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Measuring the Effects of Video
Surveillance on Crime
in Los Angeles
Prepared for the California Research Bureau
CRB-08-007

May 5, 2008
Aundreia Cameron
Elke Kolodinski
Heather May
Nicholas Williams

CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ...........................................................................................................4
THE RISE OF CCTV SURVEILLANCE IN CALIFORNIA...................................................6
The Prevalence of Video Surveillance in California ...........................................................7
California Crime Rates, Video Surveillance and Spending.................................................8
Privacy, Efficacy and Public Opinion................................................................................10
Arguments against CCTV on Privacy Grounds…………………………………. 10
Arguments for CCTV on Efficacy Grounds…………………………………….. 11
Privacy versus Efficacy in California…………………………………………... 13
META-ANALYSIS OF EXISTING EMPIRICAL WORK ....................................................14
Crime Deterrence ...............................................................................................................14
Crime Detection, Mitigation and Prosecution ...................................................................17
Local Characteristics of CCTV Implementation ...............................................................18
CCTV, CRIME AND POLICING IN LOS ANGELES ...........................................................18
Crime and Policing in Los Angeles ...................................................................................19
Gang-related Activity.............................................................................................20
The Advent of Video Surveillance ....................................................................................20
RESEARCH QUESTIONS, CASE STUDIES AND METHODOLOGY ..............................21
Research Questions............................................................................................................22
Case Selection: Hollywood Boulevard and Jordan Downs Housing Project ....................22
Methodology ......................................................................................................................25
Statistical Analysis of Crime Data.....................................................................................25
Geographic Areas: Target, Buffer, Control...........................................................25
Time Period of Analysis .........................................................................................27
Measures of Crime.................................................................................................28
Statistical Tests ......................................................................................................28
Qualitative Interviews........................................................................................................29
STATISTICAL FINDINGS ........................................................................................................29
Hollywood Boulevard Statistical Findings ........................................................................30
Pre-Post Crime Analysis........................................................................................32
Crime Displacement Effects...................................................................................33
Pre-Post Arrest Analysis........................................................................................34
Jordan Downs Statistical Findings.....................................................................................35
Pre-Post Crime Analysis........................................................................................36
Crime Displacement Effects...................................................................................38
Pre-Post Arrest Analysis........................................................................................38
Discussion of Findings..................................................................................................................39
Data Limitations ....................................................................................................39
Disparities between the Target and Control..........................................................40
Nature of Crimes....................................................................................................41
Capacity Constraints .............................................................................................42
Increased Detection, Mitigation and Resolution of Crime ....................................42
IMPLEMENTATION AND EFFECTIVENESS......................................................................43
Funding & Private Public Partnerships..................................................................44
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Hollywood ..................................................................................................44
Jordan Downs ............................................................................................45
Types of Partnerships ................................................................................45
Legacy Issues and Maintenance ................................................................45
Additional Public Resources......................................................................46
Simultaneous Crime Reduction Strategies.............................................................46
Surveillance Coverage Area and Camera Placement.............................................47
Hollywood ..................................................................................................47
Jordan Downs ............................................................................................47
Technology and Monitoring ..................................................................................48
Camera Technology ...................................................................................48
Head End Monitoring Systems...................................................................48
Future Implementation...............................................................................49
Operations, Training and Turnover........................................................................49
Camera Configuration ...............................................................................49
Leadership, Training and Turnover...........................................................49
Privacy Considerations and Community Involvement ..........................................50
Station Practices ........................................................................................50
Protecting Privacy Rights ..........................................................................51
CONCLUSIONS FOR POLICYMAKERS...............................................................................53
REFERENCES.............................................................................................................................55
APPENDICES ..............................................................................................................................64
APPENDIX A. Evidence of CCTV Crime Prevention......................................................61
APPENDIX B. Sorting the Data........................................................................................73
APPENDIX C. Statistical Analysis ...................................................................................77
APPENDIX D. Video Camera Specifications ..................................................................90
LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES
Table 1. CA Cities with Significant Surveillance Systems..............................................................7
Table 2. CA Jurisdictions with Actively Monitored Systems..........................................................7
Figure 1. Crime in California 1996-2005 .......................................................................................9
Table 3. Causal Mechanisms of CCTV Crime Curtailment ..........................................................12
Table 4. Summary of Meta-analysis Results .................................................................................16
Figure 2. Crime in Los Angeles 1997-2007...................................................................................19
Figure 3. Case Study Locations .....................................................................................................22
Table 5. Hollywood Boulevard Characteristics .............................................................................23
Figure 4. Hollywood Demographic Change ..................................................................................23
Table 6. Jordan Downs Characteristics..........................................................................................24
Table 7. Methodology....................................................................................................................25
Figure 5. Hollywood Camera Locations........................................................................................26
Figure 6. Jordan Downs Camera Locations...................................................................................27
Table 8. Jordan Downs and Nickerson Gardens Demographics....................................................27
Table 9. Hollywood Average Monthly Crime Rates (pre-implementation) ..................................30
Table 10. Hollywood Target and Control Area Arrests January 2003 to February 2005 (preimplementation) .............................................................................................................................31
Table 11. Hollywood Monthly Crime Rates..................................................................................32
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Figure 7. Hollywood Monthly Crime ............................................................................................33
Figure 8. Percentage Change in Hollywood Monthly Crime Rates Following CCTV .................34
Table 12. Hollywood Monthly Arrest Rates..................................................................................34
Table 13. Jordan Downs/Nickerson Gardens Average Monthly Crime Rates
(pre-implementation) .....................................................................................................................35
Table 14. Jordan Downs Target and Control Arrests January 2003 to September 2006 (preimplementation) .............................................................................................................................36
Table 15. Monthly Crime Rates in Jordan Downs and Nickerson Gardens ..................................37
Figure 9. Jordan Downs Monthly Crime .......................................................................................38
Figure 10. Percentage Change in Crime in Jordan Downs Study Areas .......................................38
Table 16. Jordan Downs Monthly Arrests Rates ...........................................................................39
Table 17. Implementation Successes and Challenges....................................................................43

Acknowledgements: Our project would not have come together without the guidance, assistance
and enthusiasm of the following individuals: Dr. Juliet Musso, Charlene Wear Simmons and
Dean Misczynski of the California Research Bureau, Commander Louis H. Gray Jr., Deputy
Chief Charlie Beck, Lieutenant Jeff Godown, Douglas Wagner, Nathan Ong, Sergeant Daniel
Gomez, Sergeant Don Graham, Officer Manuel Hernandez, Officer Jude Washington, Captain
Clay Farrell, Lieutenant Ruben De La Torre, Kerry Morrison, Sarah MacPherson, Tracey
Yasunaga, Peter Bibring, Romy Ganschow, Tamika Taylor, Pastor Mike Cummings and Chris
Weare. And special thanks to Toasted Head Wines and Nabisco Corp.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This study reviews existing literature of video surveillance and measures the effectiveness of
surveillance to deter crime in select locations within Los Angeles, California. Aided by
additional funding from the federal government, private donations and the dropping cost of video
surveillance equipment, a growing number of local law-enforcement departments across
California are employing fixed video surveillance, also called closed-circuit television (CCTV),
of public space. Proponents of video surveillance argue that it may deter criminal behavior by
increasing the probability of detection and apprehension, but evidence pertaining to its
effectiveness is mixed and concerns about privacy infringement persist.
Building upon previous research of CCTV by the California Research Bureau, we first examine
44 video surveillance evaluations, primarily conducted in the United Kingdom, that investigate
the technology’s deterrent effect on crime. Following deployment of CCTV, 41 percent of these
evaluations reported a statistically significant reduction in crime, 43 percent reported no
statistically significant effect (increase or decrease) on crime, and 16 percent showed a
significant crime increase. Importantly, none of the five evaluations of CCTV conducted in the
United States found a statistically significant crime reduction. In addition, few empirical studies
have investigated the utility of video surveillance in enhancing law enforcement’s ability to
detect crimes or mitigate harm after it occurs. Nor did our meta-analysis uncover studies that
examined the relationship between the presence of CCTV and the ability of police to elicit
confessions from suspects or raise the likelihood of obtaining a guilty verdict in court.
The City of Los Angeles is one municipality in the state in which law enforcement monitors
video surveillance cameras in “real time.” L.A. has financed many of its cameras through
innovative public-private partnerships and federal grants. To further inform state and local
policymakers as to the effectiveness of CCTV in deterring crime, we employ a quasiexperimental research design to analyze the effectiveness of video surveillance in two locations
in Los Angeles: Hollywood Boulevard’s “Walk of Fame” and Jordan Downs public housing
development.
Our statistical analysis of crime and arrest data before and after implementation found:
• Neither cameras in Jordan Downs nor Hollywood Boulevard had any statistically
significant effect in reducing the overall monthly crime rates within the target areas;
• The monthly rate of violent crimes fell in both the Jordan Downs and Hollywood target
areas but the results were not statistically significant;
• The monthly rate of property crimes decreased in Hollywood and increased in Jordan
Downs, but the results were not statistically significant;
• The evidence on the displacement of crime is mixed; in both locations, some crimes
increased at a faster rate in buffer areas (between 500 and 1000 feet), while other crimes
decreased at a faster rate in these same areas; however, the results were not statistically
significant;
• CCTV had no statistically significant effect on monthly arrest rates for misdemeanor
“quality of life” infractions in either Jordan Downs or Hollywood Boulevard.

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Because local implementation and operations were found to be critical to CCTV effectiveness in
our meta-analysis, we complement our statistical findings through interviews with the Los
Angeles Police Department (LAPD), community groups and business interests as well as through
related documents and media reports. In so doing, we find that the types of crimes being targeted
by the Los Angeles Police Department, and the dynamism of the areas under study, may limit the
generalizability of our results.
We also isolate specific aspects of deployment in Los Angeles that may present challenges or
opportunities to policymakers and law enforcement considering CCTV. These include funding
and public-private partnerships; the presence of simultaneous crime reduction strategies; the
importance of camera placement and coverage area; the technology and monitoring capabilities
of the cameras; the influence of training, turnover and leadership in CCTV operations; and
privacy considerations and community involvement.
Our study led to the development of the following six overarching lessons for policymakers:
1. CCTV is a tool for law enforcement, not a panacea;
2. Public-private partnerships save costs, but raise new policy questions;
3. Effective and sustainable CCTV systems require adequate training, leadership and
resources;
4. Explicit guidance on storage and use of video surveillance might help to allay privacy
concerns;
5. Deterrence and enforcement are strongly intertwined;
6. Additional research is needed into local program operations, as well as the detection,
apprehension and prosecution of criminal suspects.

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THE RISE OF VIDEO SURVEILLANCE IN CALIFORNIA
This study examines the effectiveness of video surveillance, also called closed-circuit television
(CCTV) systems, in reducing and deterring crime. While privately monitored CCTV systems
have long been a feature of crime prevention in shopping malls, convenience stores, parking
garages, airports and hospitals, video surveillance systems that are monitored by law
enforcement are relatively new to the U.S. A nationwide survey of law enforcement agencies
conducted by RAND in 2000 found that only 3 percent of local departments and 7 percent of
state police reported extensive use of “fixed-site video surveillance cameras (Schwabe et al.
2001). 1
In contrast, public CCTV systems have been employed extensively in cities throughout Europe
for more than a decade. In Great Britain, for example, CCTV is so prevalent that some residents
can expect to be captured by a camera at least 300 times a day (Fussey 2007). With more than
10,000 cameras operating in London alone, at a total cost of nearly $400 million, the securitycamera cordon surrounding the city has earned the nickname the “Ring of Steel” (Davenport
2007). 2
However, an amalgamation of technological improvements, cost reductions in video-monitoring
equipment and federal grants to aid local law enforcement in fighting terrorism have contributed
to an appreciable increase in CCTV deployment in the United States. Since the terrorist attacks
of September 11, 2001, for instance, the Department of Homeland Security’s Grant Program
(HSGP) has awarded $23 billion to state and local governments — funds that can be used by
local law enforcement for a variety of security enhancements, including video surveillance
(Center for Democracy and Technology 2008). While the Department of Homeland Security will
not divulge the funding allocated specifically for video surveillance, a Boston Globe
investigation suggests that a “large number of new surveillance systems, costing at least tens and
probably hundreds of millions of dollars, are being simultaneously installed around the country
as part of homeland security grants” (Savage 2007). Our own analysis of news coverage suggests
the following cities received federal grants to aid in their CCTV deployment: Chicago, New
York, St. Paul, Madison, Pittsburgh, New Orleans, Baltimore, San Francisco and Los Angeles. 3
Chicago, which now has 560 cameras in “high-crime areas,” received $34 million to help link up
existing camera systems to one centralized location (Moore 2005). New York, for its part,
recently unveiled the Lower Manhattan Security Initiative, a plan that includes adding more than
3,000 surveillance cameras to the 250 cameras currently in place (Viahos 2008). Other cities
such as Philadelphia, Washington D.C. and New Orleans have also invested heavily in CCTV
surveillance (Bulwa and Stannard 2007). 4
1

The RAND survey further found that only 1 percent of state and local police nationally use “mobile video
surveillance cameras, [which] might be used in a stakeout or hostage negotiation situation” (Schwabe et al. 2001).
2
Costs reported in pound sterling by London’s Evening Standard as £200 million. Converted into dollars April 11,
2008, at a rate of 1.969.
3
The Globe reports the following grants from DHS: St. Paul, MN, received a $1.2 million grant for 60 cameras;
Madison, WI, received a $388,000 grant for 32 cameras; Pittsburgh received $2.58 million for 83 cameras.
4
In 2007, U.S. Senator Joe Lieberman (I-CT), Chairman of the Homeland Security and Government Affairs
Committee, proposed an amendment requiring the Homeland Security Department to develop a “national strategy”
for surveillance-camera deployment in the United States to fight terrorism (Office of U.S. Senator Joseph Lieberman
2007).

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Active vs. Passive
Monitoring
Two basic modes of
deployment currently
enable CCTV
surveillance in public
spaces: actively
monitored systems and
passively monitored, or
recording-only,
systems.
Actively monitored
systems require
personnel to monitor
television screens in
real time. Depending
on the hardware
installed, actively
monitored systems can
allow for recording as
well, in addition to
remote movement of
cameras and even
audible communication
with subjects in the
surveilled areas. Such
systems enable law
enforcement to respond
to, and potentially halt,
crime as it occurs.
Passively monitored,
recording-only
systems, on the other
hand, provide a record
of criminal activity that
can be used as evidence
later, but these systems
cannot be viewed in
real time.

The burgeoning federal involvement in CCTV funding and
deployment has likely contributed to the growth of public video
surveillance by law enforcement in California — a trend that is
likely to continue. In this section, we discuss the prevalence of
CCTV in California and give a general snapshot of crime trends in
the state. We also examine some of the privacy concerns raised by
opponents of public video surveillance and delineate the
predominant theories as to why video surveillance may prove an
effective crime fighting tool.
The Prevalence of Video Surveillance in California
The use of CCTV in California is on the rise. A 2007 American
Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) report found that, of the 131 cities in
northern and southern California surveyed, at least 37 have some
sort of public video surveillance program in place. Of these cities,
18 have “significant” surveillance programs for public streets and
plazas (Schlosberg and Ozer 2007). Cities and jurisdictions with
“significant” surveillance systems are listed in Table 1; cities and
jurisdictions with “actively monitored” systems in which local
police departments can monitor the cameras in real time are listed in
Table 2. 5
Table 1.
California Cities with
Significant Surveillance
Systems
Antioch
Brentwood
Clovis
Fairfield
Fresno
Lakeport
Los Angeles
Manteca
Pittsburg

Ripon
Sacramento
San Francisco
Stockton
Long Beach
Palm Springs
Riverside
Santa Barbara
South Gate

Table 2.
California Cities with
Actively Monitored
Systems
Brentwood
Clovis
Fairfield
Fresno
Lindsay
Pinole
Pittsburg
Ripon

Sacramento
Santa Rosa
Stockton
Fullerton
Long Beach
Los Angeles
Oxnard
Riverside
Santa Monica

Schlosberg and Ozer (2007). “Public Records Survey Summary Findings”;
available at:
www.aclunc.org/docs/Government_Surveillance/report_spreadsheet_for_website.
pdf.

Schlosberg and Ozer (2007) do not indicate whether these municipalities view the cameras in real time, nor do they
specify what constituted a “significant” CCTV system.

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Particularly notable cases of video surveillance programs in California include the following city
programs: 6
San Francisco. The city has installed 68 CCTV recording cameras since 2005. The San
Francisco Chronicle reported that, as of March 2008, the city had spent $900,000 and
had budgeted an additional $200,000 for 25 more cameras to target both violent gang
activity and property crime (Knight 2008). 7
Fresno. The city has 47 video surveillance cameras currently in place. The Fresno Bee
reports that the city plans to deploy 130 more cameras by October 2008, followed by 250
more cameras by 2009 (Guy 2008). 8 The Fresno Police Chief has indicated that the $3
million project will be actively monitored.
El Cerrito. This California city in Contra Costa County enacted the Surveillance Act of
2007. The law mandates police-accessible video surveillance cameras in certain types of
businesses such as liquor stores, banks, check-cashing businesses, gas stations,
convenience stores and pawn shops (El Cerrito City Ordinance 2007–06).
San Jose. In June 2006, the San Jose City Council appropriated $96,727 to install
surveillance cameras in the city’s downtown areas (San Jose City Council 2006). The San
Jose Redevelopment Agency raised $97,000 for the purchase of the video surveillance
cameras (Herhold 2007). 9
Los Angeles. In conjunction with private businesses, federal grants and businessimprovement districts, the Los Angeles Police Department has purchased and deployed
80 actively monitored cameras in various locations since 2002, including the famous
Hollywood “Walk of Fame”; MacArthur Park, a municipal park in downtown; Santee
Alley in downtown; and the Jordan Downs public housing projects in Watts, among
others. Private parties have given the LAPD direct access to data collected by
approximately 30 additional cameras (Email correspondence, Gomez April 14, 2008).
California Crime Rates, Video Surveillance and Spending
As the utilization of video surveillance by law enforcement has increased, overall crime in
California has remained relatively stable, and, in some cases, declined. In 2006, the state had 518
violent crimes and 1,889 property crimes per 100,000 residents (California Department of Justice
2006). Compared with other states, California ranked 25th in the rate of crime per 100,000
residents (United States Department of Justice 2005). While the violent crime rate in California
6

For brief descriptions of additional CCTV systems in California, including Palm Springs, San Diego and Vallejo,
see California Research Bureau (Nieto et al. 2002) “Public and Private Applications of Video Surveillance and
Biometric Technologies,” p. 17-18.
7
Cameras are located at 24th and Harrison streets in the Mission District, at the corner of Eddy and Laguna streets,
outside the Yerba Buena Plaza East housing project, Pacific Avenue and Stockton Street in Chinatown, and Market
Street and Sunnyvale Avenue at the request of residents.
8
The article notes that “cameras are already in place in Roeding Park, near the FAX bus transfer station in
Manchester Center and along Parkway Drive” and will also be used to monitor activity near public schools.
9
Note that because of the timing of the ACLU report, neither El Cerrito nor San Jose was included in its survey.

-8-

increased 1.2 percent in 2006, this was the first such increase in 13 years (California Department
of Justice 2006). In contrast, the property crime rate has steadily increased since 1999 (ibid). 10
Rates for violent and property-related crime per 100,000 residents in California from 1996 to
2005 are shown in Figure 1.
Figure 1. Crime in California 1996-2005

COMPSTAT Historical Fact Sheet (2008).

Despite these general declines, crime and crime prevention loom large in both the minds of
residents and the state budget. A 2006 poll conducted by the Ralph and Goldy Lewis Center for
Regional Policy Studies at the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA), indicated that
crime was the second most important concern among southern Californian residents that year
(SCS Fact Sheet 2006). Another poll, conducted in 2005, indicated that 56 percent of
Californians were “extremely concerned” about crime and law enforcement (California Opinion
Index 2005). Clearly, public safety is important to Californians, and the use of video surveillance
has increasingly become a part of the crime prevention toolkit used by police departments.
In 2002, California spent about $18.1 billion to fight crime, a figure that includes the costs of
police, prosecution, courts and corrections (California Department of Justice 2002). 11 Additional
grants from the federal government to California cities and jurisdictions for new security
measures such as video surveillance represent an important source of new revenue for law
enforcement in the state.

