC as SVK Main Staff Chief of Security to the VJ Military Academy in
October 1994.2295
813.
The Prosecution submits that officers moved fluidly between the VRS, SVK and VJ
pursuant to Peri{i}’s orders and based on the needs of service of the VJ.2296 The Prosecution
acknowledges that, as stated in the VJ General Staff Instructions, officers’ requests to return to the
VJ were reviewed by, and required the consent of the respective VRS or SVK commanders.2297 It
argues that such consent ensured that the needs of service of the VRS and SVK would be
protected.2298 Moreover, the Prosecution submits that this requirement essentially enabled the VRS
2288
2289
2290
2291
2292
2293
2294
2295
2296
2297
2298
Ex. P2864, VJ General Staff Personnel Administration Document Sent to 40th PC, 20 April 1994.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ex. P2864, VJ GS Personnel Admin Chief Gen. Zori} document sent to 40th PC, 20 April 1994. But see Miodrag
Star~evi} stating that there was no provision under FRY law authorizing a VJ officer to redeploy an officer from
a “different country serving in a different army”, Miodrag Star~evi}, T. 5489, 5493.
Ex. P1151, Correspondence Between VJ and SVK, 7 April 1994.
Ex. P1893, VJ Personnel File of Radislav Krsti}, Doc ID 0422-8342, p. 1.
Ex. P1691, VJ Personnel File of Stojan [panovi}, Doc ID 0611-6334, p. 2.
Ex. P1686, VJ Personnel File of Dragan [arac, Doc ID 0611-4956, p. 2.
Prosecution Final Brief, paras 190, 197-198.
Prosecution Closing Arguments, T. 14686-14687, discussing Ex. P1529, Letter of Ratko Mladi} to the Chief of
the VJ General Staff, 31 March 1993, pp 1-2, wherein Mladi} highlighted the issue of personnel returning to the
VJ without VRS consent, stating, in relevant part: “₣eğvery individual request to return to the ₣VJğ will be
reviewed by the relevant commands and officers of the ₣VRSğ, who will issue the appropriate agreement”.
Prosecution Closing Arguments, T. 14687-14688, 14690.
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and SVK commanders to act as “gatekeepers”, preventing the unauthorised return of officers to the
FRY.2299 However, the Prosecution asserts that the VJ, and Peri{i} personally, was the ultimate
authority on whether an individual served in one of the PCs or in the FRY, and that where the needs
of the VJ overrode those of the SVK or VRS, officers were required to return to the FRY.2300
814.
The Defence argues that the VRS and SVK, not the VJ, made the final decisions regarding
the redeployment of officers to the VJ.2301 The Defence does not dispute that, in some instances,
officers were permitted to return to the VJ at their own request, but maintains that individual
requests by VRS and SVK officers to redeploy to the VJ were reviewed and decided upon by
commanders of the VRS and SVK.2302 The Defence further argues that Peri{i} played no role in
these decisions and that there is no evidence to support the contention that he was able to influence
or overrule the VRS or SVK in any decisions regarding redeployment.2303
(a) Requests for Redeployment
815.
Evidence shows instances where members of the PCs requested permission to leave their
positions in the VRS and SVK and be redeployed to the VJ. Moreover, at least some of these
requests were sent directly to units within the VRS or SVK, not to the VJ. For example, on 16
August 1994, Miroslav Dadi} sent a request to the Drina Corps Command to be redeployed from
Military Post 7111 to his original unit in the VJ, wherein he explained that he went to the VRS
voluntarily for a three-month period and was told that he would only be there on a “temporary
basis”.2304 Ljubiša Mili~i} instead sent his request to be returned from the Drina Corps to the VJ
directly to Peri{i}.2305 The request was however forwarded back to Mili~i}’s commanding officer in
the 1st Zvornik Infantry Brigade Command of the Drina Corps, with a request that he “read it
carefully ₣…ğ and to give [his] opinion and return to this Command as soon as possible”.2306
816.
The Trial Chamber was presented with instances where the VRS approved such
redeployment requests made by personnel before redeployment to the VJ could take effect. For
example, on 18 April 1996, Mladi} sent a letter “to the 30th PC”, approving the request to transfer
Dragomir Milo{evi} from his position as Commander of the SRK in the VRS to the VJ, stating that
he should be “transferred and appointed according to the needs of the service to the [VJ]”.2307
2299
2300
2301
2302
2303
2304
2305
2306
2307
Prosecution Closing Arguments, T. 14688.
Prosecution Final Brief, para. 192; Prosecution Closing Arguments, T. 14689.
Defence Final Brief, para. 309.
Defence Final Brief, paras 309-310, 322.
Defence Final Brief, para. 304.
Ex. P2825, Letter from Miroslav Dadi} Requesting Transfer to VJ, 16 August 1994.
Ex. P1860, Letter by Drina Corps Command, 2 February 1995, p. 1.
Ibid.
Ex. D120 (under seal).
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Similarly, on 25 December 1996, the VRS Main Staff sent a letter, signed by [krbi}, to Savo Joji}
informing him that his “request for transfer to the VJ outside of the 30th [PC] was discussed at the
Advisory Board” of the Commander of the VRS Main Staff. At the meeting, a decision was made to
forward the request to the 30th PC “for deliberation with a proposal to the officer in charge to issue
an order for transfer to the VJ outside the 30th [PC]”.2308
817.
Regarding such requests by personnel for redeployment to the VJ, [krbi} testified that:
All the requests for transfer to the [VJ] were discussed at […] the collegium meeting of the
commander of the Main Staff. It was the commander who ultimately decided on such requests and
for the most part they were denied. Only those requests involving individuals who were ill,
seriously wounded, or had family difficulties were accepted.2309
Moreover, VRS involvement in the decisions to redeploy personnel to the VJ was referred to in a
4 November 1994 letter from Mladi} regarding the status of VRS officers and soldiers.2310 Due to
dealing with other important combat issues at the time, Mladi} stated that: “₣pğrecisely for this
reason, we are not able to review and decide on requests for transfer to ₣theğ VJ, except in
emergency cases, i.e. personal sickness, or that of a family member”.2311
818.
In other instances the VRS Main Staff denied requests from members of the 30th PC to be
redeployed to the VJ, due to needs of the army or because adequate replacements were not
available.2312 A letter from the VRS Main Staff addressing one of these requests referred to the fact
that “₣tğhe final decision to send back officers assigned under Article ₣58(3) of the Law on VJğ ₣…ğ
shall be passed by the Commander of the [VRS Main Staff] […] in agreement with the competent
[VJ General Staff] officer […]”.2313
819.
The SVK also, at times, denied requests submitted by personnel in the SVK to be transferred
back to the VJ. During a May 1994 coordination meeting of the VJ General Staff, ^eleketi}
reportedly stated that:
2308
2309
2310
2311
2312
2313
Ex. D335, VRS Main Staff Response to Request of Transfer to the VJ, 25 December 1996.
Petar [krbi}, T. 11696.
Ex. P2817, Letter from VRS Main Staff Sector for Organisation, Mobilization and Personnel, 4 November 1994.
Ex. P2817, Letter from VRS Main Staff Sector for Organisation, Mobilization and Personnel, 4 November 1994,
p. 2.
Ex. D334, VRS Main Staff Reply to Requests for Reassignments of Rajko Kne`evi} and Predrag Gli{i}, 23 May
1995; Ex. D336, VRS Main Staff Response to Request for Transfer to the VJ of Ljubislav [trbac, 25 December
1996. See Ex. P2564, Response of the VRS Main Staff to the Request of Ostoja Popovi} Returning to his VJ
Home Unit, 9 May 1996; Ex. P2568, Response of the VRS Main Staff to the Request of Ostoja Popovi}
Concerning the Return to his VJ Home Unit, 22 June 1996.
Ex. P2564, Response of the VRS Main Staff to the Request of Ostoja Popovi} Returning to his VJ Home Unit,
9 May 1996.
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[a]n increasing number of commanding officers, currently in ₣theğ SVK, are demanding to return,
that is, to be transferred to the VJ. Without adequate replacements, apart ₣fromğ exceptional cases
(terminal illness), we won’t be able to approve their return to the VJ.2314
Moreover, according to MP-80, Perišić supported ^eleketi}’s decision to only allow replacements
or transfers from the SVK back to the VJ in exceptional cases.2315
(b) Peri{i}’s Role in the Redeployment of Personnel
820.
Witness MP-5 testified that transfers between the VRS and the VJ “worked in both
directions”.2316 However, he admitted that “he never had a chance to find out” if any officer
belonging to the 30th PC serving with the VRS was ever ordered by the VJ to go back to the VJ.2317
821.
Defence witness Petar [krbi} testified that as VJ Chief of General Staff, Peri{i} could not
order a VRS soldier to go back to the VJ and that redeployment orders were not issued without the
consent of the VRS.2318
822.
Skrbi} also explained that, as in his own situation, members of the PCs could be placed “at
the disposal of the VJ” if they had not accumulated sufficient years of service, and therefore, were
not eligible for pension.2319 As an example, [krbi} testified that he informed Plav{i} that he no
longer wished to remain in the VRS and requested to be put at the disposal of the VJ and that she
approved his request.2320
823.
As discussed above, the Trial Chamber was presented with several personnel files which
included orders from the VJ General Staff redeploying personnel from service in the PCs to the
VJ.2321 In addition, the Trial Chamber received the following evidence regarding Peri{i}’s personal
involvement in redeploying personnel to the VJ.
2314
2315
2316
2317
2318
2319
2320
2321
Ex. P1798, Aide-Memoire for Coordination in the VJ General Staff, May 1994, p. 6. See also MP-80, T. 8326
(closed session).
MP-80, T. 8335-8337 (closed session).
MP-5, T. 2462.
Ibid.
Petar [krbi}, T. 11776.
Petar [krbi}, T. 11800-11802.
Petar [krbi}, T. 11800-11802. See Ex. D347, RS Presidential Decree Relieving Petar [krbi} of Duty in the VRS,
28 January 1997. See also Ex. D526, RS Presidential Decree Relieving Zdravko Tolimir of Duty, 28 January
1997; Ex. D527, RS Presidential Decree Relieving Radivoje Miletić of Duty, 28 January 1997; Ex. D528, RS
Presidential Decree Relieving Grujo Borić of Duty, 9 January 1997; Ex. D529, RS Presidential Decree Relieving
Milan Gvero of Duty, 9 January 1997. The Trial Chamber notes that in 1996, when Biljana Plav{i} replaced
Radovan Karad`i} as the RS President, she issued a decree releasing Ratko Mladi} and Manojlo Milovanovi} of
their “up-to-date duty” as Commander of the VRS Main Staff and Deputy Commander of the VRS Main Staff,
respectively, and placing them “at the disposal of the VRS General Staff”, Ex. P2024, RS Presidential Decree,
8 November 1996. [krbi} testified that Mladi} was never placed at the disposal of the VJ after being relieved of
his duty as Commander of the VRS Main Staff; yet, he was never appointed to another position in the VRS
either, Petar [krbi}, T. 11809.
See supra para. 812.
252
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824.
On 5 October 1994, Peri{i} issued an order redeploying Bodgan Sladojevi} from his
position as Commander of the “11th Corps of the ₣VJğ General Staff 40th [PC]” to the Novi Sad
Corps of the VJ.2322 The 11th Corps was part of the SVK.2323 Sladojevi} obeyed the order and took
over the duty of Commander of the 12th Mechanized Brigade of the Novi Sad Corps of the VJ 1st
Army on 1 November 1994.2324 There is nothing in the order, nor in Sladojevi}’s personnel file, to
suggest that there was any approval or other action taken by the SVK regarding Sladojevi}’s
redeployment.2325
825.
Additionally, the Office of the VJ Chief of General Staff ordered VJ Major General
Branislav Petrovi} to return to duty in the VJ Air Force after serving with the Slavonia-Baranja
Corps (“SBC”), the 11th Corps.2326 On 24 October 1995, in a letter addressed to “Colonel General
Peri{i}, personally”, the SBC Command requested that Branislav Petrovi} be allowed to remain in
the SBC until the completion of operations.2327 The following day, the Assistant Chief of the VJ Air
Force responded to the Office of the Chief of General Staff that Petrovi} needed to return to duty in
the VJ Air Force Administration because he had “completed preparations for [combat operations] of
the 11th Corps, for which he was deployed”.2328 On 26 October 1995, the Office of the VJ Chief of
General Staff sent a telegram back to the SBC Command denying its request for Petrovi} to remain
in the territory, requiring Petrovi} to return to duty in the VJ Air Force Administration.2329 The
Prosecution alleges that this example in particular shows that Peri{i} was the “ultimate arbiter” of
whether an individual served in the PCs or returned to the FRY.2330 The Trial Chamber notes that it
does not have sufficient evidence to determine whether Branislav Petrovi} was a member of the 40th
PC, or if he was, in fact, directly seconded to the SVK.
826.
Two additional documents in evidence, related to VRS officer Tihomir Babi}, demonstrate
that the VJ General Staff issued orders on the redeployment of personnel and that those orders were
2322
2323
2324
2325
2326
2327
2328
2329
2330
Ex. P1524, Order of the Chief of the VJ General Staff Redeploying Bogdan Sladojevi}, 5 October 1994, p. 1. See
also Ex. P1522, Personnel File of Bogdan Sladojevi}, pp 6-7; Miodrag Star~evi}, T. 5484-5485.
Stamenko Nikoli}, T. 10604-10606. See supra para. 301.
Ex. P1525, Report on Takeover of Duty by Bogdan Sladojevi}, 3 November 1994.
Ex. P1522, Personnel File of Bogdan Sladojevi}; Ex. P1524, Order of the Chief of the VJ General Staff
Redeploying Bogdan Sladojevi}, 5 October 1994; Ex. P1525, Report on Takeover of Duty by Bogdan
Sladojevi}, 3 November 1994.
Ex. P2754, Documents Regarding Request from SVK Slavonia-Baranja Corps to Peri{i}, 24-26 October 1995,
Doc ID 0647-6990.
Ex. P2754, Documents Regarding Request from SVK Slavonia-Baranja Corps to Peri{i}, 24-26 October 1995,
Doc ID 0647-6987.
Ex. P2754, Documents Regarding Request from SVK Slavonia-Baranja Corps to Peri{i}, 24-26 October 1995,
Doc ID 0647-6989.
Ex. P2754, Documents Regarding Request from SVK Slavonia-Baranja Corps to Peri{i}, 24-26 October 1995,
Doc ID 0647-6990.
Prosecution Final Brief, para. 192; Prosecution Closing Arguments, T. 14691-14692.
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complied with by the VRS.2331 The first document is an order issued by the VRS Main Staff on
14 August 1994 and sent to the Drina Corps Command. It ordered the transfer of Tihomir Babi}
from the 30th PC to the VJ, “pursuant to an order No. 5-193” of 17 June 1994,2332 which was an
order from the Chief of Personnel Administration of the VJ General Staff transferring Babi} back to
the VJ 1st Army.2333 The reference to order “No. 5-193” shows that the VRS Main Staff executed an
order by the VJ General Staff transferring Babi} back to the VJ. The second document is the
subsequent order from the Drina Corps Command dated 16 August 1994, transferring Babi} from
the VRS to the VJ 1st Army, in execution of order “No. 5-193” from the VJ General Staff.2334
827.
Defence witness Petar [krbi} claimed that these orders failed to mention that VRS approval
was required.2335 He further testified that the Personnel Administration of the VJ General Staff
would have issued the transfer order only after receiving approval from the Commander of the VRS
Main Staff.2336 [krbi} also insisted that the Drina Corps Command order was drafted incorrectly
and that it should have been issued in execution of the order from the VRS Main Staff.2337 He
maintained that when he took up the position as Head of the Organisation, Mobilisation and
Personnel section of the VRS Main Staff, “[they] executed things only on the approval of the
Commander of the Main Staff of the VRS. Nobody else’s, you can be sure of that”.2338 Defence
witness Branko Gaji} also testified that Babi} could not have been redeployed to the VJ without
previous authorisation from the VRS Main Staff.2339
828.
The Prosecution submits that MP-80 confirmed that Peri{i} was the ultimate superior on
issues of transfer for members of the 40th PC.2340 However, the Trial Chamber notes that MP-80
stated that:
In issues of transfer, retirement, et cetera, the qualified person was General Peri{i}. Or, rather, let
me correct that, the [FRY SDC] could send ₣a VJ general serving in the 40th PCğ into retirement
and that's what they did.2341
829.
The Trial Chamber finds that MP-80 is ambiguous on this point and that he generally
referred to Peri{i} as the “qualified person” for transfer, although he then partially corrected himself
by referring only to retirement and placing this authority higher on the ladder— on the SDC.2342
2331
2332
2333
2334
2335
2336
2337
2338
2339
Ex. P2598, Order by VJ General Staff Personnel Administration, 17 June 1994, pp 9-10; Ex. P1856, Order of the
VRS Main Staff to the Drina Corps, 14 August 1994.
Ex. P1856, Order of the VRS Main Staff to the Drina Corps, 14 August 1994; Petar [krbi}, T. 11953.
Ex. P2598, Order by VJ General Staff Personnel Administration, 17 June 1994, pp 9-10.
Ex. P1855, Letter by Drina Corps Command, 16 August 1994; Petar [krbi}, T. 11957-11958.
Petar [krbi}, T. 11950-11954.
Petar [krbi}, T. 11953.
Petar [krbi}, T. 11957-11958.
Petar [krbi}, T. 11958-11959.
Branko Gaji}, T. 11008-11010.
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(c) Final Findings
830.
Based on the foregoing, the Trial Chamber finds that as a rule, personnel serving in the VRS
and SVK through the 30th and 40th PCs could be redeployed to VJ units. The evidence clearly
shows that when the request for redeployment came from the PC member himself, it was granted
only if his superior in the VRS or SVK consented to such transfer; subsequently, the VJ would
order the transfer. At the same time, the record contains some VJ orders of transfer initiated by the
VJ, rather than by the PC member, transferring both 30th and 40th PC members back to the VJ,
without evidence of prior approval from the VRS or the SVK. However, in light of the testimony of
[krbi} and Gaji}, the Trial Chamber cannot conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that these VJ
orders for redeployment could be carried out without approval from the VRS and SVK.
831.
The question of Peri{i}’s ability to order the redeployment of members of the 30th and 40th
PCs will be further discussed in the section devoted to his alleged effective control over the VRS
and SVK under Article 7(3) of the Statute.2343
8. De Jure Status of Members of the Personnel Centres
832.
Military personnel assigned to the PCs remained members of the VJ2344 and exercised their
rights in the FRY and the VJ through the 30th and 40th PCs.2345
833.
As will be described in greater detail in the following paragraphs, members of the PCs
received their salaries from the VJ and enjoyed benefits such as housing, health care (including for
family members) and education benefits, like any other member of the VJ.2346
834.
Peri{i} himself recognised that the soldiers assigned to the PCs possessed the status of VJ
members. At the SDC session of 11 October 1993, Peri{i} explained that the purpose of the
verification of promotions obtained in the VRS and SVK was necessary so that officers transferred
there would continue to enjoy all the rights in the VJ with respect to “the ranks they acquire
2340
2341
2342
2343
2344
2345
2346
Prosecution Final Brief, para. 194.
MP-80, T. 8853, 8855 (closed session) (emphasis added).
See also supra para. 819.
See infra section VIII.A.2.
Miodrag Star~evi}, T. 5454, 5489 (stating that members of the VJ assigned/appointed/transferred to the 30th and
40th PCs were members of the VJ according to the law), 5496-5500 (partly private session); Ex. P1870, Order by
the VJ Chief of General Staff, 22 June 1993; Stamenko Nikoli}, T. 10556; Ex. P1872, Set of VJ General Staff
and FRY MOD Documents (see particularly Doc ID 0630-6548, p. 2, stating that all professional members of the
VJ who are made available and reassigned to the Main Staffs of the VRS or the SVK will have and fully retain
their personal legal status of VJ members); Ex P731, Presidential Order on the Formation of Special PCs, 10
November 1993, para. 3.
Stamenko Nikoli}, T. 10543-10545; Rade Rašeta, T. 5883-5884; Ex. P734, VJ General Staff Instructions on the
PCs, 8 December 1993, para. 4; Du{an Kova~evi}, T. 12591-12593.
See infra section VI.A.8.(b)-(f). See also MP-5, T. 2378; MP-14, T. 3507 (closed session).
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there”.2347 At the SDC session of 25 December 1993, Peri{i} summarised the number of VJ
commissioned and non-commissioned officers and stated “[t]here are 7,233 of them in two
personnel centres in [RS] and [RSK]. When planning any kind of welfare assistance these people
should be included”.2348 Similarly, when counting the total number of VJ officers during the
subsequent SDC session, Peri{i} included those serving in the RS and RSK.2349
835.
Several judgements issued by the Military Supreme Court in Belgrade in relation to claims
filed by members of the 30th and 40th PCs for compensation of unused annual leave during the war
confirmed that those members retained their status as VJ members while serving in the VRS and
SVK.2350 In all of these cases, the parties did not dispute that during the period for which
compensation was sought, the officers, as VJ members, were serving outside the VJ on orders of a
superior officer and that they did not use their annual leave. The Military Supreme Court reversed
the decision of the PCs denying those claims and affirmed that because the claimants were
professional soldiers of the VJ during the period in question, the provisions of the Law on the VJ
applied to them.2351 The Court went further to state that:
It is the legal understanding of the Court that the legal position of a serviceman whom the
competent officer sent outside the [VJ] and who did not take his annual leave due to a raised level
of combat readiness and engagement in combat operations, is to be brought in line with the
position of a serviceman whose annual leave was suspended or cut short by the [Chief of the VJ
General Staff] due to extraordinary needs of service.2352
836.
The Military Supreme Court adopted the same reasoning in relation to a claim of a VJ
professional soldier who had been deployed through the 40th PC to the RSK.2353 The Federal Court,
2347
2348
2349
2350
2351
2352
2353
Ex. P709, Stenographic Transcript of the 14th Session of the SDC, 11 October 1993, pp 37-38.
Ex. P781, Stenographic Transcript of the 16th Session of the SDC, 25 December 1993, p. 19.
Ex. P791, Stenographic Transcript of the 17th Session of the SDC, 10 January 1994, p. 52. See also Ex. P776,
Stenographic Transcript of the 21st Session of the SDC, 7 June 1994, p. 46; Ex. P784, Stenographic Transcript of
the 22nd Session of the SDC, 11 July 1994, pp 7-8; Ex. P785, Stenographic Transcript of the 23rd Session of the
SDC, 21 July 1994, p. 19; Ex. P792, Stenographic Transcript of the 27th Session of the SDC, 27 September 1994,
p. 88; Ex P794, Stenographic Transcript of the 31st Session of the SDC, 18 January 1995, p. 47.
Ex. P846, Supreme Military Court Judgement Reversing the Decision of the Military Post 3001 Belgrade,
22 February 2001, p. 2; Ex. P847, Supreme Military Court Judgement Reversing the Decision of the Military
Post 3001 Belgrade, 29 January 2001, p. 2; Ex. P1072, Supreme Military Court Judgement Annulling the
Decision of the Military Post 3001 Belgrade, 28 June 2001, p. 2; Ex. P1073, Supreme Military Court Judgement
Annulling the Decision of the Military Post 3001 Belgrade, 29 May 2001, p. 2; Ex. P1074, Supreme Military
Court Judgement Annulling the Decision of the Military Post 1790 Belgrade, 29 January 2001, p. 2; Ex. P1075,
Supreme Military Court Judgement Annulling the Decision of the Military Post 3001 Belgrade, 27 September
2001, p. 2; Ex. P1076, Supreme Military Court Judgement Annulling the Decision of the Military Post 1122-1
Belgrade, 28 November 2002, p. 8; Ex. P1680, Supreme Military Court Judgement Annulling the Decision of
the Military Post 3001 Belgrade, 28 June 2001, p. 2.
Ibid.
Ex. P1680, Supreme Military Court Judgement Annulling the Decision of the Military Post 3001 Belgrade,
28 June 2001, p. 2.
Ex. P1077 Supreme Military Court Judgement Annulling the Decision of the Military Post 4578 Belgrade,
22 April 1998, p. 2. That the plaintiff was serving in the RSK is clear from Ex. P1117, Dokmanovi} Reply to
Motion for Extraordinary Review of the Judgement by the Supreme Military Court, 20 July 1998, p. 1.
256
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seised of a request for extraordinary review, rejected the request and upheld the judgement of the
Military Supreme Court.2354
837.
In addition, the Trial Chamber particularly notes that the Second Municipal Court in
Belgrade concluded that Dragomir Milo{evi} retained the status as a VJ member throughout the
period he served in the VRS. The case concerned a lawsuit filed by Dragomir Milo{evi} against the
FRY for compensation of non-material damages suffered following his wounding on the battlefield
near Sarajevo on 17 May 1995.2355 The FRY, represented by the Military Legal Office of the VJ,
argued that Milo{evi} did not have the passive legitimacy to make such a claim, because at the time
of the wounding he was a member of the VRS and not of the VJ.2356
838.
In addressing this objection the Court stated:
[The court is] of the opinion that this objection was not valid since, based on the evidence
presented during the proceedings, it was established beyond reasonable doubt that the plaintiff was
a professional officer of the [VJ] at the time of wounding and was on its payroll throughout that
time and that his participation on the front in the general sector of Zlati{te near Sarajevo was
certainly in agreement with or with the knowledge of the General Staff of the [VJ]. Had that not
been the case, an unauthorized arrival of the plaintiff as a professional officer of the [VJ] at the
front in another, internationally recognized state would have resulted in the termination of his
employment, and neither did his superior ever initiate such a measure against the plaintiff, nor was
evidence to that effect presented before this court by the end of the proceedings.2357
839.
The Municipal Court also established that even though Dragomir Milo{evi} belonged to the
30th PC at the time of his wounding, he was a member of the JNA and VJ “without any
interruptions” from 27 July 1960 until his retirement on 31 December 1996.2358
2354
2355
2356
2357
2358
Ex. P1118, Military Post 4578 Motion for Extraordinary Review of the Judgement by the Supreme Military
Court, 23 April 1998; Ex. P848, Federal Court Decision Denying Motion of Military Post 4578, 8 September
1998.
Ex. P821, Complaint of D. Milo{evi} Against the FRY MOD for Compensation, 8 September 1995; Ex. P825,
D. Milo{evi}’s Submission for Compensation, 5 November 1996; Ex. P822, Judgement of the 2nd Municipal
Court, Belgrade, 9 July 2001.
Ex. P822, Judgement of the 2nd Municipal Court, Belgrade, 9 July 2001, pp 1-2.
Ex. P822, Judgement of the 2nd Municipal Court, Belgrade, 9 July 2001, p. 8.
Ex. P822, Judgement of the 2nd Municipal Court, Belgrade, 9 July 2001, p. 2. See also Ex. P823, Submission of
Information to the 2nd Municipal Court, 1997; Ex. P824, FRY Statement of Defence before the 2nd Municipal
Court, 21 January 1997; Ex. P825, D. Milo{evi}’s Submissions before the 2nd Municipal Court, 5 November
1996; Ex. P827, Record of Hearing in D. Milo{evi} Case Held before the 2nd Municipal Court in Belgrade,
11 September 1997; Ex. P828, Request for Information from 2nd Municipal Court in Belgrade, 12 September
1997; Ex. P829, Brief of Arguments by the Accused, 29 September 1997; Ex. P830, Response to Request for
Information from 2nd Municipal Court in Belgrade, 31 October 1997, 31 October 1997; Ex. P831, Request for
Information from 2nd Municipal Court in Belgrade, 15 January 1998; Ex. P832, Certificate Issued by Military
Post 7572-6, 8 August 1996; Ex. P833, Record of Hearing in D. Milo{evi} Case Held before the 2nd Municipal
Court in Belgrade, 19 March 1998; Ex. P834, Request for Information from 2nd Municipal Court in Belgrade, 30
March 1998; Ex. P835, Record of Hearing in D. Milo{evi} Case Held before the 2nd Municipal Court in
Belgrade, 17 April 1998; Ex. P836, Presidential Decree of FRY Placing D. Milo{evi} at the Discretion of VJ
General Staff 30th PC, undated; Ex. P837, Request for Information from 2nd Municipal Court in Belgrade, 23
April 1998; Ex. P838, Record of Hearing in D. Milo{evi} Case Held before the 2nd Municipal Court in Belgrade,
21 September 1998; Ex. P839, Record of Hearing in D. Milo{evi} Case Held Before the 2nd Municipal Court in
Belgrade, 9 July 2001; Ex. P840, Request for Information from 2nd Municipal Court in Belgrade, 15 October
257
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840.
Based on the above, as well as on the evidence discussed in relation to the creation of the
PCs, the Trial Chamber finds that the members of the 30th and 40th PCs remained de jure members
of the VJ while serving in the VRS and SVK.
(a) Promotions
(i) Law on Promotions
841.
According to the Law of the VRS, the President of the RS had the power to decide on the
promotion of officers to the rank of major-general and higher2359 and the Minister of Defence on the
promotion of active and reserve commissioned and non-commissioned officers up to and including
the rank of lieutenant-colonel.2360 According to Article 370 of the Law on the VRS, the Minister of
Defence could delegate such power (and others) to other officers,2361 normally the VRS
Commander and/or the Corps Commanders.2362 The evidence shows, that in June 1992, the then
Minister of Defence Bogdan Suboti}, issued such delegation to the Commander of the VRS.2363
Stojan Malčić testified that promotion orders in the VRS were final and took effect immediately.2364
Petar [krbi} – Assistant Commander of Sector for Recruitment, Mobilisation and System Affairs in
the VRS Main Staff from 1994 – stated that VRS promotions were made public and that promotion
orders were transmitted to the individuals in question as soon as was practicable.2365 The promotion
procedure in the SVK was similar. The President of the RSK had the authority to decide on the
promotion of officers to the rank of Major General and higher, upon the recommendation of the
SDC.2366 The Commander of the SVK had the authority to promote officers up to and including the
rank of Colonel.2367
2359
2360
2361
2362
2363
2364
2365
2366
2367
1997; Ex. P841, Request of Military Post 1790 to D. Milo{evi} Asking for Evidence, 3 November 1997;
Ex. P842, Request from the Command of the 30th PC Regarding Evidence of D. Milo{evi}’s Wounds, 4
November 1997; Ex. P843, Request of Military Post 3001 to D. Milo{evi} Asking for Evidence of his Wounds,
14 November 1997.
Ex. P191, Law on the VRS, 1 June 1992, Article 369.
Ex. P191, Law on the VRS, 1 June 1992, Article 370; Stamenko Nikoli}, T. 10548; Petar [krbi}, T. 1168211683.
Ibid.
Stamenko Nikoli}, T. 10548.
Ex. D332, Minister of Defence Order on Determination of Competence and Authority of Commanding Officers,
16 June 1992, p. 3; Petar Škrbić, T. 11682-11683; Stamenko Nikoli}, T. 10548. See also Ex. P191, Law on the
VRS, 1 June 1992, Articles 31-40. According to the same order, the Corps commanders were authorised to
promote non-commissioned officers in peace and wartime, Ex. D332, Minister of Defence Order on
Determination of Competence and Authority of Commanding Officers, 16 June 1992, p. 2.
Stojan Malči}, T. 11291, 11294-11295. See also MP-5, T. 2472-2473 (private session).
Petar [krbi}, T. 11716-11717.
Ex. D170, Law on the SVK, 22 April 1993, Doc ID 1D21-0183, Article 153.
Ex. D170, Law on the SVK, 22 April 1993, Doc ID 1D21-0183, Articles 43, 46, 153, 154.
258
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842.
According to the Law on the VJ, officers were promoted to the rank of General and higher
by the President of the FRY.2368 Article 46 of the Law on the VJ empowers the President to
exceptionally promote officers to the rank of General at the proposal of the Chief of the VJ General
Staff.2369 The Chief of the VJ General Staff could promote officers up to and including the rank of
Colonel.2370 He also had the authority to exceptionally promote to the rank immediately above the
rank of Colonel.2371
(ii) The Procedure of Verification
843.
The evidence shows that the promotions process for members of the 30th and 40th PCs
entailed a dual procedure: PC members promoted in the VRS and SVK were later also promoted in
the VJ after a “verification” process.2372
844.
The statement of reasons attached to the proposed order on the creation of the PCs of
8 October 1993 already contained an indication of the dual promotion procedure. The relevant part
reads that “[p]romotions to a higher rank […] at the proposal or by decision of the President of the
[RS] and [RSK][…] or military organ, would also be conducted in the [VJ] pursuant to the Law on
the [VJ]”.2373 During the SDC session of 11 October 1993, Peri{i} explained to the SDC members
that the promotions granted by the VRS and SVK were valid in those armies, but not in the VJ. The
verification process would be the means to enable these officers to enjoy in the FRY all the rights
attached to the ranks they acquired in the SVK and VRS. He further emphasised that he was
insisting that these officers should have the “same status as officers” in the VJ, so that they and their
families could enjoy certain benefits.2374
845.
Škrbić explained that once the promotions were granted in the VRS, the VRS Main Staff
sent the list of the promoted persons to the 30th PC with a proposal that their new VRS rank be
verified by the VJ.2375 After the verification, the VJ issued its promotion order which was then
published in the VJ’s Official Gazette.2376 The officers concerned would receive an excerpt of the
2368
2369
2370
2371
2372
2373
2374
2375
2376
Ex. P197, Law on the VJ, 18 May 1994, Article 151; Ex. P1900, Decree of the FRY President, 14 June 1995.
Ex. P197, Law on the VJ, 18 May 1994, Article 46.
Ex. P197, Law on the VJ, 18 May 1994, Article 152.
Ex. P197, Law on the VJ, 18 May 1994, Article 46. See also Petar [krbi}, T. 11704-11705; Miodrag Starčevi},
T. 5498; Ex. P1898, Order issued by Periši} exceptionally promoting Pejic, Obrenovi} and Gaborovi}, 7 January
1994.
MP-5, T. 2476-2477, 2507 (partly private session); Du{an Kova~evi}, T. 12732; Rade Rašeta, T. 6039-6040.
Ex. P1872, Set of VJ General Staff and FRY MOD Documents, Doc ID 0630-6544, p. 2.
Ex. P709, Stenographic Transcript of the 14th Session of the SDC, 11 October 1993, pp 38-39.
Petar Škrbić, T. 11720, 11855.
Ex. P2815, Excerpt of the Official Gazette of the FRY, 29 March 1994; Ex. P780, Stenographic Transcript of the
15th Session of the SDC, 10 November 1993, p. 22; MP-5, T. 2476, 2490.
259
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Gazette bearing the date of the promotion.2377 The Trial Chamber received evidence that a similar
dual procedure of promotions applied to the SVK.2378
846.
As an illustration of the procedure in the VRS, the Trial Chamber notes that on 23 June
1994, Vinko Pandurevi} and Dragan Obrenovi}, members of the 30th PC, were extraordinarily
promoted to the ranks of Infantry Lieutenant Colonel and Major, respectively, by order of the VRS
Main Staff Commander Ratko Mladi}.2379 They were then extraordinarily promoted to the same
ranks in the VJ by order of the Chief of VJ General Staff of 16 June 1995.2380 The VJ Personnel file
of Pandurevi} further indicates that he was also extraordinarily promoted to the rank of Infantry
Colonel on 31 December 1995 by order of Peri{i}.2381
847.
As for promotions within the SVK, Rade Rašeta testified that while he was serving in the
SVK he was promoted to a higher rank in the SVK, which was then reflected in his personnel file in
the 40th PC.2382 When Novakovi} was promoted to the rank of a Colonel-General in the SVK, this
was then verified by a decree of the President of the FRY.2383 Evidence also shows that Peri{i}
exercised his authority to exceptionally promote members of the 40th PC serving in the SVK. For
instance, Peri{i} exceptionally promoted both Bosanac and Krajnovi} on 3 February 1994 to the
ranks of Lieutenant Colonels.2384
848.
There is evidence, however, that not all promotions in the VRS were “verified” by the VJ.
Malčić testified that for the promotions to the rank of General, it was a prerequisite in the VJ
regulations that the officer had graduated from the School of the National Defence, whereas the
2377
2378
2379
2380
2381
2382
2383
2384
MP-5, T. 2490-2492.
Du{an Kova~evi}, T. 12732; Rade Rašeta, T. 6039-6040.
Ex. D122, Order of Mladi} to Extraordinary Promotions within the VRS, 23 June 1994.
According to which they were serving in the VJ General Staff 30th PC, the document however shows a
handwritten note besides their names, reading 1st Zvornik Infantry Brigade, Ex. P2137, Order on Promotion,
16 June 1995, pp 1, 3; Ex. P1731, VJ Personnel File of Vinko Pandurević, Doc ID 0422-8476, p. 1; Ex. P1897,
VJ Personnel File of Dragan Obrenovi}, Doc ID 0611-8717, p. 1. See Ex. P2132, Order on Promotion of Dragan
Obrenović, 31 December 1995; Ex. P2133, Order on Promotion of Milenko Kajtaz, 1 November 1995;
Ex. P2134, Order on Promotion, 11 September 1995; Ex. P2135, Order on Promotion, 16 June 1995; Ex. P2136,
Order on Promotion, 16 June 1995; Ex. P2137, Order on Promotion, 16 June 1995; Ex. P2138, Order on
Promotion, 16 June 1995; Ex. P2139, Order on Promotion, 16 June 1995; Ex. P2140, Order on Promotion, 8
June 1995; Ex. P2141, Order on Promotion, 9 May 1995; Ex. P2142, Order on Promotion, 24 April 1995;
Ex. P2143, Order on Promotion, 19 April 1995; Ex. P2144, Order on Promotion, 28 February 1995; Ex. P2145,
Order on Promotion, 14 January 1994.
Ex. P1731, Personnel File of Vinko Pandurević, Doc ID 0422-8476.
Rade Rašeta, T. 6039.
Mile Novaković, T. 13271; Ex. P1777, VJ Personnel File of Mile Novaković, Doc ID 0611-7595, p. 1.
Ex. P2866, Excerpt from Promotion Order 3-43, 3 February 1994.
260
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same prerequisite did not apply in the VRS.2385 Consequently, not all of the promotions to the rank
of General granted by the VRS were verified and granted by the VJ.2386
849.
The Trial Chamber also notes that, for example, Živanović was promoted from the rank of
Major General to that of Lieutenant General by RS Presidential decree of 12 July 1995.2387
However, a 2001 decision from the 30th PC regarding his compensation for unused annual leave
refers to him as “retired Major General”, suggesting that his promotion was not verified by the
VJ.2388 Similarly, the evidence shows that Gali}’s VRS promotion of August 1994 to the rank of
Lieutenant General by RS Presidential decree was not verified by the VJ.2389 Rajko Petrovi} also
testified that the 30th PC did not verify his promotion by the VRS Main Staff to the rank of Captain
1st Class.2390
850.
The Trial Chamber notes that there were also instances in which the promotion in the VJ
preceded the promotion in the VRS. For example, Ratko Mladi} was exceptionally promoted to the
rank of Colonel General by a FRY Presidential decree of 16 June 1995, in which he is identified as
Commander of the Main Staff of the 30th PC. Then, on 28 June 1995, he was exceptionally
promoted to the same rank in the VRS by RS Presidential decree. The decree refers to him as the
Commander of the VRS Main Staff.2391 [krbi} testified that he was aware of only one other
occasion in which a VRS officer was promoted first in the FRY and only a couple of days later in
the RS, the case of Radivoje Mileti}.2392
(iii) The Effect of the “Verification”
851.
Both Defence and Prosecution witnesses articulated the significance and effect of VJ
verifications. Malčić testified that verification was a formal recognition of a VRS rank by the VJ,
which was necessary for the calculation of the new salary:
[T]he basic idea was that officers should be appointed and promoted in accordance with the
regulations of the Army of Republika Srpska. However, in order for them to receive salaries, this
2385
2386
2387
2388
2389
2390
2391
2392
Stojan Malčić, T. 11333-11339; Ex. P2135, Order on Promotion, 16 June 1995; Ex. P2140, Order on Promotion,
8 June 1995; Ex. P2141, Order on Promotion, 9 May 1995; Ex. P2142, Order on Promotion, 24 April 1995;
Ex. P2143, Order on Promotion, 19 April 1995; Ex. P2144, Order on Promotion, 28 February 1995.
Stojan Malčić, T. 11337-11339.
Ex. D683, RS Presidential Decree on Extraordinary Promotion of Milenko @ivanovi}, 12 July 1995.
Ex. P1892, Decision by Military Post 3001, 25 September 2001.
Ex. D705, RS Presidential Decree Extraordinarily Promoting Stanislav Gali} to Lieutenant General, 7 August
1994; P1766, Excerpt from Stanislav Galić Personnel File; Ex. P1760, Record Regarding Retirement of
Stanislav Galić, 12 August 1994; Ex. P1759, Letter by VRS Main Staff, 31 December 1996; Ex. P1765, Excerpt
from Stanislav Galić Personnel File; Ex. P1879, Decision by Military Post 3001, 9 July 2001; Ex. P784,
Stenographic Transcript of the 22nd Session of the SDC, 11 July 1994, pp 45-47.
Rajko Petrovi}, T. 13732; Ex. D463, Order of VRS Commander on promotion of Petrovic Rajko, 7 January
1993.
Ex. P1902, Decree of the FRY President, 16 June 1994; Ex. P1903, Decree of the RS President, 28 June 1994.
Petar [krbi}, T. 11720; Ex. P1721, Excerpt from Radivoje Miletić’s VJ Personnel File.
261
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had to be accorded with regulations in the Army of Yugoslavia. That is to say that we had two
systems of laws, if I can put it that way, according to which we worked, the laws of Republika
Srpska; and in order to have that verified, it had to be adjusted to the regulations in the Army of
Yugoslavia so that it could be sent to the accounting centre so their salaries could be calculated.2393
852.
Škrbić confirmed that a higher rank carried a higher salary and thus the new VRS rank
needed to be verified by the VJ.2394 Non-verification of a VRS rank by the VJ resulted in the newly
promoted officer not receiving a salary in accordance with his new rank.2395 However he was still
allowed to display his new rank and command the VRS forces.2396
853.
Milenko Jev|ević stated that while he was serving in the VRS he was promoted twice, in
1993 and again in 1994, and each time the promotion required verification by the VJ under the
auspices of the 30th PC, before the salary commensurate with the higher rank would be paid.2397
Similarly, Milenko Živanović's promotion to Major General is reflected – after the VJ verification –
in his FRY MOD payment slips for 1994 and 1995.2398 Since Jev|ević's promotion of 1994 to the
rank of Major was not verified by the VJ until June of 1995, he did not receive the commensurate
salary until that time.2399
854.
The Trial Chamber also received evidence that Galić's exceptional promotion to the rank of
Lieutenant General in the VRS was not verified in the VJ.2400 A written request to verify Galić's
rank was made by the VRS to the VJ on 31 December 1996, noting that the failure to confirm his
new rank constituted “a great disservice to him”.2401
855.
In relation to the personal significance of the promotion verification, Novakovi} testified
that the verification by the VJ “meant a lot to [him]”.2402
2393
2394
2395
2396
2397
2398
2399
2400
2401
2402
Stojan Malčić, T. 11337-11338. See also Petar Škrbić, T. 11719.
Petar Škrbić, T. 11719. See also Milenko Jev|evi}, T. 11080.
Stojan Malčić, T. 11337; MP-5, T. 2475-2476; MP-5, T. 2491.
Stojan Malčić, T. 11337-11339; MP-14, T. 3507-3508 (closed session); MP-5, T. 2475-2476, 2491, 2507-2508
(partly private session). See also MP-14, T. 3682-3683.
Milenko Jev|evi}, T. 11080-11082.
Ex. P1594, MOD Payslip of Milenko Živanovi} for 1995, 16 January 1996; Ex. P1595, MOD Payslip of
Milenko Živanovi} for 1994, 25 January 1995; Ex. P1596, MOD Payslip of Milenko Živanovi} for 1995, 6 July
1995; Ex. D682, RS Presidential Decree on Extraordinary Promotion of Milenko @ivanovi}, 26 July 1993.
Milenko Jev|evi}, T. 11081-11082; Ex. P2135, Order on Promotion, 16 June 1995, p. 1; Ex. P2136, Order on
Promotion, 16 June 1995.
Ex. D705, RS Presidential Decree Extraordinarily Promoting Stanislav Gali} to Lieutenant General, 7 August
1994; Ex. P1766, Excerpt from Stanislav Galić Personnel File; Ex. P1760, Record of Retirement Procedure for
General Gali}, 12 August 1994.
Ex. P1759, Letter by VRS Main Staff, 31 December 1996.
Mile Novaković, T. 13271.
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(iv) Role of Peri{i} in the “Verification” Process
856.
The Prosecution submits that Perišić played an integral role in the promotion of officers
serving in the VRS and SVK to equivalent ranks in the VJ; the purpose of which was to provide
practical benefits, moral support and motivation to those officers.2403
857.
The Defence instead maintains that the final determination as to whether to promote a
particular officer fell within the purview of the VRS and SVK and was carried out and finalised
within those armies.2404 Perišić played neither a role in assessing the suitability of such promotions
nor in the decisions taken by the VRS and SVK, but rather brought forward the proposals to the
SDC.2405 In particular, the Defence argues that Peri{i} was not privy to any assessments of the
persons promoted by the VRS and SVK.2406
858.
As stated above, the promotion and verification of personnel serving in the VRS and SVK
was on the agenda for the SDC session of 11 October 1993. Perišić enumerated the names of
officers proposed for promotion by the VRS and SVK, explaining that they requested these
promotions to be verified in the VJ. These included the promotion within the VRS of Du{an
Kova~evi} and Bodgan Suboti} to the rank of Major General, and within the SVK of Mile
Novakovi} and Borislav \uki} to the rank of Major General.2407
859.
On this occasion, Peri{i} accepted Milošević's suggestion to seek further information about
these officers from Mladi} before verifying the promotions. He stated that while he knew some of
them, he had no basis for an opinion about “a large number of these people” and did not want to put
the SDC in a position to “promot[e] certain people I don’t know”.2408 At the following SDC session
of 10 November 1993, Peri{i} confirmed that Mladi} had “reported” back to him on the proposed
2403
2404
2405
2406
2407
2408
Prosecution Final Brief, paras 224, 227, 238.
Defence Final Brief, paras 380, 387-391.
Defence Final Brief, paras 384-385, 393, 421, 431-438.
Defence Final Brief, para. 437.
Ex. P709, Stenographic Transcript of the 14th Session of the SDC, 11 October 1993, pp 37-38; Ex. D558, RSK
Presidential Decree Regarding Early Promotion of Brislav Dukič, 16 July 1992; Mile Novaković, T. 1301013011; Ex. D702, RSK Presidential Decree Regarding Extraordinary Promotion of Mile Novakovi} to Major
General of the SVK, 25 October 1992.
Ex. P709, Stenographic Transcript of the 14th Session of the SDC, 11 October 1993, pp 39-40.
263
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officers and the verification of the promotions was accepted by the SDC.2409 There is evidence that
Mladi} subsequently informed Kova~evi} that his promotion had been verified by the SDC.2410
860.
In its Final Brief, the Defence argues that “a prior opinion or report from Mladi} was neither
a practice nor a systematic part of the verification process”2411 and that Milošević’s request to
Perišić at the SDC session of 11 October 1993 “to obtain the opinion of Mladić was formulated
prior the formation of PCs where there was no mechanism in place to recognize the newly afforded
rights that were attached to the new ranks”.2412 The Trial Chamber notes that, indeed, the procedure
used during the 11 October 1993 SDC meeting preceded the creation of the PCs and could very
well be exceptional. At the same time, however, contrary to the Defence position that Perišić had no
role in assessing the suitability of promotions, the Trial Chamber received extensive evidence of
Peri{i}’s direct involvement in the verification process also after the creation of the PCs.
861.
Illustratively, Milan ^eleketi} was promoted by the SVK from the rank of a Colonel to the
rank of Major-General in February 1994 and the “verification” of his promotion was discussed
during the SDC session of 16 March 1994.2413 On this occasion, Peri{i} suggested to wait until they
could see how he would do in the new position, as he had just taken up duty. ^eleketi}’s promotion
therefore was not verified until June 1994.2414 The further promotion of Milan ^eleketi} to the rank
of Lieutenant General and of Du{an Lon~ar to Major General was discussed at the SDC session on
13 June 1995.2415 On this occasion, Periši} told the SDC that their promotions should not be
recognised, as they were “guilty” for the situation in the RSK.2416 The evidence shows that there are
no promotions after the date of 16 June 1994, as noted in ^eleketi}’s VJ personnel file.2417
862.
Similarly, during the SDC session of 11 July 1994, the verification of promotions of VRS
officers – including Manojlo Milovanović to the rank of Lieutenant General, and Milan Gvero and
Dragomir Milošević to the rank of Major General – and the pensioning off of others were
2409
2410
2411
2412
2413
2414
2415
2416
2417
Ex. P780, Stenographic Transcript of the 15th Session of the SDC, 10 November 1993, pp 21-23; Ex. P1777,
Documents relating to Mile Novaković, Doc ID 0611-7595, p. 5 (VJ File of Novakovi}, document contains
reference to the FRY Presidential Decree on his promotion); Mile Novakovi}, T. 13010-13011. See also
Ex. P744, Conclusions from the 15th Session of the SDC, 1 December 1993, p. 2.
Du{an Kovačević, T. 12732; Ex. P1906, VJ Personnel File of Du{an Kova~evi}, Doc ID 0611-5691; Ex. P709,
Stenographic Transcript of the 14th Session of the SDC, 11 October 1993, pp 39-40; Ex. P780, Stenographic
Transcript of the 15th Session of the SDC, 10 November 1993, pp 21-23.
Defence Final Brief, paras 431-432.
Defence Final Brief, para. 434.
Ex. P1911, VJ Personnel File of Milan ^eleketi}, Doc ID 0611-7831, p. 5; Ex. P783, Stenographic Transcript of
the 19th Session of the SDC, 16 March 1994, p. 27.
MP-080, T. 8563-8564 (closed session); Ex. P783, Stenographic Transcript of the 19th Session of the SDC,
16 March 1994, p. 27; Ex. P776, Stenographic Transcript of the 21st Session of the SDC, 7 June 1994, pp 9, 13,
23; Ex. P753, Minutes from the 21st Session of the SDC held on 7 June 1994, p. 2; Ex. P1911, VJ Personnel File
of Milan ^eleketi}, Doc ID 0611-7831, p. 5.
Ex. P786, Minutes from the 37th Session of the SDC held on 13 June 1995, pp 31-32.
Ex. P786, Minutes from the 37th Session of the SDC held on 13 June 1995, p. 32.
Ex. P1911, VJ Personnel File of Milan ^eleketi}, Doc ID 0611-7831, p. 5.
264
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discussed.2418 Peri{i} stated that he could give his opinion on each of the officers put forward for
promotion and/or retirement.2419 During this session, however, no promotions were verified.2420 The
SDC members questioned the verification process and Lili} insisted that the VRS should make
promotions only if previously agreed on with Peri{i}.2421 The Trial Chamber notes that the
promotions of Milovanovi} to the rank of Lieutenant General and of Dragomir Milo{evi} to Major
General were verified by the SDC on 27 December 1995, almost one year and half later.2422
863.
During the SDC session held on 13 June 1995, the promotion of 12 generals put forward by
the 30
th
PC was up for discussion.2423 Of the 12 generals put forward for promotion, Peri{i}
proposed to verify the promotion of only six: Ðuki}, Gvero, Mileti}, Tolimir, Mari} and Novak.2424
Peri{i} supported the promotion of Gvero, as he was “an extremely positive person who is a
cohesive force between the Republika Srpska Army and us” and of Tolimir, as he had been “much
criticized, primarily by President Karad`i}, because he stands in their way of exercising their indepth influence”.2425 The promotions of Stevan Tomi}, Dragomir Milo{evi} and Budimir Gavri}
were rejected by Peri{i} on the basis of their membership of the Serbian Democratic Party. Peri{i}
did not give reasons for rejecting the promotions of Mi}o Grubor, Mi}o Vlaisavljevi} and Milutin
Skočaji}.2426 The SDC accepted all of his proposals.2427 The next day, the FRY President issued the
decree whereby Milan Gvero was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant General, and Zdravko Tolimir
and Radivoje Mileti} to the rank of Major General. According to the decree, all three men were
serving in the VJ General Staff 30th PC and their promotion was effective starting on 16 June
1995.2428
864.
The Defence also argues that while VRS and SVK decisions to promote a particular
individual were forwarded to Perišić with a request for verification, neither reason nor criteria for
said promotions were provided by the VRS and the SVK.2429 The Trial Chamber recalls [krbi}’s
testimony that indeed the VRS Main Staff drew up statements of reasons and completed “promotion
2418
2419
2420
2421
2422
2423
2424
2425
2426
2427
2428
2429
Ex. P784, Stenographic Transcript of the 22nd Session of the SDC, 11 July 1994, p. 45.
Ibid.
Ex. P784, Stenographic Transcript of the 22nd Session of the SDC, 11 July 1994, pp 48-49, 51.
Ibid.
Ex. P748, Minutes from the 48th Session of the SDC held on 27 December 1995, p. 3; Ex. P1698, VJ Personnel
File of Manojlo Milovanovi}, p. 1; Ex. P1751, Excerpt from D. Milošević VJ Personnel File.
Ex. P786, Stenographic Transcript of the 37th Session of the SDC, 7 June 1995, p. 31.
Ex. P786, Stenographic Transcript of the 37th Session of the SDC, 7 June 1995, p. 32.
Ex. P786, Stenographic Transcript of the 37th Session of the SDC, 7 June 1995, p. 31.
Ex. P762, Minutes from the 37th Session of the SDC held on 13 June 1995, p. 5; Ex. P1751, Excerpt from D.
Milošević VJ Personnel File.
Ex. P786, Stenographic Transcript of the 37th Session of the SDC, 13 June 1995, pp 32-33; Ex. P762, Minutes
from the 37th Session of the SDC held on 13 June 1995, p. 5.
Ex. P1900, Decree of the FRY President, 14 June 1995; Ex. P1721, Excerpt from Radivoje Miletić’s VJ
Personnel File, p. 1; Ex. P1899, VJ Personnel File of Milan Gvero, Doc ID 0422-3207, p. 1; Ex. P1786, Excerpt
from Personnel File of Zdravko Tolimir, p. 1.
Defence Final Brief, paras 431-438.
265
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questionnaires” for all the promotions it granted, but none of these were provided to the 30th PC.2430
However, the Trial Chamber also recalls that the PCs regulated the paperwork and kept record of
VJ personnel serving in the VRS and SVK.2431 This included ensuring a “timely entry of data […]
on promotions in the [VJ][…] [and] on assessment” of all personnel recorded in the PCs.2432
Through the PCs, therefore, Peri{i} had at his disposal information on all personnel serving in the
PCs. Against this backdrop and considering the SDC session records discussed above, the Trial
Chamber finds that Peri{i} was personally aware of the character and performance of members of
the PCs proposed for promotion verification. He therefore had information available that he would
assess to decide whether those officers were suitable for a promotion within the VJ. After such
assessment - for officers submitted for verification to the rank of General - Peri{i} would make
proposals before the SDC on their suitability for promotion in the VJ.
865.
In addition to the individuals discussed above, the Trial Chamber has received evidence on
the promotion and verification of, inter alia, the following: Radivoje Mileti},2433 Radislav Krsti},2434
Vujadin Popovi},2435 Vidoje Blagojevi},2436 Dragan Joki}2437 and Drago Nikoli}.2438
(v) Final Findings
866.
In sum, the Trial Chamber finds that as a general rule, promotions were first granted in the
VRS and SVK in accordance with the laws of the RS and RSK, respectively. The VRS and SVK
Main Staffs would then send a list of promotions to the VJ General Staff with a request that they be
verified. The Trial Chamber is also satisfied that the verification and promotions within the VJ were
made according to the Law on the VJ. Hence, Peri{i} retained the authority to promote members of
the PCs up to and including the rank of Colonel and had the power of proposal to the FRY President
for exceptional promotion to the rank of General. The Trial Chamber also finds that Peri{i} decided
2430
2431
2432
2433
2434
2435
2436
2437
Petar Škrbić, T. 11720. See e.g. Ex. P1907, VJ Personnel File of Bogdan Suboti}, Doc ID 0611-5563
(Questionnaire for a Candidate for a Promotion to the Rank of Major General, 20 October 1993). But see Petar
Škrbić, T. 11855, stating that “[i]t went without saying that this list should have been looked at by General
Mladi} and that we gave his opinion. As we saw in one of the exhibits, he put the word ‘no’ next to one of the
name[s]. So this kind of list was then also submitted to the 30th [PC] for the sake of preparation of certain
welfare documents”.
See supra paras 778-787.
Ex. P734, VJ General Staff Instructions on the PCs, 8 December 1993, para. 17.
Ex. P786, Stenographic Transcript of the 37th Session of the SDC, 7 June 1995, p. 32; Ex. P1729, VJ Personnel
File of Radivoje Miletić, Doc ID 0422-2358; Ex. P1900, Decree of the FRY President, 14 June 1995, p. 2;
Ex. P762, Minutes from the 37th Session of the SDC held on 13 June 1995, p. 5.
Ex. P748, Minutes from the 48th Session of the SDC held on 27 December 1995, p. 3; Ex. P1994, Excerpt of
Radislav Krsti} VJ Personnel File; Ex. P1999, Belgrade Military Post 1790 Certificate on the Promotion of
Radislav Krsti}, 21 August 1998.
Ex. P1934, VJ personnel file of Vujadin Popovi}, Doc ID 0422-8607; Ex. P2137, Order on Promotion, 16 June
1995, p. 3.
Ex. P2138, Order on Promotion, 16 June 1995, p. 3; Ex. P2139, Order on Promotion, 16 June 1995, p. 3.
Ex. P2143, Order on Promotion, 19 April 1995, p. 1.
266
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whether a promotion in the VJ was merited based on his own assessment of character and
performance of the members of the PCs proposed for promotion verification. Finally, the
verification and corresponding promotion in the VJ allowed the PC members to enjoy the benefits
and rights attached to the new rank, most importantly a commensurate salary.
(b) Salaries
867.
Several witnesses testified that officers who served in the VRS or SVK through the 30th and
40th PCs received their salaries and other benefits from the VJ.2439 Stamenko Nikoli} estimated that
between 4,000 and 4,700 military personnel in the VRS were entitled to a salary from the VJ,2440
2438
2439
2440
Ex. P2142, Order on Promotion, 24 April 1995, p. 1; Ex. P1655, VJ Personnel File of Drago Nikoli}, Doc ID
0422-8709.
Petar [krbi}, T. 11811; Rade Orli}, T. 5723-5724, 5739; Rade Rašeta, T. 5893, 6037; MP-14, T. 3507 (closed
session); Stamenko Nikoli}, T. 10520, 10680-10682; MP-5, T. 2395, 2419, 2423, 2456-2457, 2491, 2501, 25052506 (partly private session); MP-80, T. 8235, 8305-8306, 8364 (closed session); Stojan Mal~i}, T. 11329; Mile
Novakovi}, T. 13047-13048, 13049, 13323; Rajko Petrovi}, T. 13741; Du{an Kovacevi}, T. 12775; Ex. P75,
Witness Statement of \or|e \uki}, 4/29 February 1996, pp 2-3; Ex. P851, Coded Dispatch from the VJ Chief of
the General Staff Signed by Periši}, 22 February 1995 (Peri{i} on payment of VRS salaries); Ex. P769, Minutes
from the 58th Session of the SDC, 21 November 1996, p. 3; Ex. P1888, Decision by Military Post 3001, (the
decision recognized Aleksander \uki} son of the deceased \orde \uki} rights to salaries and special
compensation for unused leave); Ex. P1906, VJ Personnel File of Du{an Kova~evi}, Doc ID 0611-5812
(communication to the Accounting Centre of VJ G[ on Kova~evi}’s appointment to 30th PC for salary concern,
11 December 1995); Ex. P1911, VJ Personnel File of Milan ^eleketi}, Doc ID 0611-7957, (certificate of
^eleketi}’s income from VJ during 12/10/91-30/12/94, 2 April 2003); Ex. P1918, Request of Milan ^eleketi} to
the Military Post 1790 Belgrade, 24 May 2003; Ex. P1920, VJ personnel file of Ljubi{a Beara, Doc ID 06030644, (decision granting Beara right to redundancy in the amount equivalent to four times salary to be paid by
RC VJ G[ on the day his service in the 30th PC ceases, 25 November 1997); Ex. P1573, VJ Financial File of
Manojlo Milovanovi} 1992-2002, Doc ID 0610-4494, (MOD record of salary payment for July - December
1996, 3 February 1997); Doc IDs 0610-4495 (MOD record of salary payment for 1995, 6 July 1995), 0610-4497
(MOD record of salary payment for 1994, 25 January 1995); Ex. P1574, Various Documents Concerning VJ
Payments to Radivoje Mileti}, 1992-2001, Doc ID 0622-3479-0622-3493 (MOD Accounting Centre Records of
Mileti}’s salary payments between 1991 and 2000); Ex. P1586, MOD Payslip of Dragan Obrenovi} for 1992, 26
August 1992; Ex. P1585, MOD Payslip of Dragan Obrenovi} for 1994, 25 January 1995; Ex. P1584, MOD
Payslip of Dragan Obrenovi} for 1995, 16 January 1995; Ex. P1583, MOD Payslip of Dragan Obrenovi} for
1995, 6 July 1995; Ex. P1883, VJ Personnel File of Milutin Sko~aji}, Doc ID 0611-7043 (Military Post 3001
Decision granting salary and special compensation for unused annual leave from 1992 to 1994, to be paid by the
Accounting Centre of the MOD, 13 December 2001); Ex. P1884, VJ Personnel File of Lazo Babi}, Doc ID
0611-7172 (Military Post 3001 Decision granting him salary and special compensation for unused annual leave
for 1991-1995, to be made by the Accounting Centre of the VJ G[, 1 October 2001); Ex. P1885, VJ Personnel
File of Grujo Bori}, Doc ID 0611-7589 (Military Post 3001 Decision granting Bori} the right to salary and
special compensation for unused annual leave for 1991-1995, to be made by the Accounting Centre of the VJ
G[, 21 May 2001); Ex. P1886, VJ Personnel File of Momir Tali}, Doc ID 0611-8208 (Military Post 3001
Decision granting Tali} salary and special compensation for 1991-1995, to be paid by the Accounting Centre of
the MOD, 29 January 2002); Ex. P1887, VJ Personnel File of Bozo Novak, Doc ID 0611-8549 (MP 3001
decision grating Novak salary and special compensation for unused annual leave for 1991-1995, to be paid by
the Accounting Centre of the VJ G[, 8 March 2001); Ex. P1889, Decision by Military Post 3001, date unknown,
(granting Stanislav Gali}’s entitlement to salary and special compensation for unused annual leave for 19911994, to be paid by the Recruitment Centre of the VJ G[); Ex. P1891, Decision by Military Post 3001, undated
(granting Petar Salapura salary and special compensation for unused annual leave for 1992-1995, to be paid by
the Accounting Centre of the MOD); Ex. P1892, Decision by Military Post 3001, 25 September 2001 (decision
granting Milenko @ivanovi} entitlement to salary and special compensation for unused annual leave for 19911995, to be paid by the VJ General Staff Accounting Centre); Ex. P1893, VJ Personnel File of Radislav Krsti},
Doc ID 0422-8441, pp 10-11 (Military Post 3001 decision recognising his entitlement to receive salary and
allowances for the period between 1/9/94 to 31/1/95, 9 January 2002).
Stamenko Nikoli}, T. 10553; Ex. P769, Minutes from the 58th Session of the SDC held on 21 November 1996.
267
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while in the SVK, this number never exceeded 4,000 persons.2441 With particular emphasis on 1995,
he testified that in that period 2,421 officers and contract soldiers received their salaries through the
30th PC and 930 through the 40th PC.2442 There is also evidence that the payment of salaries for
members of the 30th PC was suspended for six months.2443 This interruption coincided with Serbia’s
imposition of sanctions on the RS when its leadership refused to sign the Vance-Owen peace
plan.2444
868.
The Defence submits that the Chief of the VJ General Staff was not involved in either the
budget determinations, which were the responsibility of the MOD, or in the determination of
salaries, which were the responsibility of the Federal Government.2445 The Defence argues that,
based on the Law on the VJ, the MOD was responsible for implementing regulations - approved by
the Federal Government - related to salary and other forms of remuneration.2446 Furthermore, the
MOD, through its accounting centre, which collected the data related to VJ officers, calculated the
salaries according to the regulations and issued the payments.2447
869.
The Trial Chamber recalls that the MOD was responsible for the annual national defence
budget that was eventually submitted to the FRY Assembly for approval.2448 This annual budget
included the budgetary needs for both the MOD and the VJ. The evidence shows that the VJ
General Staff participated in the planning of the annual budget by submitting its plan for budgetary
needs to the MOD, for its subsequent approval by the Minister of Defence and inclusion in the
annual budget.2449 It was a common practice for the VJ General Staff to also informally coordinate
its efforts with the MOD in preparing a realistic budget proposal for the approval of the Minister.2450
2441
2442
2443
2444
2445
2446
2447
2448
2449
2450
Stamenko Nikoli}, T. 10553.
Stamenko Nikoli}, T. 10553-10555; Ex. D246, Numerical Strength of Professional Soldiers in the 30th and 40th
PCs in May 1995.
MP-5, T. 2457, 2465 (MP-5 remained in the VRS during this period when he did not receive any salary,
T. 2466); Stojan Malčić, T. 11321; Milenko Jev|evi} T. 11079; Petar [krbi}, T. 12044; Rajko Petrovi},
T. 13771, 13777. Rajko Petrovi} also stated that no one left the ranks of the VRS because of the lack of payment,
Rajko Petrovi}, T. 13772. See also Stamenko Nikoli}, T. 10558-10559, 10668-10669; Ex. P2817, Letter from
VRS Main Staff Sector for Organisation, Mobilization and Personnel, 4 November 1994; Petar Škrbić, T. 1177011771; Drago ^ovilo, T. 13862; Ex. P1711, Request by Manojlo Milovanović, 31 March 2000; Ex. P2770,
Response from Mladi} to Peri{i} letter of 22 February 1995 regarding VJ salaries for September 1994, undated;
Ex. D344, Excerpt from Mladi}’s Notebook (meeting with Peri{i}), 12 August 1994, pp 10-11; Petar [krbi},
T. 11765-11766.
MP-14, T. 3525; MP-80, T. 8649-8650 (closed session); Ex. P75, Witness Statement of \or|e \uki}, 4/29
February 1996, pp 2-3; MP-5, T. 2465-2466; Miodrag Simi}, T. 10182-10183. See also Charles Kirudja,
T. 2827-2829; Ex. P2372, Transcript of Michael Williams from Prosecutor v. S. Milošević, 24 June 2003,
T. 22957; Du{an Kovačević, T. 12740-12741; Rajko Petrovi}, T. 13777.
Defence Final Brief, paras 346, 348, 355.
Defence Final Brief, paras 347, 355.
Defence Final Brief, para. 349.
Stamenko Nikoli}, T. 10622, 10625.
Stamenko Nikoli}, T. 10621-10624; Borivoje Jovani}, T. 11435, 11454.
Stamenko Nikoli}, T. 10624-10625; Borivoje Jovani}, T. 11454. See also supra paras 232-234.
268
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The largest expenditure within the VJ budget was for salaries2451 and this included the necessary
funds to pay members of the 30th and 40th PCs.2452 The evidence shows that in the plan for
budgetary needs, the VJ General Staff identified the total number of personnel entitled to a salary
and its estimate of the total funds needed to cover the salaries.2453
870.
Illustratively, at the 17th Session of the SDC held on 10 January 1994, Peri{i} justified the
request of 88.75 million dollars2454 in the budget proposal for the salary of military personnel in the
following way:
We have a total of 16,000 officers, including those in the [RSK] and the [RS]. They had an
average of 60.34 dollars […].
We have 13,000 non-commissioned officers; 20,000 contract soldiers – now we have 12,000 of
them. We plan to hire so many to make up for the soldiers we lack. […]
We have 24,000 civilians – in all three states.
This means that the total paid active duty service personnel in the [RSK], [RS] and SRJ is
73,722.2455
871.
At the SDC session of 7 June 1994, Peri{i} specified that:
[I]n [RS] we support and pay for 4,173 persons, or 7.42% from the [VJ], and in the [RSK] 1,474
persons or 2.62% from the [VJ]; that is a total of 5,647 persons. We allot around 14 million for
them each year and we need the same amount for next year, and that’s just for the salaries. That’s
a great help to them.2456
Those salaries were eventually paid by the Accounting Centre of the MOD with funds allocated to
the VJ in the national defence budget.2457
872.
However, the evidence also shows that in September 1994, while the payment of salaries
had been interrupted in light of the sanctions on the RS, Peri{i} provided Mladić personally and
2451
2452
2453
2454
2455
2456
2457
About 65% of the military budget was allocated to salaries and pensions, Stamenko Nikoli}, T. 10620, 10623;
Borivoje Jovani}, T. 11434-11435, 11437.
Borivoje Jovanić, T. 11456.
Borivoje Jovanić, T. 11454-11455.
Ex. P791, Stenographic Transcript of the 17th Session of the SDC, 10 January 1994, pp 3, 53.
Ex. P791, Stenographic Transcript of the 17th Session of the SDC, 10 January 1994, p. 52. See Ex. P783,
Stenographic Transcript of the 19th Session of the SDC, 16 March 1994, pp 6, 22-24; Borivoje Jovani},
T. 11434-11435.
Ex. P776, Stenographic Transcript of the 21st Session of the SDC, 7 June 1994, p. 46. See also Ex. P784,
Stenographic Transcript of the 22nd Session of the SDC, 11 July 1994, pp 7-8, 15 (stating that “together with the
Krajinas there are around 55,000 [salaried soldiers]”); Ex. P792, Stenographic Transcript of the 27th Session of
the SDC, 27 September 1994, pp 87-89; Petar Škrbić, T. 11765-11766, 11835; Ex. D352 (under seal), at 06:5517:15; Ex. P231, Transcripts of the 53rd Session of the Bosnian Serb Assembly, 28 August 1995 (wherein
Karad`i} was recorded as stating “one should know that we took over personnel that is dependant on Yugoslavia
and that is linked to Yugoslavia by its salaries and pensions and weapons and ammunition supply, etc. Although
we have paid for a large amount of that, we were also given a large amount”, p. 73).
Borivoje Jovani}, T. 11415-11417, 11456.
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directly with 500,000 Serb Dinars for the payment of salaries, without the involvement of the
Accounting Centre of the MOD.2458
873.
The Law on the VJ provided the legal framework for the determination of salary and other
forms of remuneration of military personnel. It defined the different elements of the salary structure
as well as the circumstances in which payments could be reduced or suspended. The salary of
military personnel was calculated based on rank, position and length of service. The salary structure
included the so-called “military supplement” or “army addition”, as well as compensations (such as
compensation for service under special conditions).2459
874.
The Law on the VJ established the general principles governing the payment of salaries and
vested the Federal Government with the function of defining, by way of decree, the specifics
necessary to calculate them. As Nikoli} stated, the MOD was “responsible for regulations
governing salaries, pecuniary allowances, and other sorts of remuneration in the army in accordance
with the Law on the Army of Yugoslavia”.2460
875.
Against this backdrop, the VJ was in charge of receiving the salary-related information from
VJ soldiers.2461 The VJ General Staff Personnel Administration processed that information and sent
it to the Accounting Centre of the MOD, which was in charge of paying these salaries. 2462
876.
Stojan Malčić explained how the salaries for members of the 30th PC were calculated. The
information necessary to calculate the salary was contained in the appointment orders.2463 On the
basis of these orders, the Personnel Department of the VRS Main Staff drew up reports on handover of duty which were sent to the 30th PC. Once verified, the reports were transmitted to the
Accounting Centre of the MOD which then issued the payment.2464 The salary was only paid if
2458
2459
2460
2461
2462
2463
2464
Stamenko Nikoli}, T. 10680-10682; Ex. P851, Coded Dispatch from the VJ Chief of the General Staff Signed by
Periši}, 22 February 1995; Ex. P2770, Response from Mladi} to Peri{i} letter of 22 February 1995 Regarding VJ
Salaries for September 1994, undated. See also Rajko Petrovi}, T. 13775-13776, 13793, 13796-13797.
Bojivoje Jovani}, T. 11430-11431; Stojan Mal~i} T. 11231-11232; Stamenko Nikoli}, T. 10449; Ex. P197, Law
on the VJ, 18 May 1994, Article 71.
Ex. P197, Law on the VJ, 18 May 1994, Article 87; Stamenko Nikoli}, T. 10417-10418.
Stojan Mal~i}, T. 11302-11308 (private session); Ex. D311 (under seal); Ex. D312 (under seal); Ex. D313 (under
seal); Ex. D314 (under seal).
Borivoje Jovani}, T. 11456, 11462.
Stojan Malčić, T. 11231, 11233, 11237, 11251. See also MP-5, T. 2513-2514.
Stojan Malčić, T. 11277-11279, 11284-11285 (partly private session), 11234-11235, 11237-11238, 11242,
11246, 11251, 11339; Ex. D305, Report on Taking Up of Duty by Stojan Mal~i}, 7 February 1994; Ex. P1810,
Decision by Military Post 3001, 12 May 1994; Ex. P2128, Order by VJ General Staff Personnel Administration,
7 February 1994; Ex. D306 (under seal); Ex. P1893, VJ Personnel File of Radislav Kristi}, Doc ID 0422-8441,
pp 8-9 (report on hand over duties as Chief of Staff of the Land Forces in the 30th PC, signed by Kristi}, 30
October 1994); Ex. P1897, VJ Personnel File of Dragan Obrenovi}, Doc ID 0611-8778. Before the establishment
of the PCs, the report on hand-over of duty was sent directly from the VRS Main Staff to the accounting centre
of the MOD in Belgrade, Stojan Mal~i}, T. 11263-11264; Ex. D294, Decree on Transfer and Appointment of
Stanislav Galić, 31 August 1992; Ex. D299, Report on Handover of Duty, 30 May 1992; Ex. P1573, VJ
Financial File of Manojlo Milovanovi} 1992-2002, Doc IDs 0610-4554, 0610-4559; Ex. P1899, VJ Personnel
File of Milan Gvero, Doc ID 0422-3303, pp 3-5.
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28963
appointments within the VRS were in compliance with the VJ rules.2465 The same procedure applied
to the officers serving in the SVK via the 40th PC.2466
877.
Stojan Malčić testified that former JNA military personnel who remained in BiH to serve in
the VRS received salaries as if they continued to serve with the JNA.2467 Stamenko Nikoli} also
testified that former members of the JNA who had remained to serve in the VRS and SVK
continued to receive their salaries from the FRY with the “cycle never [being] broken”.2468
878.
The Trial Chamber was presented with evidence in relation to the payment of salaries to,
inter alia, Ratko Mladi},2469 Milan ^eleketi},2470 Manojlo Milovanovi},2471 Radislav Krsti},2472
Milenko Živanovi},2473 Vujadin Popovi},2474 Dragan Obrenovi},2475 \or|e \uki},2476 Mile
2465
2466
2467
2468
2469
2470
2471
2472
2473
2474
2475
2476
Stojan Malčić, T. 11239-11240, 11266, 11268, 11271-11272; Ex. D304, Decision in Relation to Allowance for
Stojan Malčić, 8 December 1993.
Rade Rašeta, T. 5893-5894.
Stojan Malčić, T. 11225-11226, 11328-11329, 11373-11375. See also Milenko Jev|evi}, T. 11078-11079. Pyers
Tucker also testified that Bosnian Serb officers “gossiped” that Belgrade continued to pay them, which was
corroborated by intelligence he saw in 1996 at the UK crisis management headquarters in Northward, confirming
that “Bosnian Serb senior officers ₣…ğ salaries were being paid from Belgrade”, Pyers Tucker, T. 9170.
Stamenko Nikoli}, T. 10520. See also Ex. P75, Witness Statement of \or|e \uki}, 4/29 February 1996, pp 2-3;
Ex. P149, Analysis of the Combat Readiness and Activities of the VRS in 1992, April 1993, p. 128; Rajko
Petrovi}, T. 13745.
Ex. P1571, MOD Payslip of Ratko Mladi} for 1994, 25 January 1995; Ex. P1613, Payslip of Ratko Mladi} for
1994, 1 August 1994; Ex. P1570, MOD Payslip of Ratko Mladi} for the First Half of 1995, 6 July 1995;
Ex. P1569, MOD Payslip of Ratko Mladi} for 1996, 3 February 1997; Ex. P1568, MOD Payslip of Ratko Mladi}
for the First Half of 1997, 25 August 1997; Ex. P1614, MOD Payslip of Ratko Mladi} for 1995, 16 January
1996; Ex. P1615, MOD Payslip of Ratko Mladi} for 1996, 15 July 1996; Ex. P1616, MOD Payslip of Ratko
Mladi} for 1997, 20 February 1998; Ex. P1567, MOD Payslip of Ratko Mladi} for 1998, 12 January 1999;
Ex. P1566, MOD Payslip of Ratko Mladi} for 1999, 9 February 2000; Ex. P1565, MOD Payslip of Ratko Mladi}
for 2000, 23 January 2001; Ex. P1572, MOD Payslip of Ratko Mladi} for 2002, 12 March 2002.
Ex. P1911, VJ Personnel File of Milan ^eleketi}, Doc IDs 0611-7955, 0611-7957 (Certification of ^eleketi}’s
income from 12 October 1991 to 30 December 1994).
Ex. P1573, VJ Financial File of Manojlo Milovanovi} 1992-2002, Doc IDs 0610-4498 (1994), 0610-4497
(1994), 0610-4495 (1995), 0610-4493 (1996), 0610-4494 (1996), 0610-4491 (1997), 0610-4490 (1998), 06104489 (1999), 0610-4488 (2000), 0610-4487 (2001), 0610-4486 (2002).
Ex. P2014, Decision of Military Post 3001 recognizing Krsti}’s entitlement to receive salaries, 9 January 2002;
Ex. P2013, VJ Financial File of Radislav Krsti}, Doc IDs 0622-6134 (1994), 0622-6133 (1995), 0622-6132
(1995), 0622-6131 (1996), 0622-6128 (1997), 0622-6129 (1997), 0622-6127 (1998), 0622-6126 (1999), 06226123 (2001).
Ex. P1595, MOD Payslip of Milenko Živanovi} for 1994, 25 January 1995; Ex. P1596, MOD Payslip of
Milenko Živanovi} for 1995, 6 July 1995; Ex. P1594, MOD Payslip of Milenko Živanovi} for 1995, 16 January
1996.
See Ex. P2077, Set of Documents Regarding Vujadin Popovi}, pp 68-71.
Ex. P1587, MOD Payslip of Dragan Obrenovi} for 1992, 26 August 1992, Ex. P1586, MOD Payslip of Dragan
Obrenovi} for 1992, 26 August 1992; Ex. P1585, MOD Payslip of Dragan Obrenovi} for 1995, 25 January 1995;
Ex. P1583, MOD Payslip of Dragan Obrenovi} for 1995, 6 July 1995; Ex. P1584, MOD Payslip of Dragan
Obrenovi} for 1995, 16 January 1995; Ex. P1582, MOD Payslip of Dragan Obrenovi} for 1996, 3 February
1997; Ex. P1580, MOD Payslip of Dragan Obrenovi} for 1997, 25 August 1997; Ex. P1581, MOD Payslip of
Dragan Obrenovi} for 1997, 20 February 1998; Ex. P1579, MOD Payslip of Dragan Obrenovi} for 1998,
12 January 1999; Ex. P1578, MOD Payslip of Dragan Obrenovi} for 1999, 9 February 1999; Ex. P1577, MOD
Payslip of Dragan Obrenovi} for 2000, 23 January 2001; Ex. P1576, MOD Payslip of Dragan Obrenovi} for
2001, 7 August 2001.
Ex. P1592, MOD Payslip of \or|e \uki} for 1992, August 1992; Ex. P1593, MOD Payslip of \or|e \uki} for
1992, 31 August 1992; Ex. P1591, MOD Payslip of \or|e \uki} for 1994, August 1994; Ex. P1590, MOD
Payslip of \or|e \uki} for 1994, 25 January 1995; Ex. P1589, MOD Payslip of \or|e \uki} for 1995, 6 July
1995; Ex. P1588, MOD Payslip of \or|e \uki} for 1995, 16 January 1996.
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Novakovi},2477 Bogdan Sladojevi},2478 Radivoje Mileti},2479 Milan Gvero,2480 Zdravko Tolimir,2481
Stanislav Gali}2482 and Dragomir Milo{evi}.2483
879.
In addition to a salary, members of the PCs received “special payments” for service at the
time of their retirement. The Accounting Centre of the VJ General Staff was in charge of making
these payments. For example, at the time of his retirement in 2000, Mladi} received special
payments for his service in the 30th PC.2484 Two decisions issued by the 30th PC, on 11 October
2000 and 3 March 2000, stated that the payment Mladi} was entitled to for his service with the 30th
PC “shall be made by the Accounting Centre of the VJ/Yugoslav Army/G[/ General Staff”.2485
Likewise, a decision of 20 September 2000 declared that Tolimir was entitled to payments for his
service at the 30th PC “by the Accounting Centre of the VJ G[”.2486
880.
The Trial Chamber is therefore satisfied that Peri{i} was directly involved in determining
the funds needed for the payment of salaries for military personnel, including members of the 30th
and 40th PCs.2487 The Trial Chamber is further satisfied that the material payment of the salaries was
made by the Accounting Centre of the MOD, with the funds that were allocated to the VJ in the
national defence budget. In addition, the Trial Chamber is satisfied that the PCs, or the Personnel
2477
2478
2479
2480
2481
2482
2483
2484
2485
2486
2487
Ex. P1611, Payslip of Mile Novakovi} for 1992, 24 June 1992; Ex. P1612, Payslip of Mile Novakovi} for 1992,
2 September 1995; Ex. P1609, Payslip of Mile Novakovi} for 1993, undated; Ex. P1610, Payslip of Mile
Novakovi} for 1994, 20 January 1995.
Ex. P1608, Pay Record of Bogdan Sladojevi} for 1991, 8 January 1992; Ex. P1607, Pay Record of Bogdan
Sladojevi} for 1991, 15 January 1992; Ex. P1606, Pay Record of Bogdan Sladojevi} for 1992, 8 October 1992;
Ex. P1605, Pay Record of Bogdan Sladojevi} for 1992, 8 October 1992; Ex. P1597, Pay Record of Bogdan
Sladojevi} for 1993, undated; Ex. P1604, Pay Record of Bogdan Sladojevi} for 1994, 2 July 1994; Ex. P1603,
Pay Record of Bogdan Sladojevi} for 1994, 23 January 1995; Ex. P1602, Pay Record of Bogdan Sladojevi} for
1997, 17 February 1998; Ex. P1601, Pay Record of Bogdan Sladojevi} for 1998, 12 January 1999; Ex. P1600,
Pay Record of Bogdan Sladojevi} for 2000, date illegible; Ex. P1599, Pay Record of Bogdan Sladojevi} for
2001, 2 February 2005; Ex. P1598, Pay Record of Bogdan Sladojevi} for 2004, date illegible.
Ex. P1574, VJ Personnel File of Radivoje Mileti}, Doc IDs 0622-3493 (1991), 0622-3489 (1994), 0622-3488
(1994), 0622-3487 (1995), 0622-3486 (1995), 0622-3484 (1996), 0622-3483 (1997), 0622-3482 (1997), 06223481 (1998), 0622-3480 (1999), 0622-3479 (2000).
Ex. P1987, VJ Financial File of Milan Gvero, Doc IDs 0622-5175 (1991), 0622-5173 (1992), 0622-5172 (1992),
0622-5171 (1992), 0622-5169 (1994), 0622-5170 (1994), 0622-5167 (1995), 0622-5168 (1995), 0622-5165
(1996), 0622-5166 (1996), 0622-5164 (1997).
Ex. P1796, VJ Financial File of Zlatko Tolimir, Doc IDs 0622-3564 (1994), 0622-3563 (1994), 0622-3562
(1995), 0622-3561 (1995), 0622-3560 (1996), 0622-3559 (1996), 0622-3558 (1997), 0622-3556 (1998), 06223555 ( 1999), 0622-3554 (2000).
See Ex. P1774, Request by Stanislav Galić, 10 April 2000.
Ex. P822, Judgement of the 2nd Municipal Court, Belgrade, 9 July 2001, p. 8; Ex. P833, Record of Hearing in D.
Milo{evi} case held before the 2nd Municipal Court in Belgrade, 19 March 1998, p. 6.
Ex. P1919, Decision of Military Post 3001, Decision Granting Mladi} Salaries and Relevant Compensation for
the Period from 01/09/94-31/01/95, 11 October 2000.
Ex. P1919, Decision of Military Post 3001, Decision Granting Mladi} Salaries and Relevant Compensation for
the Period from 01/09/94-31/01/95, 11 October 2000; Ex. P1924, Decision of the Military Post 3001 Belgrade, 3
March 2000.
Ex. P1791, Order by the VJ Personnel Administration, 20 September 2000.
The Trial Chamber notes that the Defence does not seem to dispute that the General Staff of the VJ calculated
the total sum required to pay all officers and servicemen in the VJ, Defence Final Brief, para. 360.
272
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Administration of the VJ General Staff, provided the Accounting Centre of the MOD with all of the
records and information necessary to calculate the salaries of the members of the 30th and 40th PCs.
(c) Pensions
881.
Several witnesses testified that members of the 30th and 40th PCs continued to be part of the
VJ retirement plan, although they had served in the VRS and the SVK.2488
882.
The VJ retirement plan was financed partly by contributions made by VJ military personnel,
including members of the 30th and 40th PCs, during their service, and partly by funds allocated for
this purpose within the yearly military budget.2489 Both Nikoli} and Jovani} testified that about 60
to 65% of the VJ military budget was allocated to pensions and salaries.2490 Different estimates
were provided, however, as to the portion of this sum allocated to pensions: 40%, according to
Nikoli} and about 20% according to Jovani}.2491
883.
Service in the VRS and SVK by members of the 30th and 40th PCs, respectively, was
counted by the VJ as continuous service time for the calculation of pensions.2492 Illustratively, MP14, a JNA career officer who served with the VRS as a member of the 30th PC, testified that upon
his retirement from the VRS, his years of service both with the JNA and the VRS were added
together for the calculation of his pension.2493 The Trial Chamber heard that a similar pension
regime applied to the SVK. Rade Rašeta explained that upon his retirement, his years of service
with the SVK were added to his years of service with the JNA/VJ.2494
884.
Articles 264 to 267 of the Law on the VJ provided for various regimes to calculate the
pensionable service for professional soldiers.2495 Pursuant to Article 264, those who participated in
armed activities after 17 August 1990 as members of the VJ would have their time in service
counted as double for the purpose of pension calculation.2496 For those professional soldiers who
carried out especially hard work or tasks that were hazardous to their health, the length of the
pensionable service was calculated on an increased basis, depending on the “degree of hardship and
2488
2489
2490
2491
2492
2493
2494
2495
2496
Petar Škrbić, T. 11799; MP-5, T. 2388-2389; Rade Rašeta, T. 6037; MP-14, T. 3508-3509 (closed session);
Miodrag Star~evi}, T. 6784-6785.
Petar Skrbi}, T. 11799; Borivoje Jovani}, T. 11433-11434.
Stamenko Nikoli}, T. 10620, 10764-10765; Borivoje Jovani}, T. 11434.
Stamenko Nikoli}, T. 10764-10765; Borivoje Jovani}, T. 11437.
Miodrag Star~evi}, T. 6784; Milenko Jev|evi}, T. 11162.
MP-14, T. 3508-3509 (closed session).
Rade Rašeta, T. 5874-5875, 5947, 6037.
Ex. P197, Law on the VJ, 18 May 1994, pp 68-70.
Ex. P197, Law on the VJ, 18 May 1994, p. 68; Ex. P734, VJ General Staff Instructions on the PCs, 8 December
1993, para. 16.
273
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28960
harmfulness or the nature of work”.2497 For example, 12 months spent on a certain duty could be
counted as 15, 16 or 18 months for pensionable purposes.2498
885.
Petar Škrbić testified as to the procedure for the provision of pensions for members of the
th
30 PC. He stated that the Sector for Recruitment, Mobilisation and System Affairs in the VRS
Main Staff sent a list of the VRS retired servicemen to the 30th PC office in Belgrade.2499 In turn,
the 30th PC issued a decision in relation to their pensions based on the Law on the VJ.2500
Illustratively, on 15 November 1995, Petar Škrbić issued a certificate stating that in 1992, General
Manojlo Milovanović was transferred to Military Post 7572 in Sarajevo to help regulate
Milovanović’s “accelerated pension plan” in accordance with Article 264 of the Law on the VJ.2501
On 15 December 1995, the VJ General Staff Personnel Administration recognised Milovanović’s
right to an accelerated pension plan.2502 Similarly, the VJ Personnel Administration decided on 9
December 1994 that Colonel Jovo Kundačina was “entitled to have his service calculated as double
as of 20 May 1992” for pension purposes.2503 The VJ Personnel Administration also granted
requests from Zdravko Tolimir to calculate as double his years of service with the VRS from 1990
until 1995.2504 Witness Milenko Jev|ević provided a similar account in relation to the calculations
of his pensionable years of service.2505
886.
The Trial Chamber received evidence that the calculation of double years of pensionable
service in the VJ for wartime service in the VRS also applied to Ratko Mladi},2506 Dragomir
Milo{evi},2507 Vinko Pandurevi},2508 Drago Nikoli},2509 Vujadin Popovi},2510 Bogdan Suboti}2511
2497
2498
2499
2500
2501
2502
2503
2504
2505
2506
2507
2508
2509
Ex. P197, Law on the VJ, 18 May 1994, Article 266, p. 69.
Ex. P197, Law on the VJ, 18 May 1994, Articles 266-267, pp 69-70.
Petar Škrbić, T. 11799.
Ibid.
Ex. P1702, Certificate of Transfer of Manojlo Milovanovi}, 15 November 1995. See also Ex. P734, VJ General
Staff Instructions on the PCs, 8 December 1993, para. 16.
Ex. P1707, VJ General Staff Decision on Accelerated Pension for Manojlo Milovanovi}, 15 December 1995. See
also Ex. P1706, VJ General Staff Decision on Accelerated Pension for Manojlo Milovanovi}, 25 March 1998.
Ex. P402, Decision of the Sector for Recruitment, Mobilisation, and Systems Issues of the General Staff of the
VJ, 9 December 1994. See also MP-5, T. 2409-2410.
Ex. P1790, Decision by VJ Personnel Administration, 2 June 1998. See also Ex. P401, Decision of the Sector for
Recruitment, Mobilisation, and Systems Issues of the General Staff of the VJ, undated; Ex. P1706, VJ General
Staff Decision on Accelerated Pension for Manojlo Milovanovi}, 25 March 1998; Ex. P1707, VJ General Staff
Decision on Accelerated Pension for Manojlo Milovanovi}, 15 December 1995.
Milenko Jev|evi} T. 11162. See also the similar account of MP-5, T. 2390, 2480-2482 (partly private session);
Ex. P398 (under seal), p. 1.
Ex. P2015, VJ Military Post 3001 Decision On Ratko Mladi}’s Pensionable Service, 28 February 2002;
Ex. P1924, Decision of the Military Post 3001 Belgrade, 3 March 2000; Ex. P2016, Request for Recognition of
Administrative Pension from Ratko Mladi} to VJ Military Post 3001, 28 February 2002; Ex. P2019, VJ Military
Post 3001 Decision On Ratko Mladi}’s Pensionable Service, 28 February 2002.
Ex. P1758, Decision by VJ Personnel Administration, 20 December 1996.
Ex. P1739, Decision of the VJ General Staff Personnel Administration, 30 September 1994; Ex. P401, Decision
of the Sector for Recruitment, Mobilisation, and Systems Issues of the General Staff of the VJ, undated.
Ex. P1668, VJ Documents Relating to the Pension Procedures in Regard to Drago Nikoli}; Ex. P1662, VJ
Documents Relating to Termination of Military Services of Drago Niloki}, 19 May 1995.
274
Case No.: IT-04-81-T
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28959
and Ljubiša Beara.2512 The Trial Chamber also notes that, on 30 August 2002, the Military Social
Insurance Fund in Belgrade granted Ratko Mladi}’s personal request to an administrative
pension.2513
887.
The same procedure applied to members of the 40th PC. Rade Rašeta’s years of service with
the SVK were similarly considered as double for the purpose of calculating his pension.2514 Peri{i}
himself granted Mile Mrk{i}’s right to double his years of pensionable employment “after assessing
the evidence and facts”.2515 The right to double years of service was also granted to Čeleketi} on 27
June 1994 by the VJ General Staff Personnel Administration.2516 Rade Orlić's years of service in the
SVK, instead, were calculated based on the accelerated length of service at the rate of 12/152517
months, which lowered his retirement age by two years.2518
888.
Stamenko Nikoli} testified that it was the Military Social Insurance Fund (“SOVO”) – not
the VJ General Staff - that calculated and distributed the pensions.2519 Based on the foregoing
evidence, the Trial Chamber understood Stamenko Nikoli} to say that while the General Staff
decided on the provision of pensions for members of the 30th and 40th PCs, the material calculation
and distribution thereof were carried out by the SOVO.
889.
In sum, the Trial Chamber finds that the PCs decided on the recognition of pensionable
years of service and on the provision of pensions, which were then paid by the SOVO.
(d) Housing
890.
On 17 August 1994, Peri{ić ordered that housing matters for members of the 30th and 40th
PCs should be regulated in the same manner as other VJ members.2520 According to this order,
requests for housing of members of the 30th and 40th PCs had to be certified by the respective PC.
2510
2511
2512
2513
2514
2515
2516
2517
2518
2519
2520
Ex. P2072, Request of Vujadin Popovi} to Military Post 3001, 27 August 1994; Ex. P2073, VJ General Staff
Personnel Administration Decision, 30 September 1994; Ex. P2075, Military Post 3001 Decision, 24 March
1995; Ex. P2076, Military Post 3001 Decision, 6 October 1999; Ex. P2077, Set of Documents Regarding
Vujadin Popovi}, pp 17-18 (Military Post 3001 Decision of 30 March 2000), 23-24 (Military Post 3001 Decision
of 9 February 2001); Ex. P2079, Military Post 3001 Decision, 28 November 2001.
Ex. P1907, VJ Personnel File of Bogdan Suboti}.
Ex. P1960, VJ General Staff Personnel Administration Decision, 17 February 1995; Ex. P1969, VJ General Staff
Personnel Administration Decision, 27 July 1994.
Ex. P2016, Request for Recognition of Administrative Pension from Ratko Mladi} to VJ Military Post 3001,
28 February 2002; Ex. P2023, VJ Military Social Insurance Fund, 23 June 2002.
Rade Rašeta, T. 5947-5948.
Ex. P1916, VJ Personnel File of Mile Mrk{i}, Doc ID 0422-2973.
Ex. P1970, VJ Personnel Administration Decision, 27 June 1994.
The term 12/15 means that 12 months of service were recognised as 15 months, Ex. P197, Law on the VJ,
18 May 1994, Article 267.
Ex. P1683, Military Post 3001 Decision, 13 February 2001, Doc ID 0611-4935; Rade Orli}, T. 5771-5773.
Stamenko Nikoli}, T. 10764.
Ex. P1871, Order by VJ General Staff, 17 August 1994; Ex. P734, VJ General Staff Instructions on the PCs, 8
December 1993, para. 29.
275
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Once certified, the applications were transmitted to the garrison from which the soldiers were
dispatched.2521 The Trial Chamber notes that the housing certificates in evidence demonstrate that a
soldier’s periods of service in different units were considered as one continuous period of
service.2522 For example, a housing certificate issued to Veljko Bosanac in 1998 stipulated that he
served continuously in the JNA/VJ from 1971 until 1996, despite the fact that he was transferred to
the 40th PC in 1994 and served at the Novi Sad Garrison in 1995.2523
891.
The Trial Chamber was presented with evidence showing that the housing needs of soldiers
serving in the 30th and 40th PCs were addressed either by (i) the issuance of a housing certificate or
by (ii) the provision of a family separation allowance.2524 Witness MP-5, a 30th PC officer who
served in the VRS, testified that personnel serving in the VRS through the 30th PC were provided
with accommodation in the RS, or in the alternative, were financially compensated by the 30th
PC.2525 Stamenko Nikolić also testified that a soldier was entitled to have a housing facility
provided to both him and his family by the VJ for the duration of his service.2526 Likewise, Mile
Novakovi} testified that when the JNA left Croatia, the soldiers who decided to stay in Krajina were
still treated as being part of the JNA and were entitled to housing. They were asked to choose in
which garrison in FRY territory they wanted to have an apartment allocated to them.2527 If that
accommodation was not available, they were financially compensated and such compensation was
regulated through and paid for by the PCs.2528
892.
Additionally, the Trial Chamber received evidence that soldiers were required to inform the
VJ of any change in their housing situation.2529
893.
Soldiers who were not provided housing at their garrison of service were entitled to a family
allowance from the VJ.2530 Defence witness Stojan Malčić testified that soldiers “were entitled to an
allowance if [they] did not live in the same garrison with [their] families”.2531 By way of example,
2521
2522
2523
2524
2525
2526
2527
2528
2529
2530
2531
Ex. P1871, Order by VJ General Staff, 17 August 1994.
Ex. P1649, VJ Personnel File of Veljko Bosanac, the file contains a Certificate Issued by the Sector for
Recruitment, Mobilization and Systems Issues, Personnel Administration of the VJ General Staff, 16 July 1998.
Ex. P1649, VJ Personnel File of Veljko Bosanac.
Stojan Mal~i}, T. 11263-11264; Ex. P1650, VJ Personnel File of Ljubomir Cvjetan, containing a Decision to
grant Family Separation Allowance by the 40th PC, 10 November 1993; Ex. P1731, VJ Personnel File of Vinko
Pandurević; Ex. P2044, Request of Recognition of Compensatory Entitlements from Ratko Mladi} to VJ
Military Post 3001, 8 April 1994; Ex. P2040, VJ Military Post 3001 Certificate, 18 May 1994; Ex. P2039, VJ
Military Post 3001 Decision, 18 May 1994.
MP-5, T. 2424, 2462-2463.
Stamenko Nikoli}, T. 10453.
Mile Novakovi}, T. 13051-13052.
MP-5, T. 2423-2424; Mile Novakovi}, T. 13051, 13324; Borivoje Jovani}, T. 11458-11459.
Ex. P1929, Decision of Military Post 2102 Belgrade on Vinko Pandurevi}, 7 August 1998; Ex. P1930,
Indictment of the VJ Military Disciplinary Prosecutor against Vinko Pandurevi}, 19 March 1999; Ex. P1932,
Judgement against Vinko Pandurevi} of the VJ Military Disciplinary Court, 14 October 1999.
Ex. P1650, VJ Personnel File of Ljubomir Cvjetan; MP-5, T. 2424, 2462-2463.
Stojan Malčić, T. 11263.
276
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28957
the Trial Chamber notes a decision from the Military Post 4001, signed by General Milan ^eleketi},
granting Ljubomir Cvjetan a family separation allowance in accordance with the Rules of Procedure
on Travel and Other Expenses in the VJ. The decision stated that Cvjetan did not have free
accommodation in the Knin area and shared a household with his family in Belgrade, and thus, was
entitled to the allowance.2532
894.
Additionally, on 3 November 1999, the Military Post at Bijeljina BiH issued a decision
granting Vinko Pandurevi} a family separation allowance in accordance with the Regulation of
Travel and Other Allowances in the VJ. The decision states, in relevant part, that a “professional
soldier ₣…ğ who is supporting the family he is living with in common household, and who has an
apartment on the territory of FRY, i.e. on the territory of the republics of the former SFRY ₣…ğ has
a right to separation allowance if at the service post he has no apartment”.2533
895.
Further evidence suggests that some members of the PCs, such as General Ratko Mladi} in
particular, received both housing and a family separation allowance from the VJ.2534 Specifically,
on 18 May 1994 and later, on 8 April 1997, Mladi} was granted compensation for “expenses
incurred for living apart from his family”.2535 The decision of 8 April 1997 refers specifically to the
fact that although Mladi} was not provided an “official apartment at his place of service”, he was
provided with accommodation at the military facility at Han Pijesak garrison where he was
serving.2536 Additionally, both decisions confirm that Mladi} had a separate family residence in
Belgrade, while the 8 April 1997 decision further indicates that Mladi} was “relocated from the
Belgrade Garrison, where he had a settled housing issue/permanent housing provided/, to the Han
Pijesak Garrison […]”.2537 Therefore, it appears that Mladi} was provided with both an
accommodation in Belgrade, as well as multiple family separation allowances from the VJ, at least
for a period of time in 1994 and 1997.
896.
In conclusion, in relation to housing, the Trial Chamber finds that members of the PCs were
treated in the same manner as other VJ soldiers. The Trial Chamber is also satisfied that Peri{i}
2532
2533
2534
2535
2536
2537
Ex. P1650, VJ Personnel File of Ljubomir Cvjetan.
Ex. P1731, VJ Personnel File of Vinko Pandurević, Doc ID 0422-8574, pp 6-7.
Ex. P2044, Request of Recognition of Compensatory Entitlements from Ratko Mladi} to VJ Military Post 3001,
8 April 1994; Ex. P2040, VJ Military Post 3001 Certificate, 18 May 1994; Ex. P2039, VJ Military Post 3001
Decision, 18 May 1994; Ex. P2035, Request of Separation Allowance from Ratko Mladi} to VJ Military Post
3001, 12 March 1997; Ex. P2036, Military Post 7403 Certificate, 12 March 1997; Ex. P2045, Military Post 7403
Decision, 8 April 1997.
Ex. P2039, VJ Military Post 3001 Decision, 18 May 1994; Ex. P2045, Military Post 7403 Decision, 8 April
1997.
Ex. P2045, Military Post 7403 Decision, 8 April 1997; Ex. P2035, Request of Separation Allowance from Ratko
Mladi} to VJ Military Post 3001, 12 March 1997; Ex. P2036, Military Post 7403 Certificate, 12 March 1997.
Ex. P2045, Military Post 7403 Decision, 8 April 1997 (emphasis added); Ex. P2039, VJ Military Post 3001
Decision, 18 May 1994.
277
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took an active role in regulating the housing entitlements for VJ members deployed to the VRS and
SVK through the PCs.2538
(e) Medical Assistance
897.
Members of the 30th and 40th PCs serving in the VRS and the SVK were entitled to medical
insurance in the FRY and were treated in VJ medical facilities located in the territory of the
FRY.2539
898.
For example, Dragomir Milo{evi} was treated in the Military Medical Academy Hospital
(“VMA”) in Belgrade after being wounded during combat activities near Sarajevo in August
1995.2540 Similarly, Radislav Krsti} was treated at the VMA for the wounds he sustained in the
field.2541 Witness MP-80 testified that the medical centres in the territory of RSK had a relatively
low capacity to treat and rehabilitate the seriously injured.2542 Consequently, seriously wounded
SVK soldiers were treated in the VMA in Belgrade and some of them were sent for treatment to the
RS.2543 The SVK also suffered from a chronic shortage of medical officers and medicines.2544 The
VJ therefore provided some medical personnel at the request of the SVK, but according to MP-80,
it was insufficient.2545
899.
The evidence shows that the VJ provided medical treatment to wounded VRS and SVK
soldiers in general and not only to the PCs members. In April 1995, Peri{i} acknowledged that the
VMA in Belgrade was “already overstretched” and that less serious cases of wounded VRS and
SVK soldiers “should be treated in local medical institutions, rather than transferred – as they are
now – to the VMA”.2546 A month later, Peri{i} had to issue an order allocating 20 beds from a
military barrack in Belgrade to accommodate VRS and SVK wounded soldiers, due to a shortage of
beds at the VMA.2547
2538
2539
2540
2541
2542
2543
2544
2545
2546
2547
Ex. P1871, Order by VJ General Staff (regarding housing for members of the 30th and 40th PCs), 17 August
1994; Ex. P734, VJ General Staff Instructions on the PCs, 8 December 1993, para. 29.
Mile Novakovi}, T. 13323; Stojan Mal~i}, T. 11229; Ex. P863, Folder Containing Documents Regarding
Medical Treatment of Members of VRS and SVK Treated in the FRY; MP-5, T. 2380-2385, 2462-2463;
Ex. P396 (under seal).
Ex. P822, Judgement of the 2nd Municipal Court, Belgrade, 9 July 2001.
Ex. P907, Document Issued by the Drina Corps Command, 2 January 1995.
MP-80, T. 8361-8363 (closed session).
Ibid.
MP-80, T. 8360-8361 (closed session).
Ibid.
Ex. P719, Minutes from the 34th Session of the SDC held on 2 March 1995, p. 3. See also Ex. P2865, Order of
the VRS 2nd Krajina Corps Logistics Command Regarding Sending Wounded to VJ Institutions, 16 March 1995;
Ex. P779, Stenographic Transcript of the 28th Session of the SDC, 2 November 1994, p. 9; Ned Krayishnik,
T. 9491-9493, 9496-9497; Ex. P2806, Le{i} Videotape of Mladi} and others in Belgrade, Han Piljesik and Crna
Rijeka, 16-18 July 1995, at 57:20.
Ex. P908, VJ General Staff Order Issued by Momčilo Perišić, 30 May 1994, Doc ID 0630-7398, p. 1.
278
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900.
Medical treatment was also provided to PC members for pre-existing medical conditions.
For instance, Ratko Mladić was admitted as an emergency patient to the VMA in Belgrade on 14
September 1995, where he underwent medical treatment in connection with a previously diagnosed
medical condition.2548
901.
In order to receive medical care, each member of the 30th and 40th PCs was required to have
a valid medical booklet, which was stamped each time treatment was received.2549 Such medical
booklets, in order to be valid, needed to contain an up-to-date stamp certifying the current unit of
service of the soldier and his place of residence.2550
902.
Family members of the military beneficiaries also received medical care – regardless of
whether they stayed in the FRY or joined their relatives serving in the VRS or SVK – and their
booklets needed to be stamped every year in order to be valid.2551
903.
The Trial Chamber received further evidence that requests were made by the VRS for
critical equipment, including medicine.2552 During the SDC session of 10 January 1994, Perišić
stated “[l]ogistic support has been the best functioning element in the wretched war, and medical
support was the best functioning part thereof. […] With the current budget we have managed to
provide proper treatment for all the wounded, including those from the [RS] and [RSK]. We did not
get a single dinar for that”.2553
904.
The Trial Chamber is satisfied that members of the PCs and their families were entitled to
and benefited from medical assistance in the VJ and the FRY.
(f) Other Benefits
905.
Like other VJ officers, members of the 30th and 40th PCs also enjoyed various benefits, such
as compensation for service under difficult conditions, health insurance and housing benefits.2554
906.
Service in the VRS and SVK by members of the PCs was considered “service under difficult
(or special) conditions” and therefore gave them the right to compensation according to the Law on
2548
2549
2550
2551
2552
2553
2554
Ex. P2744, Documents Concerning Mladi} Discharge from VJ Military Medical Academy in Belgrade,
20 September 1995; Ex. P1113, Medical History Form for Ratko Mladić, 14 September 1995.
MP-5, T. 2380-2385 (private session); Ex. P396 (under seal).
MP-5, T. 2381-2383 (private session), 2468-2469 (private session); Stojan Malčić, T. 11230.
MP-5, T. 2382-2385 (private session), 2462-2464 (partly private session); Stojan Mal~i}, T. 11229-11230;
Ex. P1857, Letter to 30th PC, 21 June 1994.
See Ex. P2915, VRS Request to the VJ for the Provision of Amunition, 18 July 1993, p. 4.
Ex. P791, Stenographic Transcript of the 17th Session of the SDC, 10 January 1994, pp 59-60.
Stojan Malčić, T. 11229-11232; Mile Novaković, T. 13051-13052, 13324-13326.
279
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the VJ.2555 On 3 February 1994, Mladi} issued a decision regarding the compensation for military
service performed in difficult (special) conditions. The decision was issued pursuant to Article 26 of
the Rules of Travel and Other Expenses in the VJ, and “in connection with the implementation” of a
19 October 1993 decision of the Sector for Operations of the VJ General Staff identifying the
territory where service was carried out under difficult (special) conditions.2556 Mladi}’s decision
stated:
All professional officers and NCOs, civilians in the army, officers, NCOs and contract soldiers
serving in the Yugoslav Army, deployed in the Army of Republika Srpska, are entitled to
compensation for carrying out military service in difficult (special) conditions.2557
907.
This decision established that the VRS Main Staff Commander, the Commander of the Air
Force and Anti-Aircraft Defence as well as the Corps Commanders of the VRS decided on
compensation for all eligible individuals and submitted the decisions to the Accounting Centre of
the FRY MOD.2558
908.
On 22 March 1994, Peri{i} issued a decision determining that any active servicemen in the
VJ who were performing tasks in “territory where the members of the 30th and 40th Personnel
Centres are in service” were entitled to compensation for service “under difficult (special)
conditions”.2559
909.
The Trial Chamber notes that a decision of the 30th PC on 12 May 1994 granted Mladi}
compensation for service under difficult conditions, based on the Law on the VJ as well as on a
2555
2556
2557
2558
2559
Mile Novaković, T. 13051, 13324-13326; MP-5, T. 2396; Ex. P1777, VJ Personnel File of Mile Novaković,
Doc ID 0611-7677, p. 1; Ex. P2626, Decision on Reimbursement of Mile Vignjević, 19 September 1994, p. 1;
Ex. P1792, Certificate by the VJ Personnel Administration, 23 September 1994, p. 2 (on Tolimir’s salary
increase due to “difficult (special) conditions”); Ex. P1573, VJ Financial File of Manojlo Milovanovi} 19922002, Doc IDs 0610-4526, 0610-4536, 0610-4543, 0610-4550, 0610-4553 (decisions on Manojlo Milovanovi}’s
compensation for service under difficult circumstances); Ex. P1730, Various Military Documents of Radivoje
Miletić, pp 22-23 (special compensation to Mileti} to be paid by the Accounting Centre of the VJ General Staff);
Ex. P1526, VJ Financial File of Bogdan Sladojevi}, Doc IDs 0622-3625, 0626-3646, 0622-3647, 0622-3672,
0622-3687 (decisions granting Sladojevi} allowance for service in “special” and “difficult” conditions);
Ex. P1916, VJ Personnel File of Mile Mrk{i}, Doc ID 0422-2976 (decision granting compensation for service
under hardship circumstances in Military Post 4001, 21 June 1995); Ex. P1921, Decision of the Military Post
4001 Belgrade, 5 May 1994; Ex. P1922, Decision of the Military Post 3001 Belgrade, 12 May 1994; Ex. P1923,
Decision of the Military Post 3001 Belgrade, 24 February 2000 (special conditions allowance to be paid by the
Accounting Centre of VJ General Staff); Ex. P1777, VJ Personnel File of Mile Novaković, Doc ID 0611-7677
(Military Post 4001 decision granting Novakovi} right to compensation for service under difficult conditions, 10
February 1995); Ex. P1809, Decisions by Military Post 7111, February and May 1994 (Decisions on
compensation for service carried out in difficult conditions, signed by Milenko @ivkovi}, to be paid by the
Accounting Center of the VJ); Ex. P1814, Decision by VJ General Staff, 18 November 1996.
Ex. P399, Decision of the VRS Main Staff, 3 February 1994, p. 1. See also Ex. P740, VJ General Staff Decision
Assigning the Tasks and Territory Where Service is Performed in Difficult Conditions, 19 October 1993.
Ex. P399, Decision of the VRS Main Staff, 3 February 1994, p. 1.
Ex. P399, Decision of the VRS Main Staff, 3 February 1994, p. 2; MP-5, T. 2399-2400, 2477-2478.
Ex. P741, VJ General Staff Decision Assigning the Tasks and Territory Where Service is Performed Under
Difficult Conditions, 22 March 1994. See also Ex. P742, VJ General Staff Decision to Amend the Decision
Assigning Tasks and Territory Where Service is Performed in Difficult Conditions, 14 June 1995; Miodrag
Star~evi}, T. 5505-5507; Borivoje Jovani}, T. 11462.
280
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decision issued by Peri{i} on 22 March 1994.2560 In addition, the compensation was granted and
calculated based on the decision issued by Mladi} himself as Commander of the VRS on 3 February
1994.2561 MP-5 also testified that he received compensation for service under difficult conditions2562
and that officers in the VRS who were not assigned to the 30th PC did not benefit from the said
arrangement.2563
910.
A similar procedure applied to the SVK as well. Decisions regarding service in difficult
conditions made by the SVK were forwarded through the 40th PC to the Accounting Centre of the
FRY MOD so that the benefits could be calculated and paid.2564 Rašeta also testified that his salary
was increased by about 15% due to the hardship allowance for his service in the SVK.2565
911.
Officers assigned to the 30th and 40th PCs were equally entitled to compensation for unused
annual leave, requests for which were made directly to the PCs.2566 Such applications were made in
2560
2561
2562
2563
2564
2565
2566
Ex. P1810, Decision by Military Post 3001, 12 May 1994, p. 1. See also Ex. P741, VJ General Staff Decision
Assigning the Tasks and Territory Where Service is Performed Under Difficult Conditions, 22 March 1994, p. 1;
Ex. P2046, Military Post 7572 Decision, 11 February 1994.
Ex. P399, Decision of the General Staff of the VRS, 3 February 1994.
MP-5, T. 2397, 2399, 2464.
MP-5, T. 2397-2398.
Stamenko Nikoli}, T. 10612-10614. See also Ex. D261, List of Soldiers Serving in the 40th PC, 14 February
1995.
Rade Rašeta, T. 5894, 5901.
Mile Novaković, T. 13325-13326; P1777, VJ Personnel File of Mile Novaković, Doc ID 0611-7677; Ex. P1772,
Request by Stanislav Galić, 21 November 1994 (for compensation for unused leave from VJ General Staff to
30th PC); Ex. P1774, Request by Stanislav Galić, 10 April 2000; Ex. P1879, Decision by Military Post 3001,
9 July 2001 (granting Stanislav Gali} compensation for unused annual leave for 1991-1994, to be made by the
Accounting Centre of the VJ General Staff); Ex. P1625, Procedural Submission of Žarko Ljubojevi} to Supreme
Military Court, 27 September 2000 (regarding compensation for unused leave in 1992-1995); Ex. P1526, VJ
Financial File of Bogdan Sladojevi}, Doc IDs 0622-3587, 0622-3600 (decisions on Sladojevi}’s request for
remuneration for unused annual leave for 1991-1995 and 2002, to be paid by the Accounting centre of MOD);
Ex. P1573, VJ Financial File of Manojlo Milovanovi} 1992-2002, Doc ID 0610-4538 (Decision on payment of
unused annual leave, 31 October 2002); Ex. P1574, Various Documents Concerning VJ Payments to Radivoje
Mileti}, 1992-2001, Doc ID 0622-3406 (decision on special payment for unused leave for Mileti}, to be paid by
the Accounting Centre of the VJ General Staff, 9 May 2001); Ex. P1649, VJ Personnel File of Veljko Bosanac,
Doc ID 0611-9029, (decision to compensate Bosanac for unused annual leave from 1991 to 1995, to be paid by
the Accounting Centre of the VJ General Staff 2001); Ex. P1650, VJ Personnel File of Ljubomir Cvjetan,
Doc ID 0622-7485 (decision granting compensation for unused annual leave, to be paid by the Accounting
Centre of the VJ General Staff, 12 February 2002); Ex. P1652, VJ Personnel File of Borislav \uki}, Doc ID
0611-4266 (decision granting compensation for unused annual leave, to be paid by the Accounting Centre of the
VJ General Staff, 24 January 2001); Ex. P1654, VJ Personnel Administration Documents Concerning \orde
\uki}, Doc ID 0611-6892 (decision granting special compensation for unused annual leave, to be paid by the
Accounting Centre of the VJ General Staff, 15 November 2001); Ex. P1675, VJ Personnel File of Budimir
Gavri}, Doc ID 0611-9155 (decision granting special compensation for unused annual leave for various periods
in 1991-1995); Ex. P1679, VJ Personnel File of Bo{ko Kle~evi}, Doc ID 0611-4168 (decision granting special
compensation for unused annual leave, to be paid by the Accounting Centre of the VJ General Staff, 21 May
2001); Ex. P1680, Supreme Military Court Judgement Annulling the Decision of the Military Post 3001
Belgrade, 28 June 2001; Ex. P1682, VJ Personnel File of Jovan Mari}, Doc ID 0611-4026 (decision granting
salary and compensation for unused annual leave, to be paid by the Accounting Centre of the VJ General Staff, 4
April 2001); Ex. P1688, VJ Personnel File of Petar [krbi}, Doc ID 0611-5348 (decision granting compensation
for unused annual leave, to be paid by the Accounting Centre of the MOD, 4 December 2001); Ex. P1693, VJ
Personnel File of Stevan Tomi}, Doc ID 0611-4576 (decision granting salary and special compensation for
unused annual leave, to be paid by the Accounting Centre of the MOD, 4 June 2002); Ex. P1711, Request by
Manojlo Milovanović for Unpaid Salary, 31 March 2000, 1 March 2000 (request for compensation for unused
281
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accordance with Articles 99 and 103 of the Law on the VJ.2567 For example, Radivoje Miletić, a
member of the 30th PC, requested compensation from the 30th PC for unused annual leave for his
time serving in the VRS from 1992 to 1995.2568 His request was granted based on the same legal
interpretation of the Supreme Military Court in Belgrade set out above.2569 Other members of the
30th and 40th PCs who were granted compensation for unused annual leave included Mladi},2570
Beara,2571 Popovi},2572 Gvero,2573 Pandurevi},2574 Gali},2575 Obrenovi},2576 Novakovi}2577 and
^eleketi}.2578 All of these decisions were issued based on the Supreme Military Court interpretation
of the status of the members of the PCs serving outside the territory of the FRY.2579
2567
2568
2569
2570
2571
2572
2573
2574
2575
2576
2577
2578
2579
leave for 1/9/94 to 31/1/1995); Ex. P1777, VJ Personnel File of Mile Novaković, Doc ID 0611-7695 (request to
Military Post 3001 for compensation of unused annual leave from 1991 to 1994, 19 December 2000); Ex. P1796,
Decision by Military Post 3001, 9 May 2001, Doc ID 0622-3511 (decision granting Tolimir compensation for
unused annual leave during 1992-1995, 9 May 2001); Ex. P1877, Decision by Military Post 3001, September
2001 (relating to Vinko Pandurević’s compensation for unused annual leave in 1992-1995, to be paid by the
Accounting Centre of the MOD); Ex. P1878, Decision by Military Post 3001, 19 June 2001 (Vidoje Blagojevi}’s
compensation for unused annual leave FROM 1991 to 1995, to be paid by the Accounting Centre of the MOD);
Ex. P1880, VJ Financial File of Mile Novakovi}, Doc ID 0622-7170 (granting compensation for unused annual
leave for 1991-1994, to be paid by the Accounting Centre of the VJ General Staff, 28 February 2001);
Ex. P1881, Decision by Military Post 3001, 27 December 2001, Doc ID 0611-8543 (Military Post 3001 decision
granting compensation for unused annual leave for 1991-1995, to be paid by the Accounting Centre of the
MOD); Ex. P1882, VJ Personnel File of @ivomir Ninkovi}, Doc ID 0611-6532 (Military Post 3001 decision
granting compensation for unused annual leave during 1991-1995, to be paid by the Accounting Centre of the VJ
General Staff, 1 March 2001); Ex. P1907, VJ Personnel File of Bogdan Suboti}, Doc ID 0611-5588 (decision for
the compensation of Suboti}’s unused annual leave for 1991-1995, to be paid by the MOD Accounting Centre,
17 February 2003); Ex. P1911, VJ Personnel File of Milan ^eleketi}, Doc IDs 0611-7964, 0611-7965 (2002
request and decision granting special compensation of ^eleketi}’s unused annual leave for 1992-1994);
Ex. P1915, VJ Personnel File of Mirko Bjelanovi}, Doc IDs 0611-9272, 0611-9273 (2001 request and decision
granting compensation for unused annual leave during 1991-1994, to be paid by the MOD Accounting Centre);
Ex. P1934, VJ Personnel File of Vujadin Popovi}, Doc ID 0422-8702 (decision granting Popovi} compensation
for unused annual leave, to be paid by the MOD Accounting Centre); Ex. P1963, Military Post 3001 Decision,
17 May 2001 (granting Ljubi{a Beara special payments for unused leave between 1992 and 1995); Ex. P1899,
VJ Personnel File of Milan Gvero, Doc ID 0422-3321, pp 1-4 (2001 certificate, request and decision regarding
compensation for Gvero’s unused annual leave in 1991-1995); Ex. P1897, VJ Personnel File of Dragan
Obrenovi}, Doc IDs 0611-8785, 0611-8786, 0611-8788 (2001 documents relating to special compensation for
unused annual leave for 1992-1995, to be paid by VJ General Staff Accounting Centre); Ex. P1649, VJ
Personnel File of Veljko Bosanac, Doc ID 0611-9029 (2001 decision granting Bosanac the right to compensation
for unused annual leave from 1991 to 1995, to be paid by VJ General Staff Accounting Centre).
Ex. P197, Law on the VJ, 18 May 1994. Article 99 defines the right for professional soldiers to get paid annual
leave. Article 103 defines the use of annual leave and the right to receive compensation for unused annual leave
under special circumstances.
Ex. P1725, Letter by Radivoje Miletić, 9 May 2001.
Ex. P1726, Decision by Military Post 3001, 9 May 2001, p. 2. See supra paras 835-836.
Ex. P849, VJ Military Post 3001 Decision Regarding Request for Compensation by Ratko Mladi}, 17 May 2001.
Ex. P1876, Decision by Military Post 3001, 17 May 2001.
Ex. P1934, VJ Personnel File of Vujadin Popovi}, Doc ID 0422-8702
Ex. P1899, VJ Personnel File of Milan Gvero, Doc ID 0422-3321, pp 1-2.
Ex. P1877, Decision by Military Post 3001, September 2001.
Ex. P1879, Decision by Military Post 3001, 9 July 2001.
Ex. P1897, VJ Personnel File of Dragan Obrenovi}, Doc ID 0611-8785.
Ex. P1880, VJ Financial File of Mile Novakovi}, Doc ID 0622-7170.
Ex. P1911, VJ Personnel File of Milan ^eleketi}, Doc ID 0611-7964.
See supra paras 835-836.
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912.
The evidence shows that VJ officers serving in the SVK were also entitled to reimbursement
of travel and other expenses.2580 Peri{i} issued an order in July 1994 regulating such
reimbursements.2581
913.
Moreover, members of the PCs were entitled to welfare benefits on the basis of the length of
their service in the army.2582 For example, Boro Poznanovi}, a 40th PC officer, was granted double
his serviceable years with respect to welfare benefits for certain periods.2583
914.
Finally, there is evidence that members of the 30th PC were entitled to education benefits
from the VJ.2584 By means of illustration, Vinko Pandurevi}, a 30th PC officer, was sent for
education at the Yugoslav Army School of National Defence on 30 September 1998.2585
(g) FRY Citizenship
915.
There is evidence that, after the war, members of the 30th and 40th PCs could also request to
become citizens of the FRY based on their service in their respective PC. To this end, they needed
to request that their respective PC issue a certificate of service in the VJ. This allowed the officers
2580
2581
2582
2583
2584
2585
Ex. P1526, VJ Financial File of Bogdan Sladojevi}, Doc IDs 0622-3610 (decision approving Sladojevi}’s
request for Mission subsistence allowance, 22 October 1998), Doc 0622-3635, 0622-3639, 0622-3647 (decisions
granting allowances for troop duty in 1995 and 1997).
Ex. P1131, Order of the Chief of the VJ General Staff Peri{i}, 8 July 1994.
Ex. P1728, Decision by Military Post 1790, 1 February 2000 (relating to the calculation of Mileti}’s length of
service for the purposes of establishing the military allowance to be added to his basic salary); Ex. P1729, VJ
Personnel File of Radivoje Miletić, Doc ID 0422-2442 (Military Post 1790 Belgrade decision on recognition of
military allowance of 1% on Mileti}’s basic salary, 1 February 2000); Ex. P1731, VJ Personnel File of Vinko
Pandurević, Doc ID 0422-8585, pp 12-13 (decision recognising Pandurevi}’s military allowance as the amount
of 2% of the salary, 16 March 2000); Ex. P1758, Decision by VJ Personnel Administration, 20 December 1996
(deciding to double Dragomir Milo{evi}’s service from 30/06/91 to 14/12/95 for welfare benefits); Ex. P1907,
VJ Personnel File of Bogdan Suboti}, Doc IDs 0611-5577 (decision, dated 23 January 1996, to double Suboti}’s
service years for welfare benefits from 15/7/91 to 31/1/96), 0611-5579 (certificate of Suboti}’s service status for
welfare benefits, 17 January 1996); Ex. P1959, VJ General Staff Personnel Administration Decision, 11
September 1997 (to double service years for welfare benefits); Ex. P1897, VJ Personnel File of Dragan
Obrenovi}, Doc ID 0611-8748 (VJ General Staff Personnel Administration decision, dated 5 May 1997,
recognising his right to double his service years for welfare benefits for the periods of 26/06/91-25/5/92 and
1/12/92-14/12/95); Ex. P1960, VJ General Staff Personnel Administration Decision, 17 February 1995 (doubling
service years for welfare benefits).
Ex. P1684, VJ Personnel File of Boro Poznanovi}, Doc ID 0611-5425 (VJ General Staff Personnel
Administration Decision recognising Pozanovi}’s right to double his years of service for welfare benefits, 30
January 1995).
Ex. P1526, VJ Financial File of Bogdan Sladojevi}, Doc ID 0622-3635 (approval of schooling entitlements, 17
October 1997); Ex. P1897, VJ Personnel File of Dragan Obrenovi}, Doc ID 0611-8778 (order of the VJ General
Staff Personnel Administration to 30th PC on Obrenovi} enrolment as an external postgraduate student in the
military academy of the military school centre of the VJ, 23 September 1997). See also Ex. P776, Stenographic
Transcript of the 21st Session of the SDC, 7 June 1994, p. 38 (Peri{i} stated that “if we stop helping them in the
area of education, financing of educated personnel and material assistance for certain combat operations, they’ll
start losing territory”) (emphasis added); Ex. P769, Minutes from the 58th Session of the SDC held on 21
November 1996, p. 3; Ex. P800, Stenographic Transcript of the 58th Session of the SDC, 21 November 1996,
pp 5-6.
Ex. P1731, VJ Personnel File of Vinko Pandurević, Doc ID 0422-8525, pp 17-20,
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to obtain an identification card which then allowed them to become citizens of the FRY.2586 In this
way, those officers could continue to receive their salary and other emoluments from the FRY after
the end of the war in BiH.2587 Stojan Malči} confirmed that upon his retirement in 1997, he acquired
FRY citizenship, which enabled him to enjoy certain monetary rights.2588 Mile Novakovi} testified
that he also obtained FRY citizenship in 1997, more than two years after he moved to the FRY.2589
There is also evidence that shows that family members of deceased soldiers could also obtain a
certificate for the purpose of acquiring FRY citizenship.2590
9. Termination of Service
(a) Law on Termination of Service
916.
According to the Law on the VJ, the VJ Chief of General Staff had the authority to make
decisions regarding the termination of service of professional non-commissioned and commissioned
officers up to, and including, the rank of Colonel, as well as of civilian personnel in the Army.2591
The FRY President, in turn, was authorised to make decisions regarding the termination of service
of professional soldiers with the rank of General.2592 The decrees issued by the President of the
FRY to terminate service were implemented through a decision discharging the soldier from
professional military service.2593
917.
The Federal Minister of Defence, or a commander authorised by him, carried out decisions
regarding the termination of service for professional soldiers and civilian personnel assigned to the
MOD.2594 Decisions on termination could only be issued by a superior officer holding the position
2586
2587
2588
2589
2590
2591
2592
2593
2594
MP-5, T. 2415-2417; Ex. P1673, VJ Documents Relating to inter alia Drago Nikoli} (certificate issued by the
30th PC for D. Nikoli} to use for obtaining citizenship for him and his immediate family); Ex. P1687, VJ
Documents Concerning Novica Simi}, Doc ID 0611-6693 (certificate issued by the 30th PC for N. Simi} to use
for obtaining citizenship for him and his immediate family).
According to MP-5, in 1997 only FRY citizens were entitled to a salary from the VJ/FRY. Thus, those assigned
to the 30th PC with citizenship in BiH or RS had to seek citizenship from the FRY in order to continue receiving
salary, MP-5, T. 2418-2419.
Stojan Malčić, T. 11319.
Mile Novakovi}, T. 13054.
Ex. P1843, VJ Personnel File of Radovan Ravić, Doc ID 0422-9526 (certificate issued by Military Post 8486 for
Radovan Ravic’s wife to use for obtaining citizenship for her and her immediate family).
Ex. P197, Law on the VJ, 18 May 1994, Articles 152(6), 152(7).
Ex. P197, Law on the VJ, 18 May 1994, Article 151(3).
Ex. P1777, VJ Personnel file of Mile Novaković, Doc ID 0611-7665 (decision issued by Major General Zori} of
discharging Mile Novakovi} following a Presidential Decree); Ex. P1885, VJ Personnel File of Grujo Bori},
Doc ID 0611-7576 (decision issued by Peri{i} discharging Grujo Bori} from professional military service, 8 June
1998, issued pursuant to a decree issued by FRY President on 8 April 1997); Ex. P1897, VJ Personnel File of
Dragan Obrenovi}, Doc ID 0611-8792 (decision issued by Military Post 3001 discharging Dragan Obrenovi}
from professional military service, 20 June 2001); Ex. P1716, Decision issued by Military Post 1790 dismissing
Manojlo Milovanovi}, undated (issued by Lieutenant General Milan Korajovi} based on a Presidential Decree;
Ex. P1717, Decree by FRY President on Dismissal of Manojlo Milovanovi}, 31 December 2000.
Ex. P197, Law on the VJ, 18 May 1994, Article 158; Ex. P1776, VJ Personnel File of Kosta Novaković, Doc ID
0611-6321 (order issued by FRY MOD terminating the professional military service of Kosta Novaković on the
grounds that he had completed 30 years of pensionable service and the needs of service require cessation of his
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of regiment commander or higher.2595 The decree or order terminating the military service of a
professional soldier could be the subject of a complaint before the VJ Supreme Military Court in
Belgrade.2596
918.
Article 107 of the Law on the VJ provided the grounds on which VJ personnel could be
terminated. Generally, military service was terminated when the professional soldier reached a
mandatory retirement age and had completed 40 years of pensionable service.2597 Other grounds for
terminating service included cases where a soldier was absent from service for five consecutive
days without leave, was given a disciplinary sentence of suspension, after receiving two consecutive
negative evaluations, or upon his own request.2598 Military service of soldiers could also be
terminated when they acquired at least 30 years of pensionable service when “the needs of service
so required”.2599 In this respect, Miodrag Starčevi} testified that determining the “needs of service”
was at the discretion of the authorised officer and could be based on “objective or subjective”
reasons.2600 Military service was also terminated in cases of permanent disability.2601
919.
The Trial Chamber notes that similar procedures and grounds for the termination of service
of members of the VRS and SVK were provided for in the Law on the VRS and the Law on the
SVK.2602
920.
Pursuant to the Law on the VRS, the RS Minister of Defence had the authority to terminate
service for soldiers up to the rank of Colonel, while the RS President could terminate the service of
Generals.2603 Moreover, an order issued by the RS Minister of Defence on 16 June 1992 further
defined the authority of VRS commanding officers with respect to the termination of military
2595
2596
2597
2598
2599
2600
2601
2602
2603
professional military service); Ex. P2627, Order of the FRY MOD on the Termination of Mile Vignjević's
Military Service, 4 October 1996.
Ex. P197, Law on the VJ, 18 May 1994, Article 153. See e.g. Ex. P1695, Termination of Military Service of
Vidoja Živanovi}, 13 November 1995.
See e.g. Ex. P1695, Termination of Military Service of Vidoja Živanovi}, 13 November 1995.
Ex. P197, Law on the VJ, 18 May 1994, Article 107.
Ex. P197, Law on the VJ, 18 May 1994, Article 107. See also Petar [krbi}, T. 11808-11809.
Ex. P197, Law on the VJ, 18 May 1994, Article 107.
Miodrag Starčevi}, T. 5548-5550.
Ex. P197, Law on the VJ, 18 May 1994, Article 107. See e.g. Ex. P1649, VJ Personnel File of Veljko Bosanac,
Doc ID 0611-9018 (order issued by Peri{i} Veljko Bosanac due to the establishment of his permanent disability
and inability to serve in the army, 23 January 1996); Ex. P1696, Decree of the FRY President on Termination of
Military Service of Vidoja Živanovi}, 10 October 1995; Ex. P1731, VJ Personnel File of Vinko Pandurević,
Doc ID 0422-8478; Ex. P1794, Decree by the FRY President, 31 December 1999; Ex. P1884, VJ Personnel File
of Lazo Bori}, Doc ID 0611-7160 (order issued by the Chief of the General Staff of the VJ terminating Laza
Babi}, 19 December 1995); Ex. P1897, VJ Personnel File of Dragan Obrenovi}, Doc ID 0611-8795 (order of the
Chief of the Personnel Administration of the VJ General Staff terminating Dragan Obrenovi}, 20 February
2001).
See Ex. P191, Law on the VRS, 1 June 1992, Articles 215-225, 369(4), 370(5); Ex. D170, Law on the SVK,
22 April 1993, Articles 108-116.
Ex. P191, Law on the VRS, 1 June 1992, Articles 369(4), 370(5).
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service contracts of their subordinates.2604 In particular, the Commander of the VRS Main Staff was
authorised to terminate the military service of active-duty non-commissioned and commissioned
officers, up to and including the rank of Lieutenant Colonel.2605
921.
Under the Law on the SVK, the “Commander of the Army” and commanding officers had
the authority to terminate the service of soldiers up to the rank of Colonel, while the President of the
RSK, following recommendations from the SDC, had the authority to terminate the service of
Generals.2606
(i) Role of Peri{i} in the Termination of Service Process
922.
The Prosecution argues that Peri{i} had the authority under the Law on the VJ to terminate
the military service of many members of the VJ who served in the PCs, and, in fact, exercised this
authority.2607 It submits that Peri{i} personally terminated the service of the following VJ personnel
who served in the 30th PC: Ljubi{a Beara, Milutin Skočaji}, Stevan Tomi}, Mi}o Vlaisavljevi}; and
similarly, of the following VJ personnel who served in the 40th PC: Boro Poznanovi}, Veljko
Bosanac, Laza Babi} and Rade Orli}.2608
923.
The Defence asserts that the final authority regarding termination of service for personnel in
the VRS and SVK was within the purview of RS and the RSK, and that such decisions were
forwarded to the VJ by the VRS and SVK “exclusively to regulate the status in service” of these
personnel.2609 As an example, the Defence refers to the fact that Mladi}’s active military service
was terminated by decree of the RS President in 2002, not by the VJ.2610 It argues that the VRS
Military Post decisions illustrate that their service was regulated by RS legislation.2611 The Defence
further asserts that the VJ did not play any role in the process or decision to terminate the military
service of personnel in the VRS or SVK and moreover, that the VJ did not attempt to influence any
decisions on termination of service adopted by the VRS or SVK.2612
2604
2605
2606
2607
2608
2609
2610
2611
2612
Ex. D332, RS Minister of Defence Order on Determination of Competence and Authority of Commanding
Officers, 16 June 1992. See Ex. P191, Law on the VRS, 1 June 1992, Articles 215-225, 369(4), 370(5). See also
Petar [krbi}, T. 11682-11685, wherein he testified that the order issued by the RS Minister of Defence defined
the powers of senior officers of the VRS regarding, inter alia, termination of service of personnel serving in the
VRS.
Ex. D332, RS Minister of Defence Order on Determination of Competence and Authority of Commanding
Officers, 16 June 1992, p. 3.
Ex. D170, Law on the SVK, 22 April 1993, Articles 153-154.
Prosecution Final Brief, paras 239, 761-764; Prosecution Closing Arguments, T. 14747.
Prosecution Final Brief, para. 762.
Defence Final Brief, paras 443, 445-446, 456, 481.
Defence Final Brief, para. 476; Defence Closing Arguments, T. 14843.
Defence Final Brief, para. 453.
Defence Final Brief, para. 454. See Petar [krbi}, T. 11799.
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924.
The Trial Chamber received evidence demonstrating that as Chief of the VJ General Staff,
Peri{i} personally exercised his authority to terminate the professional military service of members
of both the 30th and 40th PCs without any involvement from the VRS or SVK.2613 In cases relating
to Generals, military service contracts were terminated by decree of the FRY President.2614 In both
cases, service was terminated based on the grounds discussed above under the Law on the VJ
including, inter alia, after completing 40 years of pensionable service, or 30 years “when the needs
of service so required”, or upon the personnel member’s own request.2615
925.