The crime rate represents the number of crimes per 100,000 people in California. It should be noted that official
crime statistics imperfectly measure actual crime. Official statistics are based on reported crimes and, therefore, do
not account for crimes that were not reported to police or were otherwise not detected by law enforcement officials.
11
This figure is not adjusted for inflation and represents the last year in which the cost of crime was estimated by the
California Department of Justice.

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Furthermore, the sale of video surveillance equipment has exploded in recent years. While
surveillance sales trends in California were not available, one market research firm estimates that
global surveillance sales will have grown at a compound annual growth rate of 12.4 percent from
2005 to 2008 (RNCOS, 2007). Another market research firm anticipates revenue for video
surveillance equipment worldwide will expand from $13.5 billion in 2006 to $46 billion in 2013
(ABI Research Press Release, 2008). “This is a modern version of the California gold rush
except that people are bringing cameras instead of pickaxes and shovels,” ABI Research Vice
President and Research Director Stan Schatt stated (ibid).
The general fear of crime, the availability of federal grants and an ever-expanding video
surveillance marketplace have certainly played a role in the growth of CCTV in California and
elsewhere. But the expansion has been accompanied by lingering questions about the
effectiveness of CCTV systems and concerns about the protection of individuals’ civil liberties.
We next consider these underlying concerns in the context of general support for video
surveillance.
Privacy, Efficacy and Public Opinion
The ubiquity of public video surveillance cameras nationwide is experiencing widespread public
support, including in California. An ABC News/Washington Post Poll (2007), for example,
reveals that 71 percent of Americans approve of additional video surveillance. This has not
changed since a CBS News opinion poll conducted in 2002 (CBS) found that 60 percent of
respondents polled thought video surveillance would help reduce crime.
Nevertheless, these programs do face some opposition on privacy grounds, a problem that
California policymakers will eventually be called on to weigh against the systems’ purported
value as a law enforcement tool (discussed in “Arguments for CCTV on Efficacy Grounds” on p.
11). Growing concern regarding the value of video surveillance as a crime prevention strategy is
starting to make headlines in California (Knight 2008). The debate generally hinges upon two
main issues: privacy and effectiveness.
Arguments Against CCTV on Privacy Grounds
Many privacy advocates and constitutional scholars have taken issue with CCTV surveillance,
both nationally and in California. The Fourth Amendment, which ensures “… the right of the
people to be secure in their persons…” has served as the primary legal grounds for opposition to
CCTV surveillance. Privacy advocates suggest that the use of video surveillance in public places
violates the Fourth Amendment wherever a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy is
intruded (Schlosberg and Ozer 2007). The U.S. Supreme Court has battled over whether video
surveillance is constitutional and should be used as evidence in criminal proceedings. In
California, local chapters of the ACLU have further decried the possible “chilling effect” (Nieto
1997) video surveillance might have on First Amendment rights, such as the freedom of
assembly and the freedom of speech. Additionally, California is unique in that voters
overwhelmingly approved a “Right to Privacy” amendment to the California Constitution in
1972. Privacy advocates argue that unrestricted or unregulated utilization of video surveillance
may infringe upon this constitutional provision (Schlosberg and Ozer 2007).
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To address the privacy issues that emerged after the deployment of CCTV in businesses, the
courts established the rule that “whatever the public may see from a public place cannot be
private” 12 (Paton-Simpson 2000). In 1997, the standard was tightened slightly to include only
what could be seen with “the naked eye” 13 in response to the intrusive nature of some video
surveillance technologies. Privacy advocates note that the confluence of sophisticated
technologies — easily available personal data; GIS-mapping software; free street-mapping
software with satellite and, in some cases, street views; facial-recognition software; radiofrequency identification; and high-resolution video surveillance equipment — dramatically
widens the scope of information that can be obtained about an individual within the view of “the
naked eye” (Nieto 2002). 14
Of primary importance to privacy advocates is an apparent lack of guidance on the protection of
civil liberties regarding the storage of video imagery and how actively monitored systems should
be used, if at all. The ACLU notes that “[c]ities throughout California have approved and
implemented camera systems without guidelines to guard against abuse and, in most
circumstances, with little or no public debate” (Schlosberg and Ozer 2007). They argue that
without such guidance, stored video footage may be obtained by random citizens through routine
public records requests. Moreover, video operators may inappropriately profile certain groups or
target individuals for personal amusement. In the United Kingdom, one privacy watchdog
suggests that up to “90 percent of CCTV installations fail to comply with the Information
Commissioner’s U.K. CCTV code of practice, and many installations are operated illegally”
(Davenport 2007). A review of more than 600 hours of data from three different surveilled areas
in the United Kingdom found that 9 out of 10 targets by CCTV operators were men and almost
half were teenagers (Norris 2007). The study also found that Britons of African descent were
between 1.5 and 2.5 times more likely to be targeted by CCTV operators than one would expect
when compared to their percentage in the overall population (ibid). 15
Arguments For CCTV on Efficacy Grounds
Supporters of video surveillance typically adhere to “rational choice” theories or environmental
criminology, both of which emphasize place-based constraints on criminal behavior. A rationalchoice model assumes that criminals are rational actors that make decisions as to where, when
and how they will commit a crime. For environmental criminologists, the spatial dimensions of
crime are most important, and, therefore, offer “place-based” strategies for prevention
(Brantingham and Brantingham 1981). Taken together, Ronald Clarke (1983) calls these
“situational crime prevention” strategies, which he characterizes as comprising measures that:
“(1) target specific forms of crime, and (2) involve management, design, or manipulation of the
immediate environment … so as to increase its risks as perceived by a wide range of offenders.”

N.O.C., Inc. v. Schaefer, 484 A.2d 729, 730 (N.J. Super. 1984).
Vega-Rodriguez v. Puerto Rico Telephone Company, 110 F.3d 174 (1st Cir. 1997).
14
For additional information on these technologies, see California Research Bureau (Nieto, et al. 2002) “Public and
Private Applications of Video Surveillance and Biometric Technologies.”
15
It is worth noting that 40% of people of the people that the police targeted in the study were picked out “for no
obvious reason.”
13

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Clarke and Homel (1997) classify CCTV as a type of “formal surveillance” that grew from Oscar
Newman’s (1972) “defensible space” approach, which proposed designing buildings and
communities to increase visibility in vulnerable public spaces. Newman’s was among the first
situational crime techniques and a significant catalyst for formalized surveillance.16 It has been
suggested that CCTV surveillance acts as a “force multiplier” that can prevent crime by
enhancing law enforcement’s ability to detect and apprehend criminals, increasing the public’s
awareness of criminal activity, and elevating the perceived risk of apprehension to criminals.
Table 3 provides a matrix of crime-prevention mechanisms.

Table 3. Causal Mechanisms of CCTV Crime Curtailment
Caught in the act
You’ve been
framed

Nosy parker

Effective
deployment

Perpetrators will be detected and possibly removed or deterred.
CCTV deters potential offenders who perceive an elevated risk of
apprehension.
CCTV may lead more people to feel able to frequent the surveilled
places. This will increase the extent of natural surveillance by
newcomers, which may deter potential offenders.
CCTV directs security personnel to ambiguous situations, which may
head off their translation into crime.

Time for crime

CCTV could symbolize efforts to take crime seriously, and the
perception of those efforts may energize law-abiding citizens and/or
deter crime.
CCTV may be perceived as reducing the time available to commit crime,
preventing those crimes that require extended time and effort.

Memory jogging

The presence of CCTV may induce people to take elementary security
precautions, such as locking their car, by jogging their memory.

Publicity

Anticipated
shaming
Appeal to the
cautious

The presence of CCTV may induce people to take elementary security
precautions for fear that they will be shamed by being shown on CCTV.
Cautious people migrate to the areas with CCTV to shop, leave their
cars, and so on. Their caution and security mindedness reduce the risk.

Armitage, Smyth, and Pease (1999). Burnley CCTV Evaluation. In N. Tilley (ed.), Surveillance of Public
Space: CCTV, Street Lighting and Crime Prevention, pp. 226-227

These theories function in contrast to traditional criminological theories that investigate the “root
causes” of crime, that is, the psychological and social forces that lead to criminal behavior
16

Nevertheless, Newman was much more interested in “natural surveillance” and never explicitly advocated for
formal video surveillance. In addition, his own defensible space research was widely criticized because of
methodological errors.

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(Clarke 1983). From this perspective, because situational strategies do not address the underlying
causes of crime, CCTV surveillance simply displaces criminal activity to areas that are not being
watched (Brantingham and Brantingham 1981). Moreover, if the deterrent effects of CCTV
surveillance rest on perpetrators being rational actors who minimize the chance of being caught,
it may not be effective in preventing certain types of crimes, such as crimes of passion or those
where post-operation apprehension does not apply, such as suicide bombing.

Privacy versus Efficacy in California
The tensions between liberty and security in relation to video surveillance are playing out, in
particular, in two northern California cities. However, as the use of CCTV to monitor public
spaces grows, cities in other parts of California are likely to face similar deliberations.
The 68 publicly funded cameras in San Francisco, spearheaded by Mayor Gavin Newsom are
passively monitored, a configuration that was decided upon to address privacy concerns. San
Francisco city law prohibits police officers from viewing video surveillance footage in real time,
and mandates that the cameras be turned off during planned protests to protect political speech.
Instead, footage may be viewed after a crime occurs, but is automatically erased every 72 hours.
However, Kevin Ryan, the newly appointed director of the mayor’s own Office of Criminal
Justice, argued that without an actively monitored surveillance system like that in Chicago or
Los Angeles, the power of video surveillance as a law enforcement tool cannot be realized
(Bulwa, 2008). Ryan and others argue that actively monitored systems provide police with an
opportunity to respond to crimes as they occur. San Francisco Police Commissioner Joe AliotoVeronese, too, believes that the passively monitored configuration — along with their low
resolution and slow frame rate (two to four frames per second) — limits the system’s usefulness
to police. Some of the police commissioners note that only one arrest has been made in
connection with a murder after more than two years of video surveillance. San Francisco Police
Chief Heather Fong, however, argues that, despite the difficulty in quantifying criminal
deterrence, the level of comfort video surveillance brings to citizens should not be discounted.
In neighboring Oakland, then-mayor and current California State Attorney General Jerry Brown
rejected the use of video surveillance in the city in 1999 (Schlosberg and Ozer 2007). Brown
argued that the police department and the community working together will make the city safer;
video surveillance, while becoming increasingly intrusive, will not. Mr. Brown’s past opposition
to video surveillance and his current position as the State Attorney General at the California
Department of Justice make him a potentially significant source of opposition to further
deployment of CCTV systems in California. In October 2005, however, Oakland Councilman
Ignacio De La Fuente circumvented the City Council, attracted funding through a public-private
partnership and had three cameras installed in his district, giving full utilization of them to the
police. Interestingly, De La Fuente had eloquently stated his opposition to the installation of
video surveillance cameras in the city in 1999, but apparently changed his mind (Ozer 2006) in
an effort to combat drug dealing outside a liquor store in his district (De La Fuente 2005).
In many cases, these arguments play out ideologically because empirical study of the
effectiveness of CCTV in California is lacking. Currently, researchers at UC Berkeley are
- 13 -

evaluating San Francisco’s CCTV program, but according to Peter Bibring, contributing writer
on the ACLU’s “Watchful Eye” study, and Romi Ganschow, policy department coordinator for
ACLU, Northern California, very little research is currently underway in other parts of the state
to determine the true efficacy of video surveillance in crime prevention (Interviews, November
14, 2007). 17 The goal of this study is to provide a better empirical foundation for considering
CCTV policy in California through both existing research and original case studies. We first
summarize empirical findings from studies of video surveillance systems in other jurisdictions.
We then use these studies to inform our evaluation of the effectiveness of video surveillance in
select locations within the City of Los Angeles.
META-ANALYSIS OF EXISTING EMPIRICAL WORK
A number of studies from around the world have examined the effectiveness of video
surveillance as a law enforcement tool. This meta-analysis builds upon these studies to detail the
apparent effects of video surveillance on various types of crime both in the United States and
internationally. It also reviews the effects of video surveillance by the environment in which the
surveillance cameras operate. Finally, the analysis provides a framework for understanding local
programmatic characteristics that may impact CCTV, describing qualitative differences between
the prevention of crime, the mitigation of crime as it occurs, and the apprehension and
prosecution of criminal subjects.
Crime Deterrence
In 2002, Welsh and Farrington published a meta-analysis of the research on the effectiveness of
CCTV done to date for the United Kingdom’s Home Office, the government department
responsible for protecting the public from crime and terrorism. They found that half (11) of the
22 evaluations analyzed reported statistically significant reductions in crime, 27 percent (6)
reported no statistically significant results, and 23 percent (5) reported a statistically significant
increase in crime. We built upon their analysis and used their framework to include additional
evaluations that have been produced since the meta-analysis was published. Our results are
similar, with 41 percent of the evaluations reporting a statistically significant decrease in crime,
43 percent reporting no statistically significant or uncertain results, and 16 percent reporting a
statistically significant increase in crime.
The criteria for including a CCTV evaluation, as specified in Welsh and Farrington’s (2002: 3)
and used in our analysis, are:
1. CCTV intervention is the focus of the study;
2. Outcome measures of crime are reported;
3. The study used a minimum research design of before-and-after measures of crime in
experimental and control areas;
4. The total number of crimes in each area prior to the CCTV intervention was at least
20.

University of California researchers released preliminary findings from as study on the effectiveness of video
cameras in San Francisco in March of 2008.

- 14 -

We searched online academic databases and the bibliographies of CCTV reports to identify
additional studies. We found another 22 CCTV evaluations in addition to the 22 evaluations
from the initial analysis for a total of 44 assessments. 18 Of these evaluations, 79.5 percent (35)
were conducted in the UK, 11 percent (5) in the U.S., and the remaining 4 percent were
conducted in Canada, Japan, the Netherlands or Norway. The majority 57 percent (25) of the
CCTV systems we evaluated monitored city streets, 20.5 percent (9) were in residential areas, 11
percent (5) were in public transit stations, and 11 percent (5) were in public parking lots.
Summaries of the evaluations methodologies, locations, and results included in our analysis can
be found in Appendix A (p. 65).
We then classified the evaluations into one of the categories defined by Welsh and Farrington
(2002: 7): 19
1. Desirable effect: Significant decrease in crime;
2. Undesirable effect: Significant increase in crime;
3. Null effect: No statistically significant effect on crime;
4. Uncertain effect: Unclear evidence of an effect on crime.
Of the 44 evaluations included in our analysis, 43 percent reported the cameras had no or an
uncertain effect on reducing crime, 41 percent reported a statistically significant reduction in
crime, and 15.9 percent reported some undesirable effect (i.e. a statistically significant crime
increase). Within the 19 evaluations that found no statistically significant effect on crime or were
uncertain as to CCTV’s effect, 36.8 percent (7) reported a reduction in crime, 52.6 percent (10)
reported an increase in crime, and 10.5 percent (2) reported no change or a very small change in
crime.
Importantly, none of the five evaluations that were conducted on CCTV systems in the United
States showed any significant decrease in crime from the presence of cameras. This raises
interesting questions as to whether cultural or geographic differences may influence CCTV’s
deterrent effect. Another review by Welsh and Farrington (2004) suggests that video surveillance
was “found to be far more effective in reducing crime in Britain than in America.” These
differences, they argue, may be attributable to a number of factors, including the absence of
interventions such as ”improved street lighting or police patrols” in the American CCTV
programs they evaluated, as well as cultural differences, such as stronger public support of
CCTV in the United Kingdom (ibid).
The CCTV systems in parking lots had the greatest success rate, with four of the five systems
evaluated demonstrating a desirable effect. In contrast, none of the nine CCTV systems in
residential areas were classified as having a desirable effect, with the majority (seven)
demonstrating no or an uncertain effect on crime. The results for the systems in city streets and
public transit stations were mixed; about half (12) of the systems in city streets were associated
with a desirable effect, 10 exhibited no or an uncertain effect on crime, and three were associated
18

The number of assessments is the total number of quantitative CCTV evaluations, not the number of studies.
Some reports included evaluations of CCTV systems in multiple locations, so the number of evaluations exceeds the
number of studies.
19
The categories are based on the results of the statistical analyses reported in the evaluations and do not necessarily
indicate that the CCTV system caused the observed change in crime.

- 15 -

with increased crime compared to the control. Similarly, two of the CCTV systems in public
transit stations fell in the desirable effect category, two were classified as having a null effect and
one experienced an undesirable effect. Refer to Table 4 for a summary of the results of our metaanalysis.
Table 4. Summary of Meta-Analysis Results
Effect

Desirable Effect

Undesirable Effect

Uncertain/Null
Effect

Evaluations

Location (#
evaluations)

CCTV Environment
(# evaluations)

UK (16)
The Netherlands (1)
Japan (1)

City Streets (12)
Parking lot (4)
Public Transit (2)

UK (7)

City Streets (3)
Residential (2)
Parking lot (1)
Public Transit (1)

UK (12)
US (5)
Canada (1)
Norway (1)

City Streets (10)
Residential (7)
Public Transit (2)

Some of the studies also analyzed changes in certain types of crime. Overall, CCTV had the
greatest impact on vehicle and other types of property crimes, with 10 evaluations reporting
decreases in vehicle crime and 12 evaluations reporting decreases in property crime. 20 The
CCTV systems had a lesser effect upon violent crimes; four assessments reported a decrease in
violent crime and two evaluations reported increases in violent crime (although the authors
suggest that the increase in violent crime may be due to increased detection). Similarly, in
California, University of California, Berkeley researchers released preliminary findings of their
evaluation of San Francisco’s CCTV system. They found “that nonviolent thefts dropped by 22
percent within 100 feet of the cameras, but the devices had no effect on burglaries or car theft”
(Knight, 2008). The study also found that San Francisco’s cameras had “no effect” on violent
crimes (ibid).
These differences between the apparent ineffectiveness of cameras to deter violent crimes, by
comparison to their apparent success in deterring property crimes, may relate back to the
underlying theory that some crimes, such as property-related offenses like larceny, are often
opportunistic (Fabrikant 1979). In contrast, many violent crimes may be motivated by passions
that make individuals less rational, more impulsive, and therefore less influenced by the risk of
detection or apprehension.
20

The evaluations were carried out in several countries, each with their own different system of categorizing and
defining crime. Here, vehicle crime generally refers to vehicle theft and theft from vehicles. Other types of property
crime include burglary, robbery, theft, larceny and “street crimes.”

- 16 -

The findings from the University of California, Berkeley study regarding possible differences in
deterrent effects based on the distance from the cameras also raise concerns about possible
displacement of crime to other areas — an issue raised by critics of situational crime prevention
strategies.
Crime Detection, Mitigation and Prosecution
Although an inherent part of deterring crime is the detection and apprehension of criminals,
operational differences between CCTV systems affect law enforcement’s ability to mitigate
crime as it is happening and the prosecution of a crime after it has been committed.
As discussed briefly in “Privacy versus Efficacy in California” (p. 13) proponents of actively
monitored video surveillance argue that while not all areas may show a statistically significant
net reduction in crime, such monitoring can be used to reduce the escalation of crime as it is
happening. For instance Shepherd (et al. 2005) argues that CCTV surveillance helps to explain
conflicting reports in England and Wales, between an increase in the number of violent crimes
recorded by police, and a decrease in the number of injuries resulting from violent crimes.
Shepherd’s analysis suggests that surveillance has increased detection of violent crimes while
“facilitating a faster police response to arguments and assaults, which limits their duration and
reduces the likelihood and seriousness of injury” (Laurence 2005).
Law enforcement and other officials further argue that video evidence provides a critical
prosecutorial tool, but no studies in our review examine their effectiveness in the apprehension
and prosecution of criminal suspects. Anecdotal evidence suggests that a crime captured on
video may move an undecided jury to reach a guilty verdict or a judge to impose a more severe
sentence on an assailant. For instance, the California Research Bureau cites the importance of
video evidence in prosecuting the perpetrators of the first World Trade Center Bombing (Nieto
1997). According to Deputy Chief Charlie Beck of the Los Angeles Police Department, recorded
evidence of a crime is also instrumental in gaining a confession from a suspect before court
proceedings begin (Interview, Beck, February 5, 2008). A recent homicide investigation in
Fresno provides further evidence for this assertion: Two individuals captured on video shooting a
young man in southwest Fresno were apprehended by police. The suspects originally pleaded
self-defense but confessed to the crime after being told of the video evidence (Guy 2008).
Some studies have questioned the admissibility of CCTV and other surveillance-related
technologies in a courtroom setting (Murphy 1999). As evidence, CCTV footage is considered
circumstantial, not conclusive (Schlosberg and Ozer 2007). Moreover, to be considered
admissible as evidence, the video footage must add new factual elements to the prosecution’s
case; merely being persuasive does not make it pertinent to a case in court (Greenfield 1991).