Peri{i} terminated the military service of the following 30th PC members: Ljubi{a Beara,
Milutin Skočaji}, Stevan Tomi}, Mi}o Vlaisavljevi} and the following 40th PC members: Boro
Poznanovi}, Veljko Bosanac, Laza Babi} and Rade Orli}.2616 Illustratively, Ljubi{a Beara’s military
2613
2614
2615
2616
Ex. P1650, VJ Personnel File of Ljubomir Cvjetan, Doc ID 0622-7499 (order issued by Peri{i} terminating
Ljubomir Cvjetan on the of completing 40 years of pensionable service); Ex. P1883, VJ Personnel File of
Milutin Sko~aji}, Doc ID 0611-7005 (order of the Chief of the VJ General Staff terminating Milutin Sko~aji} on
the grounds that he had had completed 40 years of pensionable service); Ex. P1884,VJ Personnel File of Laza
Babi}, Doc ID 0611-7160 (order issued by the Chief of the General Staff of the VJ terminating Laza Babi}, 19
December 1995); Ex. P2119, Order Issued by Peri{ić Related inter alia to the Termination of Professional
Military Service of Ljubiša Beara from the VJ 30th PC, 6 August 1997; Ex. P1904, Order of Mom}ilo Peri{i}, 6
August 1997; Ex. P1693, VJ Personnel File of Stevan Tomi}, Doc ID 0611-4545 (order issued by Peri{i}
terminating Stevan Tomi} based on being “permanently unfit to serve in the Army”, 6 September 1996);
Ex. P1694, VJ Personnel File of Mi}o Vlaisavljevi}, Doc ID 0611-8371 (order issued by Peri{i} terminating
Mi}o Vlaisavljevi} on the grounds that he had completed 30 years of pensionable service and the “needs of
service require cessation of professional military service”, 28 September 1994); Ex. P1684, VJ Personnel File of
Boro Poznanovi}, Doc ID 0611-5428 (order issued by Peri{i} terminating Boro Poznanovi} on the grounds that
he had completed 40 years of pensionable service, 30 June 1998); Ex. P1649, VJ Personnel File of Veljko
Bosanac, Doc ID 0611-9018 (order issued by Peri{i} terminating Veljko Bosanac due to permanent disability
and inability to serve in the army, 23 January 1996); Ex. P1683, VJ Documents Concerning Rade Orli}, Doc ID
0611-4935 (order issued by Peri{i} terminating Rade Orli} “in order to exercise the right to early retirement”
after 35 years of pensionable service, 31 December 1994); Ex. P1755, Certificate by VJ General Staff, 3 May
1996; Rade Orli}, T. 5747-5748; Ex. P1910, Official Note of Momčilo Peri{i}, 6 October 1995 (regarding
Peri{i}’s interview with Milan ^eleketi} discussing the termination of his “professional military service and
engagement in the [VRS]”); Ex. P1807, Order by VJ Personnel Administration, 9 May 1995 (issued by the Chief
of Personnel Administration of the VJ General Staff, Du{an Zori}, terminating Ljubo Kosojevi} on the grounds
he had been absent from service without leave for five consecutive days).
Ex. P1717, Decree by FRY President on the Dismissal of Manojo Milovanovi}, 31 December 2000 (on the
grounds that he had 48 years of service for retirement and the “needs of service” so required); Ex. P1727, Decree
of FRY President, 31 December 1999 (terminating Radivoje Mileti} on the grounds that the needs of service so
required); Ex. P1777, VJ Personnel File of Mile Novaković, Doc ID 0611-7664 (Decree by the FRY President
terminating Mile Novakovi} on the grounds that the needs of service so required and he had completed 30 years
of pensionable service); Ex. P1908, Decree of the FRY President, 22 December 1994 (terminating Milan
Čeleketi} on the grounds that he had “over 30 years of pensionable service and that the officer in charge assessed
that [it] was required by the service”); Ex. P1757, Decree by the FRY President, 19 December 1996 (terminating
Dragomir Milo{evi}); Ex. P1794, Decree by the FRY President, 31 December 1999 (terminating Zdravko
Tolimir based on his permanent disability); Ex. P1915, VJ Personnel File of Mirko Bjelanovi}, Doc ID 06119285 (Decree of the FRY President terminating Mirko Bjelanovi}, 22 December 1994); Ex. P1916, VJ Personnel
File of Mile Mrk{i}, Doc ID 0422-2982 (Decree of the FRY President terminating Mile Mrk{i}, 22 December
1994); Ex. P1912, Decree of the FRY President, 22 December 1994 (terminating Mile Novakovi}); Ex. P1887,
VJ Personnel File of Bozo Novak, Doc ID 0611-8525 Decree Issued by FRY President Zoran Lili} Terminating
the Professional Military Service of Bozo Novak; Ex. P1687, VJ Documents Concerning Novica Simi}, Doc ID
0611-6768 (decree of the FRY President terminating Novica Simi}, 16 June 2001).
See supra paras 916, 918.
See supra para. 924, fn. 2613.
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service with the VJ was terminated on 6 August 1997 pursuant to an order issued by Peri{i}.2617
Beara served in the 30th PC2618 and his military service with the VJ was terminated on the grounds
that he had reached the mandatory retirement age and had acquired 40 years of pensionable service.
As an example from the 40th PC, Bora Poznavovi}, who served in the 40th PC as the SVK 7th Corps
Commander,2619 was retired by Peri{i} on 30 June 1998, also because he had reached the mandatory
retirement age and had completed 40 years of pensionable service.2620
926.
Also the President issued decisions relating to members of the PCs, as illustrated by the fact
that Stanislav Gali}’s professional military service in the 30th PC was terminated on 30 September
1994 by decree of the FRY President, based on the grounds that he had more than 30 years of
pensionable service and that “service requirements” demanded the termination of his professional
military service.2621
927.
Moreover, the Trial Chamber received evidence that professional military service contracts
were terminated in cases where VJ officers refused to be transferred to the 30th or 40th PCs.2622 In
this regard, the Trial Chamber recalls its earlier discussion regarding Dane Petrovi},2623 a Colonel
serving in the VJ 1st Army, whom Peri{i} temporarily “relieved” from duty in July 1996 after he
refused to transfer to the 40th PC.2624 The Trial Chamber further recalls Peri{i}’s statement at the
SDC session of 11 October 1993 regarding “retiring” personnel early if they refused to serve in the
PCs provided they had “over 30 years of pensionable employment”.2625
928.
Some evidence at first suggests that the final decisions regarding termination of service of
members of the PCs did not always fall with the VJ.2626 The Trial Chamber notes in this respect
several decrees issued by the President of the RS terminating the service of personnel who served in
2617
2618
2619
2620
2621
2622
2623
2624
2625
Ex. P1904/P2119, Order Issued by Peri{ić Related inter alia to the Termination of Professional Military Service
of Ljubiša Beara from the VJ 30th PC, 6 August (on the grounds that he had reached a mandatory retirement age
and had acquired 40 years of pensionable service).
Ex. P1920, VJ Personnel File of Ljubi{a Beara, Doc ID 0603-0574, p. 2, stating that Beara officially began his
service in the 30th PC on 10 November 1993, coinciding with the creation date of the PCs.
Ex. P1684, VJ Personnel File of Boro Poznanovi}, Doc ID 0611-5357, stating that Poznavovi} began his service
in the 40th PC as the SVK 7th Corps Commander on 1 July 1994.
Ex. P1684, VJ Personnel File of Boro Poznanovi}, Doc ID 0611-5428 (order issued by Peri{i} terminating Boro
Poznanovi} on the grounds that he had completed 40 years of pensionable service, 30 June 1998).
Ex. P1775, Decree of Zoran Lili} Terminating the Professional Military Service of Stanislav Gali}, 30
September 1994.
See supra section VI.A.6.
See supra para. 806.
Ex. P2545, Order of VJ General Staff to Relieve Dane Petrovi} Temporarily of his Duties, 12 July 1996.
See supra para. 766. Ex. P709, Stenographic Transcript of the 14th Session of the SDC, 11 October 1993, p. 35,
Peri{i} stated that “if someone doesn’t want to go and has over 30 years of pensionable employment, we can
give him early retirement so that we’re not accepting this. We’ll tell him that he is not performing his duties in a
satisfactory manner and other things, but we won’t write that he did not want to go there. So we won’t give them
any kind of legal stronghold”.
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the 30th PC.2627 The decrees stated they were final and could not be appealed.2628 Such decrees
formed the basis for the subsequent implementation of decisions issued by the relevant VRS
Military Posts.2629 However, these decrees were issued by the RS President after the 30th PC was
already disbanded.2630 Consequently, the VRS decisions in evidence implementing the Presidential
Decrees were also issued in 2002, after the 30th PC was abolished.2631
929.
Addressing the Defence submissions regarding circumstances of termination of Mladi}’s
contract, the Trial Chamber notes that on 16 June 2001, Mladi} was “removed from the records of
VJ professional soldiers” by Decree of the FRY President, along with 25 other personnel members
serving in the 30th PC.2632 Miodrag Star~evi} testified about this decree, explaining that being
“removed from the records of VJ professional soldiers” meant that “from that point on, in a formal
legal sense they ceased to be professional soldiers in the ₣VJğ”.2633
930.
Subsequently, on 7 March 2002, the RS President issued a decree terminating Mladi}’s
professional military service.2634 The next day, the decree was implemented by a VRS Military Post
2626
2627
2628
2629
2630
2631
2632
2633
2634
Ex. P1756, Proposal by VRS Main Staff, 3 August 1996 (proposal sent from the VRS Main Staff Deputy
Commander Manojlo Milovanovi} to the 30th PC, stating that Dragomir Milo{evi}’s post had been abolished and
thus, pursuant to the Law of the VJ, it was “necessary to regulate his service status by putting him on disposal”).
Ex. D259, RS Presidential Decree on Cessation of Professional Military Service, 1 November 2002 (terminating
Novica Simi}). Stamenko Nikoli} confirmed that the decree was issued on 1 November 2002, after the
agreement on special parallel relations was concluded between the FRY and RS, Stamenko Nikoli}, T. 1061710618. See also Ex. P1749, Decree by RS President, undated (terminating Vinko Pandurevi}); Ex. D348, Decree
by RS President on Termination of Professional Service for Certain Officers, 7 March 2003. See Stamenko
Nikoli}, T. 10609-10611, 10615-10618.
Ex. D259, RS Presidential Decree on Cessation of Professional Military Service, 1 November 2002 (terminating
Novica Simi}); Ex. P1749, Decree by RS President, undated (terminating Vinko Pandurevi}); Ex. P2007, Decree
of the RS President (terminating Radislav Krsti} as of 28 February 2002).
Ex. D260, Decision Terminating the Professional Military Service of Bogdan Sladojevi}, 8 March 2002;
Ex. D119 (under seal); Ex. D696, Military Post 7572 Decision Terminating the Professional Military Service of
Radislav Krsti}, 8 March 2002; Ex. D674, Military Post 7572 Decision of Termination of Professional Service
of Momir Tali}, 8 March 2002; Ex. D537, Decision Terminating the Professional Military Service of Vinko
Pandurević, 8 March 2002; Ex. P1522, Personnel File of Bogdan Sladojevi}, p. 8 (excerpt of personnel file
showing that Sladojevi}’s professional military service ended on 7 March 2002 “due to the needs of service” by
decree of the RS President; subsequently, Military Post 7572 Banja Luka issued a decision on 8 March 2002,
relieving him of his military service).
See supra fns 2627-2628.
See supra fn. 2629.
Ex. P1905, Decree of the FRY President, 16 June 2001, instructing that a number of “Generals filling the posts
in the [VJ] General Staff Personnel Centre”, including Ratko Mladi}, were to be removed from the records of
professional soldiers of the VJ. See also Miodrag Star~evi}, T. 5499-5500. Star~evi} affirmed that the 26
personnel identified in the decree as serving in the 30th PC were “from a formal legal aspect […] in fact members
of the [VJ]”, Miodrag Star~evi}, T. 5499; Ex. P1901, VJ Personnel Files of Ratko Mladi}, Doc ID 0422-8234,
p. 11, wherein it states that Mladi}’s “future status shall be resolved in keeping with the provisions of the
Agreement to establish special parallel relations between the FRY and [RS]”.
Miodrag Star~evi}, T. 5499.
Ex. P2033, RS Presidential Decree, 7 March 2002. See Ex. P1901, VJ Personnel Files of Ratko Mladi}, Doc ID
0422-8234, p. 11. The Trial Chamber recalls that Mladi} was released of his duty as Commander of the VRS
Main Staff in 1996 by decree of the RS President, Biljana Plav{i}, at which point she placed him at the disposal
of the VRS Main Staff. Ex. P2024, RS Presidential Decree, 8 November 1996. See supra fn. 2320.
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decision, as provided for under the Law on the VRS.2635 Miodrag Star~evi} further testified that due
to Mladi}’s rank in the VRS, such decisions were under the jurisdiction of the RS President.2636
931.
The Trial Chamber notes that both the RS presidential decree and VRS Military Post
decision were issued in 2002, after the 30th PC was abolished and after Mladi} was removed from
the records of VJ soldiers by the FRY President.2637
932.
Petar [krbi} testified that while working in the Personnel Sector of the VRS Main Staff, he
never received any requests from Peri{i} for a particular officer to be “pensioned off”.2638 He
further testified that he never received any requests for an officer to remain in service after the VRS
decided he would be “pensioned off”, stating: “[t]here was no way for that to be done. Anyone who
was to be pensioned off was pensioned off, and no one questioned that decision”.2639 The Trial
Chamber notes that the veracity of [krbi}’s testimony is put into question by the numerous
examples of orders issued by Peri{i} terminating military service of VJ soldiers serving in the
PCs.2640
(ii) Final Findings
933.
The Trial Chamber finds that pursuant to the Law on the VJ, the FRY President and Peri{i}
possessed the authority to terminate the professional military service of personnel assigned to the
30th and 40th PCs. Furthermore, both the FRY President and Peri{i} exercised this authority, as
demonstrated by the numerous examples of decrees and orders terminating the military service of
personnel serving in the PCs.
934.
The Trial Chamber further finds that the RS presidential decrees and corresponding VRS
Military Post decisions relied on by the Defence to demonstrate that termination of service for
members of the 30th PC was only within the purview of the RS and VRS were, in fact, issued after
the war and following the disbandment of the 30th PC. As a result, the Trial Chamber is not
convinced that this practice calls into question Peri{i}’s authority to terminate the military service
of the members of the 30th PC.
935.
The Trial Chamber finds that the evidence does not support the Defence argument that the
decrees issued by Peri{i} or by the FRY President on termination of service for members of the PCs
2635
2636
2637
2638
2639
Ex. P2018, VRS Military Decision, 8 March 2002. See also Ex. P1901, VJ Personnel Files of Ratko Mladi},
Doc ID 0422-8234, p. 11.
Miodrag Star~evi}, T. 7032.
See Ex. P1905, Decree of the FRY President, 16 June 2001; Ex. P2018, VRS Military Decision, 8 March 2002;
Ex. P2033, RS Presidential Decree, 7 March 2002.
Petar [krbi}, T. 11799.
Ibid.
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were preceded by RS Presidential Decrees, nor that such decrees were only issued to regulate
status-related rights of the concerned personnel.
10. Removal from Duty
936.
The Prosecution argues that Peri{i} had the discretion to temporarily remove from duty
“persons who committed disciplinary offences/criminal acts damaging to the interests of the VJ”2641
and where he was aware that “a subordinate had committed war crimes; he had discretion to remove
the offender from the VJ”.2642 The Defence submits that Peri{i} did not have this authority.2643 They
argue that the Regulations on the Application of International Laws of War in the Armed Forces of
the SFRY were only applicable in cases of armed conflict of an international character referrring to
Star~evi},2644 and that the articles on command responsibility could only be “applied under the
condition that it had been enshrined in the FRY Criminal Code, as explained by Gojovi}”.2645 The
Trial Chamber is not convinced that Gojovi}’s argument affects the general applicability of the
Regulations. It further notes that Star~evi} does not support the Defence argument, but rather states
that the Regulations were applicable when the SFRY/FRY was one of the parties to a conflict.2646
The Regulations were therefore applicable to the VJ.
937.
Articles 20 and 21 of the Regulations set out the responsibilty of perpetrators of war crimes,
as well as command responsibility for such crimes.2647 According to Star~evi}, a violation of this
regulation could be the basis for invoking removal from duty pursuant to Article 64 of the Law of
the VJ.2648 He further stated that the final analysis rested with the person authorised to decide on
removal from service and that Peri{i} had this authority.2649 Removal from duty is a temporary
measure pending, for example, criminal proceedings and following the completion of such
proceedings, a different procedure for determining if termination could be initiated.2650
2640
2641
2642
2643
2644
2645
2646
2647
2648
2649
2650
See supra para. 925.
Prosecution Final Brief, para. 765.
Ibid.
Defence Final Brief, paras 961-973.
Defecne Final Brief, paras 974-979, referring to Radomir Gojovi}, T. 12901-12902, 12964-12965, 12984 and
Miodrag Star~evi}, T. 6978. See also Prosecution Final Brief, paras 717-720; Prosecution Closing Arguments,
T. 14723-14725.
Defence Final Brief, para. 974.
See Miodrag Star~evi}, T. 5528-5531, 6978-6979; Ex. P198, Article in Politika, 28 April 1992; Ex. P1183,
Decree on the Proclamation of the Law on Defence, 27 May 1994.
Miodrag Star~evi}, T. 5528-5531; Ex. P2304, Regulations on the Application of International Laws of War in
the Armed Forces of the SFRY, Articles 20-21.
Miodrag Star~evi}, T. 5531-5534
Miodrag Star~evi}, T. 5534.
Miodrag Star~evi}, T. 5534-5535.
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938.
The Trial Chamber finds that according to the Law on the VJ and the Regulations, Peri{i}
had the legal authority to temporarily remove VJ staff from duty and notes that there is no evidence
that Peri{i} excercised this authority in relation to members of the 30th and 40th PC.
11. Disbandment
939.
At the SDC session of 29 August 1995, the SDC decided to disband the 40th PC in light of
the fact that the SVK “ceased to exist” after the loss of the RSK territory to Croatia and there was,
therefore, no further need to finance and provide assistance through the PC.2651 The SDC decided
that all the officers of the 40th PC involved in the SVK defeat had to write statements on the events
that unfolded in their areas of responsibility during the attack from the HVO and submit them to
Peri{i}.2652 Similarly, the SDC instructed the SVK Commander to send Peri{i} a detailed report on
the cause of the “fall” of the western parts of the RSK.2653 Members of the 40th PC who were found
to have acted in a “professional and dignified manner” could be reassigned to posts in the VJ or in
the 30th PC, with Peri{i}’s approval.2654 For example, on 29 August 1995, Goran Gaji} was
transferred from the 40th PC to the 30th PC.2655
940.
The 30th PC was disbanded by a decree issued by the President of the FRY on 28 March
2001.2656 After its disbandment, members of the 30th PC serving in the VRS were formally removed
from the record of VJ professional soldiers by a decree issued by the FRY President and their status
was regulated in accordance with an agreement on special parallel relations between the FRY and
the RS of 5 March 2001.2657
2651
2652
2653
2654
2655
2656
2657
Ex. P708, Minutes from the 43rd Session of SDC held on 29 August 1995, 30 August 1995, pp 1-2; Ex. P765,
Minutes from the 44th Session of the SDC held on 6 September 1995, pp 1-2. (Excerpt for the 11th Corps in
Sector East).
Ex. P708, Minutes from the 43rd Session of SDC held on 29 August 1995, 30 August 1995. p. 2; Ex. P798,
Stenographic Transcript of the 44th Session of the of the SDC held on 12 September 1995, pp 9-10; Ex. P765,
Minutes from the 44th Session of the SDC held on 6 September 1995, pp 1-2.
Ex. P708, Minutes from the 43rd Session of SDC held on 29 August 1995, 30 August 1995. p. 2; Ex. P798,
Stenographic Transcript of the 44th Session of the SDC held on 12 September 1995, pp 9-10.
Ex. P798, Stenographic Transcript of the 44th Session of the SDC, 12 September 1995, p. 10; Ex. P708, Minutes
from the 43rd Session of SDC held on 29 August 1995, 30 August 1995, pp 1-2; Ex. P765, Minutes from the 44th
Session of the SDC held on 6 September 1995, pp 1-2. See also Ex. P798, Stenographic Transcript of the 44th
Session of the SDC, 12 September 1995, pp 6-10.
Ex. P2098, Order of the Main Staff of the 30th PC, 29 August 1995.
Ex. P735, FRY Presidential Decree Regarding 30th PC, 28 March 2001; P736, Order of the VJ General Staff
Regarding Disbandment of the 30th PC, 10 April 2001; Ex. P1868, Order by the VJ General Staff, 16 April 2001.
Ex. P1905, Decree of the FRY President, 16 June 2001; Ex. P735, FRY Presidential Decree Regarding 30th PC,
28 March 2001; Ex. P1886, VJ Personnel File of Momir Tali}, Doc ID 0611-8256 (FRY Presidential Decree of
16 June 2001); Ex. P1687, VJ Personnel File of Novica Simi}, Doc ID 0611-6678 (FRY Presidential Decree of
16 June 2001).
292
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B. Perišić’s Authority Over the Logistical Assistance Process
1. Submissions of the Parties
941.
The Prosecution argues that Momčilo Perišić, as Chief of VJ General Staff, had significant
responsibility over the provision of logistical assistance to the VRS and SVK,2658 and exercised that
authority pursuant to the decision of the SDC.2659 It posits that Perišić organised the system of
cooperation with the VRS and SVK, and was “fully supportive” of FRY efforts to assist these
armies.2660
942.
Conversely, the Defence generally submits that, under FRY law and procedure, the SDC
and FRY MOD—not Perišić and the VJ General Staff—held the primary authority over the
logistical assistance process.2661 It argues that “the FRY MOD owned all movable and immovable
military property”, “[t]he VJ only had the right to use the property the MOD allocated to the VJ for
usage”, and the VJ “did not have the right to dispose or alienate the property”.2662 The Defence
contends that Perišić, being a subordinate in the process, had no control over the decision of the
SDC and FRY MOD to give logistical assistance to the VRS, and therefore “cannot be held legally
responsible for making governmental policy since he had neither the position nor authority to make
policy”.2663 In the Defence’s view, Perišić’s role in the logistical assistance process was essentially
limited to giving certain quantities of materiel that would not endanger the VJ’s reserves, pursuant
to the orders of the SDC and the authorisation of the FRY MOD.2664
2. Coordination and Meetings with VRS and SVK Officials
943.
On 27 September 1993, Peri{ić presided over a meeting of the VJ Supreme Command Staff
attended, inter alia, by the chiefs of the different administrations and sectors, as well as the chiefs
of the combat arms and services.2665 Peri{ić ordered that the VJ “[i]mprove the coordination and
cooperation with the Army of the Republic of Serbian Krajina and the Army of Republika
Srpska”.2666 He instructed that meetings with senior representatives of the VRS and SVK be
organised on a monthly basis in order to consider “[a]ssistance in manpower”, “₣ağssistance in
2658
2659
2660
2661
2662
2663
2664
2665
2666
See Prosecution Final Brief, paras 35, 45, 59, 116-117, 240-242, 251-256, 283-301.
Prosecution Final Brief, paras 35, 253, 287-288, citing Ex. P1009, Order of FRY President, 18 February 1994.
Prosecution Final Brief, para. 59.
Defence Final Brief, paras 137-142, 613-615, 617.
Defence Final Brief, paras 614-615.
Defence Final Brief, paras 128, 142, 617, 629.
Defence Final Brief, paras 142, 614-615, 622, 631-632, 634-635, 784.
Ex. P1626, Official Note from the Meeting of the VJ Supreme Command Staff, 27 September 1993, p. 1.
Ex. P1626, Official Note from the Meeting of the VJ Supreme Command Staff, 27 September 1993, p. 4.
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equipment and materiel” and “[e]conomic assistance”.2667 Peri{ić added that “[s]upply of material
and technical equipment to the [VRS and SVK] should be realized in accordance with the real
possibilities and only upon the authorization of the Chief of the General Staff of the Yugoslav
Army”.2668 Peri{ić warned that officers unwilling to “develop and care for good interaction and
spirit of cooperation” with the VRS and SVK would be dismissed.2669 After the meeting, Peri{ić
issued a memorandum reiterating that, in order to “[i]mprove coordination and cooperation”
between the VJ, VRS and SVK, he would “organise meetings once a month” to discuss, inter alia,
“₣ağssistance in ₣…ğ equipment and technical materiel” and “₣fğinancial assistance”.2670
944.
MP-80 testified that these monthly meetings occurred and were held in Belgrade at the
offices of the VJ General Staff.2671 Peri{ić chaired the meetings, which were attended by several VJ
generals and by General Ratko Mladić of the VRS and General Milan Čeleketić of the SVK.2672
Mladić and Čeleketić gave presentations explaining the situation in RS and RSK and asking the VJ
to assist with the needs of the VRS and SVK.2673 Making the presentation to Peri{ić was necessary
because “nothing could have been done without his knowledge. He couldn’t have been
bypassed”.2674
945.
Mladić’s diary documents his meetings with Perišić and other FRY officials.2675 In addition,
on eight or nine occasions between mid-1993 and February 1996, Mladić dispatched Ðor|e Ðukić,
the VRS Assistant Commander for Logistics, to Belgrade in order to request weaponry and
2667
2668
2669
2670
2671
2672
2673
2674
2675
Ex. P1626, Official Note from the Meeting of the VJ Supreme Command Staff, 27 September 1993, p. 4.
Ibid.
Ex. P1626, Official Note from the Meeting of the VJ Supreme Command Staff, 27 September 1993, p. 5.
Ex. P878, Tasks set by Perišić at the Supreme Command Staff meeting of 27 September 1993, 26 October 1993,
p. 3.
MP-80, T. 8321-8322 (closed session). See also Ex. P2175, Documents Regarding Meetings between SVK, VRS
and VJ Chiefs of Staff, fall 1993 (the documents attest to coordination and meetings regarding logistical
assistance between the VJ, VRS and SVK in October 1993); Ex. P2157, Communication Between SVK and VJ,
3 November 1993 (confirming forthcoming meeting); Ex. P2156, Memorandum on Co-ordination Between the
VJ, VRS and SVK, 19 November 1993; Ex. P317, Aide Mémoire of the Chief of the Office of the SVK
Commander to the VJ General Staff, December 1993; Ex. P919, SVK Main Staff Memo on the Coordination of
Tasks in the VJ General Staff, January 1994; Ex. P2176, Documents Regarding the Cooperation Between VRS,
SVK and VJ in April and May 1994 (regarding a coordination meeting between VJ, VRS and SVK organised on
19 May 1994); Ex. P2177, Letter from VJ General Staff to SVK Main Staff, 11 May 1994 (regarding the same
coordination meeting on 19 May 1994).
MP-80, T. 8322-8325, 8338-8339, 8349-8350 (closed session).
Ibid.
MP-80, T. 8351 (closed session).
See Ex. D440, Excerpt from Ratko Mladi}'s Notebook, 24 September 1993; Ex. D441, Excerpt from Ratko
Mladi}'s Notebook, 21 October 1993; Ex. D442, Excerpt from Ratko Mladi}'s Notebook, 8 November 1993;
Ex. P2933, Excerpt from Ratko Mladi}'s Notebook, 13 December 1993; Ex. P2934, Excerpt from Ratko Mladi}'s
Notebook, 14 December 1993; Ex. P2935, Excerpt from Ratko Mladi}'s Notebook, 27 December 1993;
Ex. P2928, Excerpt from Ratko Mladi}'s Notebook, 7 July 1994; Ex. P2783, Excerpt from Ratko Mladić’s
Notebook, 1995 (concerning, inter alia, meetings involving Peri{i} on 24 January 1995, 16 February 1995, 6
April 1995 and 24 July 1995).
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logistical assistance from Peri{ić and other VJ General Staff officials.2676 Mladić regularly wrote to
Perišić to ask for assistance as well.2677
946.
A department of the RSK Defence Ministry was itself part of the representation of the RSK
government in Belgrade, and dealt with the procurement and transport of goods for the use of the
state and the SVK.2678
947.
On 15 March 1994, a meeting was organised in Belgrade between Slobodan Milošević,
Zoran Lilić, Ratko Mladić and Radovan Karadžić, among others.2679 Karadžić opined that “[s]o far
cooperation between the VRS and the VRSK [i.e., SVK] with the VJ and General PERI[IĆ has
been good and correct”.2680 On 13 December 1993 in Belgrade, Karadžić gave a presentation to
various FRY and RS high-ranking officials, including Perišić, Milošević and Mladić.2681 Karadžić
explained RS’s strategic military objectives, notably separating Serbs from Muslims and Croats, the
elimination of the Drina as a border and “to have our part of Sarajevo”, the city being “the key to
the war”.2682 Referring to logistical assistance, Milošević emphasised that “General Perišić will give
everything that does not jeopardize b/g /combat readiness/ of units here”.2683 At the continuation of
the meeting on the next day, Perišić said “[w]e will help with weapons”.2684
3. Establishment of a Procurement and Delivery Procedure
948.
The VJ’s provision of logistical assistance to the VRS became more institutionalised and
orderly during Peri{i}’s tenure as Chief of General Staff.2685 In order to avoid unauthorised transfers
of ammunition and equipment, an agreement was entered into between Perišić and Mladi}
according to which VRS units would submit logistical assistance requests to the VRS Main Staff’s
2676
2677
2678
2679
2680
2681
2682
2683
2684
Ex. P75, Witness Statement of \or|e \uki}, 4/29 February 1996, pp 3-4.
See e.g. Ex. P625, Request from Ratko Mladić to Perišić Regarding Communications Equipment, 7 October
1993; Ex. P1818, Request from Mladić to Perišić, 15 January 1994; Ex. P2768, Request from Ratko Mladić to
the VJ General Staff Regarding Ammunition, 30 January 1994; Ex. P2719, Documents Relating to a Request
from Ratko Mladić to Perišić Regarding Training of Officers, 15 and 20 April 1995; Ex. P2720, Documents
Relating to a Request from Ratko Mladić to Perišić Regarding Guns, 30 April and 5 May 1995; Ex. P2781,
Request from Ratko Mladić to Perišić for Engineering Equipment, 12 May 1995; Ex. D56, Request from Ratko
Mladić to the VJ General Staff, 26 May 1995; Ex. P2722, Request from Ratko Mladić to Perišić for Expert
Assistance, 31 May 1995; Ex. P2723, Request from Ratko Mladić to Perišić for Nitrogen Tanks, 31 May 1995;
Ex. P2724, Request from Ratko Mladić to Perišić for Ammunition and Rockets, 14 June 1995; Ex. P624,
Request from Ratko Mladić to Perišić for Ammunition, 19 June 1995; Ex. P2746, Request from Ratko Mladić to
Perišić for Air Bombs, 7 October 1995; Ex. P2721, Documents Relating to a Request from Ratko Mladić to
Perišić Regarding Provision of Sniper Training, May-July 1995 (see testimony provided by Radojica Kadijević
regarding the dates on these documents, T. 13715-13718).
MP-80, T. 8623-8626 (closed session).
Ex. P2940, Excerpt from Ratko Mladi}'s Notebook, 15 March 1994.
Ex. P2940, Excerpt from Ratko Mladi}'s Notebook, 15 March 1994, p. 8.
Ex. P2933, Excerpt from Ratko Mladi}'s Notebook, 13 December 1993.
Ex. P2933, Excerpt from Ratko Mladi}'s Notebook, 13 December 1993, pp 1-2.
Ex. P2933, Excerpt from Ratko Mladi}'s Notebook, 13 December 1993, p. 5.
Ex. P2934, Excerpt from Ratko Mladi}'s Notebook, 14 December 1993, p. 1.
295
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Logistics Sector, which would review all requests, and relay them to the VJ General Staff to obtain
Perišić’s approval.2686
949.
This procedure is also reflected in a subsequent order from Peri{ić: “Every month, a work
plan by the VJ [General Staff] shall regulate the issues and time of coordination with the General
Staff of the [SVK] and VRS” and “₣ağll requests to the [VJ] shall be sent in time only through the
VJ [General Staff] to the specialist organs and representatives, signed by the commanders of the
General Staffs of the [SVK] and VRS, and I shall personally approve those proposed to me by my
[a]ssistants. Other request[s] shall not be considered”.2687 Based on this procedure, Peri{ić refused
to consider various requests, such as a direct request from VRS Lieutenant-Colonel Rade Danilović,
instructing him to follow the chain of command and process his demand through the VRS Main
Staff.2688 Similarly, Perišić’s office declined a request for equipment sent by the RS MUP because
the VJ General Staff did not have the authority to review requests from this RS Ministry.2689
950.
Ðorñe Ðukić reported that the VJ had denied certain requests to loan equipment because
they had been improperly brokered by some VJ unit commanders, deploring: “[W]e are compelled
to completely bar the realisation of the requests relating to promises of some irresponsible
individuals from the VJ, who are actually not familiar with the situation regarding [weapons and
military equipment] and VJ resources [and made] unrealistic promises”.2690 Ðukić added: “In the
future, VRS Main Staff will not send to VJ General Staff requests which are not in accordance with
realistic potentials of the [VJ], repeated requests to which a negative answer has been received,
requests for [equipment and materiel] which VJ also has to buy on the market, as well as for
services in institutions which operate on the basis of influx and distribution of earnings”.2691
2685
2686
2687
2688
2689
2690
2691
See e.g. Mladen Mihajlovi}, T. 3959-3960.
Ex. P1245, Drina Corps Command Internal Memo, 24 October 1993.
Ex. P1258, VJ General Staff Order, 27 December 1993, pp 1-2. It should also be noted that, on 18 April 1994,
Perišić called supplies to a halt, stating: “I hereby forbid (until further notice) the issuance of the NVO / weapons
and military equipment / to the [a]rmies of the RS and RSK 30th and 40th [PCs]”, Ex. P1008, Order from Perišić
Sent to the Heads of VJ Services Regarding Issuing of Weapons and Military Equipment, 18 April 1994.
Nevertheless, the VJ resumed its deliveries of weapons and military equipment to the VRS, as indicated by
subsequent SDC meetings and deliveries of logistical assistance, see infra sections VI.B.4, VI.C.
Ex. P629, Telegram from the VRS 3rd Podrinje Mountain Infantry Brigade to the VRS Main Staff and the VJ
General Staff, 24 September 1993; Mladen Mihajlovi}, T. 3934-3936, 3940-3943.
Ex. D452, Letter from the Office of the Chief of the VJ General Staff to the Republic of Serbia’s MUP, 29
October 1993; Radojica Kadijević, T. 13640-13642.
Ex. P1247, Correspondence From VRS Main Staff Regarding Loan of Military Equipment From the VJ,
undated, p. 1.
Ex. P1247, Correspondence From VRS Main Staff Regarding Loan of Military Equipment From the VJ,
undated, p. 2. See also Dušan Kovačević, T. 12671 (commenting on Ex. P1247: “₣Ağs far as the Supreme
Command meetings are concerned ₣...ğ, I heard that Perišić was trying to put a stop to this arbitrary waste and in
expenditure of army reserves at a local level as well as everywhere else”).
296
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951.
Perišić instituted disciplinary proceedings against certain VJ commanders who had
impermissibly given military supplies directly to the VRS and SVK.2692 But he issued an order to
replenish the VRS and SVK with material supplies,2693 thereby distinguishing official assistance
from the actions of individuals who did not follow the standard procedure.
952.
Mladić instructed VRS members to abide by the procurement procedure established by
Perišić.2694 Mladić ordered that no request would be considered or approved without his own
signature and that of Perišić or his subordinated command.2695 Mladić forbade VRS units from
directly obtaining supplies from the VJ outside the procurement procedure: “I forbid contacting
state and other organs and organisations in the FRY for the purpose of collecting material aid for
the needs of the [VRS] without my permission”.2696 “All authorisations, confirmations and other
documents for collecting material aid in the FRY for the needs of the VRS units and institutions,
issued without my permission, shall be rendered invalid; they shall be retracted and destroyed”.2697
953.
The SVK Command issued a similar order:
In spite of orders and many warnings that the security of [material supplies] from the VJ be done
in planned fashion and through the SVK [General Staff], there are still instances of commands or
individuals directly contacting the VJ [General Staff] or individual units. Direct contacts without
authorisation from the SVK [General Staff], give the impression of unorganised and haphazard
work, incur unnecessary costs and the requirements of the VJ [General Staff] and the units are not
being met. […] Requests to the VJ for [material supplies] replenishment of the units are to be sent
directly to the Corps Command. [The Command] strictly forbid[s] subordinate commands and
individuals to directly contact the VJ [General Staff] or the VJ units in order to secure [material
supplies].2698
954.
In accordance with the foregoing procedure, requests for assistance approved by Perišić
were processed by the relevant organs of the VJ General Staff.2699 Perišić instructed VJ General
Staff administrators that requests for logistical assistance should only be granted insofar as they did
2692
2693
2694
2695
2696
2697
2698
2699
Ex. P628, Orders from Perišić Regarding Procurement Procedure, 17 August 1994.
See Ex. P628, Orders from Perišić Regarding Procurement Procedure, 17 August 1994.
Ex. P1245, Drina Corps Command Internal Memo, 24 October 1993.
Ex. P1245, Drina Corps Command Internal Memo, 24 October 1993, p. 2.
Ex. P1802, Order by VRS Commander, 19 July 1995, p. 2.
Ex. P1802, Order by VRS Commander, 19 July 1995, p. 2. See also Ex. P1212, Instruction from the VRS Main
Staff to the 1st Krajina Corps Command Regarding VJ Equipment, 25 April 1994 (stating that: “VJ equipment
can only be handed over with the approval of the VJ Chief of General Staff” and the VRS Main Staff “cannot
approve takeover of equipment that does not belong to the VRS”).
Ex. P1124, SVK Order on the Method of Securing Material Supplies from the VJ, 23 December 1993; MP-80,
T. 8372-8373 (closed session). See also Ex. P1127, SVK Main Staff Order, 22 December 1993. The RSK’s
Supreme Council for Defence determined the material needs of the SVK, MP-80, T. 8590-8591 (closed session)
(commenting on Ex. D170, Law on the SVK, 22 April 1993, Article 281).
Mladen Mihajlović, T. 3886-3890, 3902-3903, 3967-3968 (partly private session).
297
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28936
not endanger the VJ’s reserves,2700 and told Mladić: “I will not give big reserves even at the cost of
being replaced […] I cannot give you what we do not have”.2701
955.
General Mladen Mihajlović, who served as Chief of the Engineering Administration in the
VJ General Staff,2702 testified that, between 1993 and 1995, the VRS Main Staff regularly made
requests to the VJ General Staff for equipment and materials.2703 Peri{ić or members of his cabinet
would review VRS requests and handwrite notes thereon, stating, for example: “Consider this
request”, “[s]upply this if possible”, “[l]ook into this, consider it”,2704 “[n]othing to be given
without my approval”,2705 or “[s]ee what can be done”.2706 Peri{ić would also enter his initials on
certain documents.2707 Upon Peri{i}’s approval, requests were eventually forwarded to the relevant
administrators of the VJ General Staff, who assessed the state of supplies and usually did not grant
requests in their entirety because of insufficient levels of replenishment in the VJ.2708 Even though
the VJ did not usually grant VRS requests in full, Mihajlović explained that it was common for the
VJ to approve the delivery of 10,000 mines at a time, for example.2709 Ðorñe Ðukić also testified
that Peri{ić and other officials normally reduced the quantities requested and denied certain requests
for weapons and ammunition.2710
956.
Once VJ General Staff administrators had evaluated whether a request could be fulfilled,
they drafted a document for Peri{ić’s “consideration and final decision-making”.2711 Civilian trucks
then transported equipment secretively to VRS bases in Banja Luka, Koran, Bileća and Bijeljina
after avoiding border crossings manned by UNPROFOR observers.2712 According to the
UNPROFOR military command,2713 most military supplies from Serbia were funnelled to the VRS
and SVK through the Posavina corridor between Tuzla, Northern Bosnia, and Croatia.2714
2700
2701
2702
2703
2704
2705
2706
2707
2708
2709
2710
2711
2712
2713
2714
Ex. D393, Office of the Chief of the VJ General Staff Note, 12 September 1993. See e.g. Ex. D488, VJ General
Staff Response to the VRS Main Staff, 19 May 1995 (wherein the VJ General Staff refused to supply the VRS
Main Staff with flamethrowers because the quantities in the VJ’s possession were minimal).
Ex. D761, Excerpt from Ratko Mladi}'s Notebook, 21 March 1994, pp 2-3.
Mladen Mihajlovi}, T. 3876.
Mladen Mihajlovi}, T. 3886-3887.
Mladen Mihajlovi}, T. 3877, 3888.
Ex. P629, Telegram from the VRS 3rd Podrinje Mountain Infantry Brigade to the VRS Main Staff and the VJ
General Staff, 24 September 1993, p. 2; Mladen Mihajlovi}, T. 3935.
Ex. P2713, Request for Ammunition Forwarded to Peri{i}, 9 August 1995, p. 1.
Mladen Mihajlovi}, T. 3888.
Mladen Mihajlovi}, T. 3888-3890, 3914 3967-3968 (partly private session).
Mladen Mihajlović, T. 3891-3899 (private session), discussing, inter alia, Ex. P623, VJ General Staff
Engineering Administration Consent for Weapons and Military Equipment Delivery to the VRS, 15 May 1995.
See also Mladen Mihajlović, T. 3871-3872 (private session).
Ex. P75, Witness Statement of \or|e \uki}, 4/29 February 1996, p. 4.
Mladen Mihajlovi}, T. 3889.
Ex. P75, Witness Statement of \or|e \uki}, 4/29 February 1996, p. 4.
MP-433, T. 2104-2105 (closed session).
MP-433, T. 2143-2144 (closed session).
298
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957.
Milomir Kovačević, a truck driver for the Serbian MUP between 14 January 1994 and 4
August 1995, explained how the VJ surreptitiously delivered military supplies to the VRS.2715 The
VJ and MUP requisitioned civilian trucks, issued travel permits and ordered them to deliver
ammunition, mines, explosives, fuel and food to the VRS.2716 In particular, Kovačević recounted a
delivery in March 1994 where the VJ and MUP requisitioned a convoy of 10 to 15 fuel trucks to
transport fuel and other goods to RS.2717 The convoy was escorted by all-terrain vehicles bearing VJ
license plates.2718 Kovačević and the other truck drivers were told to turn off their lights and take a
gravel road built through a forest in the area of Kuzmin and Sid, Serbia, heading towards Sremska
Raca, Bosnia.2719 The convoy ultimately reached a large iron gate manned by VJ soldiers.2720 The
military personnel did not go farther but ordered the truck drivers to cross a bridge over the Sava
River into Bosnia by driving as fast as possible while keeping their lights off in order to evade
European Union border monitors, who were situated three kilometres away from the bridge.2721 The
convoy was met by VRS and RS Police personnel after it crossed the bridge into RS.2722 Kovačević
and his fellow truck drivers were subsequently ordered to deliver their cargo to various locations in
RS, including the VRS Kozora barracks in Banja Luka.2723
958.
Kovačević also conducted deliveries by crossing the FRY-RS border across the Drina River
near Zvornik, RS, taking a special road at night where there were no checkpoints.2724 On several
instances, he transported weapons, ammunition, explosives and fuel from Serbia to RS, namely
ammunition from the Prvi Partizan company in Užice, as well as automatic rifles and pistols from
Kragujevac.2725 Further, while Kovačević was employed by the Partnertrans company in 1994, his
truck was requisitioned by the VJ, and he performed deliveries on 10 to 15 occasions pursuant to
orders from VJ Major @arko Slujkić.2726 While Milomir Kovačević’s credibility was called into
question when he falsely denied part of his criminal record, namely convictions on two counts of
2715
2716
2717
2718
2719
2720
2721
2722
2723
2724
2725
2726
Milomir Kova~evi}, T. 6055-6057, 6065-6074.
Milomir Kova~evi}, T. 6056, 6114.
Milomir Kova~evi}, T. 6058, 6065-6066.
Milomir Kova~evi}, T. 6067-6068.
Milomir Kova~evi}, T. 6068-6069.
Ibid.
Milomir Kova~evi}, T. 6070-6072, 6137-6138. Civilians owned stalls selling audio-cassettes at the bridge, and
police deployed at the border crossing instructed them to play loud music during the trucks’ passage in order to
cover the engines’ noise, Milomir Kova~evi}, T. 6138-6139.
Milomir Kova~evi}, T. 6071-6072.
Milomir Kova~evi}, T. 6072.
Milomir Kova~evi}, T. 6073-6074.
Milomir Kova~evi}, T. 6057, 6074-6077. Kova~evi} knew that the ammunition from Prvi Partizan in Užice was
shipped to RS, although he did not know to which entity it was shipped, Milomir Kova~evi}, 6076-6077.
Milomir Kova~evi}, T. 6113-6116.
299
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fraud,2727 the Trial Chamber finds that Kovačević’s account of surreptitious border crossings is
amply corroborated by separate testimonial and documentary evidence.
959.
A report states that, on 16 June 1995, the VRS made arrangements to take over 22 motor
vehicles and 5 trailers from the VJ.2728 This operation was to be conducted by “co-ordination with
the VJ Drina Border Division Detachment for providing support at ferry crossing point”.2729 The
border crossing was to “be carried out in the sector of the village of Balatun-Cra Bara” because
“[i]llegal crossings are the least frequent there, access roads are good, the Drina River bed has no
dunes and the crossing point is easy to close off to prevent the UNPROFOR from coming”.2730
960.
Ðukić likewise explained that equipment was secretly transported by civilian trucks to VRS
bases in Banja Luka, Koran, Bileća and Bijeljina after avoiding border crossings manned by
UNPROFOR observers.2731 Witness MP-14 elaborated on the surreptitious nature of the
transportation system, reporting that after the 1993 Orthodox Christmas, the VRS’s Koran Depot
sent two trucks to collect military supplies at a VJ depot in Kraljevo in southern Serbia.2732 The
trucks were not stopped but rather waved along at both the Serbian and Bosnian borders because the
operation had been formally arranged beforehand.2733 The procedure changed when the FRY
imposed sanctions on RS, as ammunition was henceforth transported “in secret” through a forest
road where there were only VJ patrols but no border checkpoint.2734
961.
International monitors had difficulty controlling the FRY-RS border given its length and the
2735
terrain.
The evidentiary record plainly demonstrates that the border was porous and that it was
rather easy for FRY and RS authorities to evade international monitors. After going to RS for a
meeting with Mladić on 12 August 1994, Perišić himself remarked “[w]e have passed through the
blockade incognito”.2736 The surreptitious nature of the logistical assistance process is further
discussed below.2737
2727
2728
2729
2730
2731
2732
2733
2734
2735
2736
2737
Milomir Kova~evi}, T. 6096-6104. See Ex. D92, Letter with a Copy of the Criminal Record of Milomir
Kovačević from the MUP, 12 May 2009.
Ex. P1205, VRS Correspondence on Reception of Logistical Assistance from the VJ, 30 June 1995.
Ex. P1205, VRS Correspondence on Reception of Logistical Assistance from the VJ, 30 June 1995, p. 1.
Ibid.
Ex. P75, Witness Statement of \or|e \uki}, 4/29 February 1996, p. 4.
MP-14, T. 3527-3528 (closed session).
MP-14, T. 3528-3529 (closed session).
Ibid.
Michael Williams, T. 6411.
Ex. D344, Excerpt from Ratko Mladi}'s Notebook, 12 August 1994, p. 1.
See infra section VI.C.2.(c).
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4. Supreme Defence Council Decisions on Logistical Assistance
962.
Logistical assistance to the VRS was regularly discussed and agreed upon at FRY Supreme
Defence Council meetings attended by Perišić, as well as Slobodan Milošević, President of Serbia,
Zoran Lilić, President of the FRY, Pavle Bulatović, FRY Defence Minister, Momir Bulatović,
President of Montenegro, and other officials.
963.
On 11 October 1993, the SDC discussed at length the FRY’s difficult financial situation and
its negative repercussions on the replenishment of the VJ’s reserves and its overall budget.2738
Perišić briefed the SDC about the situation and acknowledged that the VJ’s aid to the VRS and
SVK was affecting the VJ’s resources: “[O]ur reserves of wartime material which we are now
spending […] are bringing us into a situation where our combat capacities are declining, and we
can’t even help these two republics. […] Each day we are using up our reserves but we are not
getting a normal inflow of funds; and, secondly, we are helping the armies of the republics of
Serbian Krajina”.2739 Yet, Perišić never suggested that the VJ discontinue its assistance to the VRS
and SVK despite the problems with the VJ’s funding and resources.2740 Rather, in light of Perišić’s
advice, the SDC decided to raise the VJ’s budget to help replenish its reserves.2741 The SDC
adopted measures to resolve “problems concerning financing and securing funds for the
transformation of the [VJ] and charged the Federal Government with securing the funds necessary
to finance the [VJ] by the end of the week”.2742
964.
On 10 January 1994, the SDC convened to discuss the VJ’s funding.2743 Perišić cautioned
the SDC that “the financing of [RS] and [RSK]” had “not been taken into account at all”.2744 “If the
war there were to continue”, he noted, “we know that they need to be given certain assistance,
beginning with weapons and ordnance and all other materiel”.2745 Perišić stated that 522 million
dollars and 307 million dollars were respectively required for the needs of the VRS and SVK.2746
He subsequently pled: “We cannot abandon Ratko and others—they are asking for extremely
expensive ammunition they use to fire on land targets. Why? Because it is very effective […]”.2747
2738
2739
2740
2741
2742
2743
2744
2745
2746
2747
Ex. P709, Stenographic Transcript of the 14th Session of the SDC, 11 October 1993, pp 1-31.
Ex. P709, Stenographic Transcript of the 14th Session of the SDC, 11 October 1993, pp 5-6.
Ex. P709, Stenographic Transcript of the 14th Session of the SDC, 11 October 1993, pp 5-8.
Ex. P709, Stenographic Transcript of the 14th Session of the SDC, 11 October 1993, pp 9, 23-32.
Ex. P770, Minutes from the 14th Session of the SDC held on 11 October 1993, pp 1-2.
Ex. P791, Stenographic Transcript of the 17th Session of the SDC, 10 January 1994, p. 1.
Ex. P791, Stenographic Transcript of the 17th Session of the SDC, 10 January 1994, p. 4.
Ibid.
Ex. P791, Stenographic Transcript of the 17th Session of the SDC, 10 January 1994, p. 5.
Ex. P791, Stenographic Transcript of the 17th Session of the SDC, 10 January 1994, p. 56.
301
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965.
On 7 February 1994, at the 18th Session of the SDC, Perišić warned that the Law on
Property (enacted a few months earlier) “does not give the Chief of General Staff any right to
misappropriate [sic] any resource, especially in terms of assistance and specifically now to
Republika Srpska and the Republic of Serbia Krajina. All this now should go through the Ministry
and Government”.2748 Perišić told the SDC that it should either give him the authority to give
logistical assistance to the VRS and the SVK or allow the Law on Property to regulate the logistical
assistance process.2749 Perišić advised the SDC to give him that authority because “if the two
Krajinas [sic] are not defended, we will be significantly jeopardised. And they certainly can’t be
defended without our assistance in weapons and military equipment”.2750
966.
Eleven days later, Zoran Lilić directed that, “in accordance with a decision of the Supreme
Defence Council”, the VJ “shall supply the 30th and 40th Personnel Centre[s] with weapons and
military equipment”.2751 Lilić added: “The Chief of the General Staff of the [VJ] is hereby
authorised to reconcile the requests of the 30th and 40th Personnel Centre[s] with the means of the
[VJ] and specifically regulate the method and procedures for providing the supplies”.2752 Star~evi}
confirmed that the SDC thereby ordered Perišić to provide logistical assistance to the VRS and to
the SVK, within the limits of the VJ’s available resources.2753
967.
The Defence cites the transcript of the 18th SDC Session for the assertion that “[t]he Army
of Yugoslavia did not have the right to dispose or alienate [military] property”.2754 The Defence
does not mention that Perišić then urged the SDC to give the VJ the authority to give property to the
VRS and SVK.2755 The Defence Final Brief also omits any reference to Lilić’s subsequent order
giving Perišić that authority following his request. The Trial Chamber finds that the evidence
conclusively establishes that the SDC granted Perišić authority over the logistical assistance
process.
968.
On 16 March 1994, the SDC again discussed the provision of weapons and military
equipment to the VRS and SVK.2756 On 7 June 1994, Peri{i} personally advised the SDC that
logistical assistance to the VRS and SVK was necessary and must continue: “If we stop helping
2748
2749
2750
2751
2752
2753
2754
2755
2756
Ex. P782, Stenographic Transcript of the 18th Session of the SDC, 7 February 1994, p. 53.
Ex. P782, Stenographic Transcript of the 18th Session of the SDC, 7 February 1994, p. 53. See Ex. D114, Law on
Property of the FRY, 16 July 1993.
Ex. P782, Stenographic Transcript of the 18th Session of the SDC, 7 February 1994, p. 53.
Ex. P1009, Order of FRY President, 18 February 1994.
Ibid.
Miodrag Starčević, T. 6857-6858 (private session). See also MP-80, T. 8371-8372 (closed session).
Defence Final Brief, para. 615 (citing Ex. P782, Stenographic Transcript of the 18th Session of the SDC, 7
February 1994, pp 53-54).
Defence Final Brief, para. 615.
Ex. P710, Minutes of the 19th Session of the SDC, 16 March 1994, p. 2.
302
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them in the area of education, financing of educated personnel and material assistance for certain
combat operations, they’ll start losing territories. ₣...ğ This means we have to help them somehow”;
and “we can’t leave them to their own devices”.2757 Perišić recommended that the SDC approve the
grant of ammunition and spare parts to the VRS and SVK.2758
On 11 July 1994, Perišić and Pavle Bulatović, the FRY Defence Minister, “presented [to the
969.
SDC] the reasons for the materiel requests and personnel-related proposals” of RS and RSK.2759
The SDC went on to decide that “negotiations and the delivery of weapons and military equipment
to be used by ₣RSğ and the ₣RSKğ shall only be conducted through the Federal Defence Ministry
and the Yugoslav Army General Staff”.2760
970.
On 21 July 1994, Perišić equally told the SDC that it was necessary to consider “how much
longer we can extend assistance to the ₣VRSğ and ₣SVKğ”.2761 Perišić invited General Blagoje
Kovačević of the VJ General Staff2762 to make a presentation to the SDC on the matter.2763
Kovačević noted that, the VJ’s reserves were partially depleted “[b]y giving large quantities of
weapons, ammunitions, and explosives – 3,640 tonnes” to the VRS and SVK.2764 Perišić later
specified that the VJ’s stock of infantry rifle ammunition remained at 110% but that its stock of
60mm and 82mm infantry shells was down to 37%.2765 Perišić did not propose discontinuing
military assistance to the VRS and SVK, instead urging the SDC to increase the VJ’s budget: “[I]t
is not possible to send supplies across the Drina river out of these reserves. But that leads to the
conclusion that a budget of additional funds for this purpose should be considered”.2766 Slobodan
Milošević and Zoran Lilić agreed with Perišić that the VJ’s budget should be raised accordingly,2767
and the SDC went on to reach that conclusion.2768
971.
Ratko Mladić attended an SDC meeting in Belgrade six months later on 24 January
2769
1995.
2757
2758
2759
2760
2761
2762
2763
2764
2765
2766
2767
2768
2769
Milošević observed: “We are exhausted and have no reserves”, and stressed the need to
Ex. P776, Stenographic Transcript of the 21st Session of the SDC, 7 June 1994, pp 38-39.
Ex. P776, Stenographic Transcript of the 21st Session of the SDC, 7 June 1994, p. 39.
Ex. P752, Minutes from the 22nd Session of the SDC held on 11 July 1994, p. 2.
Ibid (emphasis added).
Ex. P785, Stenographic Transcript of the 23rd Session of the SDC, 21 July 1994, p. 3.
Blagoje Kovačević was Deputy Chief of the VJ General Staff, Miodrag Star~ević, T. 6810 (private session).
Ex. P785, Stenographic Transcript of the 23rd Session of the SDC, 21 July 1994, p. 8.
Ex. P785, Stenographic Transcript of the 23rd Session of the SDC, 21 July 1994, p. 9.
Ex. P785, Stenographic Transcript of the 23rd Session of the SDC, 21 July 1994, p. 15.
Ibid (emphasis added).
Ex. P785, Stenographic Transcript of the 23rd Session of the SDC, 21 July 1994, pp 15-16, 20.
Ex. P754, Minutes from the 23rd Session of the SDC held on 21 July 1994, p. 3. The Minutes also mention that
the FRY MOD should additionally use funds “secured by RS and the RSK for their needs” in “materiel and
technical equipment”, Ibid. In practice, the VRS and SVK were generally unable to provide such funds. See infra
section VI.C.7.
Ex. P2783, Excerpt from Ratko Mladić’s Notebook, 1995, pp 1-4.
303
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end the war soon by reaching a peace agreement with favourable terms.2770 Notably, Perišić urged
the SDC to continue assisting the VRS in the meantime: “Our backbone over there is the army and
we have to give them their mainstay and support”.2771
972.
On 7 June 1995, Perišić again encouraged the SDC to keep on authorising the VJ’s
assistance to the VRS and SVK: “Allow us, as has been the case so far, to offer certain help to the
[RS] and the [RSK], primarily with spare parts and whatever we can give that will not have an
impact on FRY’s combat readiness”.2772
973.
On 29 July 1995, pursuant to another briefing by Perišić, the SDC decided to “[c]ontinue to
extend certain assistance to the Armies of [RS] and the [RSK] within limits that do not jeopardise
the combat readiness of the [VJ]”.2773 The SDC agreed that it was “immediately” necessary to
“continue extending material and expert assistance to the VRS and SVK, to the extent of VJ
abilities”.2774 The SDC also decided that it was necessary to “emphasise [in the mass media] the
legitimate right of the FRY, as their mother-state, to help the survival of the Serbian people west of
the Drina”.2775 Perišić participated in several other SDC sessions where the provision of assistance
to the VRS and SVK was discussed.2776
974.
In sum, these records conclusively demonstrate that the SDC licensed military assistance to
the VRS and SVK, and that it granted to Perišić and the VJ General Staff the authority to administer
the provision of this assistance. Perišić also opted to refer certain requests to the SDC. For instance,
when the RSK MOD asked for “ammunition and mines and explosives free of charge, as soon as
possible”, Perišić appended a handwritten note to the request stating “[n]ot without the VSO”,
meaning not without the SDC’s approval.2777
2770
2771
2772
2773
2774
2775
2776
2777
Ex. P2783, Excerpt from Ratko Mladić’s Notebook, 1995, pp 2-3.
Ex. P2783, Excerpt from Ratko Mladić’s Notebook, 1995, p. 4.
Ex. P786, Stenographic Transcript of the 37th Session of the SDC, 7 June 1995, p. 43.
Ex. P763, Minutes from the 39th Session of the SDC, 29 July 1995, p. 5.
Ex. P763, Minutes from the 39th Session of the SDC, 29 July 1995, p. 4.
Ibid.
See Ex. P754, Minutes from the 23rd Session of the SDC held on 21 July 1994, p. 2; Ex. P749, Minutes from the
36th Session of the SDC held on 12 May 1995, p. 5; Ex. P720, Minutes from the 38th Session of the SDC held on
27 June 1995, p. 3.
Ex. P1142, Letter from RSK MOD to Cabinet of the Chief of the VJ General Staff, 6 December 1994; Radojica
Kadijević, T. 13629. See also Ex. P1143, Response from the Cabinet of the Chief of the VJ General Staff to
Letter from RSK MOD, 7 December 1994 (Periši}’s position was that “the final decision on this should be made
by the [SDC]”).
304
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975.
Slobodan Milošević, who took an active role on the SDC along with Perišić, admitted in
2001 that the FRY had given significant military assistance to the VRS and SVK throughout the
war, emphasising “we helped our people with all the resources we had at our disposal”.2778
976.
Several Defence witnesses nonetheless posited that Peri{i} had a limited role in the logistical
assistance system. SVK Commander Mile Novaković notably testified that he met with Perišić
around September 1993 in order to update Perišić on the essential elements of the situation in RSK
and to request materiel and personnel assistance.2779 However, Novaković claimed that the political
and military authority in the FRY was in Slobodan Milošević’s hands:
[M]y fate did not depend on General Perišić. […] Everything that had to be done was really not
referred to General Perišić. If I were to exaggerate I could say that he wasn’t to be asked about
anything. Perhaps that wasn’t quite true, but basically none of the decisions were under his
authority or jurisdiction. […] If the army was supposed to resolve something then he would call
his man from his political party, Mr. Lilić, who could possibly have a say in this. He could
possibly tell General Perišić something in the sense that some decision would need to be
implemented..2780
977.
The Trial Chamber considers that Novaković’s account of Milošević’s role cannot
reasonably lead to the conclusion that Perišić had no meaningful role or authority over the logistical
assistance process, as the aforesaid evidence demonstrates that the SDC granted him important
authority in this area.
978.
An entry in Mladić’s diary concerns a meeting in Belgrade between Mladić, Perišić,
Milošević and Novakovi} on 24 September 1993.2781 A note in the diary indicates that Peri{i} spoke
about “[f]inancial support” without further clarification.2782 Novaković claimed that Perišić meant
that there was “insufficient material financial support” and that the VJ did not have the means to
assist the SVK with material resources.2783 Novaković further testified that Perišić told him at a
prior meeting that, in light of the disastrous state of its reserves, the VJ did not have sufficient
reserves to give any ammunition to the SVK and that the VJ did not even have “the basic
prerequisites for waging war”.2784 Similarly, Dušan Kovačević, who concurrently held the titles of
RS Minister of Defence, VRS Major General and VJ Major General,2785 acknowledged that the
2778
2779
2780
2781
2782
2783
2784
2785
Milošević made these admissions in legal pleadings filed after the Investigating Judge of the Belgrade District
Court placed him in detention under charges of having fraudulently used state funds from 1994 to 2000,
Ex. P322, Appeal by Slobodan Milošević to the Investigating Judge of the Belgrade District Court, 2 April 2001,
pp 1-3.
Mile Novaković, T. 13113-13115.
Mile Novaković, T. 13310-13311.
Ex. D440, Excerpt from Ratko Mladi}'s Notebook, 24 September 1993, pp 1-11.
Ex. D440, Excerpt from Ratko Mladi}'s Notebook, 24 September 1993, p. 2.
Mile Novaković, T. 13136-13137.
Mile Novaković, T. 13115-13117.
Dušan Kovačević, T. 12531-12532, 12588, 12730-12732.
305
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VRS received assistance from the VJ and the SDC, although he testified that Peri{i} would “not
give ammunition out of his own reserves” when it threatened the combat readiness of the VJ.2786
979.
The Trial Chamber does not find Novaković and Kovačević credible in suggesting that
Perišić and the VJ assisted the SVK and VRS to such a limited extent. Besides the foregoing
evidence on the organisation of a comprehensive logistical assistance process, extensive evidence
shows the VJ’s role in providing important quantities of logistical assistance to these armies
pursuant to Perišić’s directives.2787
980.
Radojica Kadijević, a retired VJ General who also served in the FRY MOD and a Defence
witness,2788 equally posited that Perišić had no authority over the provision of military supplies to
the VRS and SVK. Kadijević stressed that, “₣uğnder the law, the ₣VJğ and the General Staff had no
competencies when it came to exports of military equipment, military goods”.2789 Upon being
questioned about the reference to “reserves” attributed to Perišić in Mladić’s diary (“₣wğe will see
how much we can set aside for you from our reserves”),2790 Kadijević stated: “I believe that these
are war reserves at the disposal of the ₣VJğ in its depots, the reserves of materiel in this case”.2791
Nevertheless, Kadijević insisted that Perišić had simply no authority to supply the VRS and SVK
with weaponry from the VJ’s military reserves.2792
981.
Kadijević likewise affirmed that the FRY Military Technical Institute (VTI) was
subordinated to the FRY MOD; and was adamant that “General Perišić could not exercise power
over any of the facilities of the VTI”, had no authority over VTI personnel and could not deploy VJ
personnel to serve at a VTI facility.2793 Kadijević was subsequently presented with a series of
documents demonstrating that the VJ General Staff approved the VRS’s request for a VTI specialist
to provide sniper training to VRS soldiers and their instructors at a VTI facility, as further
confirmed by Perišić’s handwritten initials and the sniper instructor’s report.2794 Kadijević
acknowledged that the sniper instructor was “sent to the 30th Personnel Centre, which is where
2786
2787
2788
2789
2790
2791
2792
2793
2794
Dušan Kovačević, T. 12667-12669.
See infra section VI.C-D.
Between November 1993 and June 1995, Kadijević worked for the FRY MOD as “Chief of the Administration
for Investigation, Development, Manufacture of Weaponry and Military Equipment”. He then became Assistant
Federal Minister of Defence for Military Economic Activities from June 1995 until April 1999, Radojica
Kadijević, T. 13530-13531.
Radojica Kadijević, T. 13551. See also Radojica Kadijević, T. 13622-13623, 13683.
Ex. P2928, Excerpt from Ratko Mladi}'s Notebook, 7 July 1994, p. 7.
Radojica Kadijević, T. 13710.
Ibid.
Radojica Kadijević, T. 13613-13614, 13713-13714.
Radojica Kadijević, T. 13719-13724; Ex. P2721, Documents Relating to a Request from Ratko Mladić to Perišić
Regarding Provision of Sniper Training, May-July 1995 (see Radojica Kadijević, T. 13715-13718, regarding the
dates on these documents).
306
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officers were sent within the ₣VJğ in order to send them to the VRS”.2795 Kadijević said that this
information came as “a surprise” to him because he was unaware that Perišić could send VTI
members to the 30th Personnel Centre for the needs of the VRS.2796
982.
Kadijević similarly claimed that the FRY Ministry of Foreign Affairs precluded any export
of military goods to RS in due compliance with UNSC resolutions.2797 Asked whether the FRY
exported weaponry during the war from 1993 to 1995, Kadijević responded: “During that period
there was [sic] no exports. What was done was probably done illegally, unbeknownst to the
Ministry of Defence”.2798 The Trial Chamber considers that Kadijević is again unbelievable on this
point, as he is contradicted by extensive evidence documenting the role of the VJ General Staff,
MOD and other FRY authorities in supplying significant quantities of weaponry to the VRS
regardless of UNSC resolutions.2799
983.
The Trial Chamber considers that Kadijević’s account was overly legalistic and did not
comport with how things operated in practice and how existing laws were superseded by SDC
decisions granting Perišić authority over logistical assistance. In fact, Kadijević testified that he was
not privy to SDC decisions giving Perišić authority over logistical assistance.2800 The Trial
Chamber is of the view that he may have been kept in the dark about this matter because it was a
state secret, as explained below.
984.
Borivoje Jovanić, another Defence witness and former high-ranking FRY MOD official,2801
equally affirmed that Perišic, as Chief of the VJ General Staff, had no power under the FRY Law on
Property to give weaponry from the VJ war reserves to the VRS or SVK.2802 But Jovanić recognised
that the SDC could confer that authority on Perišić, although he also claimed to be unaware of the
SDC’s decisions.2803 When presented with Ex. P1009, the aforementioned SDC decision granting
2795
2796
2797
2798
2799
2800
2801
2802
2803
Radojica Kadijević, T. 13720.
Radojica Kadijević, T. 13723-13724. Kadijević was also asked to comment on a document stating that Milorad
Motika, Director of Pretis, a RS military factory, urged Mladić to ask Perišić for help in granting a request for
1,000 rocket engines needed by Pretis by having Perišić forward the request to the FRY’s Assistant Defence
Minister. Kadijević again insisted that Perišić had no authority over this matter: “It is evident that this document
does not reflect the regular procedure in Republika Srpska. […] Normally the director of this company, Motika,
would need to approach [RS MOD] and they in turn would need to contact [FRY MOD] and that would be the
end of the procedure. If I may add here, General Mladić and General Perišić appear here as, to put to crudely,
couriers who were supposed to be a contact for something that is neither within their jurisdiction nor could they
deal with it and resolve it”, Radojica Kadijević, T. 13622-13623; Ex. P604, Request Addressed to VRS Main
Staff by Milorad Motika, 10 May 1994.
Radojica Kadijević, T. 13552.
Radojica Kadijević, T. 13547-13548.
See infra section VI.C.
Radojica Kadijević, T. 13708-13709.
Borivoje Jovanić, T. 11400-11401.
Borivoje Jovanić, T. 11468. See Ex. D114, Law on Property of the FRY, 16 July 1993.
Borivoje Jovanić, T. 11468-11469 (private session). See Ex. D114, Law on Property of the FRY, 16 July 1993.
307
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Perišić authority to provide military supplies to the VRS and SVK, Jovanić stated that this matter
was “new” to him.2804
985.
Several documents indicate that weaponry was delivered to the VRS pursuant to the orders
of the MOD of the “Republic of Serbia”, not of the FRY,2805 although these documents precede
Perišić’s appointment as Chief of the VJ General Staff on 26 August 1993.2806 The Trial Chamber
does not find these documents probative of the Defence’s claim that the FRY MOD had primacy
over Perišić in matters of logistical assistance.2807 The record is clear that Perišić oversaw the
process.
986.
Finally, the Trial Chamber notes that, in the course of his interview with the Prosecution,
Perišić was pointed to page 38 of the record of the 21st SDC Session, where he urged the SDC to
continue sending logistical assistance to the VRS and SVK, as discussed above.2808 The Prosecution
told Perišić: “If you look at that, the content and that whole context, there can be no doubt that it
was precisely the VSO [i.e., SDC] and the [VJ] who provided the assistance to the RS and
RSK”.2809 Perišić’s response reads as follows: “Well, I do not deny that at all. I have never denied
that, but I do challenge the veracity of two things: first, that the Army of [RS] and of the [RSK] was
a paramilitary; and second, I challenge the assertion of this separation not having continued with
my arrival and not having been brought, in some elements, to an end”.2810 In sum, Perišić conceded
the interviewer’s point that it was the SDC and VJ who provided assistance to RS and RSK, and
instead focused on challenging distinct allegations.
987.
Conversely, on a subsequent day of his interview, Perišić denied that the VJ had provided
ammunition to the VRS pursuant to his orders and said that, at most, any ammunition came from
the FRY MOD:
Q: During your term as the Chief of the General Staff, did you ever authorise or were you ever
aware of your army providing ammunition to the VRS? […]
A: As far as I can recall, I, never authorised nor ordered anything directly, and I believe there was
no reason for that, because most of the weapon and military equipment factories were located in
the territory of Bosnia […].
2804
2805
2806
2807
2808
2809
2810
Borivoje Jovanić, T. 11468-11469 (private session) (commenting on Ex. P1009, Order of FRY President, 18
February 1994).
Ex. D449, Record of Receipt of Ammunition by the Drina Corps, 25 July 1993; Ex. D450, Record of Receipt of
Ammunition by the Drina Corps, 6 August 1993; Ex. D451, Record of Receipt of Ammunition by the Drina
Corps, 23 August 1993. See Radojica Kadijević, T. 13575-13580, 13585-13857.
Ex. P196, Decree of the President of the FRY, 26 August 1993.
Defence Final Brief, paras 137-139, 613-615.
Ex. P810, Transcript of Interview with Periši}, 23 January 2004, p. 39. See Ex. P776, Stenographic Transcript of
the 21st Session of the SDC, 7 June 1994, p. 38.
Ex. P810, Transcript of Interview with Periši}, 23 January 2004, p. 39.
Ibid.
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Q: Would it be correct to say that if there were any large amounts of ammunition that were sent
from the [VJ] to the VRS you should have been aware of that?
A: Firstly, I do not see any reason for doing that at all, and secondly, if there were any such
shipments, they went through the Ministry, i.e. trough the work organisation /factory/ – Ministry
of Defence – the Republika Srpska Army line, rather than the work organisation – the General
Staff – the Republika Sprska Army line [sic].2811
988.
The Trial Chamber finds that Perišić was not truthful in denying his role and claiming that
the FRY MOD was responsible for any logistical assistance provided to the VRS. The aforesaid
evidence conclusively establishes that Perišić oversaw the provision of ammunition and military
equipment to the VRS and SVK; and persuaded the SDC to give him the legal authority to do so.
5. Cooperation with the FRY Ministry of Defence and Influence Over FRY Military Factories
989.
The FRY’s military factories, known as “special purpose industries”, were state-owned and
legally subordinated to the FRY MOD.2812 The day-to-day operations of the special purpose
industries were officially managed by the FRY MOD, not by Perišić and the VJ General Staff.2813
990.
The Defence’s position is that the VJ operated under the authority of the MOD at the
production level.2814 In its view, “[t]he VJ could not directly obtain products from [special purpose
industries] without prior approval from the MOD” and “only the FRY MOD could contract with the
[special purpose industries] for the production of material for the needs of VJ”.2815 It submits that,
because the FRY legally owned all military property, the VJ could only “use the property the MOD
allocated to the VJ for usage” and the VJ “did not have the right to dispose or alienate the
property”.2816
991.
While the MOD technically owned military material,2817 the Trial Chamber recalls that, in
practice, the VJ was not subordinated to the FRY MOD in logistical assistance matters. The SDC
granted Perišić ample authority in this area, allowing him to provide material to the VRS and SVK.
Furthermore, the forthcoming evidence demonstrates that the VJ General Staff’s relationship with
the FRY MOD was essentially one of cooperation, not subordination, insofar as aid to the VRS and
SVK was concerned.
2811
2812
2813
2814
2815
2816
2817
Ex. P815, Transcript of Interview with Periši}, 25 January 2004, pp 21-22.
Jugoslav Kodžopeljić, T. 12311-12312, 12320-12321, 12332; Borivoje Jovanić, T. 11397; MP-80, T. 8354
(closed session); Miodrag Star~ević, T. 6896-6897; Radojica Kadijević, T. 13543. However, the VJ itself
operated two major technical repair and weapon overhaul facilities (“institutes”) at Kragujevac and Čačak,
Jugoslav Kodžopeljić, T. 12312-12313.
Mladen Mihajlovi}, T. 3966-3967; Dušan Kovačević, T. 12675; Miodrag Star~ević, T. 6896-6897; Borivoje
Jovanić, T. 11396-11397, 11399; Radojica Kadijević, T. 13543.
Defence Final Brief, para. 613.
Defence Final Brief, para. 139.
Defence Final Brief, paras 614-615.
See e.g. Ex. D114, Law on Property of the FRY, 16 July 1993, Article 39.
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992.
The SDC held that “the Federal Defence Ministry and the Yugoslav Army General Staff”
would be in charge of “negotiations and the delivery of weapons and military equipment” for the
VRS and SVK.2818 The SDC decided that “negotiations and the delivery of weapons and military
equipment to be used by Republika Srpska and the Republic of the Serbian Krajina shall only be
conducted through the Federal Defence Ministry and the Yugoslav Army General Staff, and not by
dealing directly with producers in the special-purpose industry”.2819 Notably, after the RS and RSK
Defence Ministers proposed to contract directly with the FRY special purpose industries to obtain
weaponry and military equipment, Slobodan Milošević mocked their proposal and emphasised:
“They can’t! They can only do it with the federal ministry and the General Staff”.2820
993.
A Defence exhibit indicates that Pavle Bulatović, the FRY Minister of Defence, authored
and signed another document reiterating the SDC’s conclusions and specifying that “[a]greements
and deliveries of NVO /weapons and military equipment/ for the needs of RS and RSK are to be
made exclusively through the SMO [i.e., FRY MOD] and GŠ /General Staff/ of the VJ”.2821
Bulatović, like Perišić, participated in numerous other SDC meetings where military assistance to
the VRS and SVK was agreed upon,2822 further demonstrating that Bulatović and the MOD
cooperated with Perišić and the VJ in the logistical assistance process.
994.
General Mihajlović, a senior VJ General Staff official,2823 affirmed that the VJ “could not
directly take anything from the military industry of Yugoslavia without the approval and consent of
the Ministry of Defence” and stated that the MOD “had organisation units that were responsible for
supply and procurement. They were the main organ through which supplies were executed”.2824
Radojica Kadijević explained that a particular request for weaponry from the SVK was preceded by
an application from the RSK MOD to the FRY MOD.2825 But because the FRY MOD “did not have
at its disposal data about the possibilities and capacities of the [VJ] […], it addressed the office of
2818
2819
2820
2821
2822
2823
2824
2825
Ex. P752, Minutes from the 22nd Session of the SDC held on 11 July 1994, p. 2 (emphasis added).
Ibid (emphasis added).
Ex. P784, Stenographic Transcript of the 22nd Session of the SDC, 11 July 1994, pp 39-41.
Ex. D453, Plan for Implementation of the Conclusions of the 21st Session of the SDC, 29 July 1994, p. 2
(emphasis added). The SMO is the FRY MOD, Miodrag Star~ević, T. 6947.
See Ex. P710, Minutes from the 19th Session of the SDC, 16 March 1994; Ex. P776, Stenographic Transcript of
the 21st Session of the SDC, 7 June 1994; Ex. P752, Minutes from the 22nd Session of the SDC, 11 July 1994,
p. 2 (emphasis added); Ex. P763, Minutes from the 39th Session of the SDC, 29 July 1995; Ex. P785,
Stenographic Transcript of the 23rd Session of the SDC, 21 July 1994; Ex. P754, Minutes from the 23rd Session
of the SDC, 21 July 1994; Ex. P749, Minutes from the 36th Session of the SDC, 12 May 1995; Ex. P720,
Minutes from the 38th Session of the SDC, 27 June 1995. Pavle Bulatović, as the FRY Minister of Defence, was
not officially a member of the SDC, although he partook in its work when matters of exceptional importance in
the domain of his ministry were discussed, Stamenko Nikoli}, T. 10441.
Mladen Mihajlovi}, T. 3876-3877.
Mladen Mihajlovi}, T. 3966-3967.
Radojica Kadijević, T. 13629-13630 (commenting on Ex. P1142, Letter from RSK MOD to Cabinet of the Chief
of the VJ General Staff, 6 December 1994).
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the Chief of Staff, requesting the Chief of Staff’s opinion with [sic] this regard”.2826 Perišić then
decided whether the request was approved or denied, and informed the FRY MOD, which
proceeded to prepare a document for the SDC.2827
995.
In practice, the FRY MOD could actually seek authorisation from Perišić before giving
property to the VRS and SVK, rather than the other way around, as the Defence insists was the
case.2828 According to a Defence exhibit, the FRY MOD asked Perišić’s office to “take a position”
in regard to a request from the RSK MOD “for a delivery of ammunition and mines without
payment”, and “if it should make a positive decision, prepare an appropriate decision to be signed
by the Federal Minister of Defence”.2829 Another document shows that the FRY MOD itself asked
Perišić for permission to sell Motorola radios to the VRS, which Perišić granted.2830 The director of
Krušik—a weapons factory in Valjevo, Serbia, officially subordinated to the FRY MOD2831—also
required Perišić’s approval before allowing the sale of 40 FAB-275 air-bombs to the VRS.2832
996.
Similarly, an excerpt from Mladić’s diary indicates that he and Perišić participated in a
meeting with the leadership of Krušik and that Perišić reportedly said: “We have come to see what
we can do to help the RS Army and how”, “what we can offer as assistance” and “what can be
delivered with and without payment”.2833 Vladimir Rodi}, Perišić’s driver, confirmed that he drove
2826
2827
2828
2829
2830
2831
2832
2833
Ibid.
Radojica Kadijević, T. 13630 (commenting on Ex. P1142, Letter from RSK MOD to Cabinet of the Chief of the
VJ General Staff, 6 December 1994).
Defence Final Brief, paras 137-139, 614-615.
Ex. D173, Request from FRY MOD to Office of the Chief of the VJ General Staff, 6 December 1994.
Ex. P2727, Series of Documents Relating to a Request from the VRS to Purchase Motorola Radios. Sini{a
Borovi}, Perišić’s Chef de Cabinet from November 1994 to December 1996, confirmed that the FRY MOD sent
this request (to sell Motorola radios to the VRS) to Perišić’s office. See Sini{a Borovi}, T. 13992 (commenting
on Ex. P2727, Series of Documents Relating to a Request from the VRS to Purchase Motorola Radios, He
further testified that Perišić’s office thereafter forwarded it to the Sector for Communications, Information
Technologies, and Electronic Operations of the VJ, asking for its position. The Chief of the Sector agreed to
purchase “a number of Motorolas”, Sini{a Borovi}, T. 13992-13993, and Ex. P2727 demonstrates that Peri{i}’s
office wrote the FRY MOD, stating that he agreed that the VRS purchase this equipmenT. See Ex. P2727, Series
of Documents Relating to a Request from the VRS to Purchase Motorola Radios, Doc ID 0647-6774.
Borivoje Jovanić, T. 11479-11480.
Ex. P2427, Request from Mladić to Peri{ić to Allow Purchase of Air Bombs, 2 September 1995. Mladić wrote
Perišić: “Since the Director of Military Production at the Krušik RO/Company/ requires approval from you,
please allow us to purchase the above quantity of FABs”, ibid. (The acronym “FAB” refers to air bombs.
Ex. P505, Transcript of Nikola To{ovi} Deposition Hearing, 13 December 2008, T. 62.) Miodrag Star~ević, who
was Chief of the Yugoslav Legislative Administration between 1992 and 1994, understood Ex. P2427 to mean
that the approval of the VJ General Staff was required for special purpose industries to sell weapons to the VRS,
Miodrag Starčević, T. 5425-5427, 7054-7059 (partially private session). On the other hand, Borivoje Jovanić,
who headed the FRY MOD’s finance and budget administration unit, affirmed that the Krušik director should
have asked the FRY Minister of Defence for authorisation, rather than Perišić, as only the FRY MOD could
authorise sales, Borivoje Jovanić, T. 11400-11401, 11480-11481. However, Jovanić’s position is contradicted by
Ex. P2727.
Ex. P2928, Excerpt from Ratko Mladić’s Diary, 7 July 1994, pp 1, 7. Krušik’s director stated that he was
“thrilled to be able to meet the 2 greatest Generals”, and that his factory had the annual capacity to build
hundreds of thousands of shells and rockets, as well as other ammunition, Ex. P2928, Excerpt from Ratko
Mladić’s Diary, 7 July 1994, pp 1-7.
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Peri{i} to Krušik for a meeting with Mladić, Radojica Kadijevi} and General Sava Pustinja.2834
Kadijević, then a senior FRY MOD official, equally confirmed the occurrence of this meeting (and
mentioned that he also joined Mladić in his visit of the Crvena Zastava weapons plant in 1994).2835
997.
A plan for implementing the SDC’s conclusions suggests that the VJ was exempted from
having to obtain the MOD’s approval: “No direct agreements and deliveries of NVO can be made
and special purposes industrial enterprises cannot deliver or sell NVO to anyone without the
approval of the SMO [i.e., FRY MOD], with the exception of planned deliveries for the VJ”.2836
998.
The cooperation between the VJ and FRY MOD in the logistical assistance process is
further evidenced by a contract whereby the FRY MOD agreed to loan 42,720 kilograms of TNT to
the RS MOD.2837 While the VJ apparently was not involved in the preparation of the contract, it
indicates that the VJ participated in the delivery of the TNT, which itself was stored at the VJ’s
608th Logistics Base.2838 A copy of the contract was delivered to the 608th Logistics Base and the
VJ’s Lunjevica depot, near Gornji Milanovac, Serbia.2839
999.
It must be noted that, as opposed to the weaponry delivered from the VJ’s reserves, a
portion of the weaponry delivered to the VRS and SVK was purchased from FRY special purpose
industries,2840 which were managed by the FRY MOD.2841 Even though Perišić had a measure of
influence over the special purpose industries, it cannot be ascertained whether Perišić or the FRY
MOD specifically authorised these particular deliveries emanating directly from the special purpose
industries.
1000. At any rate, the VRS obtained much fewer supplies from the special purpose industries than
from the VJ. Mladić reported to the RS National Assembly that, with regard to weaponry used in
battle from the beginning of the war until 15 April 1995, merely 9.11% of the total infantry
ammunition was “imported, i.e. bought” whereas 47.2% came from VJ “aid”, only 0.26% of
2834
2835
2836
2837
2838
2839
2840
2841
Vladimir Rodi}, T. 14213-14214, 14234.
Radojica Kadijević, T. 13688-13689, 13701-13704.
Ex. D453, Plan for Implementation of the Conclusions of the 21st Session of the SDC, 29 July 1994, p. 2
(emphasis added).
Ex. P1201, Cover Letter and Contract Regarding Loan of TNT by VJ to VRS, 17 February 1994. The Sector for
Military Activity is identified as Military Post 8634-4 in the contract, and was a FRY MOD organ, Radojica
Kadijević, T. 13603, 13606. The contract was registered with the Procurement Administration, another FRY
MOD organ, identified as Military Post 1089-30, Radojica Kadijević, T. 13601-13602.
Ex. P1201, Cover Letter and Contract Regarding Loan of TNT by VJ to VRS, 17 February 1994, p. 2; Radojica
Kadijević, T. 13604, 13606.
Ex. P1201, Cover Letter and Contract Regarding Loan of TNT by VJ to VRS, 17 February 1994, p. 1; Radojica
Kadijević, T. 13605-13606.
See MP-14, T. 3617-3618.
See supra para. 989.
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expanded artillery ammunition was imported/bought whereas 34.4% came from VJ “aid”, and 4.9%
of anti-aircraft ammunition was imported/bought whereas 52.4% came from VJ “aid”.2842
1001. Mladić did not specify from which country the imported weaponry came, although the only
reasonable conclusion presented by the evidentiary record is that it was imported from the FRY’s
special purpose industries because the VRS did not obtain significant quantities of weapons from
other countries.2843 Mladić’s report therefore demonstrates that a far greater proportion of the
VRS’s ammunition came from VJ “aid” than from the special purpose industries, as otherwise
demonstrated by the vast majority of the evidence adduced on this issue. For example, a VRS
annual report shows that the VJ provided the majority of the VRS’s infantry ammunition in 1994, as
well as approximately a fourth of its shells, whereas the rest came “from the RS government”.2844
That report does not identify FRY special purpose industries or FRY MOD as a source of supply.
6. State Secrecy of Logistical Assistance
1002. The logistical assistance system was not transparent. Slobodan Milošević admitted that
logistical assistance “was not made public because it was a state secret, as was everything else that
was provided for the Army of Republika Srpska”.2845 The Supreme Defence Council’s decisions on
the matter were classified as “military secret”.2846 Momčilo Perišić’s orders were similarly
classified as “military secret”, “strictly confidential” or both.2847 Military aid to the VRS was
delivered surreptitiously.2848 Perišić expressed concern on 7 February 1994 that, as a result of the
new Law on Property, leaks of information regarding military aid to the VRS and SVK may
increase, especially if civilians oversee these matters.2849 The subsequent SDC order reaffirming
2842
2843
2844
2845
2846
2847
2848
2849
Ex. P312, Transcript of Tape Recording of the 50th Session of the RS Assembly, 15 April 1995, p. 51.
See infra section VI.C.9.(a).
Ex. P1214, Annual Financial Statement of the Plan of Tasks and Financing of the VRS for 1994, 17 February
1995, pp 19-21.
Ex. P322, Appeal by Slobodan Milošević to the Investigating Judge of the Belgrade District Court, 2 April 2001,
p. 2 (emphasis added). A contract between the FRY and RS for the loan of 42,720 kilograms of TNT states that
the provisions of the contract “are considered to be military secrets”, Ex. P1201, Cover Letter and Contract
Regarding Loan of TNT by VJ to VRS, 17 February 1994, p. 3.
See Ex. P1009, Order of FRY President, 18 February 1994; Ex. P710, Minutes of the 19th Session of the SDC, 16
March 1994; Ex. D453, Plan for Implementation of the Conclusions of the 21st Session of the SDC, 29 July
1994.
See Ex. P878, Tasks set by Perišić at the Supreme Staff Command meeting of 27 September 1993, 27 October
1993; Ex. P1258, Order of Momčilo Perišić, December 1993; Ex. P1626, Official Note from the Meeting of the
VJ Supreme Command Staff, 27 September 1993; Ex. P571, Matériel List, 23 November 1993; Ex. P575,
Matériel List, 23 November 1993; Ex. P581, Matériel List, 22 November 1993. The translated form features an
erroneous date at its top right, although the original indicates the receipt date as 22 November 1993, see MP-14,
T. 3577. See also Ex. P582, Matériel List, 24 November 1993; Ex. P628, Orders from Perišić Regarding
Procurement Procedure, 17 August 1994.
See supra section VI.B.3; infra section VI.C.2.(c).
Ex. P782, Stenographic Transcript of 18th Session of the SDC, 7 February 1994, p. 53. See Ex. D114, Law on
Property of the FRY, 16 July 1993.
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Perišić’s authority over logistical assistance was labelled “military secret” and “strictly
confidential”.2850
1003. FRY authorities officially denied that logistical assistance occurred, as illustrated by the
words of Ambassador Dragomir Ðokić, who told the UNSC that the FRY “is constantly subjected
to provocations and absurd allegations that it is supplying the Bosnian Serbs with military
materiel”.2851
1004. Part of the reason for this state secrecy was that the FRY’s support to the VRS and SVK was
met with a measure of opprobrium by the international community. The UNSC issued multiple
resolutions urging a cease-fire and a halt of all hostilities.2852 It demanded that the FRY cease its
involvement in the military conflict in Bosnia,2853 condemned the FRY’s failure to do so and
subjected it to sanctions.2854 The UNSC further called upon the FRY to maintain the effective
closure of the border with BiH in respect of all goods with exception to food, medical supplies and
clothing for essential humanitarian needs.2855 In addition, as early as spring 1992, the UNSC
discussed the sniping and shelling of Sarajevo civilians on a nearly daily basis2856 and strongly
condemned these actions.2857
1005. The evidence unequivocally shows that Perišić sought to provide assistance to the VRS and
SVK regardless of the UNSC’s resolutions. Perišić specifically addressed the matter when he met
with a delegation of leaders of the Serbian Orthodox Church, including Patriarch Pavle, Amfilohije
Radović and Bishop Irinej of Niš. The record of the meeting indicates that the delegation asked
Perišić about the conflict in Bosnia. “In his responses, General Peri{i} said that despite the unfair
sanctions imposed by the international community the FRY has been assisting RS and the RSK in
every respect (humanitarian, military, etc.) in order for the Serbian people to successfully defend
2850
2851
2852
2853
2854
2855
2856
2857
Ex. P1009, Order of FRY President, 18 February 1994.
Ex. P2484, Record of the 3522nd Meeting of the UNSC, 21 April 1995, p. 3.
See Ex. P201, UNSC Resolution 752, 15 May 1992; Ex. P202, UNSC Resolution 757, 30 May 1992; Ex. P2434,
UNSC Resolution 758 (8 June 1992) 760 (18 June 1992) and 761 (29 June 1992); Ex. P2435, UNSC Resolution
764, 13 July 1992; Ex. P471, UNSC Resolution 781, 9 October 1992; Ex. P208, UNSC Resolution 819, 16 April
1993; Ex. P2472, UNSC Resolution 836, 4 June 1993.
See Ex. P201, UNSC Resolution 752, 15 May 1992, p. 2; Ex. P202, UNSC Resolution 757, 30 May 1992, p. 1;
Ex. P2473, UNSC Resolution 838, 10 June 1993, p. 1.
See Ex. P202, UNSC Resolution 757, 30 May 1992, pp 1-5; Ex. P2473, UNSC Resolution 838, 10 June 1993,
p. 2; Ex. P2434, UNSC Resolution 760, 18 June 1992.
See Ex. D25, UNSC Resolution 943, 23 September 1994, at p. 2; Ex. D26, UNSC Resolution 970, 21 January
1995, pp 1-2; Ex. D27, UNSC Resolution 988, 21 April 1995, pp 1, 4; Ex. D28, UNSC Resolution 1003, 5 July
1995, p. 1.
Muhamed Sacirbey, T. 7179-7181.
Ex. P2475, Note of the President of the UNSC, 7 January 1994.
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itself [sic] and survive on its [sic] territory”.2858 “Perišić promised to do everything in his power to
continue helping the Serbian people”.2859
1006. The FRY’s provision of logistical assistance to the VRS and SVK was widely known
despite its official state secrecy. UNPROFOR officials were aware that the VRS received
significant military support from the FRY.2860 General Branko Gajić, a senior VJ official and
Defence witness, himself acknowledged that the FRY sent large quantities of military aid to RS and
RSK,2861 stating that the military assistance was a matter of “common knowledge [as] the public
was aware of it, there were articles in the press about it, and as far as I can remember I think it was
discussed by the delegates in parliament ₣...ğ it was well known even to military and political
representatives accredited in Belgrade”.2862
7. Conclusion
1007. The foregoing evidence conclusively demonstrates that Momčilo Peri{i}, as Chief of the VJ
General Staff, oversaw the administration of logistical assistance for the military needs of the VRS
and SVK. In fact, Perišić convinced the SDC to give him the legal authority to do so in an effort to
comply with the FRY’s Law on Property.2863 That being noted, the Trial Chamber considers that the
question of greater relevance is not what the FRY’s domestic legislation technically stipulated, but
the actual role that Perišić played in the logistical assistance process.
1008. Peri{i}’s role went beyond administering the logistical assistance process. Perišić
participated in the SDC’s deliberations on logistical assistance to the VRS and SVK, and
recurrently encouraged the SDC to maintain this assistance, thereby helping craft the FRY’s policy
to aid these armies.
1009. Insofar as Perišić opposed certain requests conflicting with the VJ’s own needs, that fact
does not signify that Perišić generally opposed logistical assistance or sought to keep it to a
minimum. Rather, Perišić’s role in coordinating the process, his statements before the SDC, and his
approval of extensive assistance to the VRS and SVK2864 demonstrate that he was intent on
assisting these armies. Perišić’s remarks before the VJ Collegium at the end of the war are equally
instructive: “I could have retained the material reserves, all the material reserves to retain them here
2858
2859
2860
2861
2862
2863
Ex. P2743, Memo from Office of Chief of VJ General Staff, 11 August 1995, p. 2 (emphasis added).
Ex. P2743, Memo from Office of Chief of VJ General Staff, 11 August 1995, p. 4.
Michael Williams, T. 6464; Ex. P2372, Transcript of Michael Williams from Prosecutor v. S. Milošević, 24 June
2003, T. 22893-22894; MP-433, T. 2104-2105, 2142-2144 (closed session).
Branko Gajić, T. 10987-10988.
Branko Gajić, T. 10991-10992.
Ex. P782, Stenographic Transcript of 18th Session of the SDC, 7 February 1994, p. 53; Ex. P1009, Order of FRY
President, 18 February 1994.
315
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to the maximum, to give as little as possible material reserves away […]. We gave all we had
always and I am not sorry for that, as we defended the people as much as we could”.2865
2864
2865
See infra section VI.C-D.
Ex. P2203, Transcript of the Collegium of the Chief of the VJ General Staff, 6 November 1995, Doc ID 06186912, p. 3. See Miodrag Star~ević, T. 6787-6788. An undated document from “the logistics sector”, presumably
of the VJ, states that all the VRS and SVK requests had been met that far, although further provisions would
only be possible from the “surplus of unpromising equipment”. The document adds that the VJ does not have the
financial capacity to provide weaponry produced by FRY factories to the VRS and SVK. The latter “should”
make arrangements through the FRY MOD so that weaponry can be delivered from the “production sector, with
the funding plan ensured”. The document adds that the VJ “can still provide ammunition for 7.9 calibre weapons
from its own surpluses”, whereas it can no longer give fuel because “its own reserves have dropped below the
allowed minimum”. It goes on to reach the following conclusion: “The VJ has depleted its capabilities, reserves
and resources of logistical support and the only logistical support it can provide is insufficient for the actual
needs of the VRS and VRSK [sic]”, Ex. P2175, Documents Regarding Meetings between SVK, VRS and VJ
Chiefs of Staff, fall 1993, Doc ID 0630-5913 (undated), pp 1, 3. See Mile Novaković, T. 13189-13191. The Trial
Chamber finds this document relevant, but considers its weight undermined by the fact that it is undated and its
author is unnamed. In any event, the Trial Chamber finds that extensive evidence shows that the VJ continued to
assist the VRS and SVK despite problems with its reserves.
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C. Logistical and Technical Assistance to the VRS
1. Submissions of the Parties
1010. The Prosecution submits that, as approved by Momčilo Perišić pursuant to the authority
granted by the SDC, the VJ provided considerable quantities of weaponry and military equipment,
as well as training and technical assistance, to the VRS, which heavily depended on this aid because
of its limited reserves and resources.2866 It posits that the VRS did not have to pay for the material it
received from the VJ.2867 The Prosecution alleges that logistical assistance continued
notwithstanding the FRY’s official imposition of sanctions on RS in August 1994.2868
1011. The Defence recognises that Perišić and the VJ gave assistance to the VRS pursuant to the
SDC’s orders,2869 although it submits that the VRS had substantial reserves of ammunition at its
disposal, as well as other important sources of logistical assistance besides the VJ.2870 The Defence
argues that it is not possible to accurately estimate what supplies the VRS respectively obtained
from the VJ and other sources, and that the Trial Chamber would engage in speculation by reaching
a conclusion in this regard.2871 In its eyes, “we don’t know” what supplies came from where.2872
The Defence further “adopts” the “conclusions” made by Ivan Ðokić,2873 who appeared as an expert
witness on the VJ’s logistical assistance and generally posited that the latter was limited in scope.
Ðokić’s testimony and report are discussed separately in a subsequent section.2874
2. Delivery of Weaponry and Military Equipment to the VRS
(a) Analysis of Military Material Delivery Forms
1012. The Trial Chamber was presented with numerous material delivery forms allegedly
reflecting the VJ’s provision of weaponry to the VRS following Perišić’s orders.
1013. The Defence raises multiple challenges to the material delivery forms, namely that various
forms were not properly filled in, that they are unintelligible, that they do not adequately identify
2866
2867
2868
2869
2870
2871
2872
2873
2874
See generally Prosecution Final Brief, paras 35, 45-81, 240, 253, 257-301.
Prosecution Final Brief, para. 260, citing MP-14, T. 3617 (closed session).
Prosecution Final Brief, paras 283-286.
Defence Final Brief, paras 607, 780.
Defence Final Brief, paras 611, 616, 707, 723-741.
Defence Final Brief, paras 647, 742-743.
Defence Closing Arguments, T. 14784.
Defence Final Brief, para. 805, citing Ex. D507, Expert Report of Ivan Ðokić, paras 334-344.
See infra section VI.E.
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the sender and recipient, that they do not establish whether listed items were actually delivered, and
that they do not reflect Perišić’s approval.2875
1014. Defence witness Jugoslav Kodžopeljić generally called in question the reliability of the
material delivery forms, and the Defence relies to a significant extent on Kodžopeljić’s testimony in
challenging this evidence.2876 Kodžopeljić was the VJ General Staff’s Chief of Technical
Administration from 1993 to 1999, and was responsible for matters of logistical support, as well as
the oversight of the VJ General Staff’s Kragujevac and Čačak overhaul facilities.2877 Kodžopeljić
testified that the VJ had specific bookkeeping regulations governing all weapon deliveries to any
military unit, and that no equipment could be delivered if not properly recorded in a material list, as
doing so was important to the VJ’s budgetary and inventory planning.2878
1015. Conversely, Prosecution witness MP-14 analysed and authenticated various material
delivery forms introduced into evidence by the Prosecution. MP-14 notably testified that the VRS
regularly received military equipment from the VJ during the war,2879 and that delivery forms were
completed as part of standard procedure.2880 The VJ and VRS used the same types of delivery
forms, also described as “material lists”.2881 MP-14 was familiar with the issue2882 in light of his
work at a VRS base,2883 where he was subordinated to the Assistant Commander for Logistics of the
VRS Main Staff.2884
1016. The Trial Chamber has closely analysed the material delivery forms, as well as Kodžopeljić
and MP-14’s respective testimonies, and will now describe its findings.
1017. At the outset, the Trial Chamber notes both the box for “unit of measure” and the box for
“quantity” are filled in on certain forms. For instance, with regard to 155mm M-1 bullets under Ex.
P568, the “unit of measure” reads “60” and the “amount” reads “100”.2885 Witness MP-14
2875
2876
2877
2878
2879
2880
2881
2882
2883
2884
2885
Defence Final Brief, paras 648-677.
Defence Final Brief, paras 648-677.
Jugoslav Kodžopeljić, T. 12256, 12261, 12264, 12312-12314, 12383, 12414-12415, 12494. See also Siniša
Borović testifying that the Kragujevac and Čačak facilities were subordinated to the VJ, Siniša Borović,
T. 13887-13888.
Jugoslav Kodžopeljić, T. 12279-12284.
MP-14, T. 3525 (closed session).
MP-14, T. 3527-3529 (closed session), 3693-3694 (closed session).
MP-14, T. 3527 (closed session).
In addition to examining various delivery forms discussed below, MP-14 was asked to examine Ex. P568 in
detail as an example for all delivery forms. See MP-14, T. 3529-3545 (closed session); Ex. P568, Matériel List,
28 June 1993. The Trial Chamber notes that Ex. P568 concerned a delivery that occurred before Peri{i}’s
appointment as VJ Chief of General Staff. However, its format is identical to that of numerous other forms that
followed Perišić’s appointment and were tendered into evidence. See also Ex. P196, Decree of the President of
the FRY Appointing Momčilo Perišić as VJ Chief of General Staff, 26 August 1993.
MP-14, T. 3506-3507 (closed session).
MP-14, T. 3680 (closed session).
Ex. P568, Matériel List, 28 June 1993, p. 2.
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explained that the number “60” in the unit of measure form was a “code” number and not an actual
quantity of items.2886 That code is found in multiple other forms as well.2887 As explained by MP14, the relevant box is the one indicating the quantity of items, which was 100 M-1 bullets of
155mm calibre under Ex. P568.2888
1018. Kodžopeljić challenged the intelligibility of several material forms. The Trial Chamber does
not find him credible in his claim that Ex. P574 is so unclear that “practically one cannot know in
any way whatsoever what particular item has been delivered or issued”, notably because the
nomenclature number on the form was incorrect.2889 The form refers on its face to 5,400 rounds for
7.9mm M75 sniper-rifles and 60,016 universal 7.62mm rounds.2890 That fact was confirmed by MP14.2891 Kodžopeljić’s position was that property was tracked in an automated database relying on
12-digit nomenclature numbers without which “nobody would know what we were talking
about”.2892 The Trial Chamber finds Kodžopeljić unpersuasive. Even though an improper
nomenclature number might pose problems for tracking information in that database, it does not
render a material list unintelligible if one can read on its face the names of the items provided.2893
1019. With regard to Ex. P572, Kodžopeljić recognised that the form indicates the sender as the
VJ General Staff and the origin as Ladjeveci, Serbia, although he claimed that this information was
“insufficient” for purposes of VJ administrative and financial planning, and posited that “the
handwriting is the same as that of the person who has received the item”.2894 The Trial Chamber
considers that whether a form has sufficient information for purposes of VJ administrative and
financial planning is irrelevant and does not render a delivery form incomprehensible on its face.
Assuming Kodžopeljić was correct in stating that the person who filled out the form was the
recipient, that fact alone would not render the form unreliable. MP-14’s testimony suggests that this
fact would be unremarkable, as it was possible for the recipient to complete details in the paperwork
omitted by the sender.2895
2886
2887
2888
2889
2890
2891
2892
2893
2894
2895
MP-14, T. 3540-3541 (closed session).
See e.g. Ex. P576, Matériel List, 23 November 1993; Ex. P572, Matériel List, 22 November 1993; Ex. P579,
Matériel List, 24 November 1993; Ex. P571, Matériel List, 23 November 1993; Ex. P575, Matériel List,
23 November 1993; Ex. P578, Matériel List, 23 November 1993; Ex. P582, Matériel List, 24 November 1993;
Ex. P593, Matériel List, 20 December 1993.
MP-14, T. 3539-3541 (closed session); Ex. P568, Matériel List, 28 June 1993.
Jugoslav Kodžopeljić, T. 12361; Ex. P574, Matériel List, 22 November 1993.
Ex. P574, Matériel List, 22 November 1993.
MP-14, T. 3564-3565.
Jugoslav Kodžopeljić, T. 12361, 12363.
See also Jugoslav Kodžopeljić, T. 12362, 12364, 12368, 12372 (repeating argument about nomenclature
numbers being incorrect on various forms that are otherwise intelligible).
Jugoslav Kodžopeljić, T. 12353-12357; Ex. P572, Matériel List, 22 November 1993 (translated document
erroneously reads 1,936 rockets instead of 50). See also MP-14, T. 3558-3559.
MP-14, T. 3699.
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1020. Kodžopeljić also contended that Ex. P576 is unintelligible. The form reads that the sender
was the VJ General Staff, that the material originated from Bogutovačka Banja, and that the
recipient was the Drina Corps Command at Military Post 7111.2896 It refers to 296 self-propelled
gun rounds and 192 howitzer rounds, and bears a receipt stamp for the VRS’ base at Han Pijesak,
RS.2897 Upon examining the form, Kodžopeljić nevertheless opined that “[i]t’s impossible to know
what this is about”.2898 By contrast, MP-14 was able to easily understand the form.2899
1021. Kodžopeljić took a similar approach in examining Ex. P582. Because the box labelled
“name and address of sender” was left blank on the form, Kodžopeljić claimed that “it is unknown
who it was – or, rather, from which depot the material was sent”.2900 In fact, that information is
readily ascertainable by reading the box indicating the military post number of the sender and its
location, namely 7518 and Paracin, Serbia, as well as the box indicating the bookkeeping sender in
Niš, Serbia.2901 Moreover, the form specifies that the delivery was conducted pursuant to an order
by Perišić himself: “Decision NG[ VJ / Yugoslav Army Chief of General Staff / Str. pov. br. /
strictly confidential number / 6748-2, of 17.11.1993”.2902 The mention of Perišić’s decision was
inserted in the box labelled “name and address of the receiver” in Ex. P582, as well as Exs P579
and P581.2903
1022. With regard to Exs P579 and P581, the Trial Chamber notes that both forms bear the
signature of an individual named \or|e Cetkovi}, whose ID was issued by the Zvornik Secretariat
of Interior. 2904 Given that the same person signed for the receipt of a form that was explicitly
addressed to the VRS,2905 the Trial Chamber considers it established that the receiver was the VRS.
2896
2897
2898
2899
2900
2901
2902
2903
2904
2905
Ex. P576, Matériel List, 23 November 1993 (the translated document misses the quantity of 192 howitzer rounds
present in the original); MP-14, T. 3570-3571. The military post number for the Drina Corps was 7111, MP-14,
T. 3534 (closed session).
Ex. P576, Matériel List, 23 November 1993; MP-14, T. 3570-3571. Han Pijesak was a location in RS where a
VRS base as well as the VRS Main Staff headquarters were situated, Milenko Jev|ević, T. 11067; MP-14,
T. 3548.
Jugoslav Kodžopeljić, T. 12364.
MP-14, T. 3570-3571, commenting on Ex. P576, Matériel List, 23 November 1993.
Jugoslav Kodžopeljić, T. 12382; Ex. P582, Matériel List, 24 November 1993 (the English translation of the form
features an erroneous date at its top right, although the original BCS indicates the receipt date as 19 November
1993).
Ex. P582, Matériel List, 24 November 1993; MP-14, T. 3560, 3579-3582. See also Ex. P573, Matériel List, 23
November 1993.
Ex. P582, Matériel List, 24 November 1993. See also Jugoslav Kodžopeljić, T. 12376, 12380.
Ex. P582, Matériel List, 24 November 1993; Ex. P579, Matériel List, 22 November 1993; Ex. P581, Matériel
List, 22 November 1993 (the English translation of the form features an erroneous date at its top right, T. 12377).
Ex. P579, Matériel List, 22 November 1993 (the English version of the form records the recipient as illegible,
upon examination of the original, however, the Trial Chamber is satisfied that the recipient is the same as in
Ex. P581); Ex. P581, Matériel List, 22 November 1993; MP-14, T. 3574-3575, 3577. The parties agreed that a
signature is present on the original document but not the copy examined in court. See Jugoslav Kodžopeljić,
T. 12481.
Ex. P575, Matériel List, 23 November 1993; MP-14, T. 3570, 3574-3575, 3577.
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Kodžopeljić’s assertion that “there is no indication of the recipient” is therefore misleading.2906 The
Trial Chamber further notes that Ex. P571, a delivery sheet where the VRS is explicitly labelled as
the recipient, refers to a similar “confidential” order from Perišić, numbered “674-81” and dated
“12.11.93”.2907
1023. Thus, the Trial Chamber considers that Kodžopeljić’s answers evince a lack of objectivity
by depicting material delivery forms as far less intelligible than they actually are.
1024. The Trial Chamber’s analysis of the material delivery forms indicates that multiple forms
feature several boxes left unfilled. For instance, on certain forms, the box for “quantity requestedapproved” is filled in but the box for “quantity issued-received” is left blank,2908 or vice versa.2909 In
this regard, the Trial Chamber considers that the relevant box is the box that has been filled in.
Similarly, the box for “category and year of production” has been left blank on numerous forms.2910
The Trial Chamber does not find such omissions material so long as the form identifies the items
supplied, their quantity, the sender, the recipient, and the date of conveyance or receipt.
1025. The Trial Chamber notes that various forms are not stamped by both the sender and the
recipient; and some also feature boxes that have not been filled in with information indicating the
identity of the VJ member who approved the delivery, although a separate control signature may
have been appended.2911 Relying on Kodžopeljić, the Defence claims that it is consequently
impossible to determine if these deliveries occurred and were legitimate.2912 The Trial Chamber
considers that a sending stamp or signature raises a presumption of delivery. The FRY-RS border
was porous and the VJ could easily send large quantities of weaponry to the VRS with minimal risk
that any weapons would be intercepted by international border monitors.2913 The Trial Chamber
considers as well that a receipt stamp or signature by VRS or RS authorities establishes that
equipment was sent in the first place.
2906
2907
2908
2909
2910
2911
2912
2913
Jugoslav Kodžopeljić, T. 12376-12377, commenting on Ex. P581, Matériel List, 22 November 1993.
Ex. P571, Matériel List, 23 November 1993. See also Ex. P575, Matériel List, 23 November 1993. The same
analysis is applicable to Ex. P579, Matériel List, 22 November 1993. Ex. P579 also refers to the sender as
“Military Post 98080-06-302”, which MP-14 explained was the number military post in Lunjevića, Serbia, MP14, T. 3573-3574 (closed session).
See e.g. Ex. P577, Matériel List, 23 November 1993; MP-14, T. 3571-3572.
See e.g. Ex. P595 Matériel List, 1 October 1995.
See e.g. Ex. P576, Matériel List, 23 November 1993; Ex. P580, Matériel List, 24 November 1993; Ex. P584,
Matériel List, 25 November 1993.
See e.g. Ex. P575, Matériel List, 23 November 1993 (signature in sender box labelled “manager”, sending stamp
for Military Post 5292 Kraljevo, Serbia, and receipt signature); Ex. P576, Matériel List, 23 November 1993
(signature in sender’s “checked by” box but no information in sender boxes “ordered by” or “manager” and no
sender stamp; receipt signature and stamp for VRS Military Post 7111, Han Pijesak, RS).
Defence Final Brief, paras 661-673.
See supra section VI.B.3. See also infra section VI.C.2.(c).
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1026. The Defence contends that the presence of blank boxes on the material forms otherwise
renders the forms unreliable.2914 The Trial Chamber finds that the mere fact that some boxes were
left blank on a delivery form featuring multiple boxes does not raise a reasonable doubt as to the
reliability of the forms. The Trial Chamber notes that MP-14 acknowledged that most material
delivery forms were “incomplete”, but credibly explained that, in times of war, it was “practically
impossible” to follow all rules and regulations regarding paperwork, partly because there was
insufficient manpower to do so.2915 MP-14 further explained that the presence of certain blank
boxes on a form did not render transactions unfeasible or signify that they were unauthorised.2916
1027. Overall, the Defence endorses Kodžopelji}’s testimony.2917 However, for all of the aforesaid
reasons, the Trial Chamber finds Kod`opeljić to have minimal credibility. The Chamber
additionally notes that Kodžopeljić was not credible in claiming that he essentially did not know the
VJ’s 30th PC’s functions or why the 30th PC was listed as the recipient on certain material delivery
lists, despite having been the Chief of Technical Administration for the VJ General Staff’s logistics
sector from 1993 until 1999.2918 It is well established that some weaponry was technically sent to
the VRS and SVK via the Personnel Centres.2919 Kodžopeljić also was not credible in his claim that
all VJ supplies to the VRS were paid for.2920
1028. The Trial Chamber is mindful, however, that a number of supplies were delivered by VJ
members to the VRS outside of the official procurement procedure devised by Perišić. As
previously discussed,2921 Perišić ordered in December 1993 that all requests for logistical assistance
be processed through the VJ General Staff with his approval.2922 Perišić decided to institute
disciplinary proceedings against certain VJ commanders who gave military supplies directly to the
VRS and SVK without authorisation.2923 The Trial Chamber also recalls that Mladić ordered all
VRS units to involve the VRS Main Staff in the official procurement of material from the VJ,
2914
2915
2916
2917
2918
2919
2920
2921
2922
2923
Defence Final Brief, paras 661-673.
MP-14, T. 3697-3699 (closed session).
MP-14, T. 3707-3708.
Defence Final Brief, paras 648-677.
Jugoslav Kodžopeljić, T. 12314, 12473-12477.
See Ex. P1009, Order of FRY President, 18 February 1994 (ordering that the VJ General Staff provide certain
military supplies to the VRS and SVK via the 30th and 40th PC); Ex. P628, Orders from Momčilo Perišić
Regarding Procurement Procedure, 17 August 1994; Stamenko Nikolić, T. 10630-10632; Petar [krbić, T. 11944;
Miodrag Simić, T. 10192.
Jugoslav Kodžopeljić, T. 12503, 12516-12518. See infra section VI.C.7.
See supra section VI.B.3.
Ex. P1258, VJ General Staff Order, 27 December 1993.
Ex. P628, Orders from Momčilo Perišić Regarding Procurement Procedure, 17 August 1994.
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pursuant to an agreement reached with Perišić.2924 Mladić stressed that violators would face
disciplinary action.2925
1029. In light of the occurrence of unauthorised logistical assistance, the Trial Chamber has
decided to rely on material delivery forms and reports that either mention Perišić’s approval or
indicate that supplies were sent by the VJ General Staff itself, as opposed to merely the VJ
generally. The Trial Chamber has also decided to rely on documents indicating the involvement of
the VRS Main Staff in transactions with the VJ.
1030. For these reasons, the Trial Chamber has chosen not to rely on a material list simply
stipulating that a VJ military facility in Paracin, Serbia, delivered to the Drina Corps Command a
certain quantity of ammunition.2926 The same problem applies to a form stating that the “VJ”
delivered ammunition to the Drina Corps Command.2927 Other documents also merely indicate that
the Drina Corps Command received weaponry from “Batajnica”,2928 as well as from “Kragujevac”
without specifying that Perišić, the VJ General Staff or VRS Main Staff were involved.2929 This
information is also lacking in a report stating that, between 1 January and 31 December 1995, the
VRS received various weapons from the VJ.2930
1031. Finally, the Defence notably argues that, aside from delivery forms, “[r]equests for
assistance do not prove that assistance was given”.2931 The Trial Chamber agrees with the Defence
that mere requests cannot be assumed to have been fulfilled and cannot be counted as logistical
assistance.2932 That being noted, certain simple requests are otherwise instructive insofar as they
2924
2925
2926
2927
2928
2929
2930
2931
2932
Ex. P1245, Drina Corps Command Internal Memo, 24 October 1993; Ex. P1802, Order by VRS Commander,
19 July 1995.
Ibid.
Ex. P573, Matériel List, 20 November 1993; MP-14, T. 3560 (partly private session).
Ex. P592, Matériel List, 16 December 1993; MP-14, T. 3605.
Ex. P580, Matériel List, 24 November 1993; MP-14, T. 3575-3576.
Ex. P586, Matériel List, 21 December 1993. Ex. P586 is different from Ex. P593, where the sender is identified
as the “Kragujevac TRZ / Maintenance and Repairs Depot”, an institution that was under VJ General Staff
oversight, Ex. P593, Matériel List, 20 December 1993; Jugoslav Kodžopeljić, T. 12313-12314, 12414-12415,
12494; Siniša Borović, T. 13888. See also MP-14, T. 3607-3609, 3670-3671.
Ex. P1222, Analysis of Technical Support for the VRS in 1995, p. 6. The Trial Chamber likewise did not take
into account Ex. P596, as this receipt sheet is undated and therefore may fall outside the indictment period. See
Ex. P596, Matériel List, undated.
Defence Final Brief, para. 638.
See e.g. Ex. P979, Ilidža Infantry Brigade Command Request for Ammunition, 1 July 1995 (mere request for
ammunition); Ex. P2711, Request from Ratko Mladić to VJ General Staff, 10 October 1995 (mere request for
ammunition and fuel); Ex. P2712, Request from Ratko Mladić to VJ General Staff, 12 October 1995 (mere
request for modification of launching device for rockets); Ex. P2767, Request from Mladi} to the Chief of VJ
General Staff for Special Artillery Ammunition, 3 January 1994, 3 January 1994 (mere request for ammunition).
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contain statements from VRS personnel commenting on their low state of ammunition reserves or
their dependence on VJ assistance.2933
1032. The Defence goes further in claiming that exhibits reflecting approved requests cannot be
considered as proof of assistance unless separate evidence indicates that the assistance was later
delivered.2934 The Trial Chamber disagrees and finds that such exhibits indicating an agreement to
deliver supplies or provide training cannot be treated as mere requests, but rather provide a
reasonable basis to conclude that the delivery or training was later effectuated.2935 These exhibits
must be analysed in the context of the evidence adduced at trial. The Trial Chamber recalls that a
comprehensive logistical assistance system was in place and that the FRY-RS border was porous,
thereby enabling logistical assistance to be regularly delivered without difficulty.2936
1033. The Trial Chamber has considered the Defence’s remaining challenges on this issue and
finds them unsubstantiated. In particular, the Defence contends that the Trial Chamber cannot
consider Ex. P571 and P575 because they respectively concern mines and grenades sent to the VRS
by the Mrsać-Kraljevo facility, which was “not under the authority of the VJ G[”, Perišić therefore
2933
2934
2935
2936
See e.g. Ex. P1260, SRK Request to the VJ General Staff Regarding Ammunition and Weapons, 3 May 1995
(mentioning shortage of ammunition and urgent need for assistance); Ex. P2739, Request from Ratko Mladić to
VJ General Staff, 3 September 1995, p. 2 (same); Ex. P2724, Request from Ratko Mladić to Momčilo Perišić for
Ammunition and Rockets, 14 June 1995 (emphasising need for assistance).
Defence Final Brief, para. 641, citing, inter alia, Ex. P621, Approval by the Engineering Administration of the
Land Forces of the VJ General Staff Addressed to Military Post 9808, 11 March 1994; P622, Approval by the
Engineering Administration of the Land Forces of the VJ General Staff Addressed to Military Post 9808, 16 May
1995; P623, Approval by the Engineering Administration of the Land Forces of the VJ General Staff Addressed
to Military Post 9808, 15 May 1995.
See e.g. Ex. P621, Approval by the Engineering Administration of the Land Forces of the VJ General Staff
Addressed to Military Post 9808, 11 March 1994 (VJ General Staff Engineering Administration “approves”
rocket devices for VRS); Ex. P622, Approval by the Engineering Administration of the Land Forces of the VJ
General Staff Addressed to Military Post 9808, 16 May 1995 (same); Ex. P623, Approval by the Engineering
Administration of the Land Forces of the VJ General Staff Addressed to Military Post 9808, 15 May 1995
(pursuant to Perišić’s approval to “handover” mines and explosives); Ex. P876, Order of the VJ General Staff on
the Issuance of Materiel, 10 May 1994 (VJ General Staff orders fuel for the “needs” of VRS General Milan
Gvero); Ex. P877, Command of 608th Logistical Base of GS VJ Decision Signed by Periši}, 28 December 1993
(Perišić order to “cede” several hundred thousand rounds of ammunition, inter alia); Ex. P1252, Correspondence
Between VJ General Staff and VRS Command Regarding Ammunition Supply, 7 October 1995 (VJ General
Staff made rockets available for pick-up by VRS); Ex. P1255, VJ General Staff Internal Memo Regarding VRS
Request for Assistance, 28 June 1995 (Perišić order to deliver rocket engines); Ex. P1257, Order From Military
Post 2082 to Military Post 1092 Regarding Arms Supply to the 30th PC, 27 February 1995 (fuses for howitzer
cannons approved by Perišić); Ex. P1261, VJ Order Regarding Supply of Ammunition to VRS, 10 December
1993 (12,000 rounds approved by Perišić); Ex. P1262, VJ Order Regarding Supply of Ammunition to VRS, 17
December 1993 (over a million rounds approved by Perišić); Ex. P2719, Documents Relating to a Request from
Ratko Mladić to Perišić Regarding Provision of Sniper Training, May-July 1995 (Perišić’s Cabinet approved
request that VJ officers continue training VRS staff); Ex. P2721, Documents Relating to a Request from Ratko
Mladić to Perišić Regarding Provision of Sniper Training, May-July 1995 (VJ General Staff approved request
for sniper training, see Radojica Kadijević, T. 13719-13722).
See supra para. 961. See also infra section VI.C.2.(c).
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having “no responsibility for this material”.2937 Yet, both exhibits explicitly state that the transaction
was conducted pursuant to an order by Perišić.2938
(b) Deliveries Conducted Between August 1993 and August 1994
1034. The Trial Chamber will now consider the material delivery forms and other evidence that it
finds reliable and relevant to the allegations against Momčilo Perišić based on the analytical method
described above. The Trial Chamber will initially describe evidence of deliveries conducted
between 26 August 1993, when Momčilo Perišić became Chief of VJ General Staff, and August
1994, when the FRY officially imposed sanctions on RS.
1035. On 12 November 1993, the VJ General Staff ordered that the VRS be supplied with over
800,000 bullets, 2,000 “rifle grenades” and 50 rocket launchers, all “free of charge”.2939 The Drina
Corps was the intended recipient of 800,000 bullets from this order.2940 Evidence further indicates
that, on 22 November 1993, the VJ General Staff delivered to the Drina Corps 30,000 rounds for
browning machine guns and 50 anti-artillery rockets;2941 as well as 5,400 rounds for 7.9mm M75
sniper-rifles and 60,016 universal 7.62mm rounds.2942
1036. Numerous deliveries were effectuated on 22 and 23 November 1993. Three were conducted
pursuant to “strictly confidential” orders from Perišić.2943 One order concerned 30,000 rounds for
browning firearms and 50 rockets,2944 while the others concerned 60 mines2945 and 2,000
grenades.2946 In addition, three separate delivery sheets indicate that the VJ General Staff sent the
Drina Corps 300 mortar shells,2947 800,100 rounds,2948 296 self-propelled gun rounds and 192
howitzer rounds.2949
2937
2938
2939
2940
2941
2942
2943
2944
2945
2946
2947
Defence Final Brief, paras 718-719, citing Ex. P571, Matériel List, 23 November 1993; Ex. P575, Matériel List,
23 November 1993).
Ex. P571, Matériel List, 23 November 1993; Ex. P575, Matériel List, 23 November 1993.
Ex. P1269, VJ Order Regarding Supply of Ammunition to VRS, 19 November 1993.
Ex. P1512, Authorisation by the Drina Corps Command, 22 November 1993 (the Drina Corps were authorised to
pick up 800,000 7.9mm bullets in accordance with a VJ General Staff decision featuring the same order number
as Ex. P1269).
Ex. P572, Matériel List, 22 November 1993 (The translated document reads 1,936 rockets, although the original
reads 50); MP-14, T. 3558-3559.
Ex. P574, Matériel List, 22 November 1993; MP-14, T. 3563-3565. Another form bearing the same date refers to
identical quantities of the same kind of ammunition, and refers to a “strictly confidential” order from Perišić, and
contains a sending stamp by the VJ’s base at Lunjevica. See Ex. P579, Matériel List, 22 November 1993 (the
translated form features an erroneous date at its top right; boxes 40-41 of the translated form should also be
blank as in the original); Jugoslav Kodžopeljić, T. 12369; MP-14, T. 3573-3574.
Ex. P571, Matériel List, 23 November 1993; Ex. P575, Matériel List, 23 November 1993; Ex. P581, Matériel
List, 22 November 1993.
Ex. P581, Matériel List, 22 November 1993 (the translated form features an erroneous date at its top right,
although the original indicates the receipt date as 22 November 1993). See MP-14, T. 3578.
Ex. P571, Matériel List, 23 November 1993; MP-14, T. 3556-3557.
Ex. P575, Matériel List, 23 November 1993; MP-14, T. 3568-3570.
Ex. P577, Matériel List, 23 November 1993; MP-14, T. 3571-3572.
325
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1037. On 24 November 1993, another “strictly confidential” order from Perišić led the Drina
Corps to obtain 150,000 machine gun heavy rounds, 500 rockets, 960 hand grenades and 30
“modified” hand grenades.2950 On 25 November 1993, the VJ General Staff delivered to the Drina
Corps over two million bullets and 1,727 mortar shells,2951 a large delivery requiring multiple
truckloads;2952 as well as a separate delivery of 3,269 mortar rounds and 148 shells.2953
1038. Multiple deliveries were likewise conducted in December 1993. Perišic personally issued a
“strictly confidential” order stating: “For the needs of re-supply, the following weapons and
military equipment shall be ceded to VRS”.2954 The order went on to list: 721,250 rounds, 2,000
76mm cases, 27,130 grenades, 900 shells, 50 mines, 100 rockets, 85 Osa rocket launchers, 300
charges for rocket launchers, 3,000 basic charges and 350 fuses.2955 Perišić also coordinated the
VRS’s procurement of 1,525,600 rounds and 20,192 rockets,2956 as well as other orders of 12,000
bullets,2957 70,200 rounds and 600kg of hydraulic oil.2958 Pursuant to an order from the VJ General
Staff, the VRS received another 61,460 bullets.2959 The VRS additionally received at least 170
artillery rounds for D20 Howitzers and 130mm guns from the Kragujevac Technical Overhaul
Company (TRZ),2960 whose function was to repair and refill ammunition.2961 The Defence claims
that the Kragujevac TRZ was not under VJ General Staff oversight,2962 an incorrect assertion
contradicted by two of its own witnesses.2963 An order from Perišić ceding military supplies to the
2948
2949
2950
2951
2952
2953
2954
2955
2956
2957
2958
2959
2960
2961
2962
2963
Ex. P578, Matériel List, 23 November 1993; MP-14, T. 3572-3573, 3709.
Ex. P576, Matériel List, 23 November 1993 (the translated document misses the quantity of 192 howitzer rounds
present in the original); MP-14, T. 3570-3571.
Ex. P582, Matériel List, 24 November 1993; MP-14, T. 3579-3580.
Ex. P583, Matériel List, 25 November 1993; MP-14, T. 3588-3589.
MP-14, T. 3588.
Ex. P584, Matériel List, 25 November 1993; MP-14, T. 3589.
Ex. P877, Command of 608th Logistical Base of the VJ General Staff Decision Signed by Periši}, 28 December
1993.
Ibid.
Ex. P1262, VJ Order Regarding Supply of Ammunition to VRS, 17 December 1993.
Ex. P1261, VJ Order Regarding Supply of Ammunition to VRS, 10 December 1993.
Ex. P1263, VJ Order Regarding Supply of Ammunition to VRS, 23 December 1993.
Ex. P591, Matériel List, 14 December 1993; MP-14, T. 3602-3604.
Ex. P593, Matériel List, 20 December 1993. See MP-14, T. 3607-3609, 3670-3671.
Ex. P505, Transcript of Nikola To{ovi} Deposition, 13 December 2008, T. 41-43; Ex. P509, Procurement Plan
(Survey of Incoming Material By Partner), 1 January – 31 December 1994, p. 1; MP-14 (closed session),
T. 3534; Jugoslav Kodžopeljić, T. 12416.
Defence Final Brief, para. 718.
Jugoslav Kodžopeljić, T. 12313-12314, 12494; Siniša Borović, T. 13888. Immediately after asserting that the
“TRZ Kragujevac” was not under VJ GŠ authority, the Defence’s Brief incongruously states that the Kragujevac
“repair institute” was under Kodžopeljić’s VJ General Staff administration, Defence Final Brief, paras 718, 720.
The Trial Chamber notes that the Kragujevac “TRZ”, “institute” or “depot” is the same “repair” or “overhaul”
entity. See Jugoslav Kodžopeljić, T. 12406-12408, 12415-12416; MP-14, T. 3534, 3719 (closed session); Siniša
Borović, T. 13888; Petar Škrbić, T. 11943; Ex. P505, Transcript of Nikola To{ovi} Deposition, 13 December
2008, T. 41-43; Ex. P593, Matériel List, 20 December 1993.
326
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VRS confirms that Perišić evidently had the authority to issue orders to the Kragujevac TRZ: “The
responsibility for transfers of supplies is assigned to Technical Repair Facility Kragujevac”.2964
1039. Mladić and Perišić discussed logistical assistance matters on 27 December 1993 in
Belgrade.2965 Mladić wrote in his diary that a request for supplies of steel, fuses and TNT had been
“resolved”.2966
1040. On 13 January 1994, the Krajina Corps officially notified the VRS Main Staff that the VJ
had supplied it with 428 semi-automatic rifles, 286 automatic rifles, 101 rifles, 33 sub-machine
guns, 6 sniper rifles, 10 semi-automatic pistols, 4 pistols, 18 rocket launchers, 1 howitzer, 15
telephones and 2 radio sets.2967 Given that Mladić ordered that VRS units who engaged in
unauthorised procurement would face disciplinary measures, in accordance with Perišić’s
directives;2968 the only reasonable inference is that the Krajina Corps was referring to officiallyapproved assistance when it informed the VRS Main Staff that it had obtained these supplies from
the VJ.
1041. On 15 January 1994, Mladić wrote to Perišić, asking the VJ General Staff to dispatch to the
VRS a team of experts, which had previously been used to develop 262 mm “Orkan” rockets, so
that it could dismantle components from Orkan rockets located in Knin and subsequently re-mount
them on missiles at the Military Technical Institute,2969 even though it was subordinated to the FRY
MOD.2970 Four days later, Perišić wrote a letter, coded “very urgent” and “highly confidential”, to
the SVK Main Staff, stating: “A work team is dispatched, led by Col Radomir EĆIMOVIĆ, in order
to implement the agreement you made with Lt Col Gen MLADIĆ, which relates to dismantling 4
barrels of the 262mm ‘Orkan’ SVLR/self-propelled multiple rocket launcher/. Please enable the
work group to carry out the task”.2971
1042. On 17 February 1994, the VJ made an arrangement to “loan” 42.72 tonnes of TNT to the
VRS pursuant to an official transaction with the RS MOD.2972
2964
2965
2966
2967
2968
2969
2970
2971
2972
Ex. P877, Command of 608th Logistical Base of the VJ General Staff Decision Signed by Periši}, 28 December
1993, p. 2.
Ex. P2935, Excerpt from Ratko Mladi}'s Notebook, 27 December 1993.
Ibid.
Ex. P1232, Cable from 1st Krajina Corps Command to the VRS Main Staff, 13 January 1994.
Ex. P1245, Drina Corps Command Internal Memo, 24 October 1993, p. 2; Ex. P1802, Order by VRS
Commander, 19 July 1995.
Ex. P1818, Request from Ratko Mladić to Momčilo Perišić, 15 January 1994.
Radojica Kadijević, T. 13611.
Ex. P1138, Correspondence Between Chief of the VJ General Staff and the SVK Main Staff, 19 January 1994.
Ex. P1201, Contract on Loan Between the Military Post Office 8634-4 Belgrade and the RS MOD, 17 February
1994, p. 1.
327
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1043. On 31 March 1994, the VJ General Staff supplied the VRS with 1,181,491 rounds of
different types,2973 followed by 5,000 rounds for anti-aircraft guns pursuant to Perišić’s decision.2974
1044. On 18 April 1994, Perišić called supplies to a halt: “I hereby forbid (until further notice) the
issuance of the NVO / weapons and military equipment / to the armies of the RS and RSK (30th and
40th KC / Personnel Centre/)”.2975 Nevertheless, deliveries of weaponry to the VRS resumed shortly
thereafter, as indicated by multiple subsequent SDC meetings where logistical assistance continued
to be agreed upon with Perišić’s encouragement,2976 as well as by the continuing flow of logistical
assistance.
1045. On 22 May 1994, the VJ General Staff provided 3,353,000 bullets and 1,400 shells to the
VRS.2977 Following Perišić’s orders, subsequent deliveries included 200,000 bullets,2978 21,850
bullets and 64 rockets,2979 and another 2,900 bullets.2980
1046. On 11 July 1994, the VRS Krajina Corps officially informed the VRS Main Staff that it had
received from the VJ a total of 2,598,100 bullets for 7.62mm automatic rifles, 6,300 bullets for
7.62mm pistols, and 966 mines.2981 Again, because Mladić ordered that VRS units who engaged in
unauthorised procurement would face disciplinary measures, in accordance with Perišić’s
directives;2982 the only reasonable inference is that the Krajina Corps was referring to officiallyapproved assistance when it informed the VRS Main Staff that it had obtained these supplies from
the VJ.
1047. In 1994 as a whole, the VRS Main Staff estimated that it had obtained from the VJ
approximately 25,878,862 infantry bullets and 7,569 shells, among other ammunition.2983
2973
2974
2975
2976
2977
2978
2979
2980
2981
2982
2983
Ex. P1270, VJ Order Regarding Supply of Ammunition to 30th PC, 31 March 1994.
Ex. P1265, VJ Order Regarding Supply of Ammunition to 30th PC, 14 April 1994.
Ex. P1008, Order from Perišić Sent to the Heads of VJ Services Regarding Issuing of Weapons and Military
Equipment, 18 April 1994.
See supra section VI.B.4.
Ex. P1272, VJ Order Regarding Supply of Ammunition to 30th PC, 22 May 1994.
Ex. P1271, VJ Order Regarding Supply of Ammunition to 30th PC, 3 June 1994.
Ex. P1266, VJ Order Regarding Supply of Ammunition to 30th PC, 1 July 1994.
Ex. P1267, VJ Order Regarding Supply of Ammunition to 30th PC, 11 July 1994.
Ex. P1213, Correspondence Between the 1st Krajina Corps Command and the VRS Main Staff Regarding
Reception of Military Equipment, 11 July 1994, p. 3.
Ex. P1245, Drina Corps Command Internal Memo, 24 October 1993, p. 2; Ex. P1802, Order by VRS
Commander, 19 July 1995
Ex. P1214, Annual Financial Statement of the Plan of Tasks and Financing of the VRS for 1994, 17 February
1995, pp 19-21.
328
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(c) Deliveries Conducted Between August 1994 and December 1995 during the Period of
Sanctions Imposed by the FRY on Republika Srpska
1048. The flow of military supplies from the VJ General Staff to the VRS continued after August
1994, notwithstanding the FRY’s decision to officially seal its border with RS except for medical
equipment and other humanitarian supplies,2984 as part of its sanctions on RS for having refused to
accept a proposed peace plan.2985 The FRY’s nominal prohibition on the delivery of military
materiel to the VRS essentially lasted until the end of the war in BiH.2986
1049. On 25 August 1995, approximately a year after the imposition of the sanctions, a meeting of
the FRY and RS leadership was convened, bringing together, among others, Momčilo Perišić,
Slobodan Milošević, Zoran Lilić, Ratko Mladić, Radovan Karadžić and the Serbian Orthodox
Church’s top representatives.2987 The transcript of the meeting reads: “Bishop Irinej advocated the
tacit lifting of the Drina River blockade. President Milošević responded that the blockade was
merely a formality and that aid flows daily”.2988
1050. Milošević admitted in 2001 that the FRY had secretly provided significant military
assistance to the VRS during the war.2989 Milošević denied having used any state funds for his
personal gain or that of others, instead insisting that the state funds were used “for the survival of
the country during a total embargo and war across the Drina river, in which we helped our people
with all the resources we had at our disposal”.2990 Milošević specifically mentioned the FRY’s
logistical assistance to the VRS and SVK:
these expenditures constituted a state secret and because of state interests could not be indicated in
the Law on the Budget, which is a public document. The same applies to the expenditures incurred
by providing equipment, from a needle to an anchor, for the security forces and special antiterrorist forces in particular, from light weapons and equipment to helicopters and other weapons
which still remain where they are today, and this was not made public because it was a state
secret, as was everything else that was provided for the Army of Republika Srpska.2991
1051. Milošević emphasised:
2984
2985
2986
2987
2988
2989
2990
2991
Ex. P2372, Transcript of Michael Charles Williams from Prosecutor v. S. Milošević, 24 June 2003, T. 22957;
Michael Williams, T. 6463-6464; MP-14, T. 3528-3529 (closed session); Charles Kirudja, T. 2827-2828.
See generally Miodrag Simi}, T. 10182-10183; Petar Škrbić, T. 11938; Ex. P222, Press Article Published in
Borba, 5 August 1994.
See generally Petar Škrbić, T. 11947.
Ex. P230, Transcript of Meeting of FRY and RS Leadership, 25 August 1995.
Ex. P230, Transcript of Meeting of FRY and RS Leadership, 25 August 1995, p. 11.
Ex. P322, Appeal and Statement of Reasons by Slobodan Milo{evi} to the Investigating Judge of the District
Court in Belgrade, 2 April 2001, pp 2-3.
Ex. P322, Appeal and Statement of Reasons by Slobodan Milo{evi} to the Investigating Judge of the District
Court in Belgrade, 2 April 2001, pp 1-2 (emphasis added).
Ex. P322, Appeal and Statement of Reasons by Slobodan Milo{evi} to the Investigating Judge of the District
Court in Belgrade, 2 April 2001, p. 2 (emphasis added).
329
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As to the exceptional amount of material gain quoted as a reason for custody, the question arises:
for whom? For the Army of Republika Srpska, the security organs, the Army of the Republic of
Serbian Krajina, to help the people across the Drina river, the textile and metal workers and others
financed through Beogradska Banka in the most difficult social situation and during a total
external blockade.2992
1052. According to Michael Williams, who served as Director of Information for UNPROFOR
from February 1994 until April 1995 and saw all classified reports in the UN’s possession,2993 the
RS-FRY border was difficult to monitor, partly due to the nature of the terrain and the length of the
border.2994 While Milošević was reluctant to have monitors at the border, he eventually agreed to do
so in mid-September 1994 at the request of UN officials.2995 However, “the international
community was given grossly inadequate [resources]” to monitor the 300-mile border.2996 The
monitoring body consisted of a small force lacking access to the information and intelligence in
NATO’s possession.2997 The UN military command deemed that closely monitoring the border was
impossible.2998 Milošević nonetheless gave repeated assurances that the border was completely
sealed, and that only food, clothes and medicine would be permitted passage.2999
1053. A report from the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference
on the Former Yugoslavia, dated 18 May 1995, concluded that the FRY government was meeting
its commitment to close the border.3000 FRY Customs had reported confiscating various goods at the
RS border, such as petrol, diesel, cigarettes and food, although no ammunition or weapons were
reportedly confiscated.3001 These goods were contraband transported by smugglers, not VRS or VJ
personnel.3002 Smugglers regularly managed to cross the border in certain areas that were
negligently monitored by FRY Customs in spite of repeated complaints by UN officials.3003
Unarmed uniformed personnel were improperly allowed to cross the border on at least 688
occasions, while uniformed policemen were allowed to cross carrying a sidearm on at least seven
2992
2993
2994
2995
2996
2997
2998
2999
3000
3001
3002
3003
Ex. P322, Appeal and Statement of Reasons by Slobodan Milo{evi} to the Investigating Judge of the District
Court in Belgrade, 2 April 2001, p. 3.
Ex. P2372, Transcript of Michael Charles Williams from Prosecutor v. S. Milošević, 24 June 2003, T. 2289322894.
Michael Williams, T. 6411.
Ex. P2372, Transcript of Michael Charles Williams from Prosecutor v. S. Milošević, 24 June 2003, T. 2295722958; Michael Williams, T. 6411-6412.
Michael Williams, T. 6412. See Ex. P2372, Transcript of Michael Charles Williams from Prosecutor v. S.
Milošević, 24 June 2003, T. 22958-22959.
Ex. P2372, Transcript of Michael Charles Williams from Prosecutor v. S. Milošević, 24 June 2003, T. 22959.
Ibid.
Ex. P2372, Transcript of Michael Charles Williams from Prosecutor v. S. Milošević, 24 June 2003, T. 2295922961.
Ex. D156, Letter from the UN Secretary-General to the President of the UNSC, 25 June 1995, p. 2. The report
was cited in a letter from the UN Secretary-General to the President of the UNSC.
Ex. D156, Letter from the UN Secretary-General to the President of the UNSC, 25 June 1995, p. 3.
Ex. D156, Letter from the UN Secretary-General to the President of the UNSC, 25 June 1995, pp 6-10.
Ibid.
330
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occasions, and several uniformed personnel and military vehicles were barred from crossing the
border on at least one occasion.3004
1054. Despite that report, Williams observed that the overall military capabilities of the VRS
increased in 1994 and 1995 due to FRY assistance.3005 He opined that, while there had been a
“political break” between the FRY and RS, the sanctions had not fundamentally altered the “close
ties” between the VJ and VRS – both stemmed from the JNA and officers shared a sense of
“intimacy” from having taken the same courses and worked at the same bases.3006
1055. Charles Kirudja, the Chief of Civil Affairs for the UN Mission in Belgrade,3007 likewise
concluded that “most core officers of the [VJ] ha[d] never really fallen in line with [Milošević]
about the closing of the border and the isolation of their ‘brothers on the Drina’”.3008 A report by
Colonel Bogojević of the VRS’s 1st Krajina Corps corroborated this conclusion:
After the unilateral suspension of the political and economic relations of the [FRY] with the RS,
we have registered frequent rumours and misinformation on an alleged suspension of relations of
the VJ with the VRS ₣...ğ On the contrary, the relations between the VRS and VJ are still correct
and have not been upset by the suspension of political and economic relations of the SRJ with the
RS. There has not been a single case of calling of professional soldiers or NCOs in the VRS back
to the VJ. Also, the intensified measures of control of the interstate border (on border crossings)
were taken by organs of the MUP and Customs Service of the RS, but not of the VJ.3009
Bogojević went on to note that the VRS’s cooperation with the VJ had actually “improved” since
the sanctions.3010 Similarly, UN military intelligence indicated that helicopter flights from the FRY
to RS increased following the sanctions.3011
1056. In his report to the RS National Assembly, Mladić stated that supplies of weaponry almost
ended after the sanctions were imposed: “[E]ver since [August 1994] it has been very difficult,
supplies have almost dried up”.3012 Yet, the trial record demonstrates that the VJ General Staff
3004
3005
3006
3007
3008
3009
3010
3011
3012
Ex. D156, Letter from the UN Secretary-General to the President of the UNSC, 25 June 1995, p. 8.
Michael Williams, T. 6463-6464.
Michael Williams, T. 6468-6469. See also Michael Williams, T. 6411.
Charles Kirudja, T. 2796-2797.
Ex. P473, Code Cable from Charles Kirudja to Akashi, 16 February 1995, p. 2.
Ex. P2819, 1st Krajina Corps Command Document on Status of VJ-VRS Relations, 12 August 1994, p. 1.
Ex. P2819, 1st Krajina Corps Command Document on Status of VJ-VRS Relations, 12 August 1994.
Michael Williams, T. 6403; Ex. P2372, Transcript of Michael Charles Williams from Prosecutor v. S. Milošević,
24 June 2003, T. 22961. See also on issue of helicopter flights, Charles Kirudja, T. 2827, 2830-2832, 2835,
2843; Ex. P472, Code Cable from Charles Kirudja to Akashi, 13 February 1995, paras 6-9; Ex. P473, Code
Cable from Charles Kirudja to Akashi, 16 February 1995, pp 1, 3-4; Ex. D101, Letter from Dragomir Djokic to
the President of the UNSC Regarding March 1995 Flights across FRY and BiH, 11 April 1995.
Ex. P312, Transcript of the Tape Recording of the 50th Session of the National Assembly, 15 and 16 April 1995,
p. 51.
331
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continued to surreptitiously deliver significant quantities of weaponry to the VRS throughout the
sanctions period, although this assistance was a FRY “state secret”.3013
1057. MP-14 testified that he witnessed that the VRS continued to receive significant logistical
assistance from the VJ during the sanctions period, albeit in far lower volumes, as ammunition and
weapons were transported without documentation and “in secret” through a forest road without a
border checkpoint.3014 As stated above,3015 Milomir Kovačević, who worked as a truck driver for
the Serbian MUP during the sanctions period, likewise testified that the VJ continued to deliver
military supplies to the VRS by surreptitiously transporting cargo across the FRY-RS border in
order to avoid monitors.3016
1058. Additionally, Milan Babić testified that the VRS was obtaining clandestine assistance from
the VJ.3017 He explained that the sanctions could be circumvented and that they were only a
pretence.3018
1059. Even though the VRS’s situation was partly worsened by the FRY’s “economic blockade”
on RS,3019 the VJ largely maintained its regular delivery of military supplies to the VRS, as further
indicated by the following evidence.
1060. In January 1995, the VRS Main Staff reported that “a great number of commands, units and
certain members of [the] VJ have selflessly been offering us humanitarian aid and services which
are extremely important for Republika Srpska Defence”.3020On 27 February 1995, the VJ General
Staff issued to the VRS, via the 30th Personnel Centre, 100 contact fuses for howitzer cannons
following a ruling by Perišić.3021
1061. In May 1995, General Mladen Mihajlović of the VJ General Staff,3022 reported that Perišić
had granted a request by the VRS Main Staff and “approved the handover of the following
3013
3014
3015
3016
3017
3018
3019
3020
3021
3022
See supra section VI.B.6.
MP-14, T. 3525, 3528-3529 (closed session).
See supra section VI.B.3.
Milomir Kova~evi}, T. 6058-6078.
Ex. P53 (under seal), T. 13083-13087.
Ex. P53 (under seal), T. 13085. The portion of Babić’s testimony introduced into evidence did not specify
whether the proposal to obtain weapons and ammunition in exchange for “fictitious payment[s]” was actually
implemented.
Ex. P1534, Work Report of the RS MOD for the Period of August 1994 - November 1995, November 1995,
pp 9, 18.
Ex. P1211, Correspondence Between the VRS Main Staff and the RS Prime Minister Regarding the
Construction of a Material Gift for the VJ, 15 January 1995, p. 1.
Ex. P1257, Order From Military Post 2082 to Military Post 1092 Regarding Arms Supply to the 30th PC, 27
February 1995.
Mladen Mihajlovi}, T. 3876.
332
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28901
engineers’ NVO without allowance”, namely 10,000 mines and five tonnes of explosives.3023 In a
separate memorandum, Mihajlović stated that the VJ General Staff “approves the transfer of
engineering military equipment and arms, without remuneration”, namely three additional rocket
devices to open passages through mine fields.3024
1062. On 26 May 1995, General Mladić asked the VJ General Staff for over 17,000 mines and
various engineering supplies, a request granted approximately in half.3025 On 19 June 1995, Mladić
forwarded a “[v]ery urgent” request to Perišić for 1,835,850 rounds of various calibres and 2,000
shells required for heavy combat operations in the Trnovo area, near Sarajevo.3026 On the very next
day, the VJ General Staff responded by telegram: “We hereby [...] inform you that the Chief of
General Staff of the Army of Yugoslavia ordered the following: ‘Give /it/ to Ratko /so as to/ have
this resolved’”.3027 Mihajlović recognised Perišić’s initials at the top of the document3028 and
Mihajlović stated that the “Ratko” in question was Lieutenant-General Ratko Milovanović, a VJ
administrator.3029 The Trial Chamber finds that the fact that this request would be “resolved” shows
that the sanctions were not enforced.
1063. On 8 June 1995, the Zvornik Infantry Brigade reported the receipt of weaponry from the VJ
General Staff’s Kragujevac TRZ, including 254,520 bullets.3030 On 16 June 1995, the VRS Main
Staff gave its official authorisation for a unit to take over 22 motor vehicles and 5 trailers from the
VJ, and a VRS officer involved in the process noted that “it seems likely that the VJ will hand over
some 50-100 more motor vehicles and other [material supplies] in the future”.3031
3023
3024
3025
3026
3027
3028
3029
3030
3031
Ex. P623, VJ General Staff Engineering Administration Consent for Weapons and Military Equipment Delivery
to the VRS, 15 May 1995.
Ex. P622, Approval by the Engineering Administration of the Land Forces of the VJ General Staff Addressed to
Military Post 9808, 16 May 1995. See also Ex. P621, Approval by the Engineering Administration of the Land
Forces of the VJ General Staff Addressed to Military Post 9808, 11 March 1994 (document that may relate to
same items); Mladen Mihajlović, T. 3892-3894, 3896-3897.
Ex. D56, Request from Ratko Mladić to the VJ General Staff, 26 May 1995 (bearing handwritten notes of
percentages of materials approved by VJ); Ex. D57, Approval and Rejection by the Engineering Administration
Sent to the Cabinet of the Chief of the VJ General Staff, 30 May 1995; Mladen Mihajlovi}, T. 3980-3982
(private session); Ex. D58, Letter from the Cabinet of the Chief of the VJ General Staff to the VRS Main Staff,
31 May 1995; Mladen Mihajlovi}, T. 3983-3984 (partly private session).
Ex. P624, Request from Ratko Mladić to Perišić for Ammunition, 19 June 1995. This document appears to have
a duplicate in Ex. P2726, although the latter appears to have an error in translation, erroneously stating that the
telegram response comes from the Chief of the VRS Main Staff rather than the Chief of the VJ General Staff.
See Miodrag Simić, T. 10200.
Ex. P624, Request from Ratko Mladić to Perišić for Ammunition, 19 June 1995, p. 3. See Mladen Mihajlovi},
T. 3965.
Ex. P624, Request from Ratko Mladić to Perišić for Ammunition, 19 June 1995; Mladen Mihajlovi}, T. 39023903.
Mladen Mihajlovi}, T. 3965.
Ex. P1235, Correspondence Between 1st Zvornik Command and VRS Main Staff, 8 June 1995. The Kragujevac
TRZ was under VJ oversighT. See Jugoslav Kodžopeljić, T. 12494.
Ex. P1205, VRS Correspondence on Reception of Logistical Assistance from the VJ, 30 June 1995.
333
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28900
1064. On 17 June 1995, the SRK Command addressed a “very urgent” letter to the VRS Main
Staff asking for the immediate preparation of documentation necessary for representatives of the
Corps to retrieve weaponry in the FRY, namely 273,000 bullets and 11,000 shells, as “it has been
agreed with the responsible people in the VJ that the requested [materiel] should be obtained and
immediately delivered to the unit”.3032 The SRK followed with a separate yet similar request to the
VRS Main Staff concerning 120,000 bullets and 1,850 shells, as agreed upon with VJ
representatives.3033 In addition, Dragomir Milošević later notified the VRS Main Staff that the VJ
had made two mortars available to the SRK.3034 The VRS Main Staff’s involvement in these
transactions with the VJ again reasonably establishes that they were part of the official logistical
assistance process.3035
1065. The Kragujevac TRZ equally supplied 350,280 rounds to the VRS via the VJ’s 30th
Personnel Centre on 17 June 1995,3036 soon followed by 567,000 bullets and 46 rockets.3037 Later
that month, Perišić agreed with the proposal of the Ground Troops Sector of the VJ General staff
that a 152mm M37 howitzer should be “ceded permanently ₣...ğ for the needs of the VRS”.3038
1066. On 5 July 1995, the VJ General Staff provided 38 radio devices, 146 telephones and other
communications equipment to the VRS.3039 On 1 August 1995, the Kragujevac TRZ provided 6,599
bullets of various calibres and 60 mines to the VRS.3040 A letter from General Novica Simić of the
Eastern Bosnia Corps Command, dated 2 August 1995, indicates that the Posavina Light Infantry
Brigade had obtained from the VJ, with the permission of the VRS Main Staff, 1,680 shells, 1,200
rockets, 180 bullet rounds and 33 pieces for machine-gun barrels.3041
1067. Between 16 and 23 September 1995, the Eastern Bosnia Corps received from the FRY a
total of 1,046,035 bullets of various calibres, 934 mortar shells, 150 rockets, 72 rounds for RRB
64mm, 1,999 semi-automatic rifles, 50 machine guns, 18 cannons and 15 pieces of “LRL 128mm
3032
3033
3034
3035
3036
3037
3038
3039
3040
Ex. P1226, SRK Command Request to VRS Main Staff for Ammunition, 17 June 1995.
Ex. P1225, SRK Command Request to VRS Main Staff for Ammunition, 22 June 1995.
Ex. P1229, SRK Command Request to VRS Main Staff for Logistical Assistance, 7 July 1995.
See Ex. P1245, Drina Corps Command Internal Memo, 24 October 1993; Ex. P1802, Order by VRS
Commander, 19 July 1995.
Ex. P588, Matériel List, 17 June 1995 (indicating 30th PC as recipient). The VJ General Staff provided certain
military supplies to the VRS and SVK via the 30th and 40th PCs pursuant to a decision of the SDC that was
applied by Perišić. See Ex. P1009, Order of FRY President, 18 February 1994; Ex. P628, Directive from Perišic
Regarding Disciplinary Proceedings, 15 August 1994; Stamenko Nikolić, who was the head of the VJ’s
personnel administration, agreed that military supplies officially provided to the 30th and 40th PCs were actually
intended for the VRS and SVK, Stamenko Nikolić, T. 10630-10632.
Ex. P589, Matériel List, 22 June 1995.
Ex. P1256, VJ General Staff Internal Memo Regarding VRS Request for Assistance, 26 June 1995.
Ex. P1812, Order by Military Post 2082, 5 July 1995.
Ex. P590, Matériel List, 1 August 1995. While the receipt sheet does not specify the recipient’s identity, it
indicates that the recipient was based in Zvornik, a town in RS. MP-14, T. 3601. The Trial Chamber finds that
this raises a reasonable inference that the VRS was the recipient of these military supplies.
334
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M-71”.3042 Whereas the Eastern Bosnia Corps’s report to the VRS Main Staff simply states that this
weaponry originated from the “FRY”, the only reasonable inference is that it was provided by the
VJ General Staff or the FRY special purpose industries.3043 For the reasons stated above, the only
reasonable inference is that the Eastern Bosnia Corps was referring to officially-approved assistance
when it informed the VRS Main Staff that it had procured these supplies from the FRY, as Mladić
ordered that VRS units who engaged in unauthorised procurement would face disciplinary
measures.3044 The Trial Chamber concludes that the Eastern Bosnia Corps’s report equally shows
that the sanctions were not enforced.
1068. The RS MOD determined that the VRS obtained immense quantities of weaponry between
August 1994 and November 1995, precisely the period of sanctions by the FRY on RS; to wit
61,590,737 rounds of rifle ammunition, 92,125 rounds of “[o]ther infantry ammunition”, 73,184
rounds of mortar ammunition, 14,615 rounds of artillery ammunition, 5,915 rounds of tank
ammunition, 1,708 missiles, 298,593 items of “[anti-aircraft] ammunition and missiles”, 60 aerial
bombs, as well as 108,995 items of “[l]aunch equipment and other NVO /weapons and military
equipment/”.3045 The RS MOD’s report merely identifies this weaponry as “[p]urchases and
donations” without specifying its source.3046 Nevertheless, the trial record solely establishes that the
VRS received ammunition from the VJ and the FRY special purpose industries.3047 No evidence
establishes that the VRS received ammunition from any country other than the FRY.3048
1069. Overall, the FRY Supreme Defence Council continued to agree on logistical assistance to
the VRS and SVK during the sanctions period,3049 and Perišić himself urged the SDC to keep on
authorising this assistance.3050 Yet, Defence witness Sini{a Borovi}, who was Perišić’s Chef de
Cabinet between November 1994 and December 1996,3051 advanced that he was “not familiar with
any decisions made by General [Perišić] which would violate the embargo”.3052 Borović went as far
as claiming that no documents establish that the VJ assisted the VRS in violation of the military
3041
3042
3043
3044
3045
3046
3047
3048
3049
3050
3051
3052
Ex. P1203, VRS Order Regarding Redistribution of Ammunition, 2 August 1995.
Ex. P1206, VRS Internal Correspondence on Ammunition Received from the VJ and Request for More
Ammunition to be Assigned, 30 September 1995.
See infra section VI.C.9.
Ex. P1245, Drina Corps Command Internal Memo, 24 October 1993; Ex. P1802, Order by VRS Commander, 19
July 1995.
Ex. P1534, Work Report of the RS MOD for the Period of August 1994 - November 1995, November 1995, p 5.
Ibid.
See infra section VI.C.9.(a).
Ibid.
Ex. P749, Minutes from the 36th Session of the SDC held on 12 May 1995, p. 5; Ex. P720, Minutes from the 38th
Session of the SDC held on 27 June 1995, p. 3.
Ex. P786, Stenographic Transcript of the 37th Session of the SDC, 7 June 1995, p. 42; Ex. P763, Minutes from
the 39th Session of the SDC, 29 July 1995, pp 4-5.
Sini{a Borovi}, T. 13881, 14160.
Sini{a Borovi}, T. 14190.
335
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sanctions.3053 In his view, the VJ granted “very few” of the VRS’s requests even before the
sanctions.3054 The Trial Chamber does not find Borović’s testimony credible in light of the
overwhelming evidence to the contrary.
3. The Koran Depot in Republika Srpska
1070. The VJ supplied the VRS’s military depot in Koran, RS, which was affiliated with the
VRS’s 27th Rear Base in Sokolac.3055 The base formerly belonged to the JNA but was taken over by
the VRS after the war began.3056 The Koran Depot’s purpose was to supply the VRS with weapons,
ammunition, artillery, equipment, mines and, in part, fuel.3057 Within the VRS, it mainly supplied
the SRK but also the Drina Corps, 2nd Krajina Corps and other units.3058
1071. A large quantity of ammunition was stored at the Koran Depot before the conflict in BiH
started, which the VRS obtained when it took over the base from the VJ by September 1992.3059
That ammunition was exhausted by the end of 1992.3060 Because there was no capacity to
manufacture infantry ammunition in RS,3061 the Koran Depot subsequently received approximately
70% of its ammunition from the VJ and approximately 30% from manufacturers in Serbia, mainly
from Užice.3062 The supplies provided by these manufacturers included infantry ammunition from
the Prvi Partizan depot in U`ice, mortar rounds from Krušik, Valjevo and 120mm ammunition
from Čačak.3063
1072. Supplies from the VJ arrived constantly at the Koran Depot, and even more frequently when
the VRS was conducting an offensive.3064 According to MP-14, “far fewer” deliveries occurred
after the FRY imposed sanctions on the VRS, although “the supply did continue”.3065
1073. The standard procurement procedure was for the VRS to send the Koran Depot a notice
concerning an incoming order of ammunition from the VJ, and for the Koran Depot to send trucks
to Serbia to retrieve the ammunition from VJ military depots3066 or for the VJ to send its own
3053
3054
3055
3056
3057
3058
3059
3060
3061
3062
3063
3064
3065
3066
Sini{a Borovi}, T. 14183-14184.
Sini{a Borovi}, T. 14190.
MP-14, T. 3505-3506, 3679-3680 (closed session).
MP-14, T. 3505-3506 (closed session).
MP-14, T. 3517, 3522 (closed session).
MP-14, T. 3517, 3522-3523 (closed session).
MP-14, T. 3517, 3521-3522 (closed session).
MP-14, T. 3523-3524 (closed session).
MP-14, T. 3524 (closed session). Only hand-grenades were produced in Doboj, Banja Luka and Trebinje, Ibid.
MP-14, T. 3524 (closed session).
MP-14, T. 3617 (closed session).
MP-14, T. 3525 (closed session).
Ibid.
MP-14, T. 3526-3528 (closed session).
336
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delivery trucks directly.3067 On certain instances, long convoys of twenty trucks would effectuate
deliveries.3068 The biggest convoy consisted of over twenty trucks containing upwards of 500
tonnes of artillery and infantry ammunition.3069 MP-14 was unsure, however, of the precise date of
this delivery, recollecting that it occurred in either the “late summer for [sic] early autumn in
1993”.3070 Because there is doubt that this particular convoy delivery occurred after Perišić was
appointed Chief of VJ General Staff on 26 August 1993,3071 the Trial Chamber will not rely on the
evidence of this delivery.
4. The Pretis Military Factory in Republika Srpska
1074. Pretis was an industrial company and factory that produced weaponry for the VRS in
Vogo{}a, a suburb of Sarajevo.3072 The military conflict in the vicinity of the Pretis factory “did not
greatly affect security” so that all of its manufacturing and technological facilities remained “intact”
and “in working order”3073 until NATO bombed the factory in September 1995.3074 Pretis produced
artillery ammunition ranging from 57 to 220 calibres, “the latest new caliber”;3075 as well as
shells,3076 mines3077 and modified air bombs.3078 Pretis did not produce small arms ammunition, as
the technology for such production was different and was carried out in other factories in Valjevo,
Serbia, for the Krušik company, as well as Bugojno and other locations.3079 Pretis also purchased
mines, flash bombs, rifle clips, cartridges and bullets from the Kragujevac TRZ in Serbia.3080
3067
3068
3069
3070
3071
3072
3073
3074
3075
3076
3077
3078
3079
3080
MP-14, T. 3615-3616 (closed session).
MP-14, T. 3616 (closed session).
MP-14, T. 3616-3617 (closed session).
Ibid.
Ex. P196, Decree of the President of the FRY, 26 August 1993.
MP-14, T. 3634, 3640-3643 (closed session); Ex. P601 (under seal); Ex. P506, Transcript of Nikola To{ovi}
Deposition, 14 December 2008, T. 88. The Pretis plant that produced shells was different from the Pretis plant
that produced German Golf automobiles, MP-14, T. 3634 (closed session).
Ex. P508, Memorandum on Production Capacity of Pretis Factory, 20 September 1994, p. 2.
MP-14, T. 3655-3656 (closed session).
Ex. P505, Transcript of Nikola To{ovi} Deposition, 13 December 2008, T. 21-22; MP-14, T. 3634 (closed
session). See e.g. Ex. P511, RS MOD Authorisation to Pretis to Conclude a Barter Agreement, 26 November
1993.
MP-14, T. 3634, 3643-3644, 3647 (closed session); Ex. P505, Transcript of Nikola To{ovi} Deposition, 13
December 2008, T. 14, 25; Ex. P506, Transcript of Nikola To{ovi} Deposition, 14 December 2008, T. 80;
Ex. P512, Barter Agreement Between Pretis and Kragujevac Technical Overhaul Institute (“TRZ”), 24 July
1995; Ex. P602, Letter from Pretis to the VRS Main Staff, 4 April 1994.
MP-14, T. 3647 (closed session); Ex. P602, Letter from Pretis to the VRS Main Staff, 4 April 1994; Ex. P513,
Contract Between Pretis and Kragujevac TRZ, 20 July 1995.
MP-14, T. 3652-3654 (closed session); Ex. P505, Transcript of Nikola To{ovi} Deposition, 13 December 2008,
T. 61-63; Ex. P603, Letter from Pretis to the VRS Main Staff, 18 January 1995; Ex. P604, Request Addressed to
VRS Main Staff by Milorad Motika, 10 May 1994.
Ex. P505, Transcript of Nikola To{ovi} Deposition, 13 December 2008, T. 22.
Ex. P513, Contract Between Pretis and Kragujevac TRZ, 20 July 1995.
337
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(a) Status of Pretis as a Company
1075. Nikola To{ovi}, who spent his entire career working as a technician for Pretis and
ultimately became chief of technical services for the Vogoš}a brigade of the SRK,3081 could not
give an exact answer when asked under whose umbrella Pretis fell, as there were “all sorts of
connections: Belgrade, government of Republika Srpska”.3082 The company had a “representative
office” in Belgrade that sold Pretis’ products for a service commission, although it “could only
clinch minor deals”.3083 According to Tošović, Pretis operated as a commercial company, buying
raw materials to manufacture its products, which it sold on the open market.3084
1076. Tošović was also unsure about which organ regulated Pretis from 1994 until the end of the
war.3085 Tošović was not explicitly asked who regulated Pretis before 1994. He believed that Pretis
was part of the Unis corporation, which operated in the metal processing industry. General Abaz
Deronja was in charge of all of Unis, including Pretis. To{ovi} did not specify for which army
General Abaz Deronja worked. Unis’ budget “came from the orders it received because it produced
also for export, and ₣...ğ nobody gave it money”.3086
1077. Witness MP-14 described Pretis as a “half civilian, half military” facility under the RS
government.3087 He was not absolutely sure if it was overseen by the RS MOD or VRS Main Staff
during the war, although he indicated that Pretis “could decide on its own which ammunition and
what quantities of ammunition to deliver to whom” until 1994, when the VRS Main Staff ordered
Pretis to send precise quantities of ammunition to designated units.3088 On the other hand, a
document indicates that the RS MOD sought to exercise authority over Pretis.3089
1078. The evidence described below shows that the RS MOD and VRS Main Staff had competing
claims of authority over Pretis, which was a point of contention between them.3090
3081
3082
3083
3084
3085
3086
3087
3088
3089
3090
Ex. P505, Transcript of Nikola To{ovi} Deposition, 13 December 2008, T. 4-5.
Ex. P505, Transcript of Nikola To{ovi} Deposition, 13 December 2008, T. 30-31.
Ex. P506, Transcript of Nikola To{ovi} Deposition, 14 December 2008, T. 88.
Ex. P506, Transcript of Nikola To{ovi} Deposition, 14 December 2008, T. 87.
Ex. P505, Transcript of Nikola To{ovi} Deposition, 13 December 2008, T. 31.
Ex. P505, Transcript of Nikola To{ovi} Deposition, 13 December 2008, T. 29-30.
MP-14, T. 3602.
MP-14, T. 3636-3638 (closed session).
Ex. D748, RS MOD Approval for Exports by Pretis, 25 January 1994.
See infra section VI.C.4.(c).
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(b) Relationship between the VJ and Pretis
(i) Presence of the Accused at Pretis in January 1994
1079. On 8 January 1994, a meeting was held between several politicians and military
commanders, including Momčilo Peri{ić and Ratko Mladić, at the Park Hotel in Vogo{}a.3091
Mladić invited To{ovi}, his cousin, to a festive lunch with Perišić and other persons following the
meeting.3092 After Mladić introduced To{ovi} to Peri{ić as a “captain first class in charge of
logistics in the army”,3093 Peri{ić briefly addressed To{ovi} and the rest of the logistics personnel
“in passing”: “he told us that they were short of ammunition, that we were short of ammunition, that
we should save every bullet, and that we should try and use the resources that existed in companies.
For instance, Pretis had quite a substantial supply of shells, bullets, lying around in
warehouses”.3094
1080. When asked whether Peri{ić seemed to be aware of the situation at Pretis, To{ovi}
responded:
[Perišić] knew very well what Pretis was and what it meant for the entire state of Yugoslavia. It
was an excellent artillery ammunition factory with a large capacity, very substantial capacity; and
he knew very well what could be found lying around in every corner of the factory, and he knew
that with what was lying around, something could be made. And that’s why he suggested that to
us, and who better suited for such suggestion than us logistics men.3095
(ii) Involvement of the VJ in Pretis’ Production
1081. The VJ General Staff paid the salaries of monitors placed inside Pretis to inform the VJ base
command about the quantity and type of ammunition that Pretis produced in RS.3096 Notably,
3091
3092
3093
3094
3095
3096
Ex. P505, Transcript of Nikola To{ovi} Deposition, 13 December 2008, T. 7, 12; Ex. P507, Diary of Nikola
To{ovi}, 1994, p. 2. To{ovi} recorded this event in his personal diary, although he did not personally attend the
meeting, Ex. P505, Transcript of Nikola To{ovi} Deposition, 13 December 2008, T. 6-7, 10. On directexamination, To{ović stated that, to his knowledge, the meeting concerned a situation in the area of the SRK,
and was attended by the presidents of the crisis staffs of various municipalities, who were responsible for both
civilian and military matters. Ex. P505, Transcript of Nikola To{ovi} Deposition, 13 December 2008, T. 20.
However, on cross-examination, To{ovi} admitted that he “really did not know the reason for that meeting” and
that he also did not know whether it was a pre-arranged meeting or a chance encounter. Ex. P506, Transcript of
Nikola To{ovi} Deposition, 14 December 2008, T. 77-78.
Ex. P505, Transcript of Nikola To{ovi} Deposition, 13 December 2008, T. 6-7, 16-18; Ex. P507, Diary of
Nikola To{ovi}, 1994, p. 2. The following persons also attended the lunch: “Gali}”, the commander of the SRK,
“Pani}”, the commander of the special units from Pan~evo, “Rajko Koprivica”, the president of the Vogošće
municipality, “Ratko Had`ić”, president of the Ilijas municipality, “Mirko Kraji{nik”, a technician in the
Rajlovac Brigade, “Tadija”, an artillery expert, and two individuals with the last name “Krsmanovi}”, one being
an active officer who also worked as an engineer at Pretis, and the other an assistant commander of the
“Corp. for logistics”, Ex. P507, Diary of Nikola To{ovi}, 1994, p. 2; Ex. P505, Transcript of Nikola To{ovi}
Deposition, 13 December 2008, T. 16-18.
Ex. P506, Transcript of Nikola To{ovi} Deposition, 14 December 2008, T. 79.
Ex. P505, Transcript of Nikola To{ovi} Deposition, 13 December 2008, T. 13-14. See also Ex. P506, Transcript
of Nikola To{ovi} Deposition, 14 December 2008, T. 79-80; Ex. P507, Diary of Nikola To{ovi}, 1994, p. 2.
Ex. P505, Transcript of Nikola To{ovi} Deposition, 13 December 2008, T. 15-16.
MP-14, T. 3639 (closed session).
339
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Colonel Radomir E}imovi}, a VRS engineer on the VJ payroll, was in charge of military
inspections at Pretis.3097 Further, Major Markovi}, a Pretis engineer paid by the VJ, was
responsible for modifying air-bombs, as well as appending the appropriate fuses to shells and
mines.3098
1082. Before Pretis could begin manufacturing weaponry, the Military Technical Institute in
Belgrade, itself subordinated to the FRY MOD,3099 examined documents containing the proposed
design for particular weapons.3100 The Military Technical Institute would coordinate with Pretis to
see if the weapons were properly designed, such as whether a shell would function. 3101
1083. The VJ subsequently assisted Pretis in testing weapons once they had been produced.
Rockets produced by Pretis were tested on the firing range of the VJ’s Technical Testing Centre at
Nikinci in May 1994,3102 as were bullets3103 and artillery ammunition in May 1995.3104 According to
a report by Dušan Kovačević, then RS Minister of Defence, FRY assistance in testing VRS
weaponry was needed:
From the very outset of combat activities in the territory of Republika Srpska a need has appeared
for the examining of the quality of ammunition, the continuity of the production of which has been
kept up at the PRETIS – HOLDING Enterprise in Vogošća. ₣...ğ Republika Srpska is not and has
not been in a position to furnish and put into operation a training ground for testing the quality of
weapons and military equipment, nor would that prove rentable for the time being. For this reason,
existing training grounds in the territory of the FR Yugoslavia were used, in particular so the one
in Nikinci.3105
1084. Pretis also depended on the assistance of the Kragujevac TRZ, one of its main trading
partners.3106 Pretis sent the Kragujevac TRZ artillery casings, which the Kragujevac TRZ cleaned
and sent back to Pretis, where they were re-filled with new gunpowder and reusable up to five
times.3107 Pretis would not have been able to produce ammunition without overhauling by the
Kragujevac TRZ,3108 a facility under the VJ General Staff’s control.3109
3097
3098
3099
3100
3101
3102
3103
3104
3105
3106
3107
MP-14, T. 3646 (closed session); Ex. P602, Letter from Pretis to the VRS Main Staff, 4 April 1994.
MP-14, T. 3646-3647 (closed session).
Radojica Kadijević, T. 13611. See also Ex. D553, Internal VJ Letter re the Manufacturing of Weapons by the
RS, 22 June 1995 (Noting that the FRY MOD, not VJ, oversees the provision of technical documents for the
manufacturing of ammunition).
Ex. P505, Transcript of Nikola To{ovi} Deposition, 13 December 2008, T. 28.
Ibid.
Ex. P1058, Memorandum of Pretis Holding, 21 May 1994. The Nikinci weapon-testing facility was
subordinated to the VJ General Staff, Radojica Kadijević, T. 13682.
Ex. P1057, Letter from Pretis Holding Vogo{}a, 10 May 1995.
Ex. P1059, Memorandum of Pretis Factory, 13 June 1995.
Ex. P1061, RS MOD Memo Addressed to the RS Government, 11 July 1993. See also Radojica Kadijević,
T. 13683 (mentioning that Pretis used the VJ’s Nikinci weapon-testing facility).
Ex. P505, Transcript of Nikola To{ovi} Deposition, 13 December 2008, T. 38, 40-43; Ex. P509, Procurement
Plan (Survey of Incoming Material By Partner), 1 January – 31 December 1994, p. 1.
Ex. P505, Transcript of Nikola To{ovi} Deposition, 13 December 2008, T. 41-44, 64-66. See Ex. D416, RS
MOD Agreement, 26 November 1993 (proposed barter contract whereby Pretis would obtain artillery
340
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1085. The Defence submits that the Prosecution has failed to establish a “nexus” between Perišić
and Pretis’ supply of material to the VRS.3110 To the contrary, the Trial Chamber finds that Perišić
and the VJ General Staff provided an important measure of operational support to Pretis.
(iii) Importation of Raw Materials and Components from the FRY
1086. Pretis lacked the raw materials and components necessary to manufacture ammunition from
late 1992 or early 1993 onwards.3111 The Trial Chamber was presented with differing estimates of
the overall extent to which Pretis’ military production depended on materials imported from the
FRY. A 20 September 1994 document from Pretis’ director states: “The sanctions imposed by
Serbia on RS have had disastrous consequences on supplies of raw materials, because the factory
relies almost 100% on supplies from SR Yugoslavia”.3112 Tošović was shown the document and
agreed with Motika’s assessment that military production was disastrous and that Pretis relied on
Serbian assistance, although he disagreed that Pretis exclusively depended on Serbia for 100% of
its materials, as it received steel from Russia, for instance.3113 Moreover, MP-14 opined that Pretis
could not have manufactured artillery without receiving key components from the FRY.3114
1087. Gunpowder was procured from Lučani, explosive charges from Bari~ and tin from
Sevojno.3115 Pretis relied on “powder charge” from the Krušik military factory in Valjevo in order
to produce mines.3116 Fuses were also obtained from Serbia and shell components (iron blocks)
from Nikši}, Montenegro, in the FRY.3117 Components for pyrotechnic materials used in casings
and canons were obtained from Lučani, Bari~, and Valjevo.3118 Pretis’ director expected an
imminent truck delivery of 12,000 kg of TNT and 8,000 kg of copper tubing from the FRY in
August 1995.3119
1088. Pretis dispatched Ećimović to the FRY in November 1992 “to obtain raw materials for
continuing the production of weapons and military equipment”.3120 While that event preceded
3108
3109
3110
3111
3112
3113
3114
3115
3116
3117
3118
3119
3120
gunpowder, artillery test ammunition, ignition gunpowder, artillery fuses, artillery cartridges and gunpowder
charges from the Kragujevac TRZ in exchange for a quantity of shell “jackets” of “equivalent value”).
Ex. P505, Transcript of Nikola To{ovi} Deposition, 13 December 2008, T. 69.
Jugoslav Kodžopeljić, T. 12494.
Defence Final Brief, paras 709-714.
MP-14, T. 3643-3644, 3647-3650, 3652-3653 (closed session).
Ex. P508, Memorandum on Production Capacity of Pretis Factory, 20 September 1994, pp 6-7.
Ex. P505, Transcript of Nikola To{ovi} Deposition, 13 December 2008, T. 34-36.
MP-14, T. 3649-3650 (closed session).
Ex. P505, Transcript of Nikola To{ovi} Deposition, 13 December 2008, T. 24-25.
Ex. P602, Letter from Pretis to the VRS Main Staff, 4 April 1994, p. 1.
MP-14, T. 3643-3644 (closed session).
Ex. P505, Transcript of Nikola To{ovi} Deposition, 13 December 2008, T. 57-58, 61-64.
Ex. P1063, Copy of Letter From Pretis Holding, 11 August 1995.
Ex. P1065, Pretis Letter Regarding Purchase of Raw Materials From the FRY, 17 November 1992.
341
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Perišić’s appointment as Chief of VJ GŠ,3121 it shows Pretis’ reliance on raw materials from the
FRY.
1089. The Prosecution contends that Perišić was involved in the FRY’s provision of raw materials
to Pretis.3122 The Trial Chamber is not satisfied that the evidence establishes this fact. Overall, the
evidentiary record does not prove that Perišić or the VJ General Staff were involved in deliveries of
raw materials and components from the FRY to Pretis.
(c) Supply of Weapons Produced by Pretis to the VRS
1090. A letter from Pretis’ director reads that, “[s]ince the war broke out ₣...ğ Pretis factory’s
special-purposes production has been to manufacture artillery ammunition for the VRS and VJ”.3123
The bulk of the ammunition produced by Pretis during the war was sent to the VRS’s military
fronts, while a smaller proportion was supplied to the VJ.3124 Tošović was unable to say, however,
whether Pretis supplied a particular corps within the VRS.3125 However, MP-14 stated that Pretis
mostly supplied the 3rd Sarajevo Brigade, while a large number of ammunition would also go to the
VRS’s 27th Logistics Base in Renovića and the VRS’s Koran Depot.3126
1091. The Koran Depot cooperated with Pretis during the war by delivering empty shells that
Pretis would refill with gunpowder, before returning them to the Koran depot.3127 The Koran Depot
received ammunition from Pretis twice or thrice per week on average, although there were delivery
convoys everyday during certain weeks.3128 The SRK, Drina Corps and other VRS units also
brought their used shells to Pretis to be refilled with gunpowder.3129 Additionally, the VRS Krajina
Corps reportedly obtained from Pretis 800 bullets of various calibres, 800 bullets for D-30
howitzers and 700 mortar mines.3130
1092. Dušan Kovačević, the former RS Minister of Defence, claimed that the SRK could get their
ammunition directly from Pretis without prior authorisation from the RS MOD, as General Mladić
would go to Pretis and simply “order” the factory manager to cease supplying anyone except for the
unit(s) designated by Mladić himself:
3121
3122
3123
3124
3125
3126
3127
3128
3129
3130
Ex. P196, Decree of the President of the FRY, 26 August 1993.
Prosecution Final Brief, paras 293-299.
Ex. P1059, Memorandum of Pretis Factory, 13 June 1995.
MP-14, T. 3650-3651 (closed session). See also Ex. P505, Transcript of Nikola To{ovi} Deposition, 13
December 2008, T. 25-26.
Ex. P505, Transcript of Nikola To{ovi} Deposition, 13 December 2008, T. 26.
MP-14, T. 3499, 3505-3506, 3651-3652 (closed session).
MP-14, T. 3635 (closed session).
MP-14, T. 3638 (closed session).
MP-14, T. 3635 (closed session).
Ex. P1213, Correspondence Between the 1st Krajina Corps Command and the VRS Main Staff Regarding
Reception of Military Equipment, 11 July 1994.
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₣Mladićğ would bring his security there and would often threaten the manager that he would either
be removed, replaced, or liquidated. He forced Pretis to produce ammunition for a particular unit.
This practice was also employed by some local commanders of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps.
They knew that if a platoon went there or a considerable number of armed soldiers led by a
commander, they would simply lay siege to the production line, wait for the eventual product, they
would simply take it, load it onto their vehicles, and be off.3131
1093. Kovačević regarded these as unauthorised “wanton and arbitrary action₣sğ being taken by
individuals, even if they were members of the army” that “actually happened quite often, despite
which it was impossible to prevent it. All those who made incursions of this kind would normally
hold people at gun point while making their threats. […] ₣The RS MODğ had no power to issue any
orders to the Main Staff of the VRS” or “to stop occurrences such as these”.3132
1094. The Trial Chamber notes that, based on the foregoing evidence, it cannot reasonably exclude
the possibility that Mladić and his subordinates procured weaponry from Pretis without permission
from the RS MOD or by force. But this fact would be irrelevant in the context of a procurement
procedure organised by Perišić in conjunction with Mladić and the VRS Main Staff, not the RS
MOD.3133 Besides, the RS MOD’s alleged lack of control over Mladić and the VRS Main Staff with
regard to Pretis does not raise doubts regarding other evidence demonstrating the VJ General
Staff’s assistance to Pretis’ production process.
1095. The Trial Chamber further notes that, while Kovačević claimed that Mladić and VRS
members unlawfully seised weaponry from Pretis, Ðorñe Ðukić conversely claimed that Momčilo
Krajišnik, the former President of the RS Assembly, cooperated with the RS MOD to distribute
Pretis’ weaponry without the approval of the VRS Main Staff.3134 In addition, Mladić mentioned
that a number of VRS commanders improperly took certain weaponry from RS-based military
factories without permission from the VRS Main Staff and RS MOD, although Mladić stated that
these commanders had obtained the “help and tacit agreement” of the factory managers,3135 contrary
to Kovačević who mentioned forceful takeovers by Mladić and his subordinates against the Pretis
manager’s wishes.3136
1096. This particular evidence is inconclusive but suggests, at most, that the relationship between
the VRS Main Staff and RS MOD was dysfunctional and discordant. In this regard, it is noteworthy
that Kovačević himself commented on the existence of “open clashes” between the RS MOD and
3131
3132
3133
3134
3135
3136
Dušan Kovačević, T. 12603-12604.
Dušan Kovačević, T. 12617.
See supra section VI.B.2-3.
Ex. D395, Transcript of Interview with \or|e \uki}, 29 February 1996, pp 2-3.
Ex. D417, VRS Main Staff Order, 3 December 1994.
Dušan Kovačević, T. 12603, 12617.
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VRS Main Staff, “personified by General Ratko [Mladić]”; as well as clashes and “personal
resentment” between Mladić and Karadžić.3137
5. Provision of Modified Air-Bombs
1097. “Modified air-bombs” were bombs originally built to be launched from the air but that were
modified to be launched from the ground by installing rocket motors that would be triggered
electronically.3138
1098. Modified air bombs were in part the result of the imposition of a no-fly zone over BiH in
October 1992, which precluded the VRS from using their aircraft bombs normally, and led the VRS
to devise means of propelling them by rockets from the ground.3139 According to Ðor|e Ðukić, the
idea to use these weapons originated with the Eastern Bosnia Corps of the VRS, commanded by
Novica Simić.3140 “As far as I can remember”, Ðukić said, “on one occasion the late General Rajko
Balać spoke to General Mladić about this method of using aerial bombs”.3141 Mladić eventually
ordered that possibilities be explored for producing modified air-bomb launchers at the level of the
Corps.3142 “[T]he initial launches of this modified rocket system failed”.3143 Ðukić added: “I know
that the first systems used a single rocket engine for propulsion and that this is what probably
caused the launches to fail. After the rocket battery was built with two or three engines, the
launches probably became more successful […] After Mladić probably satisfied himself that the
system was efficient, he issued an order to all the corps to proceed with building launchers”.3144 The
launchers were built in the Herzegovina, Drina, Eastern Bosnia, Sarajevo-Romanija and 1st Krajina
Corps.3145
1099. Ðor|e Ðukić did not explain who managed to develop a successful technical model for
modifying air-bombs. He stated, however, “I am certain that, apart from Mladić and Balać, no one
from the Main Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska worked on this program”.3146
3137
3138
3139
3140
3141
3142
3143
3144
3145
3146
Dušan Kovačević, T. 12612-12613, 12760, 12766-12767.
MP-14, T. 3652 (closed session); Ex. P75, Witness Statement of \or|e \uki}, 4/29 February 1996, p. 4;
Ex. P76, Supplementary Statement of \or|e \uki} on Modified Rocket System, 4/29 February 1996, p. 1;
Ex. P66, Transcript of Thomas Knustad from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 1989.
Martin Bell, T. 3188.
Ex. P75, Witness Statement of \or|e \uki}, 4/29 February 1996, p. 4; Ex. P76, Supplementary Statement of
\or|e \uki} on Modified Rocket System, 4/29 February 1996, p. 1.
Ex. P76, Supplementary Statement of \or|e \uki} on Modified Rocket System, 4/29 February 1996, p. 1.
Ex. P75, Witness Statement of \or|e \uki}, 4/29 February 1996, p. 4.
Ex. P76, Supplementary Statement of \or|e \uki} on Modified Rocket System, 4/29 February 1996, p. 1
(emphasis added).
Ex. P76, Supplementary Statement of \or|e \uki} on Modified Rocket System, 4/29 February 1996, p. 1.
Ex. P76, Supplementary Statement of \or|e \uki} on Modified Rocket System, 4/29 February 1996, pp 1-2.
Ex. P76, Supplementary Statement of \or|e \uki} on Modified Rocket System, 4/29 February 1996, p. 1.
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1100. The evidence shows that the VJ General Staff played a key role in devising the successful
technical model by which aerial bombs were modified. Ivan Ðokić, a technical engineer3147 who
served as chief of the VJ General Staff’s Aeronautical Administration between 1994 and 2000,3148
denied being the “architect” of the modified air-bombs but admitted being a member of a VJ
General Staff team that developed the modified air-bomb model.3149 Ðokić acknowledged that he
“headed” the sector that designed the electronic part of the ignition system for modified airbombs.3150 Perišić himself described Ðokić as “a very intuitive man who successfully designed and
modified an aircraft bomb to fit the launcher”.3151 Asked if Perišić’s statement accurately reflects
what he did, Ðokić agreed: “It does, and it’s consistent with my previous answer that we modified
the electric – the electronic system for the ignition of the engine in my sector”.3152
1101. Ðokić denied that the air-bombs modified by his team were sent to the VRS.3153 He claimed
that these weapons were only given to the VJ General Staff’s Artillery Administration and were
never sent anywhere, remaining in the possession of the Serbian military to this day.3154 The Trial
Chamber finds that the evidence does not conclusively establish that the VJ supplied completed
modified air-bombs to the VRS. On the other hand, the only reasonable inference presented by the
evidentiary record is that the VJ General Staff shared with the VRS the technical model by which
air-bombs were successfully modified. The evidence indeed shows that the VRS’s initial technical
model was unsuccessful3155 and that the successful model was developed by Ivan Ðokić’s team in
the VJ General Staff.3156 It is clear from Ðokić’s testimony that the VRS did not independently
develop a successful technical model.
1102. Ðokić was adamant that he did not oversee the actual launching of modified air-bombs,
although he admitted travelling to Bosnia in late 1994 to help resolve operational problems with the
modified air-bombs in the VRS’s possession.3157 On 31 May 1995, Mladić wrote a letter to Perišić
stipulating that the Eastern Bosnia Corps had been “using a modified apu-13mt rocket launcher ₣...ğ
constructed with a Yugoslav Army team’s expert assistance”.3158 Mladić asked Perišić for six
3147
3148
3149
3150
3151
3152
3153
3154
3155
3156
3157
3158
Ivan Ðokić, T. 14490.
Ivan Ðokić, T. 14337.
Ivan Ðokić, T. 14489.
Ivan Ðokić, T. 14490.
Ex. P2197, Transcript of the Collegium of the Chief of the VJ General Staff, 28 October 1995, p. 57.
Ivan Ðokić, T. 14492.
Ibid.
Ibid. The Artillery Administration was an organ of the VJ General Staff. Mile Novaković, T. 13033.
Ex. P76, Supplementary Statement of \or|e \uki} on Modified Rocket System, 4/29 February 1996, p. 1.
Ivan Ðokić, T. 14489-14492; Ex. P2197, Transcript of the Collegium of the Chief of the VJ General Staff, 28
October 1995, p. 57.
Ivan Ðokić, T. 14490.
Ex. P2723, Request from Ratko Mladić to Perišić for Nitrogen Tanks, 31 May 1995 (emphasis added). See also
Ivan Ðokić, T. 14484.
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nitrogen-filled tanks for the launcher.3159 The request bears a handwritten note from Perišić stating
“Check also with Ðokić”,3160 thereby indicating that Perišić gave his agreement in principle. That
same date, Mladić asked Perišić to dispatch an expert team led by Ðokić to assist the VRS in
resolving problems with its rockets and “modified anti-aircraft defence equipment”.3161 Mladić
stated that Ðokić was “familiar with the essence of the problem and is willing to help”.3162 Perišić
handwrote the following note on Mladić’s request: “Give it to Ðokić / Let him arrange it if he can /
And report back to me today”.3163 Ðokić admitted that he participated in this mission.3164
1103. Modified air-bombs lacked guiding systems and it was consequently impossible to
adequately predict their trajectory and target.3165 Their usage on civilian areas of Sarajevo was not
legitimate, particularly since they served to terrify and kill civilians.3166 Ðokić stated that he did not
become aware until after the war that modified air-bombs were fired on Sarajevo civilians, and that
these weapons were “not at all planned nor designed to be used in urban communities”, a practice
that he described as “totally inappropriate and wrong”.3167
1104. The Pretis military factory in Bosnia produced modified air-bombs for the VRS.3168 As
previously noted, Major Markovi}, a Pretis engineer on the VJ payroll, was responsible for
modifying air-bombs.3169 The Trial Chamber recalls that the only reasonable inference presented by
the evidentiary record is that the modification of air-bombs at Pretis was based on the successful
technical model developed by Ivan Ðokić and the VJ General Staff.
1105. Only 100kg and 250kg air-bombs were modified at Pretis, as plans to manufacture 500kg
and 1,000kg modified air-bombs were thwarted by the NATO bombing of the factory in September
1995.3170 During the war, Pretis neither manufactured the air-bombs themselves nor the rocket
3159
3160
3161
3162
3163
3164
3165
3166
3167
3168
3169
3170
Ex. P2723, Request from Ratko Mladić to Perišić for Nitrogen Tanks, 31 May 1995; Ivan Ðokić, T. 14484.
Ibid.
Ex. P2722, Request from Ratko Mladić to Perišić for Expert Assistance, 31 May 1995; Ivan Ðokić, T. 1448114483.
Ex. P2722, Request from Ratko Mladić to Perišić for Expert Assistance, 31 May 1995.
Ex. P2722, Request from Ratko Mladić to Perišić for Expert Assistance, 31 May 1995; Ivan Ðokić, T. 1448214483.
Ivan Ðokić, T. 14483.
Ex. P66, Transcript of Thomas Knustad from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 1990; Ex. P479, Transcript of
Thorbjørn Øvergård from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 643-644; Hubertus J.W. Bruurmijn, T. 2643-2645,
2698-2699.
Ex. P66, Transcript of Thomas Knustad from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 1990-1992; Ex. P479, Transcript of
Thorbjørn Øvergård from Prosecutor v. D. Milo{evi}, T. 643-644. See supra section V.A.4.(e), (f), (h).
Ivan Ðokić, T. 14494.
MP-14, T. 3646-3647, 3652-3654 (closed session); Ex. P75, Witness Statement of \or|e \uki}, 4/29 February
1996, p. 4; Ex. P76, Supplementary Statement of \or|e \uki} on Modified Rocket System, 4/29 February 1996,
p. 2.
MP-14, T. 3646-3647 (closed session).
MP-14, T. 3654-3656 (closed session). In May 1994, Pretis sought to obtain Grad 122mm rocket engines for
modified air-bombs from the FRY MOD by urging Mladić to ask Perišić to intervene on Pretis’ behalf.
According to MP-14, this particular request concerned 1,000kg modified air-bombs that were never
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motor engines installed on the air-bombs, and Pretis had to procure these items in order to modify
the air-bombs.3171
1106. Pretis obtained certain air-bombs from the reserves left behind by the VJ in Bosnia,3172 a
period preceding Perišić’s appointment as Chief of General Staff. The modified air-bombs
assembled by Pretis were sent to the Koran Depot.3173 Starting in 1995, part of them were also
directly delivered to the 3rd Sarajevo Brigade for usage in Sarajevo, while the rest of the air-bombs
were sent to other units, including the Drina Corps, as well as the Bijeljina Base in the area of the
East Bosnia Corps.3174
1107. Several order sheets indicate that the SRK and other VRS units received modified air-bombs
from Pretis. On 19 April 1995, the VRS Main Staff directed Pretis to produce at least ten modified
air-bombs.3175 On 16 May 1995, it organised Pretis’ production of four modified air-bombs for the
SRK’s needs.3176 It subsequently made arrangements for Pretis to prepare eleven modified airbombs for the needs of the 1st Trebava Infantry Brigade.3177 On 20 June 1995, the VRS Main Staff
coordinated Pretis’ production of fourteen modified air-bombs for the SRK, as well as fifteen
modified air-bombs for the VRS’s 27th Logistics Base.3178 The next day, it made a separate
arrangement for the VRS’s 35th Logistics Base to deliver twenty-nine air-bombs to Pretis so they
could be modified with rocket motors and thereafter be supplied to the 27th Logistics Base.3179 On
28 June 1995, it planned Pretis’ delivery of five air-bombs to the Ilidža Brigade,3180 a unit that was
part of the SRK.3181
1108. The VJ General Staff further assisted the VRS with additional aspects of firing these
weapons. Mladić’s diary indicates as “resolved” an apparent request to Perišić for an aerial bomb
launcher.3182 Witness MP-14 testified that Grad engines were used to launch modified air-
3171
3172
3173
3174
3175
3176
3177
3178
3179
3180
3181
3182
manufactured because of the NATO bombing. Ex. P604, Request Addressed to VRS Main Staff by Milorad
Motika, 10 May 1994; MP-14, T. 3654-3656 (closed session).
MP-14, T. 3651-3653 (closed session).
Ex. P75, Witness Statement of \or|e \uki}, 4/29 February 1996, p. 4.
MP-14, T. 3654 (closed session).
Ibid.
Ex. P606, Letters from VRS Main Staff Regarding Air Bombs, 19 April 1995.
Ex. P605, Document from VRS Main Staff, Logistics Sector, 16 May 2009. See MP-14, T. 3652, 3657-3658
(closed session).
Ex. P607, Main Staff VRS Order, 28 May 1995. See MP-14, T. 3659-3660 (closed session).
Ex. P608/P609, VRS Order to Pretis Regarding Supply of Air Bombs, 20 June 1995. See MP-14, T. 3660
(closed session).
Ex. P610, Order of the VRS Main Staff Related to Air Bombs to be Delivered to Pretis, 21 June 1995. See MP14, T. 3661-3662 (closed session).
The order also refers to 410 bullets and 100 mines. Ex. P978, Order Regarding Ammunition, 28 June 1995.
Borivoje Tešić, T. 1988-1989.
Ex. P2935, Excerpt from Ratko Mladi}'s Notebook, 27 December 1993.
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bombs.3183 The record demonstrates that the VJ General Staff supplied certain Grad engines to the
VRS, as Perišić “ordered” that 200 Grad engines “be handed over to VRS” in June 1995.3184
6. Provision of Fuel
1109. A memorandum from the 1st Krajina Corps Command outlines the procedure for VRS units
obtaining fuel from the FRY based on guidelines from the VJ General Staff and VRS Main Staff:
“Issue of fuel will be done on the Yugoslav Army filling stations as follows: a) Diesel fuel D-2 on
the ‘Topčider’ barracks filling station. b) Gasoline fuel MB-98 on the [VJ General Staff]
Headquarters Administration filling station”.3185 General Mladi} also believed that the VRS could
obtain fuel from the 608th Logistics Base of the VJ.3186
1110. In an intercepted conversation between Perišić and Slobodan Milošević on 2 May 1995,
Perišić recounted that General Mladić had complained about the VRS’ fuel shortage being “a big
problem”, and Perišić noted that 700 tonnes of fuel were at the customs office, waiting to be
delivered to the VRS.3187
1111. On 16 June 1995, the SRK Command wrote to the VRS Main Staff asking permission to
import 38,600 litres of fuel for itself and 12,400 litres for the Igman Infantry Brigade.3188 The letter
specifies that the transfer had been approved by the VJ General Staff.3189
1112. Pursuant to Perišić’s confidential directives, the VJ routinely issued fuel for particular VRS
vehicles, including those transporting Mladić, Milan Gvero and other VRS Generals.3190 As
3183
3184
3185
3186
3187
3188
3189
3190
MP-14, T. 3654-3655 (closed session).
Ex. P1255, VJ General Staff Internal Memo Regarding VRS Request for Assistance, 28 June 1995. Another
exhibit confirms Perišić’s decision. See Ex. P2731, Documents Relating to Urgent Request of Mladi} to Peri{i}
on Transfer of 200 Motors Purchased for the VRS to the RS, 27 June 1995.
Ex. P996, 1st Krajina Corps Command Order, 20 December 1993.
Ex. P2158, Document Issued by Ratko Mladić Regarding Logistical Support, undated, p. 2. The 608th Logistics
Base was identified as a VJ base by two witnesses. Miodrag Simi}, T. 10155; Mladen Mihajlovi}, T. 3886.
Ex. P1316, Intercepted Conversation, 2 May 1995, p. 3.
Ex. P995, SRK Request for Approval for Importing Fuel From the FRY, 16 June 1995.
Ibid.
Ex. P876, Order of the VJ General Staff on the Issuance of Materiel, 10 May 1994 (30 litres for the “needs” of
Gvero); Ex. P909, VJ General Staff Order to Issue Material Supplies, 19 January 1994 (90 litres to transport
wounded VRS soldiers); Ex. P910, Cabinet of the Chief of the VJ General Staff Order to Issue Material
Supplies, 19 January 1994 (70 litres for an ambulance); Ex. P911, Cabinet of the Chief of the VJ General Staff
Order to Issue Material Supplies, 6 July 1994 (45 litres for a medical vehicle); Ex. P1154, Order of the VJ
Regarding Issuance of Material Supplies, 5 January 1994 (40 litres at the behest of VRS General \or|e Ðukić);
Ex. P1155, Order of the VJ Relating to Issuance of Material Supplies to the VRS, 14 January 1994 (50 litres at
the behest of VRS General Milivoj Borić); Ex. P1156, Order of the VJ Relating to Issuance of Material Supplies
to the VRS, 20 January 1994 (80 litres Mladić’s “needs”); Ex. P1157, Order of the VJ Relating to Issuance of
Material Supplies to the VRS, 20 January 1994 (80 litres at the behest of VRS Colonel Milorad Gavrić);
Ex. P1158, Order of the VJ Relating to Issuance of Material Supplies to the VRS, 25 January 1994 (100 litres for
the VRS generally); Ex. P1159, Order of the VJ Relating to Issuance of Material Supplies to the VRS, 1
February 1994 (80 litres for Mladić’s “needs”); Ex. P1160, Order of the VJ Relating to Issuance of Material
Supplies to the VRS, 17 February 1994 (80 litres for Mladić’s “needs”); Ex. P1161, Order of the VJ Relating to
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previously mentioned, the Trial Chamber also heard testimony that the VJ dispatched convoys of
civilian trucks to deliver fuel to the VRS.3191
1113. Certain documents stipulate that Perišić approved the provision of 2,000kg of “oil, type
UAMS”, 5,000 kg of “oil, type ZUON”3192 and 2,000 litres of “HUNT-S” oil.3193
1114. Hence, the Trial Chamber does not deem Siniša Borović credible in his claim that
“[s]upplying the Army of Republika Srpska and the Army of Republic of Serbian Krajina with fuel
in an organised manner was not something that was carried out [by the VJ]”.3194
1115. However, in assessing the provision of fuel, the Trial Chamber has also chosen not to rely
on various documents on provision of fuel lacking the indicia of reliability discussed above, as they
do not convincingly show that the procurement was part of the logistical assistance process
approved by Perišić and the VJ General Staff in conjunction with the VRS Main Staff.3195
3191
3192
3193
3194
3195
Issuance of Material Supplies to the VRS, 8 March 1994 (80 litres “for the needs of” VRS Captain Ratomir
Maksimović); Ex. P1162, Order of the VJ Relating to Issuance of Material Supplies to the VRS, 15 March 1994
(80 litres for Mladić’s “needs”); Ex. P1163, Order of the VJ Relating to Issuance of Material Supplies to the
VRS, 21 March 1994 (40 litres for Mladić’s “needs”); Ex. P1164, Order of the VJ Relating to Issuance of
Material Supplies to the VRS, 25 March 1994 (48 litres for the VRS’s “needs” generally); Ex. P1165, Order of
the VJ Relating to Issuance of Material Supplies to the VRS, 31 March 1994 (60 litres for the VRS’s “needs”);
Ex. P1166, Order of the VJ Relating to Issuance of Material Supplies to the VRS, 1 April 1994 (60 litres for the
VRS’s “needs” generally); Ex. P1167, Order of the VJ Relating to Issuance of Material Supplies to the VRS, 4
April 1994 (180 litres for the VRS’s “needs” generally); Ex. P1168, Order of the VJ Relating to Issuance of
Material Supplies to the VRS, 5 April 1994 (50 litres for the VRS’s “needs” generally); Ex. P1169, Order of the
VJ Relating to Issuance of Material Supplies to the VRS, 5 April 1994 (50 litres for Mladić’s “needs”);
Ex. P1170, Order of the VJ Relating to Issuance of Material Supplies to the VRS, 26 April 1994 (90 litres for
Mladić’s “needs”); Ex. P1171, Order of the VJ Relating to Issuance of Material Supplies to the VRS, 3 May
1994 (50 litres for the VRS’s “needs” generally); Ex. P1172, Order of the VJ Relating to Issuance of Material
Supplies to the VRS, 9 May 1994 (60 litres for the VRS’s “needs” generally); Ex. P1173, Order of the VJ
Relating to Issuance of Material Supplies to the VRS, 13 May 1994 (30 litres for Gvero’s “needs”); Ex. P1174,
Order of the VJ Relating to Issuance of Material Supplies to the VRS, 19 May 1994 (60 litres for Mladić’s
“needs”); Ex. P1175, Order of the VJ Relating to Issuance of Material Supplies to the VRS, 23 May 1994 (60
litres for Mladić’s “needs); Ex. P1176, Order of the VJ Relating to Issuance of Material Supplies to the VRS, 2
June 1994 (40 litres for Gvero’s “needs”); Ex. P1177, Order of the VJ Relating to Issuance of Material Supplies
to the VRS, 6 June 1994 (40 litres for Gvero’s “needs”); Ex. P1178, Order of the VJ Relating to Issuance of
Material Supplies to the VRS, 9 June 1994 (25 litres for Mladić’s “needs”); Ex. P1179, Order of the VJ Relating
to Issuance of Material Supplies to the VRS, 21 June 1994 (40 litres for Gvero’s “needs”); Ex. P1180, Order of
the VJ Relating to Issuance of Material Supplies to the VRS, 18 July 1994 (80 litres for Mladić’s “needs”);
Ex. P1181, Order of the VJ Relating to Issuance of Material Supplies to the VRS, 18 July 1994 (80 litres for
Mladić’s “needs”); Ex. P1828, Order by the VJ Chief of General Staff, 5 May 1994 (60 litres for Mladić’s
“needs”); Ex. P1829, Order by the VJ Chief of General Staff, 1 July 1994 (100 litres for Mladić’s “needs”).
Milomir Kova~evi}, T. 6056, 6058, 6065-6074, 6114.
Ex. P1270, VJ Order Regarding Supply of Ammunition to 30th PC, 31 March 1994.
Ex. P1272, VJ Order Regarding Supply of Ammunition to 30th PC, 22 May 1994.
Sini{a Borovi}, T. 14000.
Ex. P993, Document Sent by the Commander of the 4th Podrinje Light Infantry Brigade to the Drina Corps
Command, 7 October 1993 (fuel from “Belgrade Military Post 9809”, with no mention of Peri{i} or the General
Staff); Ex. P992, VRS Main Staff Cable, 14 November 1995 (VRS Main Staff notified several units that fuel had
been imported from the FRY but did not specify if it had been procured with the assistance of the VJ General
Staff); Ex. P994, SRK Request Regarding Fuel Supply Through VJ, 3 May 1995 (states that the VJ assisted with
the delivery of fuel purchased on the FRY market, although no mention of the VJ General Staff in what may
have been a clandestine transaction “through confidential persons in the [VJ]”).
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7. Lack of Payment for Military Supplies
1116. Momčilo Peri{ić’s directives referred to “Economic assistance”3196 and “Financial
assistance” from the VJ to the VRS and did not mention the need for remuneration.3197 At the
monthly coordination meetings that Perišić chaired, Mladić informed the audience of the VRS’s
needs and asked for the VJ’s help.3198 Perišić referred on various occasions to giving supplies to the
VRS.3199 Ðukić’s statement further demonstrates that the object of his meetings with Peri{ić at the
headquarters of the VJ General Staff in Belgrade was to solicit aid free of charge.3200 Indeed, the
aforestated material lists make no reference to payment. Instead, a dispatch note reflects the VJ
General Staff’s order that “ammunition is to be issued free of charge”.3201
1117. Mladić himself told the RS National Assembly that nearly half of the VRS’s total
ammunition was provided by the VJ “as humanitarian aid”.3202 The only reasonable inference from
this language is that this ammunition was not paid for. Mladić further distinguished ammunition
procured through VJ “aid” from purchased ammunition.3203 Ðor|e Ðukić himself stated that the RS
MOD paid FRY manufacturers only “[o]ccasionally”.3204 Milan Babić too explained that RS did not
pay for certain weapons because it lacked sufficient funds, as he witnessed after participating in a
meeting with Karadžić and other individuals.3205 Tellingly, a VRS Main Staff tabular report of
ammunition obtained in 1994 does not indicate a price next to the ammunition obtained from the
VJ, whereas it includes a price next to the ammunition separately procured from the RS
government.3206
1118. In the course of Mladić and Perišić’s visit to the Krušik weapons factory, Perišić was
recorded as explaining that the object of the meeting was to see “what we can offer as assistance”,
“what can be delivered with and without payment” and “what is possible by way of
3196
3197
3198
3199
3200
3201
3202
3203
3204
3205
Ex. P1626, Official Note from the Meeting of the VJ Supreme Command Staff, 27 September 1993, p. 4.
Ex. P878, Tasks Set by Perišić at the Supreme Command Staff Meeting of 27 September 1993, 26 October 1993,
p. 3.
MP-80, T. 8323-8325 (closed session).
Ex. P1470, Intercepted Conversation, 22 December 1995, p. 5; Ex. P629, Telegram from the VRS 3rd Podrinje
Mountain Infantry Brigade to the VRS Main Staff and the VJ General Staff, 24 September 1993; Mladen
Mihajlovi}, T. 3935 (private session); Ex. P625, Request from Ratko Mladić to Perišić Regarding
Communications Equipment, 7 October 1993. See also Ex. P626, Response from the Chief of the
Communications Administration to the Cabinet of the Chief of the VJ General Staff, date illegible.
Ex. P75, Witness Statement of \or|e \uki}, 4/29 February 1996, pp 3-4.
Ex. P1269, VJ Order Regarding Supply of Ammunition to VRS, 19 November 1993.
Ex. P312, Transcript of the Tape Recording of the 50th Session of the National Assembly, 15 and 16 April 1995,
p. 51. The FRY’s sanctions against RS barred the delivery of goods except those identified as “humanitarian
aid”. Miodrag Simić, T. 9996.
Ex. P312, Transcript of the Tape Recording of the 50th Session of the National Assembly, 15 and 16 April 1995,
p. 51.
Ex. P75, Witness Statement of \or|e \uki}, 4/29 February 1996, p. 4.
Ex. P53 (under seal).
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compensation”,3207 thereby demonstrating that part of the weaponry supplied to the VRS was free of
charge and part was paid for.
1119. VRS weapons produced by Pretis were tested at no cost at the VJ’s Technical Testing
Centre at Nikinci, as reported by the RS Minister of Defence: “[T]he use of the training ground/s in
the territory of the FR Yugoslavia was carried out free of charge, with all available equipment,
means, and necessary manpower. There was never a single case of the military controllers from
Republika Srpska encountering any lack of understanding whatsoever”.3208
1120. On 15 January 1995, the VRS Main Staff reported that the VJ had “selflessly been offering
us humanitarian assistance and services which are extremely important for Republika Srpska”, and
encouraged the RS Prime Minister to offer the VJ “a gift, at least once, as a token of our gratitude
and attention”, namely “2000m³ of lumber” for the VJ’s purposes.3209
1121. Payment was demanded in certain cases. On 16 March 1994, the SDC concluded: “Given
that in 1994 military industry production is the only source of weapons and military equipment
supplies, Republika Srpska and the RSK must provide the necessary funds for their needs”.3210
Similarly, after Mladić wrote to the VJ General Staff to propose that a factory in Kruševac, Serbia,
produce a disabling chemical agent (“CS”) for its anti-sabotage and anti-terrorist activities, Perišić’s
Chief of Cabinet responded:
We agree that this is a very important substance and that the procedure on getting the final product
should be accelerated. ₣...ğ Since the final products are needed by both the VJ and the VRS, and
since we are talking of urgent needs, and everything is made more complicated due to the
difficulties in securing the finances, it would be appropriate that, in order to accelerate the whole
process and the set up of the section of a factory and the production of the [chemical agent], the
GŠ VRS [Main Staff] participated in financing the set up of the section of a factory according to
its means, in the part where the cost is borne by the investor.3211
In this instance, the VJ General Staff expected the VRS Main Staff to pay for the production of the
chemical agent “according to its means”, thereby suggesting that the VJ General Staff would cover
the remaining amount. The Defence argues that it cannot be known whether this chemical agent
3206
3207
3208
3209
3210
Ex. P1214, Annual Financial Statement of the Plan of Tasks and Financing of the VRS for 1994, 17 February
1995, pp 19-21.
Ex. P2928, Excerpt from Ratko Mladi}'s Notebook, 7 July 1994, p. 1.
Ex. P1061, RS MOD Memo Addressed to the RS Government, 11 July 1993, p. 2 (emphasis added). The Nikinci
facility was overseen by the VJ General Staff. Radojica Kadijević, T. 13682.
Ex. P1211, Correspondence Between the VRS Main Staff and the RS Prime Minister Regarding the
Construction of a Material Gift for the VJ, 15 January 1995.
Ex. P710, Minutes of the 19th Session of the SDC, 16 March 1994, p. 2. A RS MOD report on weaponry
procured during the sanctions period lists millions of weapons under the general category of “[p]urchases and
donations”, and is therefore unhelpful in distinguishing weaponry that was purchased from weaponry that was
donated. Ex. P1534, Work Report of the RS MOD for the Period of August 1994 - November 1995, November
1995, p. 5.
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was produced by “the military part of the plant or the civilian part of the plant”.3212 Regardless of
how production was technically arranged at the factory, the Trial Chamber finds that the
correspondence plainly demonstrates that the agent was produced for military purposes and that the
VJ General Staff was involved in the process.
1122. A November 1995 report by the RS MOD stated that the assistance from state-owned
military companies in FRY was linked to its ability to pay for their services.3213 The same report
nonetheless posited that the VJ assented to an agreement that would “help” the VRS by “covering
all costs and debts” that the RS had incurred in its dealings with the VJ General Staff’s Čačak
facility “from the beginning of the war to the end of 1994”, the debt amounting to “about four
million dinars”.3214 The VJ had also “allowed [the VRS] to use the facilities and services of the
Moma Stanojlović Airforce Complex in Batajnica for free from the beginning of the war until the
end of 1994”.3215 The VJ-VRS agreement encompassed the “delivery of essential spare parts,
assembly sets and machinery from their stores, technical documentation and all other forms of
assistance for the Army of Republika Srpska to fight successfully”, manifestly free of charge.3216
1123. Free assistance from the VJ was crucial to the VRS because its financial situation was
“extremely poor” and had worsened between August 1994 and November 1995, partly due to the
FRY’s “economic blockade” against RS.3217 “[F]inancial resources were certainly not sufficient to
satisfy the [VRS]’s overall requirements”, which led to the “[i]mpossibility of compensation” for
certain supplies.3218
1124. On the other hand, the RS MOD technically had to purchase supplies it obtained from FRY
special purpose industries, such as Prvi Partizan in U`ice, Sloboda in Čačak and Krušik in
Valjevo.3219 Unlike the VJ, the FRY state companies that delivered military supplies to the VRS’s
3211
3212
3213
3214
3215
3216
3217
3218
3219
Ex. P1139, Correspondence Between VRS Commander Mladi} and VJ on Start of Industrial Production of “CS”
Chemical Agent, 26 January 1994, p. 5.
Defence Final Brief, paras 715-717 (citing Radojica Kadijević, T. 13624-13627).
Ex. P1534, Work Report of the RS MOD for the Period of August 1994 - November 1995, November 1995, p. 6.
Ex. P1534, Work Report of the RS MOD for the Period of August 1994 - November 1995, November 1995, p. 7.
The Čačak facility was administered by the VJ General Staff. Jugoslav Kodžopeljić, T. 12494.
Ex. P1534, Work Report of the RS MOD for the Period of August 1994 - November 1995, November 1995, p. 7
(italics in original).
Ibid.
Ex. P1534, Work Report of the RS MOD for the Period of August 1994 - November 1995, November 1995,
p. 18.
Ex. P1534, Work Report of the RS MOD for the Period of August 1994 - November 1995, November 1995, p. 9.
Ex. P75, Witness Statement of \or|e \uki}, 4/29 February 1996, p. 4; Ex. P1534, Work Report of the RS MOD
for the Period of August 1994 - November 1995, November 1995, p. 7 (“The engagement of these industries
from the FRY is linked to our ability to pay for their services, primarily that of special-purpose production
enterprises”). The Sloboda factory appears to be a different facility from the Čačak overhaul facility. See
generally Jugoslav Kodžopeljić, T. 12494.
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Koran Depot always sent an invoice for payment.3220 Invoices were submitted to the RS MOD.3221
Notably, on 27 June 1993, the VRS Main Staff reported having made a contract to buy 2 million
bullets from Prvi Partizan and to have 1 million damaged shells overhauled by the Fasau company,
also based in U`ice; and asked the RS MOD for permission to conduct these transactions.3222 On 22
February 1993, the 1st Krajina Corps Command notified the VRS Main Staff that it had made an
agreement to purchase 2 million bullets from Prvi Partizan for the sum of 250,000
Deutschmarks.3223 The letter states: “We hereby ask the [Main Staff VRS] to purchase this same
quantity of ammunition or to allow us to buy the aforementioned quantity through donors from
municipal assemblies in the zone of the 1st [Krajina Corps]”.3224 In July 1994, the SDC indicated
that RS and RSK had provided funds for their needs in FRY military materiel.3225 The VRS Main
Staff reported that it had spent 1,954,192 dinars on purchasing ammunition between March and
December 1994,3226 presumably from the FRY since no evidence establishes that the VRS received
ammunition from any other country.3227
1125. In practice, the RS and the VRS had difficulty complying with their contracts whenever the
VJ or FRY government demanded payment. As of November 1993, the VRS had a debt of 8 million
U.S. dollars to military companies, a situation that “practically prevented further purchases of
production material, which comes mainly from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia”.3228 RS
recognised that it was able to effect “very few payments to weapons and ammunition producers,
both in Republika Srpska and the FRY”.3229 For instance, in January 1994, the RS MOD advised the
VJ General Staff that it could not pay in full its debt of 547,541 German marks for the past overhaul
of VRS equipment at the Čačak TRZ.3230 RS proposed to pay only part of the debt in the amount of
135,678 marks while making the following plea: “Taking into consideration the financial situation
3220
3221
3222
3223
3224
3225
3226
3227
3228
3229
3230
MP-14, T. 3617-3618 (closed session).
MP-14, T. 3617-3618 (closed session). Two “dispatch notes” for deliveries of military supplies to the VRS from
manufacturers in Serbia were introduced into evidence, although neither mentions a purchase price. See
Ex. P597, Dispatch Note of Krušik, 4 November 1993; Ex. P598, Dispatch Note of Krušik, 20 December 1993;
MP-14, T. 3618-3620, 3724-3727 (closed session).
Ex. D51, Letter from the VRS Main Staff to the RS Ministry of the Defence, 27 June 1993; MP-14, T. 3731
(closed session). The letter does not mention the price of these transactions.
Ex. D50, Letter from Commander of the 1st Krajina Corps to the VRS Main Staff, 22 February 1993; MP-14,
T. 3728-3729 (closed session).
Ex. D50, Letter from Commander of the 1st Krajina Corps to the VRS Main Staff, 22 February 1993.
Ex. D455, FRY MOD Letter, 29 July 1994.
Ex. P1214, Annual Financial Statement of the Plan of Tasks and Financing of the VRS for 1994, 17 February
1995, pp 4-6.
See infra section VI.C.9.(a).
Ex. P1251, Report on VRS Financial Situation, November 1993, p. 5.
Ex. P1251, Report on VRS Financial Situation, November 1993, p. 2.
Ex. P1066, Memo Addressed to the Logistical Sector of the VJ General Staff Regarding Payments for Repairs of
the VRS Technical Means, 31 January 1994.
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in the VRS and the situation in the Čačak TRZ, we hope that you will accept our proposal of partial
settlement of the debt to the Čačak TRZ”.3231
1126. Jugoslav Kodžopeljić, who oversaw the Čačak facility for the VJ General Staff,3232
insistently claimed that RS systematically paid for services provided by that facility or would
otherwise be sued: “It is certain that the [Čačak] overhaul institute signed contracts, and based on
the contracts, payments had to be effected. If payments were not effected, then the commercial
court would hear the case and see why the payments had not been effected. I never received
information that a payment had not been effected”; “payments were effected in one of the agreed
ways. The payment could be the so-called barter, the exchange of certain parts and elements. And I
guarantee you that everything was paid. If payment was envisaged, payment was effected ₣...ğ It is
impossible for a payment not to be received because that would merit proceedings to be instituted to
recover the debt”.3233 The Trial Chamber does not find Kodžopeljić credible on this point as well.
Along with other evidence demonstrating the VRS’ frequent inability to pay, Ex. P10663234 and the
aforementioned Ex. P1534 directly concern the Čačak facility,3235 and contradict Kodžopeljić’s
claim.3236
1127. On 10 January 1994, Perišić warned the SDC that it had failed to take into account the VRS
and SVK’s financing needs in logistical assistance, which he estimated at 522 million dollars and
307 million dollars respectively.3237 Perišić still believed that the VRS and SVK should pay for
certain supplies, pointing out that “in the current situation there is no chance we can provide
assistance to the ones over there, except if they compensate us. For instance, we give them 100,000
pieces of ammunition, they give us the money, we put in the production to produce it”.3238 Slobodan
Milošević agreed and noted that Karadžić had agreed to set aside 20 million dollars in reserves from
the RS National Bank for such purposes.3239
1128. At a subsequent Supreme Defence Council meeting in June, Perišić reported that the VJ was
facing financial difficulties (“reserve supplies have been depleted and we have no money to buy
new ones”), and expressed frustration that the VRS and SVK were still not paying for military
3231
3232
3233
3234
3235
3236
3237
3238
3239
Ibid.
Jugoslav Kodžopeljić, T. 12313.
Jugoslav Kodžopeljić, T. 12516-12517 (emphasis added).
Ex. P1066, Memo Addressed to the Logistical Sector of the VJ General Staff Regarding Payments for Repairs of
the VRS Technical Means, 31 January 1994.
Ex. P1534, Work Report of the RS MOD for the Period of August 1994 - November 1995, November 1995, p. 7.
On Kodžopeljić’s lack of credibility, see also supra section VI.C.2.(a).
Ex. P791, Stenographic Transcript of the 17th Session of the SDC, 10 January 1994, pp 4-5, 56.
Ex. P791, Stenographic Transcript of the 17th Session of the SDC, 10 January 1994, p. 83.
Ex. P791, Stenographic Transcript of the 17th Session of the SDC, 10 January 1994, p. 84.
354
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supplies received from the VJ.3240 He added: “We don’t have anything to give them in these budget
conditions because that would directly affect our reserves. If we reduce our reserves, which are
minimal, we would put ourselves in danger in case of a conflict on the southern borders towards
Albania or in Kosovo itself”.3241 Perišić also criticised the RS and RSK political leadership for
relying excessively on funding from the FRY: “[T]hey didn’t earmark any funds for the army, they
did this only superficially. They have no laws or a defined budget for the army and so on. They rely
solely on us and come to us with demands”.3242 He emphasised: “Most equipment has to be repaired
and we do that. This requires considerable funds which we do not have. We propose that they find a
solution – we will do the repair, but they have to reimburse the costs either as compensation or
otherwise. These costs have amounted to 560,000 DEM in 1993. They haven’t paid a single penny
of this amount”.3243 “Another example is reimbursement for fuel. They come here, we give them
fuel but we are not reimbursed”.3244
1129. Perišić’s sentiment was echoed by Zoran Lilić, the FRY President, who dismissed a
suggestion by Pavle Bulatović – the FRY Defence Minister who technically oversaw the special
purpose industries’ contracts – that the VRS and SVK would henceforth pay for the military
supplies, as Lilić told Bulatović: “They said the same thing last time, and before that and every
time. I think there is no point in discussing this at all”; to which Perišić concurred: “They’re not
giving anything”.3245 However, neither Perišić nor the other attendants suggested that the FRY’s
logistical assistance to the VRS and SVK should be discontinued. Instead, Perišić stressed that it
was necessary to continue helping the VRS and SVK because they would otherwise start losing
territories.3246 Perišić went on to encourage the SDC to approve the grant of ammunition and spare
parts for the VRS and SVK.3247
1130. Two weeks later, the SDC reiterated: “The Federal Defence Ministry shall use [FRY] funds,
as well as funds secured by RS and the RSK for their needs, to organise the production and
purchase of materiel and technical equipment”.3248 But no evidence indicates that these resolutions
were enforced and that the VRS and SVK eventually started paying for a significant proportion of
the supplies they obtained. Rather, Mihajlović thereafter wrote in a memorandum that the VJ
3240
3241
3242
3243
3244
3245
3246
3247
3248
Ex. P776, Stenographic Transcript of the 21st Session of the SDC, 7 June 1994, p. 39.
Ex. P776, Stenographic Transcript of the 21st Session of the SDC, 7 June 1994, p. 38.
Ibid.
Ex. P776, Stenographic Transcript of the 21st Session of the SDC, 7 June 19944, p. 39.
Ex. P776, Stenographic Transcript of the 21st Session of the SDC, 7 June 1994, p. 40.
Ex. P776, Stenographic Transcript of the 21st Session of the SDC, 7 June 1994, p. 42.
Ex. P776, Stenographic Transcript of the 21st Session of the SDC, 7 June 1994, pp 38-39.
Ex. P776, Stenographic Transcript of the 21st Session of the SDC, 7 June 1994, p. 39.
Ex. P754, Minutes from the 23rd Session of the SDC held on 21 July 1994, p. 3.
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General Staff “approves the redistribution of engineering military equipment and arms, without
remuneration”.3249
1131. Towards the end of the war, Perišić said “I could have retained the material reserves” but
“[w]e gave all we had always” and “did not receive a single Dinar for giving”.3250
1132. In 1998, several years after the war, the Krušik military factory in Valjevo, Serbia, informed
military post Vlasenica - Han Pijesak, a former VRS base, that it still had to settle its financial debt
for 540 mines provided by Krušik in 1994, thereby demonstrating that this materiel was supplied
without payment during the war.3251 Another 1998 document indicates that the Bijeljina Special
Brigade Police-MUP had yet to settle its debt to Krušik for materiel supplied in 1994.3252
1133. While the bulk of the evidence suggests that the VJ usually gave logistical assistance to the
VRS free of charge or at significantly reduced cost, the VRS Krajina Corps reported having
purchased in the FRY a total of 3,617,440 bullets of various calibres and 4,618 mines with their
own funds.3253 Additionally, in May 1995, General Dragomir Milošević notified the VRS Main
Staff that the SRK purchased part of its supplies: “Over the past three or four months we have been
obtaining fuel by buying it on the open market in the FRY ₣...ğ which has been paid for by social
funds and businesses in the Corps’ zone of responsibility”.3254
1134. Pretis itself obtained certain materials through sale contracts,3255 although it was atypical for
Pretis to purchase materials during the war given the shortage of money to pay for materials.3256
Pretis commonly engaged in “barter agreements” whereby it offered to provide other products as a
form of non-monetary payment.3257
3249
3250
3251
3252
3253
3254
3255
3256
3257
Ex. P622, Approval by the Engineering Administration of the Land Forces of the VJ General Staff Addressed to
Military Post 9808, 16 May 1995 (emphasis added). See Mladen Mihajlović, T. 3896-3898.
Ex. P2203, Transcript of the Collegium of the Chief of the VJ General Staff, 6 November 1995, p. 3. See
Miodrag Star~ević, T. 6787-6788.
Ex. D458, Note to Han Pijesak from Kru{ik Valjevo; Radojica Kadijević, T. 13659-13662.
Ex. D459, Overview of Debt of Bijeljina MUP – Kru{ik Valjevo; Radojica Kadijević, T. 13662-13663.
Ex. P1213, Correspondence Between the 1st Krajina Corps Command and the VRS Main Staff Regarding
Reception of Military Equipment, 11 July 1994. Certain VRS units directly bought ammunition with funds
obtained from private donors without resorting to the VRS Main Staff, MP-14, T. 3729 (closed session).
Ex. P994, SRK Request Regarding Fuel Supply Through VJ, 3 May 1995.
See Ex. P1064, Exchange Contract Between Kru{ik DD and Pretis, 8 August 1994 (Pretis purchased detonators,
gun cartridges, and primary charges for shells from the Krušik military company in Valjevo, Serbia for a total
value of 1,277,920 dinars, the prices of the items being set by the VJ and FRY Defence Ministry); Ex. P513,
Contract Between Pretis and Kragujevac TRZ, 20 July 1995 (Pretis purchased 10,000 mines, 200 flash bombs,
2,000 automatic rifle clips, 5,000 cartridges, and 2,000,000 bullets from the Kragujevac TRZ, the price to be
determined in the “annexes to the contract”). See also Ex. P505, Transcript of Nikola To{ovi} Deposition, 13
December 2008, T. 41.
Ex. P506, Transcript of Nikola To{ovi} Deposition, 14 December 2008, T. 101, 104.
Ex. P506, Transcript of Nikola To{ovi} Deposition, 14 December 2008,T. 87-88, 104-107. See also Ex. P511,
RS MOD Authorisation to Pretis to Conclude a Barter Agreement, 26 November 1993 (The RS Defence
Ministry, acting on behalf of Pretis, proposed a “barter agreement” to the VJ General Staff’s Kragujevac
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8. Military Training of VRS Troops
1135. At the outset, the Defence submits that Perišić had no authority over the training of VRS
troops by the VJ, and argues that the decision to train them was made by the SDC, not Perišić.3258
1136. An order by the VJ Chief of General Staff, dated 23 August 1993, regulated the instruction
of VRS personnel in target and anti-aircraft shooting at the Pasuljanske Livade base.3259 The Trial
Chamber finds, however, that this particular order was presumably issued by Momčilo Perišić’s
predecessor, as Perišić did not officially become Chief of General Staff before 26 August 1993.
1137. On 25 December 1993, Momir Bulatović addressed the SDC about the “training of recruits”,
emphasising that “we can only do this by observing the law – military cooperation between the
FRY and other state entities. We cannot send children there”.3260 Perišić, then serving as VJ Chief
of General Staff, agreed: “That’s what we suggested too – to receive them here, train them, and
then they can go”.3261
1138. On 16 March 1994, Perišić told the SDC that the VRS and SVK had requested training for
their cadets.3262 Perišić noted that the VJ’s academies and schools could train 240 cadets, provided
the SDC provided a sufficient budget.3263 Based on Perišić’s advice, the SDC agreed that “240
students shall be enrolled at the Military Academy and the Military College for the needs of the
Army of Republika Srpska and the Army of the RSK” and that “funds necessary for their education
will be provided by the Federal Government”.3264
1139. On 11 July 1994, referring to non-commissioned officers serving in the VRS, Perišić told
the SDC: “we are educating these people; they are completing the academy here; we are sending
3258
3259
3260
3261
3262
3263
3264
Institute whereby Pretis would provide 2,900 pieces of cast jackets of different types in exchange for artillery
gunpowder, artillery ammunition for training, gunpowder, artillery igniters, artillery percussion caps and
gunpowder charges for 155mm bullets); Ex. P512, Barter Agreement Between Pretis and Kragujevac Technical
Overhaul Institute (“TRZ”), 24 July 1995 (Pretis agreed to provide the Kragujevac TRZ with construction
timber, rail truck wheel struts, construction steel, steel reinforcing bars, petrol engine and rail truck bearings,
valued at a total in exchange for bullets, shells, base charges for shells, each side of the transaction valuing an
estimated 2,345,500 dinars); Ex. P1250, Correspondence From VRS Main Staff to RS Defence Ministry
Regarding Allocation of Equipment, 29 January 1994 (“A decision for securing 100 tonnes of explosives (of the
requested 150 tonnes) in exchange for 125mm ammunition for M-84 tanks is currently in the procedure. Once
the decision is issued, the VJ Supplies Administration will sign a barter agreement with Pretis”.); Ex. D416, RS
MOD Agreement, 26 November 1993 (Proposed barter contract whereby Pretis would obtain artillery
gunpowder, artillery test ammunition, ignition gunpowder, artillery fuses, artillery cartridges and gunpowder
charges from the Kragujevac TRZ in exchange for a quantity of shell “jackets” of “equivalent value”).
Defence Final Brief, paras 780-784.
Ex. P941, VJ General Staff Information Addressed to the MOD, 30 August 1993 (referring to VJ Chief of
General Staff order No. 47-11, 23 August 1993).
Ex. P781, Stenographic Transcript of the 16th Session of the SDC, 25 December 1993, p. 16.
Ibid. (emphasis added).
Ex. P783, Stenographic Transcript of the 19th Session of the SDC, 16 March 1994, p. 22.
Ibid.
Ex. P710, Minutes of the 19th Session of the SDC, 16 March 1994, p. 2.
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them there; the president should sign the decree on commissioning them”.3265 Perišić equally
participated in an SDC decision stating that “480 students from the 30th and 40th personnel centres
are to be admitted to courses in VJ military schools and academies”.3266 Petar Škrbić also testified
that certain graduates from the VJ Military Academy entered the VRS, although the number
decreased during the course of the war.3267 Still, in 1994, for example, the VRS took in 31 noncommissioned officers and 28 officers with the rank of 2nd lieutenant who had graduated from the
VJ Military Academy.3268
1140. The Trial Chamber therefore finds that Perišić, as the head of the VJ, had authority over the
general training process, was supportive of efforts to have the VJ train VRS troops and was
involved in the SDC’s decision to authorise this assistance.
1141. In addition, the Defence submits that the Prosecution has failed to prove that Perišić
“exercised any authority with regard to the training of the 10th Sabotage Detachment”.3269
1142. According to Dra`en Erdemovi}, approximately 50 members of the VRS’s 10th Sabotage
Detachment followed another training course led by VJ officers at the VJ barracks in Pan~evo,
Serbia, in late November or early December 1994.3270 The training focused on handling
ammunition, laying explosives, destroying buildings and general fitness.3271 Erdemović’s account is
corroborated by a document referring to the completed “twenty-day training course” for the VRS’s
10th Sabotage Detachment in Pan~evo, and mentioning an “agreement” for the VJ to dispatch its
three instructors to the VRS garrison in Bijeljina, RS, in order to continue the training.3272 When VJ
instructors came to Bijeljina, they changed their VJ license plates into VRS plates in order to
maintain secrecy, and received permits that would enable them to avoid being stopped at
checkpoints.3273 The instructors subsequently travelled to Vlasenica, where they again trained the
VRS’s 10th Sabotage Detachment in weapon and explosive usage for two to three weeks in early
1995.3274 These training sessions were intended to remain secret.3275 The members of the 10th
3265
3266
3267
3268
3269
3270
3271
3272
3273
3274
3275
Ex. P784, Stenographic Transcript of the 22nd Session of the SDC, 11 July 1994, p. 49.
Ex. P760, Minutes from the 32nd Session of the SDC held on 1 February 1995, p. 1.
Petar Škrbić, T. 11735.
Ibid.
Defence Final Brief, para. 1094.
Dra`en Erdemovi}, T. 7944. Erdemović did not attend this training.
Dra`en Erdemovi}, T. 7945.
Ex. P2521, Request of Zdravko Tolimir to the VJ General Staff to Send Three Instructors to Train the 10th
Sabotage Detachment, 1 February 1995, p. 1. See also Dra`en Erdemovi}, T. 7948.
Dra`en Erdemovi}, T. 7947-7948.
Dra`en Erdemovi}, T. 7947-7949.
Dra`en Erdemovi}, T. 7948-7949.
358
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Sabotage Detachment who were trained by the VJ officers participated in the takeover of Srebrenica
in July 1995.3276
1143. A February 1995 letter from Dragomir Milošević, the Commander of the SRK, to General
Mladić indicates that Perišić approved training of the 10th Sabotage Detachment:
We have no officers in the SRK who could provide specialised training with sufficient quality,
although there is enough interest in this kind of training. For this reason, we contacted the VJ
Special Forces Corps in Belgrade, with the intention have them send us, for a short period, several
officers who would provide the specialised part of training on Jahorina with high quality. ₣...ğ [VJ
officers] agreed to train 20 soldiers for sabotage and reconnaissance operations, and ten soldiers
for anti-sabotage and anti-terrorist operations. Accommodations and meals would be provided in
Pančevo [Serbia] ₣...ğ [W]e hereby ask you to obtain approval through General PERIŠIĆ, so that
the VJ Special Forces Corps could provide the training. As they stated, based on the said approval,
training is already being provided to the 10th DIO [Sabotage and Reconnaissance Detachment] of
the GŠ VRS [Main Staff].3277
1144. Besides Dragomir Milošević’s letter, the Trial Chamber recalls that Perišić had authority
over the VJ’s training of VRS troops, and therefore finds that the only reasonable conclusion is that
Perišić authorised the training of the 10th Sabotage Detachment.
1145. The Trial Chamber was presented with additional evidence concerning the VJ’s training of
VRS troops and Perišić’s approval thereof.
1146. On 30 August 1993, VJ General Ljubomir Bajić wrote to the FRY MOD in regard to the
imminent arrival of 264 VRS servicemen to continue their training in target and anti-aircraft
shooting, as approved by Perišić.3278 General Bajić specified that the VRS troops would cross the
RS-FRY border “wearing plain clothes”, and asked the FRY MOD to “make sure with the Serbia
MUP that the [VRS personnel] cross the border unimpeded”.3279
1147. In 1993 and 1994, the VJ’s 72nd Brigade trained VRS special forces, teaching them how to
implement special tactics and how to handle special weapons and equipment.3280 The VRS special
forces were allowed to keep the weapons that the VJ gave them for their training, such as snipers
and other special weapons.3281 The staff of the VJ 72nd Brigade that conducted the training
considered that it was normal to provide the VRS with these weapons because the VJ and VRS
were the same army.3282 Peri{ić and other VJ commanders attended certain training sessions to
3276
3277
3278
3279
3280
3281
3282
Dra`en Erdemovi}, T. 7949.
Ex. P932, SRK Command Memo to the VRS Main Staff Regarding Training, 2 February 1995 (emphasis
added).
Ex. P941, VJ General Staff Information Addressed to the MOD, 30 August 1993 (referring to VJ Chief of
General Staff order No. 47-11, 23 August 1993).
Ibid.
MP-11, T. 8945-8947, 9014-9015.
MP-11, T. 8946.
MP-11, T. 8946-8947.
359
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monitor the progress of the VRS special forces and to see if further training supplies were
needed.3283
1148. Similarly, the VJ General Staff provided a month of training in reconnaissance and sabotage
to the VRS and SVK in Banja Luka in April 1994.3284 As reflected in the official gazette, the VJ
arranged to send an officer to RS in order to train the Drina Corps’ Zvornik Light Infantry Brigade
in reconnaissance and sabotage between 1 September and 30 November 1993,3285 as well as another
officer to continue training between 8 November 1993 to 7 March 1994.3286
1149. On 20 April 1995, Perišić’s Cabinet approved Mladić’s demand that two VJ officers from
the Pančevo Security and Intelligence Training Centre be allowed to continue their training of VRS
commanding officers at the Banja Luka Military School Centre until 3 May 1995.3287 On 19 May
1995, the VJ General Staff approved the VRS’s request for a specialist to provide sniper training to
VRS soldiers and their instructors.3288 Kadijević identified Perišić’s initials on the document,
acknowledged that the sniper instructor would train the instructors of other snipers, and explained
that the sniper instructor was “sent to the 30th Personnel Centre, which is where officers were sent
within the Army of Yugoslavia in order to send them to the VRS”.3289
1150. VRS troops were regularly trained by VJ units in Pan~evo, Serbia.3290 The VJ provided a
training course for the saboteurs of the East Bosnia Corps between 15 and 30 April 1994.3291 In
May 1994, the VRS made arrangements to send three soldiers to attend a 15-day VJ training in
reconnaissance and sabotage.3292 Between 25 July and 10 August 1994, 30 soldiers of a Drina Corps
manoeuvre battalion were scheduled for training.3293 The Drina Corps Command specified that
“[r]eception, accommodation, food and training of the soldiers shall be regulated by the [Yugoslav
Army Special Units Corps] Command”.3294 Drina Corps Units were expected to be trained in air
defence firing between 24 August and 10 September 1994.3295 Another report notes that VRS
3283
3284
3285
3286
3287
3288
3289
3290
3291
3292
3293
3294
3295
MP-11, T. 8947. The witness did not specify whether Perišić attended training sessions pertaining to sniping or
other skills.
Ex. P2176, Documents Regarding the Cooperation between VRS, SVK and VJ in April and May 1994, p. 12.
Ex. P2844, Stupar Temporary Assignment of VJ Saboteur to VRS, 1 September 1993.
Ex. P2846, Stupar Temporary Assignment of VJ to Drina Corps, 4 November 1993.
Ex. P2719, Documents Relating to a Request from Ratko Mladić to Perišić Regarding Training of Officers, 15
and 20 April 1995. See Petar Škrbić, T. 11925.
Ex. P2721, Documents Relating to a Request from Ratko Mladić to Perišić Regarding Provision of Sniper
Training, May-July 1995 (see above for discussion of date of first document).
Radojica Kadijević, T. 13719-13722.
MP-11, T. 8946.
Ex. P942, Lt. Col. Todorovi} Order to VP 8486-1 Pan~evo, 5 April 1994.
Ex. P870, Memorandum on Training Issued by VP 7469 Zvornik, 9 May 1994.
Ex. P1804, Order by Drina Corps Command, 18 July 1994.
Ibid.
Ex. P928, Zvornik Infrantry Brigade Command Order Regarding Training, 15 August 1994.
360
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soldiers were trained in using shells in September 1994.3296 The VRS and VJ also made
arrangements to train “30 combatants” of the Drina Corps in 1994.3297 Following a separate
arrangement, Vujadin Popović reported that the VJ had agreed to give a three-month “security”
training to an unspecified number of Drina Corps “subordinate officers”, starting in March 1995.3298
1151. A subsequent order from Dragomir Milošević refers to the “education of officers and noncommissioned officers” of the SRK by the VJ.3299 Another dispatch from him stipulates that the VJ
has consented to train SRK units in policing and reconnaissance necessary for combat
operations.3300
1152. Various other exhibits document the VJ’s regular training of VRS troops in various
locations. A VRS report recounts how “VJ senior officers” trained 42 VRS soldiers in tactical fire
and in operating artillery and hand-held rocket launchers in Batajnica, near Belgrade, in December
1994.3301 The report indicates that the VJ expended significant resources in this training: “Besides
the classroom training, that is, theoretical part of the training, we had organised a daily plane flyover, which gave us exceptional conditions for the monitoring and the training with real targets,
arriving and departing”.3302 The VJ provided training to ten marksmen of the 1st Krajina Corps.3303
The VJ conducted training sessions on operating anti-aircraft light artillery for the 1st Krajina
Corps,3304 the Drina Corps,3305 and SRK.3306 In December 1993, the VRS asked the VJ General
Staff to provide military experts to give a presentation at a conference entitled “VRS: material
support, the situation, requirements and possibilities”, which would be attended by top VRS
officers.3307 The requested VJ experts had previously provided training to the VRS and “carried out
their task impeccably”.3308
3296
3297
3298
3299
3300
3301
3302
3303
3304
3305
3306
3307
3308
Ex. P937, Report of Combat Training in the FRY of the 18th SVK Mixed Artillery Regiment.
Ex. P867, Drina Corps Command Order to the 1st Zvornik Infantry Brigade Command, 18 July 1994.
Ex. P869, Drina Corps Intelligence-Security Department (OB) Information, 13 February 1995.
Ex. P1007, Order Regarding Training of SRK Units in 1995, 29 January 1995, p. 5.
Ex. P868, SRK Command Dispatch to Seven Units Regarding Training, 2 March 1995.
Ex. P931, Reports on Training Results, 21 December 1994, pp 1-2.
Ex. P931, Reports on Training Results, 21 December 1994, p. 1.
Ex. P921, 1st Krajina Corps Command Dispatch Order to Eight Units Regarding Training, 24 November 1994.
Ex. P922, 1st Krajina Corps Command Regular Combat Report to the VRS Main Staff, 24 August 1994;
Ex. P933, VRS Main Staff Order Regarding List of Servicemen to Report to Batajnica for Training, 11 October
1995.
Ex. P923, Memo Sent by VP 4795 Belgrade Regarding Report on Training Results, 27 May 1994; Ex. P924,
Drina Corps Command Dispatch Order to Two Units Regarding Training, 24 November 1994; Ex. P925, Drina
Corps Command Orders, 3 October 1995; Ex. P926, Drina Corps Command Dispatch Order to Two Units
Regarding Training, 24 November 1994; Ex. P930, 1st Mili}i Light Infantry Brigade Command Order Regarding
Training, 18 August 1994; Ex. P933, VRS Main Staff Order Regarding List of Servicemen to Report to
Batajnica for Training, 11 October 1995.
Ex. P931, Reports on Training Results, 21 December 1994, pp 3-7; Ex. P933, VRS Main Staff Order Regarding
List of Servicemen to Report to Batajnica for Training, 11 October 1995.
Ex. P1819, Request by VRS and Authorisation by VJ General Staff, 1 December 1993.
Ibid.
361
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1153. Dragomir Milošević stressed that VJ training of SRK units was necessary to “ensure the best
possible results in the fight against poturicas”, a derogative term for Muslims.3309 He admitted that
the SRK lacked officers to provide specialised training.3310 Another SRK request to the VJ states:
“Since we do not have appropriate personnel, we ask that the training instructors bring the training
curriculum with them”.3311
1154. In sum, the Trial Chamber finds that Perišić authorised the VJ to regularly train VRS troops.
9. Other Sources of Logistics
1155. In assessing whether the VRS received substantial assistance from the VJ, it is necessary to
consider the extent to which the VRS relied on logistics from separate sources.
(a) Supplies and Training from Other Countries
1156. The Pretis factory procured part of its steel from Slovenia and Russia. Pretis received some
of its gunpowder from Slovenia in addition to Serbia.3312 At a relatively early stage of the war, RS
and RSK further agreed on a protocol designed to facilitate cooperation in the exchange and
production of ammunition and military equipment,3313 although the evidentiary record does not
establish that this protocol led to significant exchanges.
1157. At a meeting on 15 March 1994 in Belgrade, Mladić intimated to Slobodan Milošević and
Zoran Lilić, among others, that FRY assistance was important because of the “impossibility of
importing” from other countries.3314 Mladić then suggested that efforts be made to obtain assistance
from additional “friendly and neutral states”.3315
1158. According to Ðor|e Ðukić, the VRS had contacts with officials from Russia’s Directorate
for the Export of Military Material, who offered to aid with ammunition, mines and other explosive
devices.3316 Mladi} and Ðukić visited Russia respectively in March 1995 and December 1995 in
order to make arrangements for aid.3317 The Defence relies on Ðukić’s statement to contend that the
VRS actually obtained mines, ammunition and explosives from Russia.3318 Ðukić stated that no
3309
3310
3311
3312
3313
3314
3315
3316
3317
3318
Ex. P868, SRK Command Dispatch to Seven Units Regarding Training, 2 March 1995.
Ex. P932, SRK Command Memo to the VRS Main Staff Regarding Training, 2 February 1995.
Ex. P2717, Order of VRS Main Staff Chief of Staff Milavanovic to VJ General Staff, 25 February 1995.
Ex. P505, Transcript of Nikola To{ovi} Deposition, 13 December 2008, T. 24-25, 35-36.
Ex. D573, VRS and SVK Agreement on Merging Ammunition Production, 1 June 1993.
Ex. P2940, Excerpt from Ratko Mladi}'s Notebook, 15 March 1994, p. 12.
Ex. P2940, Excerpt from Ratko Mladi}'s Notebook, 15 March 1994, p. 13.
Ex. P75, Witness Statement of \or|e \uki}, 4/29 February 1996, p. 5.
Ex. P75, Witness Statement of \or|e \uki}, 4/29 February 1996, p. 5. See also Ex. D396, Transcript of
Interview with \or|e \uki}, 29 February 1996 (Describing his visit to Russia in late December 1995).
Defence Final Brief, page 190, fn. 1153, citing Ex. P75, Witness Statement of \or|e \uki}, 4/29 February 1996,
p. 5.
362
Case No.: IT-04-81-T
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weaponry was supposed to be obtained from these Russian contacts until after 15 January 1996, a
date following the end of the Indictment period.3319 And Ðukić did not even know whether an
agreement was ultimately reached.3320 No evidence establishes that the VRS obtained weaponry
from Russia.
1159. Dušan Kovačević, the former RS Defence Minister, was contacted by Israel’s Mossad
around March 1995 “about quite a large number of Mujahedin being dispatched to BosniaHerzegovina”.3321 In this respect, Mladić’s diary reads: “From Israel – they offer joint combat
against extreme Islam – offer the training of our men in Greece at their expense. They offer us
special weapons for 500 men – snipers for free – they said it came to Bihać, I don’t know whether
it was given to Serbia”.3322 Kovačević specified that Israel’s offer of assistance only applied to the
VRS’s fight against the mujahedins.3323 But no evidence was presented that Israel’s offer of
assistance was actually fulfilled.
1160. Similarly, Mladić’s diary mentions unfruitful efforts to try and procure ammunition from
Greece: “Agreement regarding take-over of ammunition from Greece – they are not very interested;
they are very difficult regarding this; they are being followed by the CIA”.3324
1161. The Defence argues that “[m]embers of the VRS not only attended schools and academies in
Belgrade but also those in such countries as Greece and France”, for which it cites Milenko
Jev|ević.3325 However, Jev|ević was speaking of training from September 1998 to August 1999,
several years after the Bosnian war.3326 The Trial Chamber therefore does not find this evidence
relevant and supportive of the Defence’s claim.
1162. Witness MP-14 testified that Pretis used certain “French bombs” in order to manufacture
modified air-bombs.3327 MP-14 did not specify if these bombs were imported from France before or
during the war, or whether they were assembled based on a French technical model, or procured
otherwise. No evidence was presented at trial that the VRS obtained logistical assistance from
France during the war.
3319
3320
3321
3322
3323
3324
3325
3326
3327
The Russian contacts were supposed to send their offer to the VRS by that date. Ex. P75, Witness Statement of
\or|e \uki}, 4/29 February 1996, p. 5. \uki} also stated that the equipment was supposed to be purchased,
albeit “at the best possible price”. Ex. D396, Transcript of Interview with \or|e \uki}, 29 February 1996, p. 3.
Ex. P75, Witness Statement of \or|e \uki}, 4/29 February 1996, p. 5.
Dušan Kovačević, T. 12746-12747.
Ex. D419, Excerpt from Ratko Mladi}'s Notebook, 11 March 1995, p. 2 (underline in original). See also Dušan
Kovačević, T. 12746-12747.
Dušan Kovačević, T. 12746.
Ex. D419, Excerpt from Ratko Mladi}'s Notebook, 11 March 1995, p. 2.
Defence Final Brief, para. 788.
Milenko Jev|ević, T. 11110.
MP-14, T. 3654-3655 (closed session).
363
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1163. Ned Krayishnik, a Serb individual who had emigrated to Canada before the war,3328
fundraised money in Canada’s Serb community and personally delivered roughly $45,000 for RS
interests, including the military, “the media and propaganda”.3329 Certain other individuals from the
Serb diaspora made donations too.3330
1164. In April 1993, the VRS Main Staff noted that “there are no imports, except from the
FRY”.3331 Similarly, a November 1993 report by the VRS Main Staff and RS MOD did not identify
any country providing logistical assistance besides the FRY: “Since the beginning of combat
operations, the [VRS] has relied on several different supply sources. The basic sources of supply
included the Army’s own reserve, the Republic reserve, Republika Srpska’s production, and various
forms of assistance from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia”.3332 By the same token, when General
Mladić identified the sources of VRS weaponry in his report to the RS National Assembly, he did
not specify that any aid had been provided by any country besides the FRY through the VJ.3333
1165. Michael Williams, the UNPROFOR Director of Information, reviewed all classified reports
in the UN’s possession3334 and never saw a “report or even an allegation that the VRS was supplied
by some force other than Yugoslavia or other than Serbia”.3335 Further, as indicated by his remarks
during an SDC session, Momčilo Perišić himself did not believe that the VRS had another
significant source of assistance: “They rely solely on us and come to us with demands”.3336 In an
interview conducted after the war, Perišić said, while referring to the FRY, RS and RSK, that there
was “one single army” that “was getting its logistics support mostly from the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia”.3337
1166. Ivan Ðokić, the Defence’s expert witness on logistical assistance, whose testimony is
discussed in a separate section,3338 advanced in his report that, besides the FRY, “the most probable
3328
3329
3330
3331
3332
3333
3334
3335
3336
3337
3338
Ned Krayishnik, T. 9464-9465.
Ned Krayishnik, T. 9469-9476.
Rajko Petrović, T. 13759, 13763.
Ex. P149, Analysis of the Combat Readiness and Activities of the VRS in 1992, April 1993, p. 96.
Ex. P1251, Report on VRS Financial Situation, November 1993, p. 1 (emphasis added).
Ex. P312, Transcript of the Tape Recording of the 50th Session of the National Assembly, 15 and 16 April 1995,
p. 51. See also supra section VI.B.5.
Ex. P2372, Transcript of Michael Charles Williams from Prosecutor v. S. Milošević, 24 June 2003, T. 2289322894.
Michael Williams, T. 6468. Williams added that VJ support was further evidenced by “the ability of both the
Croatian Serbs and Bosnian Serbs to undertake some operations for which they did not on the surface of it have
sufficient logistical and technical capability. [O]ne aspect of this, for example, would be helicopter flights.
Another aspect of this would be the strengthening of the air defence system in Bosnia in the course of 1994. I
mean, you cannot simply build an air defence system out of nothing”. Ex. P2372, Transcript of Michael Charles
Williams from Prosecutor v. S. Milošević, 24 June 2003, T. 22955.
Ex. P776, Stenographic Transcript of the 21st Session of the SDC, 7 June 1994, p. 38 (emphasis added).
Ex. P2879, Video “JNA – srpska verzija sloma” Serbian Version of the Breakup, p. 27.
See infra section VI.E.
364
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28869
sources of supply” for RS were Israel, Russia and Ukraine.3339 To support, Ðokić cited an article
from the Stockholm Peace Research Institute (SPRI).3340 The SPRI article provides a “summary of
possible/suspected sources” of arms to the VRS during the war and lists “FRY, Israel, Russia,
Ukraine” as sources.3341 This statement by the SPRI did not rely on primary investigation or direct
evidence of arms transfers. The SPRI noted that “Bosnian Serb forces are also reported to have
received weapons shipments organized by Russian intermediaries, including D-30 artillery pieces
and T-72 tanks”.3342 For this proposition the SPRI report cited a report from “Jane’s Global
Update”, which is not part of the trial record.3343 The SPRI report also posited that “there are reports
that the intelligence services of Ukraine, Greece and Israel, supplied arms to Bosnian Serb
forces”.3344 For support it cited a report by the Netherlands Institute for War Documentation, which
similarly is not in evidence.3345 The Trial Chamber finds that the SPRI report’s listing of Israel,
Russia and Ukraine as “possible/suspected sources” lacks weight since it does not rest on primary
investigation or direct evidence, but on reports that are not part of the evidentiary record.
1167. In sum, the trial record conclusively demonstrates that the FRY was the VRS’s primary
source of weaponry. The evidence of material from other sources does not raise a reasonable doubt
that the FRY was the primary source of weaponry, as the trial record shows that the VRS obtained
no more than a limited proportion of its weaponry from any country other than the FRY.
1168. On the other hand, the trial record shows that the VRS procured appreciable quantities of
fuel from the Croat Republic of Herceg-Bosna and RSK. According to Ðorñe Ðukić, the RS
government made arrangements to purchase fuel from “Croatian representatives” in mid-1993,
thereby leading to the delivery of 7,000 to 10,000 tonnes of fuel to the VRS.3346 Ðukić apparently
alluded to representatives of the Croat Republic of Herceg-Bosna.3347 While Ðukić mentioned that
these trade arrangements ended by the beginning of 1995, smaller quantities were subsequently
obtained from Croatian sources at the local level.3348 Kovačević concurred with Ðukić’s account but
stated that the VRS had provided ammunition in exchange for the fuel.3349
3339
3340
3341
3342
3343
3344
3345
3346
3347
3348
3349
Ex. D507, Ðokić Report on Logistical Assistance, p. 23.
See Ex. D800, United Nations Case Study on Arms Embargoes, 2007.
Ex. D800, United Nations Case Study on Arms Embargoes, 2007, p. 10.
Ex. D800, United Nations Case Study on Arms Embargoes, 2007, p. 12.
Ex. D800, United Nations Case Study on Arms Embargoes, 2007, pp 10, 12, fns 62, 81.
Ex. D800, United Nations Case Study on Arms Embargoes, 2007, p. 12.
Ex. D800, United Nations Case Study on Arms Embargoes, 2007, pp 4, 12, fns 12, 82.
Ex. D397, Transcript of Interview with \orde \uki}, 29 June 1996, pp 1-3. See also Ex. D758, Excerpt from
Ratko Mladi}'s Notebook, 9 January 1994 (mentioning receipt of at least 4,000 tonnes of oil from Croatia).
Ex. D397, Transcript of Interview with \or|e \uki}, 29 June 1996, pp 1-3. Kovačević testified that Ðukić’s
statement concerned the Herceg-Bosna Croats. Dušan Kovačević, T. 12682.
Ex. D397, Transcript of Interview with \or|e \uki}, 29 June 1996, p. 2; Ex. P75, Witness Statement of \or|e
\uki}, 4/29 February 1996, p. 5.
Dušan Kovačević, T. 12680-12683.
365
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1169. A document authored by General Milivoj Petković of the Croat Republic of Herceg-Bosna
also refers to providing oil to RS authorities in exchange for unspecified other products.3350 Around
the same time frame, the Defence Council of the Croat Republic of Herceg-Bosna addressed a letter
to the RS MOD concerning over 1.5 million rounds and approximately 4,000 shells, among other
equipment.3351 It states that the Croat Republic of Herceg-Bosna would “take charge of the items”
supplied by RS, which appears to have been the sender, not the recipient.3352
1170. In August 1994, the VRS Main Staff equally reached an agreement with the RSK
government to obtain 25,000 litres of D-2 fuel and 15,000 litres of MB fuel from the RSK’s
reserves.3353 Milomir Kova~evi} also advanced that the VRS obtained part of its fuel from Bulgaria
and Romania.3354
1171. Pyers Tucker deemed that the only logical place where the VRS’s fuel could possibly come
from was the FRY.3355 His testimony is not convincing in this regard because the VRS had other
sources of fuel. However, the trial record does not establish that the VRS obtained significant
quantities of weaponry from any country beside the FRY.
(b) Weaponry Purchased Directly from FRY Military Factories
1172. In addition to the weaponry supplied free of charge from the VJ’s reserves, the VRS
technically had to purchase the distinct quantity of weaponry it obtained directly from the FRY
military factories (special purpose industries), which were officially managed by the FRY MOD.3356
1173. Mladić reported to the RS National Assembly that, with regard to weaponry used in battle
from the beginning of the war until 15 April 1995, merely 9.11% of the total infantry ammunition
was “imported, i.e. bought” whereas 47.2% came from VJ “aid”, only 0.26% of expended artillery
3350
3351
3352
3353
3354
3355
3356
Ex. D750, Report on Cooperation between VRS MOD and HVO, 17 January 1994. See also Ex. D749, RS and
HVO on Coordinating Prices of MTS, 6 November 1993 (referring to trade arrangements between RS and the
Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna).
Ex. D751, HVO Request for Transport of MTS from RSK, 8 January 1994.
Ibid.
Ex. D508, Order on Release of Fuel from Dvor na Uni for the Use of the VRS, 23 August 1994.
Trucks from the Borovica Transport Company transported fuel from Bulgaria and Romania into RS and RSK.
The VJ and MUP had no involvement in these particular fuel transactions. Milomir Kova~evi}, T. 6117-6120.
See also Ex. D576, Contract for Purchase of Fuel by VRS from Private Bosna Company, May 1994 (Contract
between RS government and Bosna, a Bulgarian company, to purchase 4 million litres of D-1 fuel for 4.6 million
Deutschmarks).
Pyers Tucker, T. 9169-9170.
See e.g. MP-14, T. 3617-3618 (closed session). See also supra sections VI.B.5, VI.C.7.
366
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ammunition was imported/bought whereas 34.4% came from VJ “aid”, and 4.9% of anti-aircraft
ammunition was imported/bought whereas 52.4% came from VJ “aid”.3357
1174. Mladić did not specify from which country the “imported, i.e. bought” weaponry came. The
trial record solely establishes that the VRS received ammunition from the VJ and the FRY special
purpose industries.3358 No evidence establishes that the VRS received ammunition from any country
other than the FRY.3359 Insofar as the “imported, i.e. bought” weaponry came from FRY special
purpose industries, Mladić’s report demonstrates that a far greater proportion of the VRS’s
ammunition came from VJ “aid” than from the special purpose industries, as demonstrated by the
vast majority of the evidence at trial. For example, a VRS annual report shows that the VJ provided
the majority of the VRS’s infantry ammunition in 1994, as well as approximately a fourth of its
shells, whereas the rest came “[f]rom the RS Government”.3360 That report does not identify the
FRY’s special purpose industries or the FRY MOD as a source of supply.
(c) Ammunition Reserves in Republika Srpska
1175. According to a VJ General Staff report prepared for the international community, the JNA
left behind 72,390 shells and 5,791 rounds of various types after it withdrew from BiH territory.3361
In addition, prior to his appointment as RS Minister of Defence in January 1993, Dušan Kovačević
worked on logistical matters for the VRS and participated in a commission assessing the state of
VRS reserves that concluded its work in November 1992.3362 Kovačević testified that ammunition
was available in the Rudo, Vi{egrad, Ustikolina and Renovica depots.3363 In his view, “[t]owards
the end of 1991, there was anything between 16.000 and 19.000 tonnes of ammunition which
belonged to the reserves of the Supreme Command of the JNA”.3364
About 50 per cent of that quantity – or rather, between 8-, and 9.000 tonnes of ammunition from
those depots were transported to the territory of Yugoslavia. About 8.000 tonnes remained either
in the depots or most of it was distributed across the territory and stored in somewhat smaller
depots. ₣...ğ [I]n the general area of Podrinje there were about 8.000 tons of various kinds of
ammunition. ₣...ğ [I]n the Mrkonji} Grad depot, I personally saw that about 1.000 tonnes of
different calibre of ammunition were stored there after having been transported from Slovenia and
3357
3358
3359
3360
3361
3362
3363
3364
Ex. P312, Transcript of the Tape Recording of the 50th Session of the National Assembly, 15 and 16 April 1995,
p. 51.
See supra section VI.C.9.(a).
Ibid.
Ex. P1214, Annual Financial Statement of the Plan of Tasks and Financing of the VRS for 1994, 17 February
1995, pp 19-21.
Ex. D381, List II of Army Property Left in SR BiH after Withdrawal of JNA. See Jugoslav Kodžopeljić,
T. 12259-12260, 12272, 12274. The JNA left behind additional assets after its withdrawal from BiH territory.
See Ex. D380, List I of Army Property Left in BiH after Withdrawal of JNA (tanks and other vehicles);
Ex. D382, List III of Army Property Left in SR BiH after Withdrawal of JNA (miscellaneous items); Ex. D543,
Report from the VJ to the Federal MOD, 8 January 2004 (firearms, artillery weapons, tanks and other vehicles).
Dušan Kovačević, T. 12528-12532, 12840.
Dušan Kovačević, T. 12837.
Ibid.
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Croatia. About 1500 tonnes of ammunition had been brought over there from the Konjić and
Gabela depots. Also, about 1.000 tonnes of ammunition was transported there from the territorial
Defence of Bosnia-Herzegovina which had previously been stored in the JNA depots, and,
subsequently, all of that was taken over by the VRS.3365
1176. In November 1993, the VRS Main Staff and RS MOD mentioned that, aside from FRY
assistance and military production in RS, reserves were one of the “basic sources of supply”.3366 In
briefing the RS National Assembly on weaponry used during the war until April 15 1995, General
Mladić identified the following sources of supply: total infantry ammunition (1.49% RS production,
42.2% reserves, 9.11% imports/purchases and 47.2% VJ “aid”), total artillery ammunition (26.2%
RS production, 39% reserves, 0.26% imports/purchases and 34.4% VJ “aid”), total anti-aircraft
ammunition (none from RS production, 42.7% reserves, 4.9% imports/purchases and 52.4% VJ
“aid”).3367 Mladić’s report therefore stipulates that reserves were a significant source of weaponry
besides VJ “aid”.
1177. The Defence argues that Mladić’s figures are flawed because he deliberately underestimated
ammunition reserves in RS in order to demand more logistical assistance.3368 The Defence notably
cites statements by Milan Ninković and Dušan Kovačević for this proposition.3369
1178. After Mladić’s presentation to the RS National Assembly, Ninković, Kovačević’s successor
as Defence Minister,3370 intervened to state that Mladić’s data should have been “harmonised” with
data in the possession of the RS MOD.3371 “[W]e do not accept that part and, excuse me, I claim
that it is not true”, Ninković said.3372 Ninković did not provide figures to support his position.
According to Kovačević, “[a]lmost always most of the deputies felt that the requests were
exaggerated, that Republika Srpska was unable to meet them, and that the VRS ought to take a
more reasonable stance in that regard”.3373 Branko Simić, a deputy, also contested Mladić’s
presentation to the RS National Assembly, telling him that he “had no insight into the materiel
supplies of the Serbian army” and was unfamiliar with how much was given by local sources in
RS.3374
3365
3366
3367
3368
3369
3370
3371
3372
3373
3374
Ibid.
Ex. P1251, Report on VRS Financial Situation, November 1993, p. 1.
Ex. P312, Transcript of the Tape Recording of the 50th Session of the National Assembly, 15 and 16 April 1995,
p. 51.
Defence Final Brief, paras 732-741.
Ibid.
Dušan Kovačević, T. 12773-12774.
Ex. P312, Transcript of the Tape Recording of the 50th Session of the National Assembly, 15 and 16 April 1995,
pp 71-72.
Ex. P312, Transcript of the Tape Recording of the 50th Session of the National Assembly, 15 and 16 April 1995,
p. 72; See also Dušan Kovačević, T. 12764-12765.
Dušan Kovačević, T. 12761.
Dušan Kovačević, T. 12764-12765; Ex. P312, Transcript of the Tape Recording of the 50th Session of the
National Assembly, 15 and 16 April 1995, p. 73.
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1179. The Trial Chamber is mindful of the fact that this disagreement occurred in the context of
ongoing tensions between, on one side, the VRS Main Staff and Mladić, and on the other side the
political branch, namely the RS Presidency and MOD that Ninković and Kovačević represented.3375
Relations between Mladić and Karadžić had become “quite tense” and were marked by clashes and
“personal resentment” so that Karadžić unsuccessfully tried to have the Supreme Command dismiss
or remove Mladić from his position in the spring of 1995.3376
1180. Kovačević likewise posited that Mladić’s assessment before the RS National Assembly was
incorrect since it did not incorporate RS MOD data:
We had information to the effect that a far larger amount of assets had been produced in the RS.
We also had information indicating that a far greater quantity of goods had been imported. Having
been the ones who paid for them, we had accurate information about it. We also had figures
indicating the quantities held in the reserves belonging to the former JNA, and we also had figures
about the amount of proceeds from the purchases done by municipalities and local authorities.3377
1181. Kovačević added that “[i]n the course of the war, nobody ever responded to my request and
explain what had happened to that ammunition. Everybody knew that that ammunition had been
distributed across the territory and that that ammunition was under the control of the local brigades
and the local authorities”.3378 Kovačević stated that certain reserves “were being kept a secret from
the [VRS] Main Staff” because VRS units “at lower levels, at the levels of brigade, had been hiding
their resources and giving false images of resources to Mladić”.3379 Kovačević added that, at the end
of 1993, the VRS still had sufficient reserves of ammunition and “[t]here were only a couple of
types of ammunition that were in short supply”.3380 Kovačević acknowledged that the VRS faced a
shortage of supplies from 1994 onwards, but claimed that it was not a genuine issue because the
VRS Main Staff misevaluated its ammunition needs and existing reserves:
3375
3376
3377
3378
3379
3380
Dušan Kovačević, T. 12612-12613.
Dušan Kovačević, T. 12760, 12766-12767. According to Kovačević, General Milovanović was offered Mladi}’s
position but refused it, and most of the generals were against Mladić’s removal. Mladić arrested the generals
who did not support him, including Dragomir Milošević, whereas Karadžić had the ministers who opposed the
measure arrested as well, including Ninković. Karadžić nonetheless issued a decree reassigning Mladić as
advisor to the president of the republic and supreme commander, although Mladić opposed this measure and
remained Commander of the VRS Main Staff until his retirement in 1996. Dušan Kovačević, T. 12767, 1277212775. Ðukić gave a similar version of these events, although he stated that Dragomir Milošević stood with the
other generals who supported Mladić. Ðukić also described the personal rivalry and friction between Karadžić
and Mladić. Ex. D398, Transcript of Interview with \or|e \uki}, 29 February 1996, p. 2 (statement features two
dates).
Dušan Kovačević, T. 12763.
Dušan Kovačević, T. 12838. Kovačević added: “After the signing of the Dayton Accord, the peace forces
located in the territory of Sokolac municipality in a village between Sokolac and Olovo, several dozens of
hundreds of tonnes, and if I can remember properly, over 300 tonnes of ammunition and explosive, which proves
that I am righT. And this information was publicised by SFOR members. ₣...ğ In the course of 1996 and 1997,
SFOR units found huge quantities of ammunition hidden in the territory of Republika Srpska and confiscated all
those”, Dušan Kovačević, T. 12838.
Dušan Kovačević, T. 12880-12881.
Dušan Kovačević, T. 12667, 12844, 12882-12883.
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From the start of 1994, the problem of shortage of ammunition and fuel became gradually more
prominent. This was a problem that I personally and the members of the Main Staff were
confronted with because we received requests for ammunition. I believed the requests to be
exaggerated and unrealistic. Such quantities of ammunition were neither necessary nor was it
easy to obtain them in such quantities at such short notice. I normally instructed them to go to
apply to their local brigades and to inspect the weapons depots they had, but they would see that
they had ammunition in enough – in sufficient quantities which could be used in a rational manner,
rather than applied to the state to use its resources to obtain ammunition that was already there.3381
1182. The Trial Chamber does not discount the fact that the VRS had access to significant military
reserves left behind by the JNA upon its withdrawal from Bosnia or that some VRS units may have
miscommunicated the state of their supplies to the VRS Main Staff. It is conceivable that Mladić’s
figures were somehow exaggerated or otherwise not entirely accurate. However, the Trial Chamber
does not find Kovačević credible in generally claiming that the VRS did not face critical shortages
of ammunition. Not only is it plausible that Mladić and VRS commanders were in a better position
than the RS MOD to assess the needs for their own operations and the level of reserves in military
depots, but Kovačević’s depiction of the VRS reserves as generally satisfactory is contradicted by
the great bulk of the evidence adduced at trial.
1183. A September 1992 report from VRS General Ðorde Ðukić emphasised: “The SRJ reserves
are limited”.3382 The large quantity of ammunition left behind by the JNA at the Koran Depot was
itself depleted by the end of 1992.3383 In April 1993, the VRS Main Staff described the state of its
ammunition reserves as “very bad”, “critical” and in need of replenishment,3384 stating: “Reserves
of material resources, starting with those of significance for the troops, are exhausted, some have
also been destroyed, so that their continued supply cannot be guaranteed without external
intervention, importation, production or something similar”.3385
1184. In July 1993, General Manojlo Milovanović, Deputy Chief of Staff for the VRS Main
Staff,3386 informed the VJ General Staff that the VRS had been involved in intense fighting in the
past six months and was in need of assistance: “[We] spent huge quantities of material means which
we cannot replenish from our own resources”; and proceeded to request over a million bullets and
3381
3382
3383
3384
3385
3386
Dušan Kovačević, T. 12667 (emphasis added). In March 1995, Kovačević was named secretary of a RS
committee working on the procurement of weaponry for the VRS. The committee also included General Mladić.
Ex. D421, Decision of the President of the RS, 28 March 1995.
Ex. P1200, Correspondence Between the Main Staff of the Army of the Serbian BiH and the 1st Krajina Corps
Command Relating to Supply of Ammunition, 12 September 1992.
MP-14, T. 3517, 3521-3524 (closed session).
Ex. P149, Analysis of the Combat Readiness and Activities of the VRS in 1992, April 1993, pp 96, 131.
Ex. P149, Analysis of the Combat Readiness and Activities of the VRS in 1992, April 1993, p. 94 (emphasis
added).
MP-80, T. 8656 (closed session).
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over a thousand shells and rockets.3387 Nevertheless, Kovačević asserted that Milovanović’s
assessment that the VRS’s own resources were essentially depleted was incorrect.3388
1185. An excerpt from General Mladić’s diary, dated 17 August 1993, states that “[f]eeding the
army is a problem, as are fuel and ammunition”, and that “[m]aterial reserves have been
exhausted”.3389 In November 1993, the VRS Main Staff and RS MOD—headed by Kovačević
himself—similarly reported that the substantial consumption of supplies was depleting the army’s
reserves and incoming replenishments from the FRY:
The level of consumption in the Army, during the passed period, kept exceeding the level of
supplies of technical equipment and materiel received from our production and from the various
forms of assistance from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. This increased the Army’s
consumption of both its own reserve and products from the state reserve, which caused the lack of
certain means, especially quartermaster means to be felt in some units as early as the first half of
1993. The shortage was partially overcome through the use of local resources, municipalities, and
a number of companies and other economic organisations.3390
1186. Mladić emphasised in November 1993 as well that “[t]he Material Reserves of the Army, as
the main source of supply from the beginning of the war until present, have been exhausted”.3391
“Of 148 types of ammunition, 35% of these, the reserves of artillery and PA ammunition is
zero”.3392 Mladić further described the VRS’s general material situation as “alarming”, stating that
“the situation has been deteriorating and threatens to endanger the results achieved so far”.
3393
Kovačević nonetheless advanced that Mladić’s assessment was unreliable because existing reserves
were not taken into account since the Ministries of Finance and Defence were not consulted.3394
Yet, a report from Kovačević’s own MOD found that the state of material support for the VRS was
“poor” and “deteriorating” in November 1993, and stressed that “systematic solutions must be
found to ensure that the Army received regular supplies of all the items it needs”.3395
1187. Another contemporaneous report presents a dismal assessment of the situation faced by the
1st Krajina Corps, noting that “[e]stablishment reserves in food, clothing, ammunition, fuel, spare
parts and other necessities were used up a long time ago”, adding: “With /only/ about 100 tonnes of
fuel available monthly or three to four tonnes daily, it is difficult to carry out tasks in peacetime, let
3387
3388
3389
3390
3391
3392
3393
3394
3395
Ex. P2915, VRS Request to the VJ for the Provision of Ammunition, 18 July 1993 (emphasis added).
Dušan Kovačević, T. 12811.
Ex. P2917, Excerpt from Ratko Mladi}'s Notebook, p. 5.
Ex. P1251, Report on VRS Financial Situation, November 1993, pp 1-2. See also Ex. P1251, Report on VRS
Financial Situation, November 1993, p. 10.
Ex. P2918, VRS Main Staff Commander Memo Addressed to the Government of the RS, 1 November 1993.
Ex. P2918, VRS Main Staff Commander Memo Addressed to the Government of the RS, 1 November 1993,
p. 2.
Ex. P2918, VRS Main Staff Commander Memo Addressed to the Government of the RS, 1 November 1993.
Dušan Kovačević, T. 12843.
Ex. D415, RS MOD Report to VRS Main Staff, 25 November 1993.
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alone in time of war. The situation is the same with food, clothing, ammunition and so on, while
some other functions of logistics support are at a complete standstill”.3396
1188. On 15 March 1994, at a meeting in Belgrade with Slobodan Milošević, Zoran Lilić and
Radovan Karadžić, among others, Mladić stated: “we have a major problem of a very scanty
logistical support for the army in all areas owing to the exhaustion of the reserves, dwindling
resources […] obsolescence of some of the equipment […]. I am certain that we must do all we can
to supply the army with ammunition, new systems of RT /military hardware/”.3397
1189. In May 1994, Radovan Karadžić wrote to Perišić to express grave concern about the VRS’s
material situation:
Our army is exhausted and stretched out over a long front line. This too could be overcome
however, but the shortage of every type of ammunition cannot be overcome but through the
provision of ammunition. At some military lines, our soldiers are awaiting enemy infantry attacks
with /just/ one or two ammunition clips in /their/ automatic rifles, respectively. ₣...ğ This, however,
is a problem for the prime minister, but it does not hurt for you to know this as well.
General, Sir, I kindly request that you inform yourself through our G[ /Main Staff/ about the
equipment situation and you will realize that it is worse than what I could write you in a telegram.
The consequences are grave already while they can become tragic, also.3398
Kovačevič contended that the evaluation of the VRS’s situation made by Karadžić, his superior,
was unreliable.3399
1190. On 3 May 1995, Dragomir Milošević expressed concern about the SRK’s situation and
asked for the VJ’s immediate provision of weaponry and ammunition: “We find ourselves in a
situation where there is a great shortage of the requested items ₣...ğ. We need the items ₣...ğ very
urgently”.3400 Milošević proceeded to dispatch a special representative to Belgrade to facilitate the
procurement process.3401 He thereafter requested another 200 aerial bombs from the VJ General
Staff.3402
1191. On 23 August 1995, Mladić gave a presentation to the SDC in Belgrade and warned that the
VRS faced “a lack of ammunition, particularly for high-calibre artillery weapons”.3403 On 3
September 1995, Mladić wrote to the VJ General Staff to ask for firearms and ammunition, stating:
3396
3397
3398
3399
3400
3401
3402
3403
Ex. P2916, Report Regarding 1st Krajiški Corps and its Subordinate Commands and Units, 13 November 1993,
pp 4-5 (emphasis added).
Ex. P2940, Excerpt from Ratko Mladi}'s Notebook, 15 March 1994, pp 11-12 (emphasis added).
Ex. P2766, Cable from Karad`i} to Peri{i}, 15 May 1994 (emphasis added).
Dušan Kovačević, T. 12848.
Ex. P1260, SRK Request to the VJ General Staff Regarding Ammunition and Weapons, 3 May 1995 (emphasis
added).
Ex. P1260, SRK Request to the VJ General Staff Regarding Ammunition and Weapons, 3 May 1995.
Ex. P982, Request for Issue of Air Bombs Sent to VJ General Staff, 15 July 1995.