- 17 -

Local Characteristics of CCTV Implementation
This discussion of the effectiveness of CCTV in reducing crime, and its operational use as a
crime mitigation and prosecution tool, suggest that local programmatic characteristics heavily
influence the success of surveillance programs. It raises issues around the specific tactical
elements of deployment, for example, whether the deployment of different hardware systems in
different locations causes technical problems for a police department, how the resolution and
frame rate of surveillance cameras affect CCTV’s usefulness, and whether sporadic monitoring
of systems designed to be actively monitored contributes to public safety (Interview, Beck,
February 5, 2008).
These varying results give rise to five operational elements that researchers have identified
which may enhance the deterrent effect of video on criminal activity:

Comprehensive crime-prevention programs that employ other strategies to complement
CCTV programs (Gill and Spriggs 2005),
More cameras and greater surveillance coverage of an area (Gill and Spriggs 2005),
Continuous surveillance areas (e.g., parking lots, commercial areas, and parks) (Gill and
Spriggs 2005),
Small and well-defined surveillance areas (Ratcliffe 2006),
Police monitoring and operation of the CCTV system (Ratcliffe 2006).

These individual operational elements may not play an equal role in CCTV program
effectiveness in every case, but they do provide an initial framework for understanding potential
differences. By studying a city in California, additional characteristics that may influence CCTV
effectiveness may arise. The City of Los Angeles’ targeted deployment of CCTV, made possible
largely through public-private partnerships and donations, may also offer new insight to
California policymakers and law enforcement. In the next sections, we provide some context for
our examination of the effectiveness of video surveillance in two locations within Los Angeles.
CCTV, CRIME AND POLICING IN LOS ANGELES
Our meta-analysis identified that, despite the growing popularity of CCTV systems in California
and the mixed results of previous studies, only San Francisco has undertaken a serious evaluation
of its surveillance program — an assessment conducted only recently. Given our finding that
local program characteristics likely affect the overall success of CCTV programs — which are
often very different from one other — in reducing and preventing crime, it is critical that other
cities’ CCTV programs are evaluated and that local characteristics and context are described.
To inform policymakers and law enforcement officials who currently have or are considering
employing CCTV systems as a crime-prevention and crime-reduction tool, we evaluate two
actively monitored public video surveillance programs in Los Angeles. As the largest
municipality in California, Los Angeles may have the greatest demand for future deployment of
CCTV systems and an early assessment of its successes and failures may have broader
implications than those from a smaller city. Moreover, the unique partnerships and actively
monitored systems in Los Angeles provide a framework for comparing programmatic
- 18 -

characteristics to San Francisco’s passively monitored, publicly funded video surveillance
program.
As previously mentioned, working through various public-private partnerships, the Los Angeles
Police Department actively monitors about 80 cameras within its city limits. 21 Locations of these
cameras include MacArthur Park, major thoroughfares in Hollywood, the Jordan Downs housing
project in Watts, and a street in downtown Los Angeles’ fashion district named Santee Alley.
We first discuss crime in Los Angeles, the policing situation in the City, and the successful
deployment of CCTV in MacArthur Park. We then provide an overview of our two chosen case
studies or target areas: Jordan Downs Housing Development in Watts and Hollywood Boulevard
between La Brea and Vine in Hollywood. We also describe our control or comparison areas for
our statistical analysis before describing our research questions and methodological approach.
Crime and Policing in Los Angeles
With more than 4.2 million residents, Los Angeles is the second most populous city in the United
States and the largest city in California. Overall, crime rates in Los Angeles have steadily
declined over the years. As illustrated in Figure 2, both property crimes and violent crimes (per
10,000 residents) are the lowest in 10 years. In 2007, the number of crimes reported was fewer
than the previous year in every major (Part I) crime category, including homicide, rape, robbery,
aggravated assault, larceny, auto theft and burglary. Although the crime rate in Los Angeles
remains high when compared to the largest city in the country, New York City, L.A.’s crime rate
(per 10,000 residents) in 2006 was lower than other major California cities, such as San
Francisco and Oakland. (Both San Francisco and Oakland’s crime rates per capita increased in
various crime categories over the last two years.) Still, homicide rates are higher in Los Angeles
than in San Jose, San Diego, Santa Ana, Fresno, Sacramento and many other California cities.
Figure 2. Crime in Los Angeles 1997-2007

Spanning 469 square
miles, Los Angeles is
also one of the largest
cities in the United
States. Despite its
significant size and
population, Los
Angeles has far fewer
police officers per
resident and per square
mile than other large
American cities
(Wagers 2007). As of

It should be noted that “actively monitored” video feeds are not watched constantly. The LAPD uses knowledge
of an area and daily crime statistics to determine during which hours of the day to monitor cameras and how the
cameras should be oriented while merely recording (Interview, Graham, March 26, 2008.)

- 19 -

2006, the City of Los Angeles employed 2.4 police officers for every 100,000 residents, as
compared to 4.9 in New York City and 4.8 in Chicago (ibid). Similarly, Los Angeles’ 19.7
officers per square mile are dwarfed by New York’s 128.8 or Chicago’s 61.9 (ibid).
Gang-related Activity
Another important element of Los Angeles crime and policing, particularly in Southeast Los
Angeles, is the prevalence of gang-related activity and the focus of law enforcement on the
suppression of such crimes. A recent report by the Advancement Project (2006) names Los
Angeles “the gang capital of the world,” noting the 40,000 gang members and more than 700
gangs in the city; an astounding 75 percent of youth gang homicides in California take place in
Los Angeles. (In the beginning of 2008, Los Angeles experienced a sharp upswing in gangrelated homicides: As of March 19, 2008, 93 people had been killed in Los Angeles, compared
with 69 during the same period last year — a nearly 35 percent increase [Rubin 2008]).
The Advent of Video Surveillance
William Bratton took over as chief of the LAPD in October 2002. Prior to his arrival, crime had
increased by 54 percent over the previous three years (The Economist 2007). Chief Bratton
brought to Los Angeles many of the same crime-reduction strategies he had previously applied in
other large metropolitan areas cities, among them New York and Boston. These strategies largely
focus on his belief in a “broken windows” theory of policing, wherein officers are encouraged to
address minor criminal offenses in an effort to deter more serious crimes later. One such tactic to
capture and deter these minor offenses was the deployment of video surveillance cameras.
The first police-coordinated deployment of video surveillance in Los Angeles took place at
MacArthur Park, a 40-acre park in the Rampart police district, west of downtown Los Angeles.
While the park was once a tourist hot spot surrounded by an affluent neighborhood and upscale
hotels, after World War II the area transformed into a high-density immigrant community.
Beginning in the 1980s, the park experienced a substantial increase in gang activity, prostitution
and drug-related crimes, and eventually earned the unfortunate distinction of having one of the
highest homicide rates in the city (Leovy 2006). The park was home to five rival gangs — the
Mara Savatrucha, 18th Street, Temple Street, the Playboys and the Drifters — who turned the
park into an open-air black marketplace where drugs, fake ID cards, and stolen goods could be
readily bought and sold. The park became notorious as a place where “anything and everything”
illegal could be obtained (Interview, Beck, February 5, 2008).
A seven-camera actively monitored system was deployed in MacArthur Park in late 2003 with
the help of a federal grant and a partnership with GE Hamilton at a cost of $100,000. (Blankstein
and Ari B. Bloomekatz 2008; Interview, Beck, February 5, 2008). The cameras were one part of
the Alvarado Corridor Initiative, a multifaceted crime prevention and reduction program that
included both tactical deployments and cooperation with other city departments. For example,
the Department of Recreation and Parks added recreational after-school programs in the area,
maintenance crews began regularly cleaning up litter and graffiti in the park, and the Department
of Water and Power doubled the park’s lighting. In addition, the LAPD added standardized
- 20 -

patrols wherein the same police officers
would patrol the same beats. According
to Deputy Chief Charles Beck, the
cameras were used predominately to
target drug dealing and document
forgeries taking place in the park
(Interview, Beck, February 5, 2008).
Senior training officerss within the LAPD
at the Rampart Police Station control the
cameras and can call units in to make an
arrest. “At first we made so many arrests
that it overloaded our system — 50 to 60
buyers within a few hours”(ibid).
While no formal evaluation of the video
surveillance cameras was conducted, Sousa and Kelling (2006) report that Part I offenses fell
from 38 per week before the Alavardo Corridor Initiative was put into place to 30 after it
began. 22 These early successes of the MacArthur Park video surveillance system were referenced
to support subsequent deployments in Los Angeles, including along Hollywood Boulevard and
in Jordan Downs Housing Project.
Hollywood Boulevard cameras were initially deployed in March 2005, focusing on reducing
property crimes, for sting operations, mitigating criminal behavior outside local nightclubs and
retail establishments, and thwarting potential terrorist attacks. By contrast, cameras in Jordan
Downs, a residential public housing project in Watts, were installed in October 2006 to target
gang activity, and drug-related and violent crime. 23
The following section explores our research questions, case studies, methodology and data
collection.
RESEARCH QUESTIONS, CASE STUDIES AND METHODOLOGY
This study seeks to fill a critical information gap regarding the effectiveness of closed-circuit
television (CCTV) programs in California in deterring crime. It also seeks to identify
programmatic features that enhanced or inhibited the successful implementation of CCTV. We
employ both quantitative and qualitative methods to determine the efficacy of CCTV systems in
two Los Angeles locations: Jordan Downs Housing Project and Hollywood Boulevard. Both
locations have had CCTV systems for at least one year and provide an important context to
compare CCTV systems in different environments. Although each location has unique social,
political and economic conditions, the problems of disorderly conduct, potential terrorist acts,
22

It is important to note that this apparent reduction could not be directly attributed to the presence of the cameras.
Moreover, the study looked at crime reduction for both the reporting district (RD) that contained MacArthur Park
and the surrounding area. Finally, no comparison or control area was used in the Sousa and Kelling study.
23
Other ongoing surveillance in Los Angeles, including a partnership with the Motion Picture Association of
America to combat bootlegged DVD sales in Santee Alley in downtown Los Angeles, and cameras in MacArthur
Park that target drugs, gangs and prostitution, are not included in this analysis but remain important areas for future
study.

- 21 -

gang violence, property crime and theft, drugs and prostitution are by no means unique to these
locations or to Los Angeles, and the lessons learned here may be applicable to many other areas
throughout California.
Research Questions
Our analysis addresses the following questions:
1) What effect does CCTV surveillance have on crime rates in different environments?
• Does video surveillance have different deterrent effects on different types of crime? For
instance, has it been more effective in deterring property crimes rather than violent
crimes?
• Does CCTV displace crime to adjacent areas outside of the view of the cameras, or does
it have a more robust deterrent effect on the larger community?
• How has CCTV deployment affected arrest rates for quality of life infractions? Has it
increased the detection of these violations that would otherwise go unreported?
2) What factors have contributed to the success of, or present challenges to, CCTV
implementation?
• Which technical aspects of implementation might other localities adopt that may
contribute to success?
• Are certain kinds of environments and arrangements, such as public housing projects or
heavily touristed retail areas, well-suited or ill-suited to CCTV surveillance?
While other questions, such as the effectiveness of CCTV in the identification and prosecution of
suspected criminals, remain important, we viewed an in-depth legal case analysis to be beyond
the scope of this report.
Case Selection: Hollywood Boulevard and Jordan Downs Housing Project
Figure 3. Case Study Locations
To investigate the potentially
deterrent effects of CCTV
surveillance on the different types of
crimes that happen in different
locales, we juxtaposed research on a
retail environment using a matched
pairs analysis and a housing
development using a suitable control.
Arguably one of the most famous
streets in the world, Hollywood
Boulevard is home to the Walk of
Fame, Grauman’s Chinese Theatre,
and the Hollywood and Highland
shopping center. More than 10
million tourists visit various
- 22 -

locations along Hollywood Boulevard each year (Economic Research Associates 2004).
A 2003 LA Inc. (formerly Los
Angeles Convention &
Table. 5 Hollywood Boulevard Characteristics
Visitors Bureau) study
Retail Area
Site:
reported that the Hollywood
February/March 2005
Dated Installed:
Walk of Fame was the fifth
Number of
most visited attraction in Los
5 studied; 14 total
Cameras:
Angeles; Grauman’s Chinese
$103,000 in 2004 + $100,000 in
Theatre was also in the top 10.
Cost:
2005
Together with the 38 area
hotels and motels, 53
10-12 hours per day; 90% of time at
nightclubs and 110 restaurants
Hrs of Surveillance:
night
on or adjacent to Hollywood
Boulevard, Hollywood is
Type of
Active monitoring
trafficked by pedestrians day
Surveillance:
and night. Hollywood
Private donation
Funding Source:
Boulevard is also home to the
Kodak Theatre where the
Academy Awards are held and
Cooperative with police and the
Implementation:
a Metrolink subway station,
Business Improvement District
and is frequently the site of
movie premiers, political
rallies and protest marches,
Narcotics, property crimes, public
Crimes Targeted:
and festivals.
nuisance, robbery, and terrorism

Figure 4. Hollywood Demographic Change
In addition to the large number of
visitors to the Hollywood area, which
encompasses roughly 20 square miles, it
is also home to more than 230,000
residents (Economic Research
Associates 2004). 24 As of 2003, these
residents were slightly older (36.4), had
a lower median household income
($41,026) and were more likely to be
unemployed than Californians as a
whole (Economic Research Associates
2004; American Community Survey
Data Profile Highlights: California
2003). Figure 4 shows demographic
changes in total population and total households between 2003 and 2008. Over the next five
years, more than 4,000 new units of high-end housing will become available in and around the
24

Note that the area size includes both Griffith Park and Los Feliz; pursuant to CA Assembly Bill 588.

- 23 -

Hollywood Entertainment District, representing a development investment of more than $1
billion dollars (Economic Research Associates 2004).
Jordan Downs, a 700-unit public housing development in the Watts neighborhood in South Los
Angeles, is the second largest public-housing project run by the city’s Housing Authority. The
housing project was originally constructed during World War II to house the influx of Southern
African American laborers who came to fill jobs left vacant by departing soldiers serving
overseas (McGrath 2005). Beginning in the 1960s, the area suffered as the number of
manufacturing jobs steadily declined. By the late 1970s, street gangs formed, and Jordan Downs
became a stronghold for the Grape Street Crips (Winton and Vives 2008). While Jordan Downs
was almost exclusively African American from the early 1940s until the 1980s, the number of
Latino tenants has increased steadily to about 50 percent (Interview, Graham, March 26, 2008),
which has increased social tensions in the area (McGrath 2005). The poverty rate for the ZIP
code containing Jordan Downs was 38.1 percent in 2000 compared to 18.3 percent for the city of
Los Angeles as a whole. In addition, Jordan Downs Housing Complex has been the central point
in a gang war since 2005.

Table. 6 Jordan Downs Characteristics
Site:

Public Housing Project

Dated Installed:

October 2006; December 2006

Number of Cameras:

6 studied

Cost:

$1.2 million

Hrs of Surveillance:

Before and after school

Type of Surveillance:

Active monitoring

Funding Source:

Private grant, Federal grant

Implementation:

Cooperative with police and
community groups

Crimes Targeted

Gang violence, property
crimes, homicides, robberies

- 24 -

Methodology
Table 7 below summarizes our research methods, data and data sources.
Table 7. Methodology
How does CCTV affect crime rates?
Methodology
Statistical analysis of monthly crime rates
before and after CCTV intervention in target,
buffer, and control/matched pair sites

Data

Part I and Part II crime records; arrest
records for quality of life violations

What factors of CCTV implementation contribute to success or present
challenges?
Methodology

Data

Semi-structured interviews; document and
media report analysis

Qualitative accounts of the CCTV
implementation process and other
crime prevention interventions in study
areas

Statistical Analysis of Crime Data
We employ a quasi-experimental research design to examine monthly crime data before and after
the introduction of CCTV along the Hollywood Boulevard Walk of Fame between Vine Street
and La Brea Avenue and at the Jordan Downs public housing development in Los Angeles to
measure the effect of CCTV on crime. Descriptive statistics for overall crime and different
categories of crime are analyzed in target, buffer and control areas to determine if there are any
significant changes in crime rates and if these changes can be attributed to the CCTV system.
Our geographic areas of analysis, the time frame of the analysis, measures of crime and
statistical tests are detailed below.
Geographic Areas: Target, Buffer, Control
We delineated target, buffer and control areas that form the geographical basis of our analysis.
The target areas consist of the public space that is directly under surveillance, which we
estimated as the 500 foot radius around each camera. The buffer area is the space 500 to 1000
feet away from the cameras that is not directly under surveillance but is the most susceptible to
the diffusion of benefits or the displacement of crime from the nearby CCTV systems. 25 The
25

We base the geographic estimate on previous studies that have looked at possible displacement effects; while the
cameras at each location may be capable of viewing a crime beyond 500 feet in any direction, we felt it reasonable
to assume that not all crimes occurring within sight range could be viewed.

- 25 -

control/comparison areas serve as a point of comparison for any change in crime or arrest rates;
they are geographically and socio-economically similar and do not have CCTV systems.
For the Hollywood site, the target and buffer locations run along the approximately one-mile
stretch of Hollywood Boulevard between La Brea Avenue and Vine Street. Determining a
control area proved to be difficult, however, due to the unique combination of establishments,
tourism, armed private security and a Metrolink station along Hollywood Boulevard. Upon the
advisement of the LAPD, we selected the five surrounding police reporting districts to serve as a
comparison or matched pair. 26 This area is commonly referred to as “the Box” by the local police
since it contains a high concentration of restaurants and nightclubs that clearly delineate it from
the surrounding neighborhoods and is the focus of Hollywood Area law enforcement. Figure 5
depicts the Hollywood target, buffer and comparison areas.

Figure 5. Hollywood Camera Locations

For the Jordan Downs location, the target and buffer areas are on the grounds of the Jordan
Downs public housing development. Since the movements of the residents of Jordan Downs are
tightly bounded by the territorial boundaries of the Grape Street Crips gang that operates in the
complex, the buffer areas for the southernmost cameras on 103rd Street have been shortened to
conform to the gang’s turf boundary delineated by 103rd Street.

A reporting district is the smallest statistical unit regularly reported by the LAPD.

- 26 -

Figure 6. Jordan Downs Camera Locations
A nearby housing project
called Nickerson Gardens, the
largest public housing
development in Los Angeles,
was used as a control. As seen
in Table 8, the inhabitants of
both Jordan Downs and
Nickerson Gardens have
similar demographic
composition and incomes.
Both projects house powerful
gangs to which police
attribute the majority of
crimes — the Grape Street
Crips in Jordan Downs and
the Bounty Hunter Bloods in
Nickerson Gardens. In
addition, Jordan Downs’ two
main policing strategies aside
from video surveillance — a gang injunction and task force — have been active at Nickerson
Gardens for the duration of our study period. Figure 6 depicts the Jordan Downs study areas.
Table 8. Jordan Downs and Nickerson Gardens Demographics

White alone
Black or African American alone
Not Hispanic or Latino
Hispanic or Latino
Median Household Income in 1999

Jordan Downs
8%
61%
60%
40%
$13,306

Nickerson Gardens
13%
47%
47%
53%
$12,053

Time Period of Analysis
We collected crime data from January 2003 — the earliest date detailed crime records were
available — through March of 2008. In Hollywood, five cameras were first installed during
February of 2005, followed by the deployment of three additional cameras in June of 2006. To
control for the potentially confounding effect of the addition of cameras in the buffer and
matched pair, we evaluated the period 25 months before and 14 months after the initial
implementation, but prior to the subsequent deployment. Six cameras in Jordan Downs began
installation in December 2006, so the pre-deployment period is 45 months and the postdeployment period is 16 months. In both cases, a two-month implementation period was
excluded from the analysis to account for the difference between when the cameras first went up
and when they went “live.” (Note: The exact dates from when surveillance poles first went up to
all cameras’ going live could not be precisely determined.) These time frames are within the
- 27 -

range employed by studies with similar aims and will allow us to account for seasonal and
longer-term crime trends.

Measures of Crime
We collected two different measures of crime: arrest records and reported crime records. We
looked at both Part I crimes— homicide, robbery, aggravated assault, theft and motor vehicle
theft — and Part II crimes — including battery, bomb threats and disorderly conduct. While
LAPD reported that Part II crimes are less of a priority for the Department, we felt that in the
case of Hollywood, at least, many of these crimes may be deterred by the presence of the
cameras. Types of crime that cannot reasonably be affected by CCTV, such as fraud, were not
included in our analysis.
In addition, we collected data on arrests for minor offenses, such as narcotics, prostitution and
drunkenness, to measure CCTV’s effect in detecting crime. These “victimless” violations are not
reported to police as crimes; they are only recorded when police actually observe the criminal
behavior and make an arrest. Therefore, these crimes are under-reported, and it is hypothesized
that CCTV’s “caught in the act” mechanism described earlier in “Privacy, Efficacy, and Public
Opinion” (p. 10) will lead to an increase in detection and arrests for these quality-of-life crimes.
Statistical Tests
To determine if the changes in crime rates and arrests are real as opposed to the result of random
fluctuation, we performed a relative effect size (RES) statistical test. This test allows us to
compare before-and-after crime levels in two different areas. We compared changes in monthly
crime rates between the target and control areas as well as between the buffer and control areas.
If the RES is statistically significant, meaning that there is less than a 5 percent probability that
the observed change in crime is due to random variance, then we can conclude that crime
changed at a different rate in the experimental and control areas. It is important to note that a
statistically significant RES does not prove causation. Moreover, the absence of a statistically
significant result does not prove that the cameras were ineffective. For further information on the
statistical test, refer to Appendix C on p. 77.

- 28 -

Qualitative Interviews
To supplement and aid in the interpretation of the statistical analysis, we also collected
qualitative data on the implementation and operation of the CCTV systems and other policing
strategies. We triangulated media reports, official documents and semi-structured interviews with
Los Angeles Police Department personnel in the Hollywood and Southeast stations (which
monitor our test areas), COMPSTAT (the statistical analysis unit of the LAPD), and others in the
South Bureau for background information on the original implementation of video surveillance
in the Hollywood and Jordan Downs vicinities. Additionally, we interviewed community leaders
in the Jordan Downs area and business leaders in Hollywood. Through these interviews, we
obtained descriptions of the CCTV-system implementation process from many different
perspectives, as well as information on ongoing implementation practices, and the integration of
the technology with other policing and community strategies. This information allowed us to
identify factors of the CCTV implementation process that have been successful, what the biggest
challenges have been and how those challenges have been addressed. Given the variability in the
effectiveness of CCTV systems in other states and countries, this qualitative aspect of the
evaluation is imperative to the interpretation of the quantitative results and highlights a number
of programmatic issues that affect how the CCTV systems operate. A complete list of
interviewees is listed in the references.
STATISTICAL FINDINGS
In this section we test the three prevailing hypotheses on closed-circuit television’s (CCTV)
effects on crime. First, if CCTV effectively deterred criminal activity, we would expect that any
decrease in crime within the test area would be greater than any decrease in the matched pair or
control following CCTV deployment. In particular, we would expect property crime rates to be
more affected by CCTV than violent crimes, based on previous studies. Second, if the presence
of cameras displaced crime from the target area to the surrounding areas (the buffers), we would
expect that the crime rate in the buffer areas would increase or decline less than in the matched
pair or control area. Lastly, we would expect the arrest rate for minor violations would increase
in the target areas relative to the matched pair or control after the implementation of CCTV.
This latter hypothesis is due to the fact that, unlike property and violent crimes that are reported
to police by the victims, many minor, quality-of-life violations are “victimless,” and, therefore,
are only recorded if the police themselves detect the criminal behavior and make an arrest. We
would expect that CCTV would allow the police to better detect these minor infractions as they
are happening, leading to an increase in the arrest rate. (A lowering of crimes accompanied by an
increase in arrests occurred in MacArthur Park, where the implementation of an actively
monitored CCTV system led to a sharp increase in narcotics arrests [Sousa 2006]).
Our statistical analysis of crime and arrest data before-and-after implementation in both Jordan
Downs and Hollywood found:
•

Neither cameras in Jordan Downs nor Hollywood Boulevard had any significant effect in
reducing violent or property crime rates within the target areas;

- 29 -

•
•
•

•

The monthly rate of violent crimes fell in both the Jordan Downs and Hollywood target
areas; however, the Nickerson Gardens control site and the Hollywood Box matched pair
experienced similar reductions and the results were not statistically significant;
The monthly rate of property crimes decreased in Hollywood, and increased in Jordan
Downs, but the results were not statistically significant in either case;
The evidence on the displacement of crime is mixed; in both locations, some crimes
increased at a faster rate in the adjacent areas, indicating that CCTV may displace crime,
while other types of crimes decreased relatively more in the buffer areas, though results
were not statistically significant;
CCTV had no statistically significant effect on arrest rates for misdemeanor quality-oflife infractions in Jordan Downs or on Hollywood Boulevard.

Our statistical findings in each location are further explored below. We first examine the crime
profile of each site prior to CCTV deployment, disaggregating the monthly rate of different types
of arrests and suppressible crimes; we then present the results of the before-and-after analysis of
monthly crime and arrest rates. Following our presentation of the statistical findings, we discuss
the limitations of the analysis and provide some possible alternative explanations that may have
contributed to the uncertainty of the statistical effects of our study.
Hollywood Boulevard Statistical Findings
Over the 25 months observed prior to the implementation of CCTV along Hollywood Boulevard
(target area), there were 1,951 crimes we deemed as suppressible; that is, crimes that occurred
outside on the street or sidewalk in areas that might have been observed by the cameras. Of these
crimes, 44.3 percent were violent, 54 percent were property-related, and the remaining 1.6
percent were “other” crimes (including both violent and non-violent offenses such as shots fired,
bomb threats and pandering).
Table 9. Hollywood Average Monthly Crime Rates
January 2003 to February 2005 (pre-implementation)
Hollywood Blvd
Target Area
Crime Type
All Crimes
Violent
Homicide
Aggravated Assault
Robbery
Battery
Property
Vandalism
Car Theft
BTFV
Theft
Other Crimes

% of Total
100.0%
44.3%
0.1%
11.3%
7.6%
25.4%
54.0%
7.1%
7.2%
13.0%
26.7%
1.6%

Avg per Month
78.0
34.6
0.04
8.8
5.9
19.8
42.2
5.6
5.6
10.2
20.8
1.3

- 30 -

Hollywood Box
Matched Pair
% of Total
100.0%
39.3%
0.1%
11.1%
8.6%
19.4%
59.6%
10.1%
10.4%
19.0%
20.1%
1.1%

Avg per Month
248.0
97.4
0.4
27.6
21.2
48.2
147.8
25.0
25.8
47.1
49.9
2.8

As shown in Table 9, theft — including purse snatching, petty theft, and grand theft person —
represented the most prevalent crime in the area (26.7 percent), followed closely by battery (25.4
percent). On an average monthly basis, there were 20.8 thefts reported, 19.8 batteries, 10.2
burglaries or thefts from vehicles (BTFV), 8.8 aggravated assaults, 5.9 robberies, 5.6 car thefts
and vandalism-related crimes, 1.3 other crimes and 0.04 homicides. (There was only one
homicide in the target area over the 25-month pre-implementation period).
In the remainder of the Hollywood “Box,” the matched pair comparison area, 6,200 crimes took
place during our pre-implementation period. A higher percentage of total crimes in the Box were
related to property crimes (59.6 percent). In particular, a higher proportion of cars were stolen
(10.4 percent of all crimes) or broken into (19.0 percent of all crimes) in the Box, though the
target area had a relatively higher percentage of thefts. In contrast, the percentage of violent
crimes was lower in the Box than in the target area with a considerably lower proportion of
batteries and slightly lower percentage of aggravated assaults than the target area; however,
robberies and homicides represented a slightly larger share of crimes in the Box.
In addition to violent and property crime, we also examined the incidence of quality-of-life
infractions, which are recorded as arrests rather than as crimes. In the 25 month period before the
cameras were installed, there were 2,439 arrests in the Hollywood target area for misdemeanor
offenses. As portrayed in Table 10, the most frequently occurring arrest categories were
narcotics (35.9 percent of all arrests), drunkenness (25.3 percent of all arrests) and “other” arrests
(37.3 percent of all arrests), which include Part II crimes that may not rise to level of being
categorized into a specific category. On an average monthly basis, there were 98.9 total arrests,
35.5 arrests for narcotics, 25 arrests for drunkenness, 36.9 other arrests, and less than one arrest
for liquor laws, prostitution and weapon possession.
Table 10. Hollywood Target and Control Area Arrests
January 2003 to February 2005 (pre-implementation)

Arrest Group
Total Arrests
Drunkenness
Liquor Laws
Narcotics
Prostitution
Weapon
Possession
Other

Hollywood Blvd
Target
% of
Avg per
Total
Month

Hollywood Box
% of
Total

Avg per
Month

100.0%
25.1%
0.4%
36.7%
0.2%

97.6
24.5
0.4
35.8
0.2

100.0%
22.1%
1.0%
35.3%
4.5%

261.5
57.9
2.6
92.3
11.8

0.7%

0.7

1.1%

3.0

36.8%

35.9

35.9%

94.0

In comparison, there were 6,537 misdemeanor arrests in the Box. Table 10 shows that the
proportion of arrests were very similar in the Box and the target area; however, in the Box, a
slightly higher percentage of arrests were for liquor laws (1 percent), prostitution (4.5 percent)
and weapon possession (1.1 percent) than in the target area.

- 31 -

Taken together, the crime and arrest summaries from the pre-implementation period indicate that
the Box provided an adequate matched pair comparison for the Hollywood Boulevard target
area.
Pre-Post Crime Analysis
As shown in Table 11, we found that the average monthly crime rate on Hollywood Boulevard
decreased 10.3 percent following CCTV deployment, which is a slightly smaller reduction in
crime than seen in the matched pair (11.1 percent).
Table 11. Hollywood Monthly Crime Rates

Crime Type
All Crimes
Violent Crimes
Homicide
Agg. assault
Robbery
Battery
Property Crimes
Vandalism
Car Theft
BTFV
Theft
Other Crimes

Pre
78.04
34.60
0.04
8.84
5.92
19.80
42.16
5.56
5.60
10.16
20.84
1.28

Hollywood Blvd
Target Area
Post
% Change
70.00
33.93
0.07
7.57
5.64
20.64
34.64
6.71
4.36
6.00
17.57
1.43

-10.3%
-1.9%
78.6%
-14.4%
-4.7%
4.3%
-17.8%
20.8%
-22.2%
-40.9%
-15.7%
11.6%

Pre
248.00
97.36
0.36
27.60
21.24
48.16
147.80
25.00
25.80
47.12
49.88
2.84

Hollywood Box
Matched Pair
Post
% Change
220.50
93.86
0.14
21.57
19.36
52.79
123.50
24.64
19.57
34.36
44.93
3.14

-11.1%
-3.6%
-60.3%
-21.8%
-8.9%
9.6%
-16.4%
-1.4%
-24.1%
-27.1%
-9.9%
10.7%

Violent crime decreased slightly less in the target area (1.9 percent) compared to the matched
pair (3.6 percent) after CCTV implementation. Of the violent crimes, aggravated assault declined
the most — 14.4 percent — along Hollywood Boulevard; however, the aggravated assault rate
fell to a greater degree (21.8 percent) in the Box. Similarly, while robbery decreased by 4.7
percent in the target area, the Box saw an 8.9 percent reduction in robberies during same time
period. Battery, the most prevalent violent crime, increased in both the target and matched pair
during the post-implementation period, but Hollywood Boulevard had a relatively smaller
increase (4.3 percent) compared to the Box (9.6 percent). Although the homicide rates posted
large percentage changes from the pre- to post-implementation periods (78.6 percent and -60.3
percent in the target and matched pair, respectively), the number of homicides is so low that they
have little effect on the overall violent crime rate.
Property crimes decreased substantially more than violent crimes in both the target and matched
pair; however, in contrast to violent crimes, property crimes decreased more in the target area
(17.8 percent) than in the matched pair (16.4 percent). Both areas saw the greatest decline in
vehicle crimes, but Hollywood Boulevard experienced a relatively greater decrease in theft from
vehicles (40.9 percent versus 27.1 percent in the matched pair), while the Box saw a relatively
- 32 -

greater reduction in the number of stolen vehicles (24.1 percent versus 22.2 percent in the target
area). Thefts also decreased considerably in both areas, though the reduction was greater in
Hollywood Boulevard (15.7 percent) than the Box (9.9 percent). The starkest contrast was the
change in vandalism rates following CCTV deployment; along Hollywood Boulevard vandalism
increased 20.8 percent, while the vandalism rate decreased by 1.4 percent in the Box.
While this comparison seems to lend some credence to the hypothesis that CCTV deters property
crime, none of the observed divergences in crime rates between the target and matched pair were
statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level. Therefore, we cannot distinguish to
what extent the differences were due to random fluctuation in crime or to an actual increase or
decrease in crime attributable to CCTV or other factors. As seen in Figure 7, crime fluctuates
widely from month to month. For more details on the statistical significance of our findings,
refer to Appendix C on p. 77.

Figure 7. Hollywood Monthly Crime

Crime Displacement Effects
We compared the before-and-after crime rates in buffer areas (i.e occurring between 500 and
1,000 feet of each camera) to the matched pair to test for the potential displacement of crime. In
particular, we were interested in examining displacement of battery, burglary or theft from
vehicle, and other thefts—the categories of crime where the target area experienced a relatively
greater decrease (or smaller increase) in crime than the matched pair.
As seen in Figure 8, the evidence is mixed. The buffer area experienced a smaller decline in
BTFV and a larger increase in battery when compared to the matched pair and the target area.
This suggests that these types of crimes may have been displaced rather than deterred by CCTV.
In addition, vandalism and other crimes increased relative to the matched pair, while robbery and
- 33 -

auto theft fell at a slower rate compared to the matched pair. Yet the buffer had a larger reduction
in aggravated assaults and thefts than the Box. However, the statistical analysis revealed that
none of these differences were significant. For additional information on the statistical
significance of our findings, refer to Appendix C on p. 77.
Figure 8. Percentage Change in Hollywood
Monthly Crime Rates Following CCTV

Pre-Post Arrest Analysis
The monthly arrest rate for minor violations rose by 7.6 percent in the target area after
implementation of CCTV, an increase that was less than the rate in the Box (12.3 percent). Both
the target area and the Box experienced the greatest increase in arrests for weapon possession;
however the increase was greater in than Box (61.9 percent) than along Hollywood Boulevard
(42.5 percent). In addition, both areas saw an increase in arrests for drunkenness and other
misdemeanor crimes but the target area had a relatively larger increase in drunkenness (36.8
percent versus 14.28 percent in the Box) and the matched pair had a relatively larger increase in
other arrests (25.6 percent versus 11.1 percent in the target area).

Table 12. Hollywood Monthly Arrest Rates

Arrest Group
All Arrests
Drunkenness
Liquor Laws
Narcotics
Prostitution
Weapon Possession
Other

Hollywood Blvd Target Area
Pre
Post
% Change
98.9
106.4
7.60%
25
34.2
36.80%
0.4
0.4
-11.60%
35.5
29.5
-16.90%
0.2
0.2
-19.00%
0.8
1.1
42.50%
36.9
41
11.10%

- 34 -

Hollywood Box Matched Pair
Pre
Post
% Change
261.5
293.6
12.30%
57.9
66.1
14.28%
2.6
1.8
-30.25%
92.3
95.5
3.44%
11.8
7.4
-37.44%
3.0
4.9
61.90%
94.0
118.0
25.59%

Similarly, both the target area and the Box saw reductions in prostitution and liquor infractions,
but the Box experienced relatively larger declines in both categories. Further, narcotics arrests
decreased by 16.9 percent in the target area, compared to a 3.4 increase in the matched pair.
Although the target area did not see a relative increase (or smaller decrease) in arrest rates for
most categories as we would expect if CCTV effectively facilitated the police’s detection of
these crimes, none of the results were statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level.
Jordan Downs Statistical Findings
In the 45 months prior to the implementation of CCTV in Jordan Downs, 535 suppressible
crimes (crimes that occurred outside on the street or sidewalk) were reported in the Jordan
Downs target area. Of these crimes, 54.0 percent were violent, 44.3 percent were property
related, and the remaining 1.7 percent were classified as “other crimes,” a category including
shots fired, throwing objects at vehicles and brandishing a weapon. As shown in Table 13,
among violent crimes, robbery (25.6 percent of all crimes) was the most prevalent, followed by
aggravated assault (15.3 percent of all crimes) and battery (12.3 percent of all crimes). Among
property crimes, burglary or theft from a vehicle (BTFV) (13.8 percent of all crimes) was the
most prevalent, followed by car theft (12.7 percent of all crimes) and vandalism (12.7 percent of
all crimes).

Table 13. Jordan Downs/Nickerson Gardens Avg. Monthly Crime Rates
January 2003 to September 2006 (pre-implementation)

Crime Type

Jordan Downs
Target Area
% of Total
Avg per Month

Nickerson Gardens
Control
% of Total
Avg per Month

All Crimes

100.00%

11.89

100.00%

22.93

Violent
Homicide

54.02%
0.75%

6.42
0.09

50.10%
0.97%

11.49
0.22

15.33%
25.61%
12.34%

1.82
3.04
1.47

14.15%
20.64%
14.34%

3.24
4.73
3.29

44.30%
12.71%
12.71%
13.83%
5.05%
1.68%

5.27
1.51
1.51
1.64
0.60
0.20

49.13%
15.79%
13.66%
13.86%
5.81%
0.78%

11.27
3.62
3.13
3.18
1.33
0.18

Aggravated
Assault
Robbery
Battery
Property
Vandalism
Car Theft
BTFV
Theft
Other Crimes

Nickerson Gardens, the control area for Jordan Downs, experienced 1,032 suppressible crimes in
the pre-implementation observation period. Of these crimes, 50.1 percent were violent (a slightly
lower percentage than in Jordan Downs), 49.1 percent were property-related (a slightly higher
percentage than in Jordan Downs), and the remaining 0.8 percent were classified as “other
- 35 -

crimes.” As shown in Table 13 above, Nickerson Gardens had similar proportions of crimes to
Jordan Downs’ within the broader violent-crime category. Once again, robbery (20.6 percent of
all crimes) was the most prevalent type of crime; however, Nickerson Gardens had slightly more
batteries (14.3 percent of all crimes) and slightly less aggravated assaults (14.2 percent of all
crimes) than Jordan Downs. In both sites, homicides represented less than 1 percent of all crimes.
Among property crimes, vandalism (15.8 percent of all crimes) was the most prevalent, followed
by burglary or theft from a vehicle (13.9 percent of all crimes) car theft (13.7 percent of all
crimes) and theft (5.8 percent of all crimes). While the rank order of crime frequency differs
somewhat between Jordan Downs and Nickerson Gardens, the proportions are comparable
(within 5 percentage points in all cases), indicating that Nickerson Gardens is a suitable control.
As in Hollywood, there are several quality-of-life violations such as drunkenness and narcotics
that only appear in arrest records. In the 45-month pre-implementation period, there were 441
arrests of this nature in the target area. As shown on Table 14, the bulk of the arrests (67.8
percent) were for “other” misdemeanor violations, which includes arrests for Part II infractions
that may not rise to the level of any other specific category; one third were for drug offenses; 5.7
percent were for weapon possession; and drunkenness and liquor laws each accounted for less
than one percent of all arrests in the pre-implementation period.
Table 14. Jordan Downs Target and Control Arrests
January 2003 to September 2006 (pre-implementation)
Arrest Group
Total Arrests
Drunkenness
Liquor Laws
Narcotics
Weapon Possession
Other

Jordan Downs
Avg per
% of total
month
100.00%
1.36%
0.45%
33.33%
5.67%
67.82%

9.80
0.13
0.04
3.27
0.56
5.80

Nickerson Gardens
% of total

Avg per month

100.00%
3.28%
0.00%
42.24%
1.69%
52.79%

40.7
1.3
0
17.2
0.7
21.5

During the same period, there were 1,830 quality-of-life arrests in the Nickerson Gardens control
area. The percentage breakdown of arrests by group resembles that of Jordan Downs, with the
majority (52.8 percent) of the arrests falling into the “other” category and followed by narcotics
(42.2 percent). There was a slightly higher percentage of arrests for drunkenness and a lower
percentage of weapon arrests in Nickerson Gardens, but the differences were small. In sum, the
crime and arrest profiles corroborate the LAPD’s assertion that Nickerson Gardens represents an
appropriate control for Jordan Downs.
Pre-Post Crime Analysis
As shown in Table 15 below, both the target and control sites experienced reductions in crime;
however, crime decreased more in Nickerson Gardens (25.1 percent) than in Jordan Downs (10.6
percent). In Jordan Downs, the reduction in overall crime was due to a decline in the violent
crime rate, which fell slightly more (20.2 percent) compared to the control (18.9 percent).
Robbery, the violent crime most prevalent in both the target and the control in the pre-test period,
- 36 -

fell to a relatively larger degree in Jordan Downs (50.7 percent) than in Nickerson Gardens (20.8
percent). Yet, the aggravated assault and homicide rate declined more in Nickerson Gardens
(49.9 percent and 43.8 percent, respectively) than in Jordan Downs (17.7 percent and 40.6
percent, respectively). Additionally, battery-related crimes grew faster in Jordan Downs (36.4
percent) than in Nickerson Gardens (15.9 percent).