Ex. P713, Minutes from the 42nd Session of the SDC, 23 August 1995, p. 4.
372
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“The weapons are necessary for the purpose of equipping the newly arrived conscripts from the
[FRY] thus we ask you kindly to approve this. There is particularly a shortage of the ammunition
we requested and we are not able to supply our units in accordance with the needs; and now it is
necessary because the enemy’s offensive is in its full peak”.3404
1192. On 7 October 1995, Mladić asked Perišić for ten aerial bombs and stipulated “we do not
have any such ammunition”.3405 In November 1995, the RS MOD wrote that, “[w]ith regard to
material supplies for the [VRS], the situation is even worse [than with financing the army]. Previous
stocks have already been exhausted and the level of ammunition, explosive, weapons, military
equipment, fuel and other material supplies is critical”;3406 the VRS faces the “exhaustion of and
inability to replenish stockpile reserves to conduct the war”.3407 Mladić’s notes from a VRS Main
Staff meeting on 7 December 1995, read: “The PoOb /logistics support/ situation is very critical.
Food is the most critical”.3408 Ðukić likewise recognised that the VRS was facing a “difficult
material situation” in late 1995.3409
1193. Furthermore, numerous exhibits indicate that the VRS heavily depended on supplies from
the VJ, thereby demonstrating that the VRS’s reserves were insufficient. On 30 January 1994,
Mladić requested over 12 million bullets and over 12,000 pieces of artillery ammunition from the
VJ General Staff, asserting that these supplies “are necessary for combat security and supplying of
units engaged in combat operations”.3410 In May 1995, Mladić asked Perišić to provide 10,000
mines and 5 tonnes of plastic explosives because the VRS lacked a sufficient quantity for its
operations.3411 The following month, Mladić emphasised that, in light of ongoing combat operations
in Sarajevo and the Sava river valley, “the expenditure of human and material resources of the VRS
had been increased” and “[t]hat is precisely why, at this moment, the material assistance to the VRS
from VJ, especially in ammunition, is needed more than ever”.3412 On 19 June 1995, Mladić sent a
“[v]ery urgent” message to Perišić stating that “the Muslim offensive is still going on strong” and
that the SRK had consequently suffered significant casualties and were retreating in the general area
3404
3405
3406
3407
3408
3409
3410
3411
Ex. P2739, Request from Mladi} to the VJ General Staff for Arms and Ammunition for the SRK, 3 September
1995.
Ex. P2746, Request from Ratko Mladić to Perišić for Air Bombs, 7 October 1995. See also Ex. P505, Transcript
of Nikola To{ovi} Deposition, 13 December 2008, T. 62.
Ex. P1534, Work Report of the RS MOD for the Period of August 1994 - November 1995, November 1995,
p. 18 (emphasis added).
Ex. P1534, Work Report of the RS MOD for the Period of August 1994 - November 1995, November 1995, p. 2
(emphasis added).
Ex. D773, Excerpt from Ratko Mladi}'s Notebook, 7 December 1995, p. 3.
Ex. D396, Transcript of Interview with \or|e \uki}, 29 February 1996, p. 3.
Ex. P2768, Request from Ratko Mladić to the VJ General Staff Regarding Ammunition, 30 January 1994
(emphasis added).
Ex. P2781, Request from Ratko Mladić to Perišić for Engineering Equipment, 12 May 1995.
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of Trnovo, near Sarajevo; and emphasising “we need your urgent help with the following quantities
of ammunition”, namely 1,835,850 rounds of various calibres and 2,000 shells.3413
1194. The SRK Command similarly admitted its dependence on VJ supplies in early 1995, as it
advised the VRS Main Staff that supplies from the VJ were necessary to “replenish” its units with
ammunition, describing this support as “essential to our requirements”.3414 On 22 June 1995, the
SRK made arrangements to collect 120,000 bullets and 1,850 shells from the VJ, stressing that
these supplies were necessary “because the situation on the front is exceptionally difficult”.3415 That
month the Zvornik Infantry Brigade itself averred that it was “look[ing] for ammunition with
desperate moves”.3416
1195. Momčilo Perišić,3417 Slobodan Milošević,3418 Ratko Mladić3419 and Radovan Karadžić3420
themselves believed that the VRS would not have been able to wage war without the VJ’s help,
thereby showing that they did not consider the VRS’s reserves sufficient.
1196. In sum, extensive evidence explicitly states that the VRS’s reserves were verging towards
depletion as the war progressed and that the VRS was in serious need of supplies, although
Kovačević maintained that the state of these reserves was generally satisfactory and not critical.3421
Kovačević’s point is hardly corroborated and the Trial Chamber does not find it credible in light of
the evidentiary record.
1197. Kovačević’s assertions are equally called into doubt by the record of a July 1994 Supreme
Defence Council session.3422 Pavle Bulatović, the FRY Defence Minister, told the SDC that he had
met with the Defence Ministers of RSK and RS, namely Kovačević himself.3423 “In their demands”,
Bulatović explained, “they were precise and resolute in saying that unless they receive assistance
3412
3413
3414
3415
3416
3417
3418
3419
3420
3421
3422
3423
Ex. P2724, Request from Ratko Mladić to Momčilo Perišić for Ammunition and Rockets, 14 June 1995
(emphasis added).
Ex. P624, Request from Ratko Mladić to Perišić for Ammunition, 19 June 1995 (emphasis added). This
document appears to have a duplicate in Ex. P2726, although the latter has an error in translation, as noted
above. See Miodrag Simić, T. 10198-10200; Dušan Kovačević, T. 12857.
Ex. P1223, SRK Command Request to VRS Main Staff for Ammunition, 15 January 1995.
Ex. P1225, SRK Command Request to VRS Main Staff for Ammunition, 22 June 1995.
Ex. P1235, Correspondence Between 1st Zvornik Command and VRS Main Staff, 8 June 1995 (emphasis added).
Ex. P782, Stenographic Transcript of the 18th Session of the SDC, 7 February 1994, p. 53; Ex. P776,
Stenographic Transcript of the 21st Session of the SDC, 7 June 1994, p. 38; Ex. P796, Stenographic Transcript of
the 38th Session of the SDC, 27 June 1995, p. 12; Ex. P2743, Memo from the Chief of VJ General Staff, 11
August 1995; Ex. P1476, Intercepted Conversation, 7 October 1996, pp 4-5.
Ex. P778, Stenographic Transcript of the 25th Session of the SDC, 30 August 1994, p. 47; Ex. P1476, Intercepted
Conversation, 7 October 1996, pp 4-5.
Ex. P1282, Intercepted Conversation, undated, p. 6.
Ex. P2822, Minutes of 40th Session of the RS National Assembly, 1 and 11 May 1994, p. 57.
See e.g. Dušan Kovačević, T. 12811, 12843, 12848.
Ex. P784, Stenographic Transcript of the 22nd Session of the SDC, 11 July 1994.
Ex. P784, Stenographic Transcript of the 22nd Session of the SDC, 11 July 1994, p. 39.
374
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this state will bear responsibility for their future”.3424 Milošević stated in the session: “Kovačević
reiterated that the situation is critical for the Republika Srpska and the RSK”, and proposed to enter
a contract with FRY special purpose industries to import weapons and military equipment into RS
and RSK.3425 (Slobodan Milošević derisively dismissed Kovačević’s proposal, saying that RS and
RSK could not enter into a contract directly with FRY special purpose industries but instead had to
proceed through the FRY MOD and the VJ General Staff.)3426 This evidence indicates that, contrary
to what he testified in court, Kovačević thought that the VRS’s situation was “critical” and that
there was an important need to import weaponry from the FRY,3427 thereby showing that RS’s
ammunition reserves were not remotely satisfactory.
1198. The Trial Chamber finds other reasons to doubt Kovačević’s credibility. First, Kovačević
was officially a member of the VJ on the 30th Personnel Center’s payroll,3428 and described himself
as a longstanding personal friend of Perišić,3429 which may have impaired his objectivity.
1199. Second, Kovačević generally denied that military goods continued to be secretly transported
across the FRY-RS border and delivered to the VRS after the FRY officially imposed sanctions on
RS in August 1994.3430 It is conclusively established that logistical assistance continued and that the
sanctions were mostly a façade.3431 The Trial Chamber finds it highly implausible that Kovačević,
the former RS Minister of Defence, would not know that fact. It is additionally noteworthy that,
when presented with a RS MOD report listing millions of weapons procured during the sanctions
period under a compound category of “[p]urchases and donations”, Kovačević opined that the
purchased weapons must have come from FRY special purpose industries.3432 Kovačević’s
explanation therefore contradicted his own claim that weapons generally could not cross the border
during the sanctions period.3433
3424
3425
3426
3427
3428
3429
3430
3431
3432
3433
Ex. P784, Stenographic Transcript of the 22nd Session of the SDC, 11 July 1994, p. 39 (emphasis added).
Ex. P784, Stenographic Transcript of the 22nd Session of the SDC, 11 July 1994, pp 40-41 (emphasis added).
Ex. P784, Stenographic Transcript of the 22nd Session of the SDC, 11 July 1994, p. 41.
Ex. P784, Stenographic Transcript of the 22nd Session of the SDC, 11 July 1994, pp 39-41.
Dušan Kovačević, T. 12532, 12732, 12740. See Ex. P1906, VJ Personnel File of Du{an Kova~evi} (notably
Doc IDs 0611-5812 and 0611-5820); Ex. D406, RS Presidential Decree Appointing Du{an Kova~evi}, 19
January 1993; Ex. D407, Report of Taking Up of Duty by Du{an Kova~evi}, 19 January 1993.
In January 1993, Kovačevíć became the RS Minister of Defence, serving until August 1994, when Radovan
Karadžić appointed him to a deputy minister post until his retirement in January 1996. Besides his ministerial
positions, Kovačevíć concurrently served in both the VRS and VJ, and was promoted to VRS Major General by
Karadžić in January 1993, while the FRY SDC likewise promoted him to Major General of the VJ in November
1993. Kovačević also was a member of the RS Supreme Command by virtue of his being Defence Minister. See
Dušan Kovačević, T. 12531-12532, 12588, 12730-12732.
Dušan Kovačević, T. 12797.
Dušan Kovačević, T. 12850-12852.
See supra section VI.C.2.(c).
Dušan Kovačević, T. 12709; Ex. P1534, Work Report of the RS MOD for the Period of August 1994 November 1995, November 1995, p. 5.
Dušan Kovačević, T. 12850-12852.
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1200. Third, notwithstanding his senior membership in the VRS and service as RS Minister of
Defence, Kovačević unbelievably professed not to know that the VRS used aerial bombs in
Sarajevo: “Q: To your knowledge, sir, were you aware that the VRS was using aerial bombs in its
bombardment of Sarajevo? A: I really don’t know about that, aside from what I read in the media
about the shelling itself”.3434
(d) Fuel Reserves in Republika Srpska
1201. According to Siniša Borović, between 20,000 and 70,000 tonnes of fuel were left behind by
the JNA in BiH and Croatia.3435 Borović stated that “paramilitary forces” ended up taking
possession of these fuel reserves, sometimes overpowering storage crews.3436 Borović described
these “paramilitary forces” as Serb, Muslim and Croat units operating outside the framework of the
state armed forces.3437 Borović did not state that these reserves were procured by the VRS.
1202. Dušan Kovačević advanced that the VRS possessed sufficient fuel reserves and did not
experience problems until the beginning of 1994.3438 Ðorñe Ðukić, the former VRS Assistant
Commander for Logistics, further posited that “there were no problems regarding fuel provision
until the beginning of 1995”, when VRS units started submitting “continuous requests to the
government for fuel”.3439 Ðukić stated that approximately 40,000 tonnes of fuel and between 1,000
and 1,200 tonnes of kerosene were found in the reserves in the territory of RS.3440 But the reserves
Ðukić mentioned would have been insufficient to fulfil the VRS’s needs according to a November
1993 joint report by the RS MOD and VRS Main Staff. The latter stated that the VRS’s “daily need
for engine fuel varies around 37,000 litres of diesel fuel and 13,000 litres of super fuel”.3441 This
report also suggests that Ðukić’s estimate may have been incorrect, as it stipulates that “fuel
reserves were only 24,300 litres of diesel and 13,784 of super”.3442
1203. Another exhibit states that, in October 1995, the VRS Main Staff made arrangements to
collect 338,000 litres of D-2 diesel fuel from a depot in Banja Luka.3443 Kovačević testified that this
procurement originated from a directorate in charge of commodity reserves.3444 This document
suggests that the VRS had access to greater fuel reserves than estimated by the RS MOD and VRS
3434
3435
3436
3437
3438
3439
3440
3441
3442
3443
3444
Dušan Kovačević, T. 12864.
Sini{a Borovi}, T. 13892.
Ibid.
Sini{a Borovi}, T. 13893.
Dušan Kovačević, T. 12667.
Ex. D397, Transcript of Interview with \or|e \uki}, 29 June 1996, p. 1.
Ibid.
Ex. P1251, Report on VRS Financial Situation, November 1993, p. 5.
Ibid.
Ex. D413, VRS Main Staff Authorisation, 13 October 1995.
Dušan Kovačević, T. 12694.
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Main Staff joint report two years earlier.3445 On the other hand, this fuel may have been previously
delivered to this depot from the FRY, as the record establishes that the VJ was involved in
supplying certain VRS depots.3446
1204. The Trial Chamber finds that the exact quantity of fuel available in RS’s reserves cannot be
determined on the basis of the record adduced at trial. That being noted, the record otherwise
demonstrates that VRS personnel recurrently reported problems due to low levels of fuel, thereby
showing that fuel reserves were not sufficient from an early stage of the war.
1205. In April 1993, the VRS Main Staff reported that the state of fuel and ammunition reserves
was “very bad, so that in 1993 it will be necessary to allocate much larger sums to bring the existing
ordnance into a good state of repair and replenish material stocks”.3447 Mladić described the fuel
situation as “a problem” in his diary in August as well.3448 Mladić concluded in November 1993
that the VRS was facing a fuel shortage because its usage exceeded its replenishments, which could
lead vehicles to be grounded:
In Sep and Nov, the army has been provided 984 tonnes of diesel D-2 and 48 tonnes of petrol MB86 for the Army, and minimal monthly needs are 1100 tonnes of diesel D-2 and 600 tonnes of
petrol MB-86. In a couple of days, any movement of the vehicles (combat or ordinary) will be
impossible, the Communication centre might stop working, as well as hospitals and bakeries that
run on this fuel, etc.3449
1206. The November 1993 RS MOD and VRS Main Staff joint report reiterated that “[t]he
situation is critical enough to ground all vehicles”.3450
1207. In August 1993, the Drina Corps Command noted that some units had not reported the
quantities received from individually-owned gas stations and that “[t]he logical conclusion is that
some units even have excess of fuel”.3451 But it noted that fuel otherwise was an issue, as requests
for replenishment had generally become more frequent.3452 The Drina Corps Command reckoned
that “the problem cannot be resolved because the [FRY] does not have the corresponding quantities
3445
3446
3447
3448
3449
3450
3451
3452
See Ex. P1251, Report on VRS Financial Situation, November 1993, p. 5; Ex. D413, VRS Main Staff
Authorisation, 13 October 1995.
See supra section VI.C.3.
Ex. P149, Analysis of the Combat Readiness and Activities of the VRS in 1992, April 1993, p. 131.
Ex. P2917, Excerpt from Ratko Mladi}'s Notebook, p. 5.
Ex. P2918, VRS Main Staff Commander Memo Addressed to the Government of the RS, 1 November 1993,
pp 2-3.
Ex. P1251, Report on VRS Financial Situation, November 1993, p. 5.
Ex. D411, Drina Corps Command Report Regarding Requests for Fuel, 1 August 1993.
Ibid.
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of fuel, due to the stricter embargo measures” and “[d]irect purchase of fuel is impossible due to a
lack of monetary resources”.3453
1208. The 1st Krajina Corps itself sternly cautioned the VRS Main Staff about that problem: “You
are herewith informed and warned that we are not able to perform PoOb /logistical support/ of the
units, due to lack of p/g /fuel/ ₣...ğ [I]f we urgently do not provide [fuel] for minimal functions, we
will be forced to pull over [...] on the roads”.3454 Another contemporaneous report by the 1st Krajina
Corps restated that it had consumed its fuel reserves and consequently faced difficulties in carrying
out its operations.3455 UN intelligence reports similarly indicated that the VRS was “very short of
fuel and spare parts”, and Pyers Tucker, a senior officer in the UNPROFOR military command
from 1992 to 1993, frequently saw VRS vehicles stopped at roadsides after running out of fuel.3456
1209. In March 1994, Mladić said he was “certain” of the necessity to improve the supply of fuel
to the VRS.3457 In May 1994, Radovan Karadžić directly informed Momčilo Perišić that the VJ’s
assistance was needed because the VRS was running out of fuel.3458
1210. Between August 1994 and November 1995, the RS MOD again reported “numerous
problems” due to insufficient fuel.3459 On 8 June 1995, the Zvornik Infantry Brigade reported that it
faced a fuel shortage.3460 In December 1995, Mladić noted: “We’re getting by with fuel”.3461
1211. In sum, the Trial Chamber finds that the evidence establishes that the VRS’s fuel reserves
were insufficient to meet its military needs.
(e) Military Factories in Republika Srpska
1212. The Trial Chamber recalls Mladić’s estimate that military factories in RS were able to
produce 26.2% of the total artillery ammunition but only 1.49% of the total infantry ammunition
3453
3454
3455
3456
3457
3458
3459
3460
3461
Ex. D411, Drina Corps Command Report re Requests for Fuel, 1 August 1993. Kovačević deemed that VRS
units had sufficient supplies of fuel as of the summer of 1993. Dušan Kovačević, T. 12690.
The message added that quartermaster support “has been realised in very difficult conditions” and “₣nğutrition is
poor and affects soldiers’ health”. Ex. P1231, Logistics Report From the Command of 1st Krajina Corps to the
VRS Main Staff, 8 October 1993, pp 2-3.
Ex. P2916, Report Regarding 1st Krajiški Corps and its Subordinate Commands and Units, 13 November 1993,
pp 4-5.
Pyers Tucker, T. 9088-9089, 9168-9169.
Ex. P2940, Excerpt from Ratko Mladi}'s Notebook, 15 March 1994, p. 12.
Ex. P2766, Cable from Karad`i} to Peri{i}, 15 May 1994.
Ex. P1534, Work Report of the RS MOD for the Period of August 1994 - November 1995, November 1995, p. 3.
Ex. P1235, Correspondence Between 1st Zvornik Command and VRS Main Staff, 8 June 1995.
Ex. D773, Excerpt from Ratko Mladi}'s Notebook, 7 December 1995, p. 3.
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used by the VRS through April 15 1995.3462 Witness MP-14 indeed testified that RS factories
lacked the capability to manufacture infantry ammunition.3463
1213. As early as September 1992, the VRS Main Staff had concluded that its situation was “very
difficult since all ammunition factories [were] either closed or working at minimum capacity”.3464
Slightly over a year later, VRS Main Staff and RS MOD again determined that RS was unable to
produce sufficient quantities of weaponry at its own military factories and “cope with the high level
of wartime consumption”.3465
1214. RS tried to “ensur[e] domestic production of a major portion of the Army’s needs in
ammunition, mines and other explosive devices, and military equipment”.3466 Between January and
September 1993, RS companies delivered to the VRS 61,580 pieces of artillery missiles, 42,890
mortar shells, 870 rifle grenades, 15,670 hand grenades, 4,200 anti-personnel mines and 1,000
fuses.3467 Yet, RS-based companies struggled to maintain production: “The problem of financing
the special purpose industry in Republika Srpska has become not just a restricting factor in
executing the planned or agreed level of production, it has also shut down some companies and
caused other damages including breakdowns of expensive equipment due to inadequate
maintenance etc”.3468 Despite efforts to improve production, “[t]he level of consumption of both the
Army’s material reserves and the Republic Reserve ₣...ğ was constantly beyond the level [of]
renewing supplies”.3469 The VRS Main Staff indicated that RS’s military industrial production was
“a far cry from satisfying the material needs of VRS in 1994”.3470
1215. The VRS Main Staff and RS MOD considered that “the lack of financial means had a
catastrophic impact on production for the Army, repairs of weapons and military equipment,
supplies, that is, on the Army’s overall entire financial situation”.3471 The production of food and
clothes was also problematic due to the lack of financial means and organisation.3472 “The lack of
funds ma[de] it impossible to order clothing and footwear, and many soldiers [would] therefore
3462
3463
3464
3465
3466
3467
3468
3469
3470
3471
3472
Ex. P312, Transcript of the Tape Recording of the 50th Session of the National Assembly, 15 and 16 April 1995,
p. 51.
MP-14, T. 3524 (closed session).
Ex. P1200, Correspondence Between the Main Staff of the Army of the Serbian BiH and the 1st Krajina Corps
Command Relating to Supply of Ammunition, 12 September 1992.
Ex. P1251, Report on VRS Financial Situation, November 1993, p. 2.
Ex. P1251, Report on VRS Financial Situation, November 1993, pp 4-5.
Ex. P1251, Report on VRS Financial Situation, November 1993, p. 5.
Ibid.
Ex. P1251, Report on VRS Financial Situation, November 1993, p. 10.
Ex. P1214, Annual Financial Statement of the Plan of Tasks and Financing of the VRS for 1994, 17 February
1995, p. 7.
Ex. P1251, Report on VRS Financial Situation, November 1993, p. 3 (emphasis added). See also Ex. P1251,
Report on VRS Financial Situation, November 1993, p. 10.
Ex. P1251, Report on VRS Financial Situation, November 1993, pp 2-3, 6.
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enter the winter time half dressed and without adequate footwear”.3473 Mladić too reported that “a
large number of soldiers are approaching the winter half-dressed, without adequate or no footwear
whatsoever”.3474 Mladić later notified Milošević, Lilić and Karadžić of the “inadequate functioning
of the [RS] economy, primarily special-purpose production”.3475
1216. The VRS equally lacked adequate overhaul and technical facilities in RS. Mladi}’s logistics
strategic plan specified that the VJ General Staff’s technical maintenance facilities at Kragujeva}
and ^ačak were “to assist with requests from the VRS and SVK Main Staffs”.3476 The VJ General
Staff’s overhaul of VRS weaponry, notably at the Kragujevac TRZ, and the supply of spare parts
were a necessity for the VRS, as the RS MOD noted: “Only one of the four VRS logistics bases was
equipped to carry out mid-echelon repair work, but even these activities were brought into question
because of a lack of spare parts”.3477 The RS MOD admitted that it was seeking to remedy this
problem partly through the “[e]ngagement of repair depots and enterprises from the FRY to repair
and maintain [material and technical equipment]” and “[u]se of FRY Army services in this
area”.3478 The VRS’s difficulties in repairing equipment were such that Mladić personally wrote to
Perišić to urge him to speed up the VJ’s repair of two 130mm guns (“we are in dire need of it”).3479
The VJ complied with the request and offered to repair more 130mm guns for the VRS.3480 Mladić
also urgently requested Perišić to dispatch an expert assistance team to fix problems with rockets
and an anti-aircraft defence system.3481 Similarly, the VJ General Staff’s Čačak Maintenance and
Repairs Depot was involved in repairing military vehicles for the VRS.3482
1217. Perišić himself told the Supreme Defence Council that the VJ played a key role in repairing
the VRS’s equipment, asking the following rhetorical question: “Do you think that the technical
3473
3474
3475
3476
3477
3478
3479
3480
3481
3482
Ex. P1251, Report on VRS Financial Situation, November 1993, p. 6.
Ex. P2918, VRS Main Staff Commander Memo Addressed to the Government of the RS, 1 November 1993.
Ex. P2940, Excerpt from Ratko Mladi}'s Notebook, 15 March 1994, p. 12.
Ex. P2158, Document Issued by Ratko Mladić Regarding Logistical Support, undated, p. 2.
Ex. P1534, Work Report of the RS MOD for the Period of August 1994 - November 1995, November 1995, p. 6.
The Kragujevac TRZ was a facility under the VJ General Staff. Jugoslav Kodžopeljić, T. 12313-12314, 1241412415, 12494; Siniša Borović, T. 13888.
Ex. P1534, Work Report of the RS MOD for the Period of August 1994 - November 1995, November 1995, p. 6.
Ex. P2720, Documents Relating to a Request from Ratko Mladić to Perišić Regarding Guns, 30 April and 5 May
1995.
Ex. P2720, Documents Relating to a Request from Ratko Mladić to Perišić Regarding Guns, 30 April and 5 May
1995. See also Ex. P865, Dispatch by the Cabinet of the VJ Chief the General Staff, 6 May 1995 (Cabinet of the
VJ Chief of General Staff notifying VRS that 130mm gun has been repaired and is ready for pick-up in Nikšić).
Ex. P2722, Request from Ratko Mladić to Perišić for Expert Assistance, 31 May 1995.
Ex. P1218, Correspondence Between the TRZ ^a~ak and Military Post 7115 [ekovi}i on Repairs Carried out on
Military Equipment, 16 October 1995 (failed attempt to repair tank). The Čačak facility was administrated by the
VJ General Staff. Jugoslav Kodžopeljić, T. 12494.
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equipment, which is in Republika Srpska or in the Republic of Serbian Krajina, would be functional
if we did not engage the men from these depots?”3483
1218. Even though domestic production and overhaul capabilities were direly insufficient to fulfil
the VRS’s needs, RS factories were able to produce or repair, between 18 August 1994 and 1
November 1995, 864,000 rounds of rifle ammunition, 163,508 rounds of other infantry ammunition,
131,071 units of mortar ammunition, 37,849 units of artillery of ammunition, 18,786 units of tank
ammunition, 877 missiles and 279 aerial bombs.3484 The Trial Chamber further recalls the evidence
concerning the Pretis military factory in RS, which relied on operational support from the VJ
General Staff.3485
(f) Local Sponsors in Republika Srpska
1219. Dušan Kovačević stated that RS’s local and municipal authorities, as well as wealthy local
entrepreneurs, regularly made donations to VRS units.3486 Local municipalities and companies
earmarked certain funds and donated miscellaneous items to assist the VRS.3487 At the 50th Session
of the RS National Assembly, Branko Simić, a deputy, told Mladić:
You should visit the Serbian municipalities, I am there every day, certainly with regard to this
treatment, I could not do that, and see the sums the Serbian people are giving through the
municipalities for the Serbian army ₣...ğ There are municipalities, General, which have given up to
two million and two hundred thousand DEM [and] from oil to all the necessary articles, even
down to the small item of pepper, plus cash.3488
1220. Mladić’s notebook mentions a meeting with representatives of the Sokolac municipality,
where a local official mentioned that 150,000 Deutschmarks had been “secured” and that “one
parcel” would be given to “every soldier”,3489 presumably as salary. Local sponsors purchased
certain quantities of ammunition from FRY special purpose industries as well, providing them to
VRS units.3490 Such sponsors were increasingly involved in supplying local VRS units with
ammunition after the FRY imposed sanctions on RS.3491
3483
3484
3485
3486
3487
3488
3489
3490
3491
Ex. P796, Stenographic Transcript of the 38th Session of the SDC, 27 June 1995, p. 12.
Ex. P1534, Work Report of the RS MOD for the Period of August 1994 - November 1995, November 1995, p 5.
See supra section VI.C.4.
According to Kovačević, local political authorities identified donors, such as wealthy entrepreneurs, and ordered
them to trade and purchase various kinds of goods for the purposes of the VRS, saying that they would be
remunerated. Dušan Kovačević, T. 12601-12602, 12664-12665.
Dušan Kovačević, T. 12766.
Ex. P312, Transcript of the Tape Recording of the 50th Session of the National Assembly, 15 and 16 April 1995,
p. 73. See also Dušan Kovačević, T. 12764-12765.
Ex. D760, Excerpt from Ratko Mladi}'s Notebook, 3 March 1994.
Dušan Kovačević, T. 12673; Ex. P75, Witness Statement of \or|e \uki}, 4/29 February 1996, p. 4.
“Normally this would be carried out without the knowledge of the Ministry of Defence, especially without the
knowledge of the government, and sometimes even without the knowledge of the Main Staff”. Dušan
Kovačević, T. 12669-12670.
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1221. On 22 February 1993, the 1st Krajina Corps Command notified the VRS Main Staff that it
had made an agreement to purchase 2 million bullets from Prvi Partizan for the sum of 250,000
Deutschmarks, writing: “We hereby ask the [Main Staff VRS] to purchase this same quantity of
ammunition or to allow us to buy the aforementioned quantity through donors from municipal
assemblies in the zone of the 1st [Krajina Corps]”.3492 In May 1995, General Dragomir Milošević
informed the VRS Main Staff that local sponsors had assisted the SRK in purchasing part of its
fuel.3493 Rajko Petrović recalled that, in order to avoid military service, one particular businessman
had donated 300,000 Deutschmarks, although Petrović did not know whether he gave the sum to the
government or the Serbian Democratic Party.3494 Petrovi} added that the VRS received numerous
donations from local individuals, associations and companies.3495
1222. Kovačević contended that “local-level authorities, such as municipal authorities, were the
most important and for the most part permanent donors to their local units, normally brigade-level
units”.3496 The evidentiary record does not support Kovačević’s claim that such local sources were
the “most important” source of assistance, which strikes the Trial Chamber as a great exaggeration.
The record does not establish that the VRS obtained weaponry directly from such local sources but
only that they occasionally assisted in the purchase of weapons.
1223. The difficult economic situation in RS could undercut these efforts, as illustrated by a
November 1993 report by the 27th Motorised Brigade Command of the 1st Krajina Corps, which
reads: “Business at municipal level (both the public and the private sectors), which has unselfishly
assisted our units, is in such a state that it cannot do so anymore”.3497
(g) Unauthorised Donations of Weaponry by VJ Personnel
1224. The Trial Chamber recalls that Perišić instituted disciplinary proceedings against certain VJ
commanders who gave military supplies directly to the VRS and SVK without formal
permission.3498 In particular, on 22 September 1994, Perišić instituted proceedings against Major
General Boro Ivanović, Commander of the VJ Novi Sad Corps, for having violated orders by
issuing equipment to the VRS and SVK without official approval, notably 2,320,441 units of
3492
3493
3494
3495
3496
3497
3498
Ex. D50, Letter from Commander of the 1st Krajina Corps to the VRS Main Staff, 22 February 1993. See also
MP-14, T. 3728-3729 (closed session).
Ex. P994, SRK Request Regarding Fuel Supply Through VJ, 3 May 1995.
Rajko Petrović, T. 13784-13787 (private session).
Rajko Petrovi}, T. 13761-13762, 13759.
Dušan Kovačević, T. 12601 (emphasis added).
Ex. P2916, Report Regarding 1st Krajiški Corps and its Subordinate Commands and Units, 13 November 1993,
p. 4.
Ex. P628, Directive from Perišic Regarding Disciplinary Proceedings, 15 August 1994. See also Petar Škrbić,
T. 11938-11940.
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infantry ammunition, 11,991 mortar shells and 205,725 litres of fuel.3499 Perišić also suspended
Ivanović from duty.3500 Yet, Slobodan Milošević and Zoran Lilić strongly disputed Perišić’s
allegations against Ivanović, finding them unsupported by Perišić’s evidence.3501 They severely
rebuked Perišić and ordered him to reinstate Ivanović because he should be presumed innocent until
proven guilty in proper court proceedings.3502 According to Sini{a Borović, who served as Perišić’s
Chef de Cabinet,3503 Ivanović was eventually placed in another position and promoted.3504
(h) Smuggling
1225. While Mladić reported that the unauthorised smuggling of VJ materials was a problem, he
distinguished it from official logistical assistance:
So far in this war, along with the regular supply of the VRS units and commands in accordance
with the PoOb /Logistical Support/ plan, there existed parallel unit supply channels, used not only
by authorised persons, but also by various suppliers, donors, and so on. Supplying commands and
units through these additional channels resulted in an uncontrolled and unplanned outflow of all
kinds of [equipment and materiel] from the VJ for purposes other than designated resulting in
some of it even falling into enemy hands while at the same time, some individuals obtained
enormous profit in this way, which justifiably caused profound dissatisfaction amongst the VJ and
VRS members.3505
1226. Dušan Kovačević explained that Mladić issued this order pursuant to his request, and
remarked on how profiteers were selling weaponry to enemy forces: “This was one of the painful
issues to me as an individual and a professional. I could not accept in any way that members of the
VRS locally, as well as sponsors, should be selling weapons and ammunition to the opposite side.
This was an occurrence that was lethal to the VRS in which nobody wanted genuinely to dispense
with [sic]. And it was very detrimental. There are individuals who are still wealthy thanks to the
activities dating from that period”.3506
1227. Ðor|e \uki} likewise mentioned hearsay knowledge of “individual cases” of smuggling,
such as that of Mirko Kraji{nik, who unofficially obtained weapons and ammunition from the FRY
for the needs of the Rajlovac Brigade in Sarajevo, and who was rumoured to be a smuggler of
3499
3500
3501
3502
3503
3504
3505
3506
Ex. D480, Decision of the Chief of the VJ General Staff to Bring a Member of VJ before the Military
Disciplinary Court at the General Staff, 22 September 1994.
Ex. D481, Decree of the FRY President, 2 August 1994.
Ex. P792, Stenographic Transcript of the 27th Session of the SDC, 27 September 1994, pp 3, 12-15, 19-20, 2223, 26, 32, 34-35, 37, 45-48, 50, 54.
Ex. P792, Stenographic Transcript of the 27th Session of the SDC, 27 September 1994, pp 12-14, 35-40, 44, 49,
52-53, 55, 59. See also Ex. P757, Minutes from the 27th Session of the SDC held on 27 September 1994, p. 2
(stating that Ivanović would remain Commander of the Novi Sad Corps).
Sini{a Borovi}, T. 13881, 14160.
Sini{a Borovi}, T. 13970.
Ex. P1259, VRS Main Staff Order, 24 October 1993.
Dušan Kovačević, T. 12670-12671 (emphasis added).
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weapons and ammunition.3507 Kovačević obtained information about how Kraji{nik unlawfully
conducted business outside the framework approved by the RS Ministry of Trade, although
Kovačević did not believe that Kraji{nik became wealthy as a result.3508 Private individuals also
smuggled non-military goods from the FRY into RS.3509
1228. Jugoslav Kodžopeljić’s testimony itself suggests that smuggling from VJ facilities to the
VRS was far from commonplace, as Kodžopeljić clearly denied knowledge of war profiteering
concerning assets of VJ depots he oversaw, namely the Kragujevac and ^ačak facilities, stating “I
cannot confirm that” and “No, I can’t recall any”.3510 Conversely, Siniša Borović affirmed that the
VJ frequently had to block off its own depots to thwart smugglers.3511
1229. Carl Bildt, who served as the European Union co-Chairman of the International Conference
on the Former Yugoslavia,3512 testified that a “black market” for weapons existed in Bosnia but was
not “major”, adding: “Every war produces, and every sanctions produces black markets. There are
always people who are prepared to make money independent of ethnicity and political loyalties in
the middle of a war. And in this particular war, there was no difference”.3513 Bildt posited that
smuggling primarily concerned fuel, beer and cigarettes, as there was “no need” to smuggle arms
and ammunition because there was already an “abundance of weapons” in Bosnia.3514 The Trial
Chamber does not find Bildt’s testimony convincing for several reasons. First, Bildt testified that
international border monitors along the Drina River did not detect “any major” deliveries of
weaponry from the FRY to RS after Milošević agreed to impose an embargo on RS.3515 In fact, the
evidentiary record establishes that major deliveries continued surreptitiously, undetected by
international border monitors, who were unable to adequately control the border for either
smuggling or secretive logistical assistance from the VJ.3516 Second, Bildt’s assessment that there
was “no need” to smuggle weaponry into Bosnia is amply contradicted by the evidence concerning
the VRS’s dwindling reserves and its recurrent requests for assistance from the VJ.3517
1230. The Trial Chamber also heard evidence that smuggling occurred within the VRS’s depots.
At the VRS’s 744th Logistics Base, “[l]ocal commanders forced their way into the depot in order to
3507
3508
3509
3510
3511
3512
3513
3514
3515
3516
Ex. P75, Witness Statement of \or|e \uki}, 4/29 February 1996, p. 4.
Dušan Kovačević, T. 12782-12784 (private session).
See Ex. D156, Letter from the UN Secretary-General to the President of the UNSC 25 June 1995, p. 3
(mentioning that FRY Customs reported confiscating contraband at the RS border, such as petrol, diesel,
cigarettes and food, although no ammunition or weapons were confiscated).
Jugoslav Kodžopeljić, T. 12434.
Sini{a Borovi}, T. 13961.
Carl Bildt, T. 14244-14245.
Carl Bildt, T. 14328-14329.
Carl Bildt, T. 14329.
Carl Bildt, T. 14328.
See supra sections VI.B.3, VI.C.2.(c).
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take fuel for their own purposes, without obtaining anyone’s authorisation. The local authorities,
too, would just simply go there and take fuel for their own needs and then resell it on the market.
They would obtain certain funds from this which they then used to bankroll some of their other
initiatives and needs”.3518
1231. Overall, the evidentiary record provides no reasonable basis to conclude that a significant
quantity of the VRS’s needs in weaponry was fulfilled by smuggling. Rather, the record indicates
that smuggling was the work of a relatively limited number of rogue individuals.
(i) Conclusion
1232. The Defence submits that “the haphazard record system used throughout the RS left clear
accounting obstacles to having an accurate estimation of what the VRS had, used and received from
any source nigh on impossible”.3519 In its view, “[t]he Trial Chamber is in effect being asked to
speculate concerning the amount of materiel supplied to the VRS by all potential sources and to
extrapolate from that, that a substantial amount of the materiel received by the VRS was provided
by the VJ”.3520 The Defence argues that “[t]his invitation to speculate should be rejected as to do so
would violate burden of proof the Prosecution must meet at this Tribunal”.3521
1233. The Trial Chamber finds the Defence’s claims unpersuasive. The VRS’s primary sources of
supply are not “impossible” to evaluate. The Trial Chamber has meticulously analysed the
evidentiary record for other sources of support to the VRS. Such sources indeed existed. The trial
record, however, demonstrates that the logistical assistance that the VRS received from the VJ with
Perišić’s approval was very important in comparison to other sources. In fact, the record clearly
shows that the VRS depended on the VJ’s assistance regardless of its other sources of supply.
10. Conclusions on Logistical and Technical Assistance to the VRS
1234. The Trial Chamber finds that Momčilo Perišić, as Chief of VJ General Staff, oversaw a
system providing comprehensive military assistance to the VRS, and participated in the SDC’s
decision to license this aid. The VJ General Staff directly supplied considerable quantities of
weaponry comprising a very large part of the VRS’s munition requirements.
3517
3518
3519
3520
3521
See supra section VI.C.9.(c).
Dušan Kovačević, T. 12641-12642 (private session).
Defence Final Brief, para. 742.
Defence Final Brief, para. 743.
Defence Final Brief, para. 743.
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1235. In addition, the VJ General Staff played a key role in devising the technical model by which
the VRS’s aerial bombs were successfully modified. It further helped the VRS in multiple other
areas, such as by providing fuel, technical experts, training, as well as operational support enabling
the Pretis factory to produce weaponry.
1236. The VRS’s general state of dependence on VJ support was acknowledged by Perišić
himself,3522 as well as Slobodan Milošević,3523 Radovan Karadžić3524 and Ratko Mladić.3525
1237. Finally, the Trial Chamber notes that important logistical and technical support was
provided to the units involved in perpetrating the charged crimes: the Drina Corps, Krajina Corps
and SRK.3526 Numerous documents demonstrate that the VJ General Staff gave extensive quantities
of weaponry to the Drina Corps.3527 Documents likewise indicate that the Krajina Corps3528 and
SRK3529 received logistical assistance. The VJ also helped fulfil the artillery needs of the Eastern
Bosnia Corps,3530 which spent “significant quantities of ammunition” while actively engaged in “the
zones of responsibility of the 1st and 2nd Krajina Corps and Sarajevo-Romanija Corps”.3531 The
VRS’s Koran Depot, which obtained approximately 70% of its ammunition from the VJ, supplied
3522
3523
3524
3525
3526
3527
3528
3529
3530
3531
Ex. P782, Stenographic Transcript of the 18th Session of the SDC, 7 February 1994, p. 53; Ex. P776,
Stenographic Transcript of the 21st Session of the SDC, 7 June 1994, p. 38; Ex. P2743, Memo from the Chief of
VJ General Staff, 11 August 1995.
Ex. P778, Stenographic Transcript of the 25th Session of the SDC, 30 August 1994, p. 47.
Ex. P2822, Minutes of the 40th Session of the RS National Assembly, 1 and 11 May 1994, p. 57.
Ex. P1282, Intercepted Conversation, undated, p. 6.
See generally supra sections VI.C.2.(b)-(c), VI.C.3, VI.C.4.(c), VI.C.5-6, 8.
Ex. P1512, Authorisation by the Drina Corps Command, 22 November 1993 (this authorisation was based on a
VJ General Staff decision, as indicated by Ex. P1269); Ex. P572, Matériel List, 22 November 1993 (The
translated document reads 1,936 rockets, although the original reads 50, see Jugoslav Kod`opeljić, T. 1235712358); Ex. P574, Matériel List, 22 November 1993 (see MP-14, T. 3564-3565); Ex. P579, Matériel List, 24
November 1993 (the translated form features an erroneous date at its top right; boxes 40-41 of the translated
form should also be blank as in the original; see MP-14, T. 3573-3574); Ex. P577, Matériel List, 23 November
1993 (see MP-14, T. 3571-3572); Ex. P578, Matériel List, 23 November 1993 (see MP-14, T. 3572-3573, 3709);
Ex. P576, Matériel List, 23 November 1993 (the translated document misses the quantity of 192 howitzer rounds
present in the original; see MP-14, T. 3570-3571); Ex. P582, Matériel List, 24 November 1993 (see MP-14,
T. 3579-3580); Ex. P583, Matériel List, 25 November 1993 (see MP-14, T. 3588-3589); Ex. P584, Matériel List,
25 November 1993 (see MP-14, T. 3589). For a detailed summary of the quantities of ammunition described in
these documents, see above.
Ex. P1232, Cable from 1st Krajina Corps Command to the VRS Main Staff, 13 January 1994; Ex. P1213,
Correspondence Between the 1st Krajina Corps Command and the VRS Main Staff Regarding Reception of
Military Equipment, 11 July 1994. For the reasons stated above, because the Krajina Corps officially informed
the VRS Main Staff that it had obtained this material from the VJ, the only reasonable inference was that this
material was officially approved by the VJ General Staff.
Ex. P1226, SRK Command Request to VRS Main Staff for Ammunition, 17 June 1995; Ex. P1225, SRK
Command Request to VRS Main Staff for Ammunition, 22 June 1995; Ex. P1229, SRK Command Request to
VRS Main Staff for Logistical Assistance, 7 July 1995.
Ex. P1203, VRS Order Regarding Redistribution of Ammunition, 2 August 1995; Ex. P2723, Request from
Ratko Mladić to Perišić for Nitrogen Tanks, 31 May 1995. See also Ivan Ðokić, T. 14484. Again, because the
Eastern Bosnian Corps officially informed the VRS Main Staff that it had obtained the material in Ex. P1203
from the VJ, the only reasonable inference was that this material was officially approved by the VJ General
Staff.
Ex. P1206, VRS Internal Correspondence on Ammunition Received from the VJ and Request for More
Ammunition to be Assigned, 30 September 1995.
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the SRK, Drina Corps and 2nd Krajina Corps.3532 The Pretis factory in RS received significant
operational support from the VJ General Staff, which placed technical monitors at Pretis, tested
Pretis’ weaponry at the VJ Nikinci facility, and overhauled its artillery casings at the Kragujevac
TRZ.3533 Pretis fulfilled part of the SRK, Drina Corps and Krajina Corps’ needs in weaponry.3534
Pretis mostly supplied the VRS’s 3rd Sarajevo Brigade.3535 The modified air-bombs that Pretis
made were sent to the Koran Depot.3536 Starting in 1995, Pretis’ modified air-bombs were notably
delivered to the SRK for usage in Sarajevo.3537 Pretis produced modified air-bombs for the needs of
the Drina Corps and the East Bosnia Corps as well.3538 The Trial Chamber recalls its conclusion that
the only reasonable inference presented by the evidentiary record is that the modification of airbombs at Pretis was based on the successful technical model developed by Ivan Ðokić and the VJ
General Staff.3539
3532
3533
3534
3535
3536
3537
3538
3539
MP-14, T. 3517, 3522-3524 (closed session). See supra section VI.C.3.
See generally supra section VI.C.4.(b).(ii).
MP-14, T. 3635; Ex. P1213, Correspondence Between the 1st Krajina Corps Command and the VRS Main Staff
Regarding Reception of Military Equipment, 11 July 1994. See supra section VI.C.4.(c).
MP-14, T. 3499, 3505-3506, 3651-3652 (closed session).
MP-14, T. 3654 (closed session).
See MP-14, T. 3652, 3654, 3657-3660 (closed session). See also Ex. P606, Letters from VRS Main Staff
Regarding Air-Bombs, 19 April 1995; Ex. P605, Document from VRS Main Staff, Logistics Sector, 16 May
2009; Ex. P608, VRS Order to Pretis re Supply of Air Bombs, 20 June 1995; Ex. P978, Order re: Ammunition,
28 June 1995.
MP-14, T. 3654 (closed session).
See supra section VI.C.5.
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D. Logistical and Technical Assistance to the SVK
1. Dependence of the SVK on VJ
1238. When the JNA withdrew from Croatia in 1991, the SVK took possession of a variety of
weaponry and military equipment the JNA left behind.3540 This included military tanks, armoured
personnel carriers, infantry combat vehicles and ammunition with a total estimated value of at least
174,207,980 U.S. dollars.3541 By June 1993, the SVK began to report serious shortages in military
resources and looked more frequently for replenishment to the VJ.3542 On 4 June 1993, Goran
Hadžić, the RSK President, admitted to Slobodan Milošević that “[t]he amount of artillery
ammunition is minimal, and fuel and grease are sufficient only for fire engagement for a short
period of time” and that the RSK was “not financially in [a] position to make up for medium and
general service which may be done by the institutions of the Yugoslav Army”.3543 The special
industry factory in Teslingrad supplied the SVK but its production of light mines was routinely
hampered by shortages of raw materials.3544
1239. By March 1994, the situation within the SVK had become dire, which led to a growing
dependence on VJ assistance.3545 In March 1994, the SVK Main Staff addressed to Peri{i} a report
on logistical assistance, in which it stressed that the “SVK has been short of between half a million
and a million New Dinars on a daily basis”, that “[t]he RSK government is unable to sustain from
the budget the expenses of maintaining the lowest standard in the army (bare survival)”.3546 In July
1994 requests from the President of the RSK to Perišić for assistance contained declarations that
“the planned development and reinforcement of the SVK is directly dependent on the delivery of
3540
3541
3542
3543
3544
3545
3546
See Ex. D375, VJ General Staff Report on Destroyed, Captured, Abandoned and Damaged Materiel in the
Republic of Croatia, July 1992; Ex. D376, List I of Army Property Left in Republic of Croatia After Withdrawal
of JNA, undated; Ex. D377, List II of Army Property Left in Republic of Croatia After Withdrawal of JNA,
undated; Ex. D378, List III of Army Property Left in Republic of Croatia After Withdrawal of JNA, undated;
Ex. D379, List IV of Army Property Left in Republic of Croatia After Withdrawal of JNA, undated; MP-80,
T. 8354-8355 (closed session).
Ex. D375, VJ General Staff Report on Destroyed, Captured, Abandoned and Damaged Materiel in the Republic
of Croatia, July 1992. See also Ex. D376, List I of Army Property Left in Republic of Croatia After Withdrawal
of JNA, undated; Ex. D377, List II of Army Property Left in Republic of Croatia After Withdrawal of JNA,
undated; Ex. D378, List III of Army Property Left in Republic of Croatia After Withdrawal of JNA, undated;
Ex. D379, List IV of Army Property Left in Republic of Croatia After Withdrawal of JNA, undated; MP-80,
T. 8354-8355 (closed session); Mile Novaković, T. 13095-13097.
Ex. P320, Letter from the President of the RSK to the President of the Republic of Serbia, 4 June 1993. See also
Ex. P317, Aide Mémoire of the Chief of the Office of the SVK Commander to the VJ General Staff, 17
December 1993, pp 13-14; Ex. P1029, SVK Report Regarding Logistical Assistance, 6 March 1994, p. 5;
Ex. P2621, Aide-Memoire for Coordination in the VJ General Staff, July 1994, pp 10-11; Mile Novaković,
T. 13098; MP-80, T. 8338-8339, 8354-8355 (closed session).
Ex. P320, Letter from the President of the RSK to the President of the Republic of Serbia, 4 June 1993.
Ex. D171 (under seal), p. 2; MP-80, T. 8629-8630 (closed session).
See Ex. P782, Stenographic Transcript of 18th Session of the SDC, 7 February 1994, p. 53; Ex. P1029, SVK
Report Regarding Logistical Assistance, dated 6 March 1994, pp 2-5, 10; Ex. P1125, Request by the RSK to the
VJ for Assistance in Recruitment and Equipment of the SVK, 21 July 1994, p. 1.
Ex. P1029, SVK Report Regarding Logistical Assistance, 6 March 1994, p. 5.
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military and technical equipment by the VJ in accordance with the achieved agreement” and that
“past co-operation created [an] important foundation for further development of the SVK”.3547
Other reports on logistical assistance by the SVK indicate that, at times, the VJ General Staff was
regularly receiving requests for ammunition and weapons.3548
2. Delivery of Weaponry and Military Equipment to the SVK
(a) Provision of Weapons and Ammunition
1240. The Trial Chamber was presented with evidence regarding the VJ’s provision of weapons
and ammunition to the SVK from as early as February 1993 until November 1995.
1241. On 10 February 1993, at the 7th Session of the SDC, the then Chief of the VJ General Staff
@ivota Panić stated that “[a]s for [RS] and [RSK], huge amounts of material means have been sent
to these areas” and “we gave [the RSK] complete equipment to form one corps”.3549 He proceeded
to reiterate that “we have been receiving on a daily basis a lot of requests for ammunition and
weapons. We send what we can”.3550 In June 1993, the RSK political leadership also appealed to
Slobodan Milošević to continue to secure through the VJ General Staff “help in technical
maintenance of weapons and acquisition of ammunition”.3551
1242. Perišić assented to the SVK’s requests for assistance once he became VJ Chief of General
Staff.3552 For example, a communication intercepted on 2 November 1993 points to the provision of
1,500 automatic rifles, 3 multiple rocket launchers and a shipment of 1,000 uniforms “with the
official permission of General Perišić”.3553 A few weeks later, a VJ General Staff memorandum
stipulated that part of an anti-aircraft self-propelled rocket battery was transferred to the SVK, and
that “other approved combat equipment [was] prepared for transport”.3554 Moreover, with reference
to a request from the SVK Main Staff regarding the “takeover of assigned 20 airplanes”, the VJ
3547
3548
3549
3550
3551
3552
3553
3554
Ex. P1133, Request of the RSK President, 21 July 1994, Doc ID 0118-5617, 21 July 1994, p. 1 (emphasis
added). See also Ex. P1125, Request by the RSK President to the VJ for Assistance in Recruitment and Materiel,
21 July 1994, p. 1.
Ex. P771, Stenographic Notes of the 7th Session of the SDC, 10 February 1993, p. 28.
Ex. P771, Stenographic Notes of the 7th Session of the SDC, 10 February 1993, pp 27-28.
Ex. P771, Stenographic Notes of the 7th Session of the SDC, 10 February 1993, p. 28. See also Ex. P1009, Order
of FRY President, 18 February 1994.
Ex. P320, Letter from the President of the RSK to the President of the Republic of Serbia, 4 June 1993, p. 1.
See e.g. Ex. P1433, Intelligence Note, 2 November 1993; Ex. P2156, Memorandum on Co-ordination Between
the VJ, VRS and SVK, 19 November 1993, pp 2, 13 (emphasis added); MP-80, T. 8349-8352 (closed session).
See also supra section VI.B.
Ex. P1433, Intelligence Note, 2 November 1993.
Ex. P2156, Memorandum on Co-ordination Between the VJ, VRS and SVK, 19 November 1993, p. 13
(emphasis added).
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General Staff in November 1993 ordered its relevant administration to prepare a decision to be
signed by the Chief of VJ General Staff.3555
1243. This assistance continued into 19943556 and 1995.3557 A VJ Report on Coordination with the
SVK notably stated that “valuable assistance” was provided to the SVK in the maintenance of their
equipment from the Čačak technical and maintenance facility.3558 The same report also stressed that
the assistance provided by the VJ in “ammo, spare parts, food articles and other critical types of
[materiel] has been invaluable, but unfortunately insufficient” and proposed, inter alia, closer
coordination between the logistic sectors of the VJ and the SVK from that point forward.3559 In
relation to a request from the RSK MOD for ammunition and mortar rounds, Perišić took the
position in December 1994 that “the final decision on this [request] should be made by the ₣SDCğ”,
and accordingly requested that the issue be placed on the agenda of its next session.3560
1244. On 6 January 1995, the VJ General Staff, in response to a request from the SVK, directed
the SVK to “collect all approved equipment on the Batajnica air field”.3561 On 23 February 1995,
Perišić issued an order stating that he would give assistance in equipment and weapons to SVK
volunteers.3562 On 29 March 1995, the SVK communicated to the VJ General Staff that it was
“ready to take-over” three J-20 aircraft, whereas a decision on three “out of order aircraft” would be
made at “a later stage”.3563
1245. On 10 April 1995, the SVK Main Staff informed Perišic and Milošević that “[the] 44th AirForce Brigade has continued with the reinforcement of […] the units in depth, so that all the
3555
3556
3557
3558
3559
3560
3561
3562
Ex. P1145, Set of Requests by the SRK to the VJ General Staff. See also Ex. P1146, Request by the Baranja
Brigade Command to the VJ for Armament, 9 November 1993, pp 1-2.
See e.g. Ex. P2625, SVK Summary for the Coordination of Tasks in the VJ General Staff, 17 February 1994,
p. 15; Ex. P1798, VJ Report on Coordination with SVK, May 1994, pp 7-8; Ex. P2176, Documents Regarding
the Cooperation Between VRS, SVK and VJ in April and May 1994.
See e.g. Ex. P1136, Correspondence Between SVK and VJ, 6 January 1995; Ex. P1140, Correspondence
Between VJ and the SVK, 12 November 1994, p. 1; Ex. P1150, Response by the Chief of VJ General Staff to the
SVK Request for Recruitment of Volunteers, 23 February 1995, p. 1; Ex. P1123, Decision of VJ Regarding
Request for Planning, Organising and Deploying of Volunteers to the SVK, 23 March 1995, p. 1; Ex. P2714,
Order of the Chief of the VJ General Staff to 1st Army Command, 5 May 1995, pp 1-2; Ex. P1020, SVK Main
Staff Regular Combat Report, 10 April 1995, pp 3, 5; Ex. P2786, Requests from SVK to the Chief of the VJ
General Staff to Provide Logistical Assistance, 14-15, 19 June 1995; Ex. P950, Document from VJ General Staff
Approving the Hand-over of Air Bombs from VJ to SVK 11th Corps, 4 August 1995.
Ex. P1798, VJ Report on Coordination with SVK, May 1994, p. 8.
Ex. P1798, VJ Report on Coordination with SVK, May 1994, p. 8, stating “we propose that, together with the
VJ, we implement the ₣...ğ organised inclusion of the logistics organs of the General Staff of the SVK in the
process of the production of armament and military equipment which the VJ are carrying out for their own
needs”. See also Ex. P2621, Aide-Memoire for Coordination in the VJ General Staff, July 1994, p. 10.
Ex. P1143, Communication of the Cabinet of the Chief of the VJ General Staff to the Cabinet of the Federal
Defence Minister, 7 December 1994.
Ex. P1136, Correspondence Between SVK and VJ, 6 January 1995.
Ex. P1150, Response by the Chief of VJ General Staff to the SVK Request for Recruitment of Volunteers,
23 February 1995, p. 1. See also Ex. P1123, Decision of VJ Regarding Request for Planning, Organising and
Deploying of Volunteers to the SVK, 23 March 1995, p. 1.
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equipment we received from the VJ […] is being used”, and added: “Having received the materiel
sources [sic] from the Republic of Serbia and from the VJ in February and March of 1995, the
necessary materiel reserves (of ammunition and food stuff) for the military needs have been
created”.3564
1246. On 5 May 1995, Perišić ordered the VJ Sector for Logistics to “immediately issue the
approved quantities of materiel and technical equipment to the 11th Corps of the SVK”.3565 In
June 1995, the VJ General Staff agreed to provide the SVK with 100kg of “CS” chemical agent.3566
On 4 August 1995, the VJ General Staff also consented to provide the SVK 11th Corps with “24
aerial bombs”.3567 On 2 November 1995, in response to a request by the 11th Corps Command of the
SVK that the VJ General Staff “urgently approve another 10,000 anti-tank and 8,000 pressureactivated anti-personnel mines”, Perišić ordered that “if the combat readiness is not being reduced –
prepare and give”.3568
1247. It is noted, however, that there were instances when SVK requests were either not met or
met only in part by the VJ General Staff.3569
(b) Provision of the Orkan Rocket System
1248. Among the weapons left behind by the JNA in the territory of the RSK in 1991 was a sole
Orkan rocket system later used in the shelling of Zagreb in May 1995.3570 On 8 April 1993, the
RSK MOD wrote to Chief of the VJ General Staff requesting 200 Orkan rockets.3571 In
October 1993, the SVK Main Staff sought approval from the VJ General Staff to have an Orkan
rocket system “tested in RSK Army on real targets and in real conditions”.3572
3563
3564
3565
3566
3567
3568
3569
3570
3571
3572
Ex. P1135, Correspondence Between SVK and VJ, 29 March 1995.
Ex. P1020, SVK Main Staff Regular Combat Report, 10 April 1995, pp 3, 5.
Ex. P2714, Order of the Chief of the VJ General Staff to 1st Army Command, 5 May 1995, pp 1-2.
Ex. P2786, Requests from SVK to the Chief of the VJ General Staff to Provide Logistical Assistance, 14-15,
19 June 1995.
Ex. P950, Document from VJ General Staff Approving the Hand-over of Air Bombs from VJ to SVK 11th Corps,
4 August 1995.
Ex. P2750, Request from 11th Corps Commander, 2 November 1995. See also Siniša Borović, T. 14027.
Ex. P1797, Report by SVK on Cooperation with VJ General Staff, October 1993, p. 4; Ex. P1132, Request by
the SRK to the Chief of the VJ General Staff for Military Personnel, 20 June 1993; Mile Novaković, T. 1325413256; Ex. P1125, Request by the RSK to the VJ for Assistance in Recruitment and Equipment of the SVK,
21 July 1994, p. 6; MP-80, T. 8383-8388 (closed session); Sini{a Borovi}, T. 13982; Ex. D484, VJ General Staff
Response to the SVK Main Staff, 19 May 1995.
MP-80, T. 8704 (closed session). See also Ex. P1818, Request by VRS to VJ, 15 January 1994, p. 1; Ex. P55
(under seal), T. 13377.
Ex. P1128, Request by the RSK to the VJ for Arms, 8 April 1993, p. 1.
Ex. P1797, Report by SVK on Cooperation with VJ General Staff, October 1993, pp 3, 6.
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1249. The complexity of this rocket system required VJ assistance in repairs and maintenance.3573
(c) Provision of Fuel and Miscellaneous Equipment
1250. The Trial Chamber notes that the assistance proffered by the VJ to the SVK included fuel,
medical supplies and spare parts.3574
1251. The SVK was facing serious fuel shortages as early as June 1993.3575 In January 1994, the
SVK Main Staff reported that inadequate quantities of fuel had a crippling impact on the capacity of
the army to conduct some of its “basic functions”.3576 The SVK had to rely on the VJ and the FRY
for assistance with fuel because internal or other sources of supply were limited.3577 There were no
refineries in the RSK.3578 MP-080 testified that while there were oil wells in Dzeletovci in Eastern
Slavonia they were significant only in light of the poor state of the economy of the RSK at the time,
and not because they were themselves sizeable.3579
1252. In July 1994, the RSK MOD advised the SVK Main Staff that the “securing of fuel [was] of
vital interest for the defence of the RSK” and that at “least 1,000 tonnes of fuel” had to be procured
immediately.3580 Witness Sini{a Borovi} denied that there was an organised supply of fuel to the
VRS and SVK.3581 The Trial Chamber notes that his testimony on this point is contradicted by other
evidence.3582 Rade Rašeta testified that the SVK was dependent on the VJ for adequate fuel supplies
and that the “priority was to seek [this] from the General Staff of VJ”.3583 The Trial Chamber also
3573
3574
3575
3576
3577
3578
3579
3580
3581
3582
3583
MP-80, T. 8394-8395 (closed session). Additional evidence suggests that only the VJ possessed required
resources in this regard. On 15 January 1994, the VRS requested from the VJ General Staff that, “pursuant to a
prior arrangement”, it “facilitate the establishment of a team of experts […] composed of persons who had
worked on designing” the ORKAN system; and that they be dispatched to Knin for “the purpose of dismantling
4 tubes” from the ORKAN to be used by the VRS, Ex. P1818, Request by VRS to VJ, 15 January 1994, p. 1. On
19 January 1994, Perišić wrote a letter to the SVK Main Staff stating that a team had been “dispatched, led by
Col Radomir Ećimović, in order to implement the agreement [the SVK Main Staff] made with Lt Col Gen
Mladić, which relates to dismantling 4 barrels” of the ORKAN system, Ex. P1138, Correspondence Between
Chief of the VJ General Staff and the SVK Main Staff, 19 January 1994.
Rade Rašeta, T. 5930.
Ex. P320, Letter from the President of the RSK to the President of the Republic of Serbia, 24 June 1993 (“fuel
and grease are sufficient only for fire engagement for a short period of time”); Ex. P317, Aide Mémoire of the
Chief of the Office of the SVK Commander to the VJ General Staff, 17 December 1993, p. 14 (“fuel reserves
completely spent”); Ex. P2156, Memorandum on Co-ordination Between the VJ, VRS and SVK, 19 November
1993, p. 6; Ex. P1019, SVK Main Staff Operations Report, 7 January 1994, p. 2; Ex. P2621, Aide-Memoire for
Coordination in the VJ General Staff, July 1994, p. 11 (“The SVK is not being supplied fuel for combat
operations, and the quantities we receive are insufficient to meet even the regular needs”); MP-80, T. 8356-8357
(closed session).
Ex. P1019, SVK Main Staff Operations Report, 7 January 1994, p. 2. See also Ex. P2621, Aide-Memoire for
Coordination in the VJ General Staff, July 1994, p. 11.
MP-80, T. 8357-8358 (closed session).
MP-80, T. 8357 (closed session).
MP-80, T. 8627 (closed session).
Ex. D171 (under seal), p. 2.
Sini{a Borovi}, T. 14000-14001.
See supra paras 1069, 1109-1114.
Rade Rašeta, T. 6031.
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heard testimony about the process of transporting fuel from the FRY to the SVK: MP-80 noted that
the fuel was delivered secretly,3584 and Milomir Kovačević testified that “convoys would travel
once a week, or twice” between the FRY and the RSK.3585
1253. The evidence demonstrates that the SVK also relied on the VJ General Staff for the
provision of other basic military and technical equipment. By the end of 1993, the SVK Main Staff
began to report critical shortages in existing stock and reserves of military apparel, footwear,
quartermaster supplies, optical instruments, engines for combat and non-combat vehicles, tires,
spare parts, overhaul materials and medical supplies.3586 Evidence indicates that the VJ became a
significant source of assistance in this regard.3587 In June 1994, Perišić was convinced that if the VJ
“stop[ed] helping [the SVK] in the area of education, financing of educated personnel and material
assistance for certain combat operations, they’ll start losing territories”.3588 With regard to technical
assistance, he posed the question: “Do you think that the technical equipment which is in [...] the
[RSK] would be functional if we did not engage the men from these [VJ repair] depots?”3589 In
December 1994, Perišić ordered a team of experts from the Moma Stanojlović Complex of the VJ
air-force to the Golubić airfield in the RSK to “determine the technical operability” of a helicopter,
noting their transportation would be facilitated by the RSK and that they should travel in civilian
clothing.3590
(d) Training of SVK Soldiers
1254. The Trial Chamber was presented with evidence concerning the VJ’s involvement in
training SVK soldiers from August 1993 until the fall of RSK in August 1995.
1255. On 25 August 1993, the VJ General Staff received through the FRY MOD a request from
the RSK Prime Minister to the effect that the VJ General Staff should “provide training for recruits
3584
3585
3586
3587
3588
3589
3590
MP-80, T. 8357 (closed session).
Milomir Kovačević, T. 6056-6057.
Ex. P1051, SVK Main Staff Regular Combat Report, 11 November 1993, p. 3; Ex. P1030, SVK Report
Regarding Personnel Assistance, 13 March 1994, p. 6; Ex. P317, Aide Mémoire of the Chief of the Office of the
SVK Commander to the VJ General Staff, 17 December 1993, p. 13; Ex. P2621, Aide-Memoire for Coordination
in the VJ General Staff, July 1994, pp 11-12; Ex. P1040, SVK Main Staff Regular Operations Report, 24 July
1994, p. 5.
Ex. P1020, SVK Main Staff Regular Combat Report, 10 April 1995, p. 5; Ex. P1030, SVK Report Regarding
Personnel Assistance, 13 March 1994, p. 6; Ex. P317, Aide Mémoire of the Chief of the Office of the SVK
Commander to the General Staff of the VJ, December 1993, p. 13; Ex. P1130, Correspondence Between the
SVK Commander ^eleketi} and Chief of the VJ General Staff, 17 March 1995, p. 1.
Ex. P776, Stenographic Record of the 21st Session of the SDC, 7 June 1994, p. 38.
Ex. P796, Stenographic Record of the 38th Session of the SDC, 27 June 1995, p. 12.
Ex. P1137, Correspondence Between Chief of the VJ General Staff and the Office of the President of RSK, 5
December 1994, p. 1. See also MP-80, T. 8396-8397 (closed session).
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from this Republic for the duration of the state of the war and until the conditions are met for
training to be conducted in the [SVK]”.3591
1256. The evidence demonstrates that there were instances of training sessions organised by the
VJ for the benefit of SVK soldiers.3592 On 30 August 1993, the VJ General Staff informed the FRY
MOD that by “[o]rder of the [VJ] Chief of General Staff” a training session on target-shooting had
been scheduled to be held at the “Pasuljanske Livade polygon”, and necessitated “four buses
carrying 20 officers, 16 non-commissioned officers, and 128 soldiers from the [SVK]”, who shall
cross the FRY border “wearing plain clothes”.3593 An intercepted communication of 4 November
1993 from the Banija Corps to the SVK Main Staff refers to an agreement to “send 240 soldiers of
various specialities to training in Serbia”.3594
1257. Perišić received a letter from the RSK Prime Minister, asking that a contingent of “around
1,000 recruits” be sent for “basic (specialised) training in the VJ” in “September and December
1993”.3595 In December 1993, Perišić had the VJ General Staff submit a proposal to the SDC
concerning the “[t]raining of recruits from the RSK in VJ units”.3596 The proposal was adopted and
acted upon throughout 1994 and until August 1995.3597
1258. On 7 January 1994, the SVK Main Staff informed Perišić and Milošević that “the decision
on dispatching the recruits to the VJ for training was well-received”.3598 That month, the SVK
reported that 976 of its recruits had been sent for training with the VJ.3599
1259. On 18 April 1994 the SDC adopted a resolution directing that “[a] total of 240 students shall
be enrolled at the Military Academy […] for the needs of the […] [SVK and VRS]” and that “[t]he
funds necessary for their education shall be provided by the Federal Government” of the FRY.3600
In an internal memorandum dated 28 April 1994, the VJ General Staff discussed particular requests
3591
3592
3593
3594
3595
3596
3597
3598
3599
Ex. D625, Reference by FRY MOD to Request from RSK for Training and Conscripts, 25 August 1993.
See Ex. P1434, Intelligence Note, 4 November 1993; Ex. P2156, Memorandum on Co-ordination between the
VJ, VRS and SVK, 19 November 1993, p. 13.
Ex. P941, VJ General Staff Information Addressed to the MOD, 30 August 1993, p. 1. See also Ex. P2845, VJ
Dispatches on Temporary Assignment, 8 October 1993, p. 3.
Ex. P1434, Intelligence Note, 4 November 1993.
Ex. D846, RSK Request to VJ General Staff for Transfer of Recruits, 1993. See also Ex. P317, Aide Mémoire of
the Chief of the Office of the SVK Commander to the VJ General Staff, 17 December 1993, p. 4.
Ex. D519, Letter to the SVK to the VJ Main Staff, 21 December 1993.
See e.g. Ex. P1019, SVK Main Staff Operations Report, 7 January 1994, p. 2; Ex. P919, SVK Main Staff Memo
on the Coordination of Tasks in the VJ General Staff, 19 January 1994, p. 3; Ex. P940, VJ General Staff
Document Regarding Communications with SVK on Transport of Recruits, 22 February 1994, p. 1; Ex. P1045,
SVK Main Staff Regular Operations Report, 31 July 1994, p. 5; MP-80, T. 8393-8394 (closed session).
Ex. P1019, SVK Main Staff Operations Report, 7 January 1994, p. 2.
Ex. P919, SVK Main Staff Memo on the Coordination of Tasks in the VJ General Staff, 19 January 1994, p. 3.
See also Ex. P940, VJ General Staff Document Regarding Communications with SVK on Transport of Recruits,
22 February 1994, p. 1; MP-80, T. 8393-8394 (closed session).
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for training SVK personnel and concluded that “[b]earing in [Perišić’s] opinion […] organise
training as requested”.3601 On 10 May 1994, Perišić directed the Administration Sector of the VJ to
“execute admission of the recruits of the 40th Personnel Centre [i.e. SVK] and perform the training
with them in the [VJ] units”.3602 This was repeated in December 1994 when Perišić ordered the
Administration Sector to similarly accommodate a certain number of SVK recruits for training.3603
1260. SVK personnel subsequently continued to be sent to VJ units, participating in programmes
financed by the VJ.3604 Notably, an order from the SVK Chief of Staff on 5 August 1994 seeking
the referral of candidates for a cryptographic data protection training programme to be conducted
by the VJ states that this was “[p]ursuant to the Coordination Plan of the GŠ SVK and GŠ VJ” and
that for the “duration of the program the candidates will be provided with free accommodation and
food in the […] VJ”.3605 In a September 1994 report by the SVK, 17 SVK soldiers were identified
as having been trained as gunners for triple-barrelled 20mm anti-aircraft guns” by the VJ in
Pančevo.3606 On 10 March 1995, an intercepted communication states that the VJ “approved” a
request submitted by the SVK for “specialised training […] of soldiers from the 11th Corps”.3607 In
addition, on 26 March 1995, the VJ General Staff received the following request from the SVK:
Due to insufficient number of pilots and decreasing options to fill in these positions from the VJ,
we ask you to enable redirecting and continuing further schooling of students […] to the group
trained for pilots.3608
1261. The evidence indicates that the training provided by the VJ stretched across a multiplicity of
specialisations and purposes.3609 Notably, Perišić agreed to the attachment of SVK personnel for
training purposes in VJ units from June 1994 as follows: 50 in aviation, 15 in engineering, 10 in
atomic-biological-chemical defence and 30 in counter-electronics.3610
3600
3601
3602
3603
3604
3605
3606
3607
3608
3609
3610
Ex. P710, Minutes of the 19th Session of the SDC, 16 March 1994, p. 2.
Ex. P1817, Request by SVK to VJ, 28 April 1994, p. 1.
Ex. P2863, VJ General Staff Order Sending 40th PC Recruits for Training with VJ, 10 May 1994, p. 1.
Ex. P2862, VJ General Staff Order Sending Recruits from SVK for VJ Training, 30 December 1994, p. 1
(referring to the following number of recruits: 522 in the Army, 38 in the Air-force and Anti-Aircraft Defence,
and 232 in “units directly subordinated to the General Staff of the VJ”).
Ex. P1022, SVK Report Addressed to S. Milo{ević, M. Martić and M. Perišić, 10 July 1994, p. 6.
Ex. P2858, SVK Main Staff Order for SVK Training in the VJ, 5 August 1994, pp 1, 3.
Ex. P937, Report of Combat Training in the FRY of the 18th SVK Mixed Artillery Regiment,
10 September 1994, p. 4.
Ex. P2252, Intercepted Communication, 10 March 1995.
Ex. P938, SVK Main Staff Request to VJ General Staff Regarding Training, 26 March 1995.
See e.g. Ex. P2176, Documents Regarding Cooperation Between VRS, SVK and VJ in April and May 1994,
p. 12 (month-long reconnaissance and sabotage course in Banja Luka in April 1994); Ex. P936, Letter Signed by
Colonel Smiljani} to the Command of the 7th, 11th, 15th, 18th, 21st and 39th SVK Corps, 2 August 1994 (scheduled
intelligence course in September 1994).
Ex. P1817, Approval by Chief of the VJ General Staff of Training Request by SVK, 29 April 1994, p. 1.
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3. Conclusions
1262. The Trial Chamber finds that the VJ General Staff supplied considerable logistical and
technical assistance to the SVK in the period relevant to the Indictment. Provision of such
assistance was effected through the VJ General Staff with Perišić’s approval.3611 The assistance
took varied forms; from the provision of weapons, ammunition, fuel, technical expertise and
personnel, to the training of SVK personnel either at FRY-VJ training facilities or outside FRY
territory by VJ personnel.
1263. The SVK came to depend on the supply and continuity of logistical and technical support
(including the maintenance of the Orkan rocket system), from the VJ during Perišić’s tenure. This
assistance had an effect on the everyday work of the 40th PC members serving in the SVK, as the
success of their operations largely depended on the logistical and technical support supervised by
Peri{i}.
3611
See supra section VI.B.
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E. The Defence’s Expert Witness on Logistical Assistance
1264. The Defence called Ivan Ðokić as an expert witness on the VJ’s logistical assistance to the
VRS and SVK. The Defence specifies that it “adopts” the “conclusions” made by Ðokić in his
report on the VJ’s logistical assistance.3612
1. Ðokić’s Background
1265. At the time of his testimony, Ðokić was a lecturer at the state university of Novi Pazar,
where he taught basic courses in computers and information technology.3613 He is a retired
Lieutenant-General of the VJ, and formerly served as the head of the VJ General Staff’s
Aeronautical Administration between 1994 and 2000.3614 Ðokić was a subordinate of the Accused
and admittedly took part “in the overall process of co-operation with the [VRS]” during the war in
BiH.3615
1266. The Trial Chamber recalls that Ivan Ðokić played a key role in devising the functional
modified air-bomb model, thereby earning Perišić’s praise.3616 In May 1995, Mladić requested that
Ðokić specifically be dispatched to assist the VRS with technical problems with its rockets and
“modified anti-aircraft defence equipment”, which Perišić approved.3617 The Trial Chamber further
recalls its finding that modified air-bombs were used in committing crimes against Sarajevo
civilians under Scheduled Incidents A5, A6 and A8, which were part of a broader campaign of
attacks against civilians with modified air-bombs.3618
2. Questionable Methodology of Expert Report
1267. Ðokić states in his report that he employed the following methodology: “[c]ollection of all
available data from the greatest possible number of sources (conversations with participants of
events, military and state documentation, reports by international institutions, books, newspaper
3612
3613
3614
3615
3616
3617
3618
Defence Final Brief, para. 805 (citing Ex. D507, Ðokić Report on Logistical Assistance, paras 334-344).
Ivan Ðokić, T. 14335-14336.
Ivan Ðokić, T. 14336-14337. Ðokić subsequently served as head of the VJ General Staff Operational and
Logistics Administration between 2000 and 2001. After assuming other senior VJ positions in logistics, he
served as assistant minister for materiel resources for the MOD of Serbia and Montenegro between 2004 and
2005, Ivan Ðokić, T. 14337-14340, 14480. See also Ex. D505, Curriculum Vitae of Ivan Ðokić, p. 2.
Ivan Ðokić, T. 14480-14481.
Ivan Ðokić, T. 14489-14492; Ex. P2197, Transcript of the Collegium of the Chief of the VJ General Staff, 28
October 1995, p. 57. See also supra section VI.B.5.
Ex. P2722, Urgent Request from Mladi} to Peri{i} for Expert Assistance, 31 May 1995; Ivan Ðokić, T. 1448114483. See also Ex. P2723, Urgent Request from Mladi} to Peri{i} for 6 Cylinders of Nitrogen, 31 May 1995
(Mladić informed Perišić that the Eastern Bosnia Corps had been “using a modified apu-13mt rocket launcher
₣...ğ constructed with the help of the [VJ] team’s expert assistance”, and Perišić referred Mladić’s request for
additional assistance to Ðokić); Ivan Ðokić, T. 14484.
See supra section V.A.4, paras 376, 384, 435.
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articles and special reports, legal regulations, etc.)”.3619 On cross-examination, Ðokić admitted that
he only used documents given to him by the Defence.3620
1268. The report’s statement of methodology further reads that Ðokić conducted a “[s]election of
data with the highest degree of credibility”.3621 However, Ðokić hardly specifies in his report how
he assessed the credibility of information and conflicting estimates. Questioned about this matter,
Ðokić stated that it was “too broad of an issue to be explained here, and it is well known how such
things are done”, and that he “didn’t think it necessary to include” such information.3622 Ðokić gave
an example, however, stating that one “can reject the highest and the lowest data and only use the
data from the middle section”.3623
1269. The Trial Chamber considers that Ðokić should have concretely explained in his report his
standards for assessing data and why certain data were omitted. The Trial Chamber also finds it
questionable to automatically reject the highest or lowest figures for ammunition reserves and
deliveries without offering substantive reasons.
3. Use of Anonymous Sources
1270. The first source of information mentioned in the report’s methodology is “conversations
with participants of events”,3624 although Ðokić nowhere provided the identity of these individuals
in his report, thereby using them as anonymous sources. Ðokić testified that he did not keep a list of
the names of the individuals he spoke to.3625 He neither recorded any of these conversations nor
kept “official notes” about what was said.3626
1271. Ðokić stated that these individuals were former JNA officers who served in the VRS, were
“familiar with the events” and sometimes “participated in logistics”.3627 Ðokić explained: “I
believed it wise to make use of those people who were within the logistical system of the VRS in
order to consult with them about what perspired [sic]”.3628 When asked why he had not made any
references or citations to these conversations in his report, Ðokić said that he “did not use a single
piece of information” from these conversations because “we should base our research only on
3619
3620
3621
3622
3623
3624
3625
3626
3627
3628
Ex. D507, Ðokić Report on Logistical Assistance, para. 4(a) (emphasis added).
Ivan Ðokić, T. 14464-14465 (private session), 14479-14480.
Ex. D507, Ðokić Report on Logistical Assistance, para. 4(b).
Ivan Ðokić, T. 14398.
Ivan Ðokić, T. 14398. See also Ivan Ðokić, T. 14401-14402.
Ex. D507, Ðokić Report on Logistical Assistance, para. 4(a).
Ivan Ðokić, T. 14384-14385.
Ivan Ðokić, T. 14385.
Ivan Ðokić, T. 14384.
Ivan Ðokić, T. 14384 (emphasis added).
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documents that are credible and available to all”.3629 This statement contradicted his earlier
explanation that he felt it was “wise to make use of those people”.3630 Ðokić stated that he only used
these conversations to corroborate his findings: “I used that for my internal work as a control
parameter to make sure that I have not made a mistake or omitted something in the course of
drafting of the report”.3631 The report does not state where such corroboration was used.3632 Ðokić
averred that he discarded all the information from these conversations when he drafted his final
report.3633
1272. The Trial Chamber does not find Ðokić’s report reliable in employing anonymous sources
as a means of either primary information or corroboration.
4. Claim that Perišić Had Limited Authority Over Logistical Assistance
1273. Ðokić acknowledged that the FRY provided logistical assistance to the VRS and SVK3634
but argued that the FRY MOD was chiefly responsible for it and that Perišić and the VJ General
Staff had limited authority in this regard.3635 Ðokić’s report devotes several pages to the FRY’s
domestic laws and procedures3636 and concludes that logistical assistance was overseen by the FRY
MOD, “the Central Financial Organ, as foreseen by law and defined by the decisions of the
SDC”.3637 Ðokić deemed that, under the FRY Law on Property, the Minister of Defence and his
ministry were “the only person or organ directly responsible for lawful, purposeful, and rational use
of military equipment in the VJ”.3638 Ðokić insisted that it would have been illegal under the FRY
Law on Property for Perišić to send weaponry to the VRS and SVK without the Minister of
Defence’s approval.3639
1274. According to Ðokić, it was the SDC and MOD, not Perišić and the VJ General Staff, who
decided whether logistical assistance should be given to the VRS and SVK.3640 He claimed that
Perišić’s role was essentially limited to proposing certain quantities of aid based on surpluses from
VJ reserves following requests from RS and RSK, although Perišić did not make the decision.3641
3629
3630
3631
3632
3633
3634
3635
3636
3637
3638
3639
3640
3641
Ivan Ðokić, T. 14385.
Ivan Ðokić, T. 14384.
Ivan Ðokić, T. 14385-14386.
See Ivan Ðokić, T. 14385-14388. See also Ex. D507, Ðokić Report on Logistical Assistance.
Ivan Ðokić, T. 14390.
Ex. D507, Ðokić Report on Logistical Assistance, paras 135(c), (d), 160(c), (d), 234, 236-237, 241, 248, 288290, 339.
Ivan Ðokić, T. 14412-14413; Ex. D507, Ðokić Report on Logistical Assistance, paras 173-176, 191(e), 196,
331(a), 335, 339(3), 340, 342(1)(a).
Ex. D507, Ðokić Report on Logistical Assistance, paras 168-182.
Ex. D507, Ðokić Report on Logistical Assistance, paras 196, 339(3).
Ivan Ðokić, T. 14412. See also Ex. D507, Ðokić Report on Logistical Assistance, para. 174.
Ivan Ðokić, T. 14412-14413. See also Ex. D507, Ðokić Report on Logistical Assistance, paras 173-176.
Ex. D507, Ðokić Report on Logistical Assistance, para. 340.
Ex. D507, Ðokić Report on Logistical Assistance, paras 197, 288, 339(4).
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Ðokić advanced that, once the SDC decided on logistical assistance, the MOD “was chiefly
responsible for its coordination”, whereas “[t]he VJ was only responsible for the executive part of
logistical assistance, which fell within its authority”.3642 The MOD oversaw “international military
cooperation” with the VRS and SVK, but Perišić and the VJ General Staff merely handled “product
reception, storage, transport, maintenance (including repairs and regular servicing), operational use,
and the disposition of materiel”.3643
1275. Ðokić affirmed that the SDC had no plenary power to give Perišić authority over logistical
assistance, and that the SDC’s actions violated the FRY’s domestic laws and procedures:
The [SDC] cannot circumvent any laws or the [MOD][…] because the SDC is not superior to the
government. They can’t say the [MOD] is – has no say in this. Everything stays in power
respective [sic] of any SDC decisions. As far as I understand, the SDC may order something to the
Chief of Staff but it cannot order anything to the government or the minister of defence. They
cannot rule out the legal procedure that is in place.3644
[I]t is my belief that the decisions of the SDC were not based on sound procedures for making
strategic decisions […] I believe that the SDC ordered one of its subordinates to issue certain
documents and regulate methods without changing the legal position of the MOD. And the SDC is
not empowered to do so because it is clearly prescribed in the law.3645
1276. Ðokić was confronted on cross-examination with the order by President Zoran Lilić, made
pursuant to an SDC decision, giving Perišić the authority to supply the VRS and SVK with
weaponry and equipment.3646 While Ðokić conceded the validity of the order, he resolutely
maintained that it was the MOD, not Perišić, which was responsible for supplying the VRS and the
SVK with weaponry.3647
1277. Ðokić did not mention Lilić’s order in his report and explained this omission as follows: “I
did not make use of this document because it wasn’t provided to me when I drafted the report”.3648
Again, Ðokić acknowledged that he only relied on documents provided to him by the Defence.3649
Lilić’s order was preceded by the 18th SDC Session, where Perišić urged the SDC to give him the
authority to give logistical assistance to the VRS and the SVK or let the Law on Property regulate
the matter.3650 Ðokić failed to mention this passage of the 18th SDC Session in his report.3651
3642
3643
3644
3645
3646
3647
3648
3649
3650
3651
Ex. D507, Ðokić Report on Logistical Assistance, para. 166.
Ex. D507, Ðokić Report on Logistical Assistance, para. 335.
Ivan Ðokić, T. 14414-14415.
Ivan Ðokić, T. 14418-14419 (private session).
Ivan Ðokić, T. 14419. See Ex. P1009, Order of FRY President Zoran Lilić, 18 February 1994.
Ivan Ðokić, T. 14419 (private session).
Ivan Ðokić, T. 14420.
Ivan Ðokić, T. 14464-14465 (private session).
Ex. P782, Stenographic Transcript of the 18th Session of SDC, 7 February 1994, p. 53.
See Ivan Ðokić, T. 14420-14422.
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1278. Ðokić nonetheless claimed that he analysed “all of the available Stenographic Notes and
Minutes” of SDC meetings, including “proposals by General Perišić”.3652 His report quotes from
several SDC meetings and recognises that on two occasions Perišić encouraged the SDC to give
logistical assistance to the VRS and SVK.3653 However, in addition to the 18th SDC Session, his
report omits the 21st Session, where Perišić strongly encouraged the SDC to maintain assistance to
the VRS and SVK because they would otherwise lose territories.3654 Perišić then advised the SDC
to approve the grant of ammunition and spare parts to the VRS and SVK.3655 Ðokić similarly left
out the 37th SDC Session, where Perišić again urged the SDC to keep on authorising VJ assistance
to the VRS and SVK.3656
1279. Ðokić’s report quotes from the 23rd SDC Session, which concluded that:
the Federal Government should redistribute funds in the federal and republic budgets in order to
secure an additional 35.3 million to finance the adopted measures and the acquisition of materiel
and technical equipment needed to boost combat readiness of the [VJ]. The [FRY MOD] shall use
these funds, and those secured by RS and RSK for their needs, to organise the production and
acquisition of materiel and technical equipment.3657
Ðokić failed to mention what transpired beforehand, namely that Perišić’s Deputy Chief had given a
presentation to the SDC stressing that the VJ’s reserves were partially depleted as a consequence of
logistical assistance to the VRS and SVK; and that Perišić convinced the SDC to increase the VJ’s
budget so that logistical assistance would continue.3658
1280. The Trial Chamber reiterates its finding that the SDC delegated to Perišić the authority to
manage the logistical assistance process, and finds that Ðokić’s claims are incredible.3659 Moreover,
Ðokić’s focus on legalistic questions diverts attention from the heart of the matter: the actual role
that Perišić played in the logistical assistance process—not what the FRY’s domestic legislation
technically stipulated about the respective powers of the SDC, MOD, and Chief of the VJ General
Staff.
3652
3653
3654
3655
3656
3657
3658
3659
Ex. D507, Ðokić Report on Logistical Assistance, para. 169.
Ex. D507, Ðokić Report on Logistical Assistance, pp 79-80 (citing 36th SDC Session of 12 May 1995, and 39th
SDC Session of 29 July 1995).
Ex. P776, Stenographic Transcript of the 21st Session of the SDC, 7 June 1994, pp 38-39.
Ex. P776, Stenographic Transcript of the 21st Session of the SDC, 7 June 1994, p. 39.
Ex. P786, Stenographic Transcript of the 37th Session of the SDC, 13 June 1995, p. 42.
Ex. D507, Ðokić Report on Logistical Assistance, p. 78 (citing Ex. P785, Stenographic Record of the 23rd SDC
Session, 21 July 1994).
Ex. P785 Stenographic Transcript of the 23rd Session of the of the SDC, 21 July 1994, pp 9, 15-16, 20. See also
Ex. P754 Minutes from the 23rd Session of the SDC held on 21 July 1994, p. 3. This evidence is analysed in
detail in section VI.B.
See supra section VI.B.
401
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5. Gross Underestimation of Logistical Assistance from VJ
1281. At the outset, the Trial Chamber notes that Ðokić provided detailed numerical estimates of
the weapon reserves in the SFRY in late 1990 prior to its dissolution, as well as in RS and the other
new states in 1992 after the JNA withdrew.3660 Ðokić concluded that the VRS’s ammunition and
fuel reserves “had already been exhausted by the beginning of 1993”.3661
1282. With regard to the quantity of logistical assistance from the FRY to the VRS and SVK,
Ðokić affirms that “the assistance given from the surplus of the [VJ] was small in scope during the
period 1993-1995, since supplies of the [VJ] had almost completely stopped due to insufficient
budgetary funds, while strategic war reserves did not decrease significantly (part of the reserves
were spent on the VJ’s current activities)”.3662 To the contrary, the Trial Chamber recalls the
overwhelming evidence that the VJ gave considerable supplies from its reserves to the VRS and
SVK, and that Perišić persuaded the SDC to increase the VJ’s budget for this purpose.3663
1283. In particular, Ðokić provided figures positing that VJ assistance only constituted a tiny
fraction of the VRS’s “needs” in ammunition,3664 which he described as the quantity of used
ammunition.3665 He posited that the maximum level of assistance provided by the VJ comprised
8.11% of the VRS’s small arms ammunition and 12% of artillery ammunition.3666 Ðokić explained
how he reached this figure: “It was not an assessment of mine. I added up the figures from all
documents indicating any assistance lent. I was not making an assessment; I was doing my
math”.3667 Ðokić later conceded that he only added the quantities of ammunition on material lists
given to him by the Defence.3668 As for his figure on the VRS’s needs, Ðokić stated that he drew it
from a document he cites as “Annual Financial Report of the VRS for 1994”.3669 This document
does not appear to be in evidence, unless it is the same document as Ex. P1214, entitled “Annual
Account of the Plan of Tasks and Financing of the VRS for 1994”.3670
1284. In any event, Ex. P1214 clearly refutes Ðokić’s position, as its tabulation of ammunition
procured in 1994 indicates that the VJ was the VRS’s principal source of infantry ammunition that
3660
3661
3662
3663
3664
3665
3666
3667
3668
3669
3670
Ex. D507, Ðokić Report on Logistical Assistance, pp 50-51, 56-58, 108-112.
Ex. D507, Ðokić Report on Logistical Assistance, para. 280.
Ex. D507, Ðokić Report on Logistical Assistance, para. 293.
See supra section VI.B-D.
Ex. D507, Ðokić Report on Logistical Assistance, p. 114.
Ivan Ðokić, T. 14461.
Ivan Ðokić, T. 14379-14380; Ex. D507, Ðokić Report on Logistical Assistance, paras 289-290.
Ivan Ðokić, T. 14461.
Ivan Ðokić, T. 14464-14465 (private session).
Ex. D507, Ðokić Report on Logistical Assistance, para. 289, fn. 104.
Ex. P1214, Annual Financial Statement of the Plan of Tasks and Financing of the VRS for 1994, 17 February
1995.
402
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year, and that it provided approximately a fourth of the VRS’s shells too.3671 Conversely, Ðokić
claimed that VJ aid comprised only 6.7% of the VRS’s needs in small arms ammunition in 1994
(193.8 of 2,864 tonnes) and zero percent of its artillery ammunition needs.3672
1285. Ðokić had Ex. P1214 in his possession but did not use it for his numerical estimates. He
proffered the following unconvincing excuse for this omission: “this document does not fall within
materiel documents. According to the rules of materiel operations in the [VJ], materiel documents,
receipts, bills of ladings, delivery sheets are all materiel documents which attend materiel
transactions”.3673 When Ðokić was again asked why he omitted Ex. P1214, his answer shed more
light on his methodology:
Q: Your paragraph 289 is not an accurate determination of the extent of military assistance. What
it is, is the results of you adding up materiel lists and delivery slips which you were supplied by
the Defence. Is that a fairer characterisation of your findings in paragraph 289? A: That is true.3674
1286. The Trial Chamber further recalls the vast body of evidence showing the VRS’s clear
dependency on VJ logistical assistance, which likewise demonstrates that Ðokić’s conclusions are
not credible.3675 For instance, amid extensive additional evidence, Mladić’s report to the RS
National Assembly provides credible data on the proportion of VRS used ammunition stemming
from VJ aid, which was far more important than what Ðokić advanced.3676 Ðokić did not mention
Mladić’s figures in his report.
1287. Finally, Ðokić deemed that “[t]he predominant means of supplying the VRS and SVK with
ammunition and fuel during the period 1993-1995 was obviously by purchasing it on the market,
from the producers, based on commercial agreements. The [FRY] had no surpluses from which to
provide assistance”.3677 The Trial Chamber finds that Ðokić’s conclusion is again belied by the
overwhelming evidence to the contrary. Not only could RS scarcely afford to pay for weaponry, but
VJ aid by far exceeded the weaponry it purchased from the market.3678
6. Conclusion
1288. For all of these reasons, the Trial Chamber finds that Ivan Ðokić greatly lacks credibility,
reliability and impartiality as an expert witness. In particular, Ðokić’s conclusions on the
3671
3672
3673
3674
3675
3676
3677
Ex. P1214, Annual Financial Statement of the Plan of Tasks and Financing of the VRS for 1994, 17 February
1995, pp 19-21.
Ex. D507, Ðokić Report on Logistical Assistance, p. 114, figures 39-40.
Ivan Ðokić, T. 14478-14479.
Ivan Ðokić, T. 14479-14480.
See supra section VI.C.
See supra paras 1117, 1166, 1173.
Ex. D507, Ðokić Report on Logistical Assistance, para. 297. See also Ex. D507, Ðokić Report on Logistical
Assistance, para. 331(d).
403
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organisation of the logistical assistance process and the quantities of aid delivered carry no
evidentiary weight in the Trial Chamber’s opinion.
3678
See supra sections VI.B.5, VI.C.
404
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F. Evidence Recovered from the Alleged Crime Scenes
1. Submissions of the Parties
1289. The Prosecution contends that weaponry recovered from crime scenes in Sarajevo and
Srebrenica stemmed from the logistical assistance overseen by Perišić.3679 It affirms that “crater
analyses at the sites of artillery attacks on Sarajevo revealed that the mortar shells involved had
been manufactured using components made in Serbia during the Indictment period”.3680 It adds that
“exemplars of shell casings recovered from Srebrenica execution sites were found to have been
manufactured in Serbia during the Indictment period”.3681
1290. The Defence generally challenges the probative value of this evidence and notably submits
that the Prosecution failed to establish a link between Perišić and ammunition retrieved from
Srebrenica execution and burial sites.3682
2. Shells Recovered from Sarajevo Crime Scenes
1291. Remnants of shells manufactured by the Krušik factory in Valjevo, Serbia, were recovered
in Sarajevo at the crime scenes of Scheduled Incidents A7 and A9.3683 The Trial Chamber recalls its
finding that these shells were fired by the VRS.3684
1292. The Trial Chamber recalls its finding that the VJ General Staff provided shells from its
reserves to the VRS as part of the logistical assistance system managed by Perišić.3685 The VJ’s own
weaponry was originally manufactured by the FRY special purpose industries,3686 one of which was
Krušik.3687 In this regard, it is possible that the aforesaid Krušik shells fired on Sarajevo civilians
were obtained by VRS units from VJ reserves with Perišić’s approval.
1293. On the other hand, the VRS purchased shells directly from the special purpose industries as
well, albeit in smaller quantities.3688 It therefore would also be possible to conclude that the VRS
3679
3680
3681
3682
3683
3684
3685
3686
3687
3688
Prosecution Final Brief, para. 79.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Defence Final Brief, para. 1081. See also Defence Final Brief, paras 1049-1080.
Ex. P468, Report on Simon Bolivar Elementary School Incident, 29 June 1995, p. 2 (Scheduled Incident A7).
See also Ex. P465, Criminal Investigation File, 29 August 1995, p. 2 (Scheduled Incident A9); Ex. P690, Expert
Analysis Regarding Shelling in Sarajevo on 28 August 1995, 29 August 1995, p. 2 (Scheduled Incident A9);
MP-14, T. 3633-3634 (partly private session).
See supra section V.A.4.(g), (i).
See supra section VI.C.
See Borivoje Jovanić, T. 11396-11397; Mladen Mihajlovi}, T. 3966-3967; MP-80, T. 8354 (closed session);
Jugoslav Kodžopeljić, T. 12311, 12320, 12324-12325; Ivan Ðokić, T. 14346-14347, 14353-14354.
Radojica Kadijević, T. 13688-13689. See also Dušan Kovačević, T. 12669 (mentioning that Krušik
manufactured ammunition for the VJ).
See supra sections VI.B, VI.C.7.
405
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purchased these particular shells directly from Krušik. That transaction would not necessarily have
implicated Perišić. While Perišić had a measure of influence over the special purpose industries, the
latter were primarily managed by the FRY MOD.3689 In addition, one cannot reasonably discount
the possibility that the VRS obtained these particular shells through smuggling or donations of VJ
personnel outside the official logistical assistance process.3690
1294. Hence, the trial record does not establish that the particular shells used in Scheduled
Incidents A7 and A9 were provided to the VRS pursuant to the logistical assistance process
managed by Perišić.
3. Bullets Recovered from Srebrenica Crime Scenes
1295. Witness MP-14 examined two photographs of rifle bullet cartridges recovered from the
Srebrenica area, in which he identified two cartridges of 7.62mm bullets manufactured in 1993 and
1994 by the Prvi Partizan factory in U`ice, Serbia, as indicated by engravings on the bullets.3691
MP-14 further examined the photograph of a crate containing ammunition, which was recovered
from Orahovac, a killing site in the Srebrenica area.3692 Based on various markings, MP-14
identified the pictured material as 7.62mm bullets manufactured in 1994 by Prvi Partizan.3693 MP14 testified that the gunpowder for these bullets was manufactured by “Milan Blagojević Lučani”
and kept in the “Nikinci depot” in Serbia.3694
1296. The Trial Chamber finds that it is impossible to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that
these specific bullets were provided to the VRS pursuant to the logistical assistance process that
Perišić oversaw. Overall, this evidence presents the same problems as the aforementioned shells
recovered from Sarajevo. The trial record does not establish whether these specific bullets were
delivered to the VRS pursuant to Perišić’s orders, purchased directly from Prvi Partizan or
otherwise procured through unauthorised channels.
1297. The evidence does not establish that Perišić had a hand in the material delivered by the
Milan Blagojević facility. With regard to the Nikinci depot, the record does not conclusively
indicate whether this was a VJ General Staff or FRY MOD facility. While Radojica Kadijević
testified about a facility at Nikinci that was a technical testing centre under VJ General Staff
3689
3690
3691
3692
3693
3694
See supra section VI.B.5.
See supra section VI.C.9.(g)-(h).
MP-14, T. 3621-3623; Ex. P599, Photographs of Rifle Shell Cartridges. MP-14 also examined two other bullets,
although he could not determine the identity of the manufacturer, MP-14, T. 3623; Ex. P701, Photographs of
Ammunition.
MP-14, T. 3630-3632; Ex. P600, Photograph of Ammunition Crate.
MP-14, T. 3630-3631; Ex. P600, Photograph of Ammunition Crate.
MP-14, T. 3631-3632.
406
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oversight,3695 the record does not demonstrate that it was the same gunpowder storage facility
mentioned by MP-14.
1298. Moreover, the Defence challenges the reliability of findings made by Garry Selsky, a
Prosecution investigator who oversaw the examination of 3,644 bullet casings collected at
Srebrenica killing sites identified in Schedule D of the Indictment.3696 Upon scrutinising engravings
on the bullets, Selsky determined that most of them had been manufactured by Prvi Partizan,
including 378 that were manufactured at that factory from 1993 henceforth.3697
1299. Selsky admitted on cross-examination that his language assistant told him where Prvi
Partizan was situated—Selsky did not make an independent determination of that fact.3698 Selsky
mentioned that his language assistant participated in the counting of bullets as well.3699 Selksy did
not concretely explain whether his language assistant helped him make other substantive findings. It
is noteworthy, however, that Selsky claimed that the basis for the language assistant’s knowledge
was his experience as a soldier in the VJ and his “hobby” of buying and selling firearms for
shooting at a firing range.3700 Selsky believed that the assistant had “expertise” on firearms despite
the fact that he never vetted him to ascertain the extent of his knowledge.3701
1300. The Defence argues that Selsky’s findings are not reliable due to various problems with his
methodology, his alleged lack of knowledge, and his reliance on his language assistant’s
“hobby”.3702 The Trial Chamber agrees with the Defence that the language assistant’s “hobby” is
not a reliable source of knowledge.3703 However, the Trial Chamber finds that there is no doubt that
Prvi Partizan was based in Užice, Serbia;3704 and further notes that MP-14’s testimony confirms
that the engraving “PPU” on bullets stands for Prvi Partizan being the manufacturer.3705 Finally,
even though Selsky’s testimony was ambiguous at times, the Trial Chamber accepts his basic
3695
3696
3697
3698
3699
3700
3701
3702
3703
3704
3705
Radojica Kadijević, T. 13682.
Ex. P1833, Declaration by OTP Investigator, 25 October 2007, p. 4; Ex. P2892, Rule 92 bis Declaration and
Statement of Garry Selsky, 24 January 2010 (correcting total number of shell casings to 3,644 instead of 3,638);
Garry Selsky, T. 9771.
Garry Selsky, T. 9786-9787, 9789-9790, 9794-9798.
Garry Selsky, T. 9763-9764, 9774-9775.
Garry Selsky, T. 9765.
Garry Selsky, T. 9763-9764.
Garry Selsky, T. 9763-9765.
Defence Final Brief, paras 1049-1080.
Defence Final Brief, paras 1058-1059.
See e.g. MP-14, T. 3617 (closed session); Milomar Kovačević, T. 6076; Dušan Kovačević, T. 12675; Ex. D50,
Letter from Commander of the 1st Krajina Corps to the VRS Main Staff, 22 February 1993 (mentioning Prvi
Partizan in Užice).
MP-14, T. 3621, 3630-3631.
407
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conclusion that 378 bullet casings out of 3,644 recovered from Srebrenica killing sites were
manufactured by Prvi Partizan in 1993 henceforth.3706
1301. In any event, Selsky’s findings concerning Prvi Partizan bullets recovered from the
Srebrenica area raise the same problems as discussed above. Again, it is not possible to reasonably
conclude that Perišić was involved in the provision of these specific bullets.
4. Conclusion
1302. For all of these reasons, the Trial Chamber concludes that the evidence does not establish
beyond a reasonable doubt that Perišić was involved in providing the specific shells and bullets
recovered from the aforesaid crime scenes.
3706
Garry Selsky, T. 9776-9787, 9789-9790, 9794-9798.
408
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G. Other Forms of Assistance
1. Drina Plan
1303. On 8 November 1993, the political and military leadership of the FRY, RS and RSK,
including Peri{i}, Mladi}, Novakovi}, and Slobodan Milo{evi} met in Belgrade.3707 One of the
meeting’s conclusions was to start preparing a single war plan involving all three armies (VJ, VRS
and SVK).3708
1304. The Main Staffs of the VRS and SVK set up teams to work on the plan.3709 Novakovi}
testified that the part of the plan related to the role of the SVK was drafted in Knin, while the
harmonisation of the final version, which also included the assessments of the role of the VRS and
the VJ, was done at the premises of the General Staff of the VJ.3710
1305. The final version of the war plan took the form of a directive, which was “the highest-level
commanding document at the highest strategic level”.3711 The “top people” of the VJ General Staff
were therefore involved, as well as Novakovi} (SVK), Milovanovi} (VRS) and their own selected
teams.3712 A directive generally stressed the purpose of an operation, the general tasks and provided
an indication of how the task should be executed.3713 Its implementation therefore required the
subsequent adoption of detailed plans by the lower levels of the army, in accordance with the
directive.3714
1306. The war plan was finalised on 14 November 1993 and was signed by the President of the
SDC, Zoran Lili}.3715 It was formally known as the “Directive for Use of the Yugoslav Army, the
Republika Srpska Army, and the Serb Army of Krajina”, and was commonly referred to as the
“Drina Plan”.3716 It provided for the creation of a single Serbian State,3717 and described the main
3707
3708
3709
3710
3711
3712
3713
3714
3715
3716
3717
Ex. D442, Excerpt from the Mladić Diary, dated 8 November 1993, p. 1.
Mile Novakovi}, T. 13232-13233, 13237, 13377. Ex. D442, Excerpt from the Mladić Diary, dated 8 November
1993, pp 8-9. According to Novakovi}, the Drina Plan appeared to be a good political compromise for Milo{evi}
as he could support the war without anyone knowing this since the plan was top secret, Mile Novakovi},
T. 13242-13243.
Mile Novakovi}, T. 13238-13239; Ex. D442, Excerpt from the Mladić Diary, dated 8 November 1993, p. 11.
Mile Novakovi}, T. 13238-13239. See also Miodrag Simi}, T. 10048-10049.
Miodrag Simi}, T. 10042; Mile Novakovi}, T. 13238.
Mile Novakovi}, T. 13238-13239; Miodrag Simi}, T. 10049; Ex. P215, Directive of the President of the SDC,
for the Use of VJ, VRS and SVK, 14 November 1993
MP-80, T. 8831; Ex. P1184, VJ Course Manual on Command and Control, 1 January 1997, p. 77.
MP-80, T. 8830-8832 (closed session).
Mile Novakovi}, T. 13233, 13395, 13402; Miodrag Simi}, T. 10049; Ex. P215, The Directive of the President of
the SDC, for the Use of VJ, VRS and SVK, 14 November 1993.
Mile Novakovi}, T. 13397, 13402; Ex. P215, The Directive of the President of the SDC, for the Use of VJ, VRS
and SVK, 14 November 1993.
Miodrag Simi}, T. 10162-10163; Ex. P215, The Directive of the President of the SDC, for the Use of VJ, VRS
and SVK, 14 November 1993.
409
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tasks of the VJ, VRS and SVK in the event of foreign aggression.3718 It envisaged all three armies
having a common war objective, military doctrine and military strategy.3719 Its general objective
was to:
Defend the territorial integrity of the Serbian states west of the Drina and Danube rivers and the
FRY, protect Serbian people from genocide, liberate parts of Serbian territories with Serbian
majorities, create conditions for the establishment of a single state of the Serbian people, prevent
creation of Greater Croatia and a compact Islamic state on the territory of the former
Yugoslavia.3720
1307. According to Novakovi}, the Drina Plan was very important for the survival of the SVK, as
it established that the VRS and the VJ would assist the SVK in protecting the territory of the RSK
in case of an attack by the HVO.3721
1308. Each of the three armies needed to implement the Drina Plan at their level and this required
integrating the forces of the other armies into their respective war plans.3722 The implementation
procedure required the Main Staffs of the VRS and SVK, as well as the General Staff of the VJ, to
elaborate their own war plan in accordance with the instructions contained in the Drina Plan.3723
These plans contained specific tasks for lower units.3724
1309. The Prosecution argues that although there is no evidence that the Drina Plan was acted
upon, its existence shows that the VJ, VRS and SVK intended to act together in defence of unified
Serb interests.3725 The Defence argues that the Prosecution failed to prove that one of the objectives
of the Drina Plan was the creation of a single state of the Serbian people.3726 On the contrary, the
evidence shows that Milo{evi} distanced himself from the idea of a single Serbian state.3727
Furthermore, the Defence also points to the testimony of Simi}, according to whom the plan “had
an objective to represent a strategic masking, primarily directed to potential enemies in order to
make a diversion”.3728
3718
3719
3720
3721
3722
3723
3724
3725
3726
3727
3728
Mile Novakovi}, T. 13233, 13397, 13402; Ex. P215, The Directive of the President of the SDC, for the Use of
VJ, VRS and SVK, 14 November 1993; Ex. P1563, Photos of the Operative Maps in Relation to Operation
“Drina”.
Mile Novakovi}, T. 13234.
Miodrag Simi}, T. 10162-10163; Ex. P215, The Directive of the President of the SDC, for the Use of VJ, VRS
and SVK, 14 November 1993, p. 7.
Mile Novakovi}, T. 13240-13241, 13397; Ex. P215, The Directive of the President of the SDC, for the Use of
VJ, VRS and SVK, 14 November 1993.
Mile Novakovi}, T. 13400.
Miodrag Simi}, T. 10148. See e.g. Ex. P2158, Document Issued by Ratko Mladić Regarding Logistical Support.
Miodrag Simi}, T. 10148-10149.
Prosecution Final Brief, para. 244.
Opening Statement, T. 360; Defence Final Brief, paras 164-165.
Defence Final Brief, paras 169-171.
Defence Final Brief, para. 172.
410
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1310. The Trial Chamber notes that Simi}, head of the First Administration of the VJ, who directly
participated in the drafting of the Drina Plan,3729 came to the conclusion that the plan was a
“strategic camouflage” and that subsequent work on the plan was “interrupted suddenly”.3730 He
also stated that “only the [SDC] and possibly the Chief of [VJ] General Staff” were privy to the real
intentions of this plan.3731 According to Simi}, the Drina Plan never became operative within the
VJ.3732
1311. The Trial Chamber notes that several documents show that the Drina Plan was implemented
at the VRS Main Staff and VRS Corps level.3733 The Trial Chamber also heard the testimony of
Mile Novakovi}, who testified that the Drina Plan was incorporated into the war plan of the SVK
Main Staff, though it was never carried out in its entirety either by the VJ or the SVK.3734 In
particular, he testified that the plan was never implemented at the level of the Corps and below.3735
1312. The Trial Chamber finds that regardless of the true nature of the Drina Plan, the evidence
shows that Peri{i} participated in the preparation and approval of this plan together with other
military and political leaders of the FRY, RS and SVK. The Trial Chamber is also satisfied that
3729
3730
3731
3732
3733
3734
3735
Miodrag Simi}, T. 10048-10049. Simi} was Chief of Department for Planning and Combat Readiness and
Assistant Chief of General Staff for Operations and Staff Affairs, Miodrag Simi}, T. 9919.
Miodrag Simi}, T. 10066; Ex. P215, The Directive of the President of the SDC, for the Use of VJ, VRS and
SVK, 14 November 1993; Ex. P1563, Photos of the Operative Maps in Relation to Operation “Drina”.
Miodrag Simi}, T. 10067.
Ibid.
Ex. P1555, Extract from the Directive for Use of the VRS, December 1993; Ex. P2894, Operational Documents
of the Drina Corps Command From a Folder Marked From the VRS Main Staff, Drina Corps; Ex. P2895, List of
Documents of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps submitted to the VRS Main Staff, 2 February 1994; Ex. P2896,
Order for the Use of the SRK, 26 January 1994; Ex. P2897, Document relating to the Use of the Anti-Aircraft
Forces and the Air Force; Ex. P2898, Plan for Morale, Psychological Activities and Information for the SRK;
Ex. P2899, Plan for Morale, Psychological Activities and Information for the SRK; Ex. P2900, Plan for Security
Measures for the SRK; Ex. P2901, People’s Defence State Secret Intelligence Plan; Ex. P2902, Plan for the use
of the 1st Krajina Corps to be Executed Under Code Name “Drina”; Ex. P2903, Command for Intelligence
Security; Ex. P2904, Plan of Intelligence Security of the Defence and Attack Operation of the 1st Krajina Corps;
Ex. P2905, Plan of Operations Tactical Camouflage; Ex. P2906, Plan of Security Measures of the 1st Krajina
Corps for the Defence and Attack Operation; Ex. P2907, Plan for Anti-Electronic Combat of the 1st Krajina
Corps; Ex. P2908, 1st Krajina Corps Order for Electronic Surveillance and Jamming; Ex. P2909, 1st Krajina
Corps Order for Electronic Surveillance and Jamming; Ex. P2910, 1st Krajina Corps Order for Engineering
Support; Ex. P2911, 1st Krajina Corps Plan for Morale and Psychological Activities and Information; Ex. P2912,
1st Krajina Corps Order for Anti-Aircraft Defence, Operational No. 1; Ex. P2921, Order on Destroy Invalidated
Engagement Plan, 17 March 1995; Ex. P1554, VRS Plan for Logistic Support; Ex. P1556, Order of the
Command of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps on Logistics; Ex. P1557, Order of the Command of the VRS Drina
Corps on Communications; Ex. P1558, Chart of the VRS Daily Communication System; Ex. P1559, VRS Plan
for Intelligence; Ex. P1560, VRS Plan for Psychological Activities and Information Work; Ex. P1561, VRS Plan
for the Use of the Anti-Aircraft Defence and Air Support Forces; Ex. P1562, List of the Documents Submitted
by the 1st Krajina Corps to the General Staff of the VRS, 25 January 1995; Ex. P1564, Communications Plan for
the Operation “Drina”, November 1993; Ex. P2158, Document Issued by Ratko Mladić in re Organisation of the
Security Sector and Plan of the Operative Groups and VRS Units; Miodrag Simi}, T. 10152-10153, 1022010225, 10243-10255, 10258-10322.
Mile Novakovi}, T. 13401-13403.
Mile Novakovi}, T. 13401-13403.
411
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while the plan was not implemented in the VJ, some actions were taken at the Main Staff level in
the VRS and SVK, and to some degree at the VRS Corps level, to implement it.3736
2. Gvozd Plan
1313. During a meeting in January 1995, attended by Karadžić, Mladić, Perišić, Martić, ^eleketi}
and Bjelanović,3737 it was agreed that ^eleketi} should prepare a new plan for the defence of the
RSK. According to this plan, code named “Gvozd”, the VJ and VRS were instructed to provide
military assistance to the SVK “to respond to an aggression of the Croatian army should it
occur”.3738 The Gvozd Plan was prepared by the SVK in a period of ten days with the assistance of
three VJ General Staff colonels, who were provided by Peri{i} at ^eleketi}’s request.3739 It took the
form of a directive, formally known as the “Directive for Use of the Serbian Army of Krajina”.3740
Each army was required to implement the Gvozd Plan at its level.3741
1314. Miodrag Simi} testified that he had never heard of the Gvozd Plan. However, MP-80
testified that the Gvozd Plan replaced the Drina Plan, insofar as it concerned the SVK. According to
MP-80, Slobodan Milošević “approved” the Gvozd Plan and promised to fully support the SVK by
providing personnel and logistical assistance.3742 To this end, Milošević instructed Perišić to
transport ammunition to the SVK.3743 Although Perišić was reluctant to execute this order because
of his concern that the quantities requested would reduce the combat readiness of the VJ,3744
approximately 60 trailer trucks of goods and ammunition from the FRY were delivered to SVK
warehouses.3745
1315. According to MP-80, the Gvozd Plan provided the SVK with the assurance that the VJ, as
well as Milo{evi}, would not allow an attack against the RSK.3746 The Trial Chamber notes that
the VJ and/or VRS did not engage in two military operations of the Croatian Army against the RSK
in 1995 – Operation Flash in May and Operation Storm in August.3747
1316. The Prosecution argues that developing the Gvozd Plan was an important task for Peri{i}
and that he provided VJ General Staff officers who were specialists in drafting war plans to assist
3736
3737
3738
3739
3740
3741
3742
3743
3744
3745
3746
See supra para. 1311.
MP-80, T. 8426, 8682-8683 (closed session).
MP-80, T. 8426-8428, 8679-8680 (closed session); Ex. P494, Directive of the Supreme Commander of the SVK
on the Use of SVK, February 1995, p. 7.
MP-80, T. 8426-8428, 8679-8680 (closed session).
Ex. P494, Directive of the Supreme Commander of the SVK on the Use of the SVK, February 1995.
MP-80, T. 8830-8832, 8834-8835 (closed session).
MP-80, T. 8428-8429, 8684, 8692-8693 (closed session).
MP-80, T. 8428-8431 (closed session).
MP-80, T. 8428-8431 (closed session).
MP-80, T. 8428-8429 (closed session).
MP-80, T. 8436-8437 (closed session).
412
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the SVK in preparing the Gvozd Plan.3748 The Defence argues that Miodrag Simi}’s testimony
directly contradicts MP-80’s position that members of the VJ General Staff participated in the
development of the Gvozd Plan.3749 The Defence further submits that the Gvozd Plan was not
formed in accordance with valid military procedures, nor was it accepted and implemented by all of
the parties involved.3750
1317. The Trial Chamber finds that although Simi} may not have been aware of the existence of
the Gvozd Plan, the directive prepared by the SVK shows that the plan indeed existed. 3751 The Trial
Chamber is satisfied that MP-80 is therefore credible when he testified that the plan existed. The
Trial Chamber also notes that there is no evidence that the VJ First Administration was ever
involved in the preparation of the plan, which explains why Simi} may not have been aware of it.
1318. The Trial Chamber is also satisfied, based on the testimony of MP-80, that Peri{i} provided
VJ General Staff officers to assist in creating the plan. The Trial Chamber further finds that
following Milo{evi}’s orders, Peri{i} provided additional logistical assistance to support the SVK in
accordance with the Gvozd Plan.3752
3. VJ Members Deployed to the RS
1319. The Indictment alleges that the Accused aided and abetted the crimes described in Counts 1
to 4, inter alia, by “sending regular VJ troops stationed in the FRY into BiH”. In particular, it
alleges that VJ units participated in a military operation known as Pancir-2 that occurred in
Vogo{}a in late 1993 and early 1994.3753
(a) Operation Pancir-2
1320. On 11 November 1993, the VRS Supreme Command issued Operational Directive No. 6
(“Directive 6”) delineating, inter alia, the tasks of the VRS, including orders for the SRK “to
prevent the deblockade of Sarajevo and the occupation of the Vogo{}a, Rajlovac and Had`i}i
industrial complexes” by the ABiH.3754
1321. Two excerpts from Mladi}’s diary show that the capture of Mount @u}, in the Vogo{}a area,
was discussed in Belgrade at meetings held on 13 and 14 December 1993 between the FRY and RS
3747
3748
3749
3750
3751
3752
3753
3754
See supra paras 170-171, 564.
Prosecution Final Brief, para. 245.
Defence Final Brief, paras 174-176; Miodrag Simi}, T. 10070-10074.
Defence Final Brief, paras 177-179.
See Ex. P494, Directive of the Supreme Commander of the SVK on the Use of SVK, February 1995.
See supra para. 1314.
Indictment, para. 9. See also Prosecution Final Brief, para. 483; Prosecution Final Arguments, T. 14720.
Ex. P901, VRS Supreme Command Operational Directive 6, 11 November 1993, p. 5.
413
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military and civilian leadership.3755 Amongst the participants were Milo{evi}, Peri{i}, Karad`i} and
Mladi}.3756
1322. At the meeting of 13 December 1993, Karad`i} recalled to the participants the VRS six
strategic objectives, including the partition of Sarajevo.3757 In this context he stated that the VRS
needed to capture some elevation points and that Mount @u} was particularly important to protect
military factories in the area from the ABIH so that they continue their work uninterrupted.3758 The
next day Peri{i} was recorded as stating that reinforcements of about “a hundred professionals”
“equipped for combat” would be at the disposal of the VRS by 20 December 1993.3759 The
discussion recorded in the diary shows that Mladi} expected to receive those reinforcements from
the VJ, as well as additional support from the Serbian MUP, by 18 December 1993, and intended to
be ready for the operation by 19 December 1993.3760
1323. On 14 December 1993, as a result of talks on that day and based on the decision reached “by
the highest officials of the Serbian people”, Mladi} issued a “Supplement” to Directive 6 addressed
specifically to the SRK Commander, Stanislav Gali}.3761 The Supplement sets out the aim and plan
of operation Pancir-2, according to which the SRK and its reinforcements were to prevent
an enemy breakthrough towards Sarajevo from the direction of central Bosnia and Gora`de. One
part of the forces are [sic] to carry out [active combat] on a smaller scale in the areas of Mt.
Trebevi}, Mojmilo, Vojkovi}i, and Ilid`a in order to engage the enemy forces, while /another/ part
of the forces […] are [sic] to carry out an attack along the Vogo{}a-@u}-Pofali}i and LukavicaHrasnica axes with the following tasks: to break up Muslim forces along axes of the attack […]
and inflict on them as many losses as possible, and to take over control of the @u}, Orli}, and Hum
facilities, and Mojmilo, if possible, and so create conditions for the uninterrupted work of the
‘Famos’, ‘Orao’, and ‘Pretis’ factories; to cut off Muslim communication from Sarajevo towards
Mt. Igman and central Bosnia, and to provide conditions for the division of Sarajevo in two […]
parts.3762
The Supplement also stipulates that 120 men of the VJ “Special Forces”3763 should be resubordinated to the SRK Command in Vogo{}a on 18 December 19933764 and be ready to attack on
19 December 1993.3765
3755
3756
3757
3758
3759
3760
3761
3762
3763
3764
Ex. P2933, Extract from Ratko Mladi}'s Notebook, 13 December 1993; Ex. P2934, Extract from Ratko Mladi}'s
Notebook, 14 December 1993.
Ex. P2933, Excerpt from Ratko Mladi}'s Notebook, 13 December 1993, p. 1.
Ibid.
Ex. P2933, Excerpt from Ratko Mladi}'s Notebook, 13 December 1993, p. 2.
Ex P2934, Excerpt from Ratko Mladi}'s Notebook, 14 December 1993, p. 3. See also Ex. D521, Report of Galić
to the VRS Main Staff, 22 December 1993, p. 2. Initially Peri{i} intended to assist the VRS only with the
provision of weapons and not with the deployment of VJ units, Ex P2934, Extract from Ratko Mladi}'s
Notebook, 14 December 1993, p. 1.
Ex. P2934, Excerpt from Ratko Mladi}'s Notebook, 14 December 1993, pp 2-3.
Ex. P905, VRS Main Staff Telex from Mladi}, Amendment to Directive No. 6, 14 December 1993.
Ex. P905, VRS Main Staff Telex from Mladi}, Amendment to Directive No. 6, 14 December 1993, p. 1
Ibid.
Ex. P905, VRS Main Staff Telex from Mladi}, Amendment to Directive No. 6, 14 December 1993, p. 2.
414
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1324. On 15 December 1993, the SRK Command issued an order to the commanders of all the
brigades in execution of the Supplement.3766
(i) VJ Special Units Corps Deployment
1325. MP-11 testified that a few days before 16 December 1993, Peri{i} visited the VJ 72nd
Special Brigade HQ in Mount Avala accompanied by the brigade’s commander, Colonel Stupar.
During the briefing, Peri{i} ordered members of the 72nd Special Brigade’s military police battalion
for special operations to go to Sarajevo to participate in an offensive against the ABiH “for” the
SRK,3767 aimed at gaining control of Mount @u}.3768 Peri{i} stated that Mount @u} “was a strategic
location and it needed to be controlled by Serb forces”.3769
1326. The military police battalion departed from Mount Avala on 16 December 1993.3770 They
were joined along the way by members of other VJ SUC units - the Guards Brigade from Belgrade,
who had been ordered to deploy from Belgrade the same day,3771 the Armoured Brigade3772 and the
63rd Parachute Brigade.3773 They all arrived in the area of Vogo{}a on 17 December 1993.3774 The
following day, General Gali} briefed them on the forthcoming mission and on the strategic
importance of gaining control of Mount @u}.3775
1327. Defence witness Zlatko Danilovi}, who at the time was a member of the military police
battalion in Avala,3776 testified that he never saw Peri{i} at Mount Avala in that period, nor did he
hear from other colleagues that Peri{i} had been there.3777 In addition, the witness stated that he did
not know where they were being deployed, and realised that the action would take place in BiH
only when the convoy arrived at the barracks in Han Pijesak. The Trial Chamber finds that
Danilovi}’s statement alone is not sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to the presence of Peri{i}
3765
3766
3767
3768
3769
3770
3771
3772
3773
3774
3775
3776
3777
Ex. P905, VRS Main Staff Telex from Mladi}, Amendment to Directive No. 6, 14 December 1993, p. 1.
Ex. P1533, Order of the Sarajevo Romanja Corps Command to all Brigade Commanders, 15 December 1993,
para. 1.
MP-11, T. 8948, 8951-8952, 8996, 9007, 9032-9033 (partly private session).
MP-11, T. 8951-8952, 8996, 9007, 9033, 9037-9038. See also MP-11, T. 8949. See also supra paras 313, 367.
MP-11, T. 9036-9038 (private session). See also MP-11, T. 8951-8952, 9006-9007.
MP-11, T. 8953, 8996, 9007 (private session); Zlatko Danilovi}, T. 11035-11036.
MP-418, T. 3430-3431 (private session); Ex. P552 (under seal), p. 1. See also Borivoje Te{i}, T. 1905-1906.
Borivoje Te{i}, T. 1906; Ex. P351, Organisational Chart of the Special Unit Corps in December 1993, 19
November 2008.
MP-418, T. 3471, 3481-3482 (closed session); Ex. P351, Organisational Chart of the Special Unit Corps in
December 1993, 19 November 2008.
MP-418, T. 3430-3431 (private session); Ex. P552 (under seal), p. 1. See also Borivoje Te{i}, T. 2027-2028,
2031-2034 (private session); Ex. P356, Briefing Report Authored by the Commander of the Guards Motorised
Brigade Stojimirovi}, 13 January 1994, p. 1. See also Ex. D521, Report of Galić to the VRS Main Staff, 22
December 1993, p. 2.
MP-11, T. 9005-9006, 9037 (private session). See also Ex. D521, Report of Galić to the Main Staff of the VRS,
22 December 1993, p. 2.
Zlatko Danilovi}, T. 11027-11028.
Zlatko Danilovi}, T. 11031.
415
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at Mount Avala. The Trial Chamber notes that Danilovi} may not have been present at Mount
Avala when Peri{i} was there. As stated by both MP-11 and Danilovi}, in December 1995, the
military battalion was engaged in a parachute training in Ni{.3778 MP-11, however, returned to
Mount Avala before the rest of the battalion.3779 Danilovi}, instead, returned with the rest of the
battalion just before they were deployed in the field.3780 In the Trial Chamber’s view, this could
explain why MP-11 was present when Peri{i} and Stupar gave the order whereas Danilovi} did not
see Peri{i} or hear of his presence. Furthermore, the Trial Chamber finds Danilovi}’s testimony to
be generally of low credibility and attaches limited weight to it. The Trial Chamber notes for
example that Danilovi} stated that once in Vogo{}a, it was the civilians who lived in the area that
showed the witness’s battalion Mount @u} and told them “what their mission would involve”.3781
Danilovi} stands alone on this issue and is contradicted not only by the testimony of MP-11 but also
by the documentary evidence discussed in this section.3782
1328. The Defence argues that the purpose of seizing Mount @u} was “so that the [ABiH] would
not disturb the Serbian people on the other side of the mountain”. In support of this argument, it
cites the testimony of MP-11 and Danilovi}.3783 In reviewing their testimony, the Trial Chamber
notes that MP-11 stated that this goal was desired, however, he also added that it was a crucial point
to control the area and connect the VRS forces on that side of Sarajevo. As for Danilovi}’s
testimony cited by the Defence, the Trial Chamber notes that it refers to his assertion that it was the
civilian local population who directed the VJ members in this operation.3784 The Trial Chamber
finds that this testimony does not support the Defence argument and also notes that the Defence
misrepresented Daniliovi}’s testimony. In any event, the Trial Chamber has already concluded that
it does not find this part of his testimony credible.
(ii) Mount @u} – 27 December 1993
1329. For about ten days after their arrival in Vogo{}a, the members of the 72nd Special Brigade
engaged only in a few reconnaissance missions.3785 The attack on Mount @u} was eventually carried
out during the early hours of 27 December 1993, under the command of Stupar.3786 The operation
3778
3779
3780
3781
3782
3783
3784
3785
3786
MP-11, T. 8996 (private session); Zlatko Danilovi}, T. 11031-11032.
MP-11, T. 8996-8997 (private session).
Zlatko Danilovi}, T. 11032.
Zlarko Danilovi}, T. 11037.
See e.g. Ex. P1533, Order of the Sarajevo Romanja Corps Command to all Brigade Commanders, 15 December
1993, para. 1; Ex. D521, Report of Galić to the Main Staff of the VRS, 22 December 1993, p. 2; Ex. P359,
Interim Report of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps Command to VRS Main Staff, 27 December 1993, p. 1.
Defence Final Brief, para. 809, citing MP-11, 8952-8953 and Zlatko Danilovi}, T. 11037.
Zlatko Danilovi}, T. 11037.
MP-11, T. 8961, 9007. See also Zlatko Danilovi}, T. 11037-11039.
MP-11, T. 9007-9008; Zlatko Danilovi}, T. 11038; Ex. P359, Interim Report of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps
Command to VRS Main Staff, 27 December 1993.
416
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was not successful and the 72nd Special Brigade suffered significant losses,3787 with nine soldiers
killed3788 and several injured.3789 The injured were immediately transferred either to the Bla`uj
hospital in Rajlovac and then to the Military Medical Academy Hospital (“VMA”) in Belgrade,3790
or directly to the VMA by VJ helicopter.3791
1330. Part of the 72nd Special Brigade departed from Vogo{}a soon after the operation,3792
whereas those members that were responsible for the technical equipment remained there for some
time longer.3793
(iii) Aftermath
1331. On 30 December 1993, upon an oral order of Stojimirovi} – Commander of the Guards
Brigade – additional members of the Guards Brigade (about 120 to 130 men)3794 were deployed to
Vogo{}a with the task of assisting the pull-out of the 72nd Brigade from the area.3795 By 5 January
1994, the Guards Brigade took over the area of responsibility of the 72nd Special Brigade, thereby
entering the reserve formation of the SRK.3796
3787
3788
3789
3790
3791
3792
3793
3794
3795
3796
MP-11, T. 8953-8954; Zlatko Danilovi}, T. 11039. See also Ex. D289, Operation Pancir Map Marked by
Danilovi}, 15 March 2010; Zlatko Danilovi}, T. 11041-11042.
Ex. P1849, List of Casualties, 22 April 1994; Ex. P1850, Certificate by VJ Military Post 8486, undated;
Ex. P1851, Death Certificate, 17 January 1994; Ex. P1852, Request for Death Certificate, 6 April 1994; MP-11,
T. 8953-8954; Ex. P360, List of Killed and Wounded Soldiers in December 1993 in Vogo{}a, p. 1; Ex. P361,
Obituaries of Goran Galjak, 18 January 1994; Borivoje Te{i}, T. 1932, 1934-1935, 1938; Ex. P362, Certificates
for VJ Soldiers Killed or Injured on 27 December 1993 in Vogo{}a, pp 1-7; Ex. P1840, ABiH Report on Enemy
Casualties, 19 January 1994, p. 5 (Dragan Stojković); Ex. P1841, VJ Personnel File of Dragan Stojković,
Doc IDs 0422-9335, p. 6, 0422-9392; Ex. P1842, VJ Personnel File of Goran Galjak, Doc ID 0422-9437, p. 6;
Ex. P1843, VJ Personnel File of Radovan Ravić, Doc ID 0422-9485, p. 6; Ex. P1843, VJ Personnel File of
Radovan Ravić, Doc ID 0422-9523, p. 4. See also Ex. P1844, Medical Records, 8 – 31 December 1993, p. 3;
Ex. P359, Interim Report of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps Command to VRS Main Staff, 27 December 1993,
p. 1.
MP-11, T. 8953-8954; Borivoje Te{i}, T. 1938-1939 (closed session); Ex. P360, List of Killed and Wounded
Soldiers in December 1993 in Vogo{}a, pp 2-3; Ex. P362, Certificates for VJ Soldiers Killed or Injured on 27
December 1993 in Vogo{}a, pp 3-9.
Borivoje Te{i}, T. 1932-1933 (closed session). See also Ex. P1844, Medical Records, 8-31 December 1993.
MP-11, T. 8954, 8958 (partly private session); Borivoje Te{i}, T. 1932-1933 (closed session). See also MP-418,
T. 3442-3445, 3470 (closed session); Ex. P353, War Diary of the Guards Motorised Brigade, 30 December 1993
– 30 January 1994, p. 3; Ex. P554 (under seal).
MP-11, T. 8958; Zlatko Danilovi}, T. 11043; Ex. P354, Order of the Commander of the Special Unit Corps
Miodrag Pani}, 5 January 1994; Ex. P353, War Diary of the Guards Motorised Brigade, 30 December 1993-30
January 1994, p. 5. According to MP-11, the 72nd Special Brigade left immediately after the operation, MP-11,
T. 8958 (private session).
MP-11, T. 8958 (private session); Ex. P353, War Diary of the Guards Motorised Brigade, 30 December 1993-30
January 1994, p. 6; Ex. P355, Set of Nine Reports and One Request to the VJ Special Unit Corps Command or
Operation Centre, 2-29 January 1994, p. 5.
Borivoje Te{i}, T. 1900, 2030, 2033-2034 (partly private session).
Borivoje Te{i}, T. 1900, 1905, 1929, 2002-2003.
Ex. P353, War Diary of the Guards Motorised Brigade, 30 December 1993-30 January 1994, pp 5-6; Ex. P354,
Order of the Commander of the Special Unit Corps Miodrag Pani}, 5 January 1994; Ex. P356, Briefing Report
Authored by the Commander of the Guards Motorised Brigade Stojimirovi}, 13 January 1994, p. 1; Borivoje
Te{i}, T. 2063. As of 31 December 1993, the total number of men from the Guards Brigade engaged in the area
amounted to about 210, Borivoje Te{i}, T. 1905, 2027-2028, 2031-2034; Ex. P356, Briefing Report Authored by
the Commander of the Guards Motorised Brigade Stojimirovi}, 13 January 1994, p. 1.
417
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1332. There is evidence that the Guards Brigade was ordered to take part in military actions in the
area. For example, according to one entry in the war diary of the Guards Brigade dated 9 January
1994, the Guards Brigade was to “[c]arry out combat tasks with the unit on orders of the
commander of [Brigade’s] BG-1 [combat group]”.3797 Another entry of the war diary reads as
follows:
Order for action 18 January 1994. With one BG from the vVPSpN [Military Police Special
Purposes Platoon] and a squad from the bVP [Military Police Battalion], in coordinated action
with the forces of the Vogo{}a Brigade, launch an attack along the axis of k./elevation/ 830 –
k850, thereby acting in coordination with BG-2 on the Perivoj – Vis axis and facilitating the BG-2
attack.3798
A briefing report by Stojimirovi} states that a certain number of Guards Brigade forces could be
“engaged along the direction of the main impact within the formation of the BG-2 […] or BG3[…]”.3799 A report sent from Colonel Petkovi} – the Chief of Staff of the VJ Special Units Corps
(“SUC”) – to the SUC Commander suggests a rotation of units, due to the “increased engagement”
of the Guards Brigades, “especially in nocturnal activities”.3800
1333. Both Borivoje Te{i} – operations officer of the Guards Brigade – and MP-418 stated,
however, that the Guards Brigade did not engage in combat activities but rather limited its activity
to retrieving the bodies of the 72nd Special Brigade soldiers who had been killed on 27 December
19933801 and to maintaining, as far as possible, the defence line held by the Vogo{}a Brigade of the
VRS.3802 Te{i} estimated that the total number of Guards Brigade present in Vogo{}a was not
3797
3798
3799
3800
3801
3802
Ex. P353, War Diary of the Guards Motorised Brigade, 30 December 1993 - 30 January 1994, p. 7; Borivoje
Te{i}, T. 1923, 2064 (partly closed session).
Ex. P353, War Diary of the Guards Motorised Brigade, 30 December 1993-30 January 1994, pp 12-13.
Ex. P356, Briefing Report Authored by the Commander of the Guards Motorised Brigade Stojimirovi},
13 January 1994, p. 2. According to Te{i}, BG-1 was within the formation of the Guards Brigade’s police
battalion while BG-2 appeared to be part of the VRS, Borivoje Te{i}, T. 2041, 2059 (closed session); Ex. P353,
War Diary of the Guards Motorised Brigade, 30 December -30 January 1994, pp 3, 20). However, another entry
in the war diary, reference is made to a BG-2 from the Military Police Special Purposes Platoon, which
according to the evidence is part of the Guards Brigade, Ex. P352, Organisational Chart of the Guards Motorised
Brigade in December 1993, 19 November 2008.
Ex. P368, Set of Documents and Orders on the Mobilisation of Units out of Vogo{}a, January 1994, p. 1.
Borivoje Te{i}, T. 1900, 1905, 1929, 2002-2003, 2051; Zlatko Danilovi}, T. 11043; Ex. P353, War Diary of the
Guards Motorised Brigade, 30 December 1993 – 30 January 1994, pp 9-10, 20; Ex. P360, List of Killed and
Wounded Soldiers in December 1993 in Vogo{}a, p. 1; Ex. P361, Obituaries of Goran Galjak, 18 January 1994;
Ex. P362, Certificates for VJ Soldiers Killed or Injured on 27 December 1993 in Vogo{}a, pp 1-2; Ex. P1849,
List of Casualties, 22 April 1994; Ex. P1850, Certificate by VJ Military Post 8486, undated; Ex. P1851, Death
Certificate, 17 January 1994; Ex. P1852, Request for Death Certificate, 6 April 1994; MP-11, T. 8953-8954. But
see MP-11 stating that by the time he left Vogo{}a a couple of days after the attack on Mount @u}, all the bodies
had been retrieved, MP-11, T. 8958 (private session).
Borivoje Te{i}, T. 1900, 1905, 1929, 1986, 2002-2004, 2031, 2051, 2063 (partly closed session). The witness
agreed with the Defence that the total number of men of the Guards Brigade who were deployed in Vogo{}a
(about 210) amounted to about 10% of the overall number of the Guards Brigade during peacetime. During reexamination, the witness stated that save for one intervention in the area of Srednje with a couple of vehicles and
a group of 20 men they did not participate in active action, Borivoje Te{i}, T. 2038 (closed session). See MP418, T. 3472 (closed session) (stating that they did not engage in combat activities, but would at times observe if
anything was happening at the frontline).