Table 15. Monthly Crime Rates in Jordan Downs and Nickerson Gardens
Crime Type
All Crime
All Violent Crime
Homicide
Aggravated
Assault
Robbery
Battery
All Property
Crime
Vandalism
Car Theft
BTFV
Theft
Other Crime

Pre
11.89
6.42
0.09

Jordan Downs
Target Area
Post
% Change
10.63
-10.63%
5.13
-20.20%
0.13
40.63%

Pre
22.93
11.49
0.22

Nickerson Gardens
Control
Post
% Change
17.19
-25.05%
9.31
-18.94%
0.13
-43.75%

1.82

1.50

-17.68%

3.24

1.63

-49.91%

3.04
1.47

1.50
2.00

-50.73%
36.36%

4.73
3.29

3.75
3.81

-20.77%
15.92%

5.27

5.38

2.06%

11.27

7.44

-33.99%

1.51
1.51
1.64
0.60
0.20

1.25
1.44
1.69
1.00
0.13

-17.28%
-4.87%
2.62%
66.67%
-37.50%

3.62
3.13
3.18
1.33
0.18

2.81
2.69
1.19
0.75
0.44

-22.35%
-14.23%
-62.63%
-43.75%
146.09%

The disparity between the crime rates in the target and control were most apparent for property
crimes: Nickerson Gardens saw a relatively larger decline in every type of property crime
compared to Jordan Downs. As a result, property crime was reduced substantially in Nickerson
Gardens (34.0 percent), while it rose in the target area (2.1 percent). Although Jordan Downs did
exhibit reductions in vandalism (17.3 percent) and car theft (4.9 percent), these gains were
overshadowed by Nickerson Gardens’ 22.4 percent decrease in vandalism and 14.2 percent
decrease in theft. Moreover, theft and burglary-theft from vehicle (BTFV) increased in the target
area (by 66.7 percent and 2.6 percent, respectively) while the control experienced a reduction in
the same crimes (43.8 percent and 62.6 percent, respectively.)
Although the disparities between the crime rates in the target and control areas from the pre- to
post-implementation periods may seem considerable, they, too, failed to pass the relative effect
size test for statistical significance. The high degree of variance in month-to-month crime
(depicted in Figure 9) made it difficult to discern the extent to which any observed changes could
be attributable to CCTV or other interventions versus random variability. The results of the
relative effect size tests are detailed in Appendix C on p. 77.

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Figure 9. Jordan Downs Monthly Crime
Crime
Displacement
Effects
As in Hollywood,
the evidence on the
displacement of
crime was
inconclusive. There
was some
indication that
certain types of
crimes may have
been displaced; as
depicted in Figure
Figure 10. Percentage Change in Crime in Jordan Downs Study
10, the buffer areas
experienced a
smaller decrease in
the robbery rate
(6.3 percent) than
either the target
area (50.7 percent)
or the control area
(20.7 percent). In
addition, the rate of
theft grew at a
faster rate (321.9
percent) in the
buffer areas than in
Nickerson Gardens
(43.8 percent) or
the Jordan Downs target area (66.7 percent). However, several types of crime decreased faster or
grew more slowly in the buffer areas than in the control, including homicide, battery and car
theft. None of the results were statistically significant.
Pre-Post Arrest Analysis
Arrest rates for all categories, with the exception of weapon possession, increased relatively
more in the target area than in the control. As shown on Table 16, all arrests rose by 86.2 percent
in Jordan Downs compared to only a 14.2 percent increase in Nickerson Gardens. In particular,
the arrest rate in Jordan Downs for drunkenness, liquor law violations, narcotics and other arrests
outpaced those same arrest categories in Nickerson Gardens. Despite these ostensibly substantial
increases in arrests in the target area compared to Nickerson Gardens, the results were not
significant. (This may be due to the relatively low incidence of arrests and high degree of

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monthly variance in these areas.) For further information on the results of the relative effect size
test, refer to Appendix C on p. 77.

Table 16. Jordan Downs Monthly Arrest Rates

Arrest Group
All Arrests
Drunkenness
Liquor Laws
Narcotics
Weapon Possession
Other

Jordan Downs Target
%
Pre
Post
Change

Nickerson Gardens Control
%
Pre
Post
Change

9.8
0.1
0.04
3.3
0.6
5.8

40.7
1.3
0
17.2
0.7
21.5

18.25
1.0
0.3
6.1
0.2
10.6

86.2%
650.0%
603.1%
87.5%
-66.3%
83.2%

46.4
2.5
0
23.1
0.4
20.4

14.2%
87.5%
0.00%
34.6%
-36.5%
-5.1%

Discussion of Findings
In sum, we had hypothesized that crime rates would decrease at a faster rate in our target areas
than in the controls. In addition, we expected that CCTV would lead to an increase in detection
of misdemeanor offenses, a fact manifested in higher arrest rates. The data did not support these
hypotheses. However, the lack of statistically significant results should not be taken as
conclusive evidence that the cameras had no effect on crime. There are several factors that may
confound our analysis or offer important alternative explanations, including limitations in the
data, disparities between the target and the comparison areas, the impulsive nature of certain
crimes, CCTV’s potential to enhance the detection of crimes, LAPD capacity constraints and the
scope of our analysis.
Data Limitations
Errors or ambiguities in the original crime and arrest reports may have affected our analysis. As
the head of LAPD’s COMPSTAT Unit explained “the data that we examine is only as good as
what is written up in a crime report” (Interview, Godown, February 28, 2008). For example, due
to missing or inaccurate addresses, approximately 2 percent of the crime and arrest records could
not be mapped in the geographical information system (GIS) software used in our analysis. In
addition, ambiguities in the premise codes used to identify crimes that occurred outside likely led
to Type I (false positive) and Type II (false negative) errors. There are several different codes
that could potentially be used to describe the location of any one crime, based on the subjective
judgment of the reporting officer. For example, a robbery that occurred on the sidewalk in front
of a gym may have been coded as occurring outside on the sidewalk, or coded as at a gym. If the
premise code was listed as “sidewalk” it would be included in our analysis; however, if it had
been listed as “gym” then it would have been excluded. It is difficult to determine the extent to
which these ambiguities and errors in the data affected the analysis.

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Disparities between the Target and Control
There may be inherent differences between the target areas (Hollywood Boulevard and Jordan
Downs) and the matched pair (Hollywood Box) or control (Nickerson Gardens) that confounded
our findings.
Hollywood Boulevard is distinct from the surrounding areas that comprise the Box as it serves as
the hub of activity in the area. Its growth in recent years by comparison to other areas in the Box,
including considerably more foot traffic, more tourists and, therefore, more targets and criminals,
may have masked the cameras’ deterrent effects. For example, increased patronage of
Hollywood Boulevard’s bars and nightclubs, which has anecdotally increased 50 to 60 percent
over the past five years, may have artificially led to the absence of a statistically significant
reduction in crime (Interview, Farrell, March 27, 2008). 27 According to Clay Farrell, Captain of
the Hollywood Area Community Police Station, “As people’s inhibitions are eased by alcohol,
their chance of getting into trouble, either by committing a crime or becoming the victim of a
crime, increases” (ibid). It is reasonable to posit that many of the crimes that occurred in the
target area began in area nightclubs and spilled onto Hollywood Boulevard.
In addition, the Hollywood Entertainment District Property Owners Alliance (HEDPOA), which
purchased the cameras for the area Business Improvement District, also employs private security
to patrol Hollywood Boulevard for quality-of-life and property-related offenses. 28 It is possible
that policy changes on the part of the private security company — and not the LAPD — are
responsible for the increase in detection of and arrest rates for misdemeanor crimes in the target
area. 29 Although HEDPOA could not provide historical data on the activities of their private
security, they reported that 1,492 individuals were arrested and brought to police custody in 2007
(Email correspondence, Morrison, April 21, 2008). Therefore, the observed 20.8 percent increase
in vandalism may also be due to increased detection and reporting by private security officers. 30
Similarly, disparities in the level of gang activity and hostility in Jordan Downs and Nickerson
Gardens may have confounded the analysis. Both Sgt. Graham of the Southeast Station and
various stories in the media (LAPD Online 2008) indicate that during the study period a gang
war was under way, and that Jordan Downs’ Grape Street Crips were at the center of the
controversy. This war had been going on since 2005, beginning with a loose agreement between
the PJ Crips and the Bounty Hunter Bloods (of Nickerson Gardens) to band together for an attack
on the Grape Street Crips (LA Weekly 2007). Since Jordan Downs’ resident gang experienced an
27

Today, there are approximately 180 alcohol beverage-control (ABC) sites at or near Hollywood Boulevard with a
total nightclub capacity of more than 30,000 persons (Interview, Farrell, March 27, 2008).
28
The Hollywood Entertainment District’s initial purchase is discussed further in “Funding and Public-Private
Partnerships” p. 47.
29
In fact, the Hollywood Entertainment Property Owners Alliance, which manages the Hollywood Entertainment
District, hired a new security patrol, Andrews Security, in November of 2006.
30
However, HEDPOA told researchers that the private patrol primarily reported incidents of gang-related graffiti to
the police, while other types of graffiti are cleaned up by another company contracted by HEDPOA. Therefore, it
may be the case that vandalism is relatively under-reported in the target area, in which case, the incidence of
vandalism may have actually increased by more than the reported 20 percent.

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escalation in tensions with two rival gangs, we may expect that crime in Jordan Downs would
increase or decrease to a lesser degree relative to Nickerson Gardens. Therefore, the fact that
there were no statistically significant differences in crime between Jordan Downs and Nickerson
Gardens may actually indicate that the cameras did deter some crime.
Another disparity between Jordan Downs and Nickerson Gardens that may have confounded our
results is the faster pace at which Jordan Downs has changed demographically. Police interviews
indicate that as the demographic balance between African American and Latino inhabitants
within housing developments shift from majority African American to majority Latino, tensions
between rival gangs living side-by-side in the complex may flare. U.S. Census data from 2000
shows Jordan Downs at 60.7 percent African American and 33 percent Latino; however, data
from the Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles (HACLA), shows that by 2007, 63.4
percent of tenants were Latino and 35.9 percent of tenants were African American. By
comparison, Nickerson Gardens’ 2000 demographic breakdown of 47 percent African American
and 40 percent Latino changed to 55.2 percent Latino and 44 percent African American by 2007,
a substantially smaller shift in the balance between demographic groups and, therefore, relatively
less opportunity for racial tension and possibly crime.
Moreover, in both locations high crime rates served as the impetus for deploying the cameras,
which may indicate a certain degree of self-selection bias. It could be that the designated control
and matched pair areas did not receive CCTV because crime was not as much of a concern as in
the target areas.
Nature of Crimes
Our findings that CCTV surveillance in Hollywood, a hotbed of bars and nightclubs, has had
little effect on crime is consistent with Gill and Spriggs’ (et al. 2005) finding that “[t]hose
offences that are often considered impulsive and influenced by alcohol, for example public order
and violence against the person (VAP), were seen to increase in number more in the target areas
than in their respective control areas.” 31 In Hollywood, the introduction of alcohol may not only
serve as a catalyst for certain types of impulsive crimes, such as battery, to occur, but may also
have reduced the chances that the criminals are cognizant that cameras are in the area. “There is
a degree of subjectivity to the cameras’ deterrent effects; individuals that may otherwise notice
the cameras when they are sober may not if they have been drinking” (Interview, Farrell, March
27, 2008).
Similarly, because of the entrenched gang rivalries in Jordan Downs, the cycles of violent
retaliatory attacks might be either unaffected by the presence of video surveillance or, possibly,
positively influenced as participants often seek recognition for their crimes (Heilbrun et al. 1978)
— including prison time, which becomes a mark of distinction for them (Nisperos 2008).

Criminologists suggest that the prevalence of violent crime, such as homicide, aggravated assault and battery,
among minority groups subject to prejudice is driven by frustration with deprivation, which results in the adoption
of values that include “quick resort to physical aggression as a sign of daring, courage or defense of status”
(Heilbrun et al.1978). This can lead perpetrators to act impulsively, without adequately weighing the risk of being
caught — by CCTV or any other crime prevention strategy — or the consequences of their actions.

- 41 -

Authorities in Los Angeles have acknowledged that gangs are a social phenomenon that cannot
be deterred by the threat of arrest and incarceration. 32
Capacity Constraints
The resource constraints faced by the LAPD may be preventing the CCTV system from fulfilling
its potential as a crime mitigation and deterrence tool. Captain Farrell explained, “There is a
constant tug-of-war between resources. Do we put another cop on the street or get another
camera in place?” (Interview, Farrell March 27, 2008). Farrell further explained that even when
criminal activity is detected on the CCTV system, it is not always possible to mobilize units
quickly enough to respond if there are other, higher priority calls for service. Moreover, in
Hollywood, the cameras are not routinely monitored during the day, and when they are
monitored, there is generally one officer monitoring footage from 14 cameras; therefore, it is
likely that there are criminals who have had the experience of “getting away” with crime in the
monitored areas and may no longer feel deterred by the cameras.
In Jordan Downs, only six of the nine cameras donated by Motorola are in place. 33 The resource
commitment required to properly monitor the cameras already in place, coupled with technical
difficulties such as not having sufficient bandwidth to accommodate the amount of data currently
flowing from Southeast’s cameras to the recording station in City Hall East, currently inhibit the
potential utility of the last three cameras even if they were in place (Interview, Graham, March
26, 2008).
Increased Detection, Mitigation, and Resolution of Crime
Finally, we assumed that CCTV would act as a deterrent for property and violent crime and serve
as a detection and mitigation tool in minor quality-of-life infractions that are not generally
reported; however, it may be the case that CCTV also deters some misdemeanors like
prostitution and narcotics-related offenses, and detects some violent crimes, such as aggravated
assault or battery, that would have otherwise gone unreported. These two CCTV functions
produce opposing influence on crime rates, and it is difficult to discern the degree to which any
observed changes reflect deterrence or detection.
Moreover, by just looking at the effect of CCTV on crime rates, we do not capture the effect
CCTV has on solving crime or prosecuting criminals. For example, a gang-related homicide in
the vicinity of Jordan Downs was solved using footage collected by the video surveillance
system. However, because the LAPD does not routinely track when CCTV is used to intervene
in crimes in progress, solve crimes and prosecute criminals, it is difficult to determine CCTV’s
full impact. We expand upon this discussion further in “Conclusions for Policymakers” (p. 53).

Jeff Carr, the Los Angeles deputy mayor for gang reduction and youth development, explains, “What we've really
had in the past is a mass incarceration strategy. We’ve locked a lot of people up, and we still have this epidemic
problem” (Mozingo 2008).
33
For more on the Motorola donation, see “Funding and Public-Private Partnerships” (p. 47).

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IMPLEMENTATION AND EFFECTIVENESS
We now turn to a discussion of implementation strategy for CCTV use. Through semi-structured
interviews with LAPD personnel and community leaders, as well as document analysis and
participant observations in each area, we isolated several challenges to the adoption of CCTV
that lawmakers considering such systems will need to address. These factors are outlined in
Table 17, below.

Table 17. Implementation Successes and Challenges
Successes
Private funding and federal grants
offered alternatives to spending
public monies.

Challenges
Legacy systems and maintenance
contracts may limit future
interoperability and expansion.

Crime
Prevention
Strategy

CCTV can be an effective crimeprevention and deterrence tool when
added to a cohesive suite of other
policing strategies targeted to a
specific area.

Even if CCTV were successful in
reducing crime in our test areas,
disaggregating its contribution would
prove difficult.

Camera
Placement

Cameras were strategically placed
with community support in highcrime clusters to maximize their
impact.

Impediments to placing cameras in
strategic locations included technical
issues and working with local property
owners.

Technology

High-quality cameras with fast
frame rates, high resolution and
remote movement capabilities were
installed. Control room software
enabled easier monitoring of all
cameras' output in Jordan Downs.

Additional resources may be needed to
fully implement CCTV systems. The
configuration of control room
monitors may present challenges to
operators in Hollywood.

Operation

Systems in both test areas were
actively monitored in an effort to
mitigate crime as it occurred. A
specially trained subunit operated in
Jordan Downs.

Neither location actively monitored
CCTV 24 hours a day. Specialized
training was not apparent in
Hollywood.

Privacy and
Community
Involvement

Early buy-in of community
members initially allayed concerns
regarding the protection of
individual privacy. LAPD has
guidelines on use and storage of
camera data.

Transience in the community has
eroded some support for the cameras
in Jordan Downs. The specter of
private security officers’ gaining
access to cameras in Hollywood may
raise new privacy concerns.

Funding

- 43 -

Successfully addressing these implementation issues not only facilitates the initial deployment of
CCTV but can ultimately impact the system’s effectiveness in deterring crime, based on findings
in previous studies. For each factor, we compare and contrast systems in both locations to inform
policymakers and law enforcement on the qualitative differences that may impact CCTV’s
effectiveness. We summarize these issues and our statistical findings with some takeaways for
policymakers considering CCTV.

Funding and Public Private Partnerships
One feature worthy of exploration is the intrepid use of public-private partnerships to procure
video surveillance systems throughout Los Angeles. The City’s use of private donations for
CCTV hardware, installation and some maintenance costs marks a notable contrast to the 68
camera-system in San Francisco that has cost taxpayers nearly $900,000 (Bulwa 2008). Camera
systems in Jordan Downs and Hollywood, as well as cameras in Downtown’s Santee Alley and
MacArthur Park, have relied on donations from technology companies, business associations
and, in one case, the movie industry. The financial incentive for these partnerships is substantial:
A 1999 RAND survey found that 69 percent of local law enforcement agencies cited cost as a
major barrier to purchasing CCTV systems (Schwabe et al. 2001). Such partnerships allow a city
to create pilot projects and seek community support with a minimal amount of city resources.
Below we discuss the differences between the funding relationships at both sites and risks, such
as legacy and maintenance issues and the need for additional public resources. Despite these
issues, private funding of video surveillance seems to be gaining a firm foothold in police
departments statewide. Video surveillance is viewed by law enforcement as a potential “force-”
or “capability multiplier,” a tool that makes existing law-enforcement personnel more efficient
and productive. The fact that initial costs and maintenance contracts can be satisfied without a
large investment of public funds is seen as a boon to both local government and law enforcement
agencies. And, because camera technology advances quickly and prices are always coming
down, many, including the LAPD, believe funding to take care of these problems will not pose a
serious impediment to CCTV expansion.
Hollywood
Hardware, installation and initial maintenance for Hollywood Boulevard’s first five cameras
were made possible by a $103,000 donation from the Hollywood Entertainment District (HED),
the local business improvement district (BID), which is managed by the Hollywood Property
Owners Alliance (HEDPOA). 34 Three additional cameras and a one-year service contract were
purchased by LAPD in June of 2006 for $100,000; money donated again by the BID. According
to HEDPOA, after observing the apparent successes of the cameras on Hollywood Boulevard,
surrounding business improvement districts located in the area donated additional cameras to the
LAPD (Interview, Morrison, April 14, 2008). Presently 14 cameras are operated from the

While HED is technically managed by a non-profit 501c6 organization, HPOA’s board of directors largely
comprises private property owners. Thus, we deem the donation of cameras as “private” donations.

- 44 -

Hollywood Community Police Station, most of which were purchased with non-city funds; 35 and
the Los Angeles Times reports that the Hollywood area plans to deploy a total of 64 cameras
throughout the area in coming years (Garrison 2004).
Jordan Downs
Jordan Downs’ system was also purchased, in part, through private dollars. Motorola donated
$1.2 million for start-up costs and a $600,000 grant from the U.S. Department of Justice
(Interview, Gomez, March 17, 2008). Motorola hopes to market its Motomesh technology to
other cities, as well as to “scale up” its technology to other areas in Los Angeles. In fact,
Nickerson Gardens, our control area, is purportedly the next project in line to receive video
surveillance, which may be again provided by Motorola (Interview, Graham, March 26, 2008),
given the strength of the company’s relationship with LAPD and the South Bureau.
Types of Partnerships
A distinction should be drawn between donations by technological sponsors like Motorola
(Jordan Downs) and General Electric (MacArthur Park) and broader community and business
partnerships (Hollywood and Santee Alley). These latter partnerships may provide more
flexibility for the LAPD to choose which cameras and vendors to use. For example, HEDPOA
was responsible for finding a video surveillance vendor, in collaboration with the LAPD for the
BID. To this end, HEDPOA hired an FBI consultant to write and issue a request for proposal
(RFP) and to vet potential vendors. While an appropriate vendor was eventually settled upon,
HEDPOA said it also had to receive “buy in” from both HED property owners and the LAPD; a
task that could prove difficult and time-consuming without a strong collaborative partnership
between relevant stakeholders (Interview, MacPherson, April 14, 2008).
Legacy Issues and Maintenance
These unique partnerships and donations provide a good model for cash-strapped local
governments and resource-constrained police departments, but local government may become
locked into older or inadequate technologies that may make interoperability, maintenance and
expansion more costly and difficult. For instance, the City had problems getting some of the
cameras installed in MacArthur Park in 2003, paid for by a donation from General Electric,
replaced — an issue that was raised by the Los Angeles City Council in the early part of 2008. 36
The Los Angeles Times reported “glitches with equipment that records and stores video images”
and revealed that “data storage lasts only 12 hours before it is recorded over” (Blankenstein, et
al. 2008). According to Sergeant Daniel Gomez, South Bureau Tactical Technology Unit, no
According to the L.A. Times, “Garcetti has pushed for cameras in his district, which runs from Hollywood east to
Echo Park and north to Glassell Park. He recently obtained a $180,000 grant to install 14 cameras in areas around
parks there” (Garrison 2004).
36
Councilman Ed Reyes, whose district contains MacArthur Park, asked the Los Angeles City Council for $150,000
to add six security cameras to replace some of the cameras and add new cameras near the park. However, the Los
Angeles Times story about the maintenance issues forced Reyes to include an “accountability provision” to his
motion that would report back issues regarding equipment. To the contrary, Sgt. Gomez told researchers that most
problem cameras he was aware of had been adequately handled by GE within 72 hours of reporting them.
35

- 45 -

financial plan for replacing cameras, outside the normal maintenance provided by the
manufacturer, exists. Should a complete system overhaul become necessary at some point, a new
funding agreement will be required, either with GE or another company.
In addition, difficulties in negotiating new maintenance contracts may arise between private and
public stakeholders as CCTV systems expand. For example, the original maintenance contract
with LAPD’s current vendor in Hollywood, MetroVideo, has expired. All of the cameras are
functioning properly, but if technical problems do arise, clients with maintenance contracts are
prioritized over those without such contracts. The LAPD indicated that part of the difficulty in
negotiating a new maintenance contract is deciding who will pay for it: The 14 cameras now
span several business improvement districts and two Los Angeles City Council offices. 37
Additional Public Resources
Similarly, a technologically advanced CCTV system like that in Jordan Downs requires
additional public dollars to integrate into existing LAPD technology. For example, Motorola’s
Motomesh system, when fully installed, would allow LAPD officers to access camera footage in
their cars while within the Jordan Downs area, but the amount of bandwidth currently available,
while substantial, is not sufficient to permit this. Funding for upgrading the wireless network has
only recently been budgeted by the City. The currently available bandwidth is provided by
optical fiber that was laid in the area with funding from a grant for disadvantaged communities
before the video-surveillance project was conceived of, an example of seemingly unrelated
programs assisting each other. As adept as law enforcement might become in securing funding
for hardware and support, the efforts and expertise of other city departments are also required for
the smooth functioning of different aspects of a video surveillance program.
Finding funding partnerships, applying for grants, or deciding on vendors for innovative projects
like video surveillance is a somewhat specialized skillset in the LAPD. A core group of officers
in the LAPD, led by Sgt. Gomez, have learned “on the job” how to apply for federal grants and
to negotiate with private donors. These officers stressed that one must be “opportunistic” in
seeking funders for new projects. The generosity of corporate and business alliances to local
government is certainly not something local government can or should ignore, but such an
approach should be thought through strategically. As the City expands its deployment of CCTV
cameras, it should consider closely evaluating area technologies and “scaling up” accordingly.
Simultaneous Crime Reduction Strategies
Simultaneous crime-reduction programs that paralleled CCTV deployment, a factor identified in
our meta-analysis as influential in CCTV effectiveness, were present in both Hollywood and
Jordan Downs. Even though neither of the camera systems in our study locations was
individually directly related to a statistically significant reduction in crime, overall crime rates in
our test and control locations did fall between 10 and 25 percent, attesting to the importance of
these suites of strategies that can include everything from staggering closing times for nightclubs
to mobilizing a community to watch out for its children on their way to school. These ongoing
37

The HED paid $25,000 for the initial maintenance contract with MetroVideo for the first five cameras deployed to
Hollywood Boulevard.

- 46 -

programs stress the importance of cameras as one tactical element, rather than a stand-alone
crime-reduction strategy.
Surveillance Coverage Area and Camera Placement
Another factor that emerged as influential in determining the effectiveness of CCTV in our
review of previous evaluations was the extent of surveillance coverage in an area. While we do
not have the technical expertise to properly evaluate the effective placement of cameras in either
location, how the LAPD deployed these cameras, and the problems they encountered, deserves
some exposition.
Hollywood
In Hollywood, the five cameras located along Hollywood Boulevard’s Walk of Fame surveil a
roughly one-mile area that suffers from the highest overall crime rate in all of Los Angeles. 38
The captain of the Hollywood Division Police Station, Clay Farrell, indicated that 25-30 percent
of all crime in the Hollywood Area occurs along Hollywood Boulevard; in 2007, for instance, he
said that 21 percent of Part I crime occurred within the “Box.”
According to HEDPOA, the Business Improvement District (BID) consulted with the LAPD to
determine where crime clusters were occurring in the area before deciding on camera placement.
Assistant Executive Director MacPherson: “You have to kind of find the ideal locations and then
work backwards. You don’t want to cluster too many cameras together but do want a continuoustype surveillance system” (Interview, MacPherson, April 14, 2008). One issue was that some
“ideal locations” were owned by absentee owners who weren’t available or weren’t interested in
having the cameras on their building. Another problem was finding a building to harbor the
camera which would offer a full panoramic view of the area. One factor that facilitated
placement was that the Department of Transportation had already built poles to monitor traffic
flow in heavily condensed areas. Another implementation challenge was getting power to the
cameras and from what source. Finally, because the imagery is sent over a wireless signal, if the
cameras were not in a clear line of site of the Hollywood Area Police Station, where the cameras
are monitored, they had to set up “repeaters” to bounce the signal in the right direction. “I
remember standing on some area rooftops while we were trying to determine just where to put
the cameras (ibid).”
Jordan Downs
In Jordan Downs the six cameras currently cover approximately one square mile around the
housing complex. Cameras placed on 103rd Street cameras were erected in large measure to
monitor and protect children en route to and from school; other locations were chosen for
maximum coverage of high traffic areas. Another concern was covering routes of ingress and
egress to and from the complex in order to potentially capture images of rival gang members
entering or leaving the area. Sgt. Gomez said that once the LAPD and community had agreed on
38

According to Jane Faerber, a management analyst in the Hollywood Community Police Station’s Crime Analyst
Division (CAD), one of the reporting districts that runs along Hollywood Boulevard (RD645) has the most Part I
crimes in the City (Interview, Jane Faerber, April 8, 2008).

- 47 -

the locations, installation was relatively easy, but that some poles to which the cameras could be
attached were not present in each of the chosen locations. But, according to Gomez “dropping in
poles is cheap” (Interview, March 17, 2008).
Technology and Monitoring
Our review of news reports indicated that many of the purported problems with cameras installed
throughout San Francisco were attributed to those cameras’ low-quality resolution and slow
frame rate, in addition to the inability of police to “actively monitor” locations remotely. By
most measures, cameras in both Jordan Downs and Hollywood are relatively “high-tech” with
perhaps a slightly more advanced system in place in Jordan Downs (see Appendix D on p. 90 for
specifications).
Camera Technology
Both camera systems in our test locations produce high-resolution, high-quality video footage.
All cameras are remotely operable via pan, tilt and zoom features, and are supported by enough
data-transmission bandwidth to allow for the manipulation of, and uninterrupted recording from,
several cameras at once over an encrypted wireless signal. The cameras record at 25 frames per
second in Jordan Downs and 30 frames per second in Hollywood — approximately equivalent to
a video camera and significantly faster than the 2-to-4 frames per second of the San Francisco
system.
Head End Monitoring Systems
The observation systems that serve as the “head ends” where the cameras are monitored by law
enforcement differ substantially at the two sites. The observation system in the Southeast Police
Station, where Jordan Downs cameras are monitored, is software-based, whereas Hollywood’s
observation system is hardware-based. This means that images being sent from Jordan Downs to
Southeast appear as video windows next to each other on a single computer monitor; such a
system allows for more viewing capacity than a hardware-based system. For example, officers
monitoring the cameras in Hollywood must view a stacked set of 14 video monitors, a difficult
task for even the most observant and experienced LAPD officer.
Moreover, the software-based system allows for multiple networked screens, including a large,
flatscreen TV viewable from anywhere in the monitoring office. Controls for manipulating the
cameras in Jordan Downs appear in each small, video window and images can be blown up to
full screen with two clicks of the mouse. Officers in Hollywood’s rather small monitoring office,
by contrast, must manipulate one camera at a time with a single joystick. Some studies have
indicated the difficulty in monitoring multiple video screens simultaneously by a single
individual (Gill et al. 2005). These factors, compounded by the constant foot traffic in the
Hollywood area and the limitations of a single controller watching multiple video screens at
once, may be a vital operational deficiency in the Hollywood system, particularly for the
immediate intervention of crimes as they occur.

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Future Implementation
The LAPD’s goal is to fully install the Motorola Motomesh system in Jordan Downs, which
would allow officers to view surveillance video from the cameras in their cars. The system will
provide free Wi-Fi to the residents of the complex while withholding one secure channel for
LAPD activities. On this channel, officers would be able to watch video from any or all the
cameras active in the area while in their cars. Additionally, the cars themselves would act as
hotspot nodes, intensifying the mesh signals as they traveled in the area. Realization of the full
capacity of the system requires that all nine of the planned cameras be installed. (The seventh
camera’s future location is currently being planned.) As mentioned elsewhere, such
implementation depends on the expenditure of more City resources to supplement bandwidth for
transmission. There is no guarantee, however, that a fully implemented system would have a
discernible effect on crime rates and it may impose more intrusively on residents, intensifying a
feeling of being “in prison” in their own community (Email correspondence, Tamika Taylor,
May 1, 2008).
Operations, Training and Turnover
How cameras are monitored, including positioning and staffing, differed substantially at our test
sites. While neither test location showed any significant results in crime reduction, interviews
revealed different successes and challenges in this regard for each location.
Camera Configurations
Camera configuration while not being controlled manually emerged as a relevant operational
issue. Hollywood’s cameras are currently monitored 10-12 hours a day, 90 percent of the time at
night, according to Captain Farrell (Interview, Farrell, March 27, 2008). 39 In Jordan Downs,
cameras are actively monitored during times of the day and/or night when criminal activity is
expected to be high and are always viewed during school hours. Area police in Southeast said
that the specific times of monitoring are determined by reviewing COMPSTAT data on a daily
basis, followed by discussion amongst officers as to the situation “on the ground.”
Cameras in Hollywood roam when not controlled manually, moving quickly in multiple
directions rather than focusing on a particular area. Therefore, one might surmise that reviewing
footage after a crime to extrapolate clues or identify license plates may be more difficult here
than where a camera is fixed on a single site. For instance, one recent homicide in Jordan Downs
was essentially “solved” thanks to the cameras fixating in a single direction from which police
anticipated a perpetrator might approach the area.
Leadership, Training and Turnover
Turnover of staff in police departments is anecdotally reported to negatively affect the ability of
CCTV surveillance to function as an efficient crime-fighting tool by bleeding away the
39

As discussed on page 53, in “Privacy Considerations and Community Involvement,” the LAPD is also considering
working with HPOA to install a single monitor that an operator at Andrews Security headquarters can “scroll
through” to observe the cameras, but such a proposition is still in preliminary stages.

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institutional memory necessary to fully utilize the technology. Some studies (Carley 1992) reveal
that hierarchical and team structures excel at maintaining different types of institutional memory
and in implementing different types of projects. The functioning of small teams, or units, within
the LAPD, an organization with an overarching hierarchical structure, sets the stage for the
organization to suffer from both the disadvantages of hierarchical and team structures with
regard to personnel turnover.
The team structure is necessary, however, for a pilot project like that in Jordan Downs to
initialize. Teams learn complex systems faster and are more flexible with new material, while
hierarchies tend to be slow and distort information through simplification as it moves up the
chain of command. 40 Indeed, “implement[ing] a proposed change often requires ... creating a
specialized subunit that will take on the tasks” (Wilson, p. 231). Teams are very susceptible to
fragmentation when they experience turnover, however, and the mission of the team can then be
lost within the greater hierarchy.
The approach of Hollywood Station personnel toward the surveillance system exhibits some of
these characteristics. The initial team, led by Captain Michael Downing, present at the time
CCTV surveillance was brought into the station no longer functions there. Currently, only a few
officers at the station have much knowledge of why and exactly when the cameras were erected
in the locations they were. (Instead, researchers were referred to the HEDPOA for many of the
details used in this analysis.) It is also unclear if any specialized training is currently given to
camera operators in Hollywood. Although no statistically significant results were realized in
either location, the system in Southeast Station has greater potential for utility as a capability
multiplier due to a tight-knit team with special training that runs the video unit. Should the team
there experience a loss of personnel and expertise, however, that advantage might be lost to the
station, the private partner and the community.
Privacy Considerations and Community Involvement
The tension between potential privacy infringement and efficacy was discussed in some detail in
Privacy, Efficacy and Public Opinion (p. 10), but how privacy protections are managed at the
local level is an important consideration for policymakers implementing CCTV. In addition, the
extent of community involvement and discussion of matters such as privacy, as well as managing
expectations of program effectiveness, are also important for policymakers to consider.
Station Practices
According to LAPD Sgt. Gomez, “each police station has a policy that governs the use and
policy of the camera systems,” since the first cameras were installed at MacArthur Park in 2004
(Email correspondence, Gomez, April 14, 2008). Gomez also stated that each division captain is
responsible for the proper maintenance of records, and random audits of captured video archives
40

The team structure accompanied by specialized training in the gathering and utilization of video evidence has
served the officers in the video unit at Southeast Station well, allowing them to learn from each other as they discuss
and compare observations (Interview, Graham, March 26, 2008). The special training these officers have received
does not preclude their taking part in other types of police work, but other officers are not able to step into their
roles, should they be absent (Interview, Gomez, March 13, 2008).

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ensure that the data is being used and stored properly. Recorded video that is kept as evidence of
a crime is booked into the Property Division, where police and personnel from the Los Angeles
City Attorney can obtain access based on need. The LAPD’s Discovery Section handles all other
requests. (Note: The Los Angeles City Attorney’s office was contacted but did not respond to our
request for information).
Access to camera footage is always available upon request to the district attorney’s office.
Officers reviewing footage will mark any that can potentially be used as evidence in solving a
crime as evidentiary and put it aside. All other footage is available to the public through the same
channels they would use to obtain a police report (Interview, Hernandez, May 1, 2008).
Protecting Privacy Rights
Jordan Downs. The issue of protecting privacy rights did not appear of primary concern to the
people we interviewed; a somewhat unexpected finding given their location in a residential
setting where the potential for misuse may be high. (For example, pointing powerful cameras
into the windows of unknowing citizens in their apartments.) However, some residents have a
general feeling of being imprisoned, knowing that their movements could be captured and
viewed by remote observers when inhabitants of other parts of the city can move about
unobserved. According to Tamika Taylor of the Los Angeles Commission of Children, Youth
and Their Families: “It seems more like a liberty issue” than a privacy issue to them (Email
correspondence, May 1, 2008).
Potential privacy concerns may have been reduced initially by the early involvement of
community members. Before installation commenced in Jordan Downs, LAPD officers
participated in a year-long series of meetings to discuss with community members why the
cameras were being considered for their area, what the LAPD hoped to achieve with the
cameras, and what outcomes could reasonably be expected. The video-surveillance program also
became a “catalyst” for open and frank discussion between the police and the community as to
what was needed to improve surroundings in the area, according to the LAPD.
Congruent anecdotal evidence from the LAPD and community leaders reveals that some
community support for the cameras has eroded since the program began. Sgt. Graham noted that
the attitudes expressed toward the cameras in community meetings are more negative now than
when the cameras were first installed. Many of the faces at the meetings have changed, and he
believes that misinformation about what the cameras can and cannot do, and how they were paid
for, is the basis of some discontent (Interview, Graham, March 26, 2008). Community activists,
Pastor Mike Cummings of We Care Outreach Ministries and Tamika Taylor, Community
Program Assistant, at the Los Angeles Commission of Children, Youth and Their Families
agreed, as some residents now resent that scarce resources appear to be consumed by the CCTV
system without meaningful results (Interview, Taylor, April 4, 2008; Interview, Cummings,
April 5, 2008).
Hollywood. In Hollywood, too, the issue of privacy was reportedly less of a concern among
community members than was expected. HEDPOA’s Security Committee conducted outreach to
inform property owners and other community members about when the cameras would be
- 51 -

installed, how the cameras would be used, and in what manner the LAPD would use them.
According to HEDPOA, there has not been much opposition in the Hollywood area from the
community (ibid). “There were some initial concerns [about privacy] … but we don’t really
receive any phone calls complaining about [the cameras]” (MacPherson, Interview, April 14,
2008). From MacPherson’s observation, “the benefits seem to outweigh the privacy costs to most
community members in the effected areas” (ibid).
The apparent lack of opposition to cameras on Hollywood Boulevard along privacy grounds may
be due to the Boulevard’s “public” nature — there are few hours of the day when the Boulevard
is not heavily covered by pedestrian foot traffic — but also because of residents’ experience with
CCTV in the past. Yucca Street, a highly active residential area just north of Hollywood
Boulevard, was one of the first areas in the country to use video monitoring to target criminal
activity during the 1990s. At the time, landlords placed cameras on buildings and submitted
footage of “suspected drug activity” to area police (Garrison 2004). The Yucca Street cameras
were removed in 1999, but new cameras were installed once again, during the second
deployment of cameras to Hollywood in 2006.
Moreover, 20 to 30 signs are spread throughout the Hollywood Area warning passersby that
“Video Monitoring in Progress For Your Safety.” The signs are one aspect of the area privacy
guidance that serves not only as a public notice, but also as a potential deterrent to would-be
criminals.
According to an excerpt of a Hollywood area order, “The Los Angeles Police Department and
Hollywood Area are sensitive to individual citizen's constitutional rights and expectations of
privacy” (Los Angeles Police Department, 2004). In addition to the required signage, the “CCTV
system monitors only public areas where courts and case law have held there is no reasonable
expectation of privacy” (ibid). 41
The possibility of granting access to LAPD monitors by HEDPOA’s private security detail —
Andrews Security — does raise some additional concerns regarding privacy. The City Attorney’s
office was present for all the security meetings to help advise HEDPOA and the LAPD about
privacy, and wrote an indemnification agreement severing responsibility from HEDPOA for use
of the cameras. However, both the LAPD and Andrews would like to give the responsibility for
camera monitoring along the Boulevard to Andrews, arguing that such capability may enhance
Andrews ability to better detect and reduce crime in the area. Yet, HEDPOA suggests that
liability issues, among other policy considerations, may derail the effort before it is ever placed
in front of HEDPOA’s Security Committee. It may also raise eyebrows among civil liberties
groups: CCTV of public space by an organization unaccountable to the public seems a prime
target for legal action.