418
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substantial compared to the VRS forces present in the field.3803 Te{i} further stated that, although
the Guards Brigade’s war diary referenced to the planning of combat operations, these were not
carried out.3804
1334. Te{i} and MP-418 also denied that the Guards Brigade and the SRK cooperated or acted in
coordination.3805 Several documents nonetheless contradict their testimony: the abovementioned
briefing report by Colonel Stojimirovi} states that, upon arrival in Vogo{}a, the Guards Brigade
entered the reserve formation of the SRK pursuant to an order from the SRK Commander;3806 a
communication from the SUC command to Colonel Perkovi} shows that the SUC and the SRK
coordinated in the planning of the pullout from combat;3807 finally, the VRS warned against the use
in communications of the term “Yugoslav Army” and stated that VJ units would be treated as
reserve forces of the VRS.3808 Moreover, Te{i} himself conceded that, in relation to operations
which did not entail engagement in active combat, the superior officers of the Guards Brigade could
receive orders from the SRK commander.3809 He also testified that, between 15 and 17 January
1994, officers of the Military Police Special Purposes Platoon, a unit of the Guards Brigade,3810
provided training to the snipers of the Rajlovac and the Ilid`a Brigades, units of the SRK.3811
1335. The Trial Chamber notes that Te{i} stated that one of the reasons the Guards Brigade was
deployed, was to “stabilise the part of the defence line held by the Vogo{}a Brigade of the VRS”.
During re-examination he explained that the Guards Brigade was not engaged in active combat, but
rather that there were instances when it had to destroy emerging targets at the front line or respond
to fire with fire.3812 He added that save for one intervention in the area of Srednje with a couple of
3803
3804
3805
3806
3807
3808
3809
3810
3811
3812
Borivoje Te{i}, T. 2028-2030 (private session).
Borivoje Te{i}, T. 2016-2017 (private session), 2064-2070 (closed session).
Borivoje Te{i}, T. 2037-2040, 2050-2051, 2064-2070; MP-418, T. 3472 (closed session).
Ex. P356, Briefing Report Authored by the Commander of the Guards Motorised Brigade Stojimirovi},
13 January 1994, p. 1.
Ex. P368, Set of Documents and Orders on the Mobilisation of Units out of Vogo{}a, January 1994, pp 3-7.
Ex. P358, Warning on the Submission of Regular Combat Reports from the Main Staff of the VRS,
25 December 1993.
Borivoje Te{i}, T. 2013-2014 (private session); Ex. P353, War Diary of the Guards Motorised Brigade, 30
December 1993 – 30 January 1994, pp 7-8. During re-examination the witness defined these operations as
instances when emerging targets had to be destroyed at the front line or it was necessary to respond to fire with
fire. He also stated that on one occasion a “sabotage attack” was carried out to recapture part of Olovo where
members of the VRS had been killed. However, according to the witness, that operation could hardly be
considered a combat operation as the ABiH had already withdrawn from the area, Borivoje Te{i}, T. 2063, 2069
(closed session).
See supra para. 240.
Borivoje Te{i}, T. 1986-1989 (partly closed session); Ex. P353, War Diary of the Guards Motorised Brigade, 30
December 1993 – 30 January 1994, p. 12. See also Ex. P353, War Diary of the Guards Motorised Brigade, 30
December 1993 – 30 January 1994, p. 10, where it is recorded that two officers shall be sent to the Ilid`a
Brigade to train snipers, Borivoje Te{i}, T. 1989 (closed session); Ex. P368, Set of Documents and Orders on the
Mobilisation of Units out of Vogo{}a, January 1994, p. 7; Ex. P367, Urgent Request for Rifles, 8 January 1994.
Borivoje Te{i}, T. 2063, 2069 (closed session).
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vehicles and a group of 20 men the Guards Brigade did not participate in active action.3813 The Trial
Chamber finds that this amounts to active engagement and that Te{i} was attempting to downplay
the role of the Guards Brigade.
1336. Having carefully considered the testimony of Te{i} and MP-418 in light of the documentary
evidence described above, and their demeanour in court when discussing the engagement of the
Guards Brigade and/or their cooperation with the VRS, the Trial Chamber finds that their testimony
is not credible when they claimed that the Guards Brigade did not engage in combat activities and
that there was no coordination or cooperation with the SRK.
(b) Secrecy of VJ Presence in the Area
1337. According to the Prosecution, the VJ needed to conceal its presence around Sarajevo, as the
FRY was under international sanctions for its involvement in the war in BiH and Croatia and it
could “ill afford” to be discovered.3814 The Defence claims that the VJ presence in BiH was not and
could not be hidden, and that the VJ deployment was even reported on Sarajevo television.3815
1338. In support on its claim, the Defence cites the testimony of Te{i}, MP-418 and MP-11.
Having reviewed their testimony, the Trial Chamber notes that Te{i} testified that as far as his unit
was concerned, they did not “hide from anyone” and that in any event it was difficult to hide their
presence in the area.3816 MP-418 added that he had heard rumours that a Sarajevo television
reported that a unit from the VJ had allegedly arrived in the area.3817 Finally, MP-11 admitted that
the VJ involvement was supposed to be secret, but that members of his unit suspected that this
information reached the ABiH.3818
1339. At the same time, the Trial Chamber has been presented with evidence clearly showing that
both the VJ and VRS tried to keep the presence of the VJ in the Vogo{}a area and the involvement
of VJ troops in the attack on Mount Žu} secret. On 25 December 1993, General Milovanovi} issued
a warning forbidding the “use of or any reference in the regular and telephone communications to
the term Yugoslav Army units”.3819 One of the witnesses stated that the 72nd Special Brigade was
aware of this warning and added that “every time they were engaged in Bosnia, they were supposed
3813
3814
3815
3816
3817
3818
3819
Borivoje Te{i}, T. 2038 (closed session).
Prosecution Final Brief, para. 500.
Defence Final Brief, para. 812.
Borivoje Te{i}, T. 1961-1962, 1964-1965 (closed session).
MP-418, T. 3467 (private session).
MP-11, T. 8960.
Ex. P358, Warning on the Submission of Regular Combat Reports from the Main Staff of the VRS,
25 December 1993; MP-11, T. 8962. See also Ex. P782, Stenographic Transcript of the 18th Session of the SDC,
7 February 1994, p. 57.
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to act under the Republika Srpska”.3820 Furthermore, members of the VJ forces deployed to
Vogo{}a were instructed to remove their VJ insignia and leave behind their wallets and
identification documents before arriving at their destination.3821
1340. Additional support for the intended secret character of the VJ mission in BiH can be found
in the official medical certificate issued by the VJ to a Guards Brigade soldier who was wounded
while in Vogo{}a and later transferred by helicopter to the VMA in Belgrade.3822 The certificate,
issued by the Guards Brigade Commander, stated that he had been wounded “while carrying out
combat activities, i.e. securing [the FRY] state border”.3823 No mention was made of his
engagement in Vogo{}a. Similarly, the obituaries of one of the 72nd Brigade soldiers killed in this
operation, Goran Galjak, read that he died heroically “on 27 December 1993, defending his country,
the Greater Serbia” with no mention as to where he was killed.3824 His death certificate likewise
states that he was killed while participating in a “national defence operation”.3825 The death
certificate of another soldier who participated in the Pancir-2 Operation, Mladen Stjepanovi},
records his place of death on 27 December 1993 as Belgrade.3826
1341. The Trial Chamber recalls in this context that the FRY was under international sanctions
imposed pursuant to Chapter VII of the UN Charter and that the UNSC repeatedly condemned the
FRY’s failure to cease any form of interference in the events unfolding in BiH.3827 Sacirbey
testified that the goal of these sanctions was to have the FRY put a halt to all actions that continued
to “fuel the conflict”, including sending troops to BiH.3828
1342. Against this backdrop, the Trial Chamber finds that, whether or not the VJ was successful in
hiding its presence in the area, the evidence described above clearly shows that both the VJ and the
VRS intended and strived to keep the VJ involvement in Vogo{}a secret.
3820
3821
3822
3823
3824
3825
3826
3827
3828
MP-11, T. 8961-8962, 8964.
MP-418, T. 3432, 3472 (private session). They were not, however, asked to put on the VRS insignia, MP-418,
T. 3466-3467 (private session).
MP-418, T. 3442-3444 (private session); Ex. P554 (under seal); Ex. P553 (under seal).
Ex. P363, Certificate Confirming Wounded Status of Private, 23 June 1994. See also Ex. P552 (under seal), p. 2,
noting that the wounding in Vogo{}a occurred at a time when in theory the VJ “was not, by any means, involved
in the war in Bosnia” and that a retired VJ officer had advised MP-418 “not to mention where and when he had
been injured at all”.
Ex. P361, Obituaries of Goran Galjak, 18 January 1994.
Ex. P1852, Request for Death Certificate, 6 April 1994, Doc ID 0630-5057, p. 1. See also Ex. P1852, Request
for Death Certificate, 6 April 1994, Doc IDs 0630-5058, 0630-5056.
Ex. P1851, Death Certificate, 17 January 1994; Ex. P360, List of Killed and Wounded Soldiers in
December 1993 in Vogo{}a, p. 1.
Muhamed Sacirbey, T. 7175; Ex. P202, UNSC Resolution 757, 30 May 1992, pp 1-2; Ex. P2454, UNSC
Resolution 787, 16 November 1992, p. 3; Muhamed Sacirbey, T. 7173-7176. See supra paras 186-187.
Muhamed Sacirbey, T. 7177.
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(c) Peri{i}’s Presence in the Area
1343. The evidence shows that Peri{i} was present in Vogo{}a on 8 January 1994. He participated
in a meeting held at the Park Hotel between several RS politicians and VRS and VJ military
commanders, including Mladi}, Krsmanovi}, Gali}, Rajko Koprivica, Ratko Had`i}, Mirko
Kraji{nik and Pani} (the commander of the VJ Special Units Corps).3829 There is no evidence of
what was discussed during the meeting. However, according to a witness, it probably concerned a
situation within the area of responsibility of the SRK. 3830
(d) SDC 18th Session of 7 February 1994
1344. During the SDC session held on 7 February 1994, the deployment of VJ units in BiH was
discussed and Peri{i} stated that those men went in the area voluntarily, in the absence of an SDC
decision authorising the use of VJ forces abroad.3831 Momir Bulatovi}, however, disputed this
statement3832 and added that they did not even know where they were going. Perišić responded that
“[h]ad they known where they were going, they probably wouldn’t have gone!”3833
1345. The Trial Chamber does not believe that the VJ soldiers taking part in the Pancir-2
Operation were volunteers. The Trial Chamber notes that Peri{i} refers to the voluntary nature of
the engagement to justify the deployment in the absence of an SDC decision. Yet, Peri{i} himself
seems to concede that the men were not really volunteers when he said that “had they known where
they were going they would not have gone”.3834 In a subsequent statement made in 1996 at the 58th
Session of the SDC, Peri{i} also recalled that “we engaged a unit to regain @u}. […] We lost eight
men […]”.3835
1346. The voluntary engagement of the soldiers is further undermined by the evidence showing
that both the VJ’s 72nd Special Brigade and the Guards Brigades were ordered to deploy to the
3829
3830
3831
3832
3833
3834
3835
Ex. P505, Transcript of Nikola To{ovi} Deposition Hearing, 13 December 2008, T. 7; Ex. P507, Diary of Nikola
To{ovi}, 1994, p. 3. To{ovi} explained that Rajko Koprivica and Ratko Had`i} were the presidents of the
Vogo{}a and the Ilija{ municipalities, respectively. In relation to Krsmanovi}, To{ovi} stated that he was either
an active officer and engineer at Pretis, or the Assistant Commander of the SRK for logistics. Mirko Kraji{nik,
Mom~ilo Kraji{nik’s brother, was Chief of the Technical Services in Logistics in the Vogo{}a Brigade,
Ex. P505, Transcript of Nikola To{ovi} Deposition Hearing, 13 December 2008, T. 5, 18-19.
Ex. P505, Transcript of Nikola To{ovi} Deposition Hearing, 13 December 2008, T. 20; Ex. P506, Transcript of
Nikola To{ovi} Deposition Hearing, 14 December 2008, T. 81-82. See also Ex. P505, Transcript of Nikola
To{ovi} Deposition Hearing, 13 December 2008, T. 7-9, 16; Ex. P506, Transcript of Nikola To{ovi} Deposition
Hearing, 14 December 2008, T. 77-78.
Ex. P782, Stenographic Transcript of the 18th Session of the SDC, 7 February 1994, pp 56, 58, 60.
Ex. P782, Stenographic Transcript of the 18th Session of the SDC, 7 February 1994, pp 56-57, 59.
Ex. P782, Stenographic Transcript of the 18th Session of the SDC, 7 February 1994, p. 56.
Ibid.
Ex. P800, Stenographic Transcript of the 58th Session of the SDC, 21 November 1996, p. 7.
422
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area.3836 In addition, MP-418 expressly stated that he and his colleagues did not volunteer to go to
BiH.3837
4. Other Instances of Direct Involvement of the VJ in BiH
1347. The Trial Chamber has been presented with some evidence pertaining to the plans of further
use of the VJ units in BiH. According to MP-11, in 1994 plans were formulated to involve the 72nd
Brigade in Srebrenica, in coordination with VRS units, in order to boost morale of other units
taking part in combat there.3838 MP-11 testified that on several occasions Peri{i} visited the military
police battalion for special operations of the 72nd Special Brigade to discuss such potential
engagement.3839 Nonetheless, the battalion was never deployed to Srebrenica in 1994.3840 The same
witness heard, however, that members of the 72nd Brigade were deployed in the area of Srebrenica
in 1995.3841 However, this evidence remains uncorroborated hearsay and is not sufficient to
convince the Trial Chamber.
1348. On 13 May 1995, Peri{i} issued an order establishing that the 72nd Special Brigade and 63rd
Parachute Brigade, units of the SUC, should be ready for engagement in the Baranja region
(Croatia) at the request of the SVK 11th Corps Commander and with Peri{i}’s approval.3842
1349. Perišić addressed a telegram to Mladi} on 23 June 1995, referring to the following
assistance:
− One battalion of volunteers with about 400 men led by Colonel TRKULJA – checked for
contact with you. The Battalion is armed and battle ready.
− One battalion of about 200 men is being prepared, to come to you next week, around
Ku{i}.
− We are sending volunteers the same as we have done so far.
− An air group (three Kraguj aircraft) will relocate from Skelani to Sokolac, about 10 men
(provide them with a ready runway, one truckload of fuel and accommodation). They are
coming on Tuesday.3843
Sini{a Borovi}, who at the time was Peri{i}’s Chef de Cabinet and who forwarded the telegram to
the VRS Main Staff, testified that he was not aware whether the battalion under the command of
Trkulja was in fact dispatched from the VJ. However, he stated that had the battalion been sent to
3836
3837
3838
3839
3840
3841
3842
3843
See supra paras 1325-1327, 1331-1332.
MP-418, T. 3433 (private session).
MP-11, T. 8939-8941.
MP-11, T. 8942.
MP-11, T. 8944-8945.
MP-11, T. 8964-8965, 9018-9020.
Ex. P2755, Order from Peri{i} to Enhance RSK Combat-Readiness in Baranja Area, 13 May 1995, p. 1
Ex. P2729, Urgent Cable from Peri{i} to Mladi}, 23 June 1995.
423
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the VRS, his office would have received confirmation from the VRS Main Staff.3844 In the absence
of any such evidence, the Trial Chamber cannot make any finding as to whether these men were
sent to the VRS.
1350. Later that year, in September, Peri{i} suggested to have an urgent SDC meeting to discuss
the RS request for the deployment of 3 to 5 VJ brigades to stabilise the front in Northwest
Bosnia.3845
1351. According to Charles Kirudja’s confidential sources, in 1995, around 300-400 members of
the VJ 63rd Paratroops Command Brigade from Niš joined the VRS forces at the battle on Mt.
Majevica near Bijeljina to help them defend a communication tower.3846
5. Assistance in Communications and Electronic Data Transmissions
1352. The Prosecution submits that the VJ assisted the VRS by permitting use of their
communication centres and nodes located in Serbia and Montenegro, and by providing equipment
and technical expertise.3847 The Defence contends that VRS was responsible for the operation of its
own communications.3848 It acknowledges that the VRS utilised FRY communication hubs but
challenges any inference that such use was expressly permitted by the VJ or by Perišić.3849
1353. Milenko Jev|ević, who served as the Signals Battalion Commander of the VRS Drina
Corps, acknowledged that the VJ provided the VRS with access to “connecting pathways and the
available capacities of its communication channels at FRY stationary communications hubs”.3850
Similarly, Drago Čovilo, who served as the Chief of the Department for Operations and Staff
Affairs in the Sector for Communications, Information Technology and Electronic Warfare within
the VJ General Staff from 1993 to 1999, testified that while at no point in time “access or entry to
the VJ communications system was allowed”, communication hubs would be “used as an
intermediary radio relay station to ensure communication that went further”.3851 The
communication hubs used by the VRS Drina Corps were the Cer and Crni Vrh stations in Serbia
and the Stražbenica station in Montenegro.3852
3844
3845
3846
3847
3848
3849
3850
3851
3852
Sini{a Borovi}, T. 13999-14000, 14170.
Ex. P2716, VJ GS 1st Administration proposal to FRY President signed by Peri{i}, 15 September 1995, p. 1.
Ex. P475, Code Cable from Charles Kirudja to Akashi, 31 March 1995, para. 3; Charles Kirudja T. 2842-2843.
Prosecution Final Brief, paras 273-275.
Defence Final Brief, paras 771, 774.
Defence Final Brief, paras 772, 775.
Milenko Jev|evi}, T. 11118, 11121.
Drago Čovilo, T. 13872.
Milenko Jev|ević, T. 1111-11125, 11169-11170. See also Ex. P1246, IBK Request to the VJ Communications
Administration, 20 September 1994 (request by VRS East Bosnia Corps to activate radio relay route).
424
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1354. The Trial Chamber notes that Jev|ević testified that messages transmitted via these channels
were subject to encryption, and only decrypted at the final destination.3853 According to the witness,
the VJ did not have the code books used by individual VRS units to decode messages sent to
them.3854
1355. Jev|ević also testified that for the Krivaja 95 operation (Srebrenica), he used specific
technical equipment to encrypt written communications between the forward command post and the
Drina Corps command, as well as with subordinate VRS units.3855 Oral non-encrypted
communications among the various VRS units, e.g. between the Zvornik Brigade and the Bratunac
Brigade, went through the FRY stationary communication hubs, and took place on a ”regular
military communication line”.3856
1356. One witness testified that unlike the communications system, the radar system and the antiaircraft defence system of the VRS could operate independently of the VJ.3857 However, according
to him, it was logical that each system was better off when it was backed up by, and acted in
coordination with, the other system.3858 At the same time, the witness was shown a document
approved by Ratko Mladi} which provided instructions for coordination between the air forces
and/or the anti-aircraft defences of the VRS, VJ and SVK.3859 The witness testified that he never
saw any order or decision implementing these instructions.3860
1357. The Defence points out numerous requests by the VRS to the VJ for other communications
assistance which were unfulfilled.3861 Although the Trial Chamber does not contest that some of the
requests were not met by the VJ,3862 the record contains evidence showing that at times the VJ
General Staff did, in fact, provide assistance to the SVK and the VRS in other areas of
3853
3854
3855
3856
3857
3858
3859
3860
3861
3862
Milenko Jev|evi}, T. 11122-11123.
Milenko Jev|evi}, T. 11171.
Milenko Jev|evi}, T. 11135.
Milenko Jev|evi}, T. 11119, 11135-11141.
MP-5, T. 2438-2439 (private session), also mentioning an incident in which the anti-aircraft defence system of
the VRS brought down a French aircraft in 1995.
MP-5, T. 2454-2455 (private session).
MP-5, T. 2368-2369, 2372-2375 (partly private session); Ex. P395 (under seal), pp 1, 3, 9, providing for (i)
exchange of information on air surveillance among the operations centres of the air forces and/or the anti-aircraft
defences of the VRS, VJ and SVK; (ii) exchange of air controllers among the operations centres and command
posts of the air forces and/or the anti-aircraft defences of the VRS, VJ and SVK; and (iii) joint analyses of the
information by the commands of the air forces and/or the anti-aircraft defences of the VRS, VJ and SVK.
MP-05, T. 2450 (private session).
Defence Final Brief, para. 773, referring to e.g. Ex. P627, Response from the Cabinet of the Chief of the VJ
General Staff to the VRS Main Staff, 20 October 1993; Ex. P2176, Documents Regarding the Cooperation
Between VRS, SVK and VJ in April and May 1994.
See also supra paras 954-955, 1247.
425
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communication,
including
by
providing:
communications
equipment,3863
“jamming
capabilities”,3864 and repairs and maintenance of existing equipment.3865
1358. Based on the above evidence, the Trial Chamber is satisfied that the VRS used
communication hubs present in the FRY territory with the consent of the VJ and that Perišić
provided communication equipments and technical expertise to the VRS.
3863
3864
3865
Ex. P874, VJ General Staff Operations Sector Document, Periši} Handwritten Note, 19 October 1993. See
Ex. P2732, Documents Relating to a Request from D. Milo{evi} to the Chief of VJ General Staff, 28 July 1995;
Ex. P2769, Request from Mladi} to the Chief of VJ General Staff for Providing Means of Communications, 1
September 1995; Ex. P1254, VJ General Staff Internal Memo Regarding VRS Request for Assistance, 6
September 1995, p. 2; Ex. P2176, Documents Regarding the Cooperation Between VRS, SVK and VJ in April
and May 1994, p. 12.
Ex. P2851, Peri{i}'s Response to Mladi} Proposal that VJ Jam Radio Frequencies, 24, 30 December 1993.
Ex. P2742, Request from VRS Main Staff to the Chief of VJ General Staff for VRS Communications Facility
Materials, 15 October 1995; Ex. P2156, Memorandum on Co-ordination Between the VJ, VRS and SVK, 19
November 1993, p. 2.
426
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H. Peri{i}’s Relationship with Mladi}
1. Personal Relationship between Peri{i} and Mladi}
1359. During his suspect interview, Peri{i} stated that before he became the Chief of the VJ
General Staff he had only seen General Ratko Mladi} three times.3866 Peri{i} also asserted that, once
he became the Chief of the VJ General Staff, Mladi} maintained “a certain distance” from him
“because he knew very well that I was against any illicit actions”.3867 According to Peri{i}, this was
because “[t]he entire leadership of Republika Sprska knew that I was against any destruction of
buildings, against any […] use of force against the civilian population and so on”.3868 He further
claimed that “we did not talk all that much, so I could not really tell if he was lying to me or
deceiving me […] and we were not close enough for me to detect such a character trait”.3869
1360. Peri{i} also discussed his relationship with Mladi} in Vreme, a Belgrade weekly newspaper,
in a statement published on 2 January 1995.3870 Peri{i} stated that “Mladi} and I are acquaintances
and war comrades. Our relationship is utterly normal, that is a relationship of two professional
officers who are fighting against the physical extermination of their people”.3871
1361. General Ðorñe ]určin, the former Chief of Operations and Training of the VJ 1st Army from
1993 to 1998, testified that Peri{i}, Mladi} and ]určin were in the same group in the National
Defence School and ever since had known each other as colleagues.3872 ]určin described himself as
a “personal or family friend[…]” of General Ratko Mladi}, whom he had known for 32 years, and a
“pal” of Momčilo Peri{i}.3873 During his testimony, ]určin would not describe the extent of
Peri{i}’s relationship with Mladi} because he lacked “firsthand” knowledge, but, in his previous
witness interview, characterised them as “mates and close friends”.3874
3866
3867
3868
3869
3870
3871
3872
3873
3874
Ex. P815, Transcript of Interview with Periši}, 25 January 2004, p. 22.
Ex. P815, Transcript of Interview with Peri{i}, 25 January 2004, p. 23.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ex. P2880, Statement of Mom~ilo Peri{i} in the Weekly Newspaper Vreme, 2 January 1995.
Ex. P2880, Statement of Mom~ilo Peri{i} in the Weekly Newspaper Vreme, 2 January 1995. On 24 December
1993, in an official request from the VRS Main Staff to Peri{i}, Mladi} writes: “Dear friend, for the purpose of
jamming Ustasha radio communication, I would ask that you allocate the necessary jamming equipment […]”.
Ex. P2851, VJ CGS Peri{i} Response to Mladi} Request for Jamming Equipment with the Request Attached, 30
December 1993, p. 5. (Emphasis added).
Ðorñe ]určin, T. 4646, 4648.
Ðorñe ]určin, T. 4648.
]ur~in denied that the two bore the relationship of kum, a Serbo-Croat term referring to a “very valuable, dear
friend” who typically serves as a witness at the person’s wedding and thereafter gives the first names to the
couple’s children, Ðorñe ]určin, T. 4648-4649; Ex. P2216, Record of Interview of \or|e ]ur~in Before the
Investigative Judge of the War Crimes Chamber in Belgrade, 6 November 2007, p. 8.
427
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1362. Nikola To{ovi}, General Mladi}’s cousin and the Chief of Technical Services in Logistics in
the Vogo{}a Brigade, referred to Peri{i} and Mladi} as only “acquaintances”.3875
2. Peri{i}’s Support for Mladi}’s Selection as Commander of the VRS Main Staff
1363. The Trial Chamber reviewed an excerpt from General Ratko Mladi}’s notebook that
described a meeting held in Nevisinje, East Herzegovina, on 11 May 1992.3876 According to the
excerpt, the meeting was attended by Mladi}, Peri{i}, Vukan Brati}, the President of the Nevesinje
Municipality, and other military and political leaders from the region.3877 The excerpt attributed the
following comments to Peri{i} during the meeting: “Ninkovi} and I undertook an initiative with
Karadži} to come here[.] He [Mladi}] showed with his own example what a JNA officer should be
like. You have the right person, if you support him, you will get what you want”.3878
1364. On 12 May 1992, Mladi}, who was then a Lieutenant-General, was appointed Commander
of the VRS Main Staff by the Assembly of the Serbian People in BiH.3879
3. Peace Plans
1365. The evidence shows that Peri{i} and Milo{evi} attempted several times to convince Mladi}
to accept the peace plan. For example, on 12 August 1994, Peri{i} travelled to the VRS command
post to meet with Mladi}.3880 On that occasion, he conveyed a message from Slobodan Milo{evi},
asking Mladi} to reject the RS leadership and accept the Contact Group Plan.3881 According to an
excerpt from Mladi}’s diary, Peri{i} urged the acceptance of a peace plan by stating that Milo{evi}
was “asking that you [Mladi}] make a major turnabout in terms of politics so that the plan is
accepted”.3882 This proposal was refused.3883
3875
3876
3877
3878
3879
3880
3881
3882
3883
Ex. P505, Transcript of Nikola To{ovi} Deposition, 13 December 2008, p. 70.
Ex. P2938, Extract from Ratko Mladi}'s Notebook, 11 May 1992.
Ex. P2938, Extract from Ratko Mladi}'s Notebook, 11 May 1992, pp 2-13.
Ex. P2938, Extract from Ratko Mladi}'s Notebook, 11 May 1992, p. 8.
Ex. P188, Minutes of the 16th Session of the Assembly of the Serbian People in BiH, 12 May 1992, p. 2. See
Ex. P190, Decision on Formation of the Army of Serbian BiH, 12 May 1992, p. 1.
Ex. D344, Excerpt from Mladi}’s Notebook (meeting with Peri{i}), 12 August 1994.
Ex. D344, Excerpt from Mladi}’s Notebook (meeting with Peri{i}), 12 August 1994, p. 4. See Ex. D344, Excerpt
from Mladi}’s Notebook (meeting with Peri{i}), 12 August 1994, p. 2 (Peri{i} conveying the message that if the
RS accepts the peace plan, the FRY will continue to provide support to the VRS). See also Ex. D344, Excerpt
from Mladi}’s Notebook (meeting with Peri{i}), 12 August 1994, p. 3 (Peri{i} stating that the FRY leadership
has done “[…] everything to reason” with the RS leadership in order to convince them to accept the peace plan);
Petar [krbi}, T. 11753, stating that Peri{i} asked Mladi} and others not to recognize the authority of the VRS
leadership. The transcript of his testimony states that: “Q. It was written here in no uncertain terms that Slobodan
Milo{evi} was asking from you to reject the authority of the leadership of Republika Srpska. This is something
that General Peri{i} told you on this occasion; is that right? A. Yes, that's correct”, Petar [krbi}, T. 11753.
Ex. D344, Excerpt from Mladi}’s Notebook (meeting with Peri{i}), 12 August 1994, p. 4.
Ex. D344, Excerpt from Mladi}’s Notebook (meeting with Peri{i}), 12 August 1994, pp 7-10; Petar [krbi},
T. 11755.
428
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1366. On 20 September 1994, Peri{i} participated in another meeting during which the FRY
leadership attempted to convince Mladi} to stop the war and accept a peace plan.3884 According to
Mladi}’s diary, members of the FRY SDC attempted to persuade him to reject the RS leadership
because it had refused to accept a peace plan.3885 The efforts of the members of the FRY were
unsuccessful in this instance.3886
1367. During the SDC session of 2 November 1994, both Peri{i} and Milo{evi} expressed their
frustration that the RS leadership had refused to accept the Contact Group Plan.3887 Peri{i} stated
that Mladi}’s goals with respect to the resolution of the conflict were “unrealistic”3888 and that as a
result, his previous attempts to “persuade” Mladi} were unsuccessful.3889 He stated that that “I went
there on behalf of both presidents in order to persuade them subsequently about the pure military
facts, but to no avail”.3890 Peri{i} further stated that members of the RS leadership, including
Mladi}, could not be persuaded to accept the peace plan and that Mladi} “has been manipulated by
his politics and that is how he behaves”.3891 President Milo{evi} referred to the Bosnian Serbs’
decision to reject the Contact Group Plan “as a disastrous mistake”.3892 In response to General
Peri{i}’s recommendation that “we should invite our men from Bosnia and try to persuade them to
accept the plan[…]”,3893 Milo{evi} stated that “the Army [the VJ] is the sole factor that has
influence on them and you know very well that you cannot do anything there”.3894 Peri{i} then
stated that “at least we can invite them, and we can try to persuade those people in front of this
3884
3885
3886
3887
3888
3889
3890
3891
3892
3893
3894
Ex. D764, Excerpt from Mladi}’s Notebook, 20 September 1994, pp 11-13.
Ibid.
See Ex. D764, Excerpt from Mladi}’s Notebook, 20 September 1994, p. 18 (writing in his diary in response to
Milo{evi}’s efforts to convince him to stop the war, “oh what strong words”). The Defense argues that this line
suggests a lack of control because it illustrates the dismissive manner in which Mladi} treated the FRY
leadership. See Defense Final Brief, para. 878.
Ex. P779, Stenographic Transcript of the 28th Session of the SDC, 2 November 1994, pp 24-26.
Ex. P779, Stenographic Transcript of the 28th Session of the SDC, 2 November 1994, p. 28.
See Ex. P779, Stenographic Transcript of the 28th Session of the SDC, 2 November 1994, p. 29.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ex. P779, Stenographic Transcript of the 28th Session of the SDC, 2 November 1994, pp 23, 33. See Carl Bildt,
T. 14253-14254.
Ex. P779, Stenographic Transcript of the 28th Session of the SDC, 2 November 1994, p. 33 (emphasis added).
See also Ex. P779, Stenographic Transcript of the 28th Session of the SDC, 2 November 1994, p. 33 (Peri{i}
stating that another meeting should be held with the RS Leadership so that “we can try to bring them to
reason[…]”); Ex. P779, Stenographic Transcript of the 28th Session of the SDC, 2 November 1994, p. 34 (Peri{i}
stating that “I suggest we try and persuade them if we can still can do anything. Otherwise, they will face a
complete disaster. And it is not that they will face it, but such a situation will have dramatic consequences for
Serbian and Montenegrin peoples”); Ex. P779, Stenographic Transcript of the 28th Session of the SDC, 2
November 1994, p. 29 (Lili} suggesting that “[…] we should use our direct contacts in order to exert as much
pressure on those who can bring about the termination of this conflict”).
Ex. P779, Stenographic Transcript of the 28th Session of the SDC, 2 November 1994, p. 36.
429
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audience”.3895 Then, Milo{evi}, with the agreement of Lili} and Momir Bulatovi}, specifically
recommended that Peri{i} should contact Mladi} “so we can talk to him once more”.3896
1368. The evidence shows that another attempt to persuade Mladi} to accept a peace plan was
made by FRY leadership, particularly by Milo{evi}, during the SDC session of 24 January 1995.3897
1369. In addition, at the 42nd Session of the FRY SDC, held on 23 August 1995, members of the
SDC attempted again to persuade Mladi} to abandon the current RS leadership and support the
international peace process.3898 According to the SDC minutes, Peri{i} was present at this meeting
and participated in the efforts to persuade Mladi}.3899 Mladi}, however, repeatedly refused the
requests of the FRY to forsake the RS leadership and to endorse a peace plan. For instance, the
SDC minutes state that “having listened to the arguments tendered by President Milo{evi},
President Bulatovi}, President Lili}, and General Peri{i}, General Ratko Mladi} persisted with his
proposal”.3900 Moreover, Peri{i} also attempted to persuade Mladi} to support the peace process by
warning him of the “impending danger of Croatian aggression against Prevlaka and Eastern
Slovonia”.3901 The evidence demonstrates that any attempts made by Peri{i} and the FRY
leadership to persuade Mladi} at this meeting were unsuccessful.3902
4. Release of French Humanitarian Workers
1370. On 4 March 1995, the VRS detained four French nationals from the Pharmaciens Sans
Frontieres humanitarian organisation.3903 On 12 April 1995, a French military representative sent a
letter to Peri{i} expressing the notion that even though the VRS agents who were holding the
French humanitarian workers were not technically subordinate to the VJ General Staff, the
representative hoped that Peri{i} would nonetheless use his influence to help bring about their
release.3904
3895
3896
3897
3898
3899
3900
3901
3902
3903
3904
Ibid.
Ex. P779, Stenographic Transcript of the 28th Session of the SDC, 2 November 1994, p. 47.
Ex. P2783, Excerpt from Ratko Mladić’s notebook, 1995, p. 2, stating that “we have decided to use the plan of
the Contact Group […] the enclaves will wither away. The peace will dry them up, the war is keeping them
alive[…] you cannot allow Karad`i} and Kraji{nik to do as they like, you have to dictate the priorities to them”.
Ex. P713 Minutes from the 42nd Session of the SDC, 23 August 1995.
Ex. P713 Minutes from the 42nd Session of the SDC, 23 August 1995, p. 1.
Ex. P713, Minutes from the 42nd Session of the SDC, 23 August 1995, p. 3 (emphasis added).
See Ex. P713, Minutes from the 42nd Session of the SDC, 23 August 1995, p. 5
Ex. P713, Minutes from the 42nd Session of the SDC, 23 August 1995, pp 6-7.
MP-902, T. 14545-14546 (closed session); Ex. D510 (under seal); Dragan Vuk{i}, T. 12130-12131, 12135,
12137.
Ex. D510 (under seal) (emphasis in original). The Trial Chamber notes that the letter refers to an attached
document that requests the release of the French humanitarian organisation members. This document is not in
evidence.
430
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1371. According to Dragan Vuk{i}, the Chief of the VJ Administration for relations with foreign
armies and missions within the VJ from 1993 to 1997, Peri{i} played a “particularly significant and
delicate role” in discussions with Mladi} in order to obtain the release of the hostages3905 and that
“neither General Peri{i} nor I were ever in a position to tell General Mladi} or anyone else that they
had done something wrong”.3906 Nevertheless, Vuk{i} confirmed that “Peri{i} took steps” to ensure
that the four Frenchmen were ultimately released.3907
5. UNPROFOR Hostages
1372. On 26 and 27 May 1995, in response to the NATO forces’ air strikes on Pale earlier that
day, the VRS took approximately 400 UNPROFOR personnel as hostages and used some as human
shields to deter further air strikes.3908 Some hostages were later distributed across Bosnian Serb
territory to protect potential targets.3909
1373. By 9 June 1995, between 105 and 146 UNPROFOR hostages still had not been released.3910
Charles Kirudja, the Delegate of the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General in
Belgrade, testified that he met with Jovica Stani{i}, President Milo{evi}’s Special Envoy, who
travelled to Bosnia to meet with Mladi} in order to obtain the release of the UNPROFOR
hostages.3911
1374. Kirudja confirmed that Stani{i} and those who were conducting the operation “were under
instructions from both President Milo{evi} and General Peri{i} to do their utmost to obtain the
release of those additional three on a day that was also rainy with poor flight conditions”.3912
According to Kirudja, Stani{i} “undertook to pressure Mladi} to deblock the UN group and simply
let them go to their units”.3913 The crisis ended when Mladi} sent the remaining hostages by bus to
Ni{, where they were released to UNPROFOR.3914
3905
3906
3907
3908
3909
3910
3911
3912
3913
3914
Dragan Vuk{i}, T. 12131.
Dragan Vuk{i}, T. 12131-12132.
Dragan Vuk{i}, T. 12136.
Rupert Smith, T. 6337; Ex. P2348, Statement of Rupert Smith, 14 August 1996, para. 59.
Ex. P2348, Statement of Rupert Smith, 14 August 1996, para. 60; MP-409, T. 5705 (closed session).
Charles Kirudja, T. 2924; Ex. D32, Code Cable from Charles Kirudja to Akashi Regarding UNPROFOR
Hostage Crisis, 9 June 1995, para. 6; Ex. D33, Code Cable from Charles Kirudja to Akashi Regarding
UNPROFOR Hostage Crisis, 10 June 1995, p. 2.
Charles Kirudja, T. 2921; Ex. D32, Code Cable from Charles Kirudja to Akashi Regarding UNPROFOR
Hostage Crisis, 9 June 1995, paras 1, 9.
Charles Kirudja, T. 2924-2925; Ex. D32, Code Cable from Charles Kirudja to Akashi Regarding UNPROFOR
Hostage Crisis, 9 June 1995, para. 8.
Ex. D33, Code Cable from Charles Kirudja to Akashi Regarding UNPROFOR Hostage Crisis, 10 June 1995,
p. 3.
Charles Kirudja, T. 2934.
431
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6. Meeting between Perišić and Mladi} in Bosnia on 18 July 1995
1375. The Trial Chamber heard the testimony of Ned Krayishnik, a Canadian Serb who along with
Milan Le{i} and others established the Republika Sprska Humanitarian Organisation
(“Organisation”) in Hamilton, Ontario, Canada, in 1992.3915 Between 1992 and 1996, Krayishnik
and other members of the Organisation made five or six trips to the former Yugoslavia to provide
humanitarian aid to the Bosnian Serbs.3916
1376. On 14 July 1995, Krayishnik, along with other members of the Organisation, travelled to
Serbia and RS to deliver money to RS and, upon the request of General Mladi}, a medical scanner
to the Military Academy Hospital in Belgrade.3917 On 17 July 1995, the Organisation’s delegation
travelled to Han Pijesak in the BiH, where the VRS headquarters was located, approximately 27
kilometres from Srebrenica, in order to meet Mladi} and receive his appreciation for their
donations.3918 During the meeting, Mladi} congratulated himself on the “liberation of Srebrenica”
and for “solv[ing] our problems with Srebrenica”.3919 He stated that he hoped that “in the course of
the next day that @epa would be solved in the same way as the area of Srebrenica”.3920
1377. On 18 July 1995, the delegation arrived at a picnic area at Crna Rijeka,3921 where Generals
Peri{i}, Mladi} and Gvero were waiting to meet them.3922 The group met for a couple of hours.3923
Krayishnik stated that Mladi} and Gvero discussed the liberation of Srebrenica in the presence of
Peri{i} and that there was “a lot of joking around at lunch” and no signs of disagreement among the
generals.3924
7. Release of the French Pilots by the VRS
1378. On 30 August 1995, Frederic Chiffot and Jose Souvignet, the French crew of a NATO
Mirage 2000 aircraft (“French pilots”), were captured by the VRS after their aircraft was shot down
3915
3916
3917
3918
3919
3920
3921
3922
3923
Ned Krayishnik, T. 9464, 9468-9469.
Ned Krayishnik, T. 9470-9472.
Ned Krayishnik, T. 9491-9493, 9496-9497; Ex. P2794, Le{i} Photograph with Ned Krayishnik showing
Canadian Serb Delegation at Hotel, 16 July 1995.
Ned Krayishnik, T. 9536, 9483; 9538. See Ex. P2795, Map marked by Ned Krayishnik of Crna Rijeka’s
Location, 2 November 2009; Ex. P2796, Map marked by Ned Krayishnik of route from Belgrade through
Bijelina, 3 November 2009; Ex. P2797, Map marked by Ned Krayishnik of route from Zvornik to Crna Rijeka, 3
November 2009. According to the witness, Han Pijesak is located approximately 40 kilometers from Pale.
Ned Krayishnik, T. 9552; Ex. P2806, Le{i} Videotape of Mladi} and others in Belgrade, Han Piljesik and Crna
Rijeka, 16-18 July 1995 at 27 minutes and 19.4 seconds; Ex. P2807, Le{i} Videotape Transcript, 16-18 July
1995, p. 12.
Ned Krayishnik, T. 9550-9551; Ex. P2807, Le{i} Videotape Transcript, 16-18 July 1995, p. 12.
Ned Krayishnik, T. 9482-9483, 9559. The witness testified that Crna Rijeka is located in the outskirts of Han
Pijesak.
Ned Krayishnik, T. 9560, 9577; Ex. P2798, Le{i} Photo of Gvero and Canadian Serbs in Crna Rijeka, 18 July
1995; Exs P2799-P2805, Le{i} Photographs of Peri{i} with Mladi} and others in Crna Rijeka, 18 July 1995.
Ned Krayishnik, T. 9577.
432
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over Pale by the VRS’s anti-aircraft defence system.3925 In the following months, Peri{i} organised
a series of meetings between international representatives and Mladi} and others in RS to obtain the
release of the French pilots.3926
1379. The first meeting, which occurred while NATO temporarily halted air-strikes against
Bosnian Serb military targets around Sarajevo,3927 was between UNPROFOR Commander General
Bernard Janvier and Mladi} in Zvornik on 1 September 1995.3928 The Trial Chamber was presented
with testimony that Peri{i} helped to broker this meeting.3929 The Trial Chamber also reviewed an
excerpt from Mladi}’s diary, which described a meeting between Mladi} and General Bertrand de la
Presle, UNPROFOR Force Commander, at Mili}i, in RS, on 22 September 1995.3930 On 27 October
1995, the VJ also facilitated passage for de la Presle, to travel to RS to meet with General Tolimir
and President Karadži} about the negotiations for the release of the French pilots.3931 During the
month of November, Peri{i} made “some serious efforts and did everything in his power to get the
pilots released”.3932 Finally, the Trial Chamber reviewed an excerpt from Mladi}’s diary, describing
a meeting between de la Presle, Mladi}, Tolimir and Davidovi} in Jela on 3 December 1995.3933
1380. On 10 December 1995, at the Jela Restaurant in the Romanija plateau, FRY and VRS
leaders met to discuss negotiations for the release of the crew to the French government.3934 The
FRY was represented by President Zoran Lili}, Peri{i} and Aleksandar Dimitrijevi}, Chief of
Administration for Security of the General Staff, whereas the VRS group included Mladi}, Gvero,
Tolimir, [krbi}, Milovanovi} and \uki}.3935 Prior to the meeting, the entire VRS Main Staff
delegation, including Mladi}, denied having any knowledge of the fate of the French pilots.3936
1381. At the beginning of the meeting, President Lili} stated that “[t]he French are convinced that
the pilots are here […]. Today is the last day for us to tell France what we know about the pilots
[…] We will sign, Momo [General Peri{i}] and I, [so] that nobody will be extradited to the Hague
3924
3925
3926
3927
3928
3929
3930
3931
3932
3933
3934
3935
3936
Ned Krayishnik, T. 9579.
Dragan Vuk{i}, T. 12192; Carl Bildt, T. 14314; MP-5, T. 2438-2439 (private session).
Dragan Vuk{i}, T. 12185.
Ex. D368, Code Cable from Annan to Akashi, 6 September 1995, p. 4.
Dragan Vuk{i}, T. 12179-12182; Ex. D368, Code Cable from Annan to Akashi, 6 September 1995, p. 4.
Dragan Vuk{i}, T. 12181, 12185.
Ex. D767, Excerpt from Ratko Mladi}'s Notebook, 22 September 1995, p. 1.
Ex. P2708VRS Intelligence Cable Regarding Meeting with UNPROFOR General De La Presle, 27 October
1995, pp 1-2; Dragan Vuk{i}, T. 12189 (private session); Ex. D369, VJ General Staff Letter, 27 October 1995.
Dragan Vuk{i}, T. 12193.
Ex. D772, Excerpt from Mladić Diary, 3 December 1995, p. 1.
Petar [krbi}, T. 11759, 11788-11789, 11792; Ex. D346, Excerpt of Mladi}'s Diary (Meeting with Lili} and
Peri{i}, 10 December 1995), p. 1.
Ibid.
Petar [krbi}, T. 11788.
433
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Tribunal”.3937 For the first half of the meeting, Mladi} still denied all knowledge of the French
pilots, but later admitted that the pilots were in his custody.3938 Once Mladi} conceded that the
pilots were in his custody, there was considerable debate among the participants of the meeting as
to the appropriate course of action. 3939 During this debate, according to an excerpt from Mladi}’s
notebook, Peri{i} advocated for the release of the French pilots. He argued that “handing over the
pilots prevents the division of the Serbian ethnic entity”.3940 However, despite Peri{i}’s arguments,
no decision with respect to the appropriate course of action was made immediately after his
comments. [krbi} subsequently recommended to Mladi} that the pilots be released to the FRY
instead of France or Russia, so that the FRY could be a mediator in their release “to raise its image
in the world”.3941 Mladi} then agreed that the pilots would be handed over to the French
Government through the mediation of the FRY.3942
1382. On 11 December 1995, at the Batajnica military airbase near Belgrade, Peri{i} organised a
meeting between General Jean-Philippe Douin, the Chief of Staff of the French Armed Forces, and
Mladi}, accompanied by Tolimir and Gvero, in order to release the French pilots to Douin.3943
According to Vuk{i}, Douin and Mladi} initially refused to meet each other. In particular, Douin
refused to speak to Mladi} because he was accused of war crimes.3944 Peri{i} served as a mediator
in order to help facilitate the talks.3945 Vuk{i} testified that Perišić’s actions were instrumental
“[…]in the simple act of getting two men into the same room”.3946 Periši} played a decisive role in
these conversations, according to Vuk{i}, Peri{i}:
[…]was the only person who could influence his colleague, the Chief of General Staff of the French
army, in order for him to understand that the situation he was in was considerably different from what
he had expected. On the other hand, he could influence General Mladi} in order for him to understand
that it was not a question of his vanity.3947
1383. Peri{i} led Douin to a room to meet Mladi} to begin discussions that lasted 30 hours nonstop under “tense” conditions.3948 Mladi} initially refused to tell Douin whether the pilots were alive
3937
3938
3939
3940
3941
3942
3943
3944
3945
3946
3947
3948
Petar [krbi}, T. 11927-11928; Ex. D346, Excerpt of Mladi}'s Diary (Meeting with Lili} and Peri{i}, 10
December 1995), p. 1.
Petar [krbi}, T. 11789. [krbi} stated that during the discussion, the collegium asked why Mladi} did not inform
them that he had custody of the pilots, but that he did not answer and instead asked them what they should do
with the pilots.
Petar [krbi}, T. 11789-11795.
Ex. D346, Excerpt of Mladi}'s Notebook (Meeting with Lili} and Peri{i}), 10 December 1995, p. 4.
Petar [krbi}, T. 11790.
Ibid.
Dragan Vuk{i}, T. 12194-12195; MP-901, T. 14554 (closed session).
Dragan Vuk{i}, T. 12197-12198.
Dragan Vuk{i}, T. 12193.
Dragan Vuk{i}, T. 12200.
Dragan Vuk{i}, T. 12208-12209.
Dragan Vuk{i}, T. 12197-12198; MP-901, T. 14557-14559 (closed session); MP-902, 14540 (closed session).
434
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or dead.3949 Finally, the negotiations concluded with the release of the pilots to Douin, in Zvornik
on 12 December 1995.3950 According to Vuk{i} and MP-902, Peri{i} made “decisive” contributions
to furthering the release of the pilots, which led them to conclude that he was committed to the
peace.3951 In addition, Peri{i}’s role as a mediator in the release of the French pilots is also
mentioned in Exibit D371, which states that:
[…]the military attaché has witnessed how efficient the role of the Yugoslav Army was, under the
guidance of the Chief of the General Staff, in resolving sensitive problems in connection with the
Blue Helmets who had been taken prisoner or detained in May and June 1995, as well as with the
crew of the French aircraft[.]3952
1384. On 12 December 1995, in exchange for the RS release of the French pilots, President Lili}
signed an agreement in which the FRY pledged a series of measures including its guarantee “that no
citizen of [RS]shall be handed over by them to be called to account before the International Court in
The Hague”.3953 Borovi}, the Chef de Cabinet of the Chief of the VJ General Staff, recalled that the
agreement, which was not signed by RS leadership, was issued by the Office of the VJ General
Staff but bears the stamp of the President’s Office because they had no other stamp available.3954
According to Carl Bildt, the former European Union Co-Chairman of the International Conference
on the former Yugoslavia (ICFY), French President Jacques Chirac conditioned the signing of the
Dayton Peace Agreement of 14 December 1995 on the release of the French pilots.3955
8. Peri{i}’s Attendance at Darko Mladi}’s Wedding in July 1997
1385. The Trial Chamber reviewed videotape footage which was recorded at the wedding of
Darko Mladi}, Ratko Mladi}’s son, on 21 June 1997, which Peri{i} attended.3956 It shows Peri{i}
entering a home and speaking with Ratko Mladi} and other wedding attendants. He is then seen
standing up from a table in the center of the room where Ratko Mladi}, members of his family and
others were sitting and enjoying live music.3957
3949
3950
3951
3952
3953
3954
3955
3956
3957
Dragan Vuk{i}, T. 12203-12205; MP-901, T. 14559 (closed session); Ex. D370, Excerpt from Ratko Mladi}'s
Notebook, 11 December 1995.
Dragan Vuk{i}, T. 12206-12207. See also Vladimir Rodi}, T. 14234.
Dragan Vuk{i}, T. 12208-12210; MP-902, T. 14545 (closed session); Ex. D371, Letter from Embassy of France
in Belgrade, 13 December 1995, p. 1.
Ex. D371, Letter from Embassy of France in Belgrade, 13 December 1995. See also Ex. D510 (under seal); MP901, T. 14559, 14561, 14565-14566.
Ex. P2709, Agreement between the FRY and the RS Leadership on Releasing the French Pilots, 12 December
1995, p. 2.
Sini{a Borovi}, T. 14034-14035; Ex. P2709, Agreement between the FRY and the RS Leadership on Releasing
the French Pilots, 12 December 1995.
Carl Bildt, T. 14314.
Ex. P2784, Video of Wedding of Darko Mladić.
Ex. P2784, Video of Wedding of Darko Mladi} (20 minutes, 50 seconds, 27 minutes, 54 seconds, 46 minutes, 55
seconds).
435
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9. Peri{i}’s Visit to Mladi} at the Rajac Facility in July 1997
1386. In late July 1997, on a weekend morning, Peri{i} visited Mladi} at a VJ facility at Rajac.3958
The Rajac facility, which provided “rest and recreation” for VJ officers and their family members,
was located on a mostly uninhabited small mountain, approximately one and a half kilometres away
from the nearest village and included a hotel with lodging for thirty persons, three small weekend
homes, athletic fields and a restaurant.3959 Mladi} and his entourage stayed at the facility for over a
month under conditions of secrecy so that the public would not learn of his whereabouts.3960
General ]určin provided “fatherly advice” to those individuals present at the Rajac facility to not
disclose any information regarding Mladi}’s visits because there were people “who wanted to give
him in, in exchange for some money[…]”.3961 Milan Gunj, the manager of the Rajac Hotel, stated
that shortly before Mladi}’s arrival, the hotel was renovated and that during Mladi}’s stay no one
outside of his entourage stayed there.3962 He also testified that for the first few days, Mladić and his
entourage solely used the food and drink they had brought with them.3963 As their supplies
decreased, they gave Gunj money so that he could buy what was needed at the market.3964 Very
soon, however, they started relying mainly on provisions coming from the VJ that Gunj himself
would pick up either from the Topčider warehouse or from the central warehouse in Belgrade.3965
1387. ]určin, who was visiting Mladi} at the Rajac facility for the second time that month,
testified that he coincidentally encountered Peri{i} in a parked car in a non-parking zone outside of
the facility and eventually persuaded Peri{i} to visit the Rajac facility.3966 According to ]určin,
Peri{i}, who was traveling without security and dressed in civilian clothes, was on his way to
Belgrade after visiting his mother in Ko{tuni}i.3967 At Rajac, Peri{i} had a conversation and played
chess with Mladi} before he departed for Belgrade in the afternoon.3968
10. Peri{i}’s Visit to Mladi} at the VJ Command Post in Stragari in the Autumn of 1997
1388. In the early autumn of 1997, Peri{i} visited Mladi} at the VJ command post in Stragari,
which was used for training and included a one-story administration building, a couple of small
3958
3959
3960
3961
3962
3963
3964
3965
3966
3967
3968
Ðorñe ]určin, T. 4666-4667.
Milan Gunj, T. 3869; Ðorñe ]určin, T. 4650.
Ðorñe ]určin, 4676-4677; Milan Gunj, T. 3791-3792.
Ðorñe ]určin, T. 4676-4677.
Milan Gunj, T. 3864.
Milan Gunj, T. 3782.
Milan Gunj, T. 3783.
Milan Gunj, T. 3782-3783.
Ðorñe ]určin, T. 4658, 4669.
Ðorñe ]určin, T. 4669.
Ibid.
436
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houses/huts for personnel and other facilities.3969 The facility was gated with a duty officer to
restrict access and was located approximately 70 to 100 kilometres from Belgrade.3970 According to
]určin, after the end of the war in Bosnia, Mladi} stayed at the Stragari facility “on and off” and
“would spend some time [there] and then [would] go back home or [to] some other place”.3971
]určin stated that he, Peri{i} and Mladi} met in the mid-morning and walked through the woods,
played games and had lunch.3972
11. Peri{i}’s Visit to Mladi} at the Rajac Facility in February 1998
1389. Gunj testified that Peri{i} again visited Mladi} at the Rajac facility during one day in late
January or early February of 1998.3973 Outside of the facility’s meeting hall, Gunj spoke briefly
with Peri{i}, who requested that Gunj ensure that the meeting did not become public.3974 During this
visit, Gunj again provided food and everything that was necessary for him to stay there for a few
days.3975
3969
3970
3971
3972
3973
3974
3975
Ðorñe ]určin, T. 4651, 4674.
Ðorñe ]určin, T. 4651; Milan Gunj, T. 3765.
Ðorñe ]určin, T. 4670.
Ðorñe ]určin, T. 4674-4675.
Milan Gunj, T. 3787, 3792-3793 (private session).
Milan Gunj, T. 3793 (private session).
Milan Gunj, T. 3788.
437
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I. Peri{i}’s Access to Information
1. Background
1390. The gathering and exchange of current and reliable information regarding the conflict in
Croatia and BiH remained a significant task of the VJ throughout Perišić’s tenure as Chief of the
General Staff of the VJ.3976 Miodrag Simić, Chief of the 1st Administration within the VJ from
November 1994, testified that it was in “the interest of the [VJ] for the sake of its security to be
constantly informed of what was going on in that area”.3977 The 1995 Work Plan of the VJ
introduces the priority task of “monitor[ing] and assess[ing] the military-political and security
situation in the surrounding area, primarily in the crisis areas of the country and the areas of the
seceded republic where there are hostilities, ensuring prompt and reliable reports for relevant
measures to be taken with respect to [VJ] [combat readiness] and the defence of the FRY”.3978
1391. There were multiple channels within the VJ through which information was collected and
processed before it was reported to Perišić. As described previously, organs subordinated to the
Chief of the VJ General Staff included the Sector for Operations and Staff Affairs, the Intelligence
Administration, the Security Administration and the Information and Moral Department.3979 Perišić
had operative lines of communication with his subordinates in the various units.3980 Moreover,
Perišić had different channels of communication outside of the VJ - with the President of the FRY,
the President of Serbia, the President of Montenegro, and with the FRY MUP.3981 Perišić’s office
received on average between 50 and 300 documents daily.3982
1392. Collegium meetings of the VJ General Staff were held weekly and facilitated the timely
interaction and exchange of intelligence between its relevant organs.3983 It would begin with
briefings by the heads of the Intelligence Administration, the Security Administration and the
3976
3977
3978
3979
3980
3981
3982
3983
See Ex. D202, VJ General Staff Work Plan for 1995 by Chief of the VJ General Staff 1st Administration, 22
December 1994, p. 5; Ex. D358, Letter from Peri{i} to Slobodan Milo{evi}, 17 December 1993; Miodrag Simić,
T. 10341.
Miodrag Simić, T. 10341.
Ex. D202, VJ General Staff Work Plan for 1995 by Chief of the VJ General Staff 1st Administration, 22
December 1994, p. 5; Miodrag Simić, T. 9972.
See supra paras 214-219.
Siniša Borović, T. 13907; Miodrag Simić, T. 9939-9940. See also Ex. D195, First Organisational Chart of the VJ
General Staff, 15 June 1993.
Siniša Borović, T. 13907, 13919-13920, 13923-13925. For the reports Perišić received from the FRY MUP – see
Miodrag Simi}, T. 10335.
Siniša Borović, T. 13911-13913; Ex. P727, Order from Office of Chief of General Staff on Organisation and
Method of Work of the Chief of the General Staff and VJ Supreme Command Staff, 15 October 1993, p. 1,
ordering that mail check is to be done twice daily.
Siniša Borović, T. 13930.
438
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Operational Staff Sector.3984 The Trial Chamber notes that an assessment of the state of FRY
security and relevant intelligence was a standing item on the agenda.3985
1393. Perišić also received coded telegrams from the FRY missions abroad. In the words of
Borovi}, “the 2nd Administration also received such information, but we always double-checked
that we had actually received the same telegrams”.3986
2. Activities and Reports of Relevant VJ Organs
(a) Operations Centre
1394. Within the 1st Administration of the General Staff, the Operations Centre collected and
analysed information received on a 24-hours basis from lower units deployed in the FRY and from
other federal organs within the FRY.3987 This information was processed based on its relevance and
importance and included in daily reports sent to the Chief of General Staff.3988 Borović, Chef de
Cabinet from November 1994, confirmed that Perišić received these daily reports.3989 The
Operations Centre maintained communication also with the relevant operative centres of the SVK
3984
3985
3986
3987
3988
3989
Siniša Borović, T. 13932; Miodrag Simić, T. 9981; Branko Gajić, T. 10813. See e.g. Ex. P2207, Transcript of
the Collegium of the Chief of the VJ General Staff, 4 December 1995; Ex. P727, Order from Office of Chief of
General Staff on Organisation and Method of Work of the Chief of the General Staff and VJ Supreme Command
Staff, 15 October 1993, p. 5. The record contains many transcripts of the Collegium meetings – see Ex. P2193,
Transcript of the Collegium of the Chief of the VJ General Staff, 15 September 1997; Ex. P2194, Transcript of
the Collegium of the Chief of the VJ General Staff, 13 September 1995; Ex. P2195, Transcript of the Collegium
of the Chief of the VJ General Staff, 14 September 1995; Ex. P2196, Transcript of the Collegium of the Chief of
the VJ General Staff, 18 September 1995; Ex. P2197, Transcript of the Collegium of the Chief of the VJ General
Staff, 28 October 1995; Ex. P2198, Transcript of the Collegium of the Chief of the VJ General Staff, 2 October
1995; Ex. P2199, Transcript of the Collegium of the Chief of the VJ General Staff, 6 October 1995; Ex. P2200,
Transcript of the Collegium of the Chief of the VJ General Staff, 9 October 1995; Ex. P2201, Transcript of the
Collegium of the Chief of the VJ General Staff, 19 October 1995; Ex. P2202, Transcript of the Collegium of the
Chief of the VJ General Staff, 30 October 1995; Ex. P2203, Transcript of the Collegium of the Chief of the VJ
General Staff, 6 November 1995; Ex. P2204, Transcript of the Collegium of the Chief of the VJ General Staff,
18 September 1995; Ex. P2205, Transcript of the Collegium of the Chief of the VJ General Staff, 23 October
1995; Ex. P2206, Transcript of the Collegium of the Chief of the VJ General Staff, 13 November 1995;
Ex. P2207, Transcript of the Collegium of the Chief of the VJ General Staff, 4 December 1995; Ex. P2208,
Transcript of the Collegium of the Chief of the VJ General Staff, 13 September 1995; Ex. P2209, Transcript of
the Collegium of the Chief of the VJ General Staff, 14 September 1995, 29 December 1995; Ex. P2210,
Transcript of the Collegium of the Chief of the VJ General Staff, 9 October 1995; Ex. P2211, Transcript of the
Collegium of the Chief of the VJ General Staff, 19 October 1995; Ex. P2212, Transcript of the Collegium of the
Chief of the VJ General Staff, 30 October 1995; Ex. P2213, Transcript of the Collegium of the Chief of the VJ
General Staff, 6 November 1995; Ex. P2214, Transcript of the Collegium of the Chief of the VJ General Staff of
18 September 1995, 29 December 1995; Ex. P2215, Transcript of the Collegium of the Chief of the VJ General
Staff, 23 October 1995.
Siniša Borović, T. 13935; Mladen Mihajlović, T. 3883, 3956.
Sini{a Borovi}, T. 13918. The record contains many examples of such telegrams sent, inter alia, to Perišić – see
e.g. Exs P852-P857 (all under seal); Ex. P1832, FRY Diplomatic Cable, 26 May 1995; Ex. P2855 (under seal).
Miodrag Simi}, T. 9968, 10011.
Miodrag Simi}, T. 10010. The information gathered from all organs was based on a 24 hour period (from 06:00
the previous day until 06:00 the next day), and was processed into a report reflecting what happened the previous
day. This information involved all events affecting the security of the FRY that occurred on land, in the water
space, and in the air-space, Miodrag Simi}, T. 10009.
Siniša Borović, T. 13915.
439
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and VRS.3990 In his OTP interview, Perišić stated that the Operations Centre was used to monitor
the situation in inter alia Croatia and the BiH, and that the “update level” for these territories was
high.3991
1395. In addition, in April 1994, Perišić created an Operations Duty Team within the 1st
Administration and tasked it with “monitoring and assessing […] the situation in the VJ and the
armed forces of the neighbouring countries”.3992 It consisted of personnel from the Operations
Centre
of
the
3993
Administration.
1st
Administration,
the
Security
Administration and
the
Information
Information regarding military activities in Croatia and BiH was also supplied
through communication lines the Operations Duty Team maintained with their counterparts in the
SVK and VRS Main Staff.3994 The Operations Duty Team prepared daily operational reports
including inter alia a detailed description of the SVK and the VRS military activities, which were
sent to Perišić.3995
(b) Intelligence Administration
1396. Subsumed within the Sector for Operational and Staff Affairs, the 2nd Administration, or
Intelligence Administration, operated round the clock and produced daily bulletins on relevant
intelligence information, including on military activities and plans of the VRS, SVK, ABiH, HV
and NATO.3996 The bulletins would be sent to Perišić.3997 Moreover, the Chief of the Intelligence
Administration would report up-to-date information directly to Perišić by visiting his office.3998 The
Administration would also provide regular reports to the Operations Centre.3999
3990
3991
3992
3993
3994
3995
3996
3997
3998
3999
Miodrag Simić, T. 9968-9969. See infra section VI.I.3.(c).
Ex. P815, Transcript of Interview with Periši}, 25 January 2004, pp 18-19. See Miodrag Simić, T. 10011;
Ex. P860, VJ General Staff Report Regarding Status and Activities in the Former Republic of Bosnia, RS, 24
May 1994; Ex. P861, VJ General Staff Report Regarding Status and Activities in the Former Republic of Bosnia,
RS, 26 May 1994; Ex. P862, VJ General Staff Report Regarding Status and Activities in the Former Republic of
Bosnia, RS, 27 May 1994.
Ex. P859, Order by Chief of General Staff to Form a Duty Operations Team, 12 April 1994, p. 3.
Ibid.
Ex. P2177, Letter from VJ General Staff to SVK Main Staff, 11 May 1994; Ex. P2847, VJ General Staff Memo
on Deployment of Forces in Corridor, 11 May 1994, wherein the VJ General Staff asked (using the form
“please”) that the VRS ensure “phone contact through a secure line between the VJGS Duty Team Leader and
yours, every day at 06:00 hrs and 20:00 hrs”.
Miodrag Simić, T. 10012, 10033 (private session); Branko Gajić, T. 10814-10815. See Ex. P859, Order by Chief
of General Staff to Form a Duty Operations Team, 12 April 1994, p. 5; Ex. P860, VJ General Staff Report
Regarding Status and Activities in the Former Republic of Bosnia, RS, 24 May 1994; Ex. P861, VJ General Staff
Report Regarding Status and Activities in the Former Republic of Bosnia, RS, 26 May 1994; Ex. P862, VJ
General Staff Report Regarding Status and Activities in the Former Republic of Bosnia, RS, 27 May 1994.
Siniša Borović, T. 13915-13916, 13918-13919; Miodrag Simić, T. 10012.
Miodrag Simić, T. 10335; Ex. D200, Chief of the VJ General Staff Order on the Competences of Organisational
Units of the VJ General Staff in Peacetime, 25 July 1994.
Siniša Borović, T. 13915-13916, 13918-13919.
See e.g. Ex. D212, VJ General Staff 2nd Administration Report, 1 May 1995; Ex. D213, VJ General Staff 2nd
Administration Report, 2 May 1995; Ex. P2600, Intelligence Report from General Staff to the Operational
Centre of VJ, 1 July 1995; Ex. P2601 Intelligence Report from General Staff to the Operational Centre of VJ, 2
440
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1397. The sources of the bulletins comprised both regular reports from the SVK and VRS Main
Staff4000 and other sources connected to NATO or UNPROFOR.4001
1398. The Trial Chamber has been presented with a number of intelligence bulletins produced by
the VJ Intelligence Administration and it is satisfied of the detailed, up-to-date nature of the
information as well as of the variety of sources employed in those bulletins.4002 Sini{a Borovi}
testified that among the different types of information the VJ General Staff received, the highest
degree of authenticity and reliability was given to that provided by the Intelligence
Administration.4003
1399. Finally, the Intelligence Administration played a significant role in maintaining close
coordination and interaction between the VJ General Staff intelligence apparatus and their
counterparts in the VRS and the SVK.4004
(c) Security Administration
1400. The Security Administration produced a number of reports gathering counter-intelligence
information, which were circulated within the VJ.4005 A daily report was sent to the Chief of the
Security Administration and members of his collegium.4006 An extract of the daily report was sent
to the VJ General Staff Operative Centre.4007 A monthly report was produced and submitted to the
VJ General Staff and the SDC.4008 The VJ General Staff could also seek information from the
Security Administration on specific issues.4009 Gajić, who during the time relevant to the Indictment
served as the Chief of the Counter-Intelligence Department at the Security Administration of the VJ
General Staff, testified that this was done frequently.4010
4000
4001
4002
4003
4004
4005
4006
4007
4008
4009
4010
July 1995; Ex. P2602, Intelligence Report from General Staff to the Operational Centre of VJ, 3 July 1995;
Ex. D214, VJ General Staff 2nd Administration Intelligence Report, 7 July 1995; Ex. D215, VJ General Staff 1st
Administration Daily Operations Report, 9 July 1995; Ex. D216, VJ General Staff 2nd Administration
Intelligence Report, 9 July 1995; Ex. P2610, Intelligence Report from General Staff to the Operational Centre of
VJ, 26 July 1995.
See infra paras 1429-1432.
See e.g. Ex. P1047, SVK Main Staff Document, 10 September 1994; Ex. P1854, VRS Report to VJ Security
Administration, 11 August 1995; Ex. D212, VJ General Staff 2nd Administration Report, 1 May 1995, pp 1-2;
Ex. D213, VJ General Staff 2nd Administration Report, 2 May 1995.
See supra fn. 3999.
Sini{a Borovi}, T. 13955. The witness used the following comparison about the reliability of the sources: if one
grades the Security Administration information with 3, the media information would receive 0.25.
Rade Orlić, T. 5737; Ex. P1622, Proposal of the VJ General Staff to the VRS Main Staff on Secondment of the
Personnel, 23 November 1994.
Miodrag Simić, T. 10012.
Branko Gajić, T. 10813-10814.
Branko Gajić, T. 10814; Miodrag Simić, T. 10021-10023; Siniša Borović, T. 13918.
Branko Gajić, T. 10815.
Ibid.
Ibid.
441
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1401. The Security Administration had also contacts with foreign military diplomatic
representatives, mostly from the Western countries, accredited in Belgrade.4011 These contacts were
usually maintained by the Chief of the Security Administration who would, if need be, inform
Perišić about any important topics discussed with them.4012
1402. It was routine for the Intelligence Administration and Security Administration to share
information with each other.4013
1403. The Trial Chamber notes that the Security Administration obtained information regarding
the military activities of the SVK and the VRS directly from their counterparts in these armies.4014
(d) Information Administration
1404. The Information Administration was tasked with collecting and assessing the veracity of
media information of interest to the VJ before transmitting it to the VJ General Staff with “what one
may call a press clipping”.4015 Peri{i} himself during a telephone conversation with Slobodan
Milo{evi}, confirmed that he watched the TV news.4016
1405. According to Borović, the VJ never trusted the media treating the latter as being prone to
propaganda and sensationalism.4017 Although the VJ General Staff considered those sources, it
always tasked the Intelligence Administration to verify any information coming from the media.4018
3. Information Flow between VJ, SVK and VRS
(a) Coordination Meetings
1406. As discussed earlier, the high representatives of the SVK, VRS and the VJ held monthly
coordination meetings in Belgrade in order to exchange data and strengthen the cooperation
between these armies.4019
1407. On 27 September 1993, Perišić issued the following tasks to the branch section of the VJ
General Staff:
4011
4012
4013
4014
4015
4016
4017
Branko Gaji}, T. 10872-10873.
Branko Gaji}, T. 10873.
Branko Gajić, T. 10792.
Branko Gajić, T. 10852; Rade Rašeta, T. 5912. See infra paras 1425-1427.
Siniša Borović, T. 13918, 13956. See also Petar [krbi}, T. 11875-11876, 11879-11881, 11884-11885, testifying
that during his tenure in the G[ VJ – in the period of pre mid-1993, such bulletins would include reports from
television stations such as BBC, Sky News, CNN, international radio like the Voice of America as well as print
media or news agencies including Reuters and the Associated Press.
Ex. P1366, Intercepted Conversation, 1 May 1995, pp 3-4.
Sini{a Borovi}, T. 13956.
442
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[…]Ensure continuous, secure and protected communication with the G[ [SVK] and the G[
VRS.4020
[…]Ensure the inflow of as much verified intelligence as possible on the situation and condition in
the [RSK] and [RS] and their surroundings, with assessments of the effect of that situation on the
degree of threat to the [FRY].4021
1408. Among the participants in those meetings were Perišić, Ratko Mladi}, Mile Novakovi} and
subsequently Milan Čeleketi} or Du{an Lon~ar.4022 Items of their agenda concerned “exchange of
information and harmonisation of positions between the VJ, VRS, and SVK”4023 including, inter
alia, the issues of activity and assessment of the enemy, the results of the combat operations and
activities of the SVK and VRS forces, the security situation in the RSK and RS, logistical requests
and personnel problems.4024
1409. As an example, the Trial Chamber notes that the issue of “operative-strategic disposition of
SVK troops” was discussed during the May 1994 coordination meeting.4025 In the words of one
witness:
Descriptions such as this one contributed to the competent officers in the [G[ VJ] and [VRS]
getting a clear picture and full information about the situation and about the problems that existed,
and, of course, the action that [the SVK] would take and the tasks that [the SVK] would
implement in the forthcoming period, because that was useful for them in terms of their own
troops and their own tasks.4026
4018
4019
4020
4021
4022
4023
4024
4025
4026
Sini{a Borovi}, T. 13956.
See supra paras 943-945. See also infra para. 1411.
Ex. P878, Tasks set by Perišić at the Supreme Command Staff meeting of 27 September 1993, 26 October 1993,
p. 3; Ex. P1626 Official Note from the Meeting of the VJ Supreme Command Staff, 27 September 1993, p. 5.
Ex. P878, Tasks set by Perišić at the Supreme Command Staff meeting of 27 September 1993, 26 October 1993,
p. 4. See Ex. P1626, Official Note from the Meeting of the VJ Supreme Command Staff, 27 September 1993,
p. 5.
Ex. P2175, Documents Regarding Meetings between SVK, VRS and VJ Chiefs of Staff, fall 1993, Doc ID 06305894; Ex. P2156, Memorandum on Co-ordination Between the VJ, VRS and SVK, 19 November 1993;
Ex. P317, Aide Mémoire of the Chief of the Office of the SVK Commander to the General Staff of the VJ,
December 1993; Ex. P919, SVK Main Staff Memo on the Coordination of Tasks in the VJ General Staff,
January 1994; Ex. P2625, SVK Summary for the Coordination of Tasks in the VJ General Staff, 17 February
1994; Ex. P1798, VJ Report on Coordination with SVK, May 1994; Ex. P2176, Documents Regarding the
Cooperation Between VRS, SVK and VJ in April and May 1994; Ex. P2177, Letter from VJ General Staff to
SVK Main Staff, 11 May 1994; Ex. P2764, Document from Mladi} to VJ GS, 17 May 1994; Ex. P2621, AideMemoire for the Coordination in the General Staff of the VJ, July 1994; Mile Novakovi}, T. 13175, 1317713178.
Ex. P2175, Documents Regarding Meetings between SVK, VRS and VJ Chiefs of Staff, fall 1993, Doc ID 06305899, p. 1.
MP-80, T. 8322-8325, 8327-8328, 8338-8339 (closed session); Mile Novakovi}, T. 13175-13176; Ex. P2175,
Documents Regarding Meetings between SVK, VRS and VJ Chiefs of Staff, fall 1993, Doc IDs 0630-5894, p. 1;
0630-5899, p. 1; Ex. P2157, Communication between SVK and VJ, 3 November 1993, p. 1. See also Miodrag
Simi}, T. 10038-10039, testifying that such coordination meetings were not held on a regular basis but as the
need arose.
Ex. P1798, VJ Report on Coordination with SVK, May 1994, p. 4.
MP-80, T. 8328 (closed session).
443
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Similarly, at the same meeting, Ratko Mladi} gave a presentation on inter alia: “enemy strength,
grouping and intentions”, possible further enemy operations and the situation in the VRS corps.4027
1410. The evidence suggests that at the coordination meetings no orders were issued by the VJ to
the SVK and/or the VRS.4028 Mile Novakovi} even testified that he attended the first two or three
meetings, but decided to appoint his subordinate to attend meetings thereafter explaining that “those
meetings were not of importance because they were not beneficial”.4029
(b) Other Meetings
1411. Slobodan Milo{evi} and Perišić held several meetings with the prominent members of the
SVK and the VRS.4030 Some of these meetings were also attended by the highest authorities of the
RSK and/or RS.4031
1412. The record also shows that Perišić was holding quite regular meetings with Ratko Mladi}.
According to Sini{a Borovi}, the latter visited Perišić “once per month or less”.4032 There were also
meetings where Slobodan Milo{evi} and/or various military and political leaders of the FRY, VRS
and/or RS were present.4033
4027
4028
4029
4030
4031
4032
4033
Ex. P2764, Document from Mladi} to VJ General Staff, 19 May 1994.
MP-080, T. 8338-8339 (closed session).
Mile Novaković, T. 13176.
Ex. D440, Excerpt from Mladić diary, 24 September 1993. See also Ex. P2174, Telegram from General
Novaković to General Perišić, 18 September 1993, Novakovi} asking Perišić for a meeting (also with Mladi});
Mile Novakovi}, T. 13114, testifying about the meeting with Perišić in 1993 to discuss the situation in the RSK,
to update Perišić on the essential elements of the situation, and to request help with the personnel and financial
problems of the SVK; Mile Novakovi}, T. 13125, 13127-13128, testifying about a Belgrade meeting between
President Milošević, General Perišić, and the witness on 24 September 1993; Mile Novakovi}, T. 13167-13168,
testifying about Mladi}’s proposal regarding the creation of a Joint General Staff in which the VRS and SVK
would be considered the 4th and 5th Army of the VJ; Ex. P2937, Extract from Ratko Mladi}'s Notebook, 7
October 1994; and Ex. P2783, Ratko Mladić’s notebook from 1995, pp 10-16, depicting a meeting that took
place on 30 June 1995.
Ex. D441, Excerpt from Mladić Diary, 21 October 1993; Ex. D442, Excerpt from the Mladić Diary, 8 November
1993; Ex. P2936, Extract from Ratko Mladi}'s Notebook, 8 July 1994. The Trial Chamber notes the instances of
meetings between the FRY authorities, RS, VRS and/or RSK officials; however, the evidence does not show that
Perišić took part in them – these were held on: 15 March 1994 - with inter alia Mladi}, S. Miloševi}, Marti},
Karad‘i}, Lili} - Ex. P2940, Extract from Ratko Mladi}'s Notebook, 15 March 1994; on 3 March 1995 with
Mladi} and “President MS” - Ex. P2783, Ratko Mladić’s notebook from 1995, pp 6-7; on 7 July 1995 with S.
Miloševi}, Mladi} and Carl Bildt – Carl Bildt, T. 14284-14285; on 14-15 July 1995 - S. Miloševi}, Mladi},
Yasuki Akashi and Carl Bildt - Carl Bildt, T. 14284-14286; Ex. P2369, Note of a Meeting, 15 July 1995.
Sini{a Borovi}, T. 14086. For meetings held on 27 December 1993 – see Ex. P2935, Extract from Ratko
Mladi}'s Notebook, 27 December 1993; on 7 July 1994 in the Kru{ik special purpose company in Valjevo - see
Ex. P2928, Extract from Ratko Mladi}'s Notebook, 7 July 1994; on 6 April 1995 – see Ex. P2783, Excerpt from
Ratko Mladić’s Notebook, 1995, pp 8-9. See also Ex. P1441, Intelligence Note, 3 April 1994; Ex. P1462,
Intelligence Note, 28 November 1995; Ex. P1467, Intercepted Conversation, 10 December 1995, p. 6; Ex. P779,
Stenographic Transcript of the 28th Session of the SDC, 2 November 1994, pp 7, 28, referring to contacts
between Perišić and Mladi} leading to the former being well informed as to the situation in the VRS – see
Ex. P780, Stenographic Transcript of the 15th Session of the SDC, 10 November 1993, pp 21-22; Ex. P784,
Stenographic Transcript of the 22nd Session of the SDC, 11 July 1994, p. 47.
These were held on 13-14 December 1993 - Ex. P2933, Extract from Ratko Mladi}'s Notebook, 13 December
1993; Ex. P2934, Extract from Ratko Mladi}'s Notebook, 14 December 1993; on 24 January 1995 at the SDC
444
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1413. On 9 July 1995, Perišić visited the commander of the 11th Corps of the SVK in Vukovar and
on a separate occasion in autumn he toured the units of SVK 11th Corps.4034
1414. The evidence also shows that Perišić visited RS in the period relevant to the Indictment.4035
On 7 January 1994, he visited the Drina Corps Command.4036 The next day, he met with Mladi} and
Gali} in Vogoš}a.4037 On 12 August 1994, Perišić met with Mladi} and the inner collegium of the
Commander of the G[ VRS in Crna Rijeka.4038 Around 7 and 8 September 1994, Perišić visited
Novi Grad on the Una River.4039 On 18 July 1995, Perišić was in Han Pijesak meeting with inter
alia Mladi}.4040
(c) Reporting
(i) Regular Operations Reports
1415. The evidence establishes that in the period of October 1993 until August 1995, the SVK
Main Staff was sending reports to the VJ General Staff on quite a regular basis.
1416. In October 1993, the SVK Main Staff started sending weekly operation reports to the VJ
General Staff. The provision of those reports was laid down in the following SVK document:
Chief of VJ General Staff Operations Administration has agreed for the [SVK] General Staff
Operations and Training Organ to submit weekly operation report on the activities of the enemy,
our forces and measures taken by SVK General Staff in order to have better insight into the
defence of RSK, so the following has been done:
4034
4035
4036
4037
4038
4039
4040
session, Ex. P2783, Ratko Mladić’s notebook, 1995, pp 1-4; on 16 February 1995 - Ex. P2783, Ratko Mladić’s
notebook, 1995, p. 5; on 24 July 1995 - Ex. P2783, Ratko Mladić’s notebook, 1995, pp 17-18; on 23 August
1995 at the SDC session - Ex. P713, Minutes from the 42nd Session of the SDC, 23 August 1995; on 25 and 29
August 1995 in Dobranovci - Ex. P230, Notes of the Meeting Held in Dobanovci, 25 August 1995; P232, Notes
of Meeting Held in Dobanovci, 30 August 1995. See also Ex. P1296, Intercepted Conversation, 1 May 1995;
Ex. P1338, Intercepted Conversation, 7 May 1995; Ex. P797, Stenographic Transcript of the 41st Session of the
SDC, 14 August 1995, p. 25.
For the meeting of 9 July 1995 – see Ex. P1455, Intercepted Conversation, 9 July 1995; Ex. P2276, Intercepted
Communication, 9 July 1995; Ex. P1933, Intelligent Report of the HVO, 10 July 1995; and for the one in
autumn 1995 (after the fall of the RSK) – see Sini{a Borovi}, T. 14092; Vladimir Rodi}, T. 14220-14221.
See also Ex. P792, Stenographic Transcript of the 27th Session of the SDC, 27 September 1994, pp 86, 93,
mentioning that Perišić went to discuss things with Mladi}.
Ex. P1824, Drina Corps Combat Report, 7 January 1994.
Ex. P507, Diary of Nikola To{ovi}, 1994, p. 2; Ex. P505, Transcript of Nikola To{ovi} Deposition Hearing, 13
December 2008, pp 7-13.
Petar Škrbić, T. 11740-11741; Ex. D344, Excerpts from Mladić’s diary, 12 August 1994.
Ex. P2861, Forward Command Post 3 Intelligence sent to SVK Main Staff re: Peri{i} Secret Visit to “Breza-94”
with Handwritten note, 11 September 1994.
Exs P2800-P2805, Le{i} Photos of Peri{i} with Mladi} and others in Crna Rijeka, 18 July 1995; Ex. P2705,
Copies of three photos of Peri{i} in uniform sitting with Mladi} and others, including General Milan Gvero, 18
July 1995; Ned Krayishnik, T. 9568-9569. For the meeting concerning release of the French pilots, see supra
paras 1378-1384.
445
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-SVK General Staff Command has started to report to Operations Administration by sending a
summary of weekly report.4041
1417. The task of operative reporting started functioning in November 1993.4042 On 10 November
1993, the Commander of the SVK Main Staff set forth a detailed procedure providing for reporting
from the SVK to the VJ General Staff on a twice-per week basis:
In order to achieve full and high-quality drawing up of the combat reports and their timely
submission to the VJ G[[…]
A combat report shall be submitted to the FRY VSO[…] twice a week (on Mondays and
1.
Thursdays).
A combat report, which is to be drawn up and submitted, shall contain the following
2.
information:
2.1. Enemy – situation, intentions, possibilities, combat activities carried out […]
2.2. Our forces: combat readiness status, planning, carrying out of the combat activities and
results. Managing and commanding and problems. Training: commanding personnel, commands,
units, recruits, critical fields etc. […]
2.2.1. Combat morale status: positive indicators, negative actions, problems and causes […]
2.2.2. Material and health security: men, situation and problems […]
2.2.3. Mobilization and personnel issues […]
2.2.4. Security: security situation in units and in the territory […]
Cooperation with the UNPROFOR […]
3.
Conclusions and forecast:
4.
4.1. Enemy […]
4.2. Status of our forces, conditions for problem solving […]
4.3. Situation in the territory: overall influence on the SVK, direction and the intensity […]
Drafter of the report N[ […] SVK.
5.
Report items shall be completed by 14:00 hrs. each Monday and Friday, and shall be submitted to
the [Operations and Training Organ], which shall further integrate, process and submit them by
20.00 hrs to the FRY VSO […].4043
1418. Miodrag Simi}, a member of the VJ General Staff administration, testified that on several
occasions Perišić unsuccessfully requested the SVK and VRS Main Staffs to submit timely reports
to the VJ.4044 At the same time, there is evidence of many examples of reports prepared in line with
the abovementioned procedure and which between November 1993 and 26 August 1995 were sent
weekly by the SVK to the Operations Centre of the VJ General Staff, as well as to Perišić.4045 There
is evidence that occasionally reports were sent more frequently - e.g. in April 1995 - even daily.4046
4041
4042
4043
4044
4045
Ex. P1797, Report by SVK on Cooperation with VJ General Staff, October 1993, p. 2.
Ex. P2156, Memorandum on Co-ordination between the VJ, VRS and SVK, 19 November 1993.
Ex. P1023, SVK Main Staff Command Order, 10 November 1993; Mile Novakovi}, T. 13244-13245.
Miodrag Simi}, T. 10016. For the problems in the process of reporting at the beginning and in mid-1993 – see
Ex. P2175, Documents Regarding Meetings between SVK, VRS and VJ Chiefs of Staff, fall 1993, Doc IDs
0630-5906 and 0630-5908; Ex. P1617, Request of the VJ General Staff to the VRS and SVK Main Staffs to
Provide Reports, 6 February 1993; Ex. D209, Letter from Blagoje Kova~evi} to the Chief of the VJ General
Staff; Miodrag Simi}, T. 10028. See also Mile Novakovi}, T. 13106-13109, 13244, 13247-13249, testifying
inter alia that the information was requested and not ordered and that the VJ was the General Staff of the state
which they considered to be their home ethnic state and if any other General Staff had been friendly to the SVK,
they would have also received such reports.
MP-80, T. 8398, 8400 (closed session). See for 1993 – Ex. P1027, SVK Regular Operations Report to the FRY
SDC, Slobodan Milo{evi} and Perišić, 9 December 1993; Ex. P1017, Operations Report re: Personnel and
Logistical Assistance of the VJ, 21 December 1993; Ex. P1042, SVK Main Staff Regular Operations Report
Addressed to S. Milo{evi}, M. Marti} and M. Perišić, 24 December 1993; Ex. P1043, SVK Main Staff Regular
446
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1419. Similarly, the evidence shows that the VRS copied the VJ General Staff, or Perišić
personally, on the operations reports sent, inter alia, to the President of RS. According to Miodrag
Simi} this practice started even before Perišić became Chief of the VJ General Staff.4047 The Trial
Chamber was presented with many such reports sent between 11 April 1994 and 28 August 1994
that included sections on enemy activities, the situation in the VRS Corps and combat actions
carried out by the VRS units.4048 Simi}, while commenting on one of these reports, called it “a highquality comprehensive document”.4049 Although the Trial Chamber has not been provided with
reports for every day in the period relevant to the Indictment, the evidence suggests that the VRS
4046
4047
4048
4049
Operations Report Addressed to S. Milo{evi}, M. Marti} and M. Perišić, 31 December 1993; for 1994 – see
Ex. P1019, SVK Main Staff Operations Report, 7 January 1994; Ex. P1031, SVK Main Staff Regular Operations
Report Addressed to S. Milo{evi}, M. Marti} and M. Perišić, 27 February 1994; Ex. P1029, SVK Report
Regarding Logistical Assistance, 6 March 1994; Ex. P1030, SVK Report Regarding Personnel Assistance, 13
March 1994; Ex. P1032, SVK Main Staff Regular Operations Report Addressed to S. Milo{evi}, M. Marti} and
M. Perišić, 20 March 1994; Ex. P1021, SVK Report Addressed to S. Milo{evi}, M. Marti} and M. Perišić, 3
April 1994; Ex. P1044, SVK Main Staff Regular Operations Report Addressed to S. Milo{evi}, M. Marti} and
M. Perišić, 10 April 1994; Ex. P1033, SVK Main Staff Regular Operations Report Addressed to S. Milo{evi},
M. Marti} and M. Perišić, 24 April 1994; Ex. P1034, SVK Main Staff Regular Operations Report Addressed to
S. Milo{evi}, M. Marti} and M. Perišić, 8 May 1994; Ex. P2335, SVK Main Staff Report to the VJ General
Staff, President of the RSK and the President of Serbia, 15 May 1994.; Ex. P1028, SVK Report Addressed to S.
Milo{evi}, M. Marti} and M. Perišić, 22 May 1994; Ex. P1035, SVK Main Staff Regular Operations Report
Addressed to S. Milo{evi}, M. Marti} and M. Perišić, 28 May 1994; Ex. P1036, SVK Main Staff Regular
Operations Report Addressed to S. Milo{evi}, M. Marti} and M. Perišić, 12 June 1994; Ex. P1037, SVK Main
Staff Regular Operations Report Addressed to S. Milo{evi}, M. Marti} and M. Perišić, 26 June 1994; Ex. P1038,
SVK Main Staff Regular Operations Report Addressed to S. Milo{evi}, M. Marti} and M. Perišić, 27 June 1994;
Ex. P1022, SVK Report Addressed to S. Milo{evi}, M. Marti} and M. Perišić, 10 July 1994; Ex. P1039, SVK
Main Staff Regular Operations Report Addressed to S. Milo{evi}, M. Marti} and M. Perišić, 17 July 1994;
Ex. P1040, SVK Main Staff Regular Operations Report, 24 July 1994; Ex. P1045, SVK Main Staff Regular
Operations Report, 31 July 1994; Ex. P1026, Regular Operations Report on the Situation in Croatia and BiH
Submitted to Slobodan Milo{evi}, 14 August 1994; Ex. P1041, SVK Main Staff Regular Operations Report
Addressed to S. Milo{evi}, M. Marti} and M. Perišić, 25 September 1994; for 1995 – see Ex. P1020, SVK Main
Staff Regular Combat Report, 10 April 1995; Ex. P1054, Operations Report on the Aggression Against the RSK
and the SVK Activities between 4 August and 10 August 1995, 26 August 1995. See also Ex. P1051, SVK Main
Staff Regular Combat Report, 11 November 1993, similar report but sent directly to the SDC. For the reports
sent by the VRS, see infra para. 1419.
MP-80, T. 8398-8400 (closed session). See Branko Gajić, T. 10861-10863, 10936-10937; Ex. P1926, Report of
the SVK Security Department, 1 July 1994. But see Miodrag Simi}, T. 10038-10039, testifying that the SVK
reports were irregular and incomplete.
Miodrag Simi}, T. 10016.
See Ex. P889, VRS Main Staff Report Signed by Lt Col Gen Milovanovi}, 11 April 1994; Ex. P1501, Report by
the VRS Main Staff, 12 April 1994; Ex. P891, VRS Main Staff Situation Report to inter alia RS President, 14
April 1994; Ex. P1508, Report by the VRS Main Staff, 17 April 1994; Ex. P1502, Report by the VRS Main
Staff, 4 May 1994; Ex. P888, VRS Main Staff Situation Report to inter alia RS President, VJ Chief of General
Staff, 15 May 1994; Ex. P890, VRS Main Staff Situation Report to inter alia RS President, VJ Chief of General
Staff, 16 May 1994; Ex. P1489, Report by the VRS Main Staff, 17 May 1994; Ex. P1490, Report by the VRS
Main Staff, 18 May 1994; Ex. P1491, Report by the VRS Main Staff, 19 May 1994; Ex. P1492, Report by the
VRS Main Staff, 20 May 1994; Ex. P1493, Report by the VRS Main Staff, 21 May 1994; Ex. P1494, Report by
the VRS Main Staff, 22 May 1994; Ex. P1495, Report by the VRS Main Staff, 23 May 1994; Ex. P1496, Report
by the VRS Main Staff, 24 May 1994; Ex. P1497, Report by the VRS Main Staff, 25 May 1994; Ex. P1498,
Report by the VRS Main Staff, 26 May 1994; Ex. P1499, Report by the VRS Main Staff, 27 May 1994;
Ex. P1509, Report by the VRS Main Staff, 29 May 1994; Ex. P1500, Report by the VRS Main Staff, 31 May
1994; Ex. P1505, Report by the VRS Main Staff, 6 June 1994; Ex. P1504, Report by the VRS Main Staff, 29
June 1994; Ex. P1507, Report by the VRS Main Staff, 4 July 1994; Ex. P1511, Report by the VRS Main Staff,
19 July 1994; Ex. P1506, Report by the VRS Main Staff, 27 July 1994; Ex. P1503, Report by the VRS Main
Staff, 4 August 1994; Ex. P1510, Report by the VRS Main Staff, 28 August 1994.
Miodrag Simi}, T. 10017, commenting on Ex. P1489, Report by the VRS Main Staff, 17 May 1994.
447
Case No.: IT-04-81-T
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28786
sent reports to the VJ General Staff on a daily basis at least until 19 September 1995.4050 On that
day, Perišić sent a request to the VRS Main Staff to accept a group of VJ liaison officers whose task
would be to compile daily combat reports to be sent to the VJ General Staff4051 and issued an order
regarding details of forming such a team to be dispatched as of 21 September 1995.4052 According
to Miodrag Simi}, however, such teams were never sent to the VRS.4053
1420. The evidence confirms that the VRS reports were received by Perišić. It was common
practice for a document addressed to the Chief of the VJ General Staff personally to be delivered
directly to him.4054 An order dated 1 July 1994 also instructed the “duty operations team” of the VJ
General Staff to forward the daily VRS reports each morning to the Cabinet of the Chief of the VJ
General Staff.4055
1421. In addition to the VJ General Staff receiving regular combat reports from the VRS Main
Staff, the operations duty team of the VJ General Staff was in direct contact with the VRS and
could make requests for specific information. In a memorandum dated 11 May 1994, the VJ
General Staff requested the VRS Main Staff to provide information on the disposition and strength
of forces in RS at the coordination meeting to be held on 19 May 1994, and to “ensure that there is
a phone contact through a secure line between the VJ General Staff Duty Team Leader and yours,
every day at 06:00 hrs and 20:00 hrs”.4056
1422. The SVK and the VRS were also receiving some reports and/or information from the VJ.4057
(ii) Reporting during Operation “Pauk”
1423. Novakovi} testified that during Operation “Pauk” he sent combat reports to Peri{i}, the SVK
Main Staff, and “from time to time” to the Serbian State Security Service to transmit to the attention
4050
4051
4052
4053
4054
4055
4056
4057
Ex. P2848, Order re: VJ General Staff Duty Team, 1 July 1994, p. 1, referring to daily reports received from the
VRS; Ex. D237 (under seal); Ex. P2758, Proposal of VJ General staff 1st Administration to send VRS Main Staff
Communications Liason Teams, signed by Peri{i}, 19 September 1995, p. 2, in which Peri{i} submitted a
proposal to the VRS Main Staff which if accepted would lead to the withdrawal of the VJ request for the
delivery of the VRS daily combat reports. See also Ex. P2204, Transcript of the Collegium of the Chief of the VJ
General Staff, 18 September 1995, Doc ID 0618-7234, p. 2.
Ex. P2758, Proposal of VJ General staff 1st Administration to send VRS Main Staff Communications Liason
Teams, signed by Peri{i}, 19 September 1995; Ex. D237 (under seal).
Ex. P2759, Order of the Chief of VJ General Staff, 19 September 1995.
Miodrag Simi}, T. 10136 (private session).
Miodrag Simi}, T. 10017.
Ex. P2848, Order Regarding VJ General Staff Duty Team, 1 July 1994.
Ex. P2847, VJ General Staff Memo on Deployment of Forces in Corridor, 11 May 1994. The VJ General Staff
sent a similar memorandum to the SVK Main Staff on the same date: see Ex. P2177, Letter from VJ General
Staff to SVK Main Staff, 11 May 1994.
MP-80, T. 8398 (closed session); Ex. P2859, Intelligence from VJ General Staff forwarded to ^eleketi}, 28
December 1994; MP-5, T. 2361-2362, 2365, 2444 (private session), testifying that there was an exchange of data
between the operations centre of the 7th Corps of the VRS and a radar position in Banovci belonging to the VJ;
Ex. P394 (under seal).
448
Case No.: IT-04-81-T
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28785
of Milo{evi}.4058 He would send them to Peri{i} “about once a week”.4059 Novakovi} also stated that
he sent “extraordinary combat reports to Peri{i} to “keep him posted of the situation”.4060
(iii) SVK and VRS Intelligence and Security Administrations’ Reports
1424. Branko Gaji}, testified that the Security Administration had “some ad hoc contacts and
exchange[s] of information” with the security bodies of the VRS and SVK.4061 However, according
to him, it had “no formal relationship” with its counterparts in the two other armies.4062 He also
testified that the VJ Security Administration never requested information from the VRS and SVK
security organs nor invited their representatives to participate in VJ meetings.4063
1425. At the same time, the Trial Chamber has been presented with evidence showing that the
security organs of the SVK sent reports to its counterparts in the VJ.4064 According to Branko Gaji},
the Security Administration of the General Staff obtained sufficient information from the “official
organs” and there was no need to have its own personnel deployed in the RSK or in RS.4065
1426. Rade Rašeta testified that as Chief of the Security Department in the SVK Main Staff he
was in daily contact with the Security Administration of the VJ General Staff and in certain cases he
reported to the chief of the latter.4066 The reports concerned the personnel of the VJ who were sent
for “temporary service” to the security sector in the SVK.4067 Ra{eta testified:
In view of the fact that the security service of the SVK used all instructions, all the rules, all
special operational and technical means and cadres from the security of the General Staff of the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, I had the duty, pursuant to all the applicable special measures and
special measures as regulated by all our regulations, to report regularly to the Security
Administration of the General Staff of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.4068
4058
4059
4060
4061
4062
4063
4064
4065
4066
4067
4068
Mile Novakovi}, T. 13461-13463.
Mile Novakovi}, T. 13462-13465. See Ex. P2927, Combat Report from Novakovi}, 3 May 1995, Doc ID 02806335.
Mile Novakovi}, T. 13462-13463.
Branko Gajić, T. 10841.
Branko Gajić, T. 10841.
Branko Gajić, T. 10849, T. 10870-10872. See also Ex. D267, KSJ Command no. 138-4-1 – Warning Regarding
Releasing Communications to Unauthorized Individuals, 27 September 1995.
See Ex. P1926, Report of the SVK Security Department, 1 July 1994, reporting on situation in Autonomous
Province of Western Bosnia; Ex. P1018, SVK Security Department Report Addressed to the VJ General Staff
Security Department, 3 August 1995.
Branko Gaji}, T. 10854.
Rade Rašeta, T. 5912-5917, 5919-5921, regarding certain VJ soldiers who were under the scrutiny of the
security organs of the VJ; Ex. P2334, Report from the SVK Main Staff to the VJ General Staff Regarding the
Course of the War, 2 May 1995; Ex. P1018, SVK Security Department Report Addressed to the VJ General Staff
Security Department, 3 August 1995.
Rade Ra{eta, T. 5913.
Ibid.
449
Case No.: IT-04-81-T
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28784
At the same time, he admitted that he did not have a duty to send reports to the VJ General Staff
concerning other matters.4069
1427. The evidence also shows that the senior members of the Security Administrations of the
SVK and VRS Main Staffs occasionally met with their VJ counterparts in Belgrade and passed on
information about the military situation in the RSK and RS.4070
1428. The Security Department of the SVK Main Staff was responsible for preparing parts of
combat reports which were regularly dispatched to the VJ and which formed part of the regular
operations reports discussed above.4071
1429. The Chamber notes that on 22 September 1993, the Intelligence Administration of the VJ
General Staff reported: “together with intelligence organs of the [SVK] and the VRS we have
established a system of mutual daily reporting of all significant data of interest to all three
parties”.4072
1430. On 23 November 1994, the 2nd Administration of the VJ General Staff sent a coded telegram
to the VRS Main Staff, stating:
On proposal of the 2nd Administration, the Chief of the General Staff of the Army of Yugoslavia
Col Gen M. Perišić has agreed to dispatch one officer from the 2nd Administration of the GŠ to the
GŠ VRS Intelligence Organ, with the task of assisting your organs in the processing of
information on the activities and the combat engagements of the enemy forces and the timely
submission of the said to this Administration. The cost of his stay in your Command shall be borne
by the 2nd Administration of the GŠ VJ, while the GŠ VRS shall provide him with the
accommodation and include him in your work.4073
1431. Rade Orli} testified that in his capacity as the SVK Main Staff Chief Intelligence Officer, he
would “from time to time as required” share intelligence information about activities and
movements of Bosnian and Croatian armies with the VRS and the VJ.4074 Orli} would also request
4069
4070
4071
4072
4073
4074
Rade Rašeta, T. 5923.
Branko Gajić, T. 10852-10854, 10859-10861. See also MP-80, T. 8397-8398 (closed session).
Rade Rašeta, T. 5931-5934; Ex. P1023, SVK Main Staff Command Order, 10 November 1993, Section 2.2.4.
Ex. P2175, Documents Regarding Meetings between SVK, VRS and VJ Chiefs of Staff, fall 1993, Doc ID 06305909, p. 1.
Ex. P1622, Proposal of the VJ General Staff to the Main Staff of the VRS on Secondment of the Personnel, 23
November 1994, p. 1 (emphasis added).
Rade Orli}, T. 5737, 5751. See also Mile Novakovi}, T. 13264-13265, testifying that there was a limited
cooperation between the intelligence organs of the SVK, the VJ, and the VRS. However, according to him such
cooperation was intermittent and never useful or “actionable”.
450
Case No.: IT-04-81-T
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28783
and, at times, would receive information from the VRS or the VJ when necessary.4075 This type of
communication was transmitted using telegrams.4076
1432. Similarly, the evidence shows that the Intelligence and Security Section of the VRS Main
Staff was copying the VJ General Staff Security Administration and/or Intelligence Administration
on its intelligence reports, even on a daily basis during some periods.4077
(iv) Ad Hoc Reports and Communication Lines
1433. The evidence shows that Perišić was also receiving ad hoc reports from prominent figures in
the SVK and the VRS. The Trial Chamber has been presented with some reports sent by the
Commander of the SVK Main Staff directly to Perišić.4078 Similarly, on 15 August 1995, Perišić
received a report from the Air-Force and Anti-Aircraft Defence Organ of the SVK.4079 The record
also includes a report sent on 11 April 1994 by Ratko Mladi} directly to Perišić.4080 The VJ General
Staff was also copied on some reports sent by Mladi} to various RS political and military
authorities.4081 Moreover, the document pertaining to the discussion held on 15 September 1995,
mentions a telegram sent by Milovanovi} (the Chief of Staff of the VRS Main Staff) to Perišić
informing him about the VRS territorial losses.4082
1434. There were also encoded lines of communication between the VJ General Staff and the SVK
Main Staff, the SVK and Slobodan Milo{evi}, as well as the VJ General Staff and the VRS Main
4075
4076
4077
4078
4079
4080
4081
Rade Orli}, T. 5738-5739, 5766-5767; see Ex. P2859, Intelligence from VJ General Staff forwarded to
^eleketi}, 28 December 1994; Ex. P1621, Report of the VJ General Staff to the SVK Main Staff, 11 August
1994.
Rade Orli}, T. 5767.
For 1993 – see Ex. D547, Intelligence Report of the VRS Main Staff, 15 September 1993; for 1994 – see
Ex. P2187, VRS Main Staff Intelligence Report, 9 August 1994; for 1995 – see Ex. P2185, VRS Main Staff
Intelligence Report, 11 May 1995; Ex. P2179, VRS Main Staff Intelligence Report, 14 May 1995; Ex. P1831,
VRS Intelligence Report, 18 May 1995; Ex. P2184, VRS Main Staff Intelligence Report, 19 May 1995;
Ex. P2178, VRS Main Staff Intelligence Report, 21 May 1995; Ex. P2183, VRS Main Staff Intelligence Report,
25 May 1995; Ex. P2180, VRS Main Staff Intelligence Report, 26 May 1995; Ex. P2182, VRS Main Staff
Intelligence Report, 27 May 1995; Ex. P2188, VRS Main Staff Intelligence Report, 25 July 1995; Ex. P2189,
VRS Main Staff Intelligence Report, 26 July 1995; Ex. P2190, VRS Main Staff Intelligence Report, 27 July
1995; Ex. P2191, VRS Main Staff Intelligence Report, 28 July 1995; Ex. P2186, VRS Main Staff Intelligence
and Security Report, 30 July 1995; Ex. P2192, VRS Main Staff Intelligence Report, 31 July 1995; Ex. P1854,
VRS Report to VJ Security Administration, 11 August 1995.
Ex. P2816, SVK Combat report sent to Chief of VJ General Staff, 9 September 1994; Ex. P2857, SVK Main
Staff Commander Čeleketi} Communication to Peri{i} and Milo{evi}, 7 December 1994; Ex. P1024, SVK Main
Staff Interim Combat Report to VJ Chief of General Staff, 9 September 1994. See also Ex. P1379, Intercepted
Conversation, 2 May 1995, p. 7, where Perišić confirms that he receives information from ^eleketi}; Sini{a
Borovi}, T. 14006, testifying that on two occasions Mile Mrk{i} submitted his reports on the events in the RSK
(Operation Storm).
Ex. P2756, Report from SVK Assistant Commander for Air Force and Anti-Aircraft Defence Branislav Petrovi}
to VJ CGS.
Ex. P887, VRS Main Staff Dispatch Signed by Mladi} Addressed to the Chief of VJ General Staff, 11 April
1994.
Ex. P2181, VRS Main Staff Document Regarding Movement of Croatian Forces, 19 January 1995.
451
Case No.: IT-04-81-T
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Staff.4083 Such lines and their supporting infrastructure already existed before Perišić assumed the
position of the VJ General Staff Commander.4084 Members of the Main Staffs of the SVK and the
VRS, and the VJ General Staff communicated directly through such lines.4085 There were instances
of the SVK Corps Commanders communicating directly with Perišić.4086 There existed also
analogue radio connections between the VJ, VRS and SVK.4087 Moreover, the evidence shows that
at least as of September 1995, Perišić had direct communication with the Commander of the VRS
East Bosnia Corps and indirectly also with the VRS Herzegovina Corps.4088
1435. Further, there existed an intelligence centre in Petrova Gora – in the area of the SVK 21st
Kordun Corps.4089 This centre was part of the intelligence department of the VJ General Staff and
was in charge of monitoring activities of foreign military formations and reporting this to the
intelligence administration of the VJ General Staff.4090 This centre was not subordinated to the
SVK.4091
(d) Conclusion
1436. The Trial Chamber finds that there were multiple channels through which the information
flowed from SVK and the VRS to the VJ General Staff. Through the system of regular reports,
monthly meetings in Belgrade, various other ad hoc instances of reporting and exchanges of
4082
4083
4084
4085
4086
4087
4088
4089
4090
4091
Ex. P2193, Transcript of the Collegium of the Chief of the VJ General Staff held on 14 September 1995, 29
December 1995.
Sini{a Borovi}, T. 13908; MP-80, T. 8397-8398 (closed session). See also Miodrag Simi}, T. 10340-10341.
Sini{a Borovi}, T. 13908-13909. See Ex. P2764, p. 8, referring to the main radio relay link between BelgradeBanja Luka-Knin.
For the communications between the SVK and the VJ - see e.g. Ex. P2260, Intercepted Communication, 7
August 1995. See also MP-80, T. 8559 et seq. (closed session) - although only based on assumption of the
witness; see e.g. Ex. P1297, Intercepted Conversation, 1 May 1995; Ex. P1316, Intercepted Conversation, 2 May
1995, both mentioning that Perišić was in contact with Milan ^eleketi}. Ex. P2279, Intercepted Communication,
5 August 1995, depicting a conversation between Perišić and the Chief of the 15th Corps of the SVK; Ex. P2286,
Intercepted Communication, 2 May 1995; Ex. P1447, Intelligence Note, 24 August 1994; Ex. P1454, Intercepted
Conversation, 9 July 1995; Ex. P2281, Intercepted Communication, 9 May 1995; Ex. P1459, Intercepted
Conversation, 5 August 1995; Ex. P1460, Intercepted Conversation, 5 August 1995; Ex. P1461, Intercepted
Conversation, 6 August 1995; For the communications between the VRS and the VJ – see e.g. Ex. P1432,
Intelligence Note, 22 October 1993. See also Ex. P2269, Intercepted Communication, 23 November 1995;
Ex. P2266, Intercepted Communication, 19 November 1995; Ex. P2271, Intercepted Communication, 1
December 1995.
Ex. P2286, Intercepted Communication, 2 May 1995; Ex. P1333, Intercepted Conversation, 6 May 1995, p. 26.
See Ex. P1456, Intelligence Note, 10 July 1995; Ex. P2279, Intercepted Communication, 5 August 1995,
depicting a conversation between Perišić and the Chief of the 15th Corps of the SVK; Ex. P1447, Intelligence
Note, 24 August 1994.
Miodrag Simi}, T. 10159; Ex. P1558, Chart of the VRS Daily Communication System.
Ex. P2195, Transcript of the Collegium of the Chief of the VJ General Staff, 14 September 1995, Doc ID 06187188, p. 7; Ex. P2204, Transcript of the Collegium of the Chief of the VJ General Staff, 18 September 1995,
Doc ID 0618-7222, p. 4.
Rade Rašeta, T. 5938-5939.
Rade Rašeta, T. 5939.
Ibid.
452
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information, during his tenure as Chief of the VJ General Staff, Peri{i} was well informed of all
important aspects on the functioning of the SVK and the VRS as well as their activities.
1437. The exact content of subjects discussed at the meetings and/or reports sent to the VJ General
Staff by the Main Staffs of the SVK and the VRS will be discussed in a separate part of the
Judgement devoted to Perišić’s knowledge of the crimes charged in the Indictment.4092
4092
See infra section VI.J.
453
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J. Peri{i}’s Knowledge of the Crimes Committed in Sarajevo and Srebrenica
1. Submissions of the Parties
1438. The Prosecution submits that Peri{i} knew that the VRS had a discriminatory intent to
commit the crimes in BiH and that the VRS committed ethnic cleansing in BiH. It posits that Peri{i}
had this knowledge before becoming Chief of the VJ General Staff and “this knowledge continued
throughout his tenure”.4093 The Prosecution also submits that it is not necessary to establish that
Peri{i} had knowledge of specific incidents alleged in the Indictment.4094
1439. The Defence argues that the Prosecution failed to demonstrate that the VRS was engaged in
criminal behaviour or that Peri{i} knew of that criminal behaviour.4095 It submits that UNSC
resolutions that refer to wrongful conduct usually attributed such conduct to Bosnian Serb
paramilitaries and not to the VRS.4096
1440. The Trial Chamber will first consider whether Peri{i} was aware of criminal conduct and
discriminatory intent on the part of the VRS in the BiH theatre of war generally and second,
whether he knew of crimes committed by the VRS specifically in Sarajevo and Srebrenica. Peri{i}’s
awareness of the discriminatory intent of the VRS and criminal conduct in this context will serve as
a basis for the finding as to whether Peri{i} knew that crimes would probably be committed in
Sarajevo and Srebrenica, and that crimes committed in those areas would probably be followed by
further crimes.
2. Peri{i}’s Knowledge of the VRS’s Criminal Conduct
1441. The trial record includes evidence regarding Peri{i}’s knowledge of the VRS’s conduct from
periods preceding and following his appointment as Chief of the VJ General Staff. The Trial
Chamber will discuss the evidence relating to these two periods in turn.
(a) Evidence Preceding Peri{i}’s Appointment as Chief of the VJ General Staff
1442. The Trial Chamber will analyse whether the evidence demonstrates that Peri{i} was aware
of the VRS’s discriminatory intent and criminal conduct prior to his appointment as Chief of the VJ
General Staff.
4093
4094
4095
4096
Prosecution Final Brief, paras 563-565, 581.
Closing Arguments, T. 14676.
Defence Final Brief, paras 820-821.
Ibid.
454
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1443. The Trial Chamber recalls that prior to his appointment as Chief of the VJ General Staff on
26 August 1993, Peri{i} served as the commander of the JNA Artillery School Centre in Zadar,
Croatia until January 1992, when he was appointed Commander of the JNA 13th Corps in BiH. He
held this position until the formal withdrawal of the JNA from BiH in May 1992, when he became
the Chief of Staff and then Commander of the 3rd Army of the VJ.4097
1444. In his OTP interview, Peri{i} stated that in April 1992, when he was Commander of the JNA
13th Corps Bile}a Corps in BiH, he refused Karadži}’s offer to become VRS Commander.4098
Peri{i} explained that among his reasons for doing so had been the fact that “they wanted [an]
ethnically clean army, and [he] was against that”.4099
1445. In the same interview, Peri{i} noted that the Bile}a Corps had responsibility over an area
that contained three big Muslim enclaves, Stolac, Kula Fazlagi}a, and Podveležje. Peri{i} declared
that while he was present in the area, “not a single Muslim was killed by soldiers and not a single
soldier was killed by Muslims”, but that after he left in June 1992, “the exodus in this territory
started”.4100
1446. The OTP interview is corroborated by the following evidence. On 27 May 1993, when
Peri{i} was the 3rd VJ Army Commander,4101 the Supreme Command Staff held a meeting with the
commanders of the VJ’s Armies, which Peri{i} was ordered to attend.4102 At the meeting, FRY
President Dobrica ]osi} commented that the assistance of the VJ to the VRS and SVK “was huge,
so the reserves have dwindled”.4103 He added: “₣wğe unnecessarily and irrationally used up massive
war reserves. That is particularly apparent in Bosnia and Herzegovina. How could we allow one
commander using more than 5,000 shells around Žepa to unnecessarily destroy Muslim houses? For
such an irrational act, he should, at the very least, have been stripped of his rank of officer”.4104
1447. On 26 August 1993, the day on which Peri{i} became Chief of the VJ General Staff, the
VRS 1st Krajina Corps Command wrote a congratulatory letter to him, reflecting the desire to join
the VJ and VRS to create a unified Serbian state:
Your appointment comes at a difficult and complicated time, when the Serb people are fighting for
their freedom and dignity, proving to the whole world that their fight is justified, a fight that is
4097
4098
4099
4100
4101
4102
4103
4104
See supra para. 2.
Ex. P803, Transcript of Interview with Periši}, 8 December 2003, p. 4.
Ibid.
Ex. P803, Transcript of Interview with Periši}, 8 December 2003, p. 6.
Ex. P810, Transcript of Interview with Periši}, 23 January 2004, p. 6. See Ex. P815, Transcript of Interview with
Periši}, 25 January 2004, p. 15.
See Ex. P2887, Telegram Calling for a Meeting of the Commanders of the Armies, 25 May 1993.
Ex. P2888, Record of the Closing Remarks at the Meeting of the Supreme Command Staff, 27 May 1993, p. 2.
Ibid.
455
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becoming increasingly acknowledged, justified, as it fills us with confidence that that we will
withstand until a final victory.
We wish you to settle at your new duty as soon as possible, to choose your associates, transform
the army where needed, removing the weaknesses of the old system and the former JNA, creating
together a unified Serbian state and army, a state in which all the Serbs will live together, proudly
and with dignity.4105
1448. The Trial Chamber is satisfied that this evidence shows that by the time he became Chief of
the VJ General Staff, Peri{i} knew that the VRS wanted an ethnically pure army and Serbian state,
and that he was aware of instances of criminal behaviour by the VRS against Muslims in BiH.
1449. In addition to the foregoing evidence of Peri{i}’s direct knowledge, there is evidence
suggesting that, prior to Peri{i}’s appointment as Chief of the VJ General Staff, the FRY leadership
was aware of allegations of ethnic cleansing in BiH. This evidence is summarised briefly below.
1450. Between May 1992 and May 1993, the UNSC adopted several resolutions and issued
statements expressing alarm about ethnic cleansing and other crimes committed in BiH, although
the VRS was not expressly accused of those crimes:
(i)
Resolution 752 of 15 May 1992 called upon all parties to the conflict to ensure that
“the forcible expulsion of persons from the areas where they live and any attempts to change
the ethnic composition of the population ₣…ğ cease immediately”.4106
(ii)
On 30 May 1992, Resolution 757 imposed sanctions on the FRY, “deploring ₣…ğ
that ₣this callğ has not been heeded”.4107
(iii)
On 4 August 1992, the UNSC President issued a statement referring to continued
reports of widespread violations of international humanitarian law (“IHL”) within the
territory of the former Yugoslavia and in the BiH particularly.4108
(iv)
Resolution 771 of 13 August 1992 strongly condemned the practice of “ethnic
cleansing” and expressed “grave alarm at continuing reports of widespread violations of
₣IHLğ occurring within the territory of the former Yugoslavia and especially in ₣BiHğ,
including reports of mass forcible expulsion and deportation of civilians, […] deliberate
4105
4106
4107
4108
Ex. P1801, Letter from 1st Krajina Corps to Perišić, 26 August 1993.
Ex. P201, UNSC Resolution 752, 15 May 1992.
Ex. P202, UNSC Resolution 757, 30 May 1992.
Ex. P2436, Statement by the President of the UNSC, 4 August 1992.
456
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attacks on non-combatants, hospitals and ambulances, […] and wanton devastation and
destruction of property”.4109
(v)
Resolution 780 of 6 October 1992 again expressed grave alarm at continuing reports
of widespread violations of IHL occurring within the territory of the former Yugoslavia and
especially in BiH, including reports of mass killings and the continuance of the practice of
“ethnic cleansing”.4110 It also called on the UN Secretary-General to establish an impartial
Commission of Experts to investigate violations of IHL.4111
(vi)
Resolution 808 of 22 February 1993 again expressed grave alarm at continuing
reports of widespread violations of IHL in the former Yugoslavia including reports of mass
killings and the practice of “ethnic cleansing”, and decided that an international tribunal
would be established to prosecute persons responsible for serious violations of IHL.4112
(vii)
Resolution 827 of 25 May 1993 reiterated the UNSC’s grave alarm at continuing
reports of widespread and flagrant violations of IHL in BiH, including the practice of
“ethnic cleansing”.4113 Resolution 827 also established the ICTY.4114
(viii) On 16 April 1993, the UNSC took note of the ICJ’s Order of 8 April 1993 in which
the ICJ had indicated that as a provisional measure, the FRY government should
immediately take all measures within its power to prevent genocide.4115 The UNSC also
reaffirmed its condemnation of all violations of IHL, including “ethnic cleansing”;
expressed concern about the “pattern of hostilities by Bosnian Serb paramilitary units
against towns and villages in eastern Bosnia”; and demanded that the FRY immediately
cease the supply of military arms, equipment and services to the Bosnian Serb paramilitary
units in BiH.4116
(ix)
On 24 August 1993, the UNSC passed Resolution 859, which particularly noted that
the Bosnian Serb Party had yet to comply with all relevant UNSC resolutions and
4109
4110
4111
4112
4113
4114
4115
4116
Ex. P2438, UNSC Resolution 771, 13 August 1992, p. 1.
Ex. P2451, UNSC Resolution 780, 6 October 1992.
Ibid.
Ex. P2452, UNSC Resolution 808, 22 February 1993. See also Muhamed Sacirbey, T. 7233.
Ex. P2453, UNSC Resolution 827, 25 May 1993.
Ibid.
Ex. P208, UNSC Resolution 819, 16 April 1993, p. 1. BiH’s application before the ICJ was filed on 20 March
1993 and sought that the FRY cease all of its involvement in violations of international humanitarian law in BiH.
On 8 April 1993, the ICJ indicated that as a provisional measure, the FRY government should immediately take
all measures within its power to prevent genocide in BiH. The FRY responded to the BiH’s application.
Muhamed Sacirbey, T. 7266-7270, 7274-7276; Ex. P2460, ICJ Order of 8 April 1993; Ex. P2461, Letter of the
SG of the UN to the President of the UNSC, 29 April 1993.
Ex. P208, UNSC Resolution 819, 16 April 1993, p. 1.
457
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condemned “all war crimes and other violations of international humanitarian law, by
whomever committed, Bosnian Serbs or other individuals”.4117 The Resolution further
expressed “[c]oncern about the continuing siege of Sarajevo, Mostar and other threatened
cities”.4118
1451. On 18 August 1992, five days after the UNSC issued Resolution 771, the FRY leadership
discussed information it had received from the UN about the FRY’s alleged assistance in ethnic
cleansing. Milan Pani}, President of the Federal Government of the FRY, explained that he had
been personally informed by the UN that he should stop the ethnic cleansing in Sanski Most, where
15,000 Muslims had been given eight hours to leave their homes and travel twenty kilometres to
Jajce.4119 Pani} expressed deep concern that the FRY could not silence the persistent talk about
ethnic cleansing, and that it did not matter what the FRY actually did or said but only “what the
whole world thinks”.4120
1452. Also in August 1992, the UN Human Rights Commission appointed Tadeusz Mazowiecki as
Special Rapporteur to report on the human rights situation in the territory of the former
Yugoslavia.4121 Prior to Peri{i}’s appointment as Chief of the VJ General Staff, Mazowiecki issued
five reports, which concluded that ethnic cleansing had been committed in Serb-controlled areas
with the involvement of “Serb soldiers” and “Serbian mercenaries”.4122 Muhamed Sacirbey, the
BiH Ambassador to the UN during the war, testified that Mazowiecki received most of his
information on the ground, and that he reviewed the facts in the BiH first-hand.4123 Sacirbey also
testified that Mazowiecki’s reports were extensively covered in the media.4124
4117
4118
4119
4120
4121
4122
4123
4124
Ex. P2474, UNSC Resolution 859, 24 August 1993.
Ibid.
Ex. P2883, Short Hand Notes from the Session of the Council for Coordination of State Policy, 18 August 1992,
p. 18.
Ex. P2883, Short Hand Notes from the Session of the Council for Coordination of State Policy, 18 August 1992,
pp 18-19.
Muhamed Sacirbey, T. 7198-7199, 7215. See Ex. P2439, Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission
on Human Rights, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, on the Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the Former
Yugoslavia, 28 August 1992.
Ex. P2439, Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, on the
Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, 28 August 1992; Ex. P2440, Report of the
Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, on the Situation of Human
Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, 27 October 1992; Ex. P2441, Report of the Special Rapporteur
of the Commission on Human Rights, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, on the Situation of Human Rights in the Territory
of the Former Yugoslavia, 17 November 1992; Ex. P2442, Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission
on Human Rights, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, on the Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the Former
Yugoslavia, 10 February 1993; Ex. P2443, Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human
Rights, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, on the Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia,
5 May 1993.
Muhamed Sacirbey, T. 7215.
Muhamed Sacirbey, T. 7224.
458
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1453. The commission of crimes “by Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina” was mentioned at the 6th
SDC Session on 9 December 1992.4125 At the 8th SDC Session on 12 March 1993, one of
Mazowiecki’s reports was mentioned in the context of a discussion on paramilitary formations and
alleged human rights violations.4126
1454. The evidence demonstrates that prior to Peri{i}’s appointment as Chief of the VJ General
Staff, the FRY leadership monitored what other countries were saying about the FRY’s
involvement in the war, and that it was aware of allegations of ethnic cleansing in BiH made by the
UN and by Special Rapporteur Mazowiecki.
1455. The following observations and findings on the UNSC Resolutions and the Mazowiecki
reports are made by the Majority of the Trial Chamber, Judge Moloto dissenting.
1456. The Majority notes that no direct evidence shows that Peri{i} had knowledge of the UNSC
Resolutions and the Mazowiecki reports issued prior to his appointment as Chief of the VJ General
Staff. However, the Majority recalls that these documents expressing alarm about serious violations
of IHL, ethnic cleansing and other crimes committed in BiH were public documents.4127
Furthermore, the Majority notes that between January and May 1992, at a time when the situation
was already rapidly deteriorating in BiH, Peri{i} was stationed in BiH and was therefore directly
exposed to these events. Thereafter, in May 1992, Peri{i} held a position of authority as Chief of
Staff and Deputy Commander of the 3rd Army within the VJ and in April 1993, he became the
Commander of the 3rd Army.4128 As Commander of the 3rd Army, Peri{i} attended meetings of the
Supreme Command Staff where the FRY leadership also discussed events related to the conflict.4129
The Majority also notes that the criminal allegations denounced by the international community
were extensively covered in the media4130 and of such a scale and gravity that the Tribunal was
established to investigate and prosecute them. Based on this circumstantial evidence, the Majority
finds that the evidence leads to the only reasonable inference that Peri{i} generally knew of basic
allegations of war crimes reported in the UNSC Resolutions and the Mazowiecki reports already
prior to his appointment as Chief of the VJ General Staff.4131
4125
4126
4127
4128
4129
4130
4131
Ex. P788, Stenographic Transcript of the 6th Session of the SDC, 9 December 1992, pp 17-18.
Ex. P2692, Shorthand Notes, 8th SDC Session, 12 March 1993, p. 45.
See supra paras 1450-1452.
Ex. P706, Peri{i}’s Written Response to a Question from Trial Attorney, 23 July 1998, p. 2.
See supra para. 1446.
See infra section VI.J.3.(c).
The Prosecution has also submitted into evidence General John Wilson’s final report as Chief of UNPROFOR’s
UNMO Group, which was tasked with monitoring the security situation in BiH. The report, dated 15 November
1992, observes that in BiH “[t]here are appalling violations of human rights by all parties but, in particular by
Serb forces”, and that [l]arge scale conventional military operations continue with a view to securing an ethnic
division of the Republic”. Ex. P148, Final Report on Tour with UNPROFOR Brigadier Wilson,
459
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(b) Evidence Following Peri{i}’s Appointment as Chief of the VJ General Staff
1457. The Trial Chamber will now consider whether the evidence demonstrates that after being
appointed Chief of the VJ General Staff, and throughout the period relevant to the Indictment,
Peri{i} was aware of the VRS’s discriminatory intent and propensity to commit crimes.
(i) Statements by Peri{i}
1458. In his OTP interview, Peri{i} was questioned about his relationship with Mladi} while
serving as Chief of the VJ General Staff.4132 Peri{i} stated:
Well, he was keeping a certain distance from me, because he knew very well that I was against
any illicit actions in the course of implementation of tasks. The entire leadership of the [RS] knew
that I was against any destruction of buildings, against any [….] use of force against the civilian
population and so on.4133
1459. At the 21st SDC Session on 7 June 1994, Peri{i} raised the issue of Muslim military students
from the RS and RSK who were completing their education in the VJ. He warned: “this is very
important, if we send the Muslims there [i.e., to the RS and RSK], they’ll kill them”.4134
1460. These statements show that Peri{i} was aware that the VRS was committing crimes against
civilians in BiH in the implementation of its objectives and was particularly hostile to Muslims.
(ii) Information Received through the UN and Other Diplomatic Channels
1461. The FRY government received, through the UN and other diplomatic channels, a large
amount of information about crimes committed by the VRS against the civilian population in BiH,
including “ethnic cleansing”.
1462. Sacirbey testified that between May 1992 and the end of 1995, representatives of BiH
(although not Sacirbey himself) had extensive contacts with the staff of the FRY mission to the UN,
including the FRY ambassador.4135 These contacts were more extensive towards the end of this
period.4136 Sacirbey testified that the FRY representatives were quite well informed as to the events
4132
4133
4134
4135
4136
15 November 1992, p. 3. Because there is no indication that the final report was made public during the period
relevant to the Indictment, and because General Wilson’s testimony dates from 2005, the evidence carries no
weight in establishing whether Peri{i} could be placed on notice of the facts contained therein.
Ex. P815, Transcript of Interview with Periši}, 25 January 2004, pp 22-23.
Ex. P815, Transcript of Interview with Periši}, 25 January 2004, p. 23.
Ex. P776, Stenographic Transcript of the 21st Session of the SDC held on 7 June 1994, p. 41.
Muhamed Sacirbey, T. 7131-7132, 7137-7138. See Muhamed Sacirbey, T. 7133 (describing the BiH mission to
the UN); Muhamed Sacirbey, T. 7136 (describing contacts between Sacirbey’s deputy and FRY ambassador
\oki}).
Muhamed Sacirbey, T. 7132.
460
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in BiH.4137 The issues that the BiH tried to bring to the attention of the FRY representatives
included reports on atrocities and military actions within BiH, reports by the UN Secretary-General
on the condition of the population, and the effects of military actions on the humanitarian situation,
including the delivery of food and medicines.4138
1463. Sacirbey also testified that, starting in the fall of 1992, the UNGA and the UNSC held
frequent discussions about the war in BiH, and that, as far as he was aware, a representative of the
FRY mission had always been present.4139 The UNSC was able to draw on information from
various sources, including UNPROFOR, UN rapporteurs, the EU monitoring system and other
organisations of states, individual UN member states, and the media.4140 The UNSC also received
reports from the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and the ICRC.4141 Sacirbey testified that
while the UNSC received some confidential briefings, by and large, most of the information that
was available to the UNSC was eventually available to all member states, as well as to diplomatic
staff and the media.4142
1464. Sacirbey further testified that whenever the BiH UN Mission received relevant information
about the war from a credible source, it would pass the information on to the President of the
UNSC, or sometimes to the UN Secretary-General or the UNGA, with a request that the
information be distributed as a document of that UN organ to all member states, including the
FRY.4143 In some instances, the BiH Mission would send the information directly to the
representatives of member states.4144 Sacirbey testified that the information forwarded by the BiH
Mission mostly concerned such topics as the “human situation on the ground”, the “abuse of the
population, what we referred to at that time as genocide”, and the “humanitarian situation, the
interruption of food and medicines”.4145 Sacirbey estimated that the BiH Mission forwarded about
200 documents per year, as it tried to convey—to the FRY, to the international community, and to
the media—not only individual acts that occurred, but also a “systematic approach on the part of the
forces of [the FRY] and their agents in Bosnia”.4146
4137
4138
4139
4140
4141
4142
4143
4144
4145
4146
Muhamed Sacirbey, T. 7139.
Muhamed Sacirbey, T. 7139.
Muhamed Sacirbey, T. 7140.
Muhamed Sacirbey, T. 7141. See also Muhamed Sacirbey, T. 7383-7385; Ex. P2479, UNSC Resolution 941,
23 September 1994.
See Muhamed Sacirbey, T. 7383-7385; Ex. P2479, UNSC Resolution 941, 23 September 1994.
Muhamed Sacirbey, T. 7142-7143.
Muhamed Sacirbey, T. 7143-7145.
Muhamed Sacirbey, T. 7144.
Muhamed Sacirbey, T. 7145.
Muhamed Sacirbey, T. 7146. Sacirbey further testified that the UNSC also received reports from the UNHCR
and the ICRC regarding grave violations of international humanitarian law in the Serb-held territories of BiH.
The reports mentioned, inter alia, the practice of ethnic cleansing in Banja Luka and Bijeljina, Muhamed
Sacirbey, T. 7383-7385; Ex. P2479, UNSC Resolution 941, 23 September 1994.
461
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1465. On 27 May 1994, a Commission of Experts, established pursuant to UNSC Resolution
780,4147 produced a report in which it examined the evidence of grave breaches of the Geneva
Conventions and violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the
former Yugoslavia.4148 The Commission concluded that a policy of “ethnic cleansing” had been put
into practice by Serbs in BiH and Croatia and by their supporters in the FRY.4149 Sacirbey testified
that the report was the subject of extensive discussion at the UN—at least prior to the report being
published—and was widely discussed and disseminated in the media.4150 The report was published
in its entirety in the Belgrade newspaper Borba between 14 July 1994 and 12 August 1994.4151
1466. In its report, the Commission of Experts described the pattern of ethnic cleansing in the BiH
as follows:
First, Bosnian Serb paramilitary forces, often with the assistance of the JNA, seize control of the
area. In many cases, Serbian residents are told to leave the area before the violence begins. The
homes of non-Serb residents are targeted for destruction and cultural and religious monuments,
especially churches and mosques, are destroyed. Second, the area falls under the control of
paramilitary forces who terrorize the non-Serb residents with random killings, rapes and looting.
Third, the seized area is administered by local Serb authorities, often in conjunction with
paramilitary groups. During this phase, non-Serb residents are detained, beaten, and sometimes
transferred to prison camps where further abuse, including mass killings, have occurred.4152
1467. The Commission found that the manner in which the policy of ethnic cleansing was carried
out by Serbs in Bosnia was “consistent throughout a certain geographic area represented by an arc
ranging from northern Bosnia and covering areas in eastern and western Bosnia adjoining the Serb
Krajina area in Croatia”, and that the practice of ethnic cleansing was carried out in “strategic areas
linking Serbia proper with Serb-inhabited areas of Bosnia and Croatia”.4153
1468. The Commission observed that the “JNA and Army of the so-called ‘Bosnian-Serb
Republic’ have been involved in carrying out and facilitating the policy and practices of ‘ethnic
cleansing’ in certain parts of the territory”, and that the “leaders of Bosnian Serbs influenced,
4147
4148
4149
4150
4151
4152
Ex. P2451, UNSC Resolution 780, 6 October 1992.
Ex. P1536, Letter of the UN Secretary General to the President of the UNSC along with Final Report of the UN
Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to UNSC Resolution 780 (1992), 27 May 1994; Ex. P1535,
Annexes to the Final Report of the UN Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to the UNSC Resolution
780 (1992), 27 May 1994.
Ex. P1536, Letter of the UN Secretary General to the President of the UNSC along with Final Report of the UN
Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to UNSC Resolution 780 (1992), 27 May 1994, para. 133.
Muhamed Sacirbey, T. 7376-7381. See also Ex. P1536, Letter of the UN Secretary General to the President of
the UNSC along with Final Report of the UN Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to UNSC Resolution
780 (1992), 27 May 1994, p. 1; Muhamed Sacirbey, T. 7363-7364.
Ex. P1112, Borba Article Reproducing the Report of the UN War Crimes Commission for Former Yugoslavia,
14 July 1994.
Ex. P1535, Annexes to the Final Report of the UN Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to the UNSC
Resolution 780 (1992), 27 May 1994, para. 110; see Ex. P1536, Letter of the UN Secretary General to the
President of the UNSC along with Final Report of the UN Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to
UNSC Resolution 780 (1992), 27 May 1994, paras 134-137.
462
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encouraged, facilitated and condoned” the most marginal social elements of Bosnian society to
carry out the crimes implementing the policy of ethnic cleansing.4154 The Commission concluded
that the practice of ethnic cleansing was purposeful and systematic, and carried out by “persons
from all segments of the Serbian population in the area described: members of the army, militias,
special forces, the police and civilians”.4155
1469. On 23 September 1994, the UNSC issued Resolution 941, in which it took note of
information provided by the UNHCR and the ICRC, contained in other relevant reports, regarding
“grave violations of international humanitarian law affecting the non-Serb population in those areas
of the [BiH] under the control of Bosnian Serb force”.4156 The UNSC expressed grave concern at
the “persistent and systematic campaign of terror perpetrated by the Bosnian Serb forces in Banja
Luka, Bijeljina and other areas of the [BiH] under the control of Bosnian Serb forces”, and
emphasised that “this practice of ‘ethnic cleansing’ by the Bosnian Serb forces constitutes a clear
violation of international humanitarian law”.4157 Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the
UNSC demanded that the “Bosnian Serb authorities immediately cease their campaign of ‘ethnic
cleansing’”.4158
1470. Special Rapporteur Mazowiecki continued to submit reports to the UN on the human rights
situation in the territory of the former Yugoslavia until August 1995,4159 after which Mazowiecki’s
successor, Elisabeth Rehn, submitted another report in November 1995.4160 These reports were
released as documents of the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and the Human Rights
4153
4154
4155
4156
4157
4158
4159
4160
Ex. P1536, Letter of the UN Secretary General to the President of the UNSC along with Final Report of the UN
Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to UNSC Resolution 780 (1992), 27 May 1994, para. 131.
Ex. P1536, Letter of the UN Secretary General to the President of the UNSC along with Final Report of the UN
Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to UNSC Resolution 780 (1992), 27 May 1994, para. 141.
Ex. P1536, Letter of the UN Secretary General to the President of the UNSC along with Final Report of the UN
Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to UNSC Resolution 780 (1992), 27 May 1994, para. 142.
Ex. P2479, UNSC Resolution 941, 23 September 1994.
Ibid.
Ibid.
See Ex. P2444, Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, on
the Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, 26 August 1993; Ex. P2445, Report of
the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, on the Situation of Human
Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, 21 February 1994; Ex. P2446, Report of the Special
Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, on the Situation of Human Rights in the
Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, 4 November 1994; Ex. P2447, Report of the Special Rapporteur of the
Commission on Human Rights, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, on the Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the
Former Yugoslavia, 16 January 1995; Ex. P2448, Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on
Human Rights, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, on the Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the Former
Yugoslavia, 5 July 1995; Ex. P2449, Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights,
Tadeusz Mazowiecki, on the Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia,
22 August 1995.
Ex. P2450, Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, Elisabeth Rehn, on the
Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, 7 November 1995.
463
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Commission.4161 They were circulated to the entire UN membership, including the FRY.4162
Sacirbey testified that these reports were also discussed extensively at the UNSC.4163
1471. Mazowiecki’s reports brought to light information about instances of murder, rape, forced
deportation, ethnic cleansing, detention, denial of access to water and medicine, and destruction of
cultural and religious sites.4164
1472. The evidence shows that FRY representatives received and were familiar with the content of
Mazowiecki’s reports.4165 In a note verbale to the ECOSOC sub-commission, the FRY Mission to
the UN provided detailed comments on Mazowiecki’s sixth periodic report and noted that it had
previously responded to Mazowiecki’s earlier reports.4166 Further, Sacirbey testified that FRY
representatives were present when the reports were discussed within the UNSC and other UN
bodies.4167 Sacirbey also testified that the reports were discussed in the media including those in the
Balkans.4168
1473. The case between BiH and Serbia and Montenegro before the ICJ on the application of the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide also put on notice the FRY
authorities of allegations of VRS’s discriminatory intent and criminal behaviour. The FRY
responded to the BiH’s application of 20 March 1993 and the proceedings lasted throughout the
Indictment period.4169
1474. The following evidence shows that Peri{i} was generally concerned about and aware of the
international community’s views about Bosnian Serbs’ activity in BiH.