The Hollywood area also has some guidance regarding the storage of video equipment. Digital video must be
maintained by the Hollywood Area for a minimum of 30 calendar days, but other guidance was not provided
regarding public requests for video footage.

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CONCLUSIONS FOR POLICYMAKERS
Our statistical analysis and qualitative research have guided us to a number of lessons that
policymakers considering video surveillance of public space should consider. We describe each
briefly in our concluding remarks.
CCTV is a tool not a panacea
Policymakers considering video surveillance of public places by law enforcement should not
presume that crime reduction or prevention will occur automatically — or at all. Surveillance
may prove useful for targeting certain types of crimes in certain areas as a tool to aid law
enforcement, but it may be less effective in deterring or reducing other types of crimes in other
areas. For instance, crimes of passion, or crimes in which an individual may be inebriated or
unaware of the cameras’ existence, may not be deterred by video surveillance. Moreover, as the
literature on CCTV suggests, video surveillance may be less effective in open environments or
high traffic areas. In order to adequately cover an area like Hollywood Blvd., for instance, by
creating a “continuous” type surveillance system, LAPD would need to vastly expand the
number of cameras, and, likewise, the number of operators — an unlikely scenario. Also, areas
that are susceptible to “crime waves” like Jordan Downs may not be the most effective
deployments to deter crime, though they may be useful in solving crime. In sum, cameras used in
conjunction with larger crime-reduction strategies should be viewed as one tactical element, not
a strategy in-and-of themselves.
Public-private partnerships save costs, but raise new policy questions
The unique partnerships and donations that the City of Los Angeles has used to procure its
cameras may provide a good model for cash-strapped governments, but policymakers should
also be aware of potential risks. For instance, law enforcement may become locked into older or
inadequate technologies that may make interoperability, maintenance and expansion more costly
and difficult in the long term. In addition, difficulties regarding privacy and liability may emerge
if private security patrols are ever granted access to CCTV monitors.
Sustainability can be difficult
Sustainable CCTV surveillance requires strong leadership, and, ultimately, additional resource
allocation. Turnover of personnel that may have initiated a surveillance system in a particular
area or helped to realize some initial success may leave an implementation gap if new personnel
are not recruited and trained. New priorities for subsequent administrators, strained resources and
the absence of a well-defined training regimen may further limit later success. Policymakers
might consider making use of retired police detectives, as Chicago has, to monitor the cameras.
Need for universal guidance on use, storage and utility of video surveillance
Another issue for policymakers to consider is formalized privacy and use guidelines. While
LAPD suggests that they have local policies in place at each location that limits the accessibility
of stored footage, it seems reasonable to offer some explicit, citywide policies regarding these

- 53 -

matters. This is particularly true as the ubiquity of cameras in Los Angeles and elsewhere grows.
Other cities, such as Fresno, have formalized guidelines for use by law enforcement. 42
Deterrence and enforcement are strongly intertwined
Policymakers should also be aware of the linkages between CCTV’s possible deterrent effect and
the ability of police to enforce existing laws. Law enforcement that does not have the resources
to respond to crime and enforce laws, such as certain types of property crimes and minor
offenses where cameras are located, may lead to the belief by criminals that some crimes are
inconsequential. Following the “broken windows” theory of policing, criminals may eventually
believe that they can commit more serious crimes in the absence of consequences, nullifying any
deterrent effect the cameras may have.
Need for further research into detection, apprehension and prosecution
Finally, all of our research and findings point in one direction: Local program characteristics are
the key to the utility of video surveillance. However, police in Los Angeles currently do not
record when they use CCTV to catch criminals, elicit confessions, or provide footage that is
influential to prosecutors in a trial or plea agreement. Research that digs deeper, from initial
deployment and following the adjustments of law enforcement along the way to see how CCTV
data is used to enhance the capability of law enforcement, might provide clearer evidence as to
its cumulative effects.

The Code of Practice in the U.K. can be found here:
http://www.ico.gov.uk/upload/documents/library/data_protection/detailed_specialist_guides/cctv_code_of_practice.
pdf

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Short, E., and J. Ditton (1996). Does Closed Circuit Television Prevent Crime? An Evaluation of the Use of CCTV
Surveillance Cameras in Airdrie Town Centre. Edinburgh: The Scottish Office Central Research Unit.
Sivarajasingam, V., J. P. Shepherd, and K. Matthews (2003). “Effect of Urban Closed Circuit Television on Assault
Injury and Violence Detection.” Injury Prevention, 9(4):312-316.
Skinns, D. (1998). Doncaster CCTV Surveillance System: Second Annual Report of the Independent Evaluation.
Doncaster: Faculty of Business and Professional Studies, Doncaster College.
Sousa, William H. and George L. Kelling (2006). “Reaching the Tipping Point in Los Angeles: MacArthur Park.”
Unpublished Draft, sent by author with permission, February 14, 2008.
Squires, P. (1998). An Evaluation of the Ilford Town Centre CCTV System. Brighton (United Kingdom): Health and
Social Policy Research Centre.
Squires, P. (2003). An Independent Evaluation of the Installation of CCTV Cameras for Crime Prevention in the
Whitehawk Estate, Brighton. Brighton (United Kingdom): Health and Social Policy Research Centre.
Stohs, Brent (2004, October 15). “Privacy, Free Speech and the Garden Grove Cyber Cafe Experiment,” Duke Law
& Technology Review, No. 0012.
Taylor, Tamika (April 4, 2008). Personal Interview. Community Program Assistant, Los Angeles Commission of
Children, Youth and Their Families.
Tilley, N. (1993). Understanding Car Parks, Crime and CCTV: Evaluation Lessons from Safer Cities, Home Office
Crime Prevention Unit series, paper 42, London: Home Office.
United State Department of Justice (2005). Customized tables, based on the FBI’s UCR crime report. State and
National Crime Trend Estimates, All States, All Variables. US Bureau of Justice Statistics.
United States Census Bureau (2007). Los Angeles (City) Quick Facts, available at
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/06/0644000.html.
Viahos, James (2008, January). “New Surveillance Cameras: High Tech Law Enforcement Spying Programs,”
Popular Mechanics.
Wagers, Michael (2007). Broken Windows Policing: The LAPD Experience. Dissertation for Graduate Program in
Criminal Justice at Rutgers University.
Wagner, Douglas. (2008, March 11). Personal Interview. Management Analyst II, COMPSTAT, LAPD.
Washington, Jude (2008, May 2). Personal Interview. Officer, Southeast Community Police Station, LAPD.
Webb, B. and Laycock, G. (1992). Reducing Crime on the London Underground: An Evaluation of Three Pilot
Projects, Home Office Crime Prevention Unit series, paper 30. London: Home Office.
Welsh, B. C., and D. P. Farrington (2002). Crime Prevention Effects of Closed Circuit Television: A Systematic
Review. Home Office Research Study, Number 252, London: Home Office Research, Development and
Statistics Directorate.
Welsh, Brandon C., and D.P. Farrington (2004). “Surveillance for Crime Prevention in Public Space: Results and
Policy Choices in Britain and America.” Criminology & Public Policy.

- 58 -

Williamson, D. and McLafferty, S. (2000). “The effects of CCTV on crime in public housing: An application of GIS
and spatial statistics,” Paper presented at the American Society of Criminology meeting, November 15-19,
2000, San Francisco, California.
Winge, S., and J. Knutsson (2003). “An Evaluation of the CCTV Scheme at Oslo Central Railway Station,” Crime
Prevention and Community Safety: An International Journal 5(3):49-59.
Winton, R and Vives, R. (2008, January 30). “Shootings follow killing of gang leader,” The Los Angeles Times,
Retrieved February 15, 2008, from
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Wood, Daniel (2007, September 25). “Los Angeles Turns Cameras on Gang Graffiti,” Christian Science Monitor.

Personal Interviews, Email Correspondence, Meetings
Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD)
Beck, Charlie. Deputy Chief Commanding Officer. 77th Community Police Station, LAPD. Personal Interview. Feb.
5, 2008.
Faerber, Jane. Management Analyst. Crime Analyst Detail. Hollywood Police Station. Apr. 8, 2008.
Farrell, Clay. Captain. Hollywood Police Station, LAPD. Mar. 27, 2008.
Godown, Jeff. Lieutenant. COMPSTAT, LAPD. Personal Interview. Feb. 28, 2008.
Gomez, Dan. Sergeant. Parker Center Station, Tactical Training Unit, LAPD. Personal Interview. Mar. 13, 2008.
Graham, Don. Sergeant. Southeast Community Station, LAPD. Personal Interview. Mar. 26, 2008.
Hernandez, Manuel. Officer. Parker Center Station, Tactical Training Unit, LAPD. Personal Interview. Mar. 13,
2008.
Ligouri, Jason. Officer. Parker Center Station, Tactical Training Unit, LAPD. May 2, 2008.
Washington, Jude. Officer. Southeast Community Police Station, LAPD. May 2, 2008.
Wagner, Doug. Management Analyst II. COMPSTAT, LAPD. Mar. 11, 2008.
Community Leaders Interviewed
Cummings, Mike. Pastor. We Care Outreach Ministries. Apr. 5, 2008.
MacPherson, Sarah. Associate Director. Hollywood Entertainment District Property Owners. Apr. 14, 2008.
Morrison, Kerry. Executive Director. Hollywood Entertainment District Property Owners. Apr. 14, 2008.
Taylor, Tamika. Community Program Assistant. Los Angeles Commission of Children, Youth and Their Families.
Personal Interview. Apr. 4, 2008.
Email
De La Torre, Ruben. Lieutenant. Media Relations, LAPD. Email Correspondence. Jan. 23, 2008 and Jan. 25, 2008.
Gomez, Dan. Sergeant. Parker Center Station, Tactical Training Unit, LAPD. Email Correspondence. Mar. 11, 2008
and Apr. 14, 2008.
Gray Jr., Louis H. Commanding Officer. Parker Center Station, LAPD. Email Correspondence. Jan. 18, 2008; Jan.
25, 2008, Feb. 25, 2008, Apr. 18, 2008 and May 1, 2008.
Taylor, Tamika. Community Program Assistant. Los Angeles Commission of Children, Youth and Their Families.
Email Correspondence. May 1, 2008.
Meeting Attended
COMPSTAT Weekly Meeting, South Bureau, April 16, 2008.

- 59 -

APPENDICES

- 60 -

APPENDIX A. Evidence of CCTV in Crime Prevention
Author

Armitage,
Smyth, and
Pease, 1999

Brown, 1995

Location

Burnley,
United
Kingdom

Newcastle
Upon Tyne,
United
Kingdom

Description of
CCTV System

Results

Methodology

Cameras in the
town center

Desirable effect: 28% reduction in crime vs. a 1%
reduction control area 1, and a 9% increase in
control 2. Violent crimes decreased by 35% vs. a
20% decrease in control 1 and 0% change in
control 2. Vehicle crimes decreased by 48% vs. 8%
declines in both control areas. Burglary declined by
41% vs. increases of 9% and 34% in the two
respective control areas. There was some
displacement of burglary as well as diffusion of
benefits for total crime, violent crime, and vehicle
crime.

Good design: comparison
of crime rates 12 months
before and after CCTV
intervention in
experimental and control
areas.

16 cameras in
the city center

Undesirable effect: crime did not fall as much in
the experimental area as in the control area (21.6%
decline vs. 29.7% decline in the control area). But
there were reductions in certain types of crime:
57% reduction in burglary, compared to 38.7%
decline in control; 50% reduction in theft from
vehicle compared to 38.9% decline in the control,
47% reduction in vehicle theft compared to 40.5%
decline in control, and 34% reduction in criminal
damage.

Good design: comparison
of crime 26 months
before and 15 months
after in experimental and
control areas.

- 61 -

Brown, 1995

Burrows, 1979

Farrington,
Bennet, and
Welsh, 2002

Flight,
Heerwaarden,
and Soomeren,
2003

Birmingham,
Desirable effect: 4.3% decline in crime compared
9 cameras in the
United
to a 131.6% increase in the control. Reduction in
city center
Kingdom
robbery, burglary, and theft from person.

London,
United
Kingdom

Cambridge,
United
Kingdom

Amsterdam,
The
Netherlands

Good design: comparison
of crime rates 12 months
before and after CCTV
intervention in
experimental and control
areas.

Cameras in 4
subway stations

Desirable effect: robbery declined 22.9% compared
to 23.1% and 116.3% increases in the two
respective control areas. Theft decreased 72.8%
compared to declines of 26.5% and 39.4% in the
control areas.

Good design: comparison
of crime rates 12 months
before and after CCTV
intervention in
experimental and two
control areas.

30 cameras in
the city center

Undesirable effect: crime did not decline as much
as in the control areas: 13.8% decline vs. 26.9%
decline in control area. Violent crime fell 6% vs. a
33.8% decline in the control. Vehicle crimes
decreased by 53.1% vs. a 54% decline in the
control area. The percentage of people that
reporting being victimized increased by 2.1
percentage points vs. an increase of 2.2 percentage
points in the control.

Good design: comparison
of crime rates 11 months
before and after CCTV
intervention in
experimental and control
areas.

Desirable effect: significant reduction in crime,
compared to no change and slight increases in the
control areas.

Good design: comparison
of crime rates 12 months
before and after CCTV
intervention in
experimental, adjacent,
and control areas.

29 cameras in
city center

- 62 -

Gill and
Spriggs, 2005

"City
Outskirts,"
United
Kingdom

47 cameras
around a park,
hospital, and
industrial area

Desirable effect: crime was reduced by 28% in the
target area, compared to a 1% decrease in the
control area. Results are statistically significant.

Gill and
Spriggs, 2005

Hawkeye,
London,
United
Kingdom

556 cameras in
parking lots
along the city
outskirts

Desirable effect: crime declined by 73% compared
to a 10% decline in the control area. Results are
statistically significant.

Gill and
Spriggs, 2005

"City
Hospital,"
United
Kingdom

9 of a total of
67 cameras
around a
hospital are
evaluated

Gill and
Spriggs, 2005

"South City,"
United
Kingdom

51 cameras in a
mixed-income
city center in
southern
England

Null effect: crime decreased by 10%, but the
control area experienced a greater reduction in
crime (-12%); these results are not statistically
significant

Gill and
Spriggs, 2005

"Shire
Town,"
United
Kingdom

12 cameras in a
Midlands town
center

Null effect: 4% reduction in crime compared to a
3% increase in crime in comparison site; however,
results are not statistically significant.

Desirable effect: crime decreased by 33% in the
target area vs. a 6% reduction in the control;
however due to the large difference in size these
results are not statistically significant.

- 63 -

Good design: comparison
of crime rates crime rates
1 year before and after
CCTV intervention in
experimental and control
areas.
Good design: comparison
of crime rates crime rates
1 year before and after
CCTV intervention in
experimental and control
areas.
Good design: comparison
of crime rates crime rates
1 year before and after
CCTV intervention in
experimental and control
areas.
Good design: comparison
of crime rates crime rates
1 year before and after
CCTV intervention in
experimental and control
areas.
Good design: comparison
of crime rates crime rates
1 year before and after
CCTV intervention in
experimental and control
areas.

Gill and
Spriggs, 2005

"Market
Town,"
United
Kingdom

9 cameras in an
affluent market
town

Null Effect: crime increased by 18% in the target
area, vs. a 3% increase in the division as a whole;
however, due to the size differences of the control
and target areas, this result is not statistically
significant.

Gill and
Spriggs, 2005

"Borough
Town,"
United
Kingdom

40 cameras
around a small
town center

Null effect: crime increased slightly by .3% in the
target area, while crime increased by 13% in the
control site. The results were not statistically
significant.

Gill and
Spriggs, 2005

"Northern
Estate,"
United
Kingdom

Gill and
Spriggs, 2005

"Eastcap
Estate,"
United
Kingdom

Gill and
Spriggs, 2005

"Dual
Estate,"
United
Kingdom

11 cameras in a
residential
neighborhood
with "deprived
housing" in
North England
12 cameras in a
residential area
with "deprived
housing" in
southeast
England
14 cameras in a
low income
residential area
with some
commercial
businesses

Null effect: 10% reduction in crime in the target
area compared to a 21% increase in crime in the
control area; results were not statistically
significant.

Null effect: Crime increased by 2% in the target
area, vs. a 5% increase in the control area; results
were not statistically significant.

Undesirable effect: Crime increased by 4% in the
target area vs. a 19% decrease in the control area.
Results are statistically significant.

- 64 -

Gill and
Spriggs, 2005

Grandmaison
and Tremblay,
1997

"Southcap
Estate,"
United
Kingdom

"Borough"
United
Kingdom

"Deploy
Estate,"
United
Kingdom

Montreal,
Canada

148 cameras in
a residential
area of South
London with
"deprived
housing"
8 cameras
installed in
lamp posts in a
mixed-income
residential area
in southeast
England

Good design: comparison
of crime rates crime rates
Null effect: crime increased by 14%, compared to a
1 year before and after
13% crime reduction in the control area. Results
CCTV intervention in
are not statistically significant.
experimental and control
areas.

Undesirable effect: crime increased by 73% while
the control area experienced a 12% increase in
crime. Results are statistically significant.

Good design: comparison
of crime rates crime rates
1 year before and after
CCTV intervention in
experimental and control
areas.

11 cameras
along 3
residential
streets, and one
shopping area

Good design: comparison
of crime rates crime rates
Null effect: 21% increase in crime in the target area
1 to 2 years before and
compared to a 3% increase in the control area.
after CCTV intervention
Results are not statistically significant.
in experimental and
control areas.

13 subway
stations with 10
cameras each

Null effect: there was not significant change in
crime rates: total crime dropped 20% compared to
18.3% decline in the control; robbery declined by
27% compared to 30.8% in the control; assault
declined 27.5% compared to an increase of 5.6% in
the control; theft and fraud declined by 15.5% vs. a
16% decline in the control.

- 65 -

Good design: comparison
of crime rates 18 months
before and after in
experimental and control
areas.

Griffith, n.d.

Gillingham,
United
Kingdom

Seven cameras
in the town
center

Desirable effect: crime fell 44% compared to 22%
decline in the control area; there was a reduction in
robberies and vehicle crime.

Harada et al.,
2004

Tokyo,
Japan

Cameras in
Kabukicho area
of Tokyo

Desirable effect: 22% decrease in crime compared
to 11% decrease in control area and 9% decrease in
adjacent buffer areas. Reductions in vehicle crime
and larceny; small decrease in violent crime.

Cincinnati,
Ohio

Cameras
installed in a
strip mall in a
Northside
neighborhood

Null effect: calls for service increased by 1.8% vs.
a 0% increase in the control

Mazerolle et al.,
2002

Cincinnati,
Ohio

Cameras
installed in a
mixed-use
Null effect: calls for service increased by 9.8% vs.
commercial and a 0% increase in the control.
residential
neighborhood
Cameras
installed in
Findley Market
Place

Good design: comparison
of crime rates 1 year
before and 4 years after
CCTV intervention in
experimental and control
areas.
Good design: comparison
of crime rates 12 months
before and after CCTV
intervention in
experimental, adjacent,
and control areas.
Good design: compared
the number of calls for
service 23 months before
and 6 months after the
implementation of the
CCTV system.
Good design: comparison
of calls for service 23
months before and 4
months after the CCTV
intervention.

Good design: compared
calls for service 24.5
months before and 3.5
Null effect: calls for service increased by 16.9% vs.
months after CCTV
a 17.1% increase in the control area.
intervention in an
experimental and control
area.

- 66 -

Musheno,
Levine, and
Palumbo, 1978

Bronxdale
Houses, Ney
York City,
USA

Cameras in a
public housing
complex

Uncertain effect: crime fell 9.4% (32 to 29) in the
experimental area, and fell 19.2% (26 to 21) in the
control area.