1475. On 23 February 1994, Peri{i} wrote to Karadži}, Mladi} and VRS Corps Commanders,
stating that he had received information from reliable sources that “in the EU a mood exists that the
smallest of incidents in the territory of the former BH, for which the Serb side could be blamed,
could be used as a cause for utilising close air support to UN forces”.4170
4161
4162
4163
4164
4165
4166
4167
4168
4169
4170
Muhamed Sacirbey, T. 7217.
Muhamed Sacirbey, T. 7217-7218.
Muhamed Sacirbey, T. 7217-7218.
Ex. P2439, Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, on the
Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, 28 August 1992, referring to the ethnic
cleansing. See also Muhamed Sacirbey, T. 7219-7220, 7224-7226.
Muhamed Sacirbey, T. 7221.
Ex. P2464, Note Verbale from the Permanent Mission of the FRY to the UN, 5 August 1994, p. 2.
Muhamed Sacirbey, T. 7221-7224, 7239-7240.
Muhamed Sacirbey, T. 7223-7224.
The ICJ rendered its judgement in 2007, Muhamed Sacirbey, T. 7274-7275.
Ex. P2160, Perišić’s Communication to Mladić and Other VRS Commanders, 23 February 1994.
464
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1476. At the 25th SDC Session on 30 August 1994, the Chief of the VJ Intelligence
Administration, Colonel Branko Krga, under Peri{i}’s instruction and in Peri{i}’s presence, gave a
presentation.4171 Krga explained that since the FRY had accepted the peace plan of the Contact
Group, the international community had taken a more favourable attitude toward the FRY. He noted
that “after a long period of isolation and accusations, a profoundly new attitude of the international
community towards the [FRY] is becoming apparent”, as reflected in visits paid by foreign political
delegations and in “more favourable coverage of the FRY by foreign media, including those from
Germany and America”.4172 Krga also analysed how the FRY should respond to imposed
sanctions.4173 Krga explained that “[i]n our contacts with international representatives, we must
insist that [the issue of installing observers on the river Drina] be never put on the agenda of
UNSC”.4174 He cautioned that even if the FRY were to accept observers, sanctions would not
automatically be lifted, as new conditions were raised, including “the issue of human rights,
readiness to cooperate with the International War Crimes Tribunal, etc”.4175 Finally, Krga mapped
out possible political scenarios if the RS were to reject the peace plan. He concluded that “[h]aving
analysed the reaction of the international community”, the FRY’s best option was to continue
seeking a political solution in the BiH, but noted that “it is obvious that the most important
international players have agreed that they would not allow any party to achieve a compelling
victory, or establish Muslim or Serbian ethnically pure states”.4176
1477. The Defence argues generally that there is insufficient evidence to infer that the information
about the war provided to the FRY Mission to the UN or to the FRY authorities in Belgrade was in
fact known by Peri{i}.4177 More specifically, the Defence argues that there is no evidence that
Peri{i} personally had knowledge of discussions held at the UNSC sessions or of the BiH Mission’s
communications to the UNSC.4178
1478. The evidence shows that Peri{i}, as Chief of the VJ General Staff, was directly informed
about at least some of the UNSC proceedings and communications concerning accusation of crimes
committed by the VRS. Throughout the war, the FRY Mission to the UN sent numerous diplomatic
cables to the FRY leadership in Belgrade to inform them about discussions held and resolutions
4171
4172
4173
4174
4175
4176
4177
4178
Ex. P778, Stenographic Transcript of the 25th Session of the SDC held on 30 August 1994, pp 6-18.
Ex. P778, Stenographic Transcript of the 25th Session of the SDC held on 30 August 1994, p. 7.
Ex. P778, Stenographic Transcript of the 25th Session of the SDC held on 30 August 1994, p. 8.
Ex. P778, Stenographic Transcript of the 25th Session of the SDC held on 30 August 1994, pp 8, 10. Krga also
listed as a potential effect of the FRY accepting observers that “the possibilities of providing assistance to the
[RS] would be narrowed down”, Ex. P778, Stenographic Transcript of the 25th Session of the SDC held on
30 August 1994, p. 9.
Ex. P778, Stenographic Transcript of the 25th Session of the SDC held on 30 August 1994, p. 11.
Ex. P778, Stenographic Transcript of the 25th Session of the SDC held on 30 August 1994, pp 16-17.
Defence Final Brief, paras 840-841.
Defence Final Brief, para. 843.
465
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adopted by the UNSC.4179 Peri{i} was copied directly on several of those cables concerning shelling
and sniping incidents in Sarajevo, as well as the VRS attack on Srebrenica.4180 That evidence shows
not only that Peri{i} was aware of certain discussions by the UNSC, but also that Peri{i} knew that
the VRS was being accused of attacking civilians and committing other serious violations of
international humanitarian law. Moreover, Colonel Krga’s presentation at the 25th SDC Session
shows that both the VJ Intelligence Administration and Peri{i} personally were aware of the
UNSC’s agenda and more generally of the international community’s political views and attitudes,
including international media coverage, regarding the conflict in BiH.4181
1479. The Defence also argues that there is no evidence that Peri{i} read or had any knowledge of
the Mazowiecki reports issued by the UN Commission on Human Rights.4182 While there is no
direct evidence that Peri{i} knew about the reports, the Majority, Judge Moloto dissenting, makes
the following observations.
1480. The Majority recalls that the Mazowiecki reports were discussed extensively at the UNSC
(in the presence of FRY representatives).4183 The diplomatic cables copied to Peri{i} and the
presentation by Colonel Krga also show that Peri{i} was put on notice of at least certain
proceedings before the UNSC.4184 Furthermore, the FRY Mission deemed the Mazowiecki reports
sufficiently important to formally respond to at least several of them.4185 The fact that, as the
Defence points out, the FRY Mission rejected the content of the reports, confirms that the Mission
was aware of their content.4186 Mazowiecki’s reports were among the documents that BiH filed with
the ICJ in support of its application against Serbia and Montenegro,4187 a high profile case that was
the subject of UNSC Resolution 819.4188 Finally, Mazowiecki’s conclusions about the humanitarian
situation in BiH were discussed in the media,4189 and Peri{i} was informed of the media’s reporting
4179
4180
4181
4182
4183
4184
4185
4186
4187
4188
4189
See e.g. Ex. P852 (under seal); Ex. P853 (under seal); Ex. P854 (under seal); Ex. P855 (under seal); Ex. P858
(under seal); Ex. P896 (under seal); Ex. P897 (under seal); Ex. P898 (under seal); Ex. P899 (under seal);
Ex. P900 (under seal); Ex. P1832, FRY Diplomatic Cable, 26 May 1995. Several of these cables are discussed in
the sections of the Judgement addressing Peri{i}’s knowledge about crimes committed in Sarajevo and
Srebrenica – see infra paras 1489-1495, 1546-1553.
Ex. P852 (under seal) Ex. P853 (under seal); Muhamed Sacirbey, T. 7470-7471; Ex. P1832, FRY Diplomatic
Cable, 26 May 1995; Ex. P854 (under seal); Ex. P896 (under seal); Ex. P897 (under seal); Ex. P855 (under seal).
See infra paras 1489, 1549-1553.
Ex. P778, Stenographic Transcript of the 25th SDC, 30 August 1994, pp 8, 10.
Defence Final Brief, para. 842.
Muhamed Sacirbey, T. 7217.
E.g. Ex. P852 (under seal); Ex. P778, Stenographic Transcript of the 25th Session of the SDC, 30 August 1994,
pp 8, 10.
Ex. P2464, Note Verbale from the Permanent Mission of the FRY to the UN, 5 August 1994.
See Defence Final Brief, para. 842. As the Defence points out, the Prosecution introduced the Mazowiecki
reports into evidence for the purpose of establishing the FRY’s notice of their content, not for the purpose of
proving the truth of the matters asserted in the reports. See Muhamed Sacirbey, T. 7203.
Muhamed Sacirbey, T. 7272-7273.
Ex. P208, UNSC Resolution 819, 16 April 1993.
Muhamed Sacirbey, T. 7223-7224.
466
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on the war in BiH.4190 On 22 July 1994, the Borba Daily published an article with the headline
“What does the Federal Government hold against Tadeusz Mazowiecki’s Sixth Report on the
Human Rights situation in the FRY?”, in which it described the FRY’s criticism of Mazowiecki’s
report, raised in its note verbale to the ECOSOC sub-commission.4191
1481. The Defence argues that there is no evidence that Peri{i} or anyone from the VJ or VJ
intelligence organs read the publication in Borba regarding the report by the UN Commission of
Experts about violations of IHL in the former Yugoslavia.4192 While there is no direct evidence that
Peri{i} read the report as published in Borba, the Majority is satisfied that the publication was
available to him. In this regard, the Majority recalls the evidence that Peri{i} was kept abreast of
media information through the Information Administration of the VJ General Staff.4193
1482. The Majority finds that, collectively, the aforesaid evidence leads to the only reasonable
conclusion that the Mazowiecki reports—which were periodically issued from 1992 to 1995—were
of such interest to the FRY authorities and were publicised to such an extent that the information
contained therein was known to Peri{i}.
(c)
Conclusion
1483. The following observations and findings are made by the Majority of the Trial Chamber,
Judge Moloto dissenting.
1484. The Trial Chamber finds that direct evidence establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that
Perišić knew even before being appointed Chief of the VJ General Staff that the VRS was
perpetrating gratuitous acts of violence against Bosnian Muslims and that the international
community considered the crimes occurring in BiH to be of such magnitude that an extraordinary
step was taken in creating the Tribunal. Furthermore, Perišić’s statements in his interview
corroborate his direct knowledge of the ethnic hostilities during the war and that Mladić was using
force against civilians.
1485. In addition to the foregoing direct evidence, the Majority recalls the evidence that the Chief
of the VJ’s Intelligence Administration, Colonel Branko Krga, made a presentation to the FRY
SDC reporting the views of the international community, inter alia, on questions of human rights
and the creation of the Tribunal. The Majority recalls that Peri{i}, as Chief of the VJ General Staff,
was in charge of the “highest professional and staff organ for the preparation and use of the Army
4190
4191
4192
4193
See supra section VI.I.2.
Ex. P2877, Article in Borba, 22 July 1994.
Defence Final Brief para. 844.
See supra paras 1396-1399.
467
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in times of peace and war”.4194 By virtue of his position, he closely monitored the events unfolding
in BiH, a bordering country where a conflict was ongoing.4195 The evidence that Perišić received
daily reports on information gathered by his intelligence and security organs. Miodrag Simić, Chief
of the 1st Administration within the VJ from November 1994, testified that it was in “the interest of
the [VJ] for the sake of its security to be constantly informed of what was going on in that area”.4196
Against this backdrop, the Majority is of the view that Krga’s presentation is not an isolated
example and that the VJ’s Intelligence Administration regularly informed Perišić of the events in
BiH and general opinion of the international community. In this regard, the Majority recalls that the
international community was widely concerned about grave allegations of human rights abuses
committed by Serb military forces in BiH from the beginning stages of the war. These allegations
were extensively and regularly discussed at the UNSC, in diplomatic circles and in the international
media, and were matters of common knowledge. The Majority concludes that the only reasonable
inference is that the VJ’s Intelligence Administration notified Perišić of these criminal allegations.
1486. Based on the aforementioned evidence, the Majority is satisfied that Peri{i}, from the early
stages of the war, was aware of the VRS’s discriminatory intent and criminal conduct in BiH.
1487. The Trial Chamber will now consider to what extent Peri{i} had specific knowledge that the
VRS was committing crimes in Sarajevo.
3. Peri{i}’s Knowledge of Crimes Committed by the VRS in Sarajevo
1488. The Trial Chamber has been presented with direct evidence to show that Peri{i}, once he
became Chief of the VJ General Staff, was informed about several incidents in Sarajevo.
(a) Diplomatic Cables
1489. In 1994 and 1995, Peri{i} was directly copied on the following two diplomatic cables from
the FRY’s UN Mission in New York:4197
(i)
A cable dated 7 February 1994 discussed the international community’s reaction to
two of the Scheduled Incidents in the Indictment: the artillery attack on the Dobrinja suburb
4194
4195
4196
4197
See supra para. 206.
See supra paras 1390-1404. See e.g. Ex. P2211, Transcript of the Collegium of the Chief of the VJ General Staff,
19 October 1995, p. 1; Ex. P2215, Transcript of the Collegium of the Chief of the VJ General Staff, 23 October
1995, p. 2; Ex. P2214, Tasking of General Perišić Recorded at the Collegium of the Chief of the VJ General
Staff, 18 September 1995, p. 4; Ex. P2885, Minutes of the Collegium of the VJ General Staff, 27 November
1995, Doc IDs 0618-7643, p. 3; 0618-7634, p. 2.
Miodrag Simić, T. 10341.
Sini{a Borovi}, Peri{i}’s Chef de Cabinet, confirmed that the office of the VJ General Staff received coded
telegrams from military attaches in its missions abroad, which were decoded in that office, Sini{a Borovi},
T. 13918.
468
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of Sarajevo on 4 February 1994 (“Scheduled Incident A2”), and the shelling of Markale
market in Sarajevo on 5 February 1994 (Markale I) (“Scheduled Incident A3”).4198 It
specifically referred to “Saturday’s incident in Sarajevo” and referenced an UNPROFOR
finding that the “Serbian side was responsible for the previous attack on Dobrinja
(4 February 1994)”.4199 The cable stated that as a result of the most recent incident, NATO
air-strikes against the Serb artillery positions outside Sarajevo were being considered.4200
The cable also referenced an UNPROFOR finding that the Serb artillery positions were
“responsible for the attacks on civilian targets in the city”.4201
(ii)
A cable dated 10 April 1995 stated that UN Under-Secretary-General Gharekhan had
reported that the “situation in and around Sarajevo” had “worsened” and that “sniper
activities and artillery attacks from large calibre guns had increased”.4202 The cable added
that in one day, “three 120mm projectiles were fired on Sarajevo from the positions of
Bosnian Serbs, after which UN requested NATO’s reconnaissance flights above the
city”.4203
1490. In addition to the diplomatic cables copied to Peri{i} directly, the VJ General Staff received
two cables from the FRY’s London Mission relating to the siege of Sarajevo. On 11 January 1994,
the Mission informed the VJ Intelligence Administration that top British officials were of the
opinion that “the bombardment of Sarajevo must be halted at once”.4204 On 7 February 1994, the
Mission—apparently referring to the Markale I shelling (Scheduled Incident A3)—informed the
Intelligence Administration that “[t]he mass media here and in the West are widely manipulating
the latest massacre of civilians in Sarajevo and pressing governments to adopt a decision on air
strikes against Serbian positions around Sarajevo”.4205
1491. Peri{i} was also copied on a telegram from the FRY Mission in Rome, dated 9 December
1994, that provided information about crimes in Sarajevo.4206 The telegram asserted that recent
reporting by the Italian media about the situation in BiH had been one-sided, in that blame was
placed on the Serbs and that the most-quoted sources were UNPROFOR, representatives of
humanitarian organisations, and special rapporteurs. According to the telegram, the main point of
the media reports had been that the SVK and VRS continued their attacks by, among other things,
4198
4199
4200
4201
4202
4203
4204
4205
4206
See Muhamed Sacirbey, T. 7353-7355 (private session).
Ex. P852 (under seal), pp 1-2.
Ex. P852 (under seal), p. 2.
Ibid.
Ex. P853 (under seal); Muhamed Sacirbey, T. 7470-7471 (closed session).
Ibid.
Ex. P2853 (under seal).
Ex. P2852 (under seal).
Ex. P2855 (under seal).
469
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firing missiles on the facilities of the Muslim government in Sarajevo and blocking humanitarian
aid on land and in the air, which would lead to hunger and freezing of the population in Biha} and
Sarajevo. The telegram stated that by way of contrast there had been no media reports on “what the
Muslims or the Croats are doing”.4207
1492. At the 18th SDC Session on 7 February 1994, two days after the Markale I incident
(Scheduled Incident A3) had occurred, Peri{i} addressed the use of certain explosive devices in
Sarajevo and cited the explosion of a shell that had resulted in “massive losses”.4208 The Trial
Chamber is satisfied that this discussion concerned the Markale I incident, as at the SDC meeting,
Peri{i} described the explosion site as a small area that was closed off on all sides by buildings,
where a large number of people was concentrated, and which featured a tram stop.4209 Slobodan
Milo{evi} added that the shell had purportedly hit a “stall”.4210 The Trial Chamber notes that Peri{i}
also stated that people in the RS maintained that they were not responsible for the incident, and he
expressed the view that the likelihood was indeed small.4211 He added:
I think that it would be a good idea to prepare [special projectiles that do not hit the ground] and to
have the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia issue a statement. Our military
experts claim that this is impossible. We assume that the same was done in Vase Miskina Streetthat the explosive was prepared ahead of time and placed in a number of spots and that at a given
moment the signal was given to set it off when the largest number of people were there. Second,
there are those who believe that one of their projectiles which was just supposed to mask those
effects was actually used. That’s our understanding. The likelihood that a 120mm calibre projectile
can kill so many people in that space is very small. We assume that the mujahedin did it, because
they are against any kind of negotiations and agreements. Second the possibility that the Croats
did it can not be excluded, so as to divert the attention from the threat of sanctions. It is impossible
that the Serbs in Sarajevo set it up, except from a distance.4212
1493. At a 29 August 1995 meeting in Dobanovci of the highest political and military leadership
of the FRY and the RS, including Peri{i}, President Milo{evi} addressed the fact that a shell had
been fired at Markale and had killed a number of civilians.4213 Milo{evi} cited a UN source as
stating that it had been proved that the shell was fired from Serbian positions,4214 while Mladi} cited
a statement by a different UN source which, in Mladi}’s view, demonstrated that the shell could not
have come from Serbian positions.4215
4207
4208
4209
4210
4211
4212
4213
4214
4215
Ex. P2855 (under seal).
Ex. P782, Stenographic Transcript of the 18th Session of the SDC held on 7 February 1994, p. 60.
Ex. P782, Stenographic Transcript of the 18th Session of the SDC held on 7 February 1994, pp 60-61
Ex. P782, Stenographic Transcript of the 18th Session of the SDC held on 7 February 1994, pp 60-61. See also
supra paras 350-358.
Ex. P782, Stenographic Transcript of the 18th Session of the SDC held on 7 February 1994, p. 60.
Ex. P782, Stenographic Transcript of the 18th Session of the SDC held on 7 February 1994, p. 61.
Ex. P232, Notes of Meeting Held in Dobanovci, 30 August 1995, p. 5.
Ex. P232, Notes of Meeting Held in Dobanovci, 30 August 1995, pp 5, 12.
Ex. P232, Notes of Meeting Held in Dobanovci, 30 August 1995, p. 12.
470
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1494. On 11 October 1995, the Intelligence Administration of the VJ General Staff reported to the
FRY MOD on the Markale II incident (Scheduled Incident A9) discussing UNPROFOR’s
accusation that the VRS was responsible for the shelling:
By repeating the scenario at the Sarajevo Markale market on 28 August 1995 at 1120 hours, fresh
conditions have been created for giving the Serbs yet another ultimatum by NATO. Namely, only
half an hour after the event mentioned above, Muslim TV screened images from the location of the
incident blaming the Serbs for it […]. The following day […] UNPROFOR blamed Serbs for the
massacre, a ballistic expert carried out an expert examination only at 1100 hours. The expert
examination was not carried out on location (they did not allow the Muslims to carry it out) but on
the basis of photographs, sketches and TV images. The dead and the wounded were not examined,
nor was any type of medical examination carried out.4216
1495. In addition to the evidence discussed above, the Trial Chamber has been presented with
significant circumstantial evidence which includes documentation by the international community
of crimes committed in Sarajevo and widespread media coverage of the siege of Sarajevo.
(b) Documentation by the International Community of Crimes in Sarajevo
1496. Starting in the spring of 1992, the UNSC discussed the shelling and sniping campaign in
Sarajevo almost daily and issued several resolutions on the topic.4217 Sacirbey also testified that
leading up to the issuance of UNSC Resolution 764 in July 1992, he and his staff informed the FRY
representatives to the UN directly about a shelling that killed dozens of people standing in a
Sarajevo bread line, as well as about other aspects of the siege.4218 Further, starting in October
1992, Special Rapporteur Mazowiecki began issuing regular reports in which he described the
humanitarian situation in Sarajevo—reports of which FRY authorities were aware.4219 Among other
things, Mazowiecki reported that the indiscriminate shelling of Sarajevo had caused countless
civilian deaths4220 and that hospitals in Sarajevo were routinely and deliberately shelled.4221
Mazowiecki concluded that while “all sides are guilty of use of military force against civilian
populations and relief operations in Sarajevo”, “the main responsibility lies with the Serbian forces,
since it is they who have adopted the tactic of laying siege on the city”.4222
4216
4217
4218
4219
4220
4221
4222
Ex. D542, Report from the VJ to the FRY MOD, 11 October 1995.
Muhamed Sacirbey, T. 7179-7181. See Ex. P2434, UNSC Resolutions 758, 8 June 1992; 760, 18 June 1992; and
761, 29 June 1992. See Muhamed Sacirbey, T. 7187-7188; Ex. P2436, Note of the President of the UNSC,
4 August 1992; Ex. P2437, UNSC Resolution 770, 13 August 1992.
Muhamed Sacirbey, T. 7184.
See supra paras 1452, 1480.
Ex. P2441, Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, on the
Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, 17 November 1992, para. 41.
Ex. P2442, Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, on the
Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, 10 February 1993, paras 102-104.
Ex. P2441, Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, on the
Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, 17 November 1992, para. 42.
471
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1497. As discussed above, Sacirbey testified that he forwarded numerous documents to the
President of the UNSC with the request that they be distributed as public documents to all UN
member states, including the FRY.4223 These documents included several letters from November
1994, May 1995 and June 1995, in which the BiH Mission reported shelling and sniping attacks by
Bosnian Serbs against civilian targets in Sarajevo,4224 such as the Holiday Inn4225 and the Marin
Dvor and Hrasnica neighbourhoods.4226 In one of the letters, Sacirbey reported the killing of five
children by a shell fired by Bosnian Serbs, and then further described what he considered to be a
pattern of shelling and sniping, whereby long lulls in the attacks drew the civilian population out to
the streets, at which time “the shells from the hills hit once again, sometimes with no success in
finding victims and other times claiming scores of them”.4227
1498. On 7 January 1994, the President of the UNSC issued a statement in which the SC strongly
condemned the “continuing military pressure on and the relentless bombardment by Bosnian Serb
forces of the [BiH] capital city, Sarajevo”, and called for an immediate end to the attacks on the
city, which had resulted in “a high number of civilian casualties, seriously disrupted essential
services and aggravated an already severe humanitarian situation”.4228
1499. The 27 May 1994 report of the UN Commission of Experts stated that the “siege and
relentless bombardment from the hills surrounding Sarajevo has taken a tremendous physical toll on
the city and its inhabitants”. It noted that the Serb forces have “concentrated their efforts on
weakening the city through constant bombardment from the surrounding hillsides” and cited
estimates by UNPROFOR that the daily shelling ranged from 200 to 300 impacts on a quiet day to
800 to 1,000 impacts on an active day.4229 The report found: (i) a pattern of specific targeting of
certain locations, including the Ko{evo Hospital, the public transportation system, the Dobrinja
apartment complex, the flour mill and main bakery, and the shopping district; (ii) a pattern of
4223
4224
4225
4226
4227
4228
4229
Muhamed Sacirbey, T. 7143-7146.
Ex. P2477, Letter of the Permanent Representative of the BiH to the UN, to the President of the UNSC,
15 November 1994; Ex. P2478, Letter of the Permanent Representative of the BiH to the UN, to the President of
the UN SC, 17 November 1994; Ex. P2490, Letter of the Permanent Representative of BiH to the UN, to the
President of the UNSC, 9 May 1995; Ex. P2493, Letter of the Permanent Representative of BiH to the UN, to the
President of the UNSC, 16 May 1995; Ex. P2494, Letter of the Permanent Representative of BiH to the UN, to
the President of the UNSC, 24 May 1995; Ex. P2491, Letter of the Charge D’Affaires of the Permanent Mission
of BiH to the UN, to the President of the UNSC, 27 June 1995.
Ex. P2477, Letter of the Permanent Representative of the BiH to the UN, to the President of the UNSC,
15 November 1994.
Ex. P2478, Letter of the Permanent Representative of the BiH to the UN, to the President of the UNSC,
17 November 1994; Ex. P2490, Letter of the Permanent Representative of BiH to the UN, to the President of the
UNSC, 9 May 1995.
Ex. P2491, Letter of the Chargé d’Affaires of the Permanent Mission of BiH to the UN, to the President of the
UNSC, 27 June 1995, p. 2.
Ex. P2475, Note of the President of the UNSC, 7 January 1994.
Ex. P1536, Letter of the UN Secretary General to the President of the UNSC along with Final Report of the UN
Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to UNSC Resolution 780 (1992), 27 May 1994, paras 183, 186,
188. See also supra paras 323-326.
472
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systematic shelling of cultural and religious structures and public utilities; and (iii) a pattern of
random shelling throughout the civilian areas of the city, which had a “terror-inspiring effect on the
civilian population” and resulted in deaths, injuries and destruction in “such well-known nonmilitary structures as schools, open streets, public parks, football and athletic fields, cemeteries,
hospitals, and even bread, water and relief lines in the city”.4230 The report also mentioned the
Markale I incident, noting that on 5 February 1994 at least 68 persons were killed and 200 others
were wounded in the shelling of the market in the city centre”.4231
1500. As discussed above,4232 the report of the Commission of Experts was distributed by the
UNSC to the UN membership,4233 was discussed extensively at the UN,4234 and was discussed and
distributed in the media4235—including through publication in full in Borba.4236
1501. Special Rapporteur Mazowiecki reported periodically about the siege of Sarajevo until
1995. As discussed above,4237 his reports were released as ECOSOC documents and circulated to all
UN members, including the FRY,4238 and the FRY responded to the reports.4239 Among other
things, Mazowiecki reported the following:
(i)
On 26 August 1993, “the civilian population of Sarajevo has been subjected to brutal
violations of the laws on the conduct of war”, observing that “[t]he arbitrary killing of
civilians […] has become a permanent feature of life in the city”.4240 He reported that at the
Dobrinja check-point, located 400 meters from the front line, 130 persons had reportedly
been killed and more than 300 wounded by sniper fire from Bosnian Serb positions.4241
4230
4231
4232
4233
4234
4235
4236
4237
4238
4239
4240
4241
Ex. P1536, Letter of the UN Secretary General to the President of the UNSC along with Final Report of the UN
Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to UNSC Resolution 780 (1992), 27 May 1994, paras 189-191.
Ex. P1536, Letter of the UN Secretary General to the President of the UNSC along with Final Report of the UN
Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to UNSC Resolution 780 (1992), 27 May 1994, para. 193.
See supra para. 1465.
See Ex. P1536, Letter of the UN Secretary General to the President of the UNSC along with Final Report of the
UN Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to UNSC Resolution 780 (1992), 27 May 1994, p. 1;
Muhamed Sacirbey, T. 7363-7364.
Muhamed Sacirbey, T. 7376-7381.
Ibid.
Ex. P1112, Borba Article Reproducing the Report of the UN War Crimes Commission for Former Yugoslavia,
14 July 1994. See supra para. 1465
See supra para. 1470.
See Muhamed Sacirbey, T. 7217.
See Ex. P2464, Note Verbale from the Permanent Mission of the FRY to the UN, 5 August 1994, pp 1-2.
Ex. P2444, Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, on the
Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, 26 August 1993, para. 36.
Ex. P2444, Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, on the
Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, 26 August 1993, para. 36. He also
reported that the Koševo hospital in Sarajevo had been shelled 176 times since the siege began, killing staff and
patients alike. As the hospital was located 600 meters from the front line and was clearly visible from Bosnian
Serb positions, Mazowiecki concluded that the attacks had been deliberate, Ex. P2444, Report of the Special
473
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(ii)
On 17 November 1993, mortar attacks by Bosnian Serb forces on Sarajevo earlier
that month had killed twelve persons, including children.4242
(iii)
On 21 February 1994, “Sarajevo remains subject to indiscriminate attacks and to
sniping, directed from territory held by the Bosnian Serbs”.4243 He reported that by early
January 1994, there were on average 1,000 shell or rocket impacts per day, and that many
civilians had lost their lives.4244 He concluded that “[a]lthough a number of Bosnian Serb
attacks on Sarajevo occur in response to firing by forces of the army of Bosnia and
Herzegovina from positions situated close to highly sensitive civilian locations, most attacks
would appear to be indiscriminate”.4245 He also observed that the Markale I shelling
(Scheduled Incident A3) which had killed 68 and wounded 200, was “one of the worst
attacks perpetrated on civilians during the war”.4246
(iv)
On 4 November 1994, “attacks by Bosnian Serb forces on the civilians of Sarajevo
also manifest themselves by means of blocking of services essential for city life”.4247 He
added that “the heightened scale of attacks and threats to the people of Sarajevo […]
reversed the dramatic improvements of last summer”.4248
(v)
On 16 January 1995, there had been an intensification of attacks on Sarajevo in
November and December 1994. He reported that three children and one adult woman had
been killed by sniper fire and mortars; that the Holiday Inn hotel had been hit by two
grenades fired from Bosnian Serb army positions; and that Bosnian Serb forces had targeted
lines of people at a tram stop, injuring a 16 year-old girl and a 70 year-old man.4249 He also
4242
4243
4244
4245
4246
4247
4248
4249
Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, on the Situation of Human Rights in the
Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, 26 August 1993, para. 25.
Ex. P2881, UN Fifth Periodic Report on the Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the Former
Yugoslavia by Tadeusz Mazowiecki, 17 November 1993, para. 14. In one of the attacks, two shells hit a school
building in a densely populated district, killing three children and their teacher and wounding 40 others, mostly
children.
Ex. P2445, Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, on the
Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, 21 February 1994, para. 59.
Ex. P2445, Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, on the
Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, 21 February 1994, para. 59; Muhamed
Sacirbey, T. 7357.
Ex. P2445, Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, on the
Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, 21 February 1994, para. 61.
Ex. P2445, Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, on the
Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, 21 February 1994, para. 5.
Ex. P2446, Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, on the
Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, 4 November 1994, paras 28-29.
Ibid.
Ex. P2447, Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, on the
Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, 16 January 1995, para. 13. It was also
noted that “[s]niper and missile attacks continued to be targeted on an almost daily basis against the city centre,
near the presidency building”, Ex. P2447, Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human
474
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noted that “[s]niper and missile attacks continued to be targeted on an almost daily basis
against the city centre, near the presidency building”.4250
(vi)
On 5 July 1995, some sniping activity by Bosnian Serb forces against civilians in
Sarajevo had been reported in March of that year, and that “₣iğn late April the level of firing
incidents increased and civilians were reported to have been killed or injured on an almost
daily basis by shelling or sniping”.4251 He further reported that in May 1995, the Bosnian
Serb forces had shelled the Butmir suburb, killing 9 people and wounding 50 others
(virtually all civilians);4252 that a 18 June 1995 shelling of the Dobrinja suburb had killed
seven and injured twelve civilians at a water distribution centre (Scheduled Incident A7);4253
and that further shelling by Bosnian Serb forces in June and July 1995 had caused more
civilian deaths.4254
(c) Media Coverage of Crimes in Sarajevo
1502. Between 1992 and 1995, events in Sarajevo attracted a “tremendous” amount of attention by
the international media.4255 As witness MP-433 testified:
[T]he entire world could follow the siege of Sarajevo, almost in real-time, hour by hour. There
couldn’t be […] a casualty on sniper alley either killed or injured by the Serbian snipers that was
not immediately related to the press and with a number of photographs that would be broadcasted
throughout the world. I can say, I believe honestly that the siege of Sarajevo was offered to the
eyes of the entire world, day by day, hour by hour, with all its atrocities being broadcast.4256
1503. Martin Bell, a BBC war correspondent who was stationed in Sarajevo several times from
1992 until 1997, testified that a number of major international press agencies were present in
Sarajevo during that period, including Reuters, the Associated Press, AFP, as well as television
4250
4251
4252
4253
4254
4255
4256
Rights, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, on the Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia,
16 January 1995, para. 13.
Ex. P2447, Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, on the
Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, 16 January 1995, para. 13.
Ex. P2448, Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, on the
Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, 5 July 1995, paras 66-67.
Ex. P2448, Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, on the
Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, 5 July 1995, para. 68.
Ex. P2448, Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, on the
Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, 5 July 1995, para. 70.
Ex. P2448, Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, on the
Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, 5 July 1995, para. 70. On 7 November
1995—after the period relevant to the Indictment—Mazowiecki’s successor, Special Rapporteur Elisabeth Rehn,
reported that the Markale II incident “was a particularly brutal example of the targeting of civilians”, Ex. P2450,
Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, Elisabeth Rehn, on the Situation of
Human Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, 7 November 1995, paras 54-56.
Muhamed Sacirbey, T. 7184.
MP-433, T. 2112 (closed session).
475
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media outlets such as BBC and CNN.4257 In addition, all the large and even small European
broadcasters sent correspondents to Sarajevo.4258
1504. Despite fluctuations in media attention, particularly during the early phases of the war, the
international media maintained a presence in Sarajevo and covered what was happening to
civilians.4259 Witness MP-72 testified that there was a constant media presence in Sarajevo and that
the use of the media was part of Mladi}’s general strategy.4260 Witness MP-408, who was in the
Sarajevo area from October 1993 through September 1994, testified that both the national and
international media were present in Sarajevo and reported mainly about the humanitarian situation
of the population and about the sniping and shelling incidents.4261
1505. SkyNews reporter Aernout van Lynden began making live reports from Sarajevo in
May 1992 on the inhabitants of the city living under siege, showing civilians being wounded or
killed by Serb gunfire and how Sarajevo was hit “from every side by practically every imaginable
projectile”, and “was a scene of wholesale devastation”.4262 In June and in September 1992, van
Lynden also obtained access to Bosnian Serb positions in order to report events from their side.4263
In September 1992, he met with Mladić, who took him to see the Serb artillery positions. This visit
was filmed by van Lynden’s crew. At some point, Mladić can be heard on camera saying that “he
holds the city in his palm”.4264
1506. Van Lynden testified that various political and military figures in the former Yugoslavia
were familiar with his work. In 1994, Mladi} confronted van Lynden about his reporting on Žu}
and Goražde.4265 That same year, the FRY authorities revoked van Lynden’s accreditation in Serbia
on the ground that his work had not been in favour of “the peaceful living-together of different
4257
4258
4259
4260
4261
4262
4263
4264
4265
Martin Bell, T. 3192.
Martin Bell, T. 3196. While the number of foreign journalists in Sarajevo was relatively small (no more than
about 50 at its peak), this circumstance facilitated journalists’ direct access to the “main people”, such as UN
generals and the Bosnian Serb leadership, instead of having to get their information from “spin doctors and press
officers”, Martin Bell, T. 3192. In May 1992, foreign journalists formed the “Sarajevo Agency Pool” and the
video footage obtained by the pool would then be sent out on satellite exchanges all over the world, Martin Bell,
T. 3192-3193, 3195.
Martin Bell, T. 3193-3194. Bell testified that during the early phases of the war, images of the siege were
broadcast around Europe and around the world. However, after Bell returned to Sarajevo in 1994, “war fatigue”
set in among the international media, which meant that the war in BiH became less of a news priority. It
concurrently became more difficult to report on the siege of Sarajevo because an increase in military field
security prevented journalists from roaming around freely, Martin Bell, T. 3193-3194. From August 1994
onward, the Bosnian Serb-held territory was closed off to all the journalists except those from Russia, Greece or
other “orthodox” countries, Martin Bell, T. 3208, 3211. See Martin Bell, T. 3229.
MP-72, T. 4335, 4337 (closed session).
MP-408, T. 6171-6172 (closed session).
Aernout van Lynden, T. 465, 505-507, 519-522, 539-540; Ex. P5, SkyNews Video Clip; Ex. P6, SkyNews Video
Clip; Ex. P7, SkyNews Video Clip; Ex. P8, SkyNews Video Clip; Ex. P11, SkyNews Video Clip.
Aernout van Lynden, T. 521-522.
Aernout van Lynden, T. 527, 534, 556; See Ex. P10, SkyNews Video Clip.
Aernout van Lynden, T. 536-537.
476
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peoples”.4266 In 1995, at the 50th Session of the RS National Assembly, van Lynden was referred to
as the “famous Serb-hater”.4267
1507. Several witnesses testified that news about the siege of Sarajevo was reported in Belgrade,
either through local broadcasts of international coverage or through Serbian reporters. John Wilson,
who served as the Chief of UN Military Observers Mission in Bosnia from March 1992 until
15 November 1992, testified that television coverage provided by Sarajevo Television often
contained graphic footage of attacks against civilians in Sarajevo.4268 International media, including
CNN and BBC News, also aired footage of shelling, civilian casualties, and damage to the city,
which according to Wilson accurately represented the events that took place in Sarajevo.4269 Van
Lynden testified that many “Yugoslavs right across Yugoslavia” were able to receive SkyNews
through their satellite dishes.4270
1508. In addition to providing video coverage, the international media also covered the siege of
Sarajevo in the printed press.
1509. Morten Hvaal, who worked as a photographer for the Associated Press in Sarajevo from
1992 to 1995, testified that thousands of the photographs he took in Sarajevo during the siege were
published in the international media.4271 His photographs were transmitted to the Associated Press
headquarters in London, which were then distributed across the world.4272
1510. In the autumn of 1993, after Peri{i} had become Chief of the VJ General Staff, Hvaal took a
photograph at the French Hospital in Sarajevo, depicting a five-year-old girl named Irma
Hadžimuratović wounded in a mortar attack, which also killed her mother, in the backyard of the
building where she lived.4273 The media coverage of this incident led to the first proper evacuation
of wounded children from Sarajevo since the beginning of the siege.4274
1511. General Wilson testified that during his service, he received daily summaries of what was
being reported in the written media from throughout the former Yugoslavia and abroad.4275 Those
summaries showed that there was extensive coverage in the Belgrade press of the military attacks
4266
4267
4268
4269
4270
4271
4272
4273
4274
4275
Aernout van Lynden, T. 546.
Aernout van Lynden, T. 546-547; Ex. P12, Excerpt from Transcript of the 50th Session of the BiH National
Assembly, 15 April 1995, p. 4.
John Wilson, T. 863.
John Wilson, T. 864.
Aernout van Lynden, T. 463.
Morten Hvaal, T. 2232.
Morten Hvaal, T. 2232.
Morten Hvaal, T. 2233; Ex. P378, Transcript of Morten Hvaal in Prosecutor v. Stanislav Gali}, T. 2293;
Ex. P380, Photograph.
Morten Hvaal, T. 2233-2234.
John Wilson, T. 861.
477
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against Sarajevo through artillery and small-arms fire.4276 Upon relocating from Sarajevo to
Belgrade in June 1992, Wilson saw broadcasts on Belgrade television airing images of very heavy
fighting occurring in Bosnia.4277 He recalled that the staff of the Yugoslav Hotel in Belgrade
indicated that they had seen reports of what was happening in Sarajevo, and that they were very
concerned about the safety of their families there.4278
1512. Martin Bell testified that Yugoslavian television received the material that foreign
correspondents in Sarajevo sent out.4279 Bell also testified that “quite a lot of Serbian journalists”
came into Sarajevo.4280 Further, he testified that many of the media networks initially sent their
news reports through Belgrade, such that Serbian journalists were quite heavily involved.4281
1513. During the conflict in BiH, Muhamed Sacirbey’s staff paid attention to what was being
reported in the FRY media.4282 According to Sacirbey, allegations of shelling and sniping of
civilians in Sarajevo were “certainly sometimes” reported in the media in Belgrade or elsewhere in
the FRY.4283 Sacirbey also testified that allegations of ethnic cleansing by the Serbian forces in BiH
were reported,4284 although according to General Wilson, the Belgrade media would have focused
more on the Serb refugees than on the plight of the Bosniaks or Croats.4285 Sacirbey further testified
that BiH representatives to the UN in New York provided information about the situation in
Sarajevo at press conferences and through numerous interviews, and that accredited FRY journalists
attended those conferences.4286
1514. The evidentiary record includes numerous articles relating to the siege of Sarajevo that
appeared in the Belgrade printed press.4287 Several of the articles published after Peri{i} became
Chief of the VJ General Staff discussed the sniping and shelling attacks on civilians:
4276
4277
4278
4279
4280
4281
4282
4283
4284
4285
4286
4287
John Wilson, T. 862-863.
John Wilson, T. 865.
John Wilson, T. 866.
Martin Bell, T. 3196.
Martin Bell, T. 3196.
Martin Bell, T. 3196-3197.
Muhamed Sacirbey, T. 7186.
Muhamed Sacirbey, T. 7186.
Muhamed Sacirbey, T. 7186.
John Wilson, T. 863.
Muhamed Sacirbey, T. 7184-7185.
Ex. P2828, NIN Interview with Mladi}, 12 February 1993; Ex. P2870, Article in Politika, 14 August 1993;
Ex. P2829, Reuters Article Regarding Attacks on Sarajevo, 15 December 1993; Ex. P2830, Reuters Article
Regarding Attacks on Sarajevo, 5 January 1994; Ex. P2831, NIN Article Reacting to Previous Feature on
Mladi}, 11 March 1994; Ex. P2871, Article in Tanjug, 30 August 1995; P2872, Article in Tanjug, 30 August
1995; P2873, Article in Tanjug, 8 September 1995; Ex. P2874, Article in Tanjug, 20 September 1995;
Ex. P2832, V.I.P. Daily New Report, 4 July 1995; Ex. P2833, Politika Article Regarding Effect of Karad`i}
Indictment on Peace Negotiations, 26 July 1995; Ex. P2834, Politika Article on War Crimes Indictments of
Karad`i}, Mladi} and Marti}, 26 July, 1995; Ex. P2876, Article in Borba, 22 July 1994 (Interview with Tadeusz
478
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(i)
Reuters article in Borba, 15 December 1993: The article reported that “eight people
were killed, while ten were injured in yesterday’s mortar and artillery attacks on Sarajevo”.
The article cited hospital doctors stating that the killings occurred when two mortar grenades
fell in the old part of the city.4288
(ii)
Reuters article in Borba, 5 January 1994: The article reported that “[i]n a fierce
grenade attack yesterday in Sarajevo one person was killed while at least 10 persons were
wounded”. The article went on to describe how during the previous days, many people had
been killed by grenades, including an entire family of six and a nine year-old girl, and that
five children had been wounded.4289
(iii)
NIN (a Belgrade weekly newspaper), 28 January 1994: In an interview with Mladi},
the interviewer referred to the media coverage of the siege of Sarajevo and the widespread
criticism of the Serbs for bombing the city.4290
(iv)
NIN, 11 March 1994: Under the headline “The Burning of Sarajevo”, the article
stated that General Mladi} deployed heavy artillery around Sarajevo and that, “in
accordance with the plan of vengeance whose ideological creators sat in Belgrade and in
Pale, he began the long-awaited war feast”. The article explained that “Sarajevo was
destroyed, burnt, and demolished for months, and its people were butchered and killed”.4291
(v)
Borba, 31 July 1994 – 12 August 1994: Feuilleton in eleven instalments entitled “A
Testimony From Hell”, described the experiences of an inhabitant of Sarajevo during the
period from April 1992 to December 1993 and the sniping and shelling on the civilian
population.4292
(vi)
V.I.P. Daily News Report (a Belgrade publication in English), 4 July 1995: The
report cited the president of the ICTY as stating that formal indictments would soon be
presented against Karadži} and Mladi}.4293 The report also stated, under the heading
“UNPROFOR Condemns Attacks on Civilians”, that the UN had “asked the Muslims not to
4288
4289
4290
4291
4292
4293
Mazowiecki); Ex. P2877, Article in Borba, 22 July 1994; Ex. P333, Interview of Ratko Mladi} for Nin, 7
January 1994.
Ex. P2829, Reuters Article Regarding Attacks on Sarajevo, 15 December 1993.
Ex. P2830, Reuters Article Regarding Attacks on Sarajevo, 5 January 1994.
Ex. P333, Interview of Ratko Mladi} for Nin, 7 January 1994, p. 24.
Ex. P2831, NIN Article Reacting to Previous Feature on Mladi}, 11 March 1994, p. 3.
Ex. P2878, Article in Borba, 21 April 1992, 30-31 July 1994.
Ex. P2832, V.I.P. Daily New Report, 4 July 1995, p. 1
479
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use UN members as human shields” and had “accused the Bosnian Serbs of shelling UN HQ
[in Sarajevo] on Saturday” and opening fire on UNPROFOR members.4294
1515. Members of the FRY political and military leadership were aware of media reports related
to BiH.
1516. At the 22nd SDC Session on 11 July 1994, President Lili} discussed a promotion decree that
had been signed by Karadži}, and expressed the need to verify “what has been published in the
press”.4295 When Lili} referred to “everything that happened in Bile}a and Bijeljina” after other
promotions had been announced, Slobodan Milo{evi} asked “₣wğhat happened in Bile}a and
Bijeljina?”, to which Lili} responded, “₣ağpplauding Karadži}, all sorts of amazing things; all that
was pompous; broadcast live on radio and TV”. Peri{i} added: “It was all reported in the press”.4296
Further, in an intercepted conversation of 1 May 1995, Peri{i} told Milo{evi} that he had watched
the TV news, and Milo{evi} indicated that he had watched it as well.4297
(d) Conclusion
1517. Based on the evidence discussed above, the Majority, Judge Moloto dissenting, is satisfied
that Peri{i} was aware that the VRS was accused of committing crimes in Sarajevo. In support of
this conclusion, the Majority makes the following considerations.
1518. The Majority first notes that Peri{i} was copied on several diplomatic cables related to
events in Sarajevo.4298 The Defence argues that these diplomatic cables sent to Peri{i} provided
“little information that Mr. Peri{i} could rely upon as knowledge for the commission of crimes”.4299
In particular, the Defence asserts that the cable of 7 February 1994 from the FRY’s Mission to the
UN provided no more information other than that the Markale I incident had occurred and that the
international community responded by threatening with air-strikes.4300 While there is no explicit
indication in the cable of 7 February 1994 that the VRS had fired on Markale and killed civilians,
the Majority notes that the cable stated that air-strikes would be carried out against the Serb artillery
positions outside Sarajevo and referred to a finding by UNPROFOR that these artillery positions
were responsible for “the attacks on civilian targets in the city”. The Majority is therefore of the
view that this cable put Peri{i} on notice that the Markale incident in Sarajevo – like many others 4294
4295
4296
4297
4298
4299
Ex. P2832, V.I.P. Daily New Report, 4 July 1995, p. 2.
Ex. P784, Stenographic Transcript of the 22nd Session of the SDC held on 11 July 1994, p. 48.
Ibid.
Ex. P1366, Intercepted Conversation, 1 May 1995, p. 3. See also Ex. P2212, Transcript of the Collegium of the
Chief of the VJ General Staff, 30 October 1995, p. 1; Ex. P2214, Transcript of the Collegium of the Chief of the
VJ General Staff of 18 September 1995, 29 December 1995, pp 4-5.
See supra paras 1489, 1491.
Defence Final Brief, para. 918.
480
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involved a civilian target and that the international community considered the VRS responsible.4301
Further, the Majority notes that the cable from the FRY’s London Mission of the same date
informed the Intelligence Administration of the VJ General Staff that the mass media were
reporting on a “massacre of civilians in Sarajevo”,4302 which the Defence concedes referred to the
Markale I incident.4303 Moreover, at the 18th SDC Session held on the same day, Peri{i} stated not
only that the Markale incident had caused “massive losses”, but also gave a detailed description of
the site where the incident had occurred, showing that Peri{i} had obtained information about the
incident from sources other than the two diplomatic cables.4304 Thus, when the evidence is viewed
in its entirety, it becomes clear that Peri{i} was well-informed about the specifics of the Markale I
incident, as he was about other attacks on civilians.4305
1519. In addition to this direct evidence, the Majority recalls that Peri{i} was generally informed
of the UNSC’s agenda and specifically about some UNSC proceedings, and was in regular contact
with the FRY leadership.4306 Accordingly, the Majority is satisfied that Peri{i} was aware of the
findings regarding the VRS’s crimes in Sarajevo contained in the BiH documents provided to the
FRY, the report of the UN Commission of Experts, the Mazowiecki reports and the filings and
orders in the ICJ case between BiH and Serbia and Montenegro.
1520. Finally, the Majority recalls that Peri{i} received daily bulletins from his Intelligence
Administration, reports from his Security Administration and press clippings, containing media
information from his Information Administration. In addition, the Majority recalls that during the
Collegium presided by Peri{i}, briefings were held by the heads of the Intelligence Administration,
Security Administration and the Operations Staff Sector.4307 Furthermore, he received reports about
local and international press coverage in meetings of the VJ Collegium.4308
4300
4301
4302
4303
4304
4305
4306
4307
4308
Defence Final Brief para. 918.
Ex. P852 (under seal).
Ex. P2852 (under seal).
See Defence Final Brief, para. 918.
Ex. P782, Stenographic Transcript of the 18th Session of the SDC held on 7 February 1994, pp 60-61.
For example, the cable from the FRY’s Mission to the UN dated 10 April 1995 stated that UN Under-SecretaryGeneral Gharekhan had reported that the sniping and shelling attacks on Sarajevo had increased, Ex. P853
(under seal). The Defence argues that because the cable does not refer specifically to civilian casualties, Peri{i}
could have reasonably believed the cable to be discussing military battles in Sarajevo. See Defence Final Brief
para. 918. But when the cable is placed in the context of the numerous Serbian and international media reports
and the period Mazowiecki reports about the sniping and shelling of civilians in Sarajevo over the course of the
siege (discussed below), it would be unreasonable to believe that the cable referred only to the sniping and
shelling of combatants and military objectives. In any event, the cables form but one of many sources of
information about the activities of the VRS that reached, or most likely reached Peri{i}.
See supra paras 1455, 1474-1476, 1478, 1480.
See supra para. 1392.
Ex. P2199, Transcript of the Collegium of the Chief of the VJ General Staff, 6 October 1995, Doc ID 06186848, p. 3; Ex. P2200, Transcript of the Collegium of the Chief of the VJ General Staff, 9 October 1995, Doc ID
0618-6979, p. 6; Ex. P2202, Transcript of the Collegium of the Chief of the VJ General Staff, 30 October 1995,
481
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1521. The Majority is therefore satisfied that this evidence shows that Peri{i} was generally
informed of what was being reported in the international and Serbian press, and that he was
consequently aware of media reports that the VRS was committing crimes against the civilian
population of Sarajevo. Given that Bosnian Serb attacks on Muslim civilians in Sarajevo were
widely covered by the national and international press, the Majority finds that the only reasonable
inference is that Perišić knew of these general allegations on crimes against civilians in Sarajevo.
1522. On the basis of the foregoing evidence evaluated both in isolation and collectively, the
Majority, Judge Moloto dissenting, finds beyond a reasonable doubt that Peri{i}, while serving as
Chief of the VJ General Staff, was aware that the VRS was attacking the civilian population in
Sarajevo. The Majority also recalls its previous finding that Peri{i} was aware of the VRS’s
discriminatory intent and propensity to commit crimes. Accordingly, the Majority is satisfied
beyond a reasonable doubt that Peri{i} knew not only that the VRS was committing crimes in
Sarajevo, but that individual crimes committed by the VRS would probably be followed by more
crimes committed by the VRS throughout the city’s siege.
Doc ID 0618-7763, pp 2-3; Ex. P2203, Transcript of the Collegium of the Chief of the VJ General Staff, 6
November 1995, Doc ID 0618-6883, pp 2-3.
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4. Peri{i}’s Knowledge of Crimes Committed by the VRS in Srebrenica
(a) Peri{i}’s Knowledge of the Sensitivity of the Situation in and Around Srebrenica and the
Eastern Enclaves
1523. The Trial Chamber recalls that the third strategic objective of the Bosnian Serb leadership
aimed at the establishment of a corridor in the Drina River valley with the eradication of the Drina
River as a border between the Serbian states. This underlined the strategic importance of Srebrenica
and the surrounding enclaves, which were located right along the Drina River border where the
corridor was to be established.4309 The Trial Chamber also recalls the evidence that the VRS
launched a series of attacks in 1992 and early 1993 in areas encompassing the eastern enclaves of
Srebrenica, Goražde and Žepa, leading to a flood of refugees into the enclaves.4310
1524. UNPROFOR Commander General Morillon and his Personal Staff Officer Colonel Pyers
Tucker were present in Srebrenica during a surge of VRS operations in early 1993.4311 Tucker noted
that these attacks proceeded from one village to another, and villagers began to notice a pattern to
the attacks and decided to flee as soon as the first few shells were fired.4312 Around January or
February 1993 Tucker hired locals to monitor local print and radio media inside BiH and radio
media from Belgrade and Zagreb.4313 According to him, the situation at the Srebrenica enclave was
being covered in the international and local media.4314
1525. The Trial Chamber recalls that while in Srebrenica in March 1993, General Morillon was
prevented from leaving the area by panicked residents and on that occasion he told the crowd that
the town was under the protection of the UN.4315
1526. On 16 April 1993, the UNSC unanimously adopted Resolution 819 which: (i) proclaimed
Srebrenica to be “a safe area which should be free from any armed attack or any other hostile act”;
(ii) urged Bosnian Serb paramilitary forces to immediately cease attacks against Srebrenica and
withdraw from its surroundings; (iii) demanded that the FRY cease supplying Bosnian Serb
paramilitary forces with weapons and military equipment; and (iv) condemned the Bosnian Serbs
for attempting to evacuate civilians from Srebrenica against their will.4316 On the next day, the
4309
4310
4311
4312
4313
4314
4315
4316
See supra para. 598.
See supra paras 599-601.
Pyers Tucker, T. 9135, 9141-9142. See also supra para. 601.
Pyers Tucker, T. 9141-9142.
Pyers Tucker, T. 9182.
Pyers Tucker, T. 9183.
See supra paras 601-602.
Ex. P208, UNSC Resolution 819, 16 April 1993.
483
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FRY’s UN Mission in New York sent a cable to the FRY leadership informing it of the unanimous
adoption of the UNSC Resolution.4317
1527. Sacirbey also testified that the UNSC distributed reports on the difficult humanitarian
situation from 1992 to 1993 to all UN member states, including to the FRY’s representatives.4318
According to Sacirbey, the reports became the subject of further debate at the UNSC.4319 Sacirbey
explained that, by mid-April 1993, the situation in Srebrenica was dramatic and that recorded
footage from the area was broadcast by the media.4320
1528. On 17 April 1993, Sacirbey wrote a letter to the UNSC deploring the “horrifying situation in
Srebrenica” which he described as an “ongoing massacre”, and which was “so well documented by
the media around the world”.4321 Sacirbey wrote similar letters to the UNSC frequently,
highlighting civilian casualties in Srebrenica and other enclaves resulting from attacks by Serb
forces.4322 These letters were distributed to all UN member states, including the FRY, and were
made available as public documents.4323 In some cases, BiH sent this information directly to the
representatives of the FRY.4324 Sacirbey testified that the FRY representatives read such documents
since they subsequently responded to at least some of them either formally or informally.4325
1529. The continued and growing attacks against “threatened areas”, including Srebrenica and
Sarajevo, and their inhabitants led the UNSC in May 1993 to declare other towns in BiH in need of
protection as safe areas.4326 In light of the persistent refusal of the Bosnian Serb party to accept the
Vance-Owen plan, as well as the continued grave violations of IHL and practice of ethnic cleansing,
4317
4318
4319
4320
4321
4322
4323
4324
4325
4326
Ex. P892 (under seal).
Muhamed Sacirbey, T. 7263-7264, 7302-7304, 7329-7330. See Ex. P2462, Report of the UNSC Mission
Established Pursuant to Resolution 819, 30 April 1993. See also Ex. D159, Report of the UN Secretary-General
Pursuant to Resolution 900, 11 March 1994; Muhamed Sacirbey, T. 8146-8147.
Muhamed Sacirbey, T. 7264-7265, 7323-7325.
Muhamed Sacirbey, T. 7263; Ex. P2459, Letter of the Permanent Representative of BiH to the UN, to the
President of the UNSC, 16 April 1993.
Ex. P2459, Letter of the Permanent Representative of BiH to the UN, to the President of the UNSC, 16 April
1993.
See Ex. P2469, Letter of the Permanent Representative of BiH to the UN, to the President of the UNSC, 1 June
1993 (referring to attack on Gora`de); Ex. P2470, Letter of the Permanent Representative of BiH to the UN, to
the President of the UNSC, 2 June 1993; Ex. P2477, Letter of the Permanent Representative of the BiH to the
UN, to the President of the UNSC, 15 November 1994 (referring to attack on Biha}); Ex. P2478, Letter of the
Permanent Representative of BiH to the UN, to the President of the UNSC, 17 November 1994 (referring to
attack on Tuzla). See also Ex. P2471, Letter of the Permanent Representative of BiH to the UN, to the President
of the UNSC, 2 June 1993; Ex. D158, Report of the UN Secretary-General Pursuant to Resolution 871, 16
March 1994; Muhamed Sacirbey, T. 8143-8144.
Muhamed Sacirbey, T. 7143-7145.
Muhamed Sacirbey, T. 7144.
Muhamed Sacirbey, T. 7145. See Ex. P892 (under seal).
Ex. P212, UNSC Resolution 824, 6 May 1993. See supra para. 602.
484
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on 4 June 1993, the UNSC thereafter adopted Resolution 836, authorising UNPROFOR to take
necessary measures, including the use of force, in response to attacks against the safe areas.4327
1530. Peri{i} himself stated that, from the establishment of the enclaves until he was appointed
Chief of the VJ General Staff on 26 August 1993, he was fully aware of the sensitivity of the
situation in the enclaves and “discussed the situation very often” with Milo{evi}.4328
1531. The Majority, Judge Moloto dissenting, recalls its finding that Peri{i} was aware of
allegations of crimes being committed in BiH before his appointment as Chief of the VJ General
Staff, through a number of sources.4329 Against this backdrop and based on the evidence discussed
in this section, the Majority equally finds that Peri{i} was aware of the grave existing threat to the
safety of the Srebrenica enclave and its inhabitants, as well as of the criminal behaviour of the VRS
in general prior to being appointed Chief of the VJ General Staff.
(b) Peri{i}’s Knowledge of Events in Srebrenica Before and During the Attack
1532. The Trial Chamber recalls that tension in the eastern enclaves reached a crisis point in April
1994, when the VRS attacked Gora`de.4330 Following the attack, the UNSC adopted Resolution 913
on 22 April 1994 which “condemn[ed] in the strongest possible terms the Bosnian Serb forces for
their continued offensive against the safe area of Gora`de, which has resulted in the death of
numerous civilians and tremendous human suffering”.4331 Peri{i} was directly aware of the tensions
in the eastern enclaves and had direct knowledge of the attack against Gora`de. In reference to this
attack, Peri{i} himself stated that the VRS “attacked it and they wanted to clean it up” and that he
and Milo{evi} “saved it”.4332
1533. Peri{i} himself admitted during his interview with the OTP that “the fact that Mladi} entered
Srebrenica was known, it was publicly presented on TV, here and abroad”.4333 In a telephone
intercept of 9 July 1995, following the VRS offensive in Srebrenica which commenced on 6 July
1995, Peri{i} was informed that “[t]his thing around Srebrenica is mainly going well”.4334
4327
4328
4329
4330
4331
4332
4333
4334
Ex. P2472, UNSC Resolution 836, 4 June 1993, operative clauses 9, 10.
Ex. P807, Transcript of Interview with Periši}, 19 December 2003, p. 17.
See supra para. 1456.
See supra para. 310.
Ex. P2882, UNSC Resolution 913, 24 April 1994, p. 1.
Ex. P807, Transcript of Interview with Periši}, 19 December 2003, p. 17.
Ex. P807, Transcript of Interview with Periši}, 19 December 2003, p. 33.
Ex. P1454, Intercepted Conversation, 9 July 1995.
485
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(i) Intelligence Reports
1534. The Trial Chamber notes that the Defence does not dispute that Peri{i} periodically received
“situation reports” from the VRS and that VRS intelligence organs sent reports to the VJ General
Staff.4335 The Trial Chamber recalls in this respect that the VJ General Staff regularly received
various types of reports from the VRS, during the early days of Peri{i}’s tenure and prior to
14 July1995. The information contained in those reports was processed based on its relevance and
importance and included in daily reports sent to Peri{i}.4336
1535. In addition, information and reports from the VRS intelligence and security organs were
forwarded to the Security Administration of the VJ General Staff during the war.4337 In this respect,
the Trial Chamber recalls that Peri{i} received daily reports from his Security and Intelligence
Administrations, as well as weekly briefings during the VJ General Staff Collegium.4338
1536. From May 1995, the VRS regularly sent reports to the VJ General Staff Intelligence
Administration detailing the build-up of offensive activities in Srebrenica. The majority of the
reports set out specific ABiH movements in and around the enclaves.4339 VRS movements were not
similarly reported with such precision. The Trial Chamber notes that the VRS reported the
following information to the VJ General Staff:
(i)
On 11 May 1995: a large number of Muslims […] wanted to leave the Podrinje
enclave and “noted several indications suggesting that [the VRS] can expect offensive
activities […] most probably by mid-May”.4340
(ii)
On 18 May 1995: “Muslim propaganda is emphasising alleged VRS operations
towards the enclaves in the Podrinje region”.4341
(ii)
On 19 May 1995: “As part of offensive preparations from the Srebrenica and Žepa
enclaves, [the 28th Division of the ABiH has] taken possession of important facilities […]
linking the enclaves”.4342
4335
4336
4337
4338
4339
4340
4341
4342
Defence Final Brief, paras 823, 825.
See supra paras 1419-1421. See also Ex. D547, Intelligence Report of the VRS Main Staff, 15 September 1993.
See supra paras 1400-1403, 1427-1432.
See supra paras 1392, 1396, 1400.
See Ex. P2185, VRS Main Staff Intelligence Report Sent to VJ, 11 May 1995, p. 3; Ex. P1831, VRS Main Staff
Intelligence Report, 18 May 1995, p. 2; Ex. P2184, VRS Main Staff Intelligence Report Sent to VJ, 19 May
1995, p. 3; Ex. P2178, VRS Main Staff Intelligence Report, 21 May 1995, p. 2.
Ex. P2185, VRS Main Staff Intelligence Report Sent to VJ, 11 May 1995, p. 3
Ex. P1831, Intelligence Report, 18 May 1995, p. 3.
Ex. P2184, VRS Main Staff Intelligence Report Sent to VJ, 19 May 1995, p. 3.
486
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(iii)
On 21 May 1995: the Muslim leadership was trying to prevent the abandonment of
the Goražde enclave and that Muslim forces in Srebrenica were reinforcing and replenishing
forces along the forward line of defence.4343
(iv)
On 26 May 1995: the VRS reported that “Muslim media” had “euphorically
report[ed] on the allegedly large number of victims among the civilian population on the
territory of Tuzla, and in doing so wish to force the continuation of NATO air strikes against
VRS features and positions”.4344
1537. In addition, the Trial Chamber heard that the geographical proximity of Srebrenica to the
FRY was of particular military relevance for Peri{i} and the FRY leadership. Simi} testified that
any combat operations close to the FRY border would have had security implications for the
FRY.4345 Gaji} confirmed that the fact that NATO air-strikes could occur in an area relatively close
to the border of the FRY was something that the Security Administration of the VJ General Staff
would have been interested in.4346 Borovi}, who served as Peri{i}’s Chef de Cabinet, testified that
the take-over of the Srebrenica enclave by the VRS would have had adverse consequences for FRY
security.4347 Peri{i} was aware of the developments and the potential security threats prior to the
attack on Srebrenica, as evidenced by his 21 June 1995 order to the VJ 2nd Army Command to form
three combat groups to secure FRY territory bordering RS along the Drina valley.4348
1538. The evidence shows that from early July 1995 onwards, the VJ General Staff regularly
reported and monitored the military developments in and around the enclaves in BiH (specifically,
Sarajevo, Srebrenica, Žepa and Goražde).4349
1539. Evidence shows that from, 7 July 1995 until the fall of Srebrenica, VJ General Staff
Intelligence Administration transmitted reports to the Operations Centre of the VJ General Staff and
on the movements and combat readiness of the Muslim forces in and around the enclaves in BiH
with both specificity and an eye to the necessity for up-to-date information:
4343
4344
4345
4346
4347
4348
4349
Ex. P2178, VRS Main Staff Intelligence Report, 21 May 1995, p. 2.
Ex. P2180, VRS Main Staff Intelligence Report, 26 May 1995, p. 1.
Miodrag Simi}, T. 10094-10095.
Branko Gaji}, T. 10944.
Sini{a Borovi}. T. 14134.
Ex. P2761, Order of the Chief of VJ General Staff to 2nd Army Command, 21 June 1995; Miodrag Simi},
T. 10130-10131. See also Ex. P2755, Order from Peri{i} to Enhance RSK Combat-readiness in Baranja Area, 13
May 1995.
See e.g. Ex. D214, VJ General Staff 2nd Administration Intelligence Report, 7 July 1995, p. 1. See also Ex. D216,
VJ General Staff 2nd Administration Intelligence Report, 9 July 1995; Ex. D220, VJ General Staff 2nd
Administration Intelligence Report, 12 July 1995; Ex. D222, VJ General Staff 2nd Administration Intelligence
Report, 13 July 1995. See also supra section VI.I. 3.
487
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(i)
On 7 July 1995: “Muslim forces in the enclaves of Goražde, Žepa and Srebrenica are
maintaining a high level of combat readiness and have intensified reconnaissance, sabotage
and surprise operations against the VRS”.4350
(ii)
On 9 July 1995: “The forces of the 28th and 81st divisions engaged in provocative
fire from the Srebrenica and Goražde enclaves and inserted reconnaissance and sabotage
groups in the disposition of the VRS”.4351
(iii)
On 9 July 1995: “The units of the 28th Division from Srebrenica operated from the
safe area with the support of the Dutch Battalion and they also used the OT /armoured
personnel’ carrier/ of the Ukrainian Battalion which is stationed in Žepa”.4352
(iv)
On 10 July 1995: attacks by the Muslim army in the area of Sarajevo are detailed,
and that “[i]n the Muslim enclaves of Goražde, Srebrenica and Žepa a general mobilisation
of conscripts was carried out and the units were placed on full combat readiness to carry out
offensive operations in order to down forces of the VRS”.4353
1540. The Trial Chamber has also been presented with a number of VJ General Staff Intelligence
reports that were transmitted to the Operations Centre of the VJ General Staff at the time in which
crimes occurred following the fall of Srebrenica:
(1)
On 12 July 1995, the 2nd Administration reported that “[o]n the morning of 12 July
1995, units of the VRS Drina Corps entered Potočari village”.4354
(ii)
On 13 July 1995, the 2nd Administration reported that: “In the fighting so far, about
500 members of the [ABiH 28th Infantry Division] have been taken prisoners. So far about
50% of Muslim residents have been evacuated from the Srebrenica area; the evacuation of
the remaining residents is made difficult by a shortage of vehicles”.4355
(iii)
On 14 July 1995, the daily report of the 1st Administration Operations Centre
reflected the above information: “VRS units completely smashed the 28th Srebrenica
Infantry Division”.4356 It further reported that “[a]bout 500 members of the Muslim army
have been captured in the combat to date. About 50% of the Muslim population has been
4350
4351
4352
4353
4354
4355
4356
Ex. D214, VJ General Staff 2nd Administration Intelligence Report, 7 July 1995.
Ex. D215, VJ General Staff 1st Aministration Daily Operations Report, 9 July 1995.
Ex. D216, VJ General Staff 2nd Administration Intelligence Report, 9 July 1995.
Ex. D218, VJ General Staff 2nd Administration Intelligence Report, 10 July 1995.
Ex. D220, VJ General Staff 2nd Administration Intelligence Report, 12 July 1995.
Ex. D222, VJ General Staff 2nd Administration Intelligence Report, 13 July 1995.
Ex. D223, VJ General Staff 1st Administration Daily Operations Report, 14 July 1995.
488
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evacuated from the Srebrenica area and the evacuation of the remainder is made difficult
because of the lack of means of transport”.4357
(iv)
On 14 July 1995, the 2nd Administration reported the movements of the ABiH 28th
Infantry Division from Srebrenica, which it said was “attempting to avoid skirmishes with
and destruction by the VRS”. 4358 It futher reported that “at 1100 hours the VRS launched an
attack on the Žepa enclave in order to take it and put it under VRS control”.4359
(v)
On 14 July 1995, the 2nd Administration sent a second report, to Peri{i} directly,
stating that “Having taken the Srebrenica enclave, VRS units concentrated their forces
around the @epa enclave and on 12 July 1995 they issued an ultimatum to the Commander
of the 1st @epa Brigade […] to surrender together with civilians without fighting, otherwise
an operation was to ensue”.4360
1541. Based on the foregoing evidence, the Majority, Judge Moloto dissenting, is satisfied that
Peri{i} was aware that the eastern enclaves were a constant source of tension and subjected to
repeated attacks by the VRS. Peri{i}’s knowledge of the escalating tensions in Srebrenica strongly
indicates that he knew that an eventual attack on Srebrenica would occur. The evidence also shows
that Peri{i} received contemporaneous information of the take-over of Srebrenica by the VRS. The
Majority is also satisfied that Peri{i} was aware of the VRS’s discriminatory intent and criminal
conduct in Srebrenica and elsewhere in BiH.4361 The Majority therefore finds that Peri{i} knew of
the high probability that crimes would be committed against its population as a consequence of the
VRS attack on Srebrenica.
(ii) Peri{i}’s Knowledge of Crimes Committed by the VRS in Srebrenica
1542. The Trial Chamber will now consider to what extent Peri{i} had knowledge of the crimes
committed by the VRS in Srebrenica. According to the Prosecution, Peri{i} had direct and
contemporaneous knowledge concerning the crimes committed in Srebrenica and knew that they
were taking place by 12 July 1995 at the latest.4362
4357
4358
4359
4360
4361
4362
Ex. D223, VJ General Staff 1st Administration Daily Operations Report, 14 July 1995.
Ex. D224, VJ General Staff 2nd Administration Intelligence Report, 14 July 1995.
Ex. D224, VJ General Staff 2nd Administration Intelligence Report, 14 July 1995. See also Ex. D226, VJ General
Staff 2nd Administration Intelligence Report, 15 July 1995; Ex. D228, VJ General Staff 2nd Administration
Intelligence Report, 16 July 1995; Ex. D229, VJ General Staff 2nd Administration Intelligence Report, 17 July
1995.
Ex. D269, VJ General Staff Report on Muslim Forces in the Žepa Enclave, 14 July 1995. See Branko Gaji},
T. 10945-10946.
See supra paras 1484-1487.
Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 684.
489
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a. Statements by Peri{i}
1543. In his interview with the OTP on 7 December 2003, when asked when he first learned of the
allegations of “mass murders and the Srebrenica and the magnitude of the disaster”, Peri{i} himself
stated:
First time I learned about it in the cabinet of Slobodan Milo{evi} when he asked me whether it is
possible that Ratko Mladi} did that. And I asked: “And what did he do”₣?ğ Then he was surprised
that I did not know anything about it. And then he said that mass murder occurred in the wider
area of Srebrenica. And I had the feeling that he was caught by surprise by this event and I was
especially surprised.4363
1544. Peri{i} recalled this meeting to have taken place in Milo{evi}’s office sometime between 15
and 20 July 1995.4364 Peri{i} lamented: “When I heard from Milo{evi} about the terrible crime,
believe it or not, since then I did not want to know anything about it. I distanced myself from that
because it is unbelievable that something like that happens […] at the end of the 20th and in the
beginning of the 21st century”.4365 The Majority notes that, despite this statement, Perišić continued
to approve the provision of logistical assistance to the VRS for months after learning of the
Srebrenica massacre, 4366 and that Perišić kept urging the SDC to maintain assistance to the VRS.
4367
The Majority additionally notes that Peri{i} continued to visit Mladi} in the VJ facilities of
Rajac and Stragari in 1997-1998; at a time when Mladi} was wanted by the international
community for the crimes allegedly committed in BiH.4368
1545. Peri{i} also stated that he received an important indication that “something was about to
happen” when informed by the Užice Corps Commander of the mass escape of Muslims from Žepa,
across the Drina River to Serbia.4369 He elaborated by stating that “there were some clues that
4363
4364
4365
4366
4367
4368
4369
Ex. P802, Transcript of Interview with Periši}, 3 December 2003, pp 26-27
Ex. P802, Transcript of Interview with Periši}, 3 December 2003, p. 27.
Ex. P807, Transcript of Interview with Peri{i}, 19 December 2003, p. 19.
On 1 October 1995, the VJ General Staff supplied the Drina Corps with over 35,000 bullets, 52 rockets and
1,008 mortar grenades, pursuant to Perišić’s order. Ex. P595, Matériel List, 1 October 1995. See MP-14,
T. 3613.On 7 October 1995, the VJ General Staff made twelve “Dvina” rockets available for pick up by the
VRS. Ex. P1252, Correspondence Between VJ General Staff and VRS Command Regarding Ammunition
Supply, 7 October 1995. On the same day, Mladić asked Perišić for ten aerial bombs, a request that Perišić
immediately approved. P2746, Urgent Request from Mladi} to Peri{i} for Approval of 10 Air Bombs, 7 October
1995. See also Ex. P951, Coded Dispatch from the Cabinet of the Chief the VJ General Staff, 7 October 1995
(stating that ten air bombs are available for pick up by the VRS). These documents refer to the provision of
“FAB-275-4”, namely air bombs. See Ex. P505, Transcript of Nikola To{ovi} Deposition, 13 December 2008,
T. 62.
Ex. P2716, VJ General Staff 1st Administration Proposal to FRY President signed by Peri{i}, 15 September
1995, p. 1 (Perišić proposed an “urgent” SDC meeting to answer the VRS’s requests for assistance in arms and
equipment, which Perišić said the VJ was “capable” of satisfying to a certain extent). See also Ex. P2193,
Transcript of the Collegium of the Chief of the VJ General Staff, 15 September 1995, p. 3 (Perišić told the VJ
Collegium that the VRS’s requests were “important” and that “[i]t is realistic to fulfil those requests”).
See supra paras 1386-1389.
Ex. P802, Transcript of Interview with Periši}, 7 December 2003, p. 27.
490
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something was happening but what actually, that I really did not know”.4370 Peri{i}, however, was
acutely aware of the high probability that crimes would be committed in Srebrenica. Peri{i} himself
expanded upon this statement and stated, in his interview with the OTP, that the Užice Corps
Commander informed him of “what he was to do with all those runaways he caught at the border”
and “complained that members of the Užice MUP wanted to kill those refugees”, leading Perišić to
ask Milo{evi} to prevent the massacre of refugees by the MUP.4371
b. Diplomatic Cables
1546. The Prosecution argues that Peri{i} was directly and contemporaneously informed by
diplomatic cables of the ethnic cleansing which took place in Srebrenica.4372 The Defence argues
that the diplomatic cables that were sent to Peri{i} provided “little information that [Peri{i}] could
rely upon as knowledge of the commission of crimes”.4373
1547. Throughout the war, the FRY’s diplomatic missions at the UN and other missions sent
numerous cables to the FRY leadership, some of which were copied to Peri{i}, conveying notice of
the occurrence of several crimes, or at least serious allegations thereof, involving forcible transfers
and killings committed in Srebrenica in July 1995.
1548. On 9 July 1995, the UNSC was informed about a VRS attack on Srebrenica.4374 A
diplomatic cable from the FRY’s UN Mission shows that FRY authorities, albeit not Peri{i}, were
informed of the VRS attack on Srebrenica no later than 10 July 1995.4375 The cable reported that the
UNSC was informed that, on 7 July 1995, “Bosnian Serbs had opened tank fire on Srebrenica, on
which occasion 4 civilians were killed and 17 wounded. Bosnian Serbs continued shelling
Srebrenica on 8 and 9 July”.4376 The cable further reported that Bosnian Serbs had taken control of
five observation posts, in the course of which one Dutch soldier was killed and 30 were taken
captive.4377 No evidence was presented that Peri{i} in fact read or received this cable.
1549. On 12 July 1995, a cable marked “very urgent” was sent by the FRY’s UN Mission in New
York to members of the FRY leadership, including Peri{i}.4378 The cable outlined the positions of
4370
4371
4372
4373
4374
4375
4376
4377
4378
Ex. P803, Transcript of Interview with Periši}, 8 December 2003, p. 4.
Ex. P802, Transcript of Interview with Periši}, 7 December 2003, pp 27-28.
Prosecution Final Brief, para. 676.
Defence Final Brief, para. 918. See also para. 1106.
Muhamed Sacirbey, T. 7460; Ex. P2498, Letter of the Chargé d’Affaires of the Permanent Mission of BiH to the
UN, to the President of the UNSC, 9 July 1995.
Ex. P858 (under seal); Muhamed Sacirbey, T. 7473-7475 (closed session).
Ex. P858 (under seal), p. 1.
Ibid.
Ex. P897 (under seal).
491
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the participants of the debate that led to the unanimous adoption of UNSC Resolution 1004,4379
which expressed grave concern at “the deterioration of ₣theğ situation in and around the safe area of
Srebrenica” and “the plight of the civilian population there”.4380 The cable reported that the United
States and Germany emphasised that the Bosnian Serb leadership in Pale was directly responsible
for the “exodus of the Srebrenica population which came under the jurisdiction of the War Crimes
Tribunal”.4381 Germany reportedly further emphasised that the consequence of the offensive on
Srebrenica was “ethnic cleansing”.4382 The cable also reported that “₣ağ Muslim representative of
the BiH said that by non-reacting, UN de facto supported ‘ethnic cleansing’ committed by the
Serbs, this time in Srebrenica”.4383
1550. The Trial Chamber also received evidence that, on 12 July 1995, the FRY authorities,
including Peri{i}, were informed by diplomatic cable of the Bosnian Serbs’ shelling of Poto~ari,
where Dutch troops and refugees were located.4384 They were further informed about the holding
hostage of Dutch peacekeepers by the VRS and the fact that more than 25,000 refugees were
heading towards Tuzla.4385
1551. On 12 July 1995, the FRY Embassy in London sent a cable to the FRY leadership, including
Peri{i}, about the fall of Srebrenica, stating:
The Media in [Great Britain] are putting the events of Srebrenica into the limelight, stating
specifically the Serbs of BiH [are] ignoring completely the warnings of UN and NATO. It has
been pointed out especially about another ‘Humanitarian Disaster’, even though there are some
rumours that the leadership of RS in its announcement pointed out that the civilians were not
endangered.4386
1552. Similarly, on 13 July 1995, the FRY Embassy in Bonn sent a cable to the FRY leadership,
including Peri{i}, concerning German reactions to the entry of Bosnian Serb troops in Srebrenica.
The cable stated:
With a great intensity and publicity, German media informed the domestic public about the
extension of the “Serb Aggression on civil population of Srebrenica” and about extremely negative
consequences of further engagement of the International Community with regards to solving the
crisis in Bosnia. Numerous comments in daily papers and on special state and private TV station
broadcasts, the suffering of civilians had been shown as well as the helplessness of the Dutch blue
helmets and the “Arrogant behaviour” of the chief of the Bosnian Serbs, Radovan Karadži}.4387
4379
4380
4381
4382
4383
4384
4385
4386
4387
Ibid.
Ex. P2501, UNSC Resolution 1004, 12 July 1995, p. 1.
Ex. P897 (under seal), p. 2.
Ibid.
Ex. P897 (under seal), p. 3.
Ex. P896 (under seal); Muhamed Sacirbey, T. 7488 (closed session).
Ibid.
Ex. P857 (under seal), p. 2.
Ex. P856 (under seal), p. 1.
492
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1553. On 14 July 1995, Peri{i} was informed by diplomatic cable of concerns of the UN member
states regarding the abuse and forced expulsion of civilians in Srebrenica.4388 The cable explained
that “since dramatic news of alleged abuse of Muslim population and their forced expulsion
continue to arrive from the field, in addition to the detention of UNPROFOR members and attacks
on the second ‘protected area of Žepa’, the UNSC was forced to react with a presidential statement,
even though it adopted a resolution on the same issue two days ago”. The cable continued:
Information from the field of alleged abuse of civilians and prisoners from Srebrenica and their
forced expulsion is of special concern for the UN. The Secretary General and other leaders warn
that these are severe violations of humanitarian law and demand that they stop. One of the primary
tasks of the UN and the humanitarian agencies will be to get involved in the situation as soon as
possible to provide the threatened population with the necessary humanitarian help. 4389
c. Meetings with Members of the VRS
1554. The Prosecution maintains that Peri{i} had access to Mladi} and communicated with him
while several crimes were occurring in Srebrenica.4390 The Defence does not dispute that Peri{i}
had direct communications with VRS officers, including Mladić. Instead, the Defence maintains
that the Prosecution has failed to demonstrate that such communications contained any information
about criminal behaviour by the VRS.4391
1555. Photographic evidence shows that, on 18 July 1995, at the time when the crimes were
occurring in Srebrenica, Peri{i} attended a lunch meeting with, inter alia, Mladi} and Gvero in Han
Pijesak.4392 Ned Krayishnik testified that the mood at lunch was cheerful and that the “liberation” of
Srebrenica was discussed.4393 According to him, there were no signs of disagreement between
Peri{i} and Mladi}.4394 He further testified that he did not recall specific statements, but testified
that this was the first occasion when he heard about the resolution of the “problems with
4388
4389
4390
4391
4392
4393
4394
Ex. P855 (under seal); Muhamed Sacirbey, T. 7493-7496 (closed session).
Ex. P855 (under seal), p. 2.
Prosecution Final Brief, paras 685-686.
Defence Final Brief, para. 823.
Ex. P2799, Le{i} Photograph of Peri{i} with Mladi} and Others in Crna Rijeka, 18 July 1995; Ex. P2800, Le{i}
Photograph of Peri{i} with Mladi} and Others in Crna Rijeka, 18 July 1995; Ex. P2801, Le{i} Photograph of
Peri{i} with Mladi} and Others in Crna Rijeka, 18 July 1995; Ex. P2802, Le{i} Photograph of Peri{i} with
Mladi} and Others in Crna Rijeka, 18 July 1995; Ex. P2803, Le{i} Photograph of Peri{i} with Mladi} and Others
in Crna Rijeka, 18 July 1995; Ex. P2804, Le{i} Photograph of Peri{i} with Mladi} and Others in Crna Rijeka, 18
July 1995; Ex. P2805, Le{i} Photograph of Peri{i} with Mladi} and Others in Crna Rijeka, 18 July 1995. See
also Ex. P2705, Photographs of Peri{i} with Mladi} and others, including General Milan Gvero, 18 July 1995.
Ned Krayishnik, T. 9579.
Ned Krayishnik, T. 9578-9579.
493
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Srebrenica”.4395 He further testified “soldiers were also talking about [the liberation of
Srebrenica]”.4396
1556. The Trial Chamber also received evidence that, on 24 July 1995, Peri{i} met with Mladi}
and Slobodan Milo{evi}, and that Milo{evi} then lamented that “Srebrenica and @epa have
damaged us very greatly”.4397
d. Documentation by the International Community of Crimes in Srebrenica
1557. The Trial Chamber has also been presented with evidence that FRY authorities, albeit
without mentioning Peri{i} specifically, were receiving contemporaneous information from the
international community about crimes being committed in Srebrenica.
1558. On 9 July 1995, the UNSC was informed about a VRS attack on Srebrenica.4398 On 13 July
1995, the UNSC and the UNGA were informed by the Permanent Mission of BiH to the UN that
Serb forces were separating the Bosnian Muslims in Srebrenica, that a number of trucks with
detained men were taken to unknown destinations and that there were substantial grounds to fear
their execution.4399 The Trial Chamber heard from Sacirbey that this letter would have been
circulated to all member states, including the FRY and observer missions.4400
1559. On 14 July 1995, the UNSC discussed the expulsion of the civilian population from
Srebrenica by the Bosnian Serbs, as well as the fate of approximately 4,000 Bosnian Muslim men
and boys detained there.4401 On the same day, the President of the UNSC issued the following
statement:
The [UNSC] recalls its [R]esolution 1004 (1995). The Council is deeply concerned about the
ongoing forced relocation of tens of thousands of civilians from the Srebrenica safe area to the
Tuzla region by the Bosnian Serb party. Such a forced relocation is a clear violation of the human
rights of the civilian population. It is especially concerned about reports of grave mistreatment and
killing of innocent civilians. It is equally concerned about reports that up to 4,000 men and boys
have been forcibly removed by the Bosnian Serb party from the Srebrenica safe area. […] The
[UNSC] again condemns the unacceptable practice of ‘ethnic cleansing’ and reaffirms that those
who have committed or have ordered the commission of such acts will be held individually
responsible in respect of such acts.4402
4395
4396
4397
4398
4399
4400
4401
4402
Ned Krayishnik, T. 9550-9553; Ex. P2806, Le{i} Videotape of Mladi} and others in Belgrade, Han Piljesik and
Crna Rijeka, 16-18 July 1995, at 25 minutes and 45 seconds.
Ned Krayishnik, T. 9552.
Ex. P2783, Excerpts from Ratko Mladi}’s Notebook, 24 July 1995, p. 229.
Muhamed Sacirbey, T. 7460; Ex. P2498, Letter of the Chargé d’Affaires of the Permanent Mission of BiH to the
UN, to the President of the UNSC, 9 July 1995.
Ex. P2499, Letter of the Chargé d’Affaires of the Permanent Mission of BiH to the UN, to the President of the
UNSC, 13 July 1995.
Muhamed Sacirbey, T. 7461-7462.
Ex. P2502, Record of the 3554th Meeting of the UNSC, 14 July 1995; Muhamed Sacirbey, T. 7491-7492.
Ex. P2502, Record of the 3554th Meeting of the UNSC, 14 July 1995.
494
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1560. On 14 July 1995, the FRY’s UN Mission in New York sent a cable to FRY leadership,
although not to Peri{i} directly, about the President’s statement. That cable stated as follows:
Today (Friday 14 July), at the request of the USA, the [UNSC] has adopted, without major
problems, the presidential statement (hereby sent by fax), whereby concern was expressed over the
expulsion of civilian population from Srebrenica by the Bosnian Serbs, as well as over the report
on the killings and mistreatment of civilians. […] The [UNSC] has condemned the unacceptable
practice of “ethnic cleansing” and confirmed that those who engaged in or ordered it will
individually be held accountable.4403
1561. On 22 July 1995, a VJ General Staff report stated that “Western intelligence services are
intensively investigating what the VRS intends to do next in the Muslim enclaves Goražde and
Bihać”.4404
1562. On 25 July 1995, the UNSC condemned the Bosnian Serb offensive “in the strongest
possible terms” and expressed particular concern “at the plight of the civilian population”.4405
1563. The Trial Chamber is satisfied that official documents of the UNSC were passed on to FRY
authorities. The Trial Chamber recalls its finding that Peri{i} was in regular contact with the FRY
leadership and was generally informed of UNSC discussions. The Majority, Judge Moloto
dissenting, therefore finds that Peri{i} was aware of reports and other documentations informing the
FRY leadership of crimes committed by the VRS.4406
e. Indictments of the Tribunal
1564. While the conflict was ongoing, the Tribunal issued joint indictments against Radovan
Karadži} and Ratko Mladi} on 24 July 1995, and again on 14 November 1995, for, inter alia,
crimes committed in Srebrenica.4407 The Trial Chamber received evidence that the indictment of 24
July 1995, along with a copy of the arrest warrant, was officially transmitted to FRY authorities in
Belgrade.4408
1565. On 26 July 1995, the Politika, a Belgrade daily newspaper, reported that the Tribunal had
indicted Radovan Karadži} and Ratko Mladić.4409 It reported that Antonio Cassese, the President of
4403
4404
4405
4406
4407
4408
4409
Ex. P899 (under seal), p. 1.
Ex. P2607, Intelligence Report from General Staff to the Operational Centre of VJ, 22 July 1995, p. 1.
Ex. P2507, Statement of the UNSC President, 25 July 1995.
See supra section VI.I.3, paras 1475-1480, 1485, 1518-1521.
Ex. P1628, ICTY Indictment Against Radovan Karad`i} and Ratko Mladi}, 24 July 1995; Ex. P1629, ICTY
Indictment Against Radovan Karad`i} and Ratko Mladi}, 14 November 1995.
Ex. P1630, ICTY Warrant of Arrest for Ratko Mladi}, 25 July 1995 (to FRY); Ex. P1632, Letter to the FRY
Accompanying ICTY Warrant of Arrest for Ratko Mladi}, 26 July 1995.
Ex. P2833, Politika Article Regarding the Effect of Karad`i} Indictment on Peace Negotiations, 26 July 1995;
Ex. P2834, Politika Article on War Crimes Indictments of Karad`i}, Mladi} and Marti}, 26 July 1995.
495
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the Tribunal, had issued a statement declaring that the indicted individuals “will not be in a position
to participate in peace talks”.4410
1566. Evidence presented to the Trial Chamber demonstrates that Peri{i} knew about the
allegations against Mladi}. Peri{i} was informed at the VJ Collegium on 30 October 1995 that
“Serbs are again accused of execution of the Muslims”.4411 At the VJ Collegium on 29 December
1995, Peri{i} acknowledged that Mladi} could not serve as a liaison with IFOR because “he has
been suspected of war crimes”.4412 Finally, the Trial Chamber notes that, not only did Peri{i} know
about the allegations, but that he played an active role in protecting Mladi}. In an intercepted
conversation on 9 December 1995, Peri{i} stated that “nobody will extradite [Mladi}] to the
Tribunal”.4413
f. Media Coverage of Crimes in Srebrenica
1567. The events of Srebrenica were extensively covered by international and Serbian media,
making headlines all over the world.4414
1568. On 13 July 1995, Agence France-Presse reported on the “wholesale shipment of the
enclave’s population out of the pocket personally organized by the Bosnian Serb Commander Ratko
Mladi}”.4415 It further reported that the UNHCR called the removal of residents from Srebrenica
“one of the most blatant examples of ethnically motivated forced displacement we have seen yet in
war”.4416
1569. On 14 July 1995, a report from Agence France-Presse cited a local official from Tuzla
stating that “Bosnian Serb forces are executing men they took prisoner after capturing the
government enclave of Srebrenica”.4417 It further reported another local official in charge of social
policy and refugees as stating that Serbian soldiers had dragged refugees fleeing Srebrenica and
4410
4411
4412
4413
4414
4415
4416
4417
Ex. P2833, Politika Article Regarding the Effect of Karad`i} Indictment on Peace Negotiations, 26 July 1995.
Ex. P2202, Transcript of the Collegium of the Chief of the VJ General Staff, Doc ID 0618-7763, 30 October
1995, p. 2.
Ex. P2891, Record of the Collegium of the VJ General Staff, 29 December 1995, pp 16-17.
Ex. P1464, Intercepted Conversation, 9 December 1995, p. 1.
See e.g. Carl Bildt, T. 14325-14326.
Ex. P1089, Adam Brown, "Evacuation of Srebrenica Refugees Continues - Serbs Holding Male Prisoners",
Agence France-Presse, 13 July 1995.
Ibid.
Ex. P1092, Report Entitled "Evacuation of Srebrenica Civilians Continues; Aid Executing Men on the Spot”,
Agence France-Presse, 14 July 1995.
496
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“executed them on the spot”.4418 The official further stated that some men had been taken to the
border village of Bratunac and that others were taken to a camp where they were killed.4419
1570. On 20 July 1995, the European edition of Oslobodjenje reported that, on 4 July 1995, two
days before the start of the offensive in the area of Srebrenica, VJ 1st Army Commander General
Dragoljub Ojdani}, a subordinate of Peri{i}, reportedly issued the following public statement: “The
two Muslim enclaves of Srebrenica and Žepa are situated in the heart of Serb territory and it should
not have been allowed to form them. It is impossible to remain this way. It has to be solved
militarily”.4420 The article expressly named Peri{i} and a number of his subordinates, and described
both Ojdanić and Mladi} as “war criminals”.4421
1571. The media in Belgrade also reported on the crimes which were taking place in
Srebrenica.4422
1572. On 12 July 1995, Borba published an article concerning the fall of Srebrenica and reported
that “representatives of humanitarian organizations said that Srebrenica was ‘completely empty’
and that thousands of Bosnian Muslims were fleeing Srebrenica ahead of Bosnian Serb attacks”.4423
On 14 July 1995, Borba published another article entitled “Voluntary Ethnic Cleansing”, stating
that the whereabouts of 7,000 people from Srebrenica were unknown, adding that this number
included 3,000 ABiH soldiers, who were hiding in the surrounding woods and hills.4424 On 20 July
1995, Borba reported that the UNHCR stated that “[t]he Bosnian Serbs are carrying out ethnic
terror more systematically than ever before”.4425 On 24 July 1995, Borba published an article
entitled “Serb Behavior in Srebrenica Barbaric”, reporting DutchBat members’ allegations that they
had witnessed Bosnian Serbs killing and torturing Muslims.4426
1573. On 21 July 1995, Intervju, a Belgrade-based weekly, published an article describing the
gathering of “28,000 Muslims of all ages” at the Dutch base in Potočari.4427 The article depicted the
empty streets of Srebrenica, the looting of apartments, and the surrendering of Muslim men near
4418
4419
4420
4421
4422
4423
4424
4425
4426
4427
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ex. P2869, Article in European Edition of Oslobodjenje, 20-23 July 1995, p. 2.
Ibid.
See Muhamed Sacirbey, T. 7186.
Ex. P1099, Naša Borba Article on NATO Intervention in Srebrenica, 12 July 1995, p. 2.
Ex. P1101, Naša Borba Article on Events in Srebrenica, 14 July 1995. See also Ex. P1098, Naša Borba Article
on Srebrenica, 10 July 1995; Ex. P1099, Naša Borba Article on NATO Intervention in Srebrenica, 12 July 1995;
Ex. P1100, Naša Borba Article on NATO Intervention in Srebrenica, 12 July 1995; Ex. P1102, Naša Borba
Article, 20 July 1995; Ex. P1103, Naša Borba Article on Events in Srebrenica, 22 July 1995; Ex. P1105, Politika
Ekspres Article on Events in Srebrenica, 12 July 1995.
Ex. P1102 Naša Borba Article, 20 July 1995.
Ex. P1104, Naša Borba/NY Times Article on Events in Srebrenica, 24 July 1995.
Ex. P2824, Intervju Article on Events in Srebrenica, 21 July 1995, p. 1.
497
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Kravica.4428 It described the participation of VRS officers in the take-over of Srebrenica, among
them Krstić, Milovanović, Gvero, Tolimir and Ljubiša Borovčanin.4429
1574. On the same date, the Belgrade weekly Nin published an article entitled “Ghost Town”, in
which it stated that “[a]lready a week has passed since the fall of Srebrenica and it is still not clear
what happened to its citizens. The majority was reportedly loaded by Bosnian Serbs into buses and
trucks and taken towards Tuzla, Kladanj and other locations in the territory controlled by the
government in Sarajevo, but there is no reliable information on the whereabouts of thousands of
others”.4430 The article continued, stating that according to a UN source, “General Mladić called the
commander of the Dutch ‘blue helmets’ and told him that hundreds of people had been killed in the
villages of the Srebrenica municipality”.4431 The article also reported that a piece on Srebrenica
broadcast by Studio B aired images of several male bodies in a draining ditch and very briefly the
camera showed what appeared to be a pile of bodies, three or four layers deep, in front of a depot,
while a journalist commented that “many Muslim soldiers had been killed”.4432
1575. The Prosecution asserts that Peri{i} was provided with daily summaries of news/media
reports relating to the events in Srebrenica and that he personally watched televised media coverage
and read newspapers.4433 At the same time, the Defence submits that no evidence was presented
before the Trial Chamber to support the assertion that Peri{i} watched or read news from any
international media source and that it cannot be inferred that information contained in open source
materials or international news media reports was available to Perišić.4434
1576. The Trial Chamber heard from Gaji} that the earliest information regarding the crimes
committed in Srebrenica was gleaned by the VJ from media reports.4435 He testified that he received
the information through a foreign news agency report 10 to 15 days after its publication some time
after 20 July 1995.4436 However, the witness maintained that the VJ was not notified that any crimes
occurred at Srebrenica.4437 He only saw contradictory reports in the media.4438 He admitted that he
“did nothing” with this information because it “wasn’t a counter-intelligence issue”.4439 He testified
4428
4429
4430
4431
4432
4433
4434
4435
4436
4437
4438
4439
Ex. P2824, Intervju Article on Events in Srebrenica, 21 July 1995, pp 6, 11-12.
Ex. P2824, Intervju Article on Events in Srebrenica, 21 July 1995, pp 3-5.
Ex. P1096, Nin Article on Srebrenica Aftermath, 21 July 1995, p. 7.
Ibid.
Ex. P1096, Nin Article on Srebrenica Aftermath, 21 July 1995, pp 7-8.
Prosecution Final Brief, para. 3.
Defence Final Brief, paras 829-830.
Branko Gaji}, T. 10957.
Branko Gaji}, T. 10966-1967.
Branko Gajić, T. 10953-10955, 10959-10963, 11020-11022.
Branko Gajić, T. 10956-10961, 10966-10967.
Branko Gajić, T. 10960-10962.
498
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28735
that other bodies would have been responsible for looking into these media reports, such as the
judiciary and the VRS.4440
1577. The Prosecution asserts that it is “impossible that the VJ intelligence apparatus was ignorant
of the crimes which were occurring until two weeks after the foreign media had reported them”.4441
The Defence asserts that the Prosecution has failed to demonstrate that information from
international news reports was provided to Peri{i} in intelligence or information reports.4442
1578. Gaji} was not credible when he testified that the Security Administration of the VJ General
Staff received information regarding crimes in Srebrenica only after 20 July 1995. The Majority
recalls that the Intelligence and Security Administration monitored the situation in and around the
area of Srebrenica as shown by the reports that were sent to the VJ General Staff between 7 and 14
July 1995.4443 The evidence also shows that the VJ had a security interest in monitoring the
situation in the Srebrenica area as it was close to the FRY border.4444 In this regard, the Majority
also notes that Gaji}, when pressed by the Prosecution in cross-examination, conceded that the
conflict in Srebrenica was near the FRY border and actually presented a security problem that could
lead to an inflow of refugees.4445 Gaji} also testified that its security organs had an obligation to
duly verify the authenticity of data and intelligence received from a number of different sources.4446
The Majority is therefore satisfied that the only reasonable inference available from the evidence is
that the VJ General Staff through its intelligence and security organs must have received
information regarding crimes committed in Srebrenica well before 20 July 1995. Furthermore, the
evidence discussed above shows that the media reported information about certain crimes allegedly
occurring in Srebrenica, especially the forcible displacement of Bosnian Muslims, as early as 13
July 1995.4447 The Majority recalls that the VJ General Staff and Peri{i} himself monitored the
media’s coverage of the war in the BiH.4448 Based on these considerations, the Majority therefore
finds that Peri{i} was aware of allegations of crimes as early as 13 July 1995.
(c) Conclusion
1579. The Majority, Judge Moloto dissenting, is satisfied that Peri{i}, while serving as Chief of the
VJ General Staff, was aware of the VRS’s discriminatory intent and criminal behaviour towards
4440
4441
4442
4443
4444
4445
4446
4447
4448
Branko Gajić, T. 10961-10963.
Prosecution Final Brief, para. 682.
Defence Final Brief, paras 829-830.
See supra paras 1534-1539.
Miodrag Simi}. T. 10094-10095.
Branko Gajić, T. 10961-10962.
Branko Gaji}, T. 10803.
See supra paras 1568-1578.
See supra paras 1404-1405, 1515-1516.
499
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28734
Bosnian Muslims, as shown, inter alia, by the events in Sarajevo and Srebrenica between 1993 and
1995. The Majority therefore finds beyond a reasonable doubt that Peri{i} knew that individual
crimes committed by the VRS before the attack on Srebrenica would probably be followed by more
crimes committed by the VRS after the take-over of the enclave in July 1995. The Majority is also
satisfied that Peri{i} had contemporaneous knowledge of allegations that the VRS was committing
crimes in Srebrenica.
500
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VII. PERI[I]’S CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR AIDING AND
ABETTING CRIMES UNDER ARTICLE 7(1)
A. Elements of Aiding and Abetting
1580. Momčilo Perišić is indicted under Article 7(1) of the Statute of the Tribunal for aiding and
abetting crimes committed by the VRS in Sarajevo and Srebrenica.4449 In order for Peri{i} to be
held responsible for aiding and abetting, the Trial Chamber must be satisfied that Peri{i} provided
practical assistance, encouragement, or moral support to the principal perpetrator of the crime,
which had a substantial effect on the perpetration of the crime.4450 An alleged aider and abettor is
always accessory to a crime perpetrated by another person, the principal.4451 For an accused to be
liable for aiding and abetting, the underlying crime must have been committed by the principal
perpetrator.4452 Furthermore, the Trial Chamber must be satisfied that Peri{i} knew that his acts
assisted the commission of the crime by the principal perpetrator4453 and that he was aware of the
“essential elements” of the crime, including the state of mind of the principal perpetrator.4454
However, it is not necessary that he shared the mens rea required for the crime.4455
1581. The Trial Chamber will first analyse the objective elements and discuss the mental element
separately.
B. Findings on Objective Elements of Aiding and Abetting
1. Submissions of the Parties
1582. The Prosecution argues that the following had a substantial effect of the commission of
crimes by the VRS in Sarajevo and Srebrenica: Peri{i}’s logistic assistance, personnel assistance,
deployment of VJ troops to the Sarajevo war theatre and the creation of an environment of
impunity.4456 The Prosecution asserts that “[w]ithout this assistance in men and materiel, the VRS
4449
4450
4451
4452
4453
4454
4455
4456
Indictment, paras 40-46, 55-62.
Mrk{i} and [ljivan~anin Appeal Judgement, para. 81; Karera Appeal Judgement, para. 321; Blagojevi} and
Joki} Appeal Judgement, paras 127, 188, quoting Furundžija Trial Judgement, para. 249; Bla{ki} Appeal
Judgement, para. 45; Simi} Appeal Judgement, para. 85. See also Ori} Appeal Judgement, para. 43. For a
thorough analysis of the actus reus of aiding and abetting, see Furund`ija Trial Judgement, paras 192-235.
Tadi} Appeal Judgement, para. 229.
Milutinovi} et al. Trial Judgement, para. 92.
Blagojevi} and Joki} Appeal Judgement, para. 127; Simi} Appeal Judgement, para. 86; Bla{ki} Appeal
Judgement, paras 45-46; Seromba Appeal Judgement, para. 56; Ntagerura et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 370;
Vasiljevi} Appeal Judgement, para. 102.
Blagojevi} and Joki} Appeal Judgement, para. 221. See also Ori} Appeal Judgement, para. 43. It is not required
that the accused knew the precise crime that was intended and committed by the principal, Bla{ki} Appeal
Judgement, para. 50.
Blagojevi} and Joki} Appeal Judgement, para. 221. See also Blaškić Appeal Judgement, para. 45.
Prosecution Final Brief, paras 60-81, 461-562.
501
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would not have been a functioning army, would have been unable to prosecute the war in BiH at
such length and with such ferocity, and would have been unable to commit the crimes tragically
characteristic of that war”.4457
1583. The Defence argues that none of the methods of alleged assistance presented by the
Prosecution, whether individually or collectively, establish Peri{i}’s liability under Article 7(1) of
the Statute4458 and that the Prosecution has failed to establish a nexus between Perišić and any
crimes perpetrated by the VRS.4459
1584. The Defence also argues that the relevant question is not whether Perišić provided “a
substantial amount” of weaponry and other logistical support, but whether such assistance had “a
substantial effect” on the perpetration of the crimes,4460 which the evidence does not establish.4461 In
the Defence’s view, finding Perišić guilty of aiding and abetting the charged crimes would amount
to “the indirect criminalisation of the waging of war”.4462
1585. Finally, the Defence argues that for ex post facto assistance to amount to aiding and
abetting, the Prosecution must prove that a prior agreement existed between the accused and the
perpetrator at the time of the planning, preparation or execution of the crime.4463 It concludes that
no such agreement concerning crimes existed between Perišić and the VRS.4464
2. Preliminary Remarks
1586. With respect to the Prosecution argument of a “creation of an environment of impunity”, the
Trial Chamber notes that the Prosecution formulates this aspect of Peri{i}’s alleged responsibility as
a direct consequence of his “complete failure to prevent the crimes and to punish his subordinates
for committing them”.4465 The Defence argues that any argument in this vein should only be
considered within the ambit of Article 7(3) liability, and any effort by the Prosecution to do
otherwise would be in an effort to circumvent the stringent requirement of Article 7(3) liability.4466
The Trial Chamber finds that this aspect of the Prosecution’s theory can only be discussed once and
if a superior-subordinate relationship between Peri{i} and the principal perpetrators is established.
As will be detailed later in this Judgement, the Trial Chamber did not find that a superior4457
4458
4459
4460
4461
4462
4463
4464
4465
4466
Prosecution Final Brief, para. 61. See also Prosecution Final Brief, paras 4-8, 73.
Defence Final Brief, paras 605, 1047.
Defence Final Brief, paras 800-802, 1081-1082.
Defence Final Brief, para. 52. See also Defence Closing Arguments, T. 14785.
See Defence Final Brief, paras 800-802, 1081-1082.
Defence Closing Arguments, T. 14786.
Defence Final Brief, paras 49, 1083-1084, citing Blagojević Trial Judgement, para. 731.
Defence Final Brief, paras 796, 1083.
Prosecution Final Brief, paras 461, 831-834 (emphasis added).
Defence Final Brief, paras 64-65.
502
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subordinate relationship existed between Peri{i} and the VRS, including its officers serving in the
30th PC.4467 In the absence of Peri{i}’s material ability to prevent or punish the perpetrators of the
crimes, the Trial Chamber will not enter any finding as to whether an environment of impunity was
created and what effect it had on the commission of the crimes.
1587. The following analysis and findings are made by the Majority of the Trial Chamber, Judge
Moloto dissenting.
3. The VRS’s War Strategy Encompassed the Commission of Crimes
1588. Momčilo Perišić stands charged with aiding and abetting war crimes and crimes against
humanity committed by VRS members against civilians and/or persons not taking active part in
hostilities in Sarajevo and Srebrenica. Perišić is not charged with helping the VRS wage war per se,
which is not a crime under the Statute. The Majority, however, finds that under the VRS’s strategy
there was no clear distinction between military warfare against BiH forces and crimes against
civilians and/or persons not taking active part in hostilities. To the contrary, these crimes were
inextricably linked to the war strategy and objectives of the VRS leadership. They were not
perpetrated by rogue soldiers acting independently.
1589. The Majority recalls that Perišić was put on notice of the “strategic objectives” of the
Bosnian Serb leadership.4468 One of the six strategic objectives was a partition of Sarajevo into
Serbian and Muslim sectors and establishment of a separate state authority for each sector.4469 The
Bosnian Serb leaders viewed the siege of Sarajevo as instrumental to the implementation of this
objective.4470
1590. The systematic and widespread sniping and shelling of civilians in Sarajevo by the VRS
over a period of three years demonstrates that the VRS’s leading officers relied on criminal acts to
further the siege. As observed by Michael Williams, a senior UNPROFOR official, the VRS’s siege
of Sarajevo “was conducted with complete disregard of the Geneva [C]onventions and of
international humanitarian law and deliberately not only made no distinction between civilian and
military, but targeted the civil[ian] population in preference to military targets”.4471 Such attacks
4467
4468
4469
4470
4471
See infra paras 1770-1779.
Ex. P2933, Excerpt from Ratko Mladi}'s Notebook, 13 December 1993, p. 1.
Ex. P188, Minutes of the 16th Session of the Assembly of the Serbian People in BiH, 12 May 1992, pp 13-14;
Ex. P334, Excerpt of the RS’s Official Gazette Reporting the “Strategic Goals”, 26 November 1993. See also
supra paras 184, 305.
See supra para. 305.
Ex. P2371, Witness Statement of Michael Charles Williams, 21-22 March 2000, p. 9.
503
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were designed to intimidate the population of Sarajevo and break its morale and spirit, as well as to
destabilise BiH as a country.4472
1591. The Majority also recalls that the third strategic objective was related to Srebrenica and
aimed at establishing a corridor in the Drina River valley and eliminating the Drina River as a
border between the Serbian states.4473 At the military level, this goal was implemented through the
plan of “plunging the Bosnian Muslim population into a humanitarian crisis and ultimately
eliminating the enclave”.4474 The Majority is satisfied that the implementation of this plan involved
criminal acts. The Majority recalls in this regard that the attack of Srebrenica involved the removal
of the Bosnian Muslim civilian population and was followed by the organised mass execution and
burial of thousands of Bosnian Muslim civilians and/or persons not taking active part in hostilities,
as well as the commission of other abuses on a very wide scale.4475
4. Logistical Assistance
(a) Submissions
1592. The Prosecution submits that Perišić orchestrated the VJ’s provision of extensive logistical
assistance to the VRS, which had a substantial effect on the crimes perpetrated by the VRS in
Sarajevo and Srebrenica.4476 It advances that logistical assistance was “substantial and took many
forms: weapons and ammunition, repairs and maintenance, training, medical support,
communications support, fuel and lubricants, air bombs and rocket engines for the manufacture of
modified air bombs, and other miscellaneous assistance”.4477 The Prosecution contends that certain
shells and bullets recovered from crime scenes in Sarajevo and Srebrenica originated from the
logistical assistance provided by Perišić.4478
1593. The Defence acknowledges that Perišić and the VJ gave assistance to the VRS following the
SDC’s orders,4479 although it argues that there is no relationship between any assistance provided by
Perišić and the crimes committed by the VRS.4480 It adds that there is no evidence of a link between
Perišić and any ammunition retrieved from the alleged crime scenes.4481 Moreover, it claims that it
4472
4473
4474
4475
4476
4477
4478
4479
4480
4481
Ex. P2371, Witness Statement of Michael Charles Williams, 21-22 March 2000, pp 7-11.
Ex. P188, Minutes of the 16th Session of the Assembly of the Serbian People in BiH, 12 May 1992, p. 13.
See supra para. 607.
See supra section V.C.
Prosecution Final Brief, paras 461, 481, 554. See also Prosecution Final Brief, para. 6.
Prosecution Final Brief, para. 240.
Prosecution Final Brief, para. 79. See also supra section VI.F.
Defence Final Brief, paras 607, 780.
Defence Closing Arguments, T. 14786-14787.
Defence Final Brief, paras 801-802, 1081. See also Defence Final Brief, paras 1049-1080.
504
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is not possible to accurately determine what quantities of weaponry the VRS obtained from the VJ
as opposed to other sources.4482
(b) Discussion
1594. The Majority recalls its finding that Peri{i} oversaw a system providing comprehensive
military assistance to the VRS. Such support included provision of weapons and ammunition,
technical experts, training, medical support, fuel and operational support enabling the Pretis factory
to produce weaponry. In particular, the Majority notes that part of this assistance was given to VRS
units involved in perpetrating the charged crimes: the Drina Corps, Krajina Corps and SRK.4483
1595. The Majority recalls that although the VJ was providing logistical assistance to the VRS
even before Peri{i} became Chief of the VJ General Staff, he helped to efficiently continue this
policy. Peri{i} recurrently urged the SDC to continue providing the VRS with extensive logistical
and technical assistance free of charge, and oversaw this process in practice.4484 By these actions,
Peri{i} thus provided practical assistance to the VRS.
1596. The Majority will now turn to analyse what effect such assistance had on the commission of
the crimes by the VRS.
1597. The Majority recalls its finding that the VRS’s material reserves were significantly depleted
as the war progressed.4485 During the war, RS described its material and financial situation as
“catastrophic”,4486 “alarming”,4487 “extremely poor”4488 and “grave”.4489 The evidence shows that
the VRS was significantly dependent on the military support from the FRY and regularly requested
assistance from Perišić and the VJ,4490 sometimes pressingly.4491 The VRS’s dependence on VJ
assistance was exacerbated by the fact that the great bulk of military supplies was given free of
charge by the VJ, and that the VRS was otherwise frequently unable to pay whenever payment was
demanded.4492
4482
4483
4484
4485
4486
4487
4488
4489
4490
4491
4492
Defence Final Brief, paras 647, 742-743; Defence Closing Arguments, T. 14784.
See supra para. 1237 and sections VI.C.2.(b)-(c), VI.C.3, VI.C.4.(c), VI.C.5-6, 8.
See generally supra section VI.B-C.
See supra paras 1182-1197.
Ex. P1251, Report on VRS Financial Situation, November 1993, p. 3.
Ex. P2918, VRS Main Staff Commander Memo Addressed to the Government of the RS, 1 November 1993,
p. 3; Ex. P1251, Report on VRS Financial Situation, November 1993, p. 10.
Ex. P1534, Work Report of the RS MOD for the Period of August 1994 – November 1995, November 1995,
p. 18.
Ex. P2766, Cable from Karad`i} to Peri{i}, 15 May 1994.
See supra paras 943-947.
See supra paras 1184, 1188-1191, 1193, 1197.
See e.g. Ex. P776, Stenographic Transcript of the 21st Session of the SDC, 7 June 1994, pp 38-39. See also supra
paras 1116-1134.
505
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1598. The highest authorities in the VRS were clearly aware that their war depended on the
assistance from the VJ. Karadžić admitted that “nothing would happen without Serbia. We do not
have those resources and we would not be able to fight”.4493 Mladić too reckoned that “we would
not be able to live” if the FRY suspended its assistance.4494 At the end of the war, Mladi} addressed
a letter to Milošević, copying Perišić, to express his gratitude for the “invaluable” assistance that the
VRS had received from FRY authorities.4495 Mladić acknowledged that:
It would be difficult to imagine the course of events if it had not been for that assistance. It was
comprehensive and basically timely. We would like to emphasize that it had always come at the
right moment and was precious when we needed it most. This is well known, especially among the
[VRS] which will remain forever grateful.4496
1599. The Majority also notes that Perišić himself admitted that the VRS and SVK obtained their
logistics “mostly from the [FRY]”.4497 He clearly notified the SDC that the VRS could not have
waged war if military assistance had been withheld.4498 Referring to the FRY’s support to RS and
RSK, Perišić boasted that “[t]hanks to this assistance the Serbian people in these republics was [sic]
able to survive and to defend its [sic] centuries-old territory”.4499 Slobodan Milošević echoed these
convictions while speaking of the FRY’s support to RS: “[t]hey know very well that they cannot
survive without this country”.4500 Milošević remarked that “[e]verything that has been made there
was made thanks to Serbia and the army”, a statement with which Perišić concurred.4501 A similar
view as to dependence of the VRS on the support of the FRY was shared by several witnesses who
served in top positions with UNPROFOR at that time.4502
1600. While this evidence refers to general assistance provided by the FRY, the Majority is
satisfied that the object of these statements encompassed logistical assistance from the VJ. In this
context, the Majority recalls its finding that the quantities of weaponry provided to the VRS under
Perišić’s authority were very important in comparison to other sources of supply.4503 The VRS Main
4493
4494
4495
4496
4497
4498
4499
4500
4501
4502
4503
Ex. P2822, Minutes of 40th Session of the RS National Assembly, 1 and 11 May 1994, p. 57.
Ex. P1282, Intercepted Conversation, undated, p. 6.
Ex. P2710, Cable from Mladi} to President Milo{evi} and the Chief of the VJ General Staff, 17 December 1995,
pp 3-4.
Ex. P2710, Cable from Mladi} to President Milo{evi} and the Chief of the VJ General Staff, 17 December 1995,
p. 3.
Ex. P2879, Video “JNA – srpska verzija sloma” Serbian Version of the Breakup, p. 27.
See Ex. P791, Stenographic Transcript of the 17th Session of the SDC, 10 January 1994, p. 4; Ex. P782,
Stenographic Transcript of the 18th Session of the SDC, 7 February 1994, p. 53; Ex. P776, Stenographic
Transcript of the 21st Session of the SDC, 7 June 1994, p. 38; Ex. P2783, Excerpt from Ratko Mladić’s
Notebook, 1995, p. 4. See also supra paras 964-965, 968, 971.
Ex. P2743, Memo from the Chief of VJ General Staff, 11 August 1995, p. 2.
Ex. P778, Stenographic Transcript of the 25th Session of the SDC, 30 August 1994, p. 47.
Ex. P1476, Intercepted Conversation, 7 October 1996, pp 4-5.
See MP-433, T. 2104-2105, 2142-2144 (closed session); Ex. P2349, Transcript of Rupert Smith from Prosecutor
v. S. Milo{evi}, 9 October 2003, T. 27296; Michael Williams, T. 6464; Ex. P2372, Transcript of Michael
Williams Testimony from Prosecutor v. S. Milošević, 24 June 2003, T. 22893-22894.
See supra paras 1233-1237.
506
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Staff itself admitted that VJ military aid was “extremely important” for its objectives,4504 and
identified the need for VJ support in its strategic plans.4505 Perišić also explained that, rather than
retain material reserves at full capacity, he ensured that the VJ gave the VRS “all we had always
and I am not sorry for that”.4506
1601. The Majority notes the evidence that the VRS also obtained a measure of assistance from
sources other than Peri{i} and the VJ General Staff.4507 However, the Majority underlines that the
legal standard does not require that Perišić be the exclusive source of assistance. The fact that the
VRS obtained weaponry from other sources, including its own reserves, besides the VJ General
Staff, negates neither Perišić’s actions nor the element of substantial assistance.
1602. In conclusion, the Majority finds that the VRS depended heavily on FRY and VJ assistance
in order to function as an army and to wage war. As shown below, this dependence was not limited
to logistical assistance but also encompassed all other forms of assistance provided by the VJ
including personnel.4508 The Majority recalls that the crimes charged in the Indictment were an
integral part of the VRS’s war strategy.4509 Hence, the evidence leads the Majority to the only
reasonable conclusion that by providing vital logistical and technical assistance to the VRS during
the war, including to the specific units that perpetrated the crimes, Peri{i} facilitated the
commission of those crimes.
5. Personnel Assistance
(a) Submissions
1603. The Prosecution submits that Peri{i} provided practical assistance and moral support
through the provision of personnel to the VRS and that the highest command structure of the VRS
were VJ officers.4510 These officers included the “architects and executioners” of the VRS
campaign in BiH and were responsible for the crimes committed in Sarajevo and Srebrenica
described in the Indictment.4511
4504
4505
4506
4507
4508
4509
4510
4511
Ex. P1211, Correspondence Between the VRS Main Staff and the RS Prime Minister Regarding the
Construction of a Material Gift for the VJ, 15 January 1995, p. 1.
Ex. P1555, Extract from the Directive for Use of the VRS, December 1993, p. 12; Ex. P2158, Document Issued
by Ratko Mladić Regarding Logistical Support, undated, pp 1-2. Mladić refers to the 608th Logistics Base in
Ex. P2158, which two witnesses identified as a VJ base, see Miodrag Simi}, T. 10155; Mladen Mihajlovi},
T. 3886.
Ex. P2203, Transcript of the Collegium of the Chief of the VJ General Staff, 6 November 1995, p. 3.
See supra section VI.C.9.
See infra paras 1607-1620.
See supra para. 1588-1591.
Prosecution Final Brief, paras 62, 461.
Prosecution Final Brief, para. 62.
507
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1604. Particularly, the Prosecution argues that Peri{i} provided the group of essential senior VJ
officers, members of the 30th PC, responsible for the commission of crimes in Sarajevo: Ratko
Mladi}, Stanislav Gali}, Dragomir Milo{evi} and ^edo Sladoje.4512 He also provided the VRS with
the officers, also members of the 30th PC, who “committed, planned, instigated, ordered, or aided
the commission”4513 of the crimes charged for Srebrenica, including Ratko Mladi}, Radivoje
Mileti}, Milan Gvero, Ljubi{a Beara, Radislav Krsti}, Vujadin Popovi}, Vidoje Blagojevi}, Vinko
Pandurevi}, Dragan Joki}, Dragan Obrenovi}, Drago Nikoli}, Zdravko Tolimir, Milorad Pelemi{,
Radoslav Jankovi} and Svetozar Kosori}.4514
1605. The Defence argues that the Prosecution failed to prove that the provision of officers to the
VRS during Peri{i}’s tenure was substantial or significant.4515 It responds that all but three
individuals holding key positions in the VRS already held those positions before Peri{i}’s
appointment as Chief of the VJ General Staff.4516
1606. The Defence argues that the number of officers who received salaries and benefits from the
FRY constituted a small portion of the VRS’s military personnel4517 and was in constant decline.4518
It is the Defence’s position that the Prosecution failed to prove that the payment of salaries or
verification of VRS promotions in the VJ had a substantial effect on the commission of crimes.4519
It further notes that due to inflation salaries were often worthless and that they were even suspended
for a period of five months; yet no members of the VRS left their posts.4520 Thus, the Defence
claims that any argument that payment of salaries had an impact on the commission of crimes is
unsustainable.4521
(b) Discussion
1607. The Majority recalls that all of the military personnel serving in the VRS through the 30th
PC remained members of the VJ.4522 In addition to the payment of their salaries, these personnel
continued to enjoy all of the rights and benefits as any other VJ member, including compensation
for service under difficult conditions, housing benefits and/or a separation allowance, medical
4512
4513
4514
4515
4516
4517
4518
4519
4520
4521
4522
Prosecution Final Brief, paras 463-480.
Prosecution Final Brief, para. 503.
Prosecution Final Brief, paras 503-553.
See Defence Final Brief, para. 333.
Defence Final Brief, paras 331-333.
Defence Final Brief, para. 363.
Defence Final Brief, paras 326-329, 333.
See Defence Final Brief, paras 337, 413, 426-430, 604.
See Defence Final Brief, para. 364. See also Defence Final Brief, paras 366-368.
Defence Final Brief, para. 368.
See supra paras 832-840. See also supra paras 793, 795.
508
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insurance and treatment for themselves and their families, as well as accelerated pension plan. Once
retired, members of the 30th PC received their pensions from the FRY.4523
1608. Members of the 30th PC included the top officers in the VRS Main Staff, namely: Ratko
Mladi} (Commander), Manojlo Milovanovi} (Chief of Staff and Deputy Commander), Milan Gvero
(Assistant Commander), \or|e \uki} (Assistant Commander), Zdravko Tolimir (Assistant
Commander), Ljubi{a Beara (Chief of Security) and Radivoje Mileti} (Chief of Administration for
Operations and Training).4524 In addition, the Majority found that members of the 30th PC also held
key positions in the corps responsible for the crimes committed in Sarajevo and Srebrenica,
including: Stanislav Gali} and Dragomir Milo{evi} (Commanders of the SRK);4525 Milenko
@ivanovi} and Radislav Krsti} (Commanders of the Drina Corps);4526 Vujadin Popovi} (Assistant
Commander for Security in the Drina Corps);4527 Vinko Pandurevi} (Commander of the Zvornik
Brigade) and Dragan Obrenovi} (Chief of Staff of the Zvornik Brigade).4528
1609. The Majority acknowledges that the majority of these men started serving in the VRS before
Peri{i}’s appointment as Chief of the VJ General Staff and before the creation of the PCs.4529 Yet, it
was when Peri{i} became Chief of Staff of the VJ General Staff and the PCs were created, that they
became members of the 30th PC, effective as of 10 November 1993 (i.e. date of Lili}’s order on the
creation of the PCs), thereby legally acquiring their status of VJ members – with all the
corresponding benefits – even though they served in the VRS.4530 The Majority recalls its earlier
finding that Peri{i} carefully devised and implemented the plan to create the PCs.4531 Therefore,
while it is true that Peri{i} did not technically “provide” the VRS with its highest ranking officers,
he nonetheless created the conditions that enabled them to continue serving in the VRS without
impediments while enjoying all the rights conferred to VJ members.
1610. In addition to sustaining these key officers, Peri{i} sent other VJ military personnel to the
VRS on an ongoing basis, including specific individuals at the request of the VRS Main Staff.4532
The Majority recalls that the number of 30th PC members active in the VRS fluctuated throughout
the years, but the flow and rotation of personnel continued without interruption.4533 The Majority
4523
4524
4525
4526
4527
4528
4529
4530
4531
4532
4533
See supra section VI.A .8.(b)-(f).
See supra paras 273, 795, 878.
See supra paras 291, 795, 878.
See supra para. 284, 795, 878.
See supra paras 285, 795, 878.
See Ex. P1731, VJ Personnel File of Vinko Pandurević, Doc ID 0422-8585, pp 10-11. See also supra paras 287,
795, 878.
See supra section IV.E; paras 789, 795, 799.
See supra paras 777, 785, 787, 789.
See supra paras 777, 787.
See supra para. 790.
See supra para. 793.
509
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further recalls that VJ military personnel did not have a choice as to whether or not they would be
transferred to the VRS or the SVK through the PCs. Peri{i} intended the deployment to these armies
to be compulsory and implemented a system, whereby any military personnel who refused or were
reticent to go to the VRS and SVK were forced to do so by threat of early retirement or termination
of service.4534
1611. The Majority finds that by these actions, Peri{i} provided practical assistance to the VRS.
The Majority will now turn to analyse the effect of such assistance on the commission of the
crimes.
1612. The Majority notes that from the beginning of the war Mladi} had to deal with numerous
commanding officers leaving their positions without his authorisation and without handing over
their duties, damaging both the combat readiness of the VRS and the combat morale of the
soldiers.4535 The establishment of the PCs principally aimed to address this issue.4536 In this context,
Peri{i}’s assistance in terms of personnel was vital to help the VRS function. A letter addressed to
Peri{i} from Mladi} in 1995, illustrates the importance of this assistance:
Due to great problems with the recruitment for command positions in the units, especially the key
command positions (battalion commanders, division commanders, company commanders), I
propose that you authorise the admission of 292 professional commanders […] replacing the 292
contract soldiers whose contracts have been terminated.4537
1613. The Majority is satisfied that Peri{i} not only provided the VRS with personnel who were to
be placed in positions of different level of command, but also sustained the officers already serving
in the VRS before the establishment of the 30th PC, who either committed or had effective control
over those who committed the crimes in Sarajevo or Srebrenica.4538 The Majority finds that by these
actions, Peri{i} created the conditions for Mladi}, Gali}, Milo{evi}, Gvero, Krsti}, Tolimir and
Popovi}, amongst others in the VRS, to wage a war that encompassed systematic criminal actions
without impediments. By doing so, he facilitated the commission of the crimes in Sarajevo and
Srebrenica.
1614. The Majority is also satisfied that Peri{i} contributed to the commission of the crimes by
promoting and paying the salaries of these 30th PC members.
4534
4535
4536
4537
4538
See supra paras 803-809.
Ex. P1529, Letter of Ratko Mladi} to the Chief of the VJ General Staff, 31 March 1993. See also supra para.
762.
See supra paras 763-764.
Ex. P2725, VRS Proposal for Authorisation to Admit Professional Contract Officers into the VRS, 12 June 1995,
p. 1 (emphasis added).
See supra paras 550-555, 562, 727, 759.
510
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1615. The Majority recalls its findings that Peri{i} had a key role in the verification of promotions
and that he directly participated in the determination of the funds within the federal budget to be
allocated to the VJ General Staff for the payment of the salaries of VJ military personnel, including
30th PC members.4539
1616. The Majority finds that, in the context of the PCs, the verification and recognition of the
new rank within the VJ was essential for the PCs members and their families to enjoy the
commensurate rights and benefits in the VJ. A higher rank carried a higher salary and also affected
the calculation of the pensions and all the benefits previously described.4540 The importance of the
verification process is strictly interwoven with the role and purpose of the PCs. Against this
backdrop, the Majority finds that Peri{i}’s verification of the promotions of 30th PC members was
vital for this mechanism to function and that he thereby provided practical assistance,
encouragement and moral support to the commission of the crimes.
1617. With respect to the payment of salaries, the Majority recalls that grave financial problems
within RS caused serious difficulties with the payment of salaries for VRS personnel.4541 RS
actually warned FRY authorities that “unless you pay our non-commissioned officers they will all
leave the front”.4542 Peri{i} himself commented that the payment of these salaries was of “great
help” to the VRS.4543 Several witnesses testified that when the payment of salaries to members of
the 30th PC was suspended for approximately six months in August 1994, circumstances became
very difficult, especially for these members’ families.4544 Stamenko Nikoli} stressed that while the
military personnel itself was not “really facing the same risk in terms of survival and subsistence”,
the very “livelihood” of the families was at risk.4545 Mladi} also stated that the suspension of
salaries caused “an enormous existential crisis” for the families of the military personnel, whose
attention was unnecessarily drawn away from combat tasks.4546 He also reported that there had been
4539
4540
4541
4542
4543
4544
4545
4546
See supra paras 866, 880
See supra paras 851-854, 881-889, 905-910.
See Ex. P2918, VRS Main Staff Commander Memo Addressed to the Government of the RS, 1 November 1993,
p. 2, noting that the VRS was two months late in paying personnel salaries due to its lack of funds; Ex. D415, RS
MOD Report to VRS Main Staff, 25 November 1993, p. 1, because the RS was “not able any more to pay
regularly the salaries of the Army personnel in money”, it made arrangements to pay personnel with foodstuffs
and personal hygiene items instead; Ex. P318, Announcement of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps, 5 May 1994, RS
MOD provided notice of delays in paying VRS personnel salaries due to lack of funds.
Ex. P784, Stenographic Transcript of the 22nd Session of the SDC, 11 July 1994, p. 50.
Ex. P776, Stenographic Transcript of the 21st Session of the SDC, 7 June 1994, p. 46.
See supra para. 867. See also Stamenko Nikoli}, T. 10557-10559, 10668; Petar [krbi}, T. 11771-11772.
Stamenko Nikoli}, T. 10668. See also Petar [krbi}, T. 11771; Stojan Mal~i}, T. 11321-11322.
Ex. P2817, Letter from VRS Main Staff Sector for Organisation, Mobilization and Personnel, 4 November 1994,
p. 1.
511
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alarming warnings from the units, but considering the critical combat situation, no requests for
transfer back to the VJ would be considered or granted, except in cases of emergency.4547
1618. Contrary to what is suggested by the Defence, the Majority finds that the evidence clearly
shows that though meagre, especially in times of high inflation, the salaries were of great support to
30th PC members. Similarly, the Majority finds that other benefits, such as housing, pensions and
medical insurance – provided to both soldiers and their families – were extremely important to the
members of the 30th PC. Knowing that their families were looked after and that they could enjoy all
of the benefits attached to their ranks enabled these men to carry out their combat tasks without
impediment. In addition, the Majority notes that during the suspension of the salary payments, none
of the 30th PC members left their position in the VRS not so much because the payment of salaries
was of little consequence to them, but rather because the VRS denied the requests for transfer back
to the VJ.4548
1619. The Defence submits that because only a small proportion of the VRS military personnel
received its salary from the FRY, the assistance cannot be considered to have had a substantial
effect on the commission of the crimes. The Majority finds it must assess in qualitative rather than
quantitative terms whether the payment of the salaries and benefits these officers received from the
FRY and the VJ as members of the 30th PC facilitated the commission of the crimes. The Majority
finds that where these individuals held key positions, including positions of command in the VRS,
as well as in the Corps and units responsible for the crimes charged in the Indictments as in the
current case, then the contribution is at the very least significant. Considering that the majority of
the 30th PC members held positions of command,4549 the Majority is satisfied that the payment of
salaries and benefits was vital to the functioning of the very core of the VRS. The Majority finds
that this type of assistance contributed to the commission of the crimes.
6. Other Forms of Assistance
1620. The Majority recalls the involvement of the VJ SUC in Pancir operation in the Vogo{}a area
between December 1993 and January 1994.4550 The Majority recalls that the SUC was directly
subordinated to Peri{i} and that he ordered its deployment to Vogo{}a to assist the SRK in action
carried out to capture Mount @u} and to hold the confrontation lines against the ABiH. Although
4547
4548
4549
4550
Ex. P2817, Letter from VRS Main Staff Sector for Organisation, Mobilization and Personnel, 4 November 1994,
p. 2. See also Petar [krbi}, T. 11774, testifying that in that period, the requests for transfer back to the VJ
increased, from 5-10 a week to about 20 a week, but were usually denied, unless they regarded some serious
illness, wound or family difficulties.
Ex. P2817, Letter from VRS Main Staff Sector for Organisation, Mobilization and Personnel, 4 November 1994,
p. 2. See supra para. 817.
See supra paras 1608-1609.
See supra section VI.G.3.
512
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the operation was not successful,4551 the Majority finds that Peri{i}’s actions show that he intended
to and in fact did provide assistance to Mladi} and the VRS war-effort in the Sarajevo campaign, at
a time when he already knew of the VRS criminal intent in the implementation of its war strategy.
7. Conclusion
1621. The Majority finds that Perišić repeatedly exercised his authority to assist the VRS in
waging a war that encompassed systematic criminal actions against Bosnian Muslim civilians as a
military strategy and objective. Perišić’s actions substantially facilitated the commission of these
crimes because the VRS heavily depended on the VJ’s support to function as an army and conduct
its operations, including besieging Sarajevo and taking over Srebrenica. The Majority is also
satisfied that all of Peri{i}’s actions described above were voluntary.
1622. As found earlier, Perišić urged the FRY SDC to continue its policy of assisting the VRS. He
notably oversaw the provision of wide-ranging logistical and technical assistance to the VRS.
Without the regular supply of considerable quantities of ammunition and other weaponry, as well as
fuel, technical expertise, repair services and personnel training, the VRS would have been
hampered in conducting its operations in Sarajevo and Srebrenica.
1623. In addition, the Majority found that the military personnel that Peri{i} provided for and
sustained through the 30th PC included the officers holding positions of command and authority in
the VRS Main Staff, as well as well-trained commanding officers of the lower units. The payment
of salaries to the VRS’s top officers, including Mladi}, Dragomir Milo{evi}, Gali}, Popovi}, Gvero,
Tolimir, and other principal perpetrators of the crimes charged in Srebrenica and Sarajevo was
instrumental in helping the VRS plan and carry out its operations in Sarajevo and Srebrenica. By
creating the PCs – a mechanism through which he ensured that these military personnel continued
receiving their salaries and enjoying all their benefits in the VJ – Peri{i} allowed them to carry out
their operations in the VRS with limited concern for their basic material needs and those of their
families. Peri{i} sustained the very life line of the VRS and created the conditions for it to
implement a war strategy that encompassed the commission of crimes against civilians.
1624. The Majority recognises that the evidence does not establish that the specific weapons used
in committing the charged crimes stemmed from the logistical assistance process overseen by
Perišić. However, the Majority recalls that the acts of the aider and abettor need not have been
“specifically directed” to assist the crimes.4552 The element of substantial assistance for aiding and
4551
4552
See supra paras 1329-1330.
See supra paras 126. See also Mrk{ić and Šljivančanin Appeal Judgement, para. 159; Blagojevi} and Joki}
Appeal Judgement, paras 192, 195.
513
Case No.: IT-04-81-T
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abetting does not require that an accused provided the specific weapon used by the perpetrator, as
the element may be established by the numerous other forms of practical assistance described
above, which substantially facilitated the perpetrators’ crimes. Moreover, any suggestion that
assisting the VRS and advising the SDC was part of Perišić’s “routine duties” could not be
construed as exculpatory because the evidence establishes that this conduct substantially
contributed to the commission of the crimes.4553 By the same token, the fact that other FRY
officials, such as members of the SDC or the MOD, also played a role in assisting the VRS does not
negate Perišić’s actions.
1625. The Majority has considered the Defence’s ex post facto argument on the application of
aiding and abetting under the facts of the present case,4554 but finds that only a fraction of the
assistance provided by Perišić fits that description. The Majority is satisfied that the overwhelming
majority of Perišić’s actions in support of the VRS facilitated the commission of future crimes.
1626. The Majority also recalls that there is neither a requirement of a cause-effect relationship
between Perišić’s conduct as an aider and abettor and the commission of the crimes,4555 nor a
requirement that his actions served as a condition precedent to the commission of the crimes,4556 nor
a requirement that his actions have been the cause sine qua non of the crimes.4557
1627. In sum, the Majority finds beyond a reasonable doubt that Perišić’s logistical assistance and
personnel assistance, individually and cumulatively, had a substantial effect on the crimes
perpetrated by the VRS in Sarajevo and Srebrenica, as charged in the Indictment.
C. Findings on the Mental Elements of Aiding and Abetting
1628. The following analysis and findings are made by the Majority of the Trial Chamber, Judge
Moloto dissenting.
1. Preliminary Remarks
1629. The Majority recalls that to establish the required mental element for aiding and abetting, it
must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Peri{i} knew that his actions provided practical
4553
4554
4555
4556
4557
See Blagojevi} and Joki} Appeal Judgement, paras 182, 185-189.
Defence Final Brief, paras 49, 796-798, 1083-1084, citing Blagojević Trial Judgement, para. 731.
Mrk{ić and Šljivančanin Appeal Judgement, para. 81; Simić Appeal Judgement, para. 85; Bla{kić Appeal
Judgement, para. 48.
Mrk{ić and Šljivančanin Appeal Judgement, para. 81; Blagojević and Jokić Appeal Judgement, paras 127, 134;
Simić Appeal Judgement, para. 85; Bla{kić Appeal Judgement, para. 48.
Milutinović et al. Trial Judgement, para. 92.
514
Case No.: IT-04-81-T
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assistance to the crimes and that he was aware of the essential elements of the crimes, including the
mental state of the principal perpetrators.4558
1630. The Majority recalls its finding that the VRS committed the crimes of murder and attacks on
civilians for Counts 2 and 4 as a violation of the laws or customs of war, as well as murder and
inhumane acts as crimes against humanity for Counts 1 and 3. The Trial Chamber also found that
the VRS and/or MUP forces committed the crimes of murder as a violation of the laws or customs
of war (Count 10) and murder, inhumane acts, persecutions and exterminations as crimes against
humanity (Counts 9, 11, 12 and 13).
1631. The Majority recalls its finding that from the early stages of the war, Peri{i} was provided
with information, from a variety of sources, of the VRS’s criminal behaviour and discriminatory
intent.4559 This information related to acts of violence against Bosnian Muslims perpetrated in the
BiH theatre of war and made Peri{i} aware of the VRS’s propensity to commit crimes.4560 With this
state of mind, Peri{i} provided substantial assistance to the VRS in terms of logistic and personnel
and this assistance had a substantial effect on the crimes.4561
2. Sarajevo
1632. The Majority is satisfied that the general propensity to commit crimes in conjunction with
specific information on crimes committed in Sarajevo made Peri{i} aware that other similar crimes
would probably occur, including killing and wounding of civilians and/or persons not taking active
part in the hostilities. Notwithstanding this knowledge, Peri{i} continued to provide significant
assistance to the VRS until the end of the siege.
1633. The Majority is also satisfied that Peri{i} was aware of the essential elements of these
crimes, including the mental state of the perpetrators. At the outset, the Majority recalls that Peri{i}
knew that one of the strategic objectives of the Bosnian Serb leadership involved the partition of
Sarajevo. Through international reports and cables as well as his intelligence and security organs
and media coverage, Peri{i} soon became aware of the VRS’s campaign of sniping and shelling
against the civilian population. The Defence argues that at the time of the Indictment it was
reasonable to believe that there was no such campaign.4562 The Majority does not dispute that there
were specific instances of sniping and shelling, notably the Markale I incident, where Peri{i}
received conflicting information on the alleged perpetrators. That being noted, extensive evidence
4558
4559
4560
4561
4562
See supra paras 129-131.
See supra paras 1456, 1483-1486.
See supra paras 1457-1486.
See supra paras 1594-1602, 1607-1619, 1621-1627.
See supra paras 536-549.
515
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demonstrates that Peri{i} was put on notice of the general existence of a campaign of sniping and
shelling of civilians at the time of his tenure as Chief of the VJ General Staff. The systematic and
frequent coverage of crimes committed during the siege of Sarajevo in international reports and
media spanning over a period of three years leads the Majority to find that the only reasonable
conclusion is that Peri{i} knew of such a campaign.
1634. The Defence also argues that the UN Commission on Human Right’s reports and the
Mazowiecki reports were “replete with unsourced hearsay and unattributed conclusions and
assumptions” and therefore it would “be entirely reasonable for the VJ, VJ intelligence organs, and
Mr. Peri{i} to discount the report[s] in [their] entirety”.4563 Furthermore, it is the Defence’s position
that the information dispensed by the international and local news media “was unreliable and biased
against the Bosnian Serbs”4564 with the consequence that the Serbs in general (and in particular
military commanders) distrusted the news reporting.4565
1635. The Majority is satisfied that the international community as well as international and
Serbian media, consistently and for a considerable period of time, documented and reported
allegations of crimes committed by the VRS. This information alerted Peri{i} to the high likelihood
that the VRS was committing crimes. The Majority finds that Perišić could not have reasonably
discounted this information simply because he considered it biased against the Serbs. The fact that
information was, in some instances, biased or one-sided does not undermine the finding that Perišić
had notice of the VRS’s crimes.
1636. In conclusion, the Majority, Judge Moloto dissenting, finds beyond a reasonable doubt that
Peri{i} knew that his conduct assisted in the commission of crimes in Sarajevo. The mental element
of aiding and abetting is therefore established in relation to Counts 1 to 4 of the Indictment.
3. Srebrenica
1637. The Majority recalls its finding that Peri{i} knew of the escalating tensions and the build-up
of the eventual attack on Srebrenica by the VRS.4566 Since he was alerted to the VRS’s propensity
to commit crimes, the Majority is satisfied that Peri{i} also knew that it was very probable that the
VRS would forcibly transfer Bosnian Muslims and commit some acts of mistreatment and killings
with discriminatory intent once Srebrenica had fallen under their control. Through international
documents, including reports, UNSC’s resolutions and diplomatic cables as well as daily reports
4563
4564
4565
4566
Defence Final Brief, para. 844.
Defence Final Brief, para. 831.
Defence Final Brief, paras 831-838.
See supra paras 1530-1531, 1541.
516
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from his Intelligence organs and media coverage, Peri{i} also soon became aware of certain crimes
perpetrated by the VRS in Srebrenica.4567 Notwithstanding such knowledge, Peri{i} continued to
provide substantial assistance to the VRS both prior to and during the period crimes were
committed in Srebrenica.
1638. The Majority is therefore satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that Peri{i} knew that his
actions provided practical assistance to the crimes of murder, inhumane acts and persecutions and
that he was aware of the essential elements of these crimes, including the mental state of the
principal perpetrators.
1639. The Trial Chamber will now turn to the question of whether Peri{i} knew that his assistance
to the VRS would assist the commission of the crime of extermination (Count 13). In order to
establish that Peri{i} aided and abetted the crime of extermination, the Trial Chamber must be
satisfied that he had the requisite knowledge when he provided practical assistance to the crimes,
that the principal perpetrators intended to kill on a large scale.
1640. The Trial Chamber recalls in this regard that, well before July 1995, a variety of sources had
put Perišić on notice of the VRS’s propensity to commit crimes. The catalogue of such crimes
committed in the past by the VRS contained extremely serious ones, including murder, forcible
displacements and other inhumane acts as part of a campaign of ethnic cleansing. The Trial
Chamber notes, however, that none of the information provided to Peri{i} on the VRS’s criminal
conduct alerted him to the fact that the VRS intended to commit a crime on the scale of the one that
occurred in Srebrenica in July 1995.
1641. In this regard, the Trial Chamber notes that an internal report of 30 April 1993, which was
submitted to the President of the UNSC by the UN Mission in BiH, stated that the failure to reach
an agreement between the Bosnian Serbs and the ABiH Commander in the area of Srebrenica,
would “most probably” have led to the massacre of 25,000 people.4568 Similarly, in the wake of a
VRS offensive on Gora`de, a letter by the permanent representative of BiH to the UNSC in
June 1993 stated that “[w]e again, on the basis of past experience, fear the massacre of a civilian
4567
4568
See supra paras 1546-1553, 1557-1563, 1567-1578, 1579. In relation to the Defence argument on unreliability of
those reports and the alleged media bias against the Bosnian Serbs (see Defence Final Brief, paras 830-838), see
supra paras 1634-1635.
Ex. P2462, Report of the UNSC Mission Established Pursuant to Resolution 819, 30 April 1993, paras 12, 14,
17.
517
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population”.4569 The Trial Chamber recalls, however, that there is no evidence that Peri{i} was privy
to this information.
1642. The Trial Chamber also received conflicting evidence as to whether the massacre of
civilians in Srebrenica was subjectively seen as foreseeable at that time.
1643. Witness Pyers Tucker, who worked as the personal staff officer to the Commander of
UNPROFOR for BiH, General Phillipe Morillon,4570 testified that based on his past experience and
knowledge, it was to be expected that the Serb activities in Srebrenica would lead to the civilian
population either being removed or killed.4571 In fact, in his 20 March 1993 report which he sent to
the UNPROFOR BiH Command, he assessed the situation in Srebrenica as follows:
If free passage (with transport) [cannot] be arranged for the refugees in the Srebrenica pocket
within the next 7 to 14 days, indications are that the Serbs will carry out a genocidal “cleansing”
of the entire enclave, resulting in the potential death of up to 80,000 human beings. […] [The
Serbs] are unlikely to stop this offensive until the enclave is cleared one way or another.4572
1644. Similarly, witness Muhamed Sacirbey, the Permanent Ambassador of BiH to the United
Nations between 1992 and 2000, when asked about his contemporary view as to what may happen
in the event of an attack on Srebrenica, testified:
Starting with the Drina River valley, places like Visoko, Vi{egrad, Fo~a, Bijeljina, going into,
particularly, Prijedor where we believe many more thousands of people were murdered, this was
all more or less done at the same military and political leadership and that continued through much
of the war, of course, with the greater intensity during the beginning of the war. But it was from
our perspective, that is the perspective of the mission of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and from my
conversations with President Izetbegovi} and other Bosnian leaders, it was a very really possibility
that [these] individuals, not only would be expelled, but, in fact, could be massacred.4573
1645. On the other hand, Carl Bildt, who served as the EU co-Chairman of the International
Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, testified that it was foreseeable that ethnic cleansing would
occur in Srebrenica if it was taken over by the VRS.4574 He nonetheless remarked that the scale of
the Srebrenica killings was not foreseeable.4575
1646. This evidence reflecting conflicting views does not lead to the only reasonable conclusion
that the outright extermination of Srebrenica inhabitants was foreseeable at the time.
4569
4570
4571
4572
4573
4574
4575
Ex. P2469, Letter of the Permanent Representative of BiH to the UN, to the President of the UNSC, 30 May
1993, p. 2.
Pyers Tucker, T. 9088-9089.
Pyers Tucker, T. 9204.
Ex. P2694, BH Command on Srebrenica Evacuation, 20 March 1993, p. 3 (emphasis added).
Muhamed Sacirbey, T. 7457-7458.
Carl Bildt, T. 14321.
Carl Bildt, T. 14322-14323.
518
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1647. Based on the aforementioned evidence, the Trial Chamber therefore cannot find beyond
reasonable doubt that Peri{i} knew - at the time when he provided practical assistance to the VRS that the systematic killing of thousands of Bosnian Muslims would probably be commited. Hence, it
is not established that Peri{i} knew that his assistance to the VRS would assist the commission of
the crime of extermination (Count 13).
1648. In sum, the Majority finds beyond a reasonable doubt that Peri{i} knew that his conduct
assisted in the commission of crimes in Srebrenica. The mental element of aiding and abetting is
therefore established in relation to the crimes of murder, inhumane acts and persecutions (Counts 9
through 12). The mental element of aiding and abetting has not been established in relation to
extermination (Count 13).
D. Conclusion
1649. For all of these reasons, the Majority, Judge Moloto dissenting, finds that it has been
established beyond a reasonable doubt that Perišić is responsible for aiding and abetting, under
Article 7(1) of the Statute, for the following crimes: Count 1 (Murder, a crime against humanity),
Count 2 (Murder, a violation of the laws and customs of war), Count 3 (Inhumane Acts (injuring
and wounding civilians), a crime against humanity), Count 4 (Attacks on Civilians, a violation of
the laws and customs of war), Count 9 (Murder, a crime against humanity), Count 10 (Murder, a
violation of the laws and customs of war), Count 11 (Inhumane Acts (forcible transfer, injuring and
wounding civilians), a crime against humanity) and Count 12 (Persecution, a crime against
humanity).
1650. The Trial Chamber finds that it has not been established beyond a reasonable doubt that
Peri{i} is responsible for aiding and abetting, under Article 7(1) of the Statute, for Count 13
(Extermination, as a crime against humanity).
519
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VIII. PERI[I]’S CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY UNDER ARTICLE 7(3)
1651. Momčilo Perišić is indicted under Article 7(3) of the Statute for failing to prevent or punish
his subordinates responsible for crimes committed by shelling Zagreb on 2 and 3 May 1995.4576
Subsequently, the Prosecution clarified that it did not charge Peri{i} with his failure to prevent these
crimes but only with his failure to punish perpetrators thereof.4577
1652. Perišić is also indicted under Article 7(3) of the Statute for failing to prevent or punish his
subordinates responsible for the crimes committed in Sarajevo and Srebrenica.4578
1653. The Trial Chamber recalls that, in order for Peri{i} to be held responsible for failing to
prevent and/or punish the perpetrators of the crimes in question, the Trial Chamber must be
satisfied that a superior-subordinate relationship existed between Peri{i} and the perpetrators of the
crimes; that Peri{i} knew or had reason to know that the crimes were about to be, or had been,
committed; and finally, that he failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the
criminal act or punish the perpetrators thereof.4579
A. Superior-Subordinate Relationship between Peri{i} and the Perpetrators of the Crimes
1654. The first step of the applicable legal test to establish whether Peri{i} bears criminal
responsibility pursuant to Article 7(3) of the Statute for these crimes, is a determination whether a
superior-subordinate relationship existed between Peri{i} and the perpetrators at the time of the
commission of the crimes. The Trial Chamber recalls that the existence of a superior-subordinate
relationship depends on two factors: i) whether at the time of the commission of the crimes the
perpetrators were subordinates of the superior; and ii) whether the latter exercised effective control
over them.4580
1655. The Prosecution argues that a superior-subordinate relationship existed between Peri{i} and
the military officers who committed the alleged crimes. It submits that although the latter served in
the SVK or in the VRS,4581 they were VJ officers.4582 It further submits that the VJ, SVK, and VRS
in reality functioned as one army in which Peri{i}, as the highest ranking officer in the VJ,4583
concurrently retained the material ability to prevent and punish criminal conduct of officers serving
4576
4577
4578
4579
4580
4581
4582
4583
Indictment, paras 34, 54.
See Prosecution Closing Arguments, T. 14637, 14920.
Indictment, paras 34, 46, 62.
See supra para. 140.
See supra para. 142.
Prosecution Final Brief, paras 702-703.
See Prosecution Final Brief, paras 702-708.
See Prosecution Final Brief, paras 709-711.
520
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in the PCs with that of the commanders of the VRS and SVK, who contemporaneously maintained
operational control over the same subordinates through the existence of a parallel chain of
command.4584
1656. The Defence submits that there was no superior-subordinate relationship because the VJ,
VRS, and the SVK constituted three separate entities with individual chains of command.4585 It
argues that Peri{i} did not have de jure authority, as no formal hierarchal relationship existed
between Peri{i} and the alleged perpetrators of the crimes charged in the Indictment.4586 The
Defence submits that the fact that some members of the SVK or VRS had their status regulated by
the PCs does not make them members of the VJ during that time.4587 The Defence points out that
each army was separately established by the constitutions of their respective countries and asserts
that each operated in a distinct manner under the principle of the unity of command.4588
1. Whether Members of the 30th and the 40th PCs were Subordinates of Peri{i}
1657. The Trial Chamber will examine in this section whether the perpetrators of the crimes
charged in the Indictment were de jure or de facto subordinated to Peri{i}.
(a) Whether the Principal Perpetrators were Members of the 30th and 40th PCs
1658. The Trial Chamber recalls its finding that Milan Čeleketi}, in his capacity as Chief of the
SVK Main Staff, carried out Milan Marti}’s order to shell Zagreb with Orkan rockets on 2 and 3
May 1995.4589 Čeleketi}’s order in turn was executed by the SVK crew of the Orkan rocket
system.4590 The Trial Chamber also recalls its finding that this conduct constituted murder and
4584
4585
4586
4587
4588
4589
4590
See Prosecution Final Brief, para. 9. See e.g. Prosecution Closing Arguments, T. 14751 (discussing the notion of
one unified army and the notion of a parallel chain of command), T. 14754-14757 (partially private session)
(discussing a parallel chain of command between Peri{i} and the SVK). See also Prosecution Final Brief,
para. 695 (discussing the distinction between the concepts of singleness of command and effective control).
See Defence Final Brief, paras 147-148 (stating that “[n]o army can function on a principle of parallel command
relationships. Singleness of command is a fundamental principle, which means that there is one commander, one
decision, and one responsibility”). See also Defence Final Brief, para. 985 (stating that “[t]he evidence
establishes that the SVK functioned as an independent army with clearly defined principles of internal
organization and a unique chain of command”); para. 1110 (incorporating all arguments on the superiorsubordinate relationship with respect to Srebrenica); Defence Closing Arguments, T. 14821 (stating that
“[a]ppointment to a duty in any army establishes relationships within the service involved and that is a
relationship of subordination and superiority. One becomes part of a single chain of command […]”).
See Defence Final Brief, paras 856-861.
See e.g. Defence Final Brief, paras 251-254, 262-266, 850, 852, 984.
See Defence Final Brief, paras 146-148. See also Defence Final Brief, paras 852, 856-864, 987 (arguing that no
formal hierarchy between Peri{i} and the alleged perpetrators of the crimes existed); Defence Closing
Arguments, T. 14865 (concluding that “[i]f they are outside the VJ, then at the time when the crimes were
committed, Perišić was not their superior”).
See supra para. 585.
Ibid.
521
Case No.: IT-04-81-T
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28712
attacks on civilians as a violation of the laws or customs of war (Counts 6 and 8), and murder and
inhumane acts as a crime against humanity (Counts 5 and 7).4591
1659. Milan Čeleketi} served in the SVK from 1993 until 5 October 1995, when the FRY SDC
decided to terminate his professional military service.4592 The evidence establishes that he was a
member of the 40th PC as of its establishment on 10 November 1993.4593 His initial position in the
SVK was 18th Corps Commander.4594 On 22 February 1994, he was appointed Chief of the SVK
Main Staff, a position that he held until 18 May 1995.4595
1660. The evidence further shows that members of the 40th PC operated the Orkan rocket
system.4596
1661. The Trial Chamber recalls that key VRS officers, including Ratko Mladi}, Stanislav Gali}
and Dragomir Milo{evi} were involved in the commission of the crimes in Sarajevo by devising
and implementing a campaign of sniping and shelling on civilians, which was an integral part of the
siege of Sarajevo. The Trial Chamber found that the crimes committed by VRS members, under the
effective control of these VRS officers, constituted murder and attacks on civilians as a violation of
the laws or customs of war (Counts 2 and 4), and murder and inhumane acts as a crime against
humanity (Counts 1 and 3).4597 The Trial Chamber found that these key officers and their
subordinates committed the charged crimes.
1662. The Trial Chamber also recalls that the key VRS officers involved in the commission,
planning, ordering, instigating, or aiding and abetting of the crimes in Srebrenica are Ratko Mladi},
Radivoje Mileti}, Milan Gvero, Ljubi{a Beara, Radislav Krsti}, Vujadin Popovi}, Vidoje
Blagojevi}, Vinko Pandurevi}, Dragan Obrenovi}, Drago Nikoli}, and Dragan Joki}. The Trial
Chamber found that the conduct of VRS and/or MUP forces, under the effective control of the
aforementioned key officers, constituted murder as a violation of the laws or customs of war (Count
10) and murder, inhumane acts, persecutions and exterminations as crimes against humanity
4591
4592
4593
4594
4595
4596
4597
See supra paras 594, 596.
Ex. P766, Minutes from the 45th Session of the SDC held on 5 October 1995. See infra para. 1680.
Ex. P1895, Order by VJ General Staff Personnel Administration, 15 February 1994, p. 39; Ex. P1911, VJ
Personnel File of Milan ^eleketi}, Doc ID 0611-7831, p. 10.
Ex. P1895, Order by VJ General Staff Personnel Administration, 15 February 1994, p. 38.
Patrick Treanor, T. 1026-1027, 1370; Mile Novakovi}, T. 13003; Ex. P171/P1972 RSK Decree on Appointment
of Milan ^eleketi}, 22 February 1994; Ex. P1973, Report on Milan ^eleketi}’s Taking On Duty, 22 February
1994; Ex. P1975, Report on Milan Čeleketić Handing Over Duty as SVK Commander to Mile Mrk{ić, 18 May
1995; MP-80, T. 8616 (closed session). See also Rade Orli}, T. 5728, 5758; Jo`ef Poje, T. 3087.
MP-80, T. 8395 (closed session). See also supra para. 1248.
See supra paras 559, 562.
522
Case No.: IT-04-81-T
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(Counts 9, 11, 12 and 13).4598 The Trial Chamber found that these key officers and their
subordinates committed the charged crimes.
1663. The following VJ officers found to be responsible for the commission of crimes in Sarajevo
and Srebrenica were serving in the 30th PC at the relevant time: Ratko Mladi},4599 Stanislav
Gali},4600 Dragomir Milo{evi},4601 Radoje Mileti},4602 Milan Gvero,4603 Zdravko Tolimir,4604
Ljubi{a Beara,4605 Radislav Krsti},4606 Vujadin Popovi},4607 Vidoje Blagojevi},4608 Vinko
Pandurevi},4609 Dragan Obrenovi},4610 Drago Nikoli}4611 and Dragan Joki}.4612
1664. As to Čedo Sladoje, the Trial Chamber finds that the evidence does not establish that he was
a member of the 30th PC at the time of commission of the crimes.4613 It only shows that Sladoje was
a member of the 30th PC at one point and that he was serving there in 2001.4614
4598
4599
4600
4601
4602
4603
4604
4605
4606
4607
4608
4609
4610
4611
4612
4613
See supra paras 740, 746, 754, 758.
Ex. P1902, Decree of the FRY President, 16 June 1994; Ex. P1905, Decree of the FRY President, 16 June 2001;
Ex. P1919, Decision of VP 3001, Belgrade, 11 October 2000; Ex. P1923, Decision of the Military Post 3001
Belgrade, 24 February 2000; Ex. P1924, Decision of the Military Post 3001 Belgrade, 3 March 2000.
In the 30th PC until 31 October 1994, Ex. P1889, Decision by Military Post 3001, undated; Ex. P1879, Decision
by Military Post 3001, 9 July 2001; Ex. P1774, Request by Stanislav Galić, 10 April 2000.
Ex. P822, Judgement of the 2nd Municipal Court, Belgrade, 9 July 2001; Ex. P871, Belgrade Decision Rejecting
Claim of Dragomir Milo{evi} for Family Separation Allowance, 5 August 1997; Ex. P1753, Performance
Assessment of D. Milošević, 30 October 1995.
Ex. P1574, Various Documents Concerning VJ Payments to Radivoje Mileti}, 1992-2001, Doc ID 0622-3406;
Ex. P2128, Order by VJ General Staff Personnel Administration, 7 February 1994, p. 6; Ex. P1726, Decision by
Military Post 3001, 9 May 2001. See also Ex. P1729, VJ Personnel File of Radivoje Miletić, Doc ID 0422-2366,
p. 3.
Ex. P1899, VJ Personnel File of Milan Gvero, Doc ID 0422-3303, p. 15; Ex. P1900, Decree of the FRY
President, 14 June 1995.
Ex. P2128, Order by VJ General Staff Personnel Administration, 7 February 1994, p. 4; Ex. P1787, Excerpt from
VJ Personnel File of Zdravko Tolimir, Doc ID 0422-2463, p. 2; Branko Gaji}. T. 10902-10903.
Ex. P1876, Decision by Military Post 3001, 17 May 2001; Ex. P1920, VJ Personnel File of Ljubi{a Beara,
see e.g. Doc IDs 0603-0574; 0603-0581; 0603-0656; 0603-0657; 0603-0666; 0603-0671; Ex. P1952, Excerpts
from VJ Personnel File of Ljubi{a Beara.
Ex. P1893, VJ Personnel File of Radislav Krsti}, see e.g. Doc IDs 0422-8341; 0422-8441, p. 3; Ex. P1894,
Order by VJ General Staff Personnel Administration, 26 September 1994; Ex. P1995, Excerpt from VJ
Personnel File of Radislav Krsti}; Ex. P2114, Order by VJ General Staff Personnel Administration, 26
September 1994, pp 2-3.
Ex. P1934, VJ Personnel File of Vujadin Popovi}, see e.g. Doc IDs 0422-8609; 0422-8656, p. 2; 0422-8702. See
also Ex. P2079, Military Post 3001 Decision, 28 November 2001.
Ex. P1878, Decision by Military Post 3001, 19 June 2001; Ex. P2129, Order by VJ General Staff Personnel
Administration, 9 February 1994, p. 37. See also Ex. P1073, Supreme Military Court Judgement Annulling the
Decision of the Military Post 3001 Belgrade, 29 May 2001, p. 2.
Ex. P1877, Decision by Military Post 3001, September 2001; Ex. P1732, Order by VJ General Staff Personnel
Administration, 7 June 1994; Ex. P1731, VJ Personnel File of Vinko Pandurević, Doc ID 0422-8525, p. 10.
Ex. P1897, VJ Personnel File of Dragan Obrenovi}, Doc ID 0611-8718, p. 3; Ex. P2129, Order by VJ General
Staff Personnel Administration, 9 February 1994, p. 35. See also Ex. P1584, MOD Payslip of Dragan Obrenovi}
for 1995, 16 January 1995; Ex. P1585, MOD Payslip of Dragan Obrenovi} for 1994, 25 January 1995.
Ex. P1655, VJ Personnel File of Drago Nikoli}, Doc IDs 0422-8713; 0422-8779; Ex. P1658, Performance
Assessment of Drago Nikoli}, 10 June 1997; Ex. P2129, Order by VJ General Staff Personnel Administration, 9
February 1994, pp 17-18. See also Ex. P1668, VJ Documents Relating to the Pension Procedures in Regard to
Drago Nikoli}.
Ex. P2129, Order by VJ General Staff Personnel Administration, 9 February 1994, pp 37-38; Ex. P1815, Order
by VJ General Staff Personnel Administration, 6 October 1995, pp 29-30.
See Prosecution Final Brief, para. 480; Defence Closing Arguments, T. 14847.
523
Case No.: IT-04-81-T
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(b) Whether the 30th and 40th PC Members were VJ Members
1665. The Trial Chamber recalls its finding that the members of the 30th and 40th PCs remained de
jure members of the VJ while serving in the VRS and SVK.4615
1666. The Trial Chamber is mindful of the Defence’s assertion that membership of the PCs did not
equate to membership of the VJ4616 and the distinction it draws between service status and status
rights.4617 The Trial Chamber notes that the crux of the Defence’s argument is that while PC
members were entitled to certain rights enjoyed by VJ personnel, they left the chain of command of
the VJ and entered the one of the VRS or SVK. In the Trial Chamber’s view, this point essentially
goes to the ultimate issue of whether – besides their formal status - the PC members were under the
command and effective control of Peri{i}. The existence of such relationship is examined in the
following section of the Judgement.
(c) Conclusion
1667. The Trial Chamber recalls that Peri{i}, as Chief of the VJ General Staff during the
Indictment period, was the highest military officer in the VJ, subordinated only to the FRY
President, as Supreme Commander, and the SDC.4618 The Trial Chamber is satisfied that Peri{i}, by
virtue of his position as Chief of the VJ General Staff was de jure superior of the VJ military
personnel serving in the 40th PC, including Milan Čeleketi} as well as of the officers serving in the
30th PC, including Ratko Mladi}, Radoje Mileti}, Milan Gvero, Zdravko Tolimir Ljubi{a Beara,
Radislav Krsti}, Stanislav Gali}, Dragomir Milo{evi}, Vujadin Popovi}, Vidoje Blagojevi}, Vinko
Pandurevi}, Dragan Joki}, Dragan Obrenovi} and Drago Nikoli}.
1668. Having established that the perpetrators of the crimes were de jure subordinates of Peri{i},
the Trial Chamber will move to analyse whether Peri{i} exercised effective control over them, i.e.
whether Peri{i} had the “material ability” to prevent the crimes charged in the Indictment and/or
punish the perpetrators thereof.
2. Effective Control
1669. The Trial Chamber recalls that the indicators of effective control are more a matter of
evidence than of law and are “limited to showing that the accused had the power to prevent, punish
4614
4615
4616
4617
4618
Ex. P738, List of Professional Soldiers from the 30th PC, undated, p. 2; Ex. P1905, Decree of the FRY President,
16 June 2001, p. 2; Bretton Randall, T. 4154-4155.
See supra para. 840.
Defence Final Brief, paras 262-267.
Defence Final Brief, paras 251-256.
See supra paras 205-206.
524
Case No.: IT-04-81-T
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28709
or initiate measures leading to proceedings against the alleged perpetrators where appropriate”.4619
Further, the Trial Chamber notes that cooperation in itself and/or the mere ability to exercise
influence over subordinates is not sufficient to establish effective control.4620
1670. In support of its position that Peri{i} exercised effective control over members of the 30th
and 40th PCs, the Prosecution submits that he had the ability to either sanction or initiate
disciplinary investigations against them.4621 Other indicators of effective control identified by the
Prosecution include Peri{i}’s ability to control salaries,4622 promotions,4623 the ability to terminate
their employment within the VJ4624 and his ability to transfer and appoint them to various posts in
the SVK and the VRS.4625
1671. The Defence rejects the Prosecution’s contention. It submits that the evidence does not
support the conclusion that Peri{i} had the ability to make the final determination with respect to
the 30th and the 40th PCs members’ salaries and employment decisions related to promotion,
transfer or termination.4626 Finally, the Defence stresses the principle that having some influence
over behaviour does not amount to effective control.4627
4619
4620
4621
4622
4623
4624
4625
4626
4627
See supra para. 148.
See supra para. 147.
See Prosecution Final Brief, paras 736-746, 751-756; Prosecution Closing Arguments, T. 14740-14742.
See Prosecution Final Brief, para. 795 (stating that “₣iğt is not disputed that members of the Personnel Centers
received their salaries and benefits (health, pension, housing and the like) from the FRY/VJ”); Prosecution
Closing Arguments, T. 14729 (stating that one indicator that General Peri{i} possessed effective control is that
“the salaries and benefits for persons in the [PCs] were paid by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia”).
Prosecution Final Brief, paras 758-760; Prosecution Closing Arguments, T. 14730-14734 (stating that Peri{i}
had the ability to exceptionally promote members of the VRS and the SVK); T. 14735 (stating that “Peri{i} was
in fact a critical figure in the promotions process”).
Prosecution Final Brief, paras 761-764; Prosecution Closing Arguments, T. 14747 (arguing that “General Peri{i}
had the authority to terminate members of the VJ who were serving in the personnels [sic] and he did so”).
See e.g. Prosecution Final Brief, paras 778-786. See also Prosecution Final Brief, para. 785 (stating that
“Peri{i}’s authority to transfer and appoint VJ Members to the VRS/SVK, and his exercise of it, was the
indispensable lifeline that sustained the vitality and viability of the VRS/SVK […] Because of the consequences
of disobeying order were understood by VJ Members, they complied with order transferring them from the VJ to
the VRS/SVK and back”); Prosecution Closing Arguments, T. 14736-14737 (discussing Peri{i}’s authority to
issue transfer orders).
See e.g. Defence Closing Arguments, T. 14832 (rejecting the prosecution’s argument the Peri{i} had effective
control over the SVK or the VRS in part because he controlled the appointment process by stating that “…all
appointments to certain positions in the VRS and the SVK were done exclusively within those chains of
command without any involvement by anyone from the Yugoslav Army or by General Peri{i} himself”);
T. 14833 (rejecting the idea the Peri{i} had effective control in the form of the ability to force the members of
the VJ to serve in the VRS or RSK and stating that “[s]o there is no evidence, either direct or indirect, that would
lead beyond a reasonable doubt to the conclusion that any individual was retired as a direct consequence of their
refusal to be assigned to the VRS”). See also Defence Closing Arguments, T. 14835-14840 (arguing that the
prosecution failed to provide sufficient evidence to show that General Peri{i} had a direct influence over the
promotions of officers serving in the VRS or SVK); Defence Final Brief, paras 855, 989-996 (stating that
disciplinary and employment status decisions were made by the SVK commanders).
Defence Final Brief, paras 887-888. See also Defence Closing Arguments, T. 14859-14860.
525
Case No.: IT-04-81-T
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(a) Indicators of Effective Control
1672. The Trial Chamber has identified a number of indicators that it considers relevant, in the
circumstances of this specific case, to determine whether effective control existed. These indicators
are listed below:
1. Whether Peri{i} had the ability to discipline and to punish the 30th and the 40th PC members;
2. Whether Peri{i} had the authority to issue binding orders to the 30th and the 40th PC
members, including both transfer/appointment orders and command orders;
3. Whether Peri{i} was involved in the payment of salaries and provision of other benefits for
the 30th and the 40th PC members;
4. Whether Peri{i} had the capacity to promote members of the 30th and the 40th PC members;
5. Whether Peri{i} had the authority to terminate the professional military service of the 30th
and the 40th PC members;
6. Whether the SVK and the VRS depended on VJ logistical support;
7. Whether the SVK and VRS reported to the VJ General Staff.
1673. In addition to these indicators, the Trial Chamber is guided by the Appeals Chamber’s
holding that the possession of de jure authority, without more, provides only some evidence of such
effective control and that the burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt that the accused had
effective control over his subordinates rests with the Prosecution.4628 The Trial Chamber will now
analyse each of those indicators in turn.
(i) Whether Peri{i} had the Ability to Discipline and to Punish the PC Members
a. The 40th PC
1674. As discussed earlier in the Judgement, the Law on the VJ provided that a senior officer
holding a rank equivalent to regiment commander or higher could initiate an investigation for a
disciplinary violation.4629 Depending on the result of the investigation, he could “stay the
proceedings, pronounce a disciplinary sentence or forward the case to the competent officer who
would file charges against the violator before the military disciplinary court”.4630 Had he been
4628
4629
4630
Ori} Appeal Judgement, para. 92.
See supra para. 257.
See supra para. 259.
526
Case No.: IT-04-81-T
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28707
aware that a subordinate committed a serious violation of discipline, he could also use his discretion
to temporarily remove the offender from duty.4631
1675. The evidence below shows that there were instances where the VJ General Staff was
involved in disciplinary proceedings against VJ members serving in the 40th PC for their conduct
while holding posts in the SVK.
1676. On 26 September 1995, the Commander of the SVK 11th Corps, Du{an Lon~ar informed
Peri{i} that three officers deserted the SVK and proposed that “the cessation of professional
military service be approved and that the persons in question be prevented from having their status
resolved within the [VJ]”.4632 The handwritten note on this document shows that Peri{i} ordered to
“investigate this and file criminal reports […] if they do not report to the unit by 1st October”.4633
According to Star~evi}, this action was generally within the competence of the Chief of the VJ
General Staff.4634
1677. As shown below, after the fall of the RSK in August 1995, the VJ considered initiating
disciplinary proceedings against several high-ranking VJ officers who served in the SVK through
the 40th PC for their responsibility in the fall of the RSK.
1678. Rade Ra{eta testified that the VJ could initiate disciplinary proceedings for conduct of a VJ
soldier while serving in the SVK through the 40th PC only after the soldier returned to join a unit of
the VJ.4635
1679. At its 43rd Session, held on 29 August 1995, the SDC discussed the withdrawal of the SVK
from the RSK territory and decided to open an investigation against officers of the 40th PC by
issuing the following order:
Disciplinary or criminal proceedings shall be initiated against professional members of the 40th
₣PCğ for whom there are grounds to believe that they have committed a violation of discipline or a
criminal offence.
All officers of the 40th [PC] shall write statements on events in the area of responsibility of their
unit during the Croatian aggression against the [RSK]. The statements are to be delivered to the
Office of the Chief of the VJ General Staff no later than 15 September 1995.4636
4631
4632
4633
4634
4635
4636
See supra paras 936-937.
Ex. P2416, Report of the 11th Corps Command to Peri{i} about unauthorised absence of soldiers of the SVK, 26
September 1995, p. 2.
Ex. P2416, Report of the 11th Corps Command to Peri{i} about unauthorised absence of soldiers of the SVK, 26
September 1995, p. 1; Miodrag Star~evi}, T. 6825-6827.
Miodrag Star~evi}, T. 6826-6827.
Rade Ra{eta, T. 5924.
Ex. P708, Minutes from the 43rd Session of SDC held on 29 August 1995.
527
Case No.: IT-04-81-T
6 September 2011
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1680. On 5 October 1995, the SDC decided to terminate the professional military service,
retroactively - as of 31 December 1994 - of four generals of the 40th PC: Mile Mrk{i}, Mile
Novakovi}, Milan ^eleketi} and Mirko Bjelanovi}.4637 This decision was the result of a process
aimed at establishing responsibility for the fall of the RSK.
1681. On 17 October 1995, Peri{i} informed the generals of the SDC decision terminating their
professional military service in the VJ and of “[the] possibility that a court would look into [their]
responsibility”.4638 Mile Novakovi} testified that around that time he also received both the
Presidential decree terminating his service and the VJ decision executing it.4639 When he received
the VJ decision and the Presidential decree, Novakovi} backdated their delivery note to
25 December 1994.4640 As a result, Novakovi}’s service in the 40th PC between January and August
1995 was not taken into account when calculating his VJ pension.4641
1682. Mile Novakovi} testified that a full-fledged disciplinary and/or criminal proceeding against
the four generals would have amounted to a “trial against the [VJ] primarily”.4642 This is why this
option was eventually discarded in favour of a discrete approach.
1683. During a session of the Collegium on 6 November 1995, Peri{i} discussed his dilemma
between terminating the service of those four SVK generals and prosecuting them:
₣Hğere we have a dilemma […] [P]ursuant to [the SDC decision pensioning off the four generals]
we have to carry on so vertically […] And now, how could we prosecute them […] We have in
fact two solutions. The first one is to be lenient […] to go for […] pensioning off […]. Another
solution would be to prosecute selectively as […] all after all depends how we will decide
regarding Bulat. If we prosecute Bulat then he will be chased out, and then you have to do that
with Mile Mrk{i}, and Mile Mrk{i} as a pensioner then, and Bulat as an active officer […].4643
1684. The following evidence suggests that Peri{i} followed the SDC decision opting for the first
solution—to terminate their service. Peri{i} provided the following rationale for the decision to
terminate their service instead of prosecuting them:
As I wrote to the [SDC] that all four of them should be prosecuted [they] said ‘yes’, and ‘is it in
your interest that that would not be made public’, ‘yes’, and now if we pension them off and then
4637
4638
4639
4640
4641
4642
4643
Ex. P766, Minutes from the 45th Session of the SDC held on 5 October 1995.
Mile Novaković, T. 13305-13306, 13321-13322, 13330-13331, 13337.
Mile Novaković, T. 13339-13344; Ex. P1912, Decree of the FRY President, 22 December 1994; Ex. P1913,
Decision of Military Post 1790 Belgrade, December 1994. See also Ex. P1909, Decision of Military Post 1790
Belgrade, 30 December 1994; Ex. P1915, VJ Personnel File of Mirko Bjelanovi}, Doc ID 0611-9285;
Ex. P1916, VJ Personnel File of Mile Mrk{i}, Doc ID 0422-2981.
Mile Novaković, T. 13339-13344.
Mile Novakovi}. T. 13341-13343.
Mile Novakovi}, T. 13330. See also MP-80, T. 8285-8287 (closed session).
Ex. P2203, Transcript of the Collegium of the Chief of the VJ General Staff, 6 November 1995, Doc ID 06186912, pp 4-5. See also Ex. P2204, Transcript of the Collegium of the Chief of the VJ General Staff, 18
September 1995, Doc ID 0618-7245; Ex. P2210, Transcript of the Collegium of the Chief of the VJ General
Staff, 9 October 1995, Doc ID. 0611-3288, p. 5.
528
Case No.: IT-04-81-T
6 September 2011
28705
prosecute them there are different sanctions than if we do not pension them off and prosecute
them. And they said, as it was necessary to calm things down, and not to make public, then they
made a Solomonic decision to pension off all four of them and they pensioned them off. 4644
During the same meeting he also ordered to:
[F]inish the investigation procedure for all in order to establish if elements for criminal or
disciplinary responsibility exist. […] Parallel with that prepare all for pensioning off according to
age, and according to early pension if they wish so. Further, assign all, with remark, when the time
for criminal responsibility comes, that is why investigation procedure is being led, […] also for
those who were pensioned off criminal responsibility also for them, if they remain in the army in
regard to criminal responsibility monitor those for whom there is certain criminal responsibility
and so on, and grade them with an extraordinary grade, negative one naturally, to create the
conditions to expel them from the army.[…] [T]hat is only so that we could bring those men into
relation with those who have been pensioned off, and who according to me are the ones who are to
blame the most for the entire situation.4645
1685. In accordance with this decision not to initiate criminal proceedings against VJ officers
serving in the SVK, the case against Čedomir Bulat was also not taken to the military court.
1686. On 15 February 1994, Bulat was transferred and appointed to the 40th PC by an order from
the VJ General Staff Personnel Administration.4646
st
21 Corps of the SVK.
4647
He
became Commander of the
The VJ General Staff carried out a disciplinary inquiry against Bulat
because he surrendered his Corps to the Croatian Army during Operation Storm.4648 The VJ
committee investigating the matter proposed to institute “proceedings against him, inculpate him
and punish him”.4649 After the abovementioned discussion within the VJ General Staff about the
convenience of a disciplinary action,4650 eventually no disciplinary sanction was imposed on
Bulat.4651
1687. On 9 November 1995, Peri{i} gave the following order to his subordinates in the VJ
General Staff:
Assistant Chiefs of General Staff of the [VJ] will study official assessments, statements and other
material (information) regarding all the officers of the 40th [PC] that fall within their responsibility
and based on that they will propose:
4644
4645
4646
4647
4648
4649
4650
4651
Ex. P2203, Transcript of the Collegium of the Chief of the VJ General Staff, 6 November 1995, Doc ID 06186912, p. 5.
Ex. P2203, Transcript of the Collegium of the Chief of the VJ General Staff, 6 November 1995, Doc ID 06186912, p. 10. See also Ex. P2213, Transcript of the Collegium of the Chief of the VJ General Staff, 6 November
1995, pp 6-7.
Ex. P1895, Order by VJ General Staff Personnel Administration, 15 February 1994, p. 11; Miodrag Star~evi},
T. 6755-6756.
Ibid.
Mile Novaković, T. 13333-13335. See also Ex. P2202, Transcript of the Collegium of the Chief of the VJ
General Staff, 30 October 1995, Doc ID 0618-7763, p. 1.
Ex. P2202, Transcript of the Collegium of the Chief of the VJ General Staff, 30 October 1995, Doc ID 06187763, p. 1.
Ex. P2202, Transcript of the Collegium of the Chief of the VJ General Staff, 30 October 1995, Doc ID 06187763, p. 1; Mile Novaković, T. 13333-13335; Ex. P2203, Transcript of the Collegium of the Chief of the VJ
General Staff, 6 November 1995, Doc ID 0618-6912, p. 5 et seq.
Mile Novaković, T. 13334-13336.
529
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[…] For officers for whom reasonable suspicion that they had committed a violation of discipline
or a crime has been established, disciplinary investigation will be initiated through authorised
officers, and it will be completed by 20 November 1995.
Assistant Chiefs of General Staff of the [VJ] will study all cases under disciplinary investigation
and based on assessment of level of responsibility, they will propose for every one of these
officers either to regulate their status in service or to terminate their professional military service
in accordance with the Law. They will submit their proposals to the Personnel Administration of
the General Staff of the [VJ] latest by 30 November 1995.4652
1688. The VJ General Staff initiated some disciplinary inquires against the 40th PC members. The
final outcome, however, was in accordance with the policy aimed at avoiding public attention. On
4 December 1995, at the VJ Collegium meeting, the following was reported:
Disciplinary investigations have been initiated for officers from the 40th [PC], according to the
orders. 9 officers have come under investigation so far […] Those cases have been received by the
Personnel Administration and, in line with an earlier decision, will not be processed further,
although those are people who are indeed guilty, regardless that some of them were officers on
high positions, like Čedomir Bulat. We have, for instance, a non-commissioned officer who
received orders to recover a tank with his recovery vehicle and, instead of doing that, he
abandoned the recovery vehicle and the tank and ran away; he came to this area now and it would
be right to prosecute him, but the situation is such that I am not sure whether it could be done
now.4653
However, at the same time, the criminal action against the VJ officers serving in the RSK was not
excluded:
[About] resolving of status issues in RSK […]. We all have said, institute investigation
proceedings. If you have done it, there are no elements of criminal responsibility, but disciplinary
responsibility, then we solve his status issue by evaluating his pass for military service or
dismissing him from the VJ. If he has conditions for retirement, pension him off. However, if there
are elements of criminal responsibility, then press criminal charges and institute proceedings, like
we said last time.4654
1689. The case of Laza Babi} is an example of this process. Laza Babi} was a 40th PC member4655
serving as Commander of the SVK 18th Corps between 22 March 1994 and 2 May 1995.4656 Based
on Peri{i}’s order of 9 November 1995 mentioned above, the VJ General Staff initiated a
disciplinary investigation against Babi} for charging commission at checkpoints for transportation
4652
4653
4654
4655
4656
Ex. P2413, Order of Peri{i} to the Assistant Chiefs of General Staff of the VJ, 9 November 1995 (emphasis in
original). See also Stamenko Nikoli}, T. 10719-10720. According to Star~evi}, the order is consistent with the
competencies and authorities of General Peri{i} as Chief of the VJ General Staff, Miodrag Star~evi}, T. 68086809; Ex. P2197, Transcript of the Collegium of the Chief of the VJ General Staff, 28 October 1995, Doc ID
0618-7712, p. 2.
Ex. P2207, Transcript of the Collegium of the Chief of the VJ General Staff, 4 December 1995, Doc ID 06186816, p. 2.
Ex. P2207, Transcript of the Collegium of the Chief of the VJ General Staff, 4 December 1995, Doc ID 06186827, p. 2.
Ex. P1884, VJ Personnel File of Lazo Babi}, Doc ID 0611-7051, p. 2.
Ex. P2414, Decision of Kova~evi} to initiate a disciplinary investigation against Babi}, officer of the SVK, 11
December 1995, p. 1.
530
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of goods in the RSK.4657 On 19 December 1995, Peri{i} terminated Babi}’s professional military
service. The reason stated in the order was that Babi} became “permanently unfit to serve in the
Army”.4658
b. The 30th PC
1690. The following cases show how the VJ General Staff intervened in disciplinary proceedings
initiated by the VRS against 30th PC members.
1691. Zoran Anti} was assigned to the 30th PC by an order of the Chief of the Personnel
Administration of the VJ General Staff of 15 February 1994.4659 He was then serving in Banja
Luka.4660 On 13 March 1995, he deserted his VRS unit,4661 and the VRS military disciplinary court
initiated disciplinary proceedings against him in absentia. On 23 September 1995, the VRS military
disciplinary court pronounced a sentence of “loss of service status as an active serviceman”.4662
1692. Based on that judgment, the Commander of the VRS unit in Banja Luka recommended to
the VJ General Staff to terminate Anti}’s military service pursuant to Article 107 of the Law on the
VJ.4663 On 5 February 1996, the Chief of the Personnel Administration of the VJ General Staff
issued a decision adopting that recommendation.4664
1693. Prosecution witness Miodrag Star~evi} testified that decisions of both VRS and the VJ were
needed since Anti} was a VJ soldier and the disciplinary sanction issued by the VRS organ could
not alone serve as grounds for termination of his military service in the VJ.4665 Defence witness
Stamenko Nikoli} also testified that since Anti} was a VJ member transferred to the 30th PC, the
decision on termination of his service had to be taken by the VJ since it affected his status-related
4657
4658
4659
4660
4661
4662
4663
4664
4665
Ex. P2415, Response to a request for information according a disciplinary investigation against Babi}, 22
December 1995. See also Ex. P2414, Decision of Kova~evi} to initiate a disciplinary investigation against Babi},
officer of the SVK, 11 December 1995.
Ex. P1884, VJ Personnel File of Lazo Babi}, Doc ID 0611-7160, p. 1.
Ex. P2592, Record of Active Military Service, undated, p. 2.
Ex. P2417, Judgement of the Military Disciplinary Court relating to Zoran Anti}, 23 September 1995, p. 5.
This conduct also constituted a criminal offence, Ex. P2417, Judgement of the Military Disciplinary Court
relating to Zoran Anti}, 23 September 1995, p. 6; Ex. P2420, Judgement of the Military Disciplinary Court
relating to Nedeljko Vuji}, 20 September 1995, p. 7.
Ex. P2417, Judgement of the Military Disciplinary Court relating to Zoran Anti}, 23 September 1995, p. 3;
Miodrag Star~evi}, T. 6830-6831.
Ex. P2418, Recommendation of the 30th PC to End the Professional Military Service of Zoran Anti}, 1996;
Ex. P2419, Order of the Chief of Personnel Administration of the General Staff of the VJ Ending the
Professional Military Service of Zoran Anti}, 5 February 1996; Ex. P2593, Order to Terminate the Professional
Military Service of Zoran Anti}, 11 January 1996; Ex. P2594, Decision of Military Post 3001 (Belgrade)
Concerning the Suspending of the Salary of Zoran Anti}, 16 January 1996. See also Stamenko Nikoli},
T. 10684-10686, 10780-10781; Miodrag Star~evi}, T. 6838-6840.
Stamenko Nikoli}, T. 10780-10781.
Miodrag Star~evi}, T. 6833-6834, 6839-6840.
531
Case No.: IT-04-81-T
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rights.4666 However, at the same time, he also agreed with the proposition that the VJ “had to do
what the VRS said in this particular circumstance”.4667
1694. The following example is submitted by the Prosecution as proving that the VJ was not
automatically bound by disciplinary sanctions imposed by the VRS.4668
1695. Nedeljko Vuji} was a VJ officer who was sent temporarily to serve in the VRS.4669 Serving
in the VRS unit in Banja Luka from March 1993, he deserted on 20 May 1993 and joined his
former VJ unit.4670 On 20 September 1995, he was sentenced in absentia by the VRS military
disciplinary court for “loss of service status as an active serviceman”.4671 This judgement was
forwarded to the VJ unit where Vuji} was serving - with an annotation that he could appeal it to the
“Higher Military Disciplinary Court at the General Staff of the 30th PC” and “the Higher Military
Disciplinary Court at the VJ General Staff” “due to the fact that [he was] on duty and [a member] of
the [VJ]”.4672 The commander of this VJ unit transmitted this judgement to the Personnel
Administration of the VJ General Staff4673 with the recommendation to disregard the VRS
judgement. In his view, Vuji} and other soldiers sanctioned in the judgement were now
“reintegrated in the VJ units”, and they were therefore under the jurisdiction of the VJ disciplinary
military courts.4674
1696. Vuji} continued serving in the VJ and was relieved from professional military duty only in
2005 when he acquired 30 years of pensionable service.4675
1697. The Trial Chamber notes that the judgement of the VRS military disciplinary court of
20 September 1995 against Vuji} was not enforced in the VJ. This suggests that the VJ was not
automatically bound by disciplinary sanctions imposed by the VRS. At the same time, the Trial
Chamber notes that Vuji} deserted the VRS before the 30th PC was created and served in the VJ
units ever since. As a consequence, he could not have been a 30th PC member. His case does not
4666
4667
4668
4669
4670
4671
4672
4673
4674
Stamenko Nikoli}, T. 10686.
Ibid.
See Prosecution Final Brief, paras 741-743.
Ex. P2421, Letter of Veli~kovi} (commander of the RV and PVO) to the VJ General Staff Relating to the
Judgement to Nedeljko Vuji}, 29 January 1996, p. 1.
Ex. P2420, Judgement of the Military Disciplinary Court relating to Nedeljko Vuji}, 20 September 1995, p. 1.
See also Miodrag Star~evi}, T. 7014.
Ex. P2420, Judgement of the Military Disciplinary Court relating to Nedeljko Vuji}, 20 September 1995, p. 3.
Ex. P2597, Notice of a Judgement Concerning inter alia Nedeljko Vuji} Addressed to the 30th PC, 15 January
1996.
Ex. P2421, Letter of Veli~kovi} (commander of the RV and PVO) to the VJ General Staff Relating to the
Judgement to Nedeljko Vuji}, 29 January 1996.
Ex. P2420, Judgement of the Military Disciplinary Court relating to Nedeljko Vuji}, 20 September 1995;
Ex. P2421, Letter of Veli~kovi} (commander of the RV and PVO) to the VJ General Staff Relating to the
Judgement to Nedeljko Vuji}, 29 January 1996; Stamenko Nikoli}, T. 10686-10690.
532
Case No.: IT-04-81-T
6 September 2011
28701
support the argument that the VJ was not bound by disciplinary sanctions imposed by the VRS on
30th PC members.
1698. The ability of VJ to exercise its jurisdiction over disciplinary proceedings in relation to 30th
PC members also emerged from a case concerning Vinko Pandurevi}. Although the litigation took
place in 1998-1999, it can still serve as an additional illustration in this matter.
1699. Momir Tali}, a senior VRS officer, sent a letter to the VJ General Staff “authorising” a
disciplinary investigation against Pandurevi} for conduct when he was a 30th PC member.4676 The
letter refers to information that Tali} obtained “on the conduct of [Pandurevi}] regarding his
housing status” which led to “reasonable grounds to suspect that he violated military discipline
under […][the Law on the VJ]”.4677 At that time, Pandurevi} attended classes at the National School
of Defence in Belgrade.4678 The investigation was conducted by officers nominated by the National
School of Defence.4679 Based on their report, the VJ General Staff instituted disciplinary action
against Pandurevi}.4680 The VJ Military Disciplinary Prosecutor issued an indictment before the
Military Disciplinary Court at the VJ General Staff,4681 which ultimately issued a judgement
dismissing the charges.4682
1700. The Trial Chamber finds that the VJ General Staff could in certain circumstances initiate
disciplinary proceedings against members of the 30th PC, for offences committed while serving in
the VRS. The start of such proceedings was, however, conditioned on a decision of the VRS, who,
as the abovementioned examples show, would either pass the relevant judgement of the VRS
military disciplinary court to the VJ or, at least on one occasion, authorise the VJ to carry out the
investigation directly. The role of the VJ in this process seems to be auxiliary to that of the VRS,
limited to the enforcement of the status-related sanctions imposed by the VRS while maintaining
the discretion to do so or not. The Trial Chamber also notes that the record does not contain any
evidence concerning disciplinary and/or criminal proceedings initiated by the VJ against members
of the 30th PC ex officio.
4675
4676
4677
4678
4679
4680
4681
4682
Ex. P2422, Order of Marjanovi} (commander of the RV and PVO) on cessation of the military service of
Nedeljko Vuji}, 12 October 2005.
Ex. P1927, Information of the VRS Main Staff to the VJ General Staff on Vinko Pandurevi}, 20 July 1998. The
authorization was given pursuant to Article 180 of the Law on the VJ.
Ex. P1927, Information of the VRS Main Staff to the VJ General Staff on Vinko Pandurevi}, 20 July 1998.
Ex. P1928, Decision of the National Defence School Administration on Vinko Pandurevi}, 21 July 1998.
Ibid.
Ex. P1929, Decision of Military Post 2102 Belgrade on Vinko Pandurevi}, 7 August 1998.
Ex. P1930, Indictment of the VJ Military Disciplinary Prosecutor against Vinko Pandurevi}, 19 March 1999.
Ex. P1931, Record of the Trial against Vinko Pandurevi} before the VJ Military Disciplinary Court, 14 October
1999; Ex. P1932, Judgement against Vinko Pandurevi} of the VJ Military Disciplinary Court, 14 October 1999.
533
Case No.: IT-04-81-T
6 September 2011
28700
(ii) Whether Peri{i} had the Authority to Issue Binding Orders to the 40th PC Members
a. “Naredba” and “Nare|enje”
1701. The Trial Chamber has been presented with the evidence distinguishing between two
different types of orders issued in the VJ: “naredba” and “nare|enje”. Both could be issued in
writing or orally.4683
1702. Naredba was an administrative order that defined the responsibilities, duties and rights of
individuals.4684 According to Star~evi}, it should be viewed as a regulation that was adopted within
an administrative procedure.4685 Examples of naredba are orders transferring and assigning VJ
members from one post to another.4686 Such orders could be appealed, although in some cases
compliance was required pending appeal.4687 Naredba, as an administrative act could be issued by a
superior officer but in some cases also by authorised civilians serving in the MOD.4688
1703. The term nare|enje (command) was used in the context of issuing operational orders within
the chain of command.4689 As a matter of principle, nare|enje could not be suspended pending
appeal and had to be implemented immediately,4690 unless the compliance with the order would
imply the commission of a criminal act.4691 Complaints could be submitted afterwards.4692
1704. The Prosecution argues that Peri{i} issued both nare|enje and naredba to members of the
VRS and SVK.4693 It submits that these “orders were obeyed by his subordinates serving in the
[PCs]”.4694 It posits that evidence of Peri{i} issuing command orders (nare|enje) is “less plentiful”.
It argues that there was little need for Peri{i} to issue command orders (nare|enje) as the military
commands of the VRS and SVK comprised of VJ officers with objectives aligned with those of
Milo{evi},the SDC and Peri{i}. It points out that the dynamic changed considerably in 1995 when
4683
4684
4685
4686
4687
4688
4689
4690
4691
4692
4693
4694
See Miodrag Star~evi}, T. 6806. See e.g. Ex. P2412, Report of Slobodan Peri} to Peri{i} about Officers in SVK,
20 June 1995, p. 1.
Miodrag Star~evi}, T. 5462.
Ibid.
See Miodrag Star~evi}. T. 5470, 5476; Ex. P1895, Order by VJ General Staff Personnel Administration,
15 February 1994; Ex. P1896, Minutes from a Meeting Concerning the Transfer of a Soldier to the VRS,
11 September 1994. See supra paras 789-790.
Miodrag Star~evi}, T. 5464. One of such exceptions was a category of transfer and appointment orders,
Ex. P197, Law on the VJ, 18 May 1994, Article 154.
Miodrag Star~evi}, T. 5463.
Miodrag Star~evi}, T. 5462-5463.
Miodrag Star~evi}, T. 5463.
Miodrag Star~evi}, T. 5464.
Miodrag Star~evi}, T. 5463.
Prosecution Final Brief, para. 772.
Ibid.
534
Case No.: IT-04-81-T
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28699
the SVK risked defeat. The looming disaster compelled Peri{i} to take more robust actions by inter
alia issuing command orders (nare|enje) to the 40th PC members.4695
1705. The Defence submits that Peri{i} could not issue binding orders to the VJ soldiers serving in
the 30th and 40th PCs4696 since their relationship with the VJ chain of command terminated when
they received orders on assignment to duties in VRS or SVK.4697 It concludes that such officers
remained outside the VJ hierarchy until the moment they returned to the VJ and were appointed to a
particular duty in the VJ.4698
i. Naredba
1706. The Trial Chamber recalls that a VJ member could be transferred to the 30th or the 40th PC
by an order of Peri{i}. Such orders were issued and compliance was required by the VJ. These
transfer orders were enforced through a system of unofficial pressure and threat of termination of
military service. As a consequence, most of such transfer orders were obeyed.4699
1707. Peri{i} also could - and in fact did - issue orders transferring VJ personnel serving in the 30th
and the 40th PC back to the VJ.4700 Such orders were obeyed.4701 On the other hand, the Trial
Chamber recalls that the evidence shows instances where these transfer orders were preceded by the
agreement of the SVK or the VRS.4702
ii. Nare|enje
1708. The Trial Chamber recalls that according to the relevant laws, both the SVK and the VRS
were formed on the basis of the principle of unity or singleness of command with clearly defined de
jure chain of command.4703
1709. The parties do not contest the fact that VJ members serving in the 30th and the 40th PCs were
duty-bound and indeed did follow orders of their superiors in the SVK and the VRS; the point of
contention is, however, whether such VJ personnel, simultaneously remained in the parallel chain
of command – namely that of the VJ.4704 Specifically whether Peri{i} could issue command orders
4695
4696
4697
4698
4699
4700
4701
4702
4703
4704
Prosecution Final Brief, para. 794.
See Defence Final Brief, paras 849, 853, 857, 859, 987.
Defence Final Brief, para. 301.
Defence Final Brief, para. 301. See also paras 262-263, 859.
See supra paras 803-809.
See supra section VI.A.7.
Ibid.
Ibid.
See supra paras 265, 296.
See e.g. Defence Final Brief, paras 154-162, 262-263, 284, 857-858; Prosecution Closing Arguments, T. 1475114754 (partially private session).
535
Case No.: IT-04-81-T
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(nare|enje) to the members of the 30th and the 40th PCs and if so, whether such orders were
considered binding and obeyed.
b. Ability of Peri{i} to Issue Command Orders (nare|enje) to the 40th PC members
i. Before the Shelling of Zagreb in May 1995
1710. Before the shelling of Zagreb, Peri{i} issued at least two command orders, analysed below,
to the officers serving in the SVK through the 40th PC – Ex. P1925 and Ex. P1800. In one of those
orders, Peri{i} referred to the authority of Slobodan Milo{evi}. At the same time, the record shows
some instances where Peri{i} instead of ordering – pleaded for compliance – e.g. using the
expression “please” in the official documents.
1711. The Prosecution relies on Ex. P1925 to demonstrate that Peri{i} could issue orders
(nare|enje) to the 40th PC members.4705 The document shows that on 24 March 1995, Peri{i}
ordered (nare|enje) the formation of a Coordinating Staff “in order to extend the most effective
assistance to the Main Staff and to the [40th PC] units, for successful resistance to any possible
aggression”. Among its members were officers of the VJ General Staff as well as two VJ officers
serving in the 40th PC.4706 Although Star~evi} did not remember seeing this order, he agreed with
the Prosecution that this order was a “proper exercise of command over these [40th PC
officers]”.4707 The witness noted though that this order was partly “confusing” as one of the
members of the Coordinating Staff was a retired officer from the association of veterans over whom
Peri{i} should not have any command.4708 The Trial Chamber also notes that one of the recipients of
this order was an officer of the RSK MOD. In its closing arguments, the Prosecution submits that
this order was obeyed without directing the Chamber to any specific evidence.4709 The Trial
Chamber, however, notes that there is no evidence supporting this assertion.
1712. At least on one occasion, on 7 December 1994, Peri{i} issued an order (nare|enje) to the
SVK that was acknowledged as such by the SVK and carried out – Exhibit P1800. This order was
to the President of the RSK and the Commander of the SVK Main Staff and explicitly stated that it
was issued, “on authority of the President of the Republic of Serbia, Slobodan Milo{evi}”. It held:
On the order of the President of the Republic of Serbia, Mr. Slobodan Milo{evi}, urgently
facilitate the passage of UNPROFOR humanitarian aid in Western Bosnia (with forces in Biha}
pocket), for two reasons:
4705
4706
4707
4708
4709
Prosecution Final Brief, para. 773; Prosecution Closing Arguments, T. 14756.
Ex. Order of Mom}ilo Peri{i} to Form a Coordinating Staff, 24 March 1995.
Miodrag Star~evi}, T. 6760, 6762-6763.
Miodrag Star~evi}, T. 6762.
See Prosecution Closing Arguments, T. 14740.
536
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28697
Because you, Mr. Marti}, promised this to Mr. Yasushi Akashi
Because the decision on UNPROFOR’s withdrawal from Western Bosnia is at stake.
Inform UNPROFOR (Mr. Akashi) in writing that you will perform this task you assumed
immediately this evening (7 December 1994) and then do it.
Submit a report on completed task to the President of the Republic of Serbia, Slobodan Milo{evi},
through the [Chief of General Staff of the VJ], tomorrow (8 December 1994), by 0800 hours.4710
The order was carried out, but the response given on the same day by the Commander of the SVK
Main Staff was addressed to Slobodan Milo{evi}, not to Peri{i}: “Mr. President. As regards to your
order sent by telegram […] we inform you that we carried out your order”.4711
1713. One witness described a similar instance to the one presented above where Peri{i} passed
Milo{evi}’s order to Čeleketi}.4712
1714. According to one witness, Peri{i}, in his own capacity, did not issue command orders to
Čeleketi}.4713 The witness testified that the latter was indeed duty bound to obey Perišić’s orders
which related to promotion, transfer and retirement but in all other respects he was within the chain
of command of the SVK.4714
1715. Further evidence shows that communication between the VJ and the SVK was at times
taking the form of requests or suggestions rather than orders.
1716. As an example, on 19 January 1994, Peri{i} sent the following document to the Commander
of the SVK Main Staff. The Trial Chamber notes that the document does not look like an order instead uses the courtesy expression “please” before addressing a request: “A work team is
dispatched […] in order to implement the agreement you made with Lt Col Gen Mladi}, which
relates to dismantling 4 barrels of the 262mm “Orkan” [launcher]. Please enable the work group to
carry out the task”.4715
4710
4711
4712
4713
4714
4715
Ex. P1800, Letter signed by Perišić to RSK President and SVK Commander, 7 December 1994 (emphasis in
original). See also MP-80, T. 8803-8804 (closed session).
Ex. P2857, SVK Main Staff Commander Čeleketi} Communication to Peri{i} and Milo{evi}, 7 December 1994;
Milo{evi}’s influence over the SVK could be also seen in the evidence showing that the SVK Main Staff
received a “task” to set up the allied forces of Fikret Abdi} that were supposed to fight the ABiH 5th Corps in
Western Bosnia, MP-80, T. 8402 (closed session). This task was given by Slobodan Milo{evi} to Milan Marti}
who in turn ordered the SVK to act accordingly, MP-80, T. 8404-8406 (closed session). See also MP-80, T. 8457
(closed session).
MP-80, T. 8454 (closed session).
Ibid.
MP-80, T. 8449-8450, 8787, 8852-8854 (closed session). But see also MP-80, T. 8489 (closed session).
Ex. P1138, Correspondence Between Chief of the VJ General Staff and the SVK Main Staff, 19 January 1994
(emphasis added).
537
Case No.: IT-04-81-T
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1717. Similarly, on 11 May 1994, the following communication was sent to the SVK Main Staff:
“For the next coordination /meeting/ on 19.05.1994, please bring the exact disposition of yours and
enemy forces […]”.4716
1718. According to Miodrag Star~evi}, using the word “please” in an official military document
allows for the inference that there is no relation of superior-subordinate between the sender and the
recipient.4717 In another instance, the VJ used the more ambiguous expression “is required” instead
of the usual “order”. Accordingly, on 11 August 1994, the Acting Deputy Chief of the VJ General
Staff sent the following communication to the SVK Main Staff:
In order to prevent these planned intentions, the following is required:
Enhance operative work and the coordination of the tasks pertaining to the security and counterintelligence security of the installations
The 11th Corps of the [SVK] is to secure the bridges over the Danube River in their territory and
establish full cooperation and coordination with the Novi Sad Corps in performing this task.4718
1719. The Trial Chamber also recalls the evidence on the monthly coordination meetings held in
Belgrade.4719 In the words of one witness “[…] it wasn't along the classical military lines that [the
Chief of the VJ General Staff] would assign tasks and take decisions, because there were […] no
such relations of authority between [the SVK and the VJ]”.4720
1720. Rade Orli} who served as Chief of the Intelligence Departments of the SVK Main Staff
between June and December 1994 testified that he never received an order from the VJ while
serving in the SVK.4721 Similarly, Rade Ra{eta, who served in the Security Department of the SVK
Main Staff, also testified that once he was assigned to the SVK, his role in the chain of command in
the VJ ended.4722
ii. 1-3 May 1995
1721. After the SVK had started shelling various targets in Croatia on 1 May 1995,4723 the
following conversation took place between Peri{i} and Milo{evi}:
[Milo{evi}]: That is what you should say to Čeleketi}, that he should be prepared to discontinue
the hostilities instead of firing. And what is he going to do afterwards?
4716
4717
4718
4719
4720
4721
4722
4723
Ex. P2177, Letter from VJ General Staff to SVK Main Staff, 11 May 1994 (emphasis added).
See Miodrag Star~evi}, T. 7027.
Ex. P1621, Report of the VJ General Staff to the SVK Main Staff, 11 August 1994 (emphasis added).
See supra paras 943-944, 1406-1410.
MP-80, T. 8338-8339 (closed session).
Rade Orli}, T. 5740, 5762-5763.
Rade Ra{eta, T. 5969.
See supra para. 566.
538
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[Peri{i}]: Well, what is he going to do? Now, well…nothing.
[Milo{evi}]: We are going to arrest him if he happens to start doing it, word of honour!4724
1722. In the following conversation taking place the same day, on 1 May 1995,4725 Peri{i}
acknowledged that Čeleketi} was following orders from a person whom, based on the evidence of
the events, the Trial Chamber identifies as Milan Marti};4726 at the same time, Peri{i} refers to the
fact that he intervened with Čeleketi} to forbid any “retaliation”:
[Milo{evi}]: It would be good, if you could do it, to see with Čeleketi} that they really should not
behave like hysterical women, but like serious men.
[Peri{i}]: […] he was following orders of that one, you know […]
[Milo{evi}]: They should not make any retaliation, forbid them strictly.
[Peri{i}]: Fine. I did already. Otherwise, who knows what they do by now if we hadn’t intervened
these days.4727
1723. On the same day, Peri{i} also left the following message for Slobodan Milo{evi} referring to
his previous conversation with Du{an Lon~ar – the Commander of the SVK 11th Corps the SVK
serving through the 40th PC:4728
Peri{i} contacted Lon~ar, explained to him how to behave in the negotiations and he accepted it.
And the second thing, Eastern Slavonia Corps received the order to send one battalion to Western
Slavonia, I told Lon~ar not to send without our approval, which he accepted.4729
1724. Further Peri{i} reported to Milo{evi} “Lon~ar completely understands the things and accepts
to do as we say”.4730
4724
4725
4726
4727
4728
4729
4730
Ex. P1274, Intercepted Conversation, 1 May 1995, p. 2. The Trial Chamber notes that in the conversation with
[arini}, Milo{evi} stated that he can replace neither Marti} nor Čeleketi}, Ex. P1325, Intercepted Conversation,
undated. However, in a conversation with Peri{i}, Milo{evi} bragged that he will tell Marti} that he should
resign, Ex. P1329, Intercepted Conversation, undated, p. 8; Ex. P1301, Intercepted Conversation, 1 May 1995,
p. 3, where Milo{evi} states the following to Mikeli}: “Please do call back so I know what action to take via
Peri{i}. They will have to respect the actions I take via Peri{i}”.
The Trial Chamber notes that Ex. P1276 and P1303 talk about the start of the Operation “Flash” at 5.30 “this
morning”, Ex. P1276, Intercepted Conversation, undated, pp 3-4; Ex. P1303, Intercepted Conversation, undated,
p. 2.
See supra section V.B.
Ex. P1276, Intercepted Conversation, undated, pp 1-2 (emphasis in original omitted); See also Ex. P1303,
Intercepted Conversation, undated, p. 1; Ex. P1280, Intercepted Conversation, undated, p. 2 (where Peri{i}
reports to Milo{evi} that he “told Lon~ar not to go […] because if he does he is involving us directly”) (emphasis
in original omitted); Ex. P1299, Intercepted Conversation, 1 May 1995, p. 3.
For Lon~ar’s status as a 40th PC member - see Ex. P1681, VJ Personnel File of Du{an Lon~ar, Doc ID 06114844.
Ex. P1303, Intercepted Conversation, undated, pp 3-4. See also Ex. P1309, Intercepted Conversation, undated,
p. 4; Ex. P1316, Intercepted Conversation, undated, p. 2; Ex. P1340, Intercepted Conversation, undated, p. 2.
Ex. P1373, Intercepted Conversation, undated, p. 2. See also Ex. P1357, Intercepted Conversation, undated, p. 2
(where Lon~ar states “I will call [Peri{i}] again, so let him consult that guy, I will get an order from [Peri{i}]
again and if he says no, that means that there is no need to send anything from here”.); Ex. P1379, Intercepted
Conversation, undated, p. 3 (where Peri{i} communicates to Milo{evi}: “I insisted on important things again,
539
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1725. On 2 May 1995, Peri{i}, referring to shelling of Zagreb, reported to Milo{evi} that he told
Čeleketi} and Martić “not to do it anymore”, threatening them with dismissal.4731 In particular,
during one conversation on 2 May 1995 at 11:35 hours, Peri{i} and Milo{evi} had the following
exchange:
₣Peri{i}ğ: I also received information that they shelled /Zagreb/
₣Milo{evi}ğ: And who did you receive the information from?
₣Peri{i}ğ: From my guys who are there you know. […]
₣Milo{evi}ğ: Did you tell ^eleketi} that he mustn’t do that?
₣Peri{i}ğ: Well, I did tell ^eleketi}, but it seems that he and Marti} did it without our knowledge.
They shelled Karlovac, Sisak, and now as you see, also Zagreb.4732
1726. On 3 May 1995,4733 Peri{i} discussed Čeleketi}’s personality with Milo{evi}:
[Milo{evi}]: […] Can’t you tell him not to listen to Marti} anymore please! […]
[Peri{i}]: Mister President, you remember when I said that he was not even for a brigade level and
you remember, well, how Marti} brushed away rapidly all those real soldiers, real fighters, and he
brought only some obedient men loyal to him, who, at any rate, do whatever he tells them to do.
Well Čeleketi} is the symbol of all of that. And he doesn’t think with his own head, but the way
[Marti}] tells him to […]
[Peri{i}]: I thought and I think now, listen, to send Mile Mrk{i}, but until he accepts him, you
know? And then he will kill him there, or they will kill each other, and then the tension is even
greater.
[Milo{evi}]: Until we replace those two there is not going to be peace there at all.4734
1727. On 3 May 1995, the RSK Prime Minister, Mikeli} pleaded with Milo{evi} to stop the
shelling:
[Mikeli}]: But President, please stop those impossible ones through Peri{i}, Marti} […] gave an
order to Čeleketi} to shoot.
[Milo{evi}]: Čeleketi} has to be stopped, order Čeleketi} to stop the fire.
4731
4732
4733
4734
and [Čeleketi}] said that he would work on it to the utmost, and that Lon~ar has promised me indeed, you know?
I was thinking to call Lon~ar tomorrow and start shaking it up a bit, elaborate some things, so that he would not
make up something”).
Ex. P1314, Intercepted Conversation, undated. See MP-80, T. 8444-8445, 8488-8489, 8776, 8788, 8791-8792
(closed session); Ex. P1284, Intercepted Conversation, undated, p. 2 (where Peri{i} is recorded as saying “[…] I
can’t bring [Marti}] to his senses, and I fear that he’s the main person”.) (emphasis in original omitted). See also
Ex. P1320, Intercepted Conversation, undated; Ex. P1381, Intercepted Conversation, undated, pp 2-3;
Ex. P1389, Intercepted Conversation, undated.
Ex. P1297, Intercepted Conversation, 2 May 1995, p. 1. See also Ex. P1286, Intercepted Conversation, undated
(showing that Peri{i} also knew that the Orkan rocket system was used in the attack); Ex. P1389, Intercepted
Conversation, 3 May 1995 (where Milo{evi} informed Peri{i} of the shelling of 3 May 1995).
The Trial Chamber notes that Ex. P1286, Intercepted Conversation, 1 May 1995, p. 2, refers to the shelling of
Children Hospital in Zagreb on 3 May 1995.
Ex. P1286, Intercepted Conversation, undated, p. 3 (emphasis in original omitted).
540
Case No.: IT-04-81-T
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[Mikeli}]: I’ve just told him, this very moment I told him to stop.
[Milo{evi}]: Is he going to obey? […]
[Milo{evi}]: Tell Marti} the agreement has been reached and he shouldn’t go on doing stupid
things.
[Mikeli}]: All right, but you also tell that through Peri{i}, you know how to do it.
[Milo{evi}]: I’ve already told him to try to establish the connection and to tell this one he must,
must stop it.4735
1728. On 3 May 1995, Peri{i} reported to Milo{evi}: “Yes, actions stopped. […] [F]irst I forced
him to stop and he stopped”.4736
iii. After the Shelling of Zagreb in May 1995
1729. The evidence presented below suggests that in mid-May 1995 Čeleketi} was replaced by
Mrk{i}.4737
1730. During the meeting held in Belgrade around 10 May 1995, attended by inter alia Marti},
Milo{evi} and Peri{i}, at a certain point Peri{i}, brought in Mrk{i} and introduced him as the new
SVK Commander.4738 According to one witness, Mrkšić on that occasion said, unprompted, that he
will carry out all the duties and orders of Milošević.4739 In an intercepted conversation, Milošević
told Peri{i} to notify Mrkšić that he had nothing to worry about his verification by the RSK
Assembly.4740 The Assembly of the RSK subsequently verified Mrkšić as the Commander of the
SVK.4741 One witness testified that Mrkšić, when he took over from Čeleketi}, was in direct contact
with the VJ General Staff and that he was receiving direct orders from Belgrade, “in other words
from Perišić”.4742 During an intercepted conversation with Perišić, Milošević told him to “request
contact with Mrkšić only, and [Mrk{i}] should not take any orders from Martić”, to which Perišić
responded: “[Mrk{i}] hasn’t been taking any for a long time”.4743
4735
4736
4737
4738
4739
4740
4741
4742
4743
Ex. P1321, Intercepted Conversation, undated, pp 2-3.
Ex. P1286, Intercepted Conversation, undated, p. 5 (emphasis in original omitted). See also Ex. P1401,
Intercepted Conversation, undated, p. 3 (where Milo{evi} instruct Peri{i}: “[c]all Čeleketi} and tell him that he
must not under any circumstances, even though this one orders him to shell Zagreb”).
See also supra para. 297.
MP-80, T. 8471, 8473, 8616 (closed session). See also Ex. P1451, Intelligence Note, 6 July 1995 (describing
General Mrk{i} going to Belgrade to meet Slobodan Milo{evi} regarding the election of a new RSK Defence
Minister).
MP-80, T. 8473, 8728-8729 (closed session).
MP-80, T. 8483 (closed session); Ex. P1340, Intercepted Conversation, undated.
MP-80, T. 8482-8485, 8729-8730 (closed session). See also Ex. P1916, VJ Personnel File of Mile Mrk{i},
Doc ID 0422-2977.
MP-80, T. 8481, 8457 (closed session). See also Ex. P1340, Intercepted Conversation, undated, pp 3-4.
Ex. P1340, Intercepted Conversation, undated, p. 3; MP-80, T. 8474-8479 (closed session). See also Ex. P1344,
Intercepted Conversation, 19 May 1995, pp 1-2 (where Milo{evi} told Peri{i} to contact Lon~ar and pass him the
541
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28692
1731. On 20 June 1995, Colonel Slobodan Peri}, commander of the 18th SVK Corps, reported
back to Peri{i}, stating that: “Based on your oral order [nare|enje], I am submitting to you the list
of officers who participated and those who did not participate in combat operations […] in the
territory of Western Slavonia”.4744 In a document sent by Peri{i}’s Chef de Cabinet to the command
of the SVK 11th Corps on 1 November 1995 the expression “you are requested to send a brief
report” was used.4745 The response read: “In response to your letter […] we hereby send you a
report”.4746
1732. A letter from Peri{i} to the Commander of the SVK Main Staff, dated 18 July 1995 used
words such as “please” and “kindly”.4747 Star~evi} commented that this document does not indicate
any form of hierarchy because if it was an order there would be no politeness.4748
1733. After the fall of the RSK in August 1995, the only part of the SVK that was still operational
was the 11th Corps under the command of Lon~ar. On 9 July 1995, Peri{i} was reported as ordering
Lon~ar to prepare the list of the VJ soldiers born in Croatia to be sent to the SVK.4749
1734. In an intercepted conversation on 6 August 1995, Peri{i} gave an order to be conveyed to
Lon~ar: “arrest all scaremongers and all others who are harmful to the morale of the men of the 11th
Corps. If necessary – execute by firing squad. Blue Nine orders it”.4750 The Trial Chamber heard the
testimony explaining that the code-name “Blue Nine” (Plavi 9) was used by Peri{i}.4751 One witness
testified that after the fall of the RSK, the 11th Corps was de facto part of the VJ and that its
commander, Lon~ar, took orders from Peri{i}.4752
4744
4745
4746
4747
4748
4749
4750
4751
4752
following: “[t]herefore [Lon~ar] should go to that Assembly /session/ and to tell them that he will no ₣sicğ follow
[Marti}’s] adventurous and stupid orders, that is not pursuant to the Constitution and that he has commander of
the Main Staff, with whom he is in communication with. And [Marti}], what he wants to determine, he can do
that when he calls the Defence Council session and than when the Council brings a decision”).
Miodrag Star~evi}, T. 6765-6766 (emphasis added); Ex. P2412, Report of Slobodan Peri} to Peri{i} about
Officers in SVK, 20 June 1995, p. 1 (emphasis added).
Ex. P2707, Documents Relating to Office of the VJ letter to the 11th Corps Command, November 1995, Doc ID
0647-6992. See also Sini{a Borovi}, T. 14028.
Ex. P2707, Documents Relating to Office of the VJ letter to the 11th Corps Command, November 1995, Doc ID
0647-6994, p. 1.
Miodrag Star~evi}, T. 7027; Ex. D125, Correspondence from General Peri{i} to the SVK Main Staff, 18 July
1995.
Miodrag Star~evi}, T. 7027. See also Ex. P1617, Request of the VJ General Staff to the VRS and SVK Main
Staffs to Provide Reports, 6 February 1993 (sent to the SVK Main Staff by the VJ General Staff asking for
information and using the phrase “please”); Mile Novakovi}, T. 13107.
Ex. P2146, IHV Intelligence Administration Report, 11 July 1995; Ex. P1456, Intelligence Note, 10 July 1995.
See also Sini{a Borovi}, T. 14092; Vladimir Rodi}, T. 14220-14221 (testifying about Peri{i} touring the units of
the SVK 11th Corps in autumn 1995).
Ex. P1461, Intercepted Conversation, 6 August 1995.
Ex. P2286, Intercepted Communication, 2 May 1995. See also MP-80, T. 8465-8467 (closed session).
MP-80, T. 8456 (closed session). See also Ex. P1777, VJ Personnel File of Mile Novaković, Doc ID 0611-7672;
the order of Mrk{i} issued “₣wğith the objective of carrying out the order of [Peri{i}]”. The Trial Chamber,
542
Case No.: IT-04-81-T
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28691
c. Ability of Peri{i} to Issue Command Orders (nare|enje) to the 30th PC members
1735. The Prosecution generally asserts that Peri{i} issued nare|enje to the members of the 30th
PC, but does not refer to any specific evidence supporting this conclusion.4753
1736. The Trial Chamber notes that the record does not show any instance of nare|enje issued by
Peri{i} to the members of the 30th PC.
1737. On 11 April 1994, Peri{i} issued a written warning to the VRS Main Staff in order to
prevent further escalation of conflict in BiH.4754 Star~evi} testified that:
I don't believe that any legal measures could have been taken should someone fail to adhere to the
warning, but in view of the fact that a warning is in a way a question of good services or an advice,
perhaps there could be some influence on the quality of the relationship between the person who is
issuing the warning […] and the side that does not adhere to the warning.4755
1738. The Trial Chamber also recalls the evidence concerning relations between Peri{i} and
Mladi}, including the instances where Peri{i} tried to influence Mladi} to accept the Contact Group
peace plan and to release French pilots held hostage by the VRS.4756 On both these occasions
Peri{i} tried to persuade Mladi} into compliance rather than give him an order.4757 The Trial
Chamber recalls that the evidence demonstrates that Peri{i} was repeatedly unsuccessful in his
attempts to “persuade” Mladi} to stop the war and to support a peace plan.4758 The Trial Chamber
recalls that when the SDC, despite its previous unsuccessful attempts, decided to continue
pressuring Mladi}, and other members of the RS leadership, to endorse a peace plan, Peri{i} stated
that “at least we can invite them, and we can try to persuade those people in front of this
audience”.4759 The Trial Chamber also recalls that Peri{i} served as a sort of mediator by organising
a series of meetings between international representatives and Mladi}, and other members of the RS
leadership, to obtain the release of the French pilots.4760
(iii) Whether Peri{i} was Involved in the Payment of Salaries and Provision of Other
Benefits for the 40th and the 30th PC Members
1739. The Trial Chamber recalls that Peri{i} was directly involved in determining the funds
needed for the payment of salaries for military personnel, including members of the 30th and the
4753
4754
4755
4756
4757
4758
4759
however, notes that according to Star~evi}, Mrk{i} referred to naredba issued by Peri{i}, Miodrag Star~evi},
T. 6760.
Prosecution Final Brief, paras 768, 772, 794.
Ex. P1827, Warning to VRS Main Staff, 11 April 1994.
Miodrag Star~evi}, T. 6770.
See supra paras 1365-1369, 1378-1384.
Ibid.
See supra paras 1365-1369.
See supra para. 1367.
543
Case No.: IT-04-81-T
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40th PCs. The payment of the salaries was made by the Accounting Centre of the MOD with the
funds that were allocated to the VJ in the national defence budget. The PCs, or the Personnel
Administration of the VJ General Staff, provided the Accounting Centre of the MOD with all of the
records and information necessary to calculate the salaries of the members of the 30th and 40th
PCs.4761
1740. The Trial Chamber recalls that in addition to a salary, members of the PCs received “special
payments” for service at the time of their retirement.4762 The PCs, as part of the Personnel
Administration of the VJ General Staff, also decided on the recognition of pensionable years of
service and on the provision of pensions.4763 The housing needs of soldiers serving in the 30th and
the 40th PCs were addressed either by the issuance of a housing certificate or by the provision of a
family separation allowance.4764 The PCs members were also entitled to medical insurance in the
FRY and were treated in VJ medical facilities located in the territory of the FRY.4765 Like other VJ
officers, they also enjoyed various other benefits such as compensation for service under difficult
conditions and education benefits.4766
1741. The Trial Chamber recalls that Milan Čeleketi} received a salary like normal members of
the VJ.4767 Moreover, after he submitted a demand for recognition of his years of service in the
SVK as double for the purpose of calculating his pension, the VJ General Staff Personnel
Administration issued a decision recognising his claim pursuant to the Law on the VJ.4768
1742. The Trial Chamber recalls that it was also presented with evidence in relation to the
payment of salaries to, inter alia, Ratko Mladi}, Manojlo Milovanovi}, Radislav Krsti}, Milenko
Živanovi}, Vujadin Popovi}, Dragan Obrenovi}, \or|e \uki}, Bogdan Sladojevi}, Radivoje
Mileti}, Milan Gvero, Zdravko Tolimir, Stanislav Gali} and Dragomir Milo{evi}.4769
(iv) Whether Peri{i} had the Capacity to Promote Members of the 30th and the 40th PCs
1743. The Trial Chamber recalls that, as a general rule, promotions of officers serving in the 30th
and 40th PCs were first granted in the SVK and the VRS, respectively, in accordance with the laws
of the RSK or RS. The SVK/VRS Main Staff would then send a list of promotions to the VJ
4760
4761
4762
4763
4764
4765
4766
4767
4768
4769
See supra paras 1378-1384.
See supra para. 880.
See supra para. 879.
See supra para. 889.
See supra para. 891.
See supra paras 897, 904.
See supra para. 905.
See supra para. 878.
See supra para. 887.
See supra para. 878.
544
Case No.: IT-04-81-T
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28689
General Staff with a request that they be verified. Such verification and corresponding promotion in
the VJ allowed the PC members to enjoy the benefits and rights attached to the new rank, most
importantly a commensurate salary.4770
1744. The Trial Chamber also recalls that the verifications and promotions within the VJ were
made according to the Law on the VJ. As a consequence, Peri{i} retained the authority to promote
members of the PCs up to and including the rank of Colonel and had the power of proposal to the
FRY President for exceptional promotion to the rank of General. The Trial Chamber also found that
such verifications were not merely a rubber stamping of decisions made by the SVK or the VRS
and Peri{i} decided whether a promotion in the VJ was merited based on his own assessment of
character and performance of the members of the PCs proposed for promotion verification.4771
1745. More specifically, the Trial Chamber recalls that Milan ^eleketi} was exceptionally
promoted by the SVK from the rank of Colonel to the rank of Major-General in February 1994 and
again to the rank of Lieutenant General in 1995. The discussions concerning the “verification” of
his promotions held during the SDC sessions of 16 March 1994 and on 13 June 1995 clearly show
that Peri{i} exerted a significant authority in this process. It is worth noting that regarding the 1994
promotion Peri{i} suggested to wait until they could see how ^eleketi} would perform in the new
position. Accordingly, ^eleketi}’s promotion was not verified until June 1994. The further
promotion of Milan ^eleketi} in 1995 was not supported by Periši}, who considered him “guilty”
for the situation in the RSK, and indeed was not verified.4772
1746. As an illustration of the procedure in the VRS, the Trial Chamber recalls that on
23 June 1994, Vinko Pandurevi} and Dragan Obrenovi}, members of the 30th PC, were
extraordinarily promoted to the ranks of Infantry Lieutenant Colonel and Major, respectively, by an
order of Mladi}. These promotions were then verified in the VJ by order of Peri{i} on 16 June 1995.
The VJ Personnel file of Pandurevi} further indicates that he was also extraordinarily promoted to
the rank of Colonel on 31 December 1995 by an order of Peri{i}.4773 Similarly, the FRY SDC, on
Peri{i}’s proposal,4774 verified promotions of Radivoje Mileti},4775 Milan Gvero4776 and Zdravko
4770
4771
4772
4773
4774
4775
4776
See supra para. 866.
Ibid.
See supra para. 861.
See supra para. 846.
Ex. P786, Stenographic Transcript of the 37th Session of the SDC, 7 June 1995, p. 32.
Ex. P1729, VJ Personnel File of Radivoje Miletić, Doc ID 0422-2358; Ex. P1900, Decree of the FRY President,
14 June 1995.
Ex. P1899, VJ Personnel File of Milan Gvero, Doc ID 0422-3207; Ex. P1900, Decree of the FRY President, 14
June 1995.
545
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Tolimir.4777 The Trial Chamber also notes that some promotions were not verified by the VJ including that of Gali} of 1994.4778
1747. The Trial Chamber recalls that there were also instances in which the promotion in the VJ
preceded the promotion in the VRS. For example, Ratko Mladi} was exceptionally promoted to the
rank of Colonel General by a FRY Presidential decree of 16 June 1995, whereas the RS Presidential
decree followed on 28 June 1995.4779
(v) Whether Peri{i} had the Authority to Terminate the Professional Military Service of
the 40th PC Members
1748. The Prosecution highlights Peri{i}’s “selective application” of the law empowering him to
terminate VJ officers when their conduct did not serve the interests of the FRY and argues that such
conduct demonstrated that Peri{i} had the material ability to punish his subordinates in the PCs.4780
The Prosecution also argues that President Lili} relied on Article 107 of the Law on the VJ
selectively to retroactively terminate the professional military service of 40th PC members,
including Čeleketi}, Novakovi}, Bjelanovi} and Mrk{i}.4781
1749. The Trial Chamber recalls that, pursuant to the Law on the VJ, the FRY President and
Peri{i} possessed the authority to terminate the professional military service of personnel assigned
to the 30th and 40th PCs and that they, in fact, exercised this authority.4782 The Trial Chamber notes
in this regard that the legal provisions enumerating grounds for issuing decisions terminating
military service gave a certain amount of discretion to both Peri{i} and the FRY President.4783 The
Trial Chamber recalls that such discretion was used in several cases to pursue broader political
goals: to ensure that VJ personnel would accept transfers to the PCs and as a means of disciplining
members of the VJ as seen on the previously discussed examples of Čeleketi} or Novakovi}.4784
4777
4778
4779
4780
4781
4782
4783
4784
Ex. P1786, Excerpt from VJ Personnel File of Zdravko Tolimir; Ex. P1900, Decree of the FRY President, 14
June 1995.
See supra paras 848-849.
See supra para. 850.
Prosecution Final Brief, para. 764.
Prosecution Final Brief, para. 763. See Ex. P1908, Decree of the FRY President, 22 December 1994 (terminating
the professional military service of Milan Čeleketi}); Ex. P1912/P1777, Doc ID 0611-7664, Decree of the FRY
President, 22 December 1994 (terminating the professional military service of Mile Novakovi}); Ex. P1915, VJ
Personnel File of Mirko Bjelanovi}, Doc ID 0611-9285 (Decree of the FRY President terminating the
professional military service of Mirko Bjelanovi}), 22 December 1994; Ex. P1916, VJ Personnel File of Mile
Mrk{i}, Doc ID 0422-2982 (Decree of the FRY President terminating the professional military service of Mile
Mrk{i}, 22 December 1994).
See supra paras 916, 924-927.
See supra paras 918, 924.
See supra paras 803-809, 1680-1684.
546
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(vi) Whether the SVK and the VRS Depended on the VJ Logistical Support
1750. The Trial Chamber recalls that the SVK came to depend on the supply and continuity of
logistical and technical support (including the maintenance of the Orkan rocket system) from the VJ
during Perišić’s tenure. This fact had an effect on the everyday work of the 40th PC members
serving in the SVK, as the success of their operations to a large extent depended on the logistical
and technical support supervised by Peri{i}.4785
1751. The Trial Chamber also recalls that the VRS was highly dependent on the VJ logistical and
technical support. Without the regular supply of considerable quantities of ammunition and other
weaponry, as well as fuel, technical expertise, repair services and personnel training, the VRS
would have been hampered in conducting its operations in Sarajevo and Srebrenica.4786 The Trial
Chamber recalls its finding that Peri{i} oversaw this system.4787
(vii) Whether the SVK and VRS Reported to the VJ General Staff
1752. The Trial Chamber recalls that there were multiple channels through which information
flowed from SVK and the VRS to the VJ General Staff. Through the system of regular reports,
monthly meetings in Belgrade, various other ad hoc instances of reporting and exchanges of
information, during his tenure as Chief of General Staff, Peri{i} was well-informed of all important
aspects on the functioning of the SVK andVRS, as well as their activities.4788
4785
4786
4787
4788
See supra para. 1263.
See supra para. 1622.
See supra paras 1007, 1622.
See supra para. 1436.
547
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B. Findings on Superior-Subordinate Relationship
1. Preliminary Remarks
1753. The Trial Chamber recalls its finding that the VRS and the SVK depended heavily on FRY
and VJ assistance in order to function as an army and wage war. This dependence encompassed
different
forms
of
assistance
including
logistics, personnel
as
well
as
support
in
communications.4789 Without the regular flow of logistical assistance and personnel support, the
VRS and SVK would have been hampered in conducting their offensive operations.4790 The Trial
Chamber also recalls that the payment of salaries and other benefits was vital to the functioning of
the very core of these armies.4791 This high degree of dependence on the VJ does not per se imply,
without further evidence, that Peri{i} exercised effective control over members of those armies who
committed the crimes charged in the Indictment. Yet, the Trial Chamber is of the view that this
dependence demonstrates at least the potential for exercising control on the part of Peri{i}. The
salient question before the Trial Chamber is whether Peri{i} turned the potential for control inherent
in that dependence into effective control.
1754. In reviewing the evidence relevant for establishing effective control, the Trial Chamber is
mindful that Peri{i} and the FRY leadership tried to keep their intervention in the conflict as well as
their links with the SVK and VRS secret in order to avoid criticism or sanctions from the
international community.4792 In this regard, the Trial Chamber paid special attention to the Appeals
Chamber warning that:
Undue emphasis upon the ostensible structures and overt declarations of the belligerents, as
opposed to a nuanced analysis of the reality of their relationship, may tacitly suggest to groups
who are in de facto control of military forces that responsibility for the acts of such forces can be
evaded merely by resort to a superficial restructuring of such forces or by a facile declaration that
the reconstituted forces are henceforth independent of their erstwhile sponsors.4793
2. Whether Peri{i} Exercised Effective Control over the SVK and VRS
1755. The VJ, the SVK and the VRS operated in an atmosphere of unity and acted towards a
common goal. The Trial Chamber finds particularly revealing in this regard the statements of
Peri{i} and various SVK and VRS officials, including Commanders of the Main Staffs of the VRS
4789
4790
4791
4792
4793
See supra paras 793-796, 1263, 1358, 1622.
See supra paras 1263, 1622.
See supra paras 1619, 1623.
See supra paras 780-787, 1002-1006.
Tadi} Appeal Judgement, para. 154.
548
Case No.: IT-04-81-T
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28685
and SVK, Mladi} and Čeleketi}, in which they admitted that they considered the SVK, VRS and the
VJ to be a single army.4794 For example, Peri{i} stated:
Almost no decision in the [RSK], although it had its political leadership, nor in [RS], was made
without an agreement of the state leadership of the [FRY] at the time. Analogously, the Army also
had close ties, and there were several reasons for that. Firstly, because that was one single army,
secondly because it had its members in all those areas, and thirdly because it had equipment which
was getting its logistics support mostly from the [FRY].4795
However, the Trial Chamber notes that the colloquial meaning of the term “single army” does not
necessarily equate to the meaning that the term has in the context of legal concept of a superiorsubordinate relationship.
(a) SVK
1756. The following analysis and findings are made by the Majority of the Trial Chamber, Judge
Moloto dissenting.
1757. As a first step of an inquiry into whether Peri{i} exercised effective control over the
perpetrators of the crimes charged, the Majority notes that Peri{i} was the de jure superior of the
40th PC members who held all the key commanding positions in the SVK. This status meant that he
had de jure power to issue orders to the 40th PC members, appoint them to specific posts, discipline
them and finally, with exception of the officers holding ranks higher than colonel, dismiss them
from the army.4796 The Ori} Appeal Judgement, however, underscored that “the possession of de
jure authority, without more, provides only some evidence of such effective control” and that the
burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt that the accused had effective control over his
subordinates rests with the Prosecution.4797 In the present case, the evidence shows that Peri{i}
could use and indeed used his de jure powers vis-à-vis VJ soldiers serving in the SVK.
1758. The notion of effective control should be understood “in the sense of a material power to
prevent or punish”.4798 In this context, the actions taken by Peri{i} to initiate disciplinary
proceedings against key military officers serving in the SVK through the 40th PC are particularly
relevant in showing effective control.4799 The evidence clearly shows that Peri{i} could initiate
disciplinary and/or criminal proceedings against these key SVK officers. It was only due to the
4794
4795
4796
4797
4798
4799
See Ex. P2879, Video “JNA – Srpska Verzija Sloma” Serbian Version of the Breakup, p. 27; Ex. P1731, VJ
Personnel File of Vinko Pandurević, Doc ID 0422-8585, p. 2; Ex. P2941, Excerpt from Ratko Mladi}'s
Notebook, 13 October 1994, p. 2; Ex. P1054, Operations Report on the Aggression Against the RSK and the
SVK Activities between 4 August and 10 August 1995, 26 August 1995, p. 28.
Ex. P2879, Video “JNA – Srpska Verzija Sloma” Serbian Version of the Breakup, p. 27.
See supra paras 206-209, 254-259, 788-789, 810, 830, 916, 936-937.
Ori} Appeal Judgement, para. 92.
Čelebići Appeal Judgement, para. 303.
See supra paras 1676, 1687-1688.
549
Case No.: IT-04-81-T
6 September 2011
28684
SDC policy of keeping the VJ’s involvement in the war in Croatia a secret4800 – a policy advocated
by Peri{i} – that such proceedings were not pursued. Consequently, this policy resulted in
termination of the service instead of in the initiation of any proper disciplinary or criminal
proceedings. These political considerations, in the view of the Majority, do not call into question
Peri{i}’s ability to use his authority against SVK officers, but rather demonstrate the inconvenience
of doing so under the circumstances prevailing at that time.
1759. By the same token, the Majority finds that the fact that Peri{i} used his ability to punish
members of the 40th PC only after the fall of the RSK in November 1995 does not raise a reasonable
doubt as to his ability to punish members of the 40th PC before that. The evidence shows that the
relationship between the VJ and the SVK and VRS was characterised by overlapping goals. As a
result, Peri{i} only needed to make use of his authority when the VJ’s military objectives diverged
with those of the other two armies. This is precisely what happened: when the SVK surrendered and
RSK fell into the hands of the Croat forces, Peri{i} decided to initiate investigations on the conduct
of the highest ranking officers of the SVK.
1760. In conclusion, the evidence demonstrating that Peri{i} had the ability to initiate disciplinary
and/or criminal proceedings against members of the 40th PC strongly militates in favour of effective
control.
1761. The Majority finds that holding the highest military position in the VJ - that of Chief of the
VJ General Staff - Peri{i} was usually not expected to interfere in the command at the operational
level. The Majority, however, notes that Peri{i} was well-informed about the situation in the SVK
and VRS through, inter alia, a system of regular reports sent to him by those armies.4801 Based on
this knowledge, he occasionally provided instructions and other military directives to 40th PC
officers, at times through orders or interventions typical of a vertical military relationship and, at
other times, through requests or pleadings generally typical of a horizontal relationship.4802
1762. Before 2 May 1995, Peri{i} issued at least one command order to the senior officer serving
in the 40th PC that was subsequently obeyed.4803 Notwithstanding that this order was issued on the
instructions of Milo{evi}, the fact remains that it was Peri{i} who was actually tasked with issuing
the order and this shows that he was considered by Milo{evi} to be a person who had authority over
the SVK. The Majority is of the view that the lack of frequent interventions by Peri{i} in the
operational command of the SVK does not necessarily cast doubt on his ability to exercise
4800
4801
4802
4803
See supra para. 1684.
See supra para. 1436.
See supra section VII.A.2.a.(ii).(b).
See supra para. 1712.
550
Case No.: IT-04-81-T
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command and control over that army. Where the objectives of the VJ coincided with those of the
SVK or the VRS there was no need for Peri{i} to issue orders. The Majority recalls in this respect
that during the monthly coordination meetings between inter alia Peri{i} and high officers of the
SVK, the synchronisation of such objectives was strengthened by “exchange of information and
harmonisation of positions between the VJ, VRS and SVK”.4804
1763. When a particular VJ instruction was communicated to the SVK, it was not always complied
with, such as when Čeleketi} did not react to Peri{i}’s intervention to stop the shelling of Zagreb on
2 May 1995.4805 Čeleketi}’s non-compliance with Peri{i}’s intervention of 2 May 1995, in the
Majority’s view, does not necessarily imply that Čeleketi} treated Peri{i}’s instructions as nonbinding. Rather, Čeleketi}’s behaviour in this respect has to be considered in the context of the
existence of parallel chains of command. The evidence shows that Peri{i} issued certain command
orders to the SVK. Even if such orders were rare, their existence and the SVK’s compliance
therewith show his general ability to issue orders. This in turn shows that the system of command
and control of the SVK was bifurcated in two chains of command: one controlled by Milan Marti}
as supreme commander of the SVK, and the other by Peri{i} and other members of the FRY
leadership, including Milo{evi}. Against this backdrop, there could be cases where Čeleketi} was
simultaneously presented with two conflicting orders/interventions. Compliance with one of them
would then automatically mean non-compliance with the other. Such non-compliance, however,
especially if there is evidence that Čeleketi} was previously given orders from both chains of
command, treating them as binding and complying with them, should be seen in this specific
instance as merely showing the hierarchy between the two coexisting chains of command.
1764. Notwithstanding this instance of non-compliance, the Majority finds that Čeleketi}’s
behaviour does not call into question Peri{i}’s general ability to issue binding orders to members of
the 40th PC. In the Majority’s view, this conclusion is further confirmed by evidence showing that,
when Mrk{i} became Commander of the SVK Main Staff after the shelling of Zagreb, he took
orders not from the RSK President but directly from Peri{i}.4806 The Majority is mindful that the
superior-subordinate relationship between Peri{i} and the perpetrators of the crimes had to exist at
the time of the commission of the crimes. That being noted, the Majority is of the view that there
was no systemic change in the authority Peri{i} had vis-à-vis the SVK after Mrk{i} succeeded
Čeleketi}. Rather, the change was only in the personal relations between Peri{i} and the new SVK
Main Staff Commander and in Peri{i}’s decision to become more involved in exercising his control
over the SVK.
4804
4805
4806
See supra para. 1408.
See supra para. 1725.
See supra para. 1730.
551
Case No.: IT-04-81-T
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28682
1765. A VJ member could be transferred to the 40th PC by an order from Peri{i} or the VJ General
Staff Personnel Administration. The Majority, in this respect, recalls that although as a general rule
VJ officers were transferred and/or appointed to the 40th PC by the VJ, it was the SVK who
appointed these officers to specific posts within its structure.4807 At times, however, the SVK would
request the VJ to transfer specifically identified officers identifying the unit and position in which
these personnel were to serve if transferred to the SVK.4808 The Majority finds that in such cases the
approval of the SVK request should be seen as an indirect and discrete way of appointing the 40th
PC members to the specific posts in the SVK. Peri{i}’s ability to do so should be seen as standing in
full compliance with his de jure status as the 40th PC members superior.
1766. At the same time, however, these orders were issued and complied with while these officers
were still in the sole chain of command of the VJ. Once a VJ officer complied with an order
transferring him to the 40th, he entered the chain of command of the SVK. The question posed in
this section is, however, whether Peri{i} maintained effective control over VJ officers at the time of
the commission of the crimes - i.e. while they were serving in the SVK. In this regard, the mere fact
that these officers complied with an order by Peri{i} to be transferred to the SVK, which was issued
before they entered a new chain of command, bears limited weight in determining effective control.
The same holds true for cases where Peri{i} used his authority to terminate the professional
contracts of VJ soldiers refusing to join the 40th PC.4809
1767. Peri{i} and the VJ Personnel Administration could - and in fact did - issue orders
transferring VJ personnel serving in the 40th PC back to the VJ.4810 Such orders were obeyed.4811
However, the evidence, does not show that Peri{i} could actually redeploy the members of the 40th
PC back to the VJ without the approval of the SVK.4812 Even if the need for such approval could be
in practice nothing more than a mere formality, the conditional character of these transfer orders
prevents this indicator from carrying much weight in the context of the present considerations.
1768. The fact that Peri{i} had both the ability to make independent recommendations with respect
to the verification of promotions and the ability, under the conditions set by the Law on the VJ, to
terminate the professional contracts of the VJ soldiers serving in the 40th PC,4813 militates in favour
of effective control.
4807
4808
4809
4810
4811
4812
4813
See supra para. 797.
See e.g. Ex. P1125, Request by the RSK President to the VJ for Assistance in Recruitment and Materiel, 21 July
1994, p. 15. See also supra paras 790-791.
See e.g. supra para. 805.
See supra paras 823-825.
Ibid.
See supra para. 830.
See supra paras 866, 933.
552
Case No.: IT-04-81-T
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1769. After weighing the different indicators presented above, the Majority finds that Peri{i} had
effective control over members of the 40th PC, including over perpetrators of the crimes committed
by the shelling of Zagreb on 2 and 3 May 1995. The Majority therefore finds that a superiorsubordinate relationship existed between them at the time of the commission of the crimes.
(b) VRS
1770. The Trial Chamber recalls that Peri{i} was the de jure superior of the 30th PC’s members.4814
1771. As de jure superior, according to the Law on the VJ, Peri{i} could initiate disciplinary
proceedings against the members of the 30th PC.4815 The record, however, does not contain any
instances of disciplinary and/or criminal proceedings initiated by Peri{i} ex officio against members
of the 30th PC. The evidence shows that the VJ General Staff could initiate disciplinary proceedings
against members of the 30th PC. Yet, the initiation of such proceedings was conditioned upon a
decision from the 30th PC member’s superior officer in the VRS, who would either pass on the
relevant judgement of the VRS military disciplinary court to the VJ, or would otherwise authorise
the investigation against such a member of the 30th PC. In this process, Peri{i} therefore had an
auxiliary role.4816 The Trial Chamber consequently finds that this factor does not militate in favour
of effective control.
1772. The trial record does not contain any command orders issued by Peri{i} to the 30th PC
members serving in the VRS. His inability to do so, as opposed to mere unwillingness, can be seen
from evidence showing a divergence of views between Peri{i} and Mladi}. This was the case when
Peri{i} and the FRY leadership unsuccessfully attempted to convince Mladi} to accept the Contact
Group peace plan, which was aimed at ending the conflict in BiH.4817 Similarly, in the negotiations
leading to the release of French pilots, who were taken prisoner by the VRS, Peri{i}, acting as a
mediator between the parties involved, used his influence over Mladi} instead of simply ordering
Mladi} to release the prisoners.4818 Both these instances strongly suggest that the tools available to
Peri{i} to impose his authority upon Mladi} did not include an ability to issue binding orders. The
circumstances leading to the rejection of the Contact Group peace plan by the Bosnian Serbs show
that his power of persuasion was not sufficient to obtain the intended results. These instances
suggest cooperation between the VRS and the VJ as separate and independent military entities,
rather than the subordination of the VRS to the VJ within a single military structure.
4814
4815
4816
4817
4818
See supra para. 1667.
See supra para. 254.
See supra para. 1700.
See supra paras 1365-1369.
See supra paras 1378-1384.
553
Case No.: IT-04-81-T
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28680
1773. The Majority additionally makes the following observations. Peri{i}’s inability to issue
orders, does not mean that he did not have, at least potentially, other tools to exert his authority over
the VRS. Peri{i} oversaw a system providing comprehensive military assistance to the VRS and he
also recurrently urged the SDC to continue this policy.4819 He equally devised and implemented a
plan for the establishment of the PCs thereby creating the conditions that enabled key officers to
continue serving in the VRS without impediment while simultaneously enjoying all the rights
conferred upon VJ members.4820 The Majority is satisfied that Peri{i} could have stopped approving
particular logistic requests or urged the SDC to discontinue its policy of supporting the VRS and
that by doing so, Peri{i} could have exerted some level of pressure on the VRS. The question that
lies at the core of the issue of effective control is whether Peri{i} could make use of these means to
materially prevent or punish the commission of the crimes. The Majority is of the view that
Peri{i}’s actions before the SDC could have resulted in some forms of control over the VRS’
behaviour. Nevertheless, without further evidence, the Majority is not satisfied beyond reasonable
doubt that these actions would have materially prevented the perpetrators of the crimes.
1774. The Trial Chamber recalls that a VJ member could be transferred to the 30th PC by an order
of Peri{i} or the VJ General Staff Personnel Administration. However, such orders were issued and
complied with while these officers were still in the sole chain of command of the VJ. The Trial
Chamber finds that the mere fact that these officers complied with an order by Peri{i} to be
transferred to the VRS issued before they entered a new chain of command bears only limited
weight in assessing effective control. The same holds true for cases where Peri{i} used his authority
to terminate professional contracts of VJ soldiers refusing to join the 30th PC.4821
1775. The Trial Chamber considers the fact that the redeployment process for members of the 30th
PC back to the VJ required prior approval of the VRS4822 prevents this indicator from carrying
much weight in the present considerations.
1776. Peri{i}’s ability to make independent decisions and/or recommendations in the process of
“verifications” of promotions of soldiers serving in the 30th PC and to terminate their professional
contracts when the conditions set by the Law on the VJ were met,4823 are factors militating, in the
Majority’s view, in favour of effective control.
1777. In conclusion, the Trial Chamber is mindful of the paucity of evidence on the system of
command and control over the VRS. Even though the VRS, including its officers serving through
4819
4820
4821
4822
See supra paras 1007-1008.
See supra para. 1609.
See e.g. supra paras 804-805, 807.
See supra para. 830.
554
Case No.: IT-04-81-T
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the 30th PC, were dependent on the logistic support of the VJ and Peri{i} was de jure superior of the
30th PC members, the evidence presented does not lead to the only reasonable conclusion that the
relationship between Peri{i} and members of the 30th PC responsible for the commission of crimes
in Sarajevo and Srebrenica amounted to effective control. The Trial Chamber recalls here the
holding of the Appeals Chamber that “the doctrine of command responsibility is ultimately
predicated upon the power of the superior to control the acts of his subordinates”.4824 Peri{i} could
influence conduct of the 30th PC members through exercising certain discretion in terminating their
professional contracts, suspending their salaries or through verification of their promotions for the
purposes of acquiring certain benefits. Nevertheless, his ability to effectively control the acts of the
30th PC members is called into question by his inability to issue binding orders to them. His
material ability to prevent or punish them is also partly called into question by his secondary role in
the process of imposing disciplinary sanctions for their conduct while serving in the VRS.
1778. Instead, an alternative explanation - i.e. that the VJ and VRS, including its officers serving
in the 30th PC, cooperated as separate and independent military entities, even if strongly interlinked
in terms of logistics and other material assistance, in pursuing common goals - is also reasonably
possible from that evidence. The Trial Chamber therefore cannot find beyond a reasonable doubt
that Peri{i} had effective control over perpetrators of the crimes committed in Sarajevo and
Srebrenica and that a superior-subordinate relationship existed between them at the time of their
commission.
1779. Due to the finding that a superior-subordinate relationship did not exist, the Trial Chamber
will not analyse the two remaining requirements of the legal test for establishing responsibility
pursuant to Article 7(3) of the Statute for the crimes committed by Peri{i}’s subordinates in
Sarajevo and Srebrenica.
3. Knew or Had Reason to Know
1780. The evidence shows that Peri{i} knew about the shelling of Zagreb and Milan Čeleketi}’s
role therein within hours from the incident. The Trial Chamber recalls in this regard the intercepted
conversations between Peri{i} and Milo{evi} held on 2 and 3 May 1995.4825 In particular, during
one conversation on 2 May 1995 at 11:35 hours, Peri{i} and Milo{evi} had the following exchange:
Peri{i}: I also received information that they shelled /Zagreb/
Milo{evi}: And who did you receive the information from?
4823
4824
4825
See supra paras 866, 933.
Čelebi}i Appeal Judgement, para. 197.
See supra paras 1725-1728.
555
Case No.: IT-04-81-T
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28678
Peri{i}: From my guys who are there you know. […]
Milo{evi}: Did you tell ^eleketi} that he mustn’t do that?
Peri{i}: Wee, I did tell ^eleketi}, but it seems that he and Marti} did it without our knowledge.
They shelled Karlovac, Sisak, and now as you see, also Zagreb.4826
4. Failure to Punish
1781. A superior is bound to take “necessary and reasonable measures” to ensure that the
perpetrators of the crimes in question are brought to justice.4827 The evidence does not show any
meaningful attempts to punish the perpetrators of the crimes committed by the shelling of Zagreb
on 2 and 3 May 1995.4828 Although investigations were initiated against some members of the VJ
for their conduct while they were serving in the SVK, the SDC decided to avoid any prosecutions in
an effort to avoid making the FRY involvement in the conflict in Croatia public.4829 Peri{i}
followed this course of action. He ordered to “finish the investigation procedure for all in order to
establish if elements for criminal or disciplinary responsibility exist”. At the same time, however,
he prepared decisions pensioning them off.4830
1782. In October 1995, Milan Čeleketi} was retroactively pensioned off as a result of his conduct
in connection with Operation Storm.4831 Yet, this measure was not adopted because of his
participation in the crimes related to the shelling of Zagreb but rather for losing the RSK territory to
Croatia.
1783. The Majority therefore finds beyond a reasonable doubt that Peri{i} failed to take the
reasonable and necessary steps to punish his subordinates serving in the 40th PC for the crimes they
committed through the shelling of Zagreb on 2 and 3 May 1995.
5. Conclusion
1784. On the basis of the foregoing analysis, the Majority is satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt
that a superior-subordinate relationship between Peri{i} and the perpetrators of the crimes related to
the shelling of Zagreb existed at the time of their commission, that Peri{i} knew that these crimes
4826
4827
4828
4829
4830
4831
Ex. P1297, Intercepted Conversation, 2 May 1995, p. 1. See also Ex. P1286, Intercepted Conversation, undated,
p. 2, showing that Peri{i} also knew that the Orkan rocket system was used in the attack; Ex. P1389, Intercepted
Conversation, undated, communication where Milo{evi} informed Peri{i} of the shelling that occurred on 3 May
1995.
See supra paras 140, 160.
See Ex. P1086, Request For Assistance 656 to the Government of the Republic of Serbia, 13 July 1994, 13 July
1994; Ex. P1083, Request For Assistance 656-A to the Government of the Republic of Serbia, 27 November
2006.
See supra paras 1683-1689.
See supra para. 1684.
See supra para. 1680.
556
Case No.: IT-04-81-T
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were committed by his subordinates and finally that he failed to punish them for this conduct. In
conclusion, the Majority finds beyond a reasonable doubt that Peri{i} is responsible pursuant to
Article 7(3) for failing to punish the perpetrators of crimes committed in Zagreb on 2 and 3 May
1995.
1785. The Trial Chamber finds that it has not been established that Peri{i} is responsible pursuant
to Article 7(3) for failing to prevent and/or punish the perpetrators of crimes committed in Sarajevo
and Srebrenica.
557
Case No.: IT-04-81-T
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28676
IX. CUMULATIVE CONVICTIONS
1786. The Trial Chamber has found Mom~ilo Peri{i} responsible for murder and attacks on
civilians as violations of the laws or customs of war (Article 3 of the Statute) and for murder,
inhumane acts, and persecutions as crimes against humanity (Article 5 of the Statute).
1787. Cumulative convictions are multiple convictions under different statutory provisions which
relate to the same conduct. The Trial Chamber recalls that cumulative convictions are permissible if
each of the statutory crimes involved has a materially distinct element not contained in the other.4832
In order for an element to be considered materially distinct, it requires proof of a fact that is not
required by the other element.4833 As pointed out by the Appeals Chamber, “[t]he cumulative
convictions test serves twin aims: ensuring that the accused is convicted only for distinct offences,
and at the same time, ensuring that the convictions entered fully reflect his criminality”.4834
A. Articles 3 and 5: War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity
1788. Cumulative convictions for the same conduct under Article 3 and Article 5 of the Statute are
permissible because they require proof of distinct elements.4835 Article 3 requires a close link
between the acts of the accused and the armed conflict, while Article 5 requires proof of a
widespread and systematic attack against a civilian population.4836 Therefore, cumulative
convictions for murder as a violation of the laws or customs of war punishable under Article 3 and
for murder as a crime against humanity under Article 5 are permissible.4837
B. Article 3: Murder and Attacks on Civilians
1789. Both the actus reus and the mens rea required for murder and for attacks on civilians are
distinct from each other.4838 The Trial Chamber therefore finds that cumulative convictions for both
murder and attacks on civilians are permissible.
C. Article 5: Persecutions, Murder, and Inhumane Acts
1790. Persecutions as a crime against humanity has a materially distinct element from murder and
inhumane acts as a crime against humanity in that persecutions requires proof that an act or
omission discriminates in fact, and proof that the act or omission was committed with specific
4832
4833
4834
4835
4836
4837
^elebi}i Appeal Judgement, para. 412; Kordi} and ^erkez Appeal Judgement, para. 1033.
Ibid.
Kordi} and ^erkez Appeal Judgement, para. 1033.
Kordi} and ^erkez Appeal Judgement, para. 1036; Gali} Appeal Judgement, para. 165.
Ibid.
Ibid.
558
Case No.: IT-04-81-T
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28675
intent to discriminate.4839 Therefore, cumulative convictions for persecutions and murder and
inhumane acts as crimes against humanity under Article 5 are permissible.
4838
4839
See supra paras 89-104.
Kordi} and ^erkez Appeal Judgement, paras 1041-1042.
559
Case No.: IT-04-81-T
6 September 2011
28674
X. SENTENCING
A. Law on Sentencing
1791. A sentence is to be determined with reference to Article 24 of the Statute, and to Rules
87(C) and 101 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence (“Rules”). In accordance with Article 24(2),
the Trial Chamber takes into account “such factors as the gravity of the offence and the individual
circumstances of the convicted person”.4840 Rule 101 additionally requires the Trial Chamber to
take into account aggravating and mitigating circumstances,4841 the general practice regarding
prison sentences in the courts of the former Yugoslavia,4842 and the extent to which any penalty
imposed by a court of any State on the convicted person for the same act has already been
served.4843
1792. Rule 87(C) of the Rules grants discretion to the Trial Chamber either to impose a sentence
in respect of each finding of guilt and indicate whether such sentences shall be served consecutively
or concurrently, or to impose a single sentence reflecting the totality of the criminal conduct of the
accused.4844
1793. A sentence of imprisonment may be entered for a term up to and including the remainder of
the convicted person’s life.4845 The Trial Chamber is obligated to individualise penalties to fit the
circumstances of the accused and the gravity of the crime, and is granted broad discretion to
determine an appropriate sentence that will fulfil this purpose.4846
1. Purposes of Sentencing
1794. Retribution and deterrence are the primary purposes of sentencing for crimes within the
jurisdiction of the Tribunal.4847
4840
4841
4842
4843
4844
4845
4846
4847
Article 24(2) of the Statute.
Rule 101 (B)(ii) of the Rules.
Article 24(1) of the Statute; Rule 101(B)(iii) of the Rules; Had`ihasanovi} and Kubura Appeal Judgement,
para. 301; Limaj et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 126.
Rule 101(B)(iv) of the Rules.
Rule 87(C) of the Rules.
Article 24(1) of the Statue; Rule 101(A) of the Rules.
Strugar Appeal Judgement, paras 336, 348; Had`ihasanovi} and Kubura Appeal Judgement, para. 302; Limaj et
al. Appeal Judgement, paras 127, 135; Blagojevi} and Joki} Appeal Judgement, para. 137; Zelenovi} Sentencing
Appeal Judgement, para. 11; Gali} Appeal Judgement, para. 393; D. Nikoli} Sentencing Appeal Judgement,
para. 19; Čelebići Appeal Judgement, para. 717.
Aleksovski Appeal Judgement, para. 185; Čelebići Appeal Judgement, para. 806; Stakić Appeal Judgement,
para. 402; Krajišnik Appeal Judgement, paras 775, 803.
560
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1795. As a form of retribution, the sentence should fully express society’s condemnation of the
crimes committed without trespassing into the realm of revenge or vengeance.4848 The sentence
imposed must therefore properly reflect the personal culpability of the wrongdoer.4849
1796. The purpose of deterrence manifests itself in two forms: individual and general.4850 A
sentence should serve both to dissuade the wrongdoer from recidivism and discourage others from
committing similar crimes.4851 Deterrence, however, “must not be accorded undue prominence in
the overall assessment of the sentences to be imposed”.4852 The goal of rehabilitation is also a
legitimate consideration in sentencing, but is granted lesser weight.4853
2. Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances
1797. In the determination of a sentence, the Trial Chamber is required to consider the individual
circumstances of the convicted person, as well as any mitigating or aggravating circumstances.4854
The Statute and Rules are silent as to which factors constitute mitigating or aggravating
circumstances, with the exception of Rule 101(B)(ii), which requires the Trial Chamber to take into
account any “significant cooperation” with the Prosecutor as a mitigating factor.
1798. Only circumstances both directly related to the commission of the offence and to the
convicted person at the time he committed the offence may be considered as aggravating factors.4855
These factors must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt by the Prosecution.4856 Factors considered
as aggravating the gravity of the crime cannot double as separate aggravating circumstances.4857
1799. The primary consideration in sentencing is the gravity of an offence.4858 The gravity of the
offence is determined by assessing the inherent gravity of the crime and the criminal conduct of the
wrongdoer, a determination that requires consideration of the particular circumstances of the case
and the crimes for which the person was convicted, as well as the form and degree of the
4848
4849
4850
4851
4852
4853
4854
4855
4856
4857
4858
M. Joki} Sentencing Trial Judgement, para. 31; Mrña Trial Sentencing Judgement, para. 14.
Kordi} and ^erkez Appeal Judgement, para. 1075.
Kordi} and ^erkez Appeal Judgement, para. 1076.
D. Nikoli} Sentencing Appeal Judgement, paras 44-47; Deronji} Sentencing Appeal Judgement, para. 145.
D. Nikoli} Sentencing Appeal Judgement, para. 46; Kordi} and ^erkez Appeal Judgement, para. 1078; ^elebi}i
Appeal Judgement, para. 717.
^elebi}i Appeal Judgement, para. 806.
^elibi}i Appeal Judgement, para. 717.
Simba Appeal Judgement, para. 82.
Babi} Sentencing Appeal Judgement, para. 43; ^elebi}i Appeal Judgement, para. 763; Bla{ki} Appeal
Judgement, para. 686; D. Nikoli} Sentencing Appeal Judgement, para. 66.
Limaj et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 143; M. Nikoli} Sentencing Appeal Judgement, para. 58; Deronji}
Sentencing Appeal Judgement, paras 106-107.
Gali} Appeal Judgement, para. 442; Blaškić Appeal Judgement, para. 683; Mrk{i} and [ljivan~anin Appeal
Judgement, para. 375; Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 1038; Blagojevi} and Joki} Appeal Judgement,
para. 339.
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wrongdoer’s participation.4859 In making this assessment, the Trial Chamber may consider the
number of victims and the effect of the crimes upon the targeted group.4860 The extent of the longterm physical, psychological and emotional suffering inflicted upon victims is always relevant to
sentencing.4861 The effects of the crime on relatives of the victims may also be considered.4862
Moreover, while there is no codified hierarchy, it is reasonable to conclude that some crimes are of
a more grievous nature than others.4863 Because of their inherently discriminatory character, crimes
of genocide and targeted persecutions may thus warrant enhanced scrutiny.4864
1800. The gravity of a crime under Article 7(3) is assessed with reference to two factors: (i) the
gravity of the crimes committed by the convicted person’s subordinate; and (ii) the gravity of the
convicted person’s own conduct in failing to prevent or punish these underlying offences.4865 The
gravity of the subordinate’s underlying crimes is dependent upon the scale and brutality of the
offences, the vulnerability of the victims, and the impact of the crime upon the immediate victims
and their relatives.4866 The gravity of the superior’s conduct is dependent upon the gravity of the
underlying crimes of the subordinate.4867
1801. Other factors that have been determined to potentially aggravate the severity of a crime
include the victims’ vulnerability,4868 the length of time during which the crime continued,4869 as
well as premeditation and motive.4870 Further, under Article 7 (1) of the Statute, the Trial Chamber
may find that direct responsibility is enhanced by a perpetrator’s position of authority.4871 It is
important to note, however, that because the existence and use of authority is an element of criminal
liability under Article 7(3), it cannot double as an aggravating circumstance for this form of
4859
4860
4861
4862
4863
4864
4865
4866
4867
4868
4869
4870
4871
Gali} Appeal Judgement, para. 442; Bla{ki} Appeal Judgement, para. 683; Mrk{i} and [ljivan~anin Appeal
Judgement, para. 375; Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 1038; Blagojevi} and Joki} Appeal Judgement,
para. 139; ^elebi}i Appeal Judgement, para. 731.
Erdemović Appeal Judgement, para. 15; Galić Appeal Judgement, para. 410.
Krajišnik Appeal Judgement, para. 779; Mrk{i} and [ljivan~anin Appeal Judgement, para. 409; D. Milo{evi}
Appeal Judgement, para. 323.
Blaškic Appeal Judgement, para. 683.
Blagojevi} and Joki} Appeal Judgement, para. 138 Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 1060.
Blagojevi} and Joki} Appeal Judgement, para. 139.
^elebi}i Appeal Judgement, paras 732, 741.
Ori} Trial Judgement, para. 729; Deli} Trial Judgement, para. 563.
^elebi}i Appeal Judgement, paras 732, 741.
Bla{ki} Appeal Judgement, para. 686 (citing Kunarac et al. Trial Judgement, para. 867); Kuanarac et al. Appeal
Judgement, para. 352; Deronji} Sentencing Appeal Judgement, para. 127; Krajišnik Appeal Judgement,
para. 779.
Bla{ki} Appeal Judgement, para. 686 (citing Kunarac et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 356).
Bla{ki} Appeal Judgement, para. 686 (citing Krsti} Trial Judgement, paras 711-712).
Aleksovski Appeal Judgement, para. 183; ^elebi}i Appeal Judgement, para. 745; Kupre{ki} et al. Appeal
Judgement, para. 451; Blaškic Appeal Judgement, paras 90-91; Naletili} and Martinovi} Appeal Judgement,
para. 613; Had`ihasanovi} and Kubura Appeal Judgement, para. 320; Strugar Appeal Judgement, para. 353; D.
Milo{evi} Appeal Judgement, para. 302.
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liability.4872 Yet, the abuse of a position of authority may still be taken in consideration as an
aggravating circumstance for Article 7(3) liability.4873
1802. Mitigating circumstances need only be proven on a balance of probabilities, and need not be
related to the offence.4874 It is generally within the discretion of the Trial Chamber to determine
whether or not a factor will be accepted as a mitigating circumstance, and what weight the factor
should be granted. Examples of factors that may be accepted as mitigating circumstances include
post-conflict conduct of the defendant which promoted peace and reconciliation in the former
Yugoslavia,4875 substantial and qualitative cooperation with the Prosecution,4876 voluntary
surrender,4877 good character4878 and compliance with conditions of provisional release.4879 The
absence of a mitigating factor can never serve as an aggravating factor.4880
3. General Sentencing Practice in the Former Yugoslavia
1803. Under Article 24(1) of the Statute, the Trial Chamber shall have “recourse to the general
practice regarding prison sentences in the courts of the former Yugoslavia”.4881 It is well
established, however, that the Trial Chamber is not required to conform to that practice.4882 The
Tribunal has discretion to diverge from the sentencing practices of the former Yugoslavia,
particularly where they would be inadequate in light of international law.4883
1804. While Article 24(1) of the Statute and Rule 101(B)(iii) of the Rules refer to case law from
the courts of the former Yugoslavia, the jurisprudence of the Tribunal has established that statutory
provisions in force in the former Yugoslavia at the time of the commission of the crimes should also
4872
4873
4874
4875
4876
4877
4878
4879
4880
4881
4882
4883
Had`ihasanovi} and Kubura Appeal Judgement, para. 320; ^elebi}i Appeal Judgement, para. 732; Deronji}
Sentencing Appeal Judgement, para. 106.
^elebi}i Appeal Judgement, para. 735; Babi} Sentencing Appeal Judgement, para. 80; Had`ihasanovi} and
Kubura Appeal Judgement, para. 320; Blagojevi} and Joki} Appeal Judgement, para. 324.
Babi} Sentencing Appeal Judgement, para. 43; ^elebi}i Appeal Judgement, para. 590; Blagojevi} and Joki}
Appeal Judgement, para. 328.
Blagojevi} and Joki} Appeal Judgement, paras 328, 330; Babić Sentencing Appeal Judgement, paras 43,,55-61;
M. Joki} Sentencing Appeal Judgement, para. 54.
Rule 101(B)(ii) of the Rules; D. Nikolić Sentencing Appeal Judgement, para. 66; Babi} Sentencing Appeal
Judgement, para. 43; Bralo Sentencing Appeal Judgement, paras 51-52.
Blagojevi} and Joki} Appeal Judgement, para. 344; Babić Sentencing Appeal Judgement, paras 43, 74.
Blagojevi} and Joki} Appeal Judgement, para. 342; Babić Sentencing Appeal Judgement, para. 43.
Babi} Sentencing Appeal Judgement, para. 43.
Bla{ki} Appeal Judgement, para. 687.
Article 21(4) of the Statute.
Tadić Sentencing Appeal Judgement, para. 21; Čelebići Appeal Judgement, paras 813, 816, 820; Jelisić Appeal
Judgement, para. 117; Kupreškić et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 418; Kunarac et al. Appeal Judgement,
paras 347-349; Krstić Appeal Judgement, para. 260; Blaškić Appeal Judgement, paras 681-682; Kordić and
Čerkez Appeal Judgement, para. 1085; D. Nikoli} Sentencing Appeal Judgement, paras 17, 69; M. Joki}
Sentencing Appeal Judgement, para. 38; Galić Appeal Judgement, para. 398; Hadžihasanović and Kubura
Appeal Judgement, paras 335, 346; Krajišnik Appeal Judgement, paras 749, 811; Boškoski and Tarčulovski
Appeal Judgement, para. 212.
Kunarac et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 377.
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be consulted.4884 At the time of their alleged commission, offences of the kind at issue in the present
case were regulated by the Criminal Code of the FRY, which had been in force since 1 July
1977.4885
1805. Article 142(1) of the FRY Criminal Code, entitled “War Crimes against the Civilian
Population”, provided as follows:
Whoever, in violation of international law in time of war, armed conflict or occupation,
orders an attack on the civilian population, settlement, individual civilians or persons
hors de combat, which results in death or serious injury to body or health; indiscriminate
attack affecting civilian population; the killing, torture or inhumane treatment of the
civilian population […] causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health;
unlawful deportation, transfers; use of measures of intimidation and terror […] or
whoever commits any of the aforementioned offences, shall be punished by no less than
five years in prison, or by the death penalty.4886
1806. Article 38(1) and (2) of the FRY Criminal Code provided that no sentence of imprisonment
could exceed 15 years, but that a 20-year term could be imposed for criminal offences otherwise
punishable by the death penalty.4887
4. Credit for Time Served in Custody
1807. In accordance with Rule 101(C) of the Rules, credit shall be given to the convicted person
for the period during which they were detained pending surrender to the Tribunal or pending trial.
Momčilo Peri{i} has been detained since his voluntary surrender and transfer to the seat of the
Tribunal on 7 March 2005, although he was provisionally released on a number of occasions.
B. Determination of the Sentence
1. Submissions of the Parties
1808. The Prosecution recommends that Peri{i} be sentenced to life imprisonment.4888 In support
for its position, it notably emphasises the gravity of the crimes perpetrated in Sarajevo, Zagreb and
Srebrenica.4889 It submits that the number of civilian victims across the three crime bases is in the
4884
4885
4886
4887
4888
4889
D. Nikoli} Sentencing Appeal Judgement, para. 85.
The Criminal Code of the SFRY was adopted by the SFRY Federal Assembly on 28 September 1976. After the
dissolution of the SFRY in 1992 the Code remained in force, with some modifications, and was renamed the
Criminal Code of the FRY. The Criminal Code of the FRY was renamed the Basic Criminal Code of Serbia in
2003.
Criminal Code of the FRY, Article 142(1).
Criminal Code of the FRY, Articles 38(1)-(2).
Prosecution Final Brief, para. 856.
Prosecution Final Brief, para. 838.
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thousands, that the victims were vulnerable, and that they included women, children and the
elderly.4890
1809. The Prosecution stresses that the attacks in Sarajevo lasted for years, were indiscriminate in
nature, and led the city’s inhabitants to live in fear.4891 It states that defenseless Zagreb inhabitants
were attacked with rockets.4892 It further emphasizes that “thousands of Bosnian Muslim men and
boys were summarily executed” in Srebrenica, while “[t]ens of thousands of Srebrenica inhabitants
were terrorised, forced onto buses, forcibly removed from their homes and torn from their
families”.4893
1810. The Prosecution submits that Perišić had an extensive role in the crimes, and that his
responsibility is heightened by his post as the most senior VJ officer.4894 In its view, Perišić abused
his authority to engage in criminal behaviour instead of upholding standards of international
humanitarian law.4895
1811. Finally, the Prosecution posits that Perišić’s cooperation with the Prosecution was not
substantial, and that Perišić was not truthful in his pre-indictment interview.4896
1812. In relation to Perišić’s family circumstances and character, the Defence submits that he has a
wife, two sons and four grandchildren.4897 He is “a highly professional person, a good and honest
man”4898 and received high evaluations during his military career.4899 Perišić’s actions as Chief of
the VJ General Staff “were directed to achieve peace in the region generally, to maintain stability in
and protect the borders of FRY, and to prevent the spread of war into FRY”.4900 In its view, Perišić
and the FRY political leadership “consistently supported the peace initiatives of the international
community and insisted that the conflicts in BiH and Croatia should be resolved peacefully and by
political means”.4901 It emphasises Perišić’s role in the release of the French pilots captured by the
VRS.4902 The Defence further submits that Perišić ensured that several hundred ABiH soldiers were
4890
4891
4892
4893
4894
4895
4896
4897
4898
4899
4900
4901
4902
Prosecution Final Brief, para. 840.
Prosecution Final Brief, paras 840, 847.
Prosecution Final Brief, para. 840.
Prosecution Final Brief, para. 840.
Prosecution Final Brief, paras 842, 845.
Prosecution Final Brief, paras 846, 848.
Prosecution Final Brief, para. 852.
Defence Final Brief, para. 1145.
Defence Final Brief, para. 1149, citing Ex. D316, Statement of Zoran Živković, 3 December 2009.
Defence Final Brief, para. 1146.
Defence Final Brief, para. 1150.
Defence Final Brief, para. 1152.
Defence Final Brief, para. 1158.
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cared for and accommodated after they swam across the Drina River into FRY territory in July
1995 around the time of the Srebrenica events.4903
1813. The Defence additionally mentions Perišić’s post-conflict behaviour, including his support
for peace and for democratic forces in the FRY, as well as his opposition to Slobodan Milošević’s
regime, in particular between 1998 and 2000.4904 Perišić was a founding member of the opposition
party named Movement for a Democratic Serbia.4905 Moreover, the Defence submits that Peri{i}
participated in the preparation and adoption of the FRY’s Law on Cooperation with the ICTY, and
was among the persons involved in drafting and signing the decision to transfer Milošević into the
Tribunal’s custody.4906
1814. Finally, the Defence notes that Peri{i} cooperated with the OTP, voluntarily surrendered
into the Tribunal’s custody once indicted, and conducted himself appropriately and professionally
throughout court proceedings.4907
2. Findings of the Trial Chamber
(a) Gravity of the Crimes and the Role of the Accused
(i) Sarajevo
1815. The Trial Chamber has found, Judge Moloto dissenting, that Peri{i} aided and abetted the
campaign of sniping and shelling that took place during the siege of Sarajevo.
1816. It would be difficult to overstate the magnitude of the crimes perpetrated in Sarajevo. The
siege lasted for nearly four years during which Sarajevo civilians endured conditions of terror due
to the indiscriminate nature of the attacks.4908 Thousands of men, women and children were killed,
and tens of thousands injured.4909 In particular, Sarajevo civilians were regularly shelled and sniped
in the course of Perišić’s tenure as Chief of the VJ General Staff, a lengthy time span.4910
4903
4904
4905
4906
4907
4908
4909
4910
Defence Final Brief, para. 1155, citing Siniša Borović, T. 14003.
Defence Final Brief, paras 1162-1171.
Defence Final Brief, para. 1168, citing Ex. D373, Memo from the Movement for a Democratic Serbia (undated).
Defence Final Brief, para. 1172, citing Ex. D316, Statement of Zoran Živković, 3 December 2009.
Defence Final Brief, paras 1173-1175.
Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts III, 82-83.
Ex. P137, Witness Statement of General John Wilson, 5 June 1995 and 19 December 2002, para. 53; Ex. P2331,
Expert Report of Ewa Tabeau, Death Toll in the Siege of Sarajevo, April 1992 to December 1995: A Study of
Mortality Based on Eight Large Data Sources, 18 August 2003, p. 9; Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts I, 154-155;
Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts III, 11.
Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts I, 132, 149.
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1817. The victims of these shelling and sniping attacks were especially vulnerable. The people of
Sarajevo could hardly find refuge. Civilians were targeted in their homes, at places of worship, in
hospitals and schools.4911 Women, children, and the elderly were not spared.4912
(ii) Zagreb
1818. The Trial Chamber has held, Judge Moloto dissenting, that Peri{i} bears individual criminal
responsibility for failing to punish his subordinates for the shelling of Zagreb.
1819. The shelling of Zagreb was executed with callous disregard for civilian life. On multiple
occasions, the SVK fired Orkan rockets into the centre of Zagreb, unleashing powerful, unguided
explosives into a densely populated urban area.4913 These indiscriminate attacks struck several
civilian areas and notably a children’s hospital.4914 They resulted in injuries to over 200 civilians
and 7 deaths.4915 The victims were especially vulnerable.
(iii) Srebrenica
1820. The Trial Chamber, has determined, Judge Moloto dissenting, that Peri{i} aided and abetted
crimes perpetrated in Srebrenica.
1821. The Srebrenica tragedy stands as one of the darkest chapters in European history since
World War Two. While the Srebrenica enclave was designated as a safe area, the VRS fiercely
attacked civilians,4916 as it had previously done in Sarajevo. The VRS’s victims were, again,
numerous4917 and defenceless.4918 The Srebrenica atrocities shattered families and left behind
countless broken homes.
4911
4912
4913
4914
4915
4916
4917
Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts I 138; Mesud Jusufovi}, T. 3237; Ex. P520, Transcript of Mesud Jusufovi} from
Prosecutor v. Stanislav Gali}, T. 6532; Ex. P521, List of High Profile Facilities Set on Fire by Shelling During
the War; Ex. P125, Witness Statement of Anña Gotovac, 17 May 2006, para. 6 (the apartment building of
Gotovac’s brother-in-law Trg Heroja was destroyed and burned by shelling in 1992); Ex. P37, Witness
Statement of Enes Ja{arevi}, 10 March 1997, para. 3 (stating that in September 1993, a Serbian tank positioned
in Gavrica Brdo fired a shell into his apartment, killing his 11-year-old son); Ex. P57, Witness Statement of
Ramiz Hod`i}, 22 November 1995, p. 3; Ex. P61, Witness Statement of Ðula Leka, 25 February 1996, para. 1.
Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts I, 154, 176.
Zagreb Adjudicated Facts, 8, 39.
Zagreb Adjudicated Fact 39. See Ex. P290, Photograph Album of 3 May 1995 Rocket Attack, Žitnjak-Martinci
Village, Zagreb; Ex. P302, Map of Zagreb Centre; Ex. P297, Photograph Album of 3 May 1995 Rocket Attack,
Zagreb Paediatric Hospital; Ex. P303, Site Documentation and Maps of the Rocket Attacks on the City of
Zagreb on 2 and 3 May 1995; Ex. P307, Report of the Zagreb Police Administration, 17 May 1995.
Zagreb Adjudicated Facts, 9, 38, 57, 58.
MP-443, T. 8877; Ex. P2651-P2655, Expert Report of William Haglund on Forensic Investigation of the Cerska
Grave Site, Volumes I-V, 15 June 1998; Ex. P2646, Expert Report of William Haglund on Forensic
Investigation of the Lazete 2 Grave Site, Volume I, 15 June 1998, pp vii-ix; Dra`en Erdemovi}, T. 7968.
Helge Brunborg, T. 2545, 2562-2564. See also Ex. P409, Report by Helge Brunborg, Ewa Tabeau and Arve
Hetland, 16 November 2005, p. 6.
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1822. However, the Majority recalls the Trial Chamber’s finding that Perišić is not culpable for the
crime of extermination because it was not foreseeable to him that this crime would occur in
Srebrenica. For the same reason, the Majority finds that the fact that “thousands of Bosnian Muslim
men and boys were summarily executed” in Srebrenica, as submitted by the Prosecution,4919 cannot
be considered for sentencing purposes.
(iv) Aggravating Circumstances
1823. The Majority finds, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Peri{i}’s high rank in the VJ and the
lengthy time span over which the crimes were committed are aggravating overall. In particular, the
Majority recalls that the Accused was in charge of the highest professional and staff organ for the
preparation and use of the VJ in times of war and peace.4920
1824. The Majority emphasises the death of numerous victims and the long-term physical,
psychological and emotional suffering inflicted on survivors, as well as victims’ relatives and loved
ones.4921 The Trial Chamber recalls that the vulnerability of the victims was taken into
consideration in evaluating the gravity of the offences.
1825. With regard to the conviction under Article 7(1), it further takes note of Peri{i}’s military
rank and experience,4922 and of the fact that Perišić wrongfully exercised his authority to aid and
abet grave crimes perpetrated by the VRS.
1826. Finally, the Majority considers that Perišić showed callous disregard for the VRS’s
atrocities. It notably recalls that, while Peri{i} was aware that crimes were being committed in
Srebrenica as early as 13 July 1995, he met with Mladi} and Gvero nearby Han Pijesak on 18 July
1995 in a pic-nic area and that there was a “lot of joking around at lunch”. Perišić continued
approving logistical assistance to the VRS for months after learning of the enormous and monstrous
massacre at Srebrenica. The Majority also recalls that, long after the atrocities of Srebrenica were
uncovered, Peri{i} maintained a close relationship with Mladi}. In 1997 and 1998, Mladi} resided
over long periods of time at VJ facilities in Rajac and Stragari and the Accused visited him on
several occasions, as well as the fact that in 1997 Peri{i} attended the wedding of Mladi}’s son.
4918
4919
4920
4921
4922
Dra`en Erdemovi}, T. 7966; Ex. P2662, Expert Report of Christopher Lawrence on Autopsies of Human
Remains from the Dam Site June 1998, Annex EE, pp 2994, 3012. See MP-294, T. 9060-9061; Srebrenica
Agreed Fact 19 (Schedule D3.6); Srebrenica Agreed Fact 20 (Schedule D3.7).
Prosecution Final Brief, para. 840.
See Ex. P197, Law on the VJ, 18 May 1994, Article 5.
Blaškic Appeal Judgement, para. 683.
Aleksovski Appeal Judgement, para. 183; ^elebi}i Appeal Judgement, para. 745; Kupre{ki} et al. Appeal
Judgement, para. 451; Blaškic Appeal Judgement, paras 90-91; Naletili} and Martinovi} Appeal Judgement,
para. 613; Had`ihasanovi} and Kubura Appeal Judgement, para. 320; Strugar Appeal Judgement, para. 353; D.
Milo{evi} Appeal Judgement, para. 302.
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3. Mitigating Circumstances
1827. The Majority has taken note of Momčilo Peri{i}’s relative cooperation with the Office of the
Prosecutor and good conduct during the course of the proceedings. It considers these facts to be
mitigating circumstances, albeit of limited weight.
1828. The Majority has also taken into consideration the fact that Peri{i} voluntarily surrendered
to the Tribunal’s custody without delay and finds this to be a mitigating circumstance.
1829. The Majority has considered the Defence’s argument that Perišić worked towards peace
during the Bosnian war,4923 although it recalls that Perišić recurrently encouraged the SDC to
continue approving assistance to the VRS so it could continue to wage war; and that Perišić
oversaw the provision of this support. The Majority finds that Perišić did not genuinely work
towards peace, and that the Defence’s claim cannot reasonably serve as a mitigating circumstance
for sentencing purposes.
1830. The Majority recalls Perišić’s involvement in the release of the French pilots held hostage
by the VRS. The Majority finds that it is a mitigating circumstance, though of limited weight. It
would be unreasonable to conclude that Perišić’s involvement was simply motivated by altruism for
the pilots’ fates as opposed to the FRY’s military and political interest in easing its conflict with
NATO.
1831. The Defence solely cites Sini{a Borovi} for its proposition that Perišić ensured that ABiH
soldiers were accommodated after they swam across the Drina River in July 1995.4924 The Majority
recalls that Borović was Perišić’s Chef de Cabinet during the war and generally lacked credibility as
a witness. The Majority nonetheless does not dispute Borović in his assertion that Perišić’s position
was that the ABiH soldiers “be accommodated at reception centres, that they should be registered,
and after talking about this with President Milošević, that they should then be handed over to the
Ministry of the Interior who would go on securing them”.4925 However, the Majority finds this fact
to lack weight as a mitigating circumstance for sentencing because Perišić had himself helped
precipitate this situation due to his support to the VRS. This circumstance’s limited mitigating
weight is also attributable to the absence of additional details and corroboration.
1832. The Majority has considered Peri{i}’s post-conflict behaviour in promoting peace and
democratic reforms in the former Yugoslavia. It finds it to be a mitigating circumstance.
4923
4924
4925
Defence Final Brief, paras 1150, 1152-1161.
Defence Final Brief, para. 1155, citing Siniša Borović, T. 14003.
Siniša Borović, T. 14003.
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1833. The Majority notes that Perišić has a wife, two sons and four grandchildren. The Majority
acknowledges that Perišić’s imprisonment may cause hardship on his family, and considers it to be
a mitigating factor, albeit of limited weight.
1834. Finally, the Majority considers that Perišić’s age and the low probability that he will commit
another crime in the future are mitigating circumstances for sentencing purposes.
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XI. DISPOSITION
1835. For the foregoing reasons, having considered all of the evidence and the parties’
submissions, it is decided as follows.
1836. The Trial Chamber unanimously finds MOMČILO PERIŠIĆ NOT GUILTY and
therefore ACQUITS him of the following count:
•
Count 13:
Extermination as a crime against humanity pursuant to Articles 7(1) and 7(3)
of the Statute.
1837. The Trial Chamber unanimously finds MOMČILO PERIŠIĆ NOT GUILTY as a superior
under Article 7(3) of the Statute for failing to prevent and/or punish his alleged subordinates in
relation to the following counts:
•
Count 1:
Murder as a crime against humanity;
•
Count 2:
Murder as a violation of the laws or customs of war;
•
Count 3:
Inhumane Acts (injuring and wounding civilians) as a crime against
humanity;
•
Count 4:
Attacks on Civilians as a violation of the laws or customs of war;
•
Count 9:
Murder as a crime against humanity;
•
Count 10:
Murder as a violation of the laws or customs of war;
•
Count 11:
Inhumane Acts (inflicting serious injuries, wounding, forcible transfer) as a
crime against humanity;
•
Count 12:
Persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds as a crime against
humanity.
1838. The Trial Chamber finds by majority, Judge Moloto dissenting, MOMČILO PERIŠIĆ
GUILTY as an aider and abettor, under Article 7(1) of the Statute, of the following counts:
•
Count 1:
Murder as a crime against humanity;
•
Count 2:
Murder as a violation of the laws or customs of war;
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•
Count 3:
Inhumane Acts (injuring and wounding civilians) as a crime against
humanity;
•
Count 4:
Attacks on Civilians as a violation of the laws or customs of war;
•
Count 9:
Murder as a crime against humanity;
•
Count 10:
Murder as a violation of the laws or customs of war;
•
Count 11:
Inhumane Acts (inflicting serious injuries, wounding, forcible transfer) as a
crime against humanity;
•
Count 12:
Persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds as a crime against
humanity.
1839. The Trial Chamber finds by majority, Judge Moloto dissenting, MOMČILO PERIŠIĆ
GUILTY as a superior, under Article 7(3) of the Statute, for failing to punish his subordinates, of
the following counts:
•
Count 5:
Murder as a crime against humanity;
•
Count 6:
Murder as a violation of the laws or customs of war;
•
Count 7:
Inhumane Acts (injuring and wounding civilians) as a crime against
humanity;
•
Count 8:
Attacks on Civilians as a violation of the laws or customs of war.
1840. The Trial Chamber by majority, Judge Moloto dissenting, hereby sentences Momčilo Perišić
to a single sentence of 27 years of imprisonment. Momčilo Perišić has been in custody for 1,078
days. Pursuant to Rule 101(C) of the Rules, he is entitled to credit for the period of time he has been
in custody towards service of the sentence imposed.
1841. Pursuant to Rule 103(C) of the Rules, Momčilo Perišić shall remain in the custody of the
Tribunal pending the finalisation of arrangements for his transfer to the state where he shall serve
his sentence.
572
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Done in English and French, the English text being authoritative.
Dated this sixth day of September 2011
At the Hague
The Netherlands
_________________________
Judge Bakone Justice Moloto
Presiding
_________________________
_________________________
Judge Pedro David
Judge Michèle Picard
Judge Moloto appends a Dissenting Opinion.
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XII. DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE MOLOTO ON COUNTS 1 TO 4
AND 9 TO 12
1.
I respectfully dissent from the Majority’s finding as to Momčilo Peri{i}’s individual
criminal responsibility pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Statute in relation to Counts 1 to 4 and Counts
9 to 12 of the Indictment.
A. Introductory Remarks
2.
The Majority’s conclusion that the objective element of aiding and abetting has been met in
this case is premised on two findings: (1) that the VRS heavily depended on the VJ for logistical
and personnel support; and (2) that the crimes were inextricably linked with the strategy of the
Bosnian Serb leadership.
1. VRS Dependence on VJ Logistical and Personnel Support
3.
In my view, providing assistance to the VRS to wage war cannot and should not be equated
with aiding and abetting the crimes committed during such war. The provision of assistance by
Peri{i} to the VRS is too remote from the crimes committed during the war to qualify as aiding and
abetting such crimes. To conclude otherwise, as the Majority has done, is to criminalise the waging
of war, which is not a crime according to the Statute of the Tribunal. In addition, it raises the
question: where is the cut-off line? For instance, would a manufacturer of weapons who supplies an
army with weapons which are then used to commit crimes during a war also be criminally
responsible? In this respect, I note that it is immaterial whether the arms are provided for cash or
free of charge. It is noteworthy that, notwithstanding numerous opportunities to do so, no superior
has been charged before the Tribunal with aiding and abetting the crimes of his soldiers merely for
the reason that he supplied them with arms, sent them to war and they committed crimes. Unlike
this example, Peri{i} was not supplying his soldiers, but soldiers of another army, thus placing him
in a more remote position in relation to the crimes. Aiding and abetting has always been charged
where the conduct of the accused is proximate to the crime committed by the principal perpetrator.
Therefore, if a superior who supplies his soldiers is not charged, Peri{i}, who supplied a different
army, should not be charged.
4.
While there is no doubt in my mind that the VRS was, to a large degree, dependent upon the
VJ to function as an army, I respectfully submit that it is inappropriate to infer ipso facto on the
notion of dependence that Peri{i}’s assistance had a substantial effect on the commission of crimes.
It is noteworthy that the trial record established that the dependence of the VRS on the VJ was not
absolute.
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2. Crimes Linked to the Strategy of the Bosnian Serb Leadership
5.
States provide military and technical assistance to one another with varying strategic
objectives in a number of regions around the world. However, this does not render the leaders of the
assisting states individually criminally responsible for aiding and abetting the crimes committed
during such wars, simply because they provided the aid. It is required that to be held individually
criminal responsible, they must be shown to have committed or aided and abetted the commission
of some crimes during the war, an act which is distinct, and apart, from the mere provision of
military assistance. By holding Peri{i} criminally liable for aiding and abetting the crimes charged
in the Indictment based on his knowledge of the strategic objectives of the Bosnian Serb leadership,
the Majority conflates aiding and abetting with joint criminal enterprise (“JCE”), and moreover, is
criminalising the waging of war which is not a crime under the Statute.
6.
Peri{i} is not charged with waging an illegal or criminal war. Neither is he charged with
participation in a JCE.1 He is charged with aiding and abetting the crimes that were committed
during the war and not for the war itself; therefore his conduct must be judged in relation to the
commission of those crimes and not in relation to the waging of war or the dependence of the VRS
as an army on the VJ.
7.
For the above reasons, I am of the view that Peri{i} is not individually criminally
responsible for the crimes committed in Sarajevo and Srebrenica during the Indictment period. I
cannot agree with the Majority’s finding that the logistical and personnel assistance provided by
Peri{i}, both individually and cumulatively, had a substantial effect on the crimes perpetrated by the
VRS in Sarajevo and Srebrenica. However, I deal in more detail with the findings of the Majority
hereunder in addition, and in the alternative, to the above. Finally, I also cannot agree with the
Majority’s finding that Peri{i} had knowledge of the crimes which occurred in Sarajevo and
Srebrenica from the sources of information tendered into evidence.
B. Actus Reus
1. Preliminary Remarks on the Requisite Objective Element of Aiding and Abetting
8.
The notion of “aiding and abetting” has been defined as an act specifically directed at
providing practical assistance, encouragement or moral support to the principal perpetrator of the
1
Had the Prosecution desired to establish that the purpose of the war was criminal, it should have done so in the
Indictment by alleging, for instance, the existence of a JCE, which indeed requires participation in a common
plan or a shared criminal goal, Kraji{nik Appeal Judgment, para. 706; Br|anin Appeal Judgement, para. 430. See
Kvo~ka et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 96; Vasiljevi} Appeal Judgement, para. 100; Tadi} Appeal Judgement,
para. 227.
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crime, which had a substantial effect on the perpetration of the crime.2 I underscore that this
definition was first articulated by the Appeals Chamber in the course of drawing a distinction
between a case of aiding and abetting and one of JCE.3 This is an important point which cannot go
unnoticed in light of the Majority’s reliance upon the Bosnian Serb leadership’s strategic objectives
to support a finding that the objective element for aiding and abetting has been met. I emphasise
that the jurisprudence of this Tribunal has clearly established that in the case of aiding and abetting,
proof is not required of the existence or pre-existence of a common concerted plan as compared to
the case of acting in pursuance of a JCE where “it is sufficient for the participant to perform acts
that in some way are directed to the furthering of the common plan or purpose”.4
9.
I respectfully disagree with the Majority’s conclusion that “the acts of the aider and abettor
need not have been ‘specifically directed’ to assist the crimes”,5 and stress that the notion of
“specific direction” has been consistently cited by this Tribunal in the definition of aiding and
abetting.6 Although the Appeals Chamber in Blagojevi} held that “specific direction” has not been
an essential element of the actus reus of aiding and abetting,7 it clarified that the definition in Tadi}
had not been departed from and that whether an act is specifically directed at the commission of the
crimes “will often be implicit in the finding that the accused has provided practical assistance to the
principal perpetrator which had a substantial effect on the commission of the crime”.8 I interpret the
Appeals Chamber in Blagojevi} to say that there is no additional requirement in the notion of aiding
and abetting beyond the requirement that the assistance given to the principal perpetrator had a
substantial effect on the crimes.
10.
However, if the notion of “specific direction” is in fact implicit in finding that an accused
has provided practical assistance to the principal perpetrator which had a substantial effect on the
commission of the crime, I cannot but conclude that to reach this finding, a direct link needs to be
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Tadi} Appeal Judgement, 229; Vasiljevi} Appeal Judgement, para. 102(i); Blagojevi} and Joki} Appeal
Judgement, para. 127; Bla{ki} Appeal Judgement, para. 45; Simi} Appeal Judgement, para. 85. See Ori} Appeal
Judgement, para. 43. See also Seromba Appeal Judgement, para. 44; Ntagerura et al. Appeal Judgement, para.
370; Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 482. But see Blagojevi} and Joki} Appeal Judgement, para. 188
(quoting Furundžija Trial Judgement, para. 249). While the Appeals Chamber in Mrk{i} found specific direction
not to be an essential ingredient, I note that it still included the notion of direction in distinguishing the actus
reus from the mens rea of aiding and abetting, but see Mrk{i} and Šlivančanin Appeal Judgement, para. 159.
Tadi} Appeal Judgment, para. 229.
Tadi} Appeal Judgement, para. 229 (emphasis added); Vasiljevi} Appeal Judgement, para. 102.
See supra para. 1624.
Va{ilijevi} Appeal Judgement, para. 102(i); Blagojevi} and Joki} Appeal Judgement, para. 127; Bla{ki} Appeal
Judgement, para. 45; Simi} Appeal Judgement, para. 85. See Ori} Appeal Judgement, para. 43. See also Seromba
Appeal Judgement, para. 44; Ntagerura et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 370; Nahimana Appeal Judgement, para.
482.
Blagojevi} and Joki} Appeal Judgement, para. 189. See also Mrkši} and Šlivančanin Appeal Judgement, para.
159.
Blagojevi} and Joki} Appeal Judgement, para. 189 (emphasis added).
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established between the conduct of the aider and abettor and the commission of the crimes.9 Against
this backdrop, I draw a distinction between aiding and abetting in the present case and cases which
have previously been decided by the Appeals Chamber, where the aider and abettor was either at, or
proximate to, the crime scene. I contend that in cases of remoteness, the notion of specific direction
must form an integral and explicit component of the objective element of aiding and abetting.
11.
Thus, if the Appeals Chamber in Blagojevi} is correct that such a finding is indeed implicit
in cases such as this one, I contend that the salient question is then whether the Prosecution was
able to bring sufficient evidence, either direct or circumstantial, showing the existence of such a
link. This is consistent with the fact that aiding and abetting is in itself a form of commission
pursuant to Article 7(1). I contend that this link, as will be discussed in greater detail, cannot be
established based on: (1) the dependence of the VRS on the VJ; or (2) the fact that systematic
criminal acts were perpetrated against Bosnian Muslim civilians as part of the Bosnian Serb
leadership’s strategic objectives. I am of the view that the jurisprudence is clear that the objectives
have no place in an analysis under aiding and abetting. It follows, therefore, that the notion of
dependence alone cannot lead to the only reasonable conclusion that the objective element of aiding
and abetting has been met in the case before us.
12.
In the present case, the only direct evidence brought by the Prosecution on the existence of
such a link clearly shows that the assistance provided by Peri{i} did not have a substantial effect on
the crimes. I am referring to what was found at the scene of the crimes concerning Srebrenica.
Prosecution witness Garry Selsky testified that of 3,644 bullet casings found in Srebrenica, only
378 bullet casings that were manufactured by the Prvi Partizan depot in U`ice, Serbia could be
clearly attributed to the assistance provided by the FRY.10 I am respectfully of the view that the
finding that only 10% of the bullets found could be attributed to the assistance from the FRY cannot
lead to the only reasonable conclusion that such assistance had a substantial effect on the crimes.
Moreover, the evidence shows that this number included not only assistance potentially from the
VJ, but also logistics given by “special purpose industries”, which I recall were state-owned and
legally subordinated to the FRY MOD and not the VJ.11 Furthermore, the Prosecution was unable to
demonstrate that any of the bullets could be specifically attributed to the assistance provided by
Peri{i}. There was evidence of assistance provided by VJ officers without Peri{i}’s approval and
also evidence of unauthorised smuggling of VJ materials. I further note the finding that the trial
9
10
11
See Ndindabahizi Appeal Judgement, para. 117.
Ex. P1833, Declaration by the OTP Investigator, 25 October 2007; Ex. P2892, 92bis Declaration and Statement
of Garry Selsky, 24 January 2010; Garry Selsky, T. 9771, 9789-9798.
See supra para. 1172.
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record does not establish that the particular shells used in Scheduled Incidents A7 and A9 in
Sarajevo were provided to the VRS by Peri{i}.12
13.
Lacking direct evidence, this case is therefore based on circumstantial evidence. I recall that
where an inference is drawn from circumstantial evidence to establish a fact on which a conviction
relies, it must be the only reasonable inference that could be drawn from the evidence presented. I
am of the view that the Majority’s conclusion that Peri{i} contributed to the facilitation of the
commission of the crimes is not the only reasonable conclusion. An alternative reasonable
explanation is that the assistance provided by Peri{i} to the VRS was directed at supporting the war
effort and not to the commission of the crimes and that such assistance did not contribute
substantially to the commission of crimes.
14.
With that in mind, I cannot simply ignore that the notion of “specific direction” to the
commission of crimes continues to be expressly recited by the Appeals Chamber in the formulation
of the objective element of aiding and abetting.13 I contend that in cases such as this one, where the
assistance provided by an accused is remote, the notion of specific direction must form an explicit
part of the analysis of the objective element of aiding and abetting.
2. Logistical Assistance
15.
It is indisputable that the FRY and the VJ provided assistance to the VRS, part of which was
given to VRS units involved in the commission of crimes, namely to the Drina Corps, Krajina
Corps and Sarajevo-Romanija Corps. I, however, respectfully disagree with the conclusion of the
Majority that by recurrently urging the SDC to provide the VRS with extensive logistical and
technical assistance and by overseeing the process, Peri{i} provided practical assistance to the
crimes committed by the VRS.
16.
I acknowledge that the SDC authorised Peri{i}, who was not a member of the SDC, to
supply the VRS and the SVK with weapons and ammunition pursuant to an order by Zoran Lili}
dated 18 February 1994.14 At the same time, I also underline that the evidence in this case warrants
the conclusion that the ultimate decision-making authority on provision of assistance to the VRS
was retained de facto by the SDC, notwithstanding the order by Lili}. This is clear, for instance, in
the exhibit referring to a 6 December 1994 request of the RSK MOD for ammunition and land
mines, to which Peri{i} appended a handwritten note stating that the final decision was to be made
12
13
14
See supra paras 1293-1294.
Blagojevi} and Joki} Appeal Judgement, para. 189; Ori} Appeal Judgement, para. 43. See also Nahimana et al.
Appeal Judgement, para. 482; Seromba Appeal Judgement, para. 44; but see Mrk{i} and Šlivančanin Appeal
Judgement, para. 159.
Ex. P1009, Order of FRY President, 18 February 1994.
5
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by the SDC.15 I also refer to the evidence that Peri{i} participated in discussions and presented
proposals to the SDC, but that the SDC ultimately decided upon the type of assistance to provide.16
This conclusion is corroborated by a number of witnesses who testified that Peri{i} had a limited
role in the appropriation of logistical assistance to the VRS.17
17.
Against this backdrop, while I acknowledge that Peri{i} directly issued orders providing
assistance to the VRS and on numerous occasions urged the SDC to continue providing logistical
assistance to the VRS, no evidence was presented that such requests were specifically directed at
providing practical assistance to the perpetration of the crimes which occurred in Sarajevo and
Srebrenica. Rather, the evidence demonstrates that Peri{i}’s requests were made in the context of
supporting the war effort. In this regard, I note that the minutes of the SDC sessions show that not
even once was there a discussion among the participants linking the provision of logistical
assistance to the VRS to the commission of crimes.
18.
I also underline the fact that the evidence before the Trial Chamber does not establish that
the specific weapons used in committing the crimes which occurred in Sarajevo and Srebrenica
were provided “by a process overseen by Peri{i}”.18
19.
Furthermore, the Majority acknowledges that the evidence does not conclusively establish
that the VJ supplied the completed modified air-bombs to the VRS. I do not refute that the only
reasonable inference is that the VJ General Staff played a key role in devising the technical model
by which the VRS’s aerial bombs were successfully modified. I recall that the Majority’s
conclusion is premised on three findings: (i) the VRS’s initial technical model was unsuccessful;
(ii) the successful model was developed by Ivan Ðokić’s team in the VJ General Staff; and (iii)
Major Markovi}, a Pretis engineer who was on the VJ payroll, was responsible for modifying airbomb. I concur that it may be inferred that the production of modified air-bombs at the Pretis
factory in Bosnia for the VRS was based on the successful technical model developed by Ivan
Ðokić, then Chief of the VJ General Staff’s Aeronautical Administration.
20.
However, I am of the view that the Majority’s finding ignores the fact that no evidence was
presented that the technical model developed by Ðokić’s team was specifically directed at, or part
of, assisting the VRS to commit crimes at the time in which such assistance was provided by the
VJ. I also am mindful in this regard that Peri{i}, or Ðokić for that matter, could not have expected
15
16
17
18
See Ex. P1142, Letter from RSK MOD to Cabinet of the Chief of the VJ General Staff, 6 December 1994;
Radojica Kadijevi}, T. 13629. See also Ex. P1143, Response from the Cabinet of the Chief of the VJ General
Staff to Letter from RSK MOD, 7 December 1994.
See supra section VI.B.4.
Ibid.
See supra para. 1624.
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that such modified air-bombs would be used by the VRS to attack illegitimate targets. This was
assistance directed at waging the war.
21.
Even if one accepts the Majority’s characterisation of the role of Peri{i}, I recall that the
evidence in this case shows that the VRS also obtained, albeit to a lesser extent, logistical assistance
from a number of sources other than the VJ.19 In addition to the assistance provided by the VJ, I
recall that the VRS obtained fuel from other countries, purchased weaponry directly from FRY
military factories managed by the FRY MOD and military factories in RS, bought contraband from
VJ facilities, and received donations from the Serb diaspora, as well as unauthorised donations from
VJ personnel and local sponsors in RS.20 The VRS also had large reserves of arms and ammunition
left by the JNA in the wake of the break-up of the former Yugoslavia.21
3. Personnel Assistance
22.
The Majority also finds that the high-ranking VRS officers and other principal perpetrators
of the crimes, sustained through the 30th PC by Peri{i}, “[were] instrumental in helping the VRS
plan and carry out its operations in Sarajevo and Srebrenica”.22 I recall that the evidence in this case
shows that all but three individuals holding key positions in the VRS held those positions prior to
Peri{i}’s tenure. It follows that the contribution by Peri{i} regarding personnel assistance cannot be
considered as substantial within the meaning of aiding and abetting pursuant to Article 7(1).
23.
I acknowledge that salaries paid by the VJ and other benefits, such as housing, pensions and
medical insurance, provided to 30th PC members and their families were important to officers
serving in the 30th PC. However, it is worth recalling that members of the 30th PC continued serving
in the VRS when the payment of their salaries by the VJ was suspended for six months.23 Since the
cessation of payments did not cause high-ranking VRS officers and other principal perpetrators of
the crimes charged in Sarajevo and Srebrenica to leave their posts, it cannot be said that the only
reasonable inference is that the payment of salaries had a substantial effect on the crimes. Similarly,
the evidence demonstrates that the lack of verification of a promotion first acquired in the VRS did
not result in the loss of rank within the VRS or cause a particular officer to resign.24
19
20
21
22
23
24
See supra section VI.C.9.
Ibid.
See supra section VI.C.9.(c).
See supra para. 1623.
See supra para. 867.
See supra para. 852.
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4. Conclusions
24.
The Prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the logistical and personnel
assistance provided by Peri{i} was specifically directed at providing practical assistance to the
perpetration of the crimes and that it had a substantial effect on the perpetration of the crimes. In a
case where this finding is based on circumstantial evidence, such a finding must be the only
reasonable conclusion based on the evidence.
25.
By the foregoing analysis, I provided examples of how circumstantial evidence is
reasonably open to the conclusion that Peri{i} did not provide practical assistance to the
perpetrators of the crimes which had a substantial effect on the perpetration of the crimes. The
Majority fails to point to evidence from which a finding that Peri{i}’s practical assistance had a
substantial effect on the perpetration of the crimes in Sarajevo and Srebrenica may reasonably be
inferred, let alone which would establish it as the only reasonable conclusion.
26.
I concur with the Majority that “the legal standard does not require that Peri{i} be the
exclusive source of assistance”.25 While I also concur that evidence of materiel from other sources
does not raise a reasonable doubt that the FRY and/or the VJ was the primary source of weaponry
in this case, I respectfully cannot agree with the conclusion of the Majority that this does not raise a
reasonable doubt as to Peri{i}’s responsibility pursuant to Article 7(1).
27.
I note that the question is not whether the VRS substantially depended upon the VJ’s
support to function as an army, but rather, whether the support of Peri{i} had a substantial effect on
the perpetration of crimes. That is, dependence of an army as a whole, on a foreign army as a
whole, alone does not automatically lead to the only reasonable conclusion that such assistance
provided to that dependent army and distributed by that army to its subordinate units was
specifically directed at providing those officers in those units, being the principal perpetrators of the
crimes, with practical support which had a substantial effect on the perpetration of the crimes.
28.
Peri{i} provided logistical assistance to the VRS and the commanders in the VRS gave arms
and ammunition to their soldiers and sent them to the theatre of war. This step is in my view a
novus actus interviniens that places Peri{i} in a remote position in relation to the crimes committed.
At the same time, I am well aware that the jurisprudence of the Tribunal does not require a causeeffect relationship but rather a substantial effect on the commission of the crime.26
25
26
See supra para. 1601.
Bla{ki} Appeal Judgement, para. 48; Mrk{i} and [ljivan~anin Appeal Judgement, para. 198; Simi} Appeal
Judgement, para. 85.
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29.
Although the Majority is correct that it is not necessary to establish that the logistical
assistance provided by Peri{i} served as a conditio sine qua non to the commission of crimes, the
presence of these intervening factors breaking the chain of events raises a reasonable doubt as to
whether the logistical assistance provided by Peri{i}, in fact, had a substantial effect on the crimes
committed in Srebrenica and Sarajevo. I am therefore satisfied that the intervening factors present
in this case support an alternative inference which interrupts the natural flow of consequences from
the provision of logistical assistance provided by Peri{i} to the VRS.
30.
If the notion of direction is implicit in finding substantial assistance, I am of the view that a
linkage between the action and the crimes must exist and needs to be proved by the Prosecution
beyond a reasonable doubt. I find that based on the evidence in this case, there is no clear
connection between the assistance provided and the commission of crimes in Sarajevo and
Srebrenica. It is clear that Peri{i} supported the conflict as a whole, but there is no evidence to
suggest that such assistance supported the commission of the crimes which occurred in Sarajevo
and Srebrenica. I recall in that regard that assisting the VRS wage war per se is not a crime under
the Statute.
31.
I underscore the novelty of this case in the context of the application of aiding and abetting.
It is true that “[n]ever before have a commander and the Chief of Staff of General Staff of one army
been criminally responsible for the crimes committed by members of the armed forces of another
state or entity”.27 This case is also unique insofar as it is the first clear expression of a direct link
between the FRY and the crimes committed in Srebrenica and Sarajevo. I am satisfied that the
evidence before the Trial Chamber establishes this link. It is, however, imperative at this point to
recall a fundamental principle of national and international criminal law – namely that individual
criminal liability is based on personal guilt, not state responsibility.
32.
With that in mind, one cannot simply ignore the reality that relations between states are
often reinforced by the provision of significant military aid. Many foreign armies are dependent, to
various degrees, upon such assistance to function. In this context, I am mindful that in many
conflict zones around the world, the provision of military aid is aimed at supporting mutual interests
such as the deterrence of war, the promotion of regional and global peace, stability and prosperity
and other objectives.
33.
If we are to accept the Majority’s conclusion based solely on the finding of dependence, as it
is in casu, without requiring that such assistance be specifically directed to the assistance of crimes,
then all military and political leaders, who on the basis of circumstantial evidence are found to
9
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provide logistical assistance to a foreign army dependent on such assistance, can meet the objective
element of aiding and abetting. I respectfully hold that such an approach is manifestly inconsistent
with the law.
34.
I therefore respectfully contend that the Majority erred in concluding that the logistical and
personnel assistance provided by Peri{i} met the objective elements of aiding and abetting under
Article 7(1) of the Statute.
C. Peri{i}’s Knowledge of the Crimes Committed in Sarajevo and Srebrenica
35.
I respectfully dissent from the Majority’s finding that Peri{i} satisfied the mens rea
requirement for aiding and abetting.
36.
In line with the order followed by the Majority in presenting its reasoning, I will set forth
my arguments as follows: (1) preliminary remarks on the standard of knowledge under Article 7(1)
of the Statute; (2) Peri{i}’s knowledge of the VRS’s criminal conduct both preceding and following
his appointment as Chief of the VJ General Staff; (3) Peri{i}’s knowledge of the crimes committed
by the VRS in Sarajevo; and finally (4) Peri{i}’s knowledge of the crimes committed by the VRS in
Srebrenica.
1. Preliminary Remarks on the Standard of Knowledge
37.
In order to be found liable for aiding and abetting under Article 7(1) of the Statute, the
accused must have possessed the requisite mens rea. That is, the accused must know that his acts or
omissions would assist in the commission of the crime by the principal perpetrators.28 While the
accused does not need to have knowledge of the specific crimes that will be committed, the accused
must at least have had awareness that one of a number of crimes will probably be committed, and
one of those crimes must then in fact be committed.29 With respect to specific intent crimes, such as
persecution, the accused must have been aware that the principal perpetrators of the crime(s)
possessed a discriminatory intent.30
38.
I am fully in agreement with the Majority that the appropriate standard is a probability test. I
note, however, that this legal standard translates to actual knowledge of the probability and is
substantially different from the much lower standard applicable to responsibility under Article 7(3),
27
28
29
30
Momčilo Peri{i}, T. 426 (included in Peri{i}’s statement pursuant to Rule 84 bis of the Rules).
Blagojevi} and Joki} Appeal Judgement, para. 127.
Haradinaj et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 58. See Bla{ki} Appeal Judgement, para. 49; Tadi} Appeal Judgement,
para. 229.
Simi} Appeal Judgement, para. 86; Blagojevi} and Joki} Appeal Judgement, para. 127; Krsti} Appeal
Judgement, para. 143.
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which is based on a “had reason to know” test. I will demonstrate that some of the inferences drawn
by the Majority from the evidence incorrectly rely on the “had reason to know” standard of Article
7(3), as opposed to the knowledge standard of Article 7(1).31
39.
That being noted, I find the jurisprudence on Article 7(3), insofar as it discusses the
evidentiary requirements, instructive to the extent that it refers to the actual knowledge of the
commander.
40.
According to the relevant Article 7(3) jurisprudence, in order for an accused to have actual
knowledge, the accused must have had direct or circumstantial evidence that crimes were
committed or about to be committed.32 In the Čelebi}i case, the Trial Chamber concluded that the
knowledge of an accused cannot be presumed simply because information is generally available or
because it is public knowledge.33 Rather, knowledge must be established “on the basis of the
evidence pertaining to each individual defendant”.34 In this regard, in the absence of direct
evidence, the Trial Chamber can consider certain types of circumstantial evidence which are
indicative of whether or not the accused possessed the requisite knowledge.35 This holding was not
disturbed on appeal.36 I will show instances where the Majority seems to presume the knowledge of
the Accused from the public nature of the information rather than based on the evidence actually
received by or availed to him.
2. Peri{i}’s Knowledge of the VRS’s Criminal Conduct
41.
The Majority concludes that Peri{i} had knowledge prior to and during his tenure as Chief
of the VJ General Staff of the VRS’s discriminatory intent and criminal conduct in BiH.37 I
respectfully disagree with this conclusion and address individually the two relevant periods of time
in turn.
31
32
33
34
35
See generally Article 7(1), Article 7(3). See also supra paras 151-153.
See Čelebi}i Trial Judgement, para. 383.
Čelebi}i Trial Judgement, para. 385.
Ibid.
Čelebi}i Trial Judgement, para. 386, providing that the factors to be considered are:
(a) The number of illegal acts;
(b) The type of illegal acts;
(c) The scope of illegal acts;
(d) The time during which the illegal act occurred;
(e) The number and type of troops involved;
(f) The logistics involved, if any;
(g) The geographical location of the acts;
(h) The widespread occurrence of the acts;
(i) The tactical tempo of operations;
(j) The modus operandi of similar illegal acts;
(k) The officers and staff involved; and
(l) The location of the commander at the time.
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(a) Evidence Preceding Peri{i}’s Appointment as Chief of the VJ General Staff
42.
The Majority concludes that the only reasonable inference that can be drawn from the
evidence is that Peri{i} knew of the criminal conduct of the VRS and its discriminatory intent prior
to his appointment as Chief of the VJ General Staff.38 The Majority bases its finding on the position
of Peri{i} at that time, the scale and gravity of the crimes alleged to have been committed in BiH,
UNSC resolutions and the notoriety of reports issued by the UNHRC Special Rapporteur Tadeusz
Mazowiecki.
43.
The UNSC adopted several resolutions between May 1992 and May 1993 expressing alarm
concerning allegations of ethnic cleansing and other crimes committed in BiH. Special Rapporteur
Mazowiecki also issued a number of reports concerning the human rights situation in the territory of
the former Yugoslavia.39 Although I acknowledge that the FRY leadership was aware of allegations
made by the UN and by Special Rapporteur Mazowiecki of ethnic cleansing and other crimes which
occurred in BiH, I am of the view that the evidence does not establish that Peri{i} necessarily
shared such knowledge.
44.
I note that the Trial Chamber was not presented with evidence demonstrating that the UNSC
resolutions and the Mazowiecki reports were made available to, let alone read by, Peri{i}. The
Majority nonetheless makes its finding based on the public nature of these documents and Peri{i}’s
position of authority, concluding, based on circumstantial evidence, that the “only reasonable
inference” is that Peri{i} knew about the allegations of war crimes from these sources prior to his
appointment.40 I will address both points individually.
45.
As stated earlier, the knowledge of an accused cannot be presumed simply because
information is generally available or in the public domain.41 I am also respectfully of the view that
Peri{i}’s positions of authority in the VJ before he became Chief of the VJ General Staff are
irrelevant to the determination as to whether Peri{i} had actual knowledge of the VRS’s criminal
behaviour, lacking any evidence on what information was made available to him. In this regard,
evidence has not been presented with respect to Peri{i}’s ability to access information prior to his
appointment as Chief of the VJ General Staff. I find pertinent to this issue what was stated in the
Deli} case: open source documents are in principle accessible to an accused. However, without
evidence that the accused was ever provided with a copy of the document, or that the information
36
37
38
39
40
41
See Čelebi}i Appeal Judgement, para. 241.
See supra para. 1484.
See supra paras 1484, 1521-1522.
See supra para. 1452.
See supra paras 1456, 1485.
See supra para. 40.
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contained therein was brought to his attention, it cannot be presumed that the information contained
in an open source document was “available” to him,42 let alone – I add – that he had knowledge of
it.
46.
Even if Peri{i} had read the relevant UNSC resolutions and Mazowiecki reports, I am of the
view that their contents would not have provided Peri{i} with actual knowledge of the VRS’s
discriminatory intent and criminal conduct. They refer only generally to war crimes and fail to
specifically link any allegations of criminal conduct to the VRS. In fact, a large number of the
documents in question attribute the commission of crimes to unidentified “paramilitary” groups,43
and therefore, did not contain information which would have informed Peri{i} of the fact that the
VRS was committing crimes. Consequently, even if Peri{i} had knowledge of the reports
themselves, this information would not be sufficient to conclude that the only reasonable inference
is that Peri{i} was aware of the criminal conduct of the VRS.
47.
Finally, the Majority points to two statements made by Peri{i} as evidence of his knowledge
of the VRS’s propensity to commit crimes. First, in his OTP interview, Peri{i} stated that in April
1992, Karadži} offered him an opportunity to become the VRS Main Staff Commander.44 Peri{i}
stated that one of the reasons for refusing the offer was because “they wanted [an] ethnically clean
army, and [he] was against that”.45 It is important to note that the VRS was not established until
May 1992. Moreover, while this statement certainly indicates that Peri{i} understood that the RS
leadership intended to exclude non-Serbs from the army, and that Peri{i} opposed that practice, it
does not establish as the only reasonable conclusion that he was, in fact, aware that the VRS would
be likely to engage in the commission of war crimes.
48.
Second, the Majority notes that during the same interview, Peri{i} stated that as Commander
of the Bile}a Corps, “not a single Muslim was killed by soldiers and not a single soldier was killed
by Muslims” in the Muslim enclaves of Stolac, Kula Fazlagi}a, and Podveležje, but that after he left
in June 1992, “the exodus in this territory started”.46 First, it is important to recognise that Peri{i}
made this statement in hindsight; it tells us nothing about how much he knew about events in the
region contemporaneously. Second, one must consider the temporal context of these events. The
42
43
44
45
Deli} Trial Judgement, para. 530.
See e.g. Ex. P208, UNSC Resolution 819, 16 April 1993, p. 1; Ex. P2439, Report of the Special Rapporteur of
the Commission on Human Rights, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, on the Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of
the Former Yugoslavia, 28 August 1992, p. 4 (referring not to the VRS, but to informal “[…] Serbian
mercenaries”); Ex. P2440, Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, Tadeusz
Mazowiecki, on the Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, 27 October 1992;
Ex. P2441, Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, on the
Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, 17 November 1992.
Ex. P803, Transcript of Interview with Periši}, 8 December 2003, p. 4.
Ibid.
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dissolution of the SFRY had started by 25 June 1991,47 and the conflict broke out in BiH in 1992.48
In June 1992, the VRS was still in the nascent stages of its formation and the evidence suggests that
paramilitary groups were responsible for much of the violence taking place at that time.49 Peri{i}
made no reference to the VRS in this statement thus, the exodus he referred to cannot necessarily be
attributable to the actions of the VRS. This statement therefore does not establish as the only
reasonable conclusion that Peri{i} became aware of the VRS’s propensity to commit crimes at that
time.
49.
On a more general note, both of these statements involve knowledge that the Majority
purports Peri{i} acquired prior to the Indictment period. Even accepting the Majority’s
interpretation of these statements – which I do not – it is important to recognise that situations
during a war can change dramatically over time. What Peri{i} knew or thought he knew about the
activities and propensities of the VRS during the initial break-up of the SFRY cannot be equated
with his understanding of circumstances during the later stages of the war.
(b) Evidence Following Peri{i}’s Appointment as Chief of the VJ General Staff
50.
I respectfully dissent from the Majority’s conclusion that Peri{i} was aware from the early
stages of his appointment as Chief of the VJ General Staff of the VRS’s discriminatory intent and
criminal conduct in BiH.50
(i) Letter from the VRS
51.
The congratulatory letter sent from the VRS Krajina Corps Command to Peri{i} on 26
August 1993 regarding his appointment as Chief of the VJ General Staff – reflecting a desire to
unify the VRS and VJ to create a unified Serbian state – did not provide Peri{i} with knowledge of
any sort of discriminatory intent or criminal conduct of the VRS.51 The letter stated, in relevant
part:
We wish you to settle at your new duty as soon as possible, to choose your associates, transform
the army where needed, removing the weaknesses of the old system and the former JNA, creating
46
47
48
49
50
51
Ex. P803, Transcript of Interview with Periši}, 8 December 2003, p. 6.
Ex. P350, Report by Robert Donia on the Origins of RS, 30 July 2002, p. 16.
Ex. P375, Expert Report of Patrick Treanor Entitled: Belgrade Leadership and Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia,
1 September 2008, p. 16; Ex. P350, Report by Robert Donia on the Origins of RS, 30 July 2002, pp 30-32.
Ex. P208, UNSC Resolution 819, 16 April 1993, p. 1; Ex. P212, UNSC Resolution 824, 6 May 1993, p. 1; Ex.
P2439, Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, on the
Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, 28 August 1992, p. 4; Ex. P2454, UNSC
Resolution 787, 16 November 1992, p. 3.
See supra para. 1486.
See Ex. P1801, Letter from 1st Krajina Corps to Peri{i}, 26 August 1993.
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together a unified Serbian state and army, a state in which all the Serbs will live together, proudly
and with dignity.52
In my view, the letter does not contain any language which would provide Peri{i} with knowledge
of the probability that crimes would be committed by the VRS.
(ii) UN Reports and Resolutions
52.
The Majority points to various UNSC resolutions and UN reports which generally discuss
the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, as proof that Peri{i} knew of the criminal conduct of the VRS
and its discriminatory intent after he assumed the position of Chief of the VJ General Staff on 26
August 1993.53 For example, on 27 May 1994, the UN Commission of Experts, established
pursuant to UNSC Resolution 780,54 produced a report which detailed the commission of war
crimes, including, inter alia, “mass killings” and “rapes and looting”.55 This report generally
attributed these alleged crimes to “Bosnian Serb paramilitary forces”; it did not specifically attribute
them to the VRS.56 The Majority also points to UNSC Resolution 941, adopted on 23 September
1994, which alleged “grave violations of international humanitarian law […]”, such as “ethnic
cleansing”.57
53.
The Majority concludes that because the FRY leadership generally had knowledge of these
resolutions and reports and because the media often published these reports, the only reasonable
inference is that Peri{i} had knowledge of the criminal conduct and discriminatory intent of the
VRS. I respectfully disagree. The fact that information may have been general knowledge or widely
disseminated does not support a presumption of knowledge on the part of the accused. Knowledge
must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt based upon evidence which is specific to the accused.
The Majority also refers to letters from the BiH UN Mission which were circulated to the UNSC,
copies of which were provided to the FRY leadership, reporting on the humanitarian situation,
atrocities and military activity in BiH.58 While evidence was presented that the FRY leadership was
aware of such information, as they often responded by way of informal communications with BiH
representatives, there is no evidence that Peri{i} was privy to the same.
54.
There is insufficient evidence to support a finding that Peri{i} was aware of the following
information: any documentation of crimes by BiH representatives or the informal communications
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
Ibid.
See supra para. 1484 and section VI.J.2.(b)(ii).
Ex. P2451, UNSC Resolution 780, 6 October 1992.
Ex. P1535, Annexes to the Final Report of the UN Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to the UNSC
Resolution 780 (1992), 27 May 1994, para. 110.
Ibid.
Ex. P2479, UNSC Resolution 941, 23 September 1994.
See supra paras 1462-1464.
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as a result thereof; the Mazowiecki reports; the report of the UN Commission of Experts and the
relevant UNSC resolutions tendered into evidence. In fact, even the Majority concedes that there is
no direct evidence that Peri{i} received, let alone read, the aforementioned.59 Therefore, I contend
that the evidence does not establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Peri{i} had actual knowledge of
their content.
(iii) Media Reports
55.
The Majority relies upon a variety of international and Serbian media reports on the war to
support the inference that Peri{i} knew of the VRS’s discriminatory intent and criminal conduct.
While I acknowledge the extensive media coverage on the war in BiH while Peri{i} served as Chief
of the VJ General Staff, I recall that the mere general availability of information cannot support a
presumption of Peri{i}’s actual knowledge so as to impute individual criminal responsibility to
him.60 I therefore respectfully hold that even the extensive dissemination of information in the
media cannot support a finding of actual knowledge under Article 7(1), absent evidence that such
information was specifically made available to the accused and that it specifically referred to crimes
committed by the VRS. No evidence was presented demonstrating that Peri{i} received, let alone
read, any of the international or Serbian media reports tendered into evidence. I contend that it is
manifestly improper to impute knowledge based on circumstantial evidence, unless of course it is
the only reasonable conclusion. This is particularly so where the contents of such media do not
point to the identity of those alleged to have committed crimes.
56.
I also note that the Majority refers to the practice of the VJ General Staff of preparing
regular press clippings for Peri{i}.61 I am of the view that this practice, in and of itself, does not
establish actual knowledge with any greater degree of specificity than the general availability
standard rejected in Čelebi}i.62 Without evidence of instances of the specific clippings provided to
Peri{i} and proof of the contents of such clippings, the mere practice of receiving press clippings
cannot support a finding of actual knowledge beyond a reasonable doubt.
59
60
61
62
See supra para. 1557.
See supra para. 40, referring to Čelebi}i Trial Judgement, para. 386; Čelebi}i Appeal Judgement, para. 226.
See supra paras 1404, 1520.
See Čelebi}i Trial Judgement, para. 386; Čelebi}i Appeal Judgement, para. 226.
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3. Peri{i}’s Knowledge of Crimes Committed by the VRS in Sarajevo
57.
I respectfully disagree with the conclusion of the Majority that Peri{i}, while serving as
Chief of the VJ General Staff, was aware of the crimes committed by the VRS in Sarajevo and that
more crimes would probably follow.63
(a) Intelligence Reports
58.
I agree with the Majority that Peri{i}, as Chief of the VJ General Staff, had a sophisticated
intelligence network which informed him of alleged VRS criminal acts in BiH.64 It is well
established that various intelligence sources kept Peri{i} informed of military and strategic
developments in BiH.65 I, however, note that there is no evidence that these intelligence sources
informed Peri{i} that the VRS had committed crimes in Sarajevo.
59.
The limited direct evidence presented to the Trial Chamber suggests that Peri{i}’s
intelligence sources disputed the accuracy of reports alleging VRS crimes. For example, following
the Markale I incident, Peri{i} stated that RS had denied responsibility for the attack, and that his
sources had told him that the mujahedin or Croats were likely responsible.66 After Markale II, the
Intelligence Administration of the VJ General Staff issued a report to the FRY MOD which
described reasons to doubt UNPROFOR’s accusation that the VRS was responsible for the shelling,
noting that the “examination was not carried out on location […] but on the basis of photographs,
sketches and TV images. The dead and the wounded were not examined, nor was any type of
medical examination carried out”.67 Peri{i} also attended a meeting in Dobanovci on 29 August
1995, where President Milo{evi} informed participants that a UN source claimed that the shell was
fired from Serbian positions. Mladi}, who was in attendance, disputed this assertion, arguing that a
statement from a different UN source proved that the shell could not have come from Serbian
positions.68
60.
The only direct evidence available to the Trial Chamber regarding Sarajevo suggests two
possible conclusions. Either the sources relied upon by Peri{i} were mistaken regarding the
responsibility of the VRS, or they deliberately reported information denying VRS culpability. I
therefore respectfully contend that the Majority erred in concluding that the only reasonable
inference to be drawn from this evidence is that Peri{i}’s intelligence sources informed him of the
63
64
65
66
67
See supra paras 1521-1522.
See supra para. 1520.
See supra para. 1520 and section VI.I.2.(b).
See supra para. 1492 (citing Ex. P782, Stenographic Transcript of the 18th Session of the SDC, 7 February 1994,
p. 61).
See supra para. 1494 (citing Ex. D542, Report from the VJ to the FRY MOD, 11 October 1995).
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commission of crimes by the VRS in Sarajevo. I also recall that, unlike in the case of Article 7(3)
responsibility, the information which was received by Peri{i} does not constitute notice evoking a
duty to investigate.
61.
Finally, the Majority notes that, during the siege of Sarajevo and throughout the Indictment
period, Peri{i} attended Collegium meetings which were intended to facilitate the exchange of
information and were attended by the heads of the Intelligence Administration, the Security
Administration and the Operational Staff Sector.69 In reviewing the minutes from the Collegium
meetings, I note that not once is there any mention of the commission of crimes by the VRS.70 The
evidence therefore does not support a finding that these meetings provided Peri{i} with actual
knowledge that the VRS had committed crimes or was likely to commit crimes in Sarajevo.
(b) Diplomatic Cables
62.
The Majority relies on various diplomatic cables sent to the FRY Mission as proof that
Peri{i} knew that the VRS was committing crimes in Sarajevo. I respectfully disagree with the
Majority on this point. It is first imperative to recall that the cables tendered into evidence can be
classified into two categories: cables that were copied directly to Peri{i}; and those that were not. I
acknowledge that Peri{i} may have been aware of some of these diplomatic cables, because he was
directly copied on them. However, I do not accept the conclusion of the Majority that Peri{i} had
knowledge of those cables sent to the FRY leadership on which he was not copied. I further
acknowledge that the information contained in those cables on which he was copied may have been
sufficient to create a general awareness that abuses were occurring in BiH. However, in my view,
the few cables on which Peri{i} was directly copied were insufficient to provide Peri{i} with
knowledge that the VRS either had committed crimes or was likely to commit crimes in Sarajevo.
63.
While Peri{i} may have been copied on many cables by FRY missions around the world, the
Trial Chamber has evidence of only two diplomatic cables on which Peri{i} was directly copied
concerning Sarajevo. I am of the view that the information contained within those cables was
insufficient to have given Peri{i} actual knowledge of the VRS’s role in committing crimes in
Sarajevo.
68
69
70
Ex. P232, Notes of Meeting Held in Dobanovci, 30 August 1995, p. 12.
See supra para. 1392 (citing Siniša Borović, T. 13932; Miodrag Simić, T. 9981; Branko Gajić, T. 10813); see
e.g. Ex. P2207, Transcript of the Collegium of the Chief of the VJ General Staff, 4 December 1995; Ex. P727,
Order from Office of Chief of General Staff on Organisation and Method of Work of the Chief of the General
Staff and VJ Supreme Command Staff, 15 October 1993, p. 5. The record contains many transcripts of the
Collegium meetings, see e.g. Exs. P2193-P2215.
See e.g. Ex. P2207, Transcript of the Collegium of the Chief of the VJ General Staff, 4 December 1995; Ex.
P2193; Transcript of the Collegium of the Chief of the VJ General Staff held on 15 September 1995; Ex. P2197,
Transcript of the Collegium of the Chief of the VJ General Staff, 28 October 1995.
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64.
The first cable, sent by the FRY’s UN Mission and copied on Peri{i}, referred to
international concern over attacks on civilians in Sarajevo, and attributed responsibility for the
escalation of the situation to “Bosnian Serbs” generally.71 As multiple UN resolutions and other
documents admitted into evidence made reference to “Bosnian Serb paramilitary” units when
discussing the commission of crimes,72 the omission of a specific reference to the VRS in this cable
leaves open the possibility that Peri{i} would have understood it to be implicating paramilitary
units, or other forces outside the VRS, for the alleged attacks on civilians. The second cable on
which Peri{i} was copied, also prepared by the FRY’s UN Mission, focused simply upon the
general military situation in Sarajevo, describing “sniper activities and artillery attacks” without
making any allegations regarding war crimes or specific perpetrators.73
65.
The Majority also relies upon diplomatic communications on which Peri{i} was not directly
copied. A diplomatic cable sent from the FRY Mission in London to the VJ General Staff accused
the Western media of “widely manipulating the latest massacre of civilians in Sarajevo” to promote
air strikes against Serbian positions after Markale I, and further noted that the UK Defense Minister
had stressed that there was not yet enough information to conclusively identify the perpetrators of
the attack.74 An earlier cable sent by the FRY Mission in London simply noted that British officials
opposed the continued bombardment of Sarajevo.75 As there is no evidence that Peri{i} ever read or
received these cables, they form an improper evidentiary basis upon which to infer any type of
knowledge. Furthermore, as these diplomatic cables fail to specifically discuss the commission of
crimes by the VRS, I find that even if Peri{i} had read them, they would not establish as the only
reasonable inference that he had actual knowledge that the VRS had committed or was likely to
commit crimes during the siege of Sarajevo.
(c) Documentation by the International Community of Crimes in Sarajevo
66.
The mere existence of UN reports and resolutions which discussed the events occurring in
Sarajevo was not, in my view, sufficient to provide Peri{i} with actual knowledge of any allegations
of criminal acts committed by the VRS. First, as I noted above regarding the documentation of the
international community generally, Peri{i} cannot be presumed to have knowledge of this type of
71
72
73
74
75
Ex. P852 (under seal).
See e.g. Ex. P208, UNSC Resolution 819, 16 April 1993, p. 1; Ex. P212, UNSC Resolution 824, 6 May 1993, p.
1; Ex. P1535, Annexes to the Final Report of the UN Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to the UNSC
Resolution 780 (1992), 27 May 1994, para. 110; Ex. P2439, Report of the Special Rapporteur of the
Commission on Human Rights, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, on the Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the
Former Yugoslavia, 28 August 1992, p. 4, referring not to the VRS but to “[…] Serbian mercenaries”; Ex.
P2454, UNSC Resolution 787, 16 November 1992, p. 3.
Ex. P853 (under seal).
Ex. P2852 (under seal).
Ex. P2853 (under seal).
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evidence and I recall my previous finding that the evidence does not support the conclusion that
Peri{i} was in possession of these reports.76
67.
Furthermore, even if Peri{i} was in possession of the UN reports and resolutions, the
information contained therein does not support the conclusion that Peri{i} would have had actual
knowledge of VRS criminal conduct in Sarajevo. With the exception of UNSC Resolution 859,77
which does not implicate any specific perpetrators, the resolutions and reports refer only generally
to war crimes and fail to specifically link any allegations of criminal conduct with the VRS. In fact,
a large number of the UN documents in question attribute the commission of war crimes to
unidentified “paramilitary” groups, while the VRS and the VJ are not implicated in these reports.78
Other reports, instead of detailing specific allegations of criminal conduct and attributing such
conduct to the VRS, focused generally on the effect of the military campaign on the humanitarian
situation on the ground.79
68.
The reports issued by Mazowiecki also did not contain sufficient detail from which to
conclude which group was responsible for the alleged crimes in Sarajevo. These reports either
referred to crimes committed by “Serb soldiers” and “Serb mercenaries” without identifying their
organisational affiliation,80 or expressly declined to assign specific culpability for the criminal
conduct described therein.81
76
77
78
79
80
81
See supra paras 45, 52-54.
Ex. P2474, UNSC Resolution 859, 24 August 1993, condemning all war crimes and other violations of
international humanitarian law, by “whomsoever committed, Bosnian Serbs or other individuals”.
See Ex. P208, UNSC Resolution 819, 16 April 1993, p. 1; Ex. P212, UNSC Resolution 824, 6 May 1993, p. 1;
Ex. P1535, Annexes to the Final Report of the UN Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to the UNSC
Resolution 780 (1992), 27 May 1994, para. 110; Ex. P2454, UNSC Resolution 787, 16 November 1992, p. 3.
See Ex. P1536, Letter of the UN Secretary General to the President of the UNSC along with Final Report of the
UN Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to UNSC Resolution 780 (1992), 27 May 1994, para. 186,
stating that military forces have “concentrated their efforts on weakening the city through constant bombardment
from the surrounding hillsides”.
Ex. P2439, Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, on the
Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, 28 August 1992, p. 4; Ex. P2440, Report
of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, on the Situation of
Human Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, 27 October 1992; Ex. P2441, Report of the Special
Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, on the Situation of Human Rights in the
Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, 17 November 1992; Ex. P2442, Report of the Special Rapporteur of the
Commission on Human Rights, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, on the Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the
Former Yugoslavia, 10 February 1993; Ex. P2443, Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on
Human Rights, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, on the Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the Former
Yugoslavia, 5 May 1993.
Ex. P2441, Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, on the
Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, 17 November 1992, para. 42, stating that
“[a]ll sides are guilty”.
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(d) Media Reports
69.
The Majority states that Peri{i} was “generally informed of what was being reported in the
international and Serbian press”82 and that because attacks on Muslim civilians in Sarajevo were
widely reported, the only reasonable inference is that Peri{i} knew of these allegations.83 The
Majority cites press articles from Borba, NIN, and other publications.84 However, nothing in the
evidentiary record demonstrates that these particular documents or, for that matter, any media
describing VRS violence against Muslim civilians were provided to Peri{i} as part of his press
clippings. I am therefore not persuaded that the evidence establishes as the only reasonable
inference that Peri{i} had actual knowledge that his assistance would aid in the probable
commission of crimes by the VRS in Sarajevo.
4. Peri{i}’s Knowledge of Crimes Committed by the VRS in Srebrenica
70.
I respectfully disagree with the finding of the Majority that Peri{i} knew that his assistance
would aid in the probable commission of crimes by the VRS in Srebrenica.
(a) Statements made by Peri{i}
71.
The Majority notes that, contemporaneous with the VRS takeover of the enclave, the Užice
Corps Commander informed Peri{i} of a large group of Muslims escaping from Žepa and crossing
the Drina River into Serbia.85 The commander then informed him that the Užice MUP, a unit of the
VJ, wanted to kill refugees and that he had contacted Milo{evi} to prevent this.86 While this
communication certainly made Peri{i} aware that something significant was happening in the area
of Žepa, the commander’s declaration that he had communicated with Milo{evi} gave Peri{i}
reason to believe that any danger the Užice Corps may have posed to the Muslim civilians had been
eliminated. Furthermore, there was nothing in this communication which would have informed
Peri{i} that the VRS was perpetrating crimes in the area at that time.
82
83
84
85
86
See supra para. 1521.
Ibid.
See supra para. 1514, citing Ex. P2829, Reuters Article Regarding Attacks on Sarajevo, 15 December 1993; Ex.
P2830, Reuters Article Regarding Attacks on Sarajevo, 5 January 1994; Ex. P333, Interview of Ratko Mladi} for
Nin, 7 January 1994, p. 24; Ex. P2831, Nin Article Reacting to Previous Feature on Mladi}, 11 March 1994, p. 3;
Ex. P2878, Article in Borba, 30-31 July 1994; Ex. P2832, V.I.P. Daily New Report, 4 July 1995, pp 1-2.
See supra para. 1545 (citing Ex. P802, Transcript of Interview with Periši}, 7 December 2003, p. 27).
See supra para. 1545 (citing Ex. P802, Transcript of Interview with Periši}, 7 December 2003, p. 28).
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(b) Intelligence Reports
72.
I acknowledge that Peri{i} received periodic “situation reports” from the VRS,87 that the
VRS intelligence organs sent regular reports to the VJ General Staff, and that he received daily
reports from his own Security and Intelligence Administrations.88 None of this evidence actually
references the commission of criminal acts by the VRS.
73.
All of the reports issued by the VJ General Staff Intelligence Administration focused
exclusively upon military activities of the Muslim and VRS forces in the region; nowhere in these
reports is there any mention of the commission of crimes by the VRS, either before89or after90 the
fall of Srebrenica. It is also important to note that the movements of VRS forces were reported with
far less specificity than those of the Muslim forces.91
74.
Prior to the takeover of Srebrenica, the reports Peri{i} and the VJ General Staff received
from the VRS primarily described ABiH military activity and movements. The only reference to
allegations of crimes tendered into evidence can be found in the following VRS Main Staff
intelligence reports: a 18 May 1995 VRS report which described Muslim propaganda alleging VRS
operations against the Podrinje enclaves;92 and a 26 May 1995 report wherein the Muslim media
alleged that there were large numbers of civilian victims in an effort to force additional NATO air
strikes against the VRS.93 As both of these communications described the reports of crimes as either
Muslim propaganda or self-serving allegations generated by Muslim media sources, they implied
that the allegations should not be believed.
(c) Meetings with Members of the VRS
75.
The Majority notes that Peri{i} communicated with several VRS officers, including Mladi},
as crimes were occurring in Srebrenica.94 Peri{i} also attended a lunch meeting with Mladi}, Gvero,
and others in Han Pijesak during the same period.95 There is no evidence, however, that the
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
See supra paras 1419, 1534. See also Ex. D547, Intelligence Report of the VRS Main Staff, 15 September 1993.
See supra paras 1396, 1400, 1535. See also Ex. D547, Intelligence Report of the VRS Main Staff, 15 September
1993.
See supra para. 1539.
See supra para. 1540.
See supra para. 1536.
See supra para. 1536 (citing Ex. P1831, VRS Intelligence Report, 18 May 1995, p. 3).
See supra para. 1536 (citing Ex. P2180, VRS Main Staff Intelligence Report, 26 May 1995, p. 1).
See supra paras 1554-1555.
See supra para. 1555 (citing Ex. P2799, Le{i} Photograph of Peri{i} with Mladi} and others in Crna Rijeka, 18
July 1995; Ex. P2800, Le{i} Photograph of Peri{i} with Mladi} and others in Crna Rijeka, 18 July 1995; Ex.
P2801, Le{i} Photograph of Peri{i} with Mladi} and others in Crna Rijeka, 18 July 1995; Ex. P2802 Le{i}
Photograph of Peri{i} with Mladi} and others in Crna Rijeka, 18 July 1995; Ex. P2803, Le{i} Photograph of
Peri{i} with Mladi} and others in Crna Rijeka, 18 July 1995; Ex. P2804, Le{i} Photograph of Peri{i} with
Mladi} and others in Crna Rijeka, 18 July 1995; Ex. P2805, Le{i} Photograph of Peri{i} with Mladi} and others
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commission of crimes by the VRS was discussed on any of these occasions. Therefore, these
conversations cannot be used to support the inference that Peri{i} had actual knowledge of the
crimes committed by the VRS in Srebrenica.
(d) Diplomatic Cables
76.
I recall that a number of diplomatic cables concerning Srebrenica were sent by the FRY’s
UN Mission and other diplomatic missions to the FRY leadership, only some of which were copied
directly to Peri{i}. I reach a similar conclusion with respect to the diplomatic cables which
reference Srebrenica as I did above for those related to Sarajevo. I will first address those cables
copied directly on Peri{i}.
77.
A cable dated 12 July 1995, on which Peri{i} was copied, summarised the positions of
various participants in a UNSC debate.96 The cable did not contain any specific factual findings of
the UNSC with respect to any specific crime. Another cable, also dated 12 July 1995, is also
inconclusive because, while it referred to the military situation on the ground by discussing missile
attacks and to a general humanitarian crisis, there was no explicit discussion of crimes perpetrated
by the VRS.97 While the cable does mention Mladi} by name, it is not in the context of the missile
attacks, which are attributed more generally to “Bosnian Serbs”. The cable also failed to provide
any details regarding the damage or loss of life caused by the missile attacks, or the targets of these
attacks.98 Therefore, in the context of this cable, it would have been impossible for Peri{i} to
conclusively ascertain what crimes, if any, were committed and by whom. Similarly, other cables
on which Peri{i} was copied did not contain any detailed allegations of specific crimes committed
by the VRS, but instead focused more generally on the humanitarian situation99 or the international
media coverage of the events.100 Consequently, I respectfully disagree with the Majority’s
conclusion that the only reasonable inference to be drawn from the evidence is that Peri{i} had
actual knowledge that the VRS was committing crimes in Srebrenica. In dubio pro reo.
78.
In addition, I recall my previous finding that any diplomatic cables on which Peri{i} was not
directly copied cannot be indicative of whether or not Peri{i} had actual knowledge of the criminal
96
97
98
99
100
in Crna Rijeka, 18 July 1995; Ex. P2705, Photographs of Peri{i} with Mladi} and others, including General
Milan Gvero, 18 July 1995).
Ex. P897 (under seal).
Ex. P896 (under seal).
Ex. P896 (under seal). See also Ex. P855 (under seal) (generally discussing a concern over “severe violations of
humanitarian law” occurring in Srebrenica without listing any specific details of the alleged incidents and
without attributing the crimes to any specific group).
Ex. P857 (under seal), p. 2.
Ex. P856 (under seal).
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conduct of the VRS. Therefore, any diplomatic cable discussing the events occurring in Srebrenica,
on which Peri{i} was not copied, cannot be used to infer actual knowledge on his part.
79.
Similar to my previous conclusions regarding the Sarajevo diplomatic cables, I respectfully
hold that even if Peri{i} was aware of the contents of the diplomatic cables on which he was not
copied, the information contained within these cables does not support the conclusion that Peri{i}
would have had knowledge of the crimes charged with respect to Srebrenica. While I acknowledge
that the information contained within these cables would have been sufficient to make Peri{i} aware
of the fact that crimes were generally occurring, the cables did not contain sufficient details that
could have made Peri{i} aware of any involvement on the part of the VRS. For instance, many of
these diplomatic cables merely summarised various reports from the international media.101 Many
of the reports referenced in these cables focused on the humanitarian situation on the ground and
did not specifically reference war crimes or single out the VRS as the perpetrator of individual
criminal acts, while one report even mentioned that the RS leadership had pledged that civilians
would not be harmed.102
(e) Documentation by the International Community of Crimes in Srebrenica
80.
The Majority refers to UNSC statements,103 excerpts from UNSC meetings,104 and
diplomatic communications on which Peri{i} was not copied105 to demonstrate that Peri{i} had
knowledge that the VRS were committing crimes in Srebrenica. I disagree with this conclusion.
Peri{i} was not present at the UNSC meetings and there is simply no evidence to suggest that he
had knowledge of the contents of these meetings or of the UNSC resolutions adopted at these
meetings.
(f) Media Reports
81.
Regarding Peri{i}’s awareness of crimes committed in Srebrenica, the Majority again relies
upon the existence of specific media reports,106 of which we have no evidence that Peri{i} ever
101
102
103
104
105
106
See e.g. Ex. P857 (under seal), p. 2 (summarising the media in Great Britain); Ex. P856 (under seal), p. 3
(summarising the media in Germany).
Ex. P857 (under seal), p. 2.
Ex. P2507, Statement of the UNSC President, 25 July 1995.
Ex. P2502, Record of the 3554th Meeting of the UNSC, 14 July 1995.
Ex. P899 (under seal); Ex. P2498, Letter of the Charge D’Affaires of the Permanent Mission of BiH to the UN,
to the President of the UNSC, 9 July 1995; Ex. P2499, Letter of the Charge D’Affaires of the Permanent Mission
of BiH to the UN, to the President of the UNSC, 13 July 1995.
See e.g. Ex. P1089, Adam Brown, "Evacuation of Srebrenica Refugees Continues - Serbs Holding Male
Prisoners", Agence France-Presse, 13 July 1995 (discussing the forced removal of the enclave’s population,
organised by General Mladi}); Ex. P1092, Report Entitled "Evacuation of Srebrenica Civilians Continues; Aid
Executing Men on the Spot”, Agence France-Presse, 14 July 1995 (reporting that Bosnian Serb forces were
executing refugees and taking prisoners after the fall of the enclave); Ex. P1104, Naša Borba/New York Times
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received, in order to find that he had actual knowledge of crimes committed by the VRS.107 Branko
Gaji}’s testimony further diminishes the probability that these reports would have informed Peri{i}
of VRS crimes. He stated that notices of media reports regarding possible VRS atrocities in
Srebrenica were disregarded because they did not represent a counter-intelligence issue.108 It is
striking that the only testimony available to the Trial Chamber dealing directly with the
dissemination of media reports regarding Srebrenica through the VJ intelligence apparatus
contradicts the inference drawn by the Majority.
5. Conclusion
82.
The Majority holds that the only reasonable inference supported by the evidence is that
Peri{i} knew of the VRS’s discriminatory intent and criminal conduct in BiH during his tenure as
Chief of the VJ General Staff.
83.
I am in agreement that the evidence shows that Peri{i} received alarming information
alerting him to the fact that crimes may have been occurring during the war. In accordance with the
jurisprudence on Article 7(1) responsibility, Peri{i} was under no obligation to investigate these
allegations. The question, then, is whether it was highly probable that when Peri{i} provided
assistance, he knew that the VRS would very likely use this assistance to commit crimes in Sarajevo
and Srebrenica. In this regard, I am of the view that the Majority erred in concluding that Peri{i}
possessed the requisite knowledge.
84.
In my view, the largely circumstantial evidence presented to the Trial Chamber does not
establish as the only reasonable inference that Peri{i} was aware of the commission of crimes by the
VRS in Sarajevo and Srebrenica during the period of his tenure as Chief of the VJ General Staff. In
fact, no knowledge on Peri{i}’s part, of crimes being committed in Sarajevo and Srebrenica by the
VRS, can reasonably be inferred from the entirety of the evidence admitted in this case.
85.
As a result, I am not persuaded that Momčilo Peri{i} is individually criminally responsible
pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Statute for crimes committed in Sarajevo and Srebrenica as charged
in Counts 1 to 4 and Counts 9 to 12 of the Indictment.
107
108
Article on Events in Srebrenica, 24 July 1995, p. 5 (reporting about allegations by members of DutchBat that
they had witnessed Bosnian Serbs killing and torturing Muslims in Srebrenica).
See supra para. 1578.
See supra para. 1576 (citing Branko Gajić, T. 10960-10962).
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XIII. DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE MOLOTO ON COUNTS 5 TO 8
86.
I respectfully dissent from the Majority’s finding as to Mom~ilo Peri{i}’s individual
criminal responsibility pursuant to Article 7(3) of the Statute in relation to Counts 5-8. In particular,
I cannot agree with the Majority’s finding that Mom~ilo Peri{i} exercised effective control over the
perpetrators of the crimes committed by the shelling of Zagreb in May 1995.
A. Introductory Remarks
87.
In reaching its conclusion, the Majority analysed a number of indicators of effective
control.109 While, for the most part, I do not dispute the relevance of these indicators, I respectfully
contend that there is another indicator that the Majority did not consider, namely, whether Peri{i}
viewed himself as the superior officer of the 40th PC members and whether those members, being
the perpetrators of the underlying crimes, in turn, subjectively viewed Peri{i} in such a role. I
believe that an analysis of the instances in which Peri{i} attempted to intervene in the SVK chain of
command clearly demonstrates that the answer to this question is in the negative. Peri{i} did not
consider himself to be the superior officer of the members of the 40th PC and the latter did not view
themselves as his subordinates. Rather, the evidence paints a picture in which the members of the
40th PC were re-subordinated to the SVK and therefore, acted solely within its chain of command.
The fact that their salaries, as well as other benefits, were still paid by the VJ remains, in my view,
fully compatible with this notion of re-subordination. Consequently, once the 40th PC members
were re-subordinated to the SVK, Peri{i} could no longer exercise control over them, certainly not
operational control.
B. Peri{i}’s Ability to Issue Orders to the 40th PC Members
88.
The Majority holds that Peri{i} issued certain command orders to the SVK, stressing that
even if such orders were rare, their existence and the SVK’s compliance with them, demonstrate
that he had a general ability to issue orders.110 The Majority went on to conclude that this ability to
issue orders supports the conclusion that the SVK system of command and control was bifurcated
into two parallel chains of command: one controlled by Milan Marti} as supreme commander of the
SVK, and the other by Peri{i} and other members of the FRY leadership, including Milo{evi}.111
89.
I respectfully take issue with the Majority’s finding that before 2 May 1995, Peri{i} issued
at least one command order to a senior officer serving in the 40th PC that was subsequently
109
110
111
See supra paras 1757-1769. See also supra paras 1672 et seq.
See supra para. 1763.
Ibid.
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obeyed.112 I note that the order the Majority refers to, P1800, is the only order allegedly given by
Peri{i} to a member of the 40th PC at that time that was proven to have been followed.
90.
In my view, a reading of this document leaves no doubt that it was an order sent directly
from Milo{evi} and that Peri{i} was only instrumental in passing it along. I note the following
characteristics which distinguish it from an order given within a chain of command:
(a) It was written on the authority of Milo{evi}, not of Peri{i};
(b) Milo{evi} was neither in the chain of command of the VJ nor the SVK to entitle him to
issue a command order;
(c) One of the addressees, Milan Marti}, was not a member of the 40th PC and therefore could
not be within Peri{i}’s alleged chain of command;
(d) Reasons were provided for the issuance of the document, a feature not present in command
orders;
(e) One of the reasons for issuing it was that Milan Marti} had promised Yasushi Akashi to
facilitate the passage of UNPROFOR humanitarian aid in Western Bosnia; therefore it is
more of a reminder to Marti} to honour his word as opposed to an order; and
(f) Čeleketi} addressed his response to Milo{evi}, not to Peri{i}, evincing his view of whom,
between Milo{evi} and Peri{i}, he regarded as the one having given the order.113
91.
In my view, P1800 cannot, therefore, be used to find the existence of a parallel chain of
command on the axis VJ General Staff – SVK Main Staff. Rather it is demonstrative of a successful
attempt by Milo{evi} to influence Marti} and Čeleketi}, through a mixture of reason and authority,
to get Marti} to honour his prior agreement with Akashi.
92.
I am of the view that the notion of a parallel chain of command cannot be relied upon, as the
Majority does, to support a finding of effective control. It bears noting that the existence of a
parallel chain of command in an army that professes unity of command is, per se, indicative of lack
of effective control. The fact that Čeleketi} disregarded Peri{i}’s warning to stop shelling Zagreb
and followed Marti}’s order is a clear demonstration of the unworkability of a system of parallel
chain of command in a unity-of-command army.
112
113
See supra para. 1762.
Ex. P2857, SVK Main Staff Commander Communication to Peri{i} and Milo{evi}, 7 December 1994.
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93.
I am satisfied that P1800 was not an order within the chain of command, therefore, it is my
view that the Majority erred in relying on it, among others, to find that Peri{i} had effective control
over the members of the 40th PC.
94.
Similarly, P1925 has the following characteristics distinguishing it from a command order:
a) Marko Guli}, who is mentioned therein, is an officer in the RSK MOD, not a member of the
40th PC, therefore could not be in Peri{i}’s alleged chain of command;
b) Ljubomir Lali}, who is mentioned therein and described by the Majority as a VJ officer
serving in the 40th PC, was in fact a member of the “VJ [General Staff] Personnel
Administration 40th Personnel Centre, Department for Personnel Affairs” a department in
the VJ and not in the SVK;
c) Ljubomir Baji}, who is mentioned therein, was a retired officer of the VJ. While witness
Star~evi} testified that the order was a proper exercise of command over the 40th PC
officers, he conceded the shortcomings of the document in that one of the addressees was a
retired VJ officer;114
d) Only one other officer listed therein served in the Main Staff of the SVK through the 40th
PC;
e) The remaining officers mentioned in the document were VJ officers.115
95.
I note that the record does not demonstrate that P1925 was obeyed. For effective control to
be established, it is not enough that the superior gave orders; the order must be obeyed. Even if, for
argument sake, one assumes that it was obeyed, it bears noting that the purpose of the order was to
establish an entity to co-ordinate provision of assistance by the VJ to the SVK, a welcome step to
the SVK, which would explain the compliance of the one individual who was an SVK member. A
reasonable inference to draw is that the individual would comply because of a prior agreement by
the SVK that he be part of the co-ordinating entity. After all, the VJ or Peri{i} would not know what
assistance to give without the input of someone from the SVK. The order does not confirm the
existence of a parallel chain of command.
96.
The Majority’s theory of the existence of a parallel chain of command is contradicted by
communications which took place between the VJ General Staff and the Main Staff of the SVK in
which the VJ General Staff used the word “please” instead of the mandatory language normally
114
Miodrag Star~evi}, T. 6762-6763.
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seen in orders issued within the VJ.116 Finally, the testimony of several officers serving in the 40th
PC and holding high positions in the SVK – including Prosecution witnesses Orli} and Ra{eta –
strongly suggests that they had only one single operative chain of command – which originated
from the SVK leadership.117 This was also confirmed by MP-80 who specifically denied that Peri{i}
had any command authority over Čeleketi}. The evidence further shows that during the monthly
coordination meetings between the VJ, VRS, and the SVK no orders were ever given by Peri{i}.118
97.
During the early days of May 1995, when the Croatian forces launched an attack on the
RSK, Marti} gave an order to his subordinate Čeleketi} to retaliate by shelling Zagreb with “Orkan”
rockets. Čeleketi} carried out that order.119 After learning about the incident, Peri{i} intervened by
telling Čeleketi} to stop the shelling. The evidence demonstrates that Peri{i}’s intervention was not
successful because Zagreb was shelled again the next day.120 In this regard, I note that the record
does not contain the actual conversation Peri{i} had with Čeleketi} on 2 May 1995. However, from
an intercepted conversation between Peri{i} and Milo{evi}, in which Peri{i} refers to his
intervention with Čeleketi}, it is clear that Peri{i} used the expression “I told him” rather than
referring to ordering.121
98.
Čeleketi}’s non-compliance with this intervention can only be understood in the context of
previous communication practices between the VJ General Staff and the SVK Main Staff,
communications which did not resemble orders but rather were characterised by language typical of
a horizontal relationship. I am of the view that the only reasonable conclusion to be drawn from the
evidence is that not only was Peri{i}’s intervention of 2 May 1995 treated as non-binding by
Čeleketi} but it was also treated as non-binding by Peri{i} himself. Peri{i} was clearly against the
shelling of Zagreb. Čeleketi} was bent on shelling Zagreb. This is the one occasion that Peri{i}
should have given a firm order to Čeleketi} to stop the shelling if he saw himself as having any
control, let alone effective control, over him. Similarly, if Čeleketi} saw himself as Peri{i}’s
subordinate, he should have obeyed. He did not. He shelled Zagreb again on 3 May 1995. The only
reasonable explanation is that Čeleketi} saw himself as being in a single chain of command, that of
Marti}, whose command he chose to obey, demonstrating that Peri{i} did not have effective control
over him. It is this very uncertainty on which line of the parallel chain will be obeyed which
confirms the lack of effective control. I referred earlier to the fact that the attitude of the “superior”
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
Ex. P1925, Order of Mom~ilo Peri{i} to Form a Coordinating Staff, 24 March 1995.
Ex. P1138, Correspondence Between Chief of the VJ General Staff and the SVK Main Staff, 19 January 1994;
Ex. P2177, Letter from VJ General Staff to SVK Main Staff, 11 May 1994. See supra paras 1716-1718, 1732.
Rade Orli}, T. 5740, 5762-5763; Rade Ra{eta, T. 5969. See supra para. 1720.
See supra para. 1719.
See supra para. 585.
See supra para. 1725.
Ibid.
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and “subordinate” to their relationship is a factor to be considered in determining the existence of
effective control. The attitudes of Peri{i} and Čeleketi} to their relationship and that of Čeleketi} to
his relationship with Marti}, demonstrate the importance of this factor.
99.
Although Peri{i} claimed, in a conversation with Milo{evi}, that he ultimately forced
Čeleketi} to stop the shelling of Zagreb,122 this claim is not corroborated by any other evidence. As
a consequence, this statement about Peri{i}’s role in the events, especially in light of unsuccessful
attempts to force Čeleketi} to discontinue the shelling, carries no weight.
100.
I am also of the view that Peri{i}’s communications with the SVK 11th Corps Commander,
Du{an Lon~ar, equally suggest the lack of a superior-subordinate relationship between them. I do
not dispute that Peri{i} tried and in fact succeeded in influencing Lon~ar to take specific steps on
several occasions. However, the evidence is clear that in order to do so he used persuasion rather
than any command authority. I recall in this respect Peri{i} referring to the fact that “Lon~ar
completely understands the things and accepts to do as we say” and Peri{i} reporting that “[he] told
Lon~ar not to send [one battalion to Western Slavonia] without our approval, which he
accepted”.123(Emphasis added) This language demonstrates that Peri{i} did not issue a binding
order but rather that Lon~ar acquiesced to his request. It also demonstrates Peri{i}’s view of his
relationship with Lon~ar.
101.
Having said that, I note that some evidence suggests a change in the circumstances after
Čeleketi} was replaced by Mile Mrk{i}. The evidence of MP-80 suggests that Mrk{i}, instead of
taking orders from Marti}, was following direct orders from Peri{i}.124 At this point, I note that MP80’s testimony is not fully supported by other evidence. The record contains several documents
potentially suggesting that Peri{i} was issuing orders to the officers serving in the SVK through the
40th PC. I will briefly discuss them in turn.
102.
P2412 refers to Peri{i}’s “oral order” to submit to him the list of officers who participated or
did not participate in the combat operations of the SVK 18th Corps on 1 and 2 May 1995. Although
this request was considered as an order by the Commander of the SVK 18th Corps and was duly
complied with, I note that it did not fall within the scope of operational commands but rather
concerned the sharing of information between the SVK and the VJ. On 1 November 1995, a similar
request for submitting information was sent to the Command of the SVK 11th Corps by Peri{i}’s
Chef de Cabinet (P2707). This time, instead of referring to an “order”, the communication used the
122
123
124
See supra para. 1728.
See supra paras 1723-1724.
MP-80, T. 8457, 8481 (closed session). See supra para. 1730.
30
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28630
form “you are required”. The use of the term “required” in my view is similarly inconsistent with
the mandatory language typically used in military orders and in the VJ in particular. Moreover, the
response from the 11th Corps referred to it as a “letter”, not an order.
103.
P2146 reports Lon~ar referring to an “order” he received from Peri{i} to make a list of
commanding officers from the VJ who were born in Western and Eastern Slavonia and in North
Dalmatia, based on which the VJ General Staff would issue orders reassigning such officers to the
SVK 11th Corps. Again, I note that the substance of this order does not fall within the notion of
operational command but rather relates to Peri{i}’s effort to support the SVK with additional
officers and this notion is compatible with the cooperative relations between the two separate
armies. I also note that there is no evidence showing whether or not this order was actually obeyed.
104.
Finally, I note the intercept of a conversation (P1461) between Peri{i} and most probably an
officer in the SVK 11th Corps in which Peri{i} left a message for Lon~ar that the latter should arrest
all “scaremongers” and all others who are harmful to the morale of the 11th Corps and execute them
if necessary. From the intercept it is clear that it has the appearance of an order. This message, left
at the time of the Croatian offensive on the RSK, stands out as the only strictly apparent operational
order issued by Peri{i} to an officer of the 40th PC. At the same time, I note that there is no evidence
that this message was received by Lon~ar and more importantly, whether it was actually obeyed.
The message is just so outrageously criminal and out of character with anything Peri{i} had said
before that it leaves the impression that it was not intended to be obeyed. Instead, it sounds like
emphasis of the speaker’s frustration with the situation.
105.
The testimony of MP-80 regarding Peri{i} issuing orders to the SVK is further called into
question by the fact that even at the time when Mrk{i} replaced Čeleketi}, some communications
between Peri{i} and the new Chief of the SVK Main Staff contained words such as “please” and
“kindly”,125 language which is inherent to horizontal relationships.
106.
Based on the above, I find the testimony of MP-80 on this issue not credible. The very scant
evidence showing the “orders” given by Peri{i} – orders which in any event related mostly to the
exchange of information – and a recurring use of language of pleading as opposed to the
formulations typical for orders, all raise a reasonable doubt as to Peri{i}’s control over the SVK
even after mid-May 1995.
107.
Even if, for argument’s sake, one would assume that during Mrk{i}’s time at the helm of the
SVK, Peri{i} exerted significant influence over the SVK Main Staff which was characterised by the
125
Ex. D125, Correspondence from General Peri{i} to the SVK Main Staff, 18 July 1995. See supra para. 1732.
31
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ability to issue orders that were met with the understanding as to their binding character, it cannot
simply be concluded that Peri{i} could have exerted similar authority over the SVK during
Čeleketi}’s time in command. I agree with the conclusion of the Majority that there was “no
systemic change in the authority Peri{i} had vis-à-vis the SVK after Mrk{i} succeeded Čeleketi}”
and that “the change was only in the personal relations between Peri{i} and the new SVK Main
Staff Commander”. This further underlines the importance of the attitudes of the alleged superior
and subordinate to their relationship. It did not depend on a systemic change for a change in
relations to occur in this case. It depended on how the supposed superior and subordinate view their
relationship. It is clear that, unlike Čeleketi}, Mrk{i} was more amenable to Peri{i}’s influence –
certainly not control, based on the evidence referred to above. However, even if it could be said
Peri{i} had effective control over Mrk{i}, which I disagree with, such control was not over the
perpetrator of the crime of shelling Zagreb and was not at the time of such shelling. For effective
control to evoke individual criminal responsibility for a superior, it must exist at the time of the
commission of the underlying crime by the subordinate.
108.
The fact that Peri{i} did not consider himself to be the superior of the officers serving in the
SVK, coupled with the fact that these officers equally did not consider themselves as Peri{i}’s
subordinates, even if they officially held the status of VJ members, and the above analysis of the socalled Peri{i} orders, raise a reasonable doubt as to the validity of the theory of a “parallel chain of
command”. Rather, the evidence shows that at the time of the commission of the crimes relating to
the shelling of Zagreb, the VJ officers serving in the 40th PC were re-subordinated to the SVK
acting within its sole chain of command and not subject to Peri{i}’s control.
C. Ability to Initiate Disciplinary and/or Criminal Investigation
109.
The Majority asserts that “[i]t was only due to the SDC policy of keeping the VJ’s
involvement in the war in Croatia a secret […] that such proceedings were not pursued”.126 The
Majority goes on to state that “these political considerations […] do not call into question Peri{i}’s
ability to use his authority against SVK officers, but rather demonstrates the inconvenience of doing
so under the circumstances prevailing at that time”. I agree that, even if Peri{i} might have believed
himself to have control over 40th PC officers, the need to keep VJ involvement in the SVK secret
would have been a serious impediment in the exercise of such control because keeping VJ
involvement in the SVK secret was a national imperative. Publicising such involvement would have
had catastrophic consequences for the FRY by way of intensified international sanctions or even
attack. Therefore, I respectfully disagree with the Majority that “these political considerations”
126
See supra para. 1758.
32
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demonstrate the “inconvenience” of exercising authority. It was not just inconvenience, the
consequences could have been dire. Therefore, even on the theory of the Majority, this constraint
would have been a further limitation on Peri{i}’s control over the 40th PC members.
110.
Retroactive pensioning off of several high ranking officers serving in the 40th PC was the
only measure that could be taken in relative secrecy. These measures were aimed at punishing the
senior officers for losing the war in August 1995, not for any crimes committed by them while
serving in the SVK. This is consistent with Peri{i}’s view of his relationship with such officers
during the time they served in the SVK. The reason for so punishing them is not difficult to see.
Peri{i} had supported the war against Croatia and wanted the SVK to win. By losing the war the
SVK brought to naught all his support for the war and with it great disappointment. This
disappointment is captured in the following discussion taking place in September 1995 at a meeting
of the SDC:
Peri{i}: [T]he status of the [SVK Main Staff] should be solved. We should answer whether we
think it exists or it does not, or should it be revoked or not, because it still exists there. Marti} is
there with some of his people. Mrk{i} is in vicinity of Banja Luka. We should first make our
standpoint about it and after that we should know what to do with those people. If they live there
and are going to form something there and they are for establishing of some kind of Liberation
Army of Krajina then it would be logical that we send most of these officers to that area.
Lili}: I will remind you that we agreed to abolish the 40th [PC], except for the part of it related to
the units deployed in Sector East. This is an answer to what General Peri{i} said. I think that the
unresolved status of these people is the worst possible option.
Milo{evi}: We have to discuss this only in connection with the issue of reimbursement of the
salaries. At the moment the question is whom we should help if it no longer exists there. This issue
is related only to salaries and not to other material issues.
[…]
Lili}: [Peri{i}’s] dilemma is in the fact that he thinks that we should send all of these people back
there.
Peri{i}: If that is going to be abolished over there then it means that nothing would be left there
except the 11th Corps. And we will be sending our volunteers to that Corps. As for the others, why
do not you let me appoint them selectively according to their behaviour, capabilities, instead of
appointing some riffraff, who even contributed to have the situation as it is.
[…]
Peri{i}: Should I erase the names of those people from the payroll or should I consider them a part
of the 11th Corps, actually should I consider them as participants of the war? This is the essence of
my question.
Milo{evi}: The war over there is over. They are not in that territory any more.
Peri{i}: In another words: whoever is there should be asked to come here?
Milo{evi}: You should not ask anyone to come.
Peri{i}: I should not ask them to come and I should not pay them the salaries?
33
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Milo{evi}: To whom you should pay the salary and what do you mean to pay them salaries?
Peri{i}: I am just asking because I have to resolve their status.
Milo{evi}: There was the Republic of Serbian Krajina, which we supported through the 40th [PC].
The RSK no longer exists and accordingly the 40th PC no longer exists!127
111.
It is clear from the above discussion that no reference was made to any punishment for the
crimes committed, indicating that the SDC did not view either itself, or Peri{i}, as having the
authority to do so. Rather, as mentioned by Peri{i}, the concern was that the SVK officers
“contributed to have the situation as it is” – losing the war.
a. Whether Peri{i} had the Capacity to Promote Members of the 40th PC
112.
I respectfully disagree with the Majority’s finding that “[t]he fact that Peri{i} had […] the
ability to make independent recommendations with respect to the verification of promotions […] of
the VJ soldiers serving in the 40th PC, militates in favour of effective control”.128 I recall that there
were instances where the verifications of promotions first acquired in the SVK were delayed,
sometimes for months, but this did not result in the loss of rank within the SVK and the soldiers did
not resign or desert the army or show any change, such as loss of morale, as result of such delays in
verifications.
113.
In my view Peri{i}’s capacity to promote members of the 40th PC carries very little or no
weight as a factor in the determination of whether Peri{i} exercised effective control over the 40th
PC members.
b. Whether Peri{i} had the Capacity to Appoint 40th PC Members to Specific
Posts in the SVK
114.
The Majority states:
The Majority, in this respect, recalls that although as a general rule VJ officers were transferred
and/or appointed to the 40th PC by the VJ, it was the SVK who appointed these officers to specific
posts within its structure. At times, however, the SVK would request the VJ to transfer specifically
identified officers identifying the unit and position in which these personnel were to serve if
transferred to the SVK. The Majority finds that in such cases the approval of the SVK request
should be seen as an indirect and discrete way of appointing the 40th PC members to the specific
posts in the SVK. Peri{i}’s ability to do so should be seen as standing in full compliance with his
de jure status as the 40th PC members superior. 129
127
128
129
Ex. P798, Stenographic Transcript of the 44th Session of the SDC, 12 September 1995, pp 5 et seq.
See supra para. 1768.
See supra para. 1765.
34
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115.
I cannot agree with the logic and finding of the Majority in the above quotation. There is no
indirect appointment by Peri{i} of officers to specific posts in the SVK. The plain language of the
request by the SVK and the response by Peri{i} clearly show that he is merely agreeing to a request
of the SVK in which the SVK has pre-determined the posts to which the officers are to be
appointed. The determination is not made by Peri{i}. It is clearly a misapprehension of the evidence
to interpret the situation otherwise.
D. Conclusion
116.
The Prosecution bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that Mom~ilo
Peri{i} exercised effective control over the members of the 40th PC who shelled Zagreb on 2 and 3
May 1995. In my view, based on the above analysis of the evidence, the Prosecution failed to
adduce sufficient evidence to prove that Peri{i} had effective control over members of the 40th PC
who perpetrated the crimes charged in Counts 5-8 of the Indictment. Consequently, I respectfully
disagree with the Majority’s finding that Peri{i} is individually criminally responsible for the crimes
charged in Counts 5-8 of the Indictment.
117.
Whereas the Judgement refers to the Majority on the findings subsequent to “effective
control”, I place on record that I participated in deliberations and concur with all of the findings on
Mom~ilo Peri{i}’s notice and failure to punish.
Done in English and French, the English text being authoritative.
Dated this sixth day of September 2011
At the Hague
The Netherlands
_________________________
Judge Bakone Justice Moloto
Presiding
35
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XIV. ANNEXES
A. ANNEX A – PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1. Pre-Trial Proceedings
(a) Surrender and Initial Appearance
1.
An initial indictment against Momčilo Peri{ić was confirmed by Judge Jean-Claude
Antonetti on 24 February 2005 and unsealed on 7 March 2005.1 It charged Momčilo Peri{ić with
five counts of violations of the laws or customs of war pursuant to Article 3 of the Statute and eight
counts of crimes against humanity pursuant to Article 5 of the Statute. Momčilo Peri{ić was
charged with aiding and abetting the planning, preparation, or execution of the aforementioned
crimes pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Statute2 and as a superior officer, with failure to prevent or
punish the unlawful acts of his subordinates in the VJ pursuant to Article 7(3) of the Statute.3
2.
Momčilo Peri{ić expressed his intention to voluntarily surrender and on 7 March 2005 he
was transferred into the custody of the Tribunal.4
3.
Momčilo Peri{ić made his initial appearance before Trial Chamber III on 9 March 2005. He
pleaded not guilty to all counts in the indictment.5 On 9 June 2005, Trial Chamber III granted the
Defence request for provisional release of Momčilo Perišić.6 He returned to the UNDU in The
Hague on 18 September 2008.7
(b) Amendments to the Indictment
4.
On 29 August 2005, Trial Chamber III ordered the Prosecution to amend the indictment.8
5.
On 26 September 2005,
the
Prosecution filed an amended indictment.9
On
12 December 2005, Trial Chamber III granted the Prosecution’s motion to further amend the
indictment to correct a typographical error.10
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Confirmation of Indictment (under seal), 24 February 2005; Order to Disclose Indictment and Warrant of Arrest
Against Momčilo Perišić, 7 March 2005.
Indictment, 22 February 2005, paras 46, 62. With regards to Counts 1 to 4 and 9 to 13 only.
Indictment, 22 February 2005, paras 46, 54, 62.
Order for Detention on Remand, 8 March 2005.
Initial Appearance, 9 March 2005, T. 3-7.
Decision on Momčilo Perišić’s Motion for Provisional Release, 9 June 2005.
Order Recalling Momčilo Peri{ić from Provisional Release, 27 August 2008.
Decision on Preliminary Motions, 29 August 2005, para. 40.
Prosecution’s Filing of Amended Indictment in Compliance with Trial Chamber Order of 29 August 2005,
26 September 2005.
Decision Granting Prosecution Motion to Amend Indictment, 12 December 2005.
28624
6.
On 20 November 2006, Trial Chamber III invited the Prosecutor to propose means of
reducing the scope of the indictment.11 On 4 December 2006, the Prosecution declined the Trial
Chamber’s invitation.12 During a status conference held on 1 December 2006, the Prosecution
indicated its preference to make two minor typographical amendments to the indictment of
26 September 2005 in conjunction with an order from Trial Chamber III to reduce the scope of the
amended indictment.13 The Trial Chamber ultimately ordered the Prosecution not to lead evidence
on “terror” in relation to the Sarajevo counts, only to lead evidence relating to the scheduled
incidents that are listed in schedules A and B of the Amended Indictment and to reduce its witness
list accordingly.14
7.
On 15 May 2007, Trial Chamber III allowed the proposed amendments to the amended
indictment.15 On 13 September 2007, the Prosecution filed a second amended indictment.16 On
5 February 2008, the Prosecution filed a revised second amended indictment, which is the operative
Indictment in this case.17
(c) Composition of the Trial Chamber
8.
The case was initially assigned to Trial Chamber III18 with Judge Patrick Robinson
designated as pre-trial Judge.19 On 12 May 2006, Judges Krister Thelin and Frank Höpfel were
assigned to the case to conduct pre-trial work.20
9.
On 20 March 2008, the case was reassigned to Trial Chamber I21 composed of Judges
Alphons Orie, Christine Van den Wyngaert and Bakone Justice Moloto.22 On 26 March 2008, Judge
Moloto was designated pre-trial Judge.23 On 29 May 2008, Judges Flavia Lattanzi and Michèle
Picard were assigned as ad litem judges to the pre-trial proceedings.24
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
Invitation to the Prosecutor to Make Proposals to Reduce the Scope of the Indictment, 20 November 2006.
Prosecution’s Response to Invitation to the Prosecutor to Make Proposals to Reduce the Scope of the Incident,
4 December 2006.
Status Conference, 6 February 2007, T. 82-83.
Decision on Application of Rule 73 bis and Amendment of Indictment, 15 May 2007, paras 16-17, 20.
Decision on Application of Rule 73 bis and Amendment of Indictment, 15 May 2007.
Prosecution Filing of Second Amended Indictment, 13 September 2007.
Prosecution Filing of Revised Second Amended Indictment with Annex A, 5 February 2008.
Order Assigning a Case to a Trial Chamber (confidential and ex parte), 7 March 2005.
Order Designating Pre-Trial Judge, 9 March 2005.
Order Assigning an Ad Litem Judge for Pre-Trial Work, 12 May 2006.
Order Reassigning a Case to a Trial Chamber, 20 March 2008.
Order Composing a Pre-Trial Bench, 20 March 2008.
Order Designating a Pre-Trial Judge, 26 March 2008.
President’s Order Assigning Ad Litem Judges to Pre-Trial Proceedings, 29 May 2008.
2
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10.
On 2 October 2009, the President of the Tribunal ordered that the trial bench be composed
of Judge Bakone Justice Moloto as Presiding Judge, Judge Pedro David and Judge Michèle
Picard.25
(d) Counsel
11.
On 9 March 2005, the Registrar assigned Mr. Karim Khan as duty counsel to Momčilo
26
Perišić.
On 21 April 2005, Mr. James Castle was provisionally assigned as counsel for the
Accused for a period of 120 days.27 On 15 August 2005, the Deputy Registrar issued a decision
finding that the Accused was able to remunerate counsel in part and assigning Mr. Castle as his
counsel permanently.28
12.
On 7 April 2006, Dušan Slijepčević was assigned as co-counsel.29 On 12 June 2006, Mr.
Castle requested the withdrawal of Mr. Slijepčević.30 Mr. Slijepčević was withdrawn as co-counsel
on 25 August 2006.31 On 25 April 2007, Novak Lukić was appointed as co-counsel.32
13.
On 29 July 2008, Mr. Castle was withdrawn as lead counsel and re-assigned as co-counsel
for the Accused. On the same date Mr. Lukić was assigned as lead counsel and Mr. Guy-Smith was
assigned as an additional co-counsel for the Accused.33 On 22 December 2008, Mr. Castle was
withdrawn as co-counsel by the Deputy Registrar.34
(e) Preparations for Trial
14.
The Prosecution filed its Pre-Trial Brief on 23 February 2007.35 The Defence submitted its
Pre-Trial Brief on 30 March 2007.36
15.
Pursuant to Rule 65 bis of the Rules, status conferences were held on 6 July 2005,37
25 October 2005,38 15 February 2006,39 14 June 2006,40 11 October 2006,41 6 February 2007,42
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
Order Composing a Trial Bench, 2 October 2008.
Decision by the Registrar Re Assignment of Duty Counsel, 9 March 2005.
Decision by the Registrar Re Assignment of Counsel Pending Completion of Inquiry into Accused’s Ability to
Remunerate Counsel, 22 April 2005.
Decision by the Deputy Registrar Re Remuneration of Counsel, 15 August 2005.
Decision by the Registrar Assigning Mr Slijepčević as Co-counsel, 10 April 2006.
See Decision by the Deputy Registrar to Withdraw Mr. Slijepčević as Co-counsel, 25 August 2006.
Decision by the Deputy Registrar to Withdraw Mr. Slijepčević as Co-counsel, 25 August 2006.
Decision by the Deputy Registrar Re Assignment of Co-counsel, 25 April 2007.
Decision by the Deputy Registrar Re Assignment of Counsel and Co-counsel, 29 July 2008.
Decision by the Deputy Registrar to Withdraw Mr. Castle as Co-counsel to Mr. Lukic, 22 December 2008.
Prosecution’s Rule 65 ter Submission (confidential), 23 February 2007.
Pre-Trial Brief of the Defence (confidential), 30 March 2007.
Scheduling Order, 8 June 2005.
Order Scheduling a Status Conference, 18 October 2005.
Order Scheduling a Status Conference, 7 February 2006.
Order Scheduling a Status Conference, 31 May 2006.
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23 May 2007,43 19 September 2007,44 15 January 2008,45 6 May 2008,46 2 September 200847 and
24 September 2008.48
16.
At a status conference held on 6 May 2008, the Presiding Judge invited the Prosecution to
present its case within nine months, allowing 540 hours for the Prosecution phase.49
17.
On 27 June 2008, Trial Chamber I ordered the Pre-Trial Conference to take place on
24 September 2008 and set the Opening Statement of the Prosecution to take place on
1 October 2008, followed on 2 October 2008 by the Opening Statement of the Defence and/or a
statement of the Accused at that stage of the proceedings. 50 On 23 September 2008, Trial Chamber
I rescheduled the Pre-Trial Conference to take place on 1 October 2008, with Opening Statements
to begin on the same date.51
18.
A Pre-Trial Conference pursuant to Rule 73 bis was held on 2 October 2008.52 The Trial
Chamber granted the Prosecution 355 hours for the presentation of its evidence and set the number
of witnesses to be called by the Prosecution at 150.53
2. Trial Proceedings
19.
The trial was held between 2 October 2008 and 31 March 2011. The Trial Chamber sat for
198 trial days.
20.
The Prosecution case commenced on 2 October 2008 and concluded on 25 January 2010.54
The Prosecution adduced evidence from 108 witnesses in total, of whom 35 testified viva voce. 37
witnesses gave evidence pursuant to Rule 92 ter. The evidence of three witnesses was admitted
exclusively in written form pursuant to Rule 92 bis, one witness pursuant to Rule 71 and 11
pursuant to Rule 92 quater. Moreover, the Trial Chamber admitted the evidence of 21 witnesses
pursuant to Rule 94 bis.55
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
Order Rescheduling a Status Conference, 22 September 2006.
Order Scheduling a Status Conference, 15 January 2007.
Order Scheduling a Status Conference, 15 May 2007.
Order Scheduling a Status Conference, 21 August 2007.
Order Scheduling a Status Conference, 22 November 2007.
Order Scheduling a Status Conference, 23 April 2008.
Order Scheduling a Status Conference, 15 August 2008.
Scheduling Order, 23 September 2008.
See Status Conference, 6 May 2008, T. 162.
Order Rescheduling Start of Trial, 27 June 2008.
Scheduling Order, 23 September 2008.
Scheduling Order, 2 October 2008.
Prosecution Opening Statement, 2 October 2008, T. 343.
Hearing, 25 January 2010, T. 9801.
Decision on Uncontested Srebrenica Experts Reports, 26 August 2009.
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21.
On 13 and 14 December 2008, witness Nikola Tošković gave evidence by deposition at his
home pursuant to Rule 71.56
22.
Pursuant to Rule 73 ter, pre-Defence conferences were held on 29 January 201057 and
10 February 2010.58
23.
At the pre-Defence conference held on 10 February 2010, the Trial Chamber allocated the
Defence 180 hours to present their case.59
24.
The Defence case commenced on 22 February 2010 with its Opening Statement60 and
concluded on 11 January 2011.61 The Defence adduced evidence from 28 witnesses in total, of
whom 21 testified viva voce. The evidence of three witnesses was admitted in written form pursuant
to Rule 92 bis, three pursuant to Rule 92 quater and one pursuant to Rule 94 bis.
25.
On 4 March 2011, the Parties submitted their Final Briefs.62 The closing arguments took
place between 28 March 2011 and 31 March 2011.63
26.
The Trial Chamber admitted a total of 3,797 exhibits into evidence; 2,945 exhibits were
tendered by the Prosecution, 849 by the Defence and three by the Trial Chamber.
(a) Provisional Release
27.
On 17 December 2008, Momčilo Peri{ić was granted provisional release, to last from
22 December 2008 to 9 January 2009.64 He was again provisionally released between 9 and
17 April 2009,65 25 July 2009 and 14 August 200966, 9 December 2009 and 14 January 2010,67
23 July 2010 and 19 August 2010.68 The Trial Chamber nevertheless also denied several requests
for provisional release.69
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
Filing of Public Redacted and Corrected Version of 2 December 2008 Decision for Deposition Pursuant to
Rule 71, 10 February 2009.
Rule 73 Conference, 29 January 2010, T. 9803 (Oral Order).
Scheduling Order, 8 February 2010.
Pre-Defence Conference, 10 February 2010, T. 9845.
Defence Opening Statement, 22 February 2010, T. 9855-9913.
Hearing, 11 January 2011, T. 14582-14588.
Prosecution Final Brief, 4 March 2011; Defence Final Brief, 4 March 2011.
Closing Arguments, 8 February 2011, T. 14615.
Decision on Mr. Peri{ić’s Motion for Provisional Release During the Winter Recess, 17 December 2008.
Decision on Mr. Peri{ić’s Motion for Provisional Release During the Easter Court Recess, 6 April 2009.
Decision on Peri{ić’s Motion for Provisional Release During the Summer Court Recess, 17 July 2009.
Decision on Mr. Peri{ić’s Motion for Provisional Release, 7 December 2009.
Public Redacted Version of Decision on Peri{ić’s Motion for Provisional Release During the Summer Recess,
15 July 2010.
Decision on Mr. Peri{ić’s Motion for Provisional Release, 31 March 2010; Decision on Peri{ić’s Motion for
Provisional Release During the Winter Recess, 15 December 2010; Decision on Peri{i}’s Motion for Provisional
Release, 14 July 2011.
5
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(b) Site Visit
28.
In accordance with Rule 4, the Trial Chamber and the Parties conducted an on-site visit to
various locations in the Republic of Croatia and BiH between 21 and 26 June 2009.70 The Trial
Chamber admitted proprio motu the record of the visit into evidence.71
70
71
Order on Site Visit with Annex Containing Rules of Procedure and Conduct during Site Visit, 21 May 2009,
p. 2.
Decision on the Admission into Evidence of Record of Site Visit, 2 December 2010.
6
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28619
B. ANNEX B – GLOSSARY
1. ICTY Judgements and Decisions
Aleksovski Appeal Judgement
Prosecutor v. Zlatko Aleksovski, Case No.
Aleksovski Trial Judgement
IT-95-14/1-A, Judgement, 24 March 2000
Prosecutor v. Zlatko Aleksovski, Case No.
Aleksovski February 1999 Appeal Decision
IT-95-14/1-T, Judgement, 25 June 1999
Prosecutor v. Zlatko Aleksovski,
Case
No.
Prosecutor’s
IT-95-14/1-AR73,
Appeal
on
Decision
on
Admissibility
of
Evidence, 16 February 1999
Babi} Sentencing Appeal Judgement
Prosecutor v. Milan Babi},
Case No. IT-03-72-A, Judgement on Sentencing
Appeal, 18 July 2005
Blagojevi} and Joki} Appeal Judgement
Prosecutor v. Vidoje Blagojevi} and Dragan
Joki}, Case No. IT-02-60-A, Judgement,
9 May 2007
Blagojevi} and Joki} Trial Judgement
Prosecutor v. Vidoje Blagojevi} and Dragan
Joki}, Case No. IT-02-60-T, Judgement,
17 January 2005
Bla{ki} Appeal Judgement
Prosecutor v. Tihomir Bla{ki},
Case No. IT-95-14-A, Judgement, 29 July 2004
Bla{ki} Trial Judgement
Prosecutor v. Tihomir Bla{ki},
Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgement, 3 March 2000
Bo{koski and Tar~ulovski Appeal Judgement
Prosecutor v. Ljube Bo{koski and Johan
Tar~ulovski, Case No. IT-04-82-A, Judgement,
19 May 2010
Bo{koski and Tar~ulovski Trial Judgement
Prosecutor v. Ljube Bo{koski and Johan
Tar~ulovski, Case No. IT-04-82-T, Judgement,
10 July 2008
Brñanin Appeal Judgement
Prosecutor v. Radoslav Brñanin,
Case No. IT-99-36-A, Judgement, 3 April 2007
7
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28618
Brñanin Trial Judgement
Prosecutor v. Radoslav Brñanin, Case No.
IT-99-36-T, Judgement, 1 September 2004
^elebi}i Appeal Judgement
Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delali}, Zdravko Muci},
Hazim Deli}, and Esad Land`o, Case No.
IT-96-21-A, Judgement, 20 February 2001
^elebi}i Trial Judgement
Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delali}, Zdravko Muci},
Hazim Deli}, and Esad Land`o, Case No.
IT-96-21-T, Judgement, 16 November 1998
Deli} Trial Judgement
Prosecutor v. Rasim Deli}, Case No. 04-83-T,
15 September 2008
Deronji} Sentencing Appeal Judgement
Prosecutor v. Miroslav Deronji}, Case No.
IT-02-61-A, Judgement on Sentencing Appeal,
20 July 2005
Erdemovi} Appeal Judgement
Prosecutor v. Dra`en Erdemovi}, Case
No. IT-96-22-A, Judgement, 7 October 1997
Furund`ija Trial Judgement
Prosecutor v. Anto Furund`ija, Case No.
IT-95-17/1-T, Judgement, 10 December 1998
Gali} Appeal Judgement
Prosecutor v. Stanislav Gali}, Case No.
IT-98-29-A, Judgement, 30 November 2006
Gali} Trial Judgement
Prosecutor v. Stanislav Gali}, Case No.
IT-98-29-T, Judgement and Opinion,
5 December 2003
Gali} June 2002
Prosecutor v. Stanislav Gali}, Case No.
Appeal Rule 92 bis(C) Decision
IT-98-29-AR73.2, Decision on Interlocutory
Appeal Concerning Rule 92 bis(C), 7 June 2002
Gali} July 2002
Prosecutor v. Stanislav Gali},
Trial Expert Witnesses Decision
Case No. IT-98-29-T, Decision Concerning the
Expert Witnesses Ewa Tabeau and Richard
Philipps, 3 July 2002
8
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28617
Gotovina et al. Trial Judgement
Prosecutor v. Ante Gotovina, Ivan ^ermak and
Mladen
Marka~,
Case
No.
IT-06-90-T,
Judgement, 15 April 2011
Had`ihasanovi} and Kubura Appeal Judgement
Prosecutor v. Enver Had`ihasanovi} and Amir
Kubura, Case No. IT-01-47-A, Judgement,
22 April 2008
Had`ihasanovi} and Kubura Trial Judgement
Prosecutor v. Enver Had`ihasanovi} and Amir
Kubura, Case No. IT-01-47-T, Judgement,
15 March 2006
Had`ihasanovi} and Kubura
Prosecutor v. Enver Had`ihasanovi} and Amir
Appeal Jurisdiction Decision
Kubura, Case No. IT-01-47-AR72, Decision on
Interlocutory Appeal Challenging Jurisdiction in
Relation to Command Responsibility,
16 July 2003
Halilovi} Appeal Judgement
Prosecutor v. Sefer Halilovi},
Case No. IT-01-48-A, Appeal Judgement,
16 October 2007
Halilovi} Trial Judgement
Prosecutor v. Sefer Halilovi}, Case No.
IT-01-48-T, Judgement, 16 November 2005
Haradinaj et al. Appeal Judgement
Prosecutor v. Ramush Haradinaj, Idriz Balaj
and Lahi Brahimaj, Case No. IT-04-84-A,
Judgement, 19 July 2010
Haraqija and Morina Appeal Judgement
Prosecutor v. Astrit Haraqija and Bajrush
Morina,
Case
No.
IT-04-84-R77.4-A,
Judgement, 23 July 2009
Jelisi} Trial Judgement
Prosecutor v. Goran Jelisi}, Case No.
IT-95-10-T, Judgement, 14 December 1999
M. Joki} Sentencing Appeal Judgement
Prosecutor v. Miodrag Joki}, Case No.
IT-01-42/1-A, Judgement on Sentencing Appeal,
30 August 2005
9
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28616
M. Joki} Sentencing Trial Judgement
Prosecutor v. Miodrag Joki},
Case No. IT-01-42/1-S, Sentencing Judgement,
18 March 2004
Kordi} and ^erkez Appeal Judgement
Prosecutor v. Dario Kordi} and Mario ^erkez,
Case No. IT-95-14/2-A, Judgement,
17 December 2004
Kordi}
and
^erkez
Appeal
Judgement Prosecutor v. Dario Kordi} and Mario ^erkez,
Case
Corrigendum of 26 January 2005
No. IT-95-14/2-A, “Corrigendum to
Judgement of 17 December 2004”, 26 January
2005
Kordi} and ^erkez Trial Judgement
Prosecutor v. Dario Kordi} and Mario ^erkez,
Case No. IT-95-14/2-T, Judgement,
26 February 2001
Kraji{nik Appeal Judgement
Prosecutor v. Mom~ilo Kraji{nik,
Case No. IT-00-39-A, Judgement,
17 March 2009
Kraji{nik Trial Judgement
Prosecutor v. Mom~ilo Kraji{nik, Case No.
IT-00-39-T, Judgement, 27 September 2006
Krnojelac Appeal Judgement
Prosecutor v. Milorad Krnojelac, Case
No. IT-97-25-A, Judgement, 17 September 2003
Krnojelac Trial Judgement
Prosecutor v. Milorad Krnojelac, Case No.
IT-97-25-T, Judgement, 15 March 2002
Krsti} Appeal Judgement
Prosecutor v. Radislav Krsti},
Case No. IT-98-33-A, Judgement, 19 April 2004
Krsti} Trial Judgement
Prosecutor v. Radislav Krsti}, Case No.
IT-98-33-T, Judgement, 2 August 2001
Kunarac et al. Appeal Judgement
Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir
Kova~ and Zoran Vukovi}, Case No. IT-96-23-A
& IT-96-23/1-A, Judgement, 12 June 2002
10
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6 September 2011
28615
Kunarac et al. Trial Judgement
Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir
Kova~ and Zoran Vukovi}, Case No. IT-96-23-T
& IT-96-23/1-T, Judgement, 22 February 2001
Kupre{ki} et al. Appeal Judgement
Prosecutor
v.
Zoran
Kupre{ki},
Mirjan
Kupre{ki}, Vlato Kupre{ki}, Drago Josipovi}
and Vladimir [anti}, Case No. IT-95-16-A,
Judgement, 23 October 2001
Kupre{ki} et al. Trial Judgement
Prosecutor
v.
Zoran
Kupre{ki},
Mirjan
Kupre{ki}, Vlato Kupre{ki}, Drago Josipovi},
Dragan Papi} and Vladimir [anti}, Case No.
IT-95-16-T, Judgement, 14 January 2000
Kvo~ka et al. Appeal Judgement
Prosecutor v. Miroslav Kvo~ka, Mlado Radi},
Zoran @igi} and Dragoljub Prca}, Case No.
IT-98-30/1-A, Judgement, 28 February 2005
Kvo~ka et al. Trial Judgement
Prosecutor v. Miroslav Kvo~ka, Milojica Kos,
Mlado Radi}, Zoran @igi} and Dragoljub Prca},
Case No. IT-98-30/1-T, Judgement,
2 November 2001
Limaj et al. Trial Judgement
Prosecutor v. Fatmir Limaj, Haradin Bala and
Isak Musliu, Case No. IT-03-66-T, Judgement,
30 November 2005
Marti} Appeal Judgement
Prosecutor v. Milan Marti}, Case No.
IT-95-11-A, Judgement, 8 October 2008
Marti} Trial Judgement
Prosecutor v. Milan Marti}, Case No.
IT-95-11-T, Judgement, 12 June 2007
Marti} September 2006 Appeal Decision
Prosecutor v. Milan Marti}, Case No.
IT-95-11-AR73.2, Decision on Appeal against
the Trial Chamber’s Decision on the Evidence
of Witness Milan Babi}, 14 September 2006
D. Milo{evi} Appeal Judgement
Prosecutor v. Dragomir Milo{evi}, Case No.
11
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28614
IT-98-29/1-A, Judgement, 12 November 2009
D. Milo{evi} Trial Judgement
Prosecutor v. Dragomir Milo{evi}, Case No.
IT-98-29/1-T, Judgement, 12 December 2007
D. Milo{evi} June 2007 Appeal Decision
Prosecutor v. Dragomir Milo{evi}, Case No.
IT-98-29/1-AR73.1, Decision on Interlocutory
Appeals Against Trial Chamber’s Decision on
Prosecution Motion for Judicial Notice of
Adjudicated Facts and Prosecution’s Catalogue
of Agreed Facts, 26 June 2007
Milutinovi} et al. Trial Judgement
Prosecutor
v.
Milan
Milutinovi},
Nikola
[ainovi}, Dragoljub Ojdani}, Neboj{a Pavkovi},
Vladimir Lazarevi} and Streten Luki}, Case No.
IT-05-87-T, Judgement,
26 February 2009
Mr|a Trial Sentencing Judgement
Prosecutor v. Darko Mr|a, Case No. IT-02-59S, Sentencing Judgement, 31 March 2004
Mrk{i} and [ljivan~anin Appeal Judgement
Prosecutor v. Mile Mrk{i} and
Veselin [ljivan~anin, Case No. IT-95-13/1-A,
Judgement, 5 May 2009
Mrk{i} et al. Trial Judgement
Prosecutor v. Mile Mrk{i}, Miroslav Radi} and
Veselin [ljivan~anin, Case No. IT-95-13/1-T,
Judgement, 27 September 2007
Naletili} and Martinovi} Appeal Judgement
Prosecutor v. Mladen Naletili} and Vinko
Martinovi}, Case No. IT-98-34-A, Judgement,
3 May 2006
D. Nikoli} Sentencing Appeal Judgement
Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikoli}, Case No.
IT-94-2-A, Judgement on Sentencing Appeal,
4 February 2005
M. Nikoli} Sentencing Appeal Judgement
Prosecutor v. Momir Nikoli}, Case No.
IT-02-60/1-A, Judgement on Sentencing Appeal,
12
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28613
8 March 2006
Ori} Appeal Judgement
Prosecutor v. Naser Ori}, Case No. IT-03-68-A,
Judgement, 03 July 2008
Ori} Trial Judgement
Prosecutor v. Naser Ori}, Case No. IT-03-68-T,
Judgement, 30 June 2006
Popovi} et al. January 2008 Appeal Decision
Prosecutor v. Vujadin Popovi}, Ljubi{a Beara,
Drago Nikoli}, Ljubomir Borov~anin, Zdravko
Tolimir, Radivoje Mileti}, Milan Gvero, Vinko
Pandurevi} and Milorad Trbi},
Case No. IT-05-88-AR73.2, Decision on Joint
Defence Interlocutory Appeal Concerning the
Status of Richard Butler as an Expert Witness,
30 January 2008
Popovi} et al. Trial Judgement
Prosecutor v. Vujadin Popovi}, Ljubi{a Beara,
Drago Nikoli}, Ljubomir Borov~anin, Zdravko
Tolimir, Radivoje Mileti}, Milan Gvero, Vinko
Pandurevi} and Milorad Trbi},
Case No. IT-05-88-T, Judgement, 10 June 2010
Popovi} et al. December 2007 Trial Decision
Prosecutor v. Vujadin Popovi}, Ljubi{a Beara,
Drago Nikoli}, Ljubomir Borov~anin, Zdravko
Tolimir, Radivoje Mileti}, Milan Gvero, Vinko
Pandurevi} and Milorad Trbi}, Case No.
IT-05-88-T,
Decision on
Admissibility of
Intercepted Communications, 7 December 2007
Prli} et al. November 2007 Appeal Decision
Prosecutor v. Jadranko Prli}, Bruno Stoji},
Slobodan Praljak, Milivoj Pektovi}, Valentin
]ori} and Berislav Pu{i},
Case No. 04-74-AR73.6, Decision on Appeals
against
Decision
Admitting
Transcript
Jadranko Prli}’s Questioning into Evidence,
23 November 2007
13
Case No.: IT-04-81-T
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of
28612
Prli} et al. April 2009 Appeal Decision
Prosecutor v. Jadranko Prli}, Bruno Stoji},
Slobodan Praljak, Milivoj Pektovi}, Valentin
]ori} and Berislav Pu{i}, Case No.
04-74-AR73.15, Decision on Jadranko Prli}’s
Interlocutory Appeal against the Decision
regarding Supplement to the Accused Prli}’s
Rule 84 bis Statement, 20 April 2009
Simi} Appeal Judgement
Prosecutor v. Blagoje Simi}, Case No.
IT-95-9-A, Judgement, 28 November 2006
Staki} Appeal Judgement
Prosecutor v. Milomir Staki}, Case No.
IT-97-24-A, Judgement, 22 March 2006
Staki} Trial Judgement
Prosecutor v. Milomir Staki}, Case No.
IT-97-24-T, Judgement, 31 July 2003
Stani{i} and @upljanin February 2011 Trial Prosecutor
v.
Mi}o
Stani{i}
and
Stojan
@upljanin, Case No. IT-08-91-T, Decision
Decision
Granting in Part the Prosecution’s Bar Table
Motion and the Prosecution’s Supplementall Bar
Table Motion, 1 February 2011
Strugar Appeal Judgement
Prosecutor v. Pavle Strugar, Case No.
IT-01-42-A, Judgement, 17 July 2008
Strugar Trial Judgement
Prosecutor v. Pavle Strugar, Case No.
IT-01-42-T, Judgement, 31 January 2005
Strugar November 2002 Appeal Decision
Prosecutor v. Pavle Strugar, Miodrag Joki} and
others, Case No. IT-01-42-AR72, Decision on
Interlocutory Appeal, 22 November 2002
Tadi} Appeal Judgement
Prosecutor v. Du{ko Tadi}, Case No. IT-94-1-A,
Judgement, 15 July 1999
Tadi} Trial Judgement
Prosecutor v. Du{ko Tadi}, Case No. IT-94-1-T,
Opinion and Judgement, 7 May 1997
14
Case No.: IT-04-81-T
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28611
Tadi}
October
1995
Appeal
Jurisdiction Prosecutor v. Du{ko Tadi},
Decision
Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on the
Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on
Jurisdiction, 2 October 1995
Vasiljevi} Appeal Judgement
Prosecutor v. Mitar Vasiljevi}, Case No.
IT-98-32-A, Judgement, 25 February 2004
Vasiljevi} Trial Judgement
Prosecutor v. Mitar Vasiljevi}, Case No.
IT-98-32-T, Judgement, 29 November 2002
2. ICTR Judgements and Decisions
Akayesu Trial Judgement
Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No.
ICTR-96-4-T, Judgement, 2 September 1998
Karemera et al. June 2006 Appeal Decision
Prosecutor v. Edouard Karemera, Mathieu
Ngirumpatse and Joseph Nzirorera, Case No.
ICTR-98-44-AR73(C), Decision on Prosecutor’s
Interlocutory Appeal of Decision on Judicial
Notice, 16 June 2006
Karera Appeal Judgement
Prosecutor v. Francois Karera, Case No. ICTR01-74-A, Judgement, 2 February 2009
Kayishema and Ruzindana Appeal Judgement
Prosecutor v. Clement Kayishema and Obed
Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-95-1-A, Judgement,
1 June 2001
Kayishema and Ruzindana Trial Judgement
Prosecutor v. Clement Kayishema and Obed
Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, Judgement,
21 May 1999
Muvunyi Trial Judgement
Prosecutor v. Tharcisse Muvunyi, Case No.
ICTR-2000-55A-T, Judgement,
12 September 2006
Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgement
Prosecutor v. Ferdinand Nahimana, Jean-Bosco
Barayagwiza and Hassan Ngeze, Case No.
ICTR-99-52-A, Judgement, 28 November 2007
15
Case No.: IT-04-81-T
6 September 2011
28610
Nahimana et al. Trial Judgement
Prosecutor v. Ferdinand Nahimana, Jean-Bosco
Barayagwiza and Hassan Ngeze, Case No.
ICTR-99-52-T, Judgement, 3 December 2003
Ndindabahizi Appeal Judgement
Prosecutor v. Emmanuel Ndindabahizi,
Case No. ICTR-01-71-A, Judgement,
16 January 2007
Ntagerura et al. Appeal Judgement
Prosecutor v. Andre Ntagerura, Emmanuel
Bagambiki and Samuel Imanishimwe, Case No.
ICTR-99-46-A, Judgement, 7 July 2006
Ntakirutimana and Ntakirutimana
Appeal Judgement
Prosecutor v. Elizaphan Ntakirutimana and
Gerard Ntakirutimana, Case No. ICTR-96-10-A
& ICTR-96-17-A, Judgement,
13 December 2004
Seromba Appeal Judgement
Prosecutor v. Athanase Seromba, Case No.
ICTR-2001-66-A, Judgement, 12 March 2008
Simba Appeal Judgement
Prosecutor v. Aloys Simba, Case No.
ICTR-01-76-A, Judgement, 27 November 2007
3. Other Jurisprudence
High Command Case
United States v. Wilhelm von Leeb et al.,
Judgement, 27 October 1948, Trials of War
Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military
Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10,
Vol. XI
United States v. Wilhelm List et al., Judgement,
Hostage Case
19 February 1948, Trials of War Criminals
Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals Under
Control Council Law No. 10, Vol. XI
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear
Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons,
ICJ Advisory Opinion
Weapons, Advisory Opinion of 8 July 1996,
I.C.J. Reports 1996
Tamba Brima et al. Trial Judgement
Prosecutor v. Alex Tamba Brima, Brima Bazzy
16
Case No.: IT-04-81-T
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28609
Kamara and Santigie Borbor Kanu, Case No.
SCSL-04-16-T, 20 June 2007
Tokyo Judgement
Judgement of the International Military Tribunal
for the Far East, Tokyo, 12 November 1948,
Vol. I
4. Table of other Authorities
(a) Domestic Laws
SFRY Criminal Code
Criminal Code of the Socialist Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia, adopted by the SFRY Assembly
at the session of the Federal Council on
28 September 1976; published in the official
Gazette of the SFRY No. 44 of 8 October 1976;
correction made in the Official Gazette, SFRY
No. 36 of 15 July 1977; entry into force 1 July
1977; after the dissolution of the SFRY in 1992
the Code remained in force, with some
modifications, and was renamed the Criminal
Code of the FRY.
(b) International Legal Instruments and Commentaries
Additional Protocol I
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions
of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection
of Victims of International Armed Conflicts,
8 June 1977
Additional Protocol II
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions
of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection
of
Victims
of
Non-International
Armed
Conflicts, 8 June 1977
Common Article 3
Article
3
common
to
the
four
Geneva
Conventions of 1949
Geneva Convention IV
Geneva Convention (IV) relative to
Protection of Civil Persons in Time of war,
17
Case No.: IT-04-81-T
6 September 2011
the
28608
12 August 1949
ICRC Commentary on Additional Protocols
Commentary on the Additional Protocols of
8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of
12 August 1949 (Geneva: ICRC, 1987)
5. Table of Short Forms
ABiH
Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina
Accused
Mom~ilo Peri{i}
APC
Armoured Personnel Carriers
APZB NO
Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia
National Defence
BiH
Bosnia and Herzegovina
City Market
Indoor City Market of Sarajevo
CS
Disabling Chemical Agent
CSB
Security Service Centre
BCS
The Bosnian-Croatian-Serbian Language
BiH
Bosnia and Her`egovina
D-2
Type of Diesel Oil
DNA
Deoxyribo Nucleic Acid
Defence Adjudicated Facts I
Trial Chamber Decision on Defence Motion for
Judicial Notice of Adjudicated Facts, 4 May
2010
Defence Adjudicated Facts II
Trial Chamber Decision on Second Defence
Motion for Judicial Notice of Adjudicated Facts,
2 August 2010
Defece Agreed Facts
Trial Chamber Decision in Respect of Joint
Submission of Agreed Facts Proposed by the
Defence, 29 June 2010
18
Case No.: IT-04-81-T
6 September 2011
28607
Defence Final Brief
Mr. Peri{i}’s Final Brief (confidential), 4 March
2011
Drina Wolves
Podrinje Detachment or Drina Corps
Manoeuvre Detachment
DutchBat
Dutch Battalion of UNPROFOR
EC
European Community
ECOSOC
United Nations Economic and Social Council
ECtHR
European Court of Human Rights
Ex. Dxxxx
Defence exhibit
Ex. Pxxxx
Prosecution exhibit
Exs
Exhibits
FAB
Fugasno Avio Bombes
Fn.
Footnote
FRY
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
G[
Main Staff (predecessor to the General Staff)
HDZ
Croatian Democratic Union
HK
Herzegovina Corps
HV
Croatian Army
HVO
Croatian Defence Council
IBK
Eastern Bosnia Corps
ICFY
International
Conference
on
the
former
Yugoslavia
ICJ
International Court of Justice
19
Case No.: IT-04-81-T
6 September 2011
28606
ICRC
International Committee of the Red Cross
ICTR
International
Prosecution
Criminal
of
Persons
Tribunal
for
the
Responsible
for
Genocide and other Serious Violations of
International Humanitarian Law Committed in
the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens
Responsible for Genocide and other Serious
Violations of International Humanitarian Law
Committed in the Territory of Neighbouring
States, between 1 January 1994 and
31 December 1994
IFOR
Implementation Force (NATO-led multinational
force serving in BiH)
IHL
International Humanitarian Law
IKM
Forward Command Post
JNA
Yugoslav People’s Army
KDZ
Anti-Bomb-Squad
Kg
Kilogram
KK
Kozluk Site
KSJ (SUC)
Special Units Corps
KSZ
Department for Forensic and Anti-Terrorism
MOD
Ministry of Defence
MUP
Ministry of the Interior in Republika Srpska
NATO
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NCO
Non-Commissioned Officer
NG[
Chief of the General Staff
20
Case No.: IT-04-81-T
6 September 2011
28605
NK
Nova Kasaba
NVO
Weapons and Military Equipment
OP
Observation Post
OTP/Prosecution
Office of the Prosecutor
p.
Page
pp
Pages
para.
Paragraph
paras.
Paragraphs
PC
Personnel Centre
PJP
Special Police Units
Prosecution Final Brief
Prosecution Final Trial Brief (confidential), 4
March 2011
PTT Building
Former
Building
Postal,
Telephone
that
harboured
and
the
Telegragh
UNMO
headquarters
RS
Republika Srpska
RSK
Republika Srpska Krajina
Rules
Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the
International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
(IT/32/Rev.45)
SAO
Serbian Autonomous District
Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts I
Trial Chamber’s Decision on Prosecution’s
Motion for Judicial Notice of Adjudicated Facts
Concerning Sarajevo, 26 June 2008
Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts II
Trial Chamber’s Decision on Second Motion for
21
Case No.: IT-04-81-T
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28604
Judicial Notice of Facts Relevant to the Sarajevo
Crime Base, 17 September 2008
Sarajevo Adjudicated Facts III
Trial Chamber’s Decision on Third Motion for
Judicial Notice of Facts Relevant to the Sarajevo
Crime Base, 12 January 2010
SBC
Slavonia-Baranja Corps in the SVK
SDA
Party of Democratic Action
SDC (VSO)
Supreme Defence Council
SDS
Serb Democratic Party
SerBiH
Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Her`egovina
SFRY
Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia
SMO
Federal Ministry of Defence
Srebrenica Adjudicated Facts
Trial Chamber’s Decision on Prosecution’s
Motion for Judicial Notice of Facts Relevant to
the Srebrenica Crime Base, 22 September 2008
Srebrenica Agreed Facts
Trial Chamber’s Decision in Respect of
Srebrenica Agreed Facts, 19 August 2009
SRK
Sarajevo-Romanija Corps
SSNO
Federal Secretariat of People’s Defence
SVK
Serbian Army of Krajina
T.
Transcript page
TEZ
Total Exclusion Zone
TG
Tactical Group
TNT
Tri Nitro Toluene
22
Case No.: IT-04-81-T
6 September 2011
28603
TO
Territorial Defence forces
Tribunal
International
Criminal
Tribunal
for
the
Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious
Violations of International Humanitarian Law
Committed in the Territory of the former
Yugoslavia since 1991
TRZ
Technical Overhaul Company
UN
United Nations
UNGA
United Nations General Assembly
UNHCR
United
Nations
High
Commissioner
for
Refugees
UNHQ
United Nations Headquarters
UNMO
United Nations Military Observer
UNPAS
United Nations Protected Areas
UNPROFOR
United Nations Protection Force
UNPROFOR G-2
United Nations Protection Force Intelligence
Officer
UNSC
United Nations Security Council
USA
United States of America
VBR
Modified Aerial Bomb with Multiple Rocket
Launchers
VMA
Military Medical Academy Hospital in Belgrade
VJ
Yugoslav Army
VRS
Army of Republika Srpska
23
Case No.: IT-04-81-T
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Source Exif Data:
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