Poyner, 1991

Guildford,
United
Kingdom

Cameras in the
parking lot at
the University
of Surrey

Undesirable effect: crime decreased less in the
experimental areas than in the control areas; theft
from vehicles declined by 73.3% compared to a
93.8% decline in the control area.

Sarno et al.,
1999

Camberwell,
London

17 cameras in
town center

Desirable effect: 12% reduction in crime; street,
vehicle, and violent crimes rates decreased at a
faster pace than prior to CCTV, while control areas
experienced an increase in crime.

12 cameras on
the East Street
market

Null effect: 10% decline in crime, with reductions
in vehicle crime, property damage, and robbery;
however, the crime in the buffer and control areas
decreased at a quicker rate than in the experimental
area. Street crime increased.

Sarno et al.,
1999

London,
United
Kingdom

34 cameras
around the
Desirable effect: crime fell by 17%; the number of
Elephant and
street robberies declined substantially.
Castle shopping
center

- 67 -

Good design: comparison
of crime rate 3 months
before and after CCTV
intervention in
experimental and control
areas.
Good design: compared
theft from vehicles 24
months before and 10
months after the CCTV
intervention in
experimental and control
areas.
Good design: comparison
of crime rates 24 months
before and after CCTV
intervention in
experimental, adjacent,
and control areas.
Good design: comparison
of crime rates 24 months
before and after CCTV
intervention in
experimental, adjacent,
and control areas.
Good design: comparison
of crime rates 24 months
before and after CCTV
intervention in
experimental, adjacent,
and control areas.

Sarno, 1995

London,
United
Kingdom

Cameras in a
parkling lot in
the Borough of
Sutton

Desirable effect: crime fell 57.3% vs. declines of
36.5% and 40.2% in the two control areas.

Sarno, 1995

London,
United
Kingdom

11 cameras in
the town center
in the Borough
of Sutton

Undesirable effect: crime did not decline as much
in the experimental area as in the control areas:
12.8% decline vs. 18% decline in control 1 and a
30% decline in control 2.

Short and
Ditton, 1996

Airdrie,
Scotland,
United
Kingdom

12 cameras in
town center

Desirable effect: 35% reduction in crime vs. 12%
reduction in control area. Crimes of dishonesty and
vandalism decreased sharply. Some other types of
crime increased, likely due to increased detection.

Sivarajasingam,
Shepherd, and
Matthews, 2003

United
Kingdom

Null effect: increased police detection of and
Five towns with intervention in violent crimes and reduced hospital
CCTV
visits due to violent crime compared to control
groups.

- 68 -

Good design: comparison
of crime 12 months
before and after the
CCTV intervention in
experimental and 2
control areas.
Good design: comparison
of crime rates 12 months
before and after CCTV
intervention in
experimental and 2
control areas.
Good design: comparison
of crime rates 24 months
before and after CCTV
intervention in
experimental and control
areas.
Good design: comparison
of crime rates and
assualt-related
hospitalizations 24
months before and after
CCTV intervention in
experimental and control
areas.

Skinns, 1998

Doncaster,
United
Kingdom

63 cameras in
the city centre

Desirable effect: crime dropped 21.3% vs. an
increase of 11.9% in the control. Vehicle crime fell
after the cameras were introduced; however, there
was no affect on other property crimes (burglary,
theft, shoplifting, and criminal damage). There was
some displacement of crime to outlying areas.

Squires, 1998

Ilford, Essex,
United
Kingdom

Surveillance of
town center

Desirable effect: 17% reduction in crime vs. a 9%
increase in the control.

Squires, 2003

East
Brighton,
United
Kingdom

10 cameras in a
low-income
housing
complex

Null effect: crime continued to increase at a rate
comparable to the control.

Tilley, 1993

Hartlepool,
United
Kingdom

Parking Lot

Desirable effect: vehicle theft declined by 59% vs.
a 16.3% decline in the control; Theft from vehicles
declined by 9.4% vs. a 3.1% increase in the control
area

- 69 -

Good design: comparison
of crime rates 24 months
before and after CCTV
intervention in
experimental and control
areas.
Good design: comparison
of crime rates 6 months
before and after CCTV
intervention in
experimental and control
areas.
Good design: comparison
of crime rates before and
after CCTV intervention
in experimental and
control areas; however,
crime data were not
broken down into
categories of crime.
Good design: comparison
of crime data 15 months
before and 30 months
after the CCTV
intervention.

Parking Lot

Desirable effect: vehicle theft declined by 43.5%
vs. increases of 5.9% and 31.8% in the two control
areas. Theft from vehicle declined by 68.8% vs.
increases of 4.5% and 6.1% in the two control
areas.

Tilley, 1993

Coventry,
United
Kingdom

Parking Lot

Desirable effect: vehicle theft declined by 50.5%
vs. a 53.6% decline in the control area. Theft from
vehicles declined by 64.4% vs. a 10.7% in the
control area.

Webb and
Laycock, 1992

London,
United
Kingdom

Cameras in
Underground
stations

Desirable effect: the number of robberies declined
by 62.3% compared to a 50% decrease in the
control area. The specific affect of CCTV versus
the other aspects of the strategy is unclear.

Cameras in the
Oxford Circus
subway station

Undesirable effect: crime increased more in the
experimental area than in the control area:
robberies increased 47.1% compared to 21.4% in
the control; theft increased by 11.0% compared to a
1.9% decline in the control; assault increased by
29.4% compared to 36.4% in the control

Tilley, 1993

Bradford,
United
Kingdom

Webb and
Laycock, 1992

London,
United
Kingdom

- 70 -

Good design: comparison
of crime data 12 months
before and after the
CCTV intervention in the
experimental area and
two control areas.
Good design: comparison
of crime rates 8 months
before and after in the
experimental area to
crime rates 16 months
before and after in the
control area.
Good design: comparison
of crime rates 12 months
before and after CCTV
intervention in
experimental and control
areas. The specific affect
of CCTV versus other
aspects of the strategy is
unclear.
Good design: compared
crime rates from 28
months before and 32
months after CCTV
intervention in
experimental and control
areas.

Williamson and
McLafferty,
2000

Winge and
Knutsson, 2003

Brooklyn,
New York

Oslo,
Norway

Cameras in the
Albany and
Roosevelt
public housing
complexes

Null effect: no change in crime in the housing
project and the .1 mile buffer, compared to a 5.3%
and 4.0% decline in the control areas. There was a
reduction in major felonies.

Uncertain effect: overall recorded crime increased,
particularly violent and narcotics offenses;
6 cameras in the
however, the authors suggest that crime did not
Central Train
actually increase, but rather that crime detection
Station
improved. There was some decrease in robbery and
bicycle theft.

- 71 -

Good design: comparison
of crime rates 18 months
before and after in
experimental, adjacent,
and control areas.
Good design: comparison
of crime rates 12 months
before and after CCTV
intervention in
experimental, adjacent,
and control areas.

- 72 -

APPENDIX B: SORTING THE DATA
We identified “suppressible” crimes, by sorting the data through several filters, which are
detailed below.
Crimes
1. Sorted by Hollywood, Jordan Downs and Nickerson Gardens police reporting-districts.
2. Sorted by crime type and crime code. Types of crimes likely to be suppressed by video
surveillance given the presence of the cameras and their locations were chosen. Crime types
excluded are Stolen Boat, Recovered Boat, Kidnap, Some Miscellaneous and Other coded
crimes, Rape, Recovered Vehicle, Sex Crimes, Trespass. These are not crimes that would have
occurred within the purview of the cameras we are studying, and therefore, would not be
suppressible by the cameras’ presence. Rape and Child Abuse crime-data was excluded due to
privacy restrictions. The crimes included are listed in the table below.
Crime Type
Aggravated Assault (AGG)

Burglary/Theft from a Vehicle (BTFV)

Burglary (BURG)
Grand Theft Auto (GTA)
Grand Theft Person (GTP)

Homicide (HOM), Miscellaneous (MISS)
Robbery (ROBB)
Vandalism (VAND)

Crime Codes
230 Assault with a Deadly Weapon
231 ADW against a Police Officer
235 Child Abuse (aggravated assault)
236 Spousal Abuse (aggravated assault)
250 Shots Fired at Moving Vehicle
251 Shots Fired Inhabited Dwelling
330 Burglary from Vehicle
331 Theft from Vehicle
410 Burglary from Vehicle (attempted)
420 Theft from Vehicle (petty)
421 Theft from Vehicle (attempted)
310 Burglary
320 Burglary (attempted)
510 Vehicle, Stolen
520 Vehicle , Stolen (attempted)
350 Theft from Person
351 Pursesnatch
352 Pickpocket – Pickpurse
353 Drunkroll
450 Theft from Person (attempted)
451 Pursesnatch (attempted)
452 Pickpocket (attempted)
453Drunkroll (attempted)
110 Homicide
113 Manslaughter, Negligence
210 Robbery
220 Robbery (attempted)
740 Vandalism ($400+)
- 73 -

745 Vandalism (< $400)
341 Theft, Grand (> $400)
440 Theft, Petty (< $400)
441 Theft (attempted)
480 Bicycle Stolen
485 Bicycle Stolen (attempted)
622 Battery on Fireman
623 Batter on Police Officer
624 Battery – Misdemeanor
625 Other Misdemeanor Assault
626 Spousal Abuse
753 Shots Fired
755 Bomb Threat
756 Bomb or Poss./Mfr. Destruct. Device
761 Brandishing Weapon
762 Lewd Conduct
805 Pimping
806 Pandering
882 Inciting Riot
886 Disturbing the Peace
995 Suspicious Activity Reports

Miscellaneous – Other Theft (MISS)

Other (OTH)

3. Sorted by premise code. Included codes of locations that likely would be affected by the
presence of the video cameras in their specific locations, either by being in view of the cameras,
being open to the public and possibly in view of a camera or through location in the immediately
surrounding area to which crime might be displaced. Codes for locations that do not exist in any
of the test or control areas, that are not open to the public and that are by definition indoors were
excluded.
Category

Description

Outside

101 Street/Parkway
102 Sidewalk
103 Alley
104 Driveway
105 Ped Overcrossing
106 Tunnel
107 Vacant Lot
108 Parking Lot
109 Park Playground
110 Freeway (inc. ramp)
116 Other outside
118 Construction Site
119 Porch (residential)
121 Yard
- 74 -

131 Redline Platform
132 Redline Mezzanine
135 MTA Prop/Prk. Lot
139 Stairwell
140 Balcony
142 Drive Thru
143 Escalator
145 Mailbox
142 Drive Thru
143 Escalator
145 Mailbox
146 Patio
147 Pool/Public
148 Public Restroom

123 Parking
Underground
124 Bus Stop
125 Pay Phone
127 Trashcan/Dumpster
128 Bus Stop/Layover
Transportation
Business

114 Taxi
122 Vehicle, Pass./Truck
201 Jewelry Store
202 Liquor Store
203 Other Business
204 Mfr. Co.
205 Gun/Sporting Goods
206 TV/Radio/Appliance
207 Bar/Cocktail
208 Auto Sales
210 Restaurant/Fast Food
211 Pawn Shop
213 Warehouse
214 Bus Depot
215 Train Depot
216 Swap Meet

Outside
149 Riverbed
151 Tow Yard
152 Underpass/Bridge

217 Auto Repair Shop
218 Beauty/Barber Shop
219 Cleaners
220 Nail Salon
221 Public Storage
222 Laundromat
223 Video Rental Store
224 Surplus Store
225 Music Store
228 Bowling Alley
229 Check Cashing
233 Tattoo Parlor
234 Optical Office

Manufacturing

301 Gas Station

Stores

401 Mini-mart
402 Market
403 Drug Store
404 Department Store
405 Clothing Store

406 Other Store
407 Hardware
408 Auto Supply
409 Beauty Supply

Schools

704 Elementary *
720 Jr. High *
721 High School *
722 College/Univ. *
705 Slip/Dock/Marina
706 Adult Bookstore
707 Garage/Carport
710 Other Premise
708 Church/Temple *
730 Synagogue *
731 Mosque *
711 Arcade
716 Theater/Movie
733 Bar/Sports Bar

723 Private/Preschool *
724 Trade School *
729 Special School *

Miscellaneous

Religious Facility

Entertainment

- 75 -

717 Health Spa/Gym *
726 Police Facility *
727 Shopping Mall *

735 Night Club
736 Skateboard Park
737 Skating Rink

City/County Government

725 Gov’t Facility *
732 Post Office *

* Crimes with these codes that occurred at an address were assumed to be indoors and excluded;
those that were recorded at intersections were assumed to be outside and included.
4. Geocoded into ArcMap GIS software to identify crimes in the target, buffer, and control areas.
Arrests
1. Sorted by Hollywood, Jordan Downs and Nickerson Gardens police reporting district.
2. Pulled data for arrests for Part II crimes (“victimless” crimes that usually go unreported unless
an arrest is made, such as drunkenness or prostitution) that could likely be detected by video
surveillance. These arrest categories are weapons, narcotics, drunkenness, gambling and other
miscellaneous crimes. Many categories had very low numbers given the size of the reporting
districts and time period of the cases represented. Aggregated Part II arrest data was utilized to
gauge generally the ability of video surveillance to detect or deter Part II crime.
3. Geocoded into ArcMap GIS, and crimes that occurred within the target, buffer, and control
areas were identified.

- 76 -

APPENDIX C: STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
Relative Effect Size Test
We employed the relative effect size statistical test that allows for a comparison of before-andafter crime rates in two different locations. The calculation of the relative effect size is detailed
below:

Target Area
Control Area

Average monthly crime
rate before
implementation
a
c

Average monthly crime
rate after
implementation
b
d

Relative Effect Size = [a/(a+b)] / [b/(a+b)]
[c/(c+d)] / [d/(c+d)]
A relative size effect greater than one indicates that crime decreased in the test area at a faster
pace than, or did not increase as quickly as the control area. Alternatively, a relative effect size
less than one signifies that crime declined at a faster rate or did not increase as substantially in
the control area than in the test area.
To determine if the observed differences in crime rates are statistically significant and not due to
random variance, we calculated the 95% confidence intervals. If the entire confidence interval is
greater than one then the crime in the target area is said to have decreased significantly more
than in the control area. Alternatively, if the entire confidence interval is less than one, then the
crime in the control area is said to have decreased significantly more than in the target area. If
the confidence interval includes values both less than and greater than one, then the differences
in crime are not statistically significant. The confidence interval calculations are described
below:

95% Confidence Interval = relative effect size +/- (relative effect size * 2 * standard error)
Standard Error = var(a)/a2 + var(b)/b2 + var(c)/c2+var(d)/d2

Relative Effect Size Results
We compared before-and-after crime rates both between the target and control areas, as well as
between the buffer and control areas to test for displacement of crime areas or the diffusion of
benefits from the surveilled areas. None of the changes in crime in either our Hollywood or
Jordan Downs case study areas met the criterion for statistical significant, which is likely a result
of the large variance in crime month to month. The results of the relative effect size test and the
95% confidence intervals for the target and buffer areas are listed in the tables below.

- 77 -

Hollywood Boulevard Target Area Descriptive Crime Statistics
Pre-CCTV Period (25 Months)

Crime Type
All Crime
Violent Crime
Homicide
Aggravated
Assault
Robbery
Battery
Property
Crime
Vandalism
Auto Theft
BTFV
Theft
Other

Post-CCTV Period (14 Months)

1,951
865
1

% of
Total
Crime
100.00%
44.34%
0.05%

221
148
495

11.33%
7.59%
25.37%

8.84
5.92
19.80

13.6
6.7
32.8

106
79
289

10.82%
8.06%
29.49%

7.57
5.64
20.64

19.0
8.6
15.5

-14.35%
-4.68%
4.26%

1,054
139
140
254
521
32

54.02%
7.12%
7.18%
13.02%
26.70%
1.64%

42.16
5.56
5.60
10.16
20.84
1.28

60.4
4.1
4.0
14.2
19.4
1.3

485
94
61
84
246
20

49.49%
9.59%
6.22%
8.57%
25.10%
2.04%

34.64
6.71
4.36
6.00
17.57
1.43

13.9
6.1
1.6
8.0
10.3
1.6

-17.83%
20.76%
-22.19%
-40.94%
-15.68%
11.61%

Total #
Crimes

Monthly
Rate

Variance

Total #
Crimes

78.04
34.60
0.04

176.1
67.4
0.0

980
475
1

% of
Total
Crime
100.00%
48.47%
0.10%

%
Change
Monthly
Rate

Monthly
Rate

Variance

70.00
33.93
0.07

62.3
32.4
0.1

-10.30%
-1.94%
78.57%

Hollywood Boulevard Target Area Relative Effect Size (RES) by Crime Type
Crime Type
All Crime
Violent Crime
Homicide
Aggravated
Assault
Robbery
Battery
Property Crime
Vandalism
Auto Theft
BTFV
Theft
Other

RES

Upper
Confidence
Interval

Lower
Confidence
Interval

0.99
0.98
0.22

1.54
1.69
3.26

0.44
0.27
-2.81

0.91

2.39

-0.57

0.96
1.05
1.02
0.82
0.97
1.23
1.07
0.99

2.52
1.90
1.64
1.86
2.16
2.99
1.85
4.05

-0.61
0.20
0.39
-0.23
-0.21
-0.52
0.29
-2.06

- 78 -

Hollywood Boulevard Target Area Crime RES and 95% Confidence Intervals

Hollywood Boulevard Target Area Descriptive Arrest Statistics

Column1
Total Arrests
Drunkenness
Liquor Laws
Narcotics
Prostitution
Weapon
Other

# of
Arrests

% of
Total
Arrests

Monthly
Rate

2,439
612
10
896

100.00%
25.09%
0.41%
36.74%

6
17
898

Variance

# of
Arrests

% of
Total

Monthly
Rate

Variance

97.6
24.5
0.4
35.8

117.0
56.1
0.3
143.5

1,470
372
4
407

100.00%
25.31%
0.27%
27.69%

105.0
26.6
0.3
29.1

609.4
60.0
0.2
71.0

0.25%

0.2

0.00%

0.0

0.70%
36.82%

0.7
35.9

1.0
296.7

18
669

1.22%
45.51%

1.3
47.8

1.3
138.2

Hollywood Boulevard Target Area RES by Arrest Type
Arrest Type

RES

Upper
Confidence
Interval

Lower
Confidence
Interval

Total Arrests
Drunkenness
Liquor Laws
Narcotics
Prostitution
Weapon
Other

1.04
1.05
0.98
1.28
NA
0.86
0.94

1.75
2.24
6.32
2.62
NA
4.16
2.13

0.34
-0.13
-4.37
-0.07
NA
-2.45
-0.24

- 79 -

%
change
monthly
rate
7.63%
8.54%
-28.57%
-18.89%
100.00%
89.08%
33.03%

Hollywood Boulevard Target RES and 95% Confidence Intervals

Hollywood Boulevard Buffer Area Descriptive Crime Statistics
Pre-CCTV Period (25 Months)
Crime Type

All Crime
Violent Crime
Homicide
Aggravated
Assault
Robbery
Battery
Property
Crime
Vandalism
Auto Theft
BTFV
Theft
Other

Post-CCTV Period (14 Months)

%
Change
Monthly
rate

Total #
Crimes

% of
Total
Crime

Monthly
Rate

Variance

Total #
Crimes

% of Total
Crime

Monthly
Rate

Variance

1,868
709
5

100.00%
37.96%
0.27%

74.7
28.4
0.2

268.4
61.6
0.2

983
395
1

100.00%
40.18%
0.10%

70.2
28.2
0.1

146.6
37.6
0.1

-6.03%
-0.51%
-64.29%

219
151
334

11.72%
8.08%
17.88%

8.8
6.0
13.4

11.9
5.7
15.3

90
84
220

9.16%
8.55%
22.38%

6.4
6.0
15.7

10.7
4.3
11.8

-26.61%
-0.66%
17.62%

1,141
197
209
375
360
18

61.08%
10.55%
11.19%
20.07%
19.27%
0.96%

45.6
7.9
8.4
15.0
14.4
0.7

164.8
17.1
14.3
24.2
22.4
0.7

576
111
103
183
179
12

58.60%
11.29%
10.48%
18.62%
18.21%
1.22%

41.1
7.9
7.4
13.1
12.8
0.9

96.4
10.7
9.3
38.1
22.6
1.1

-9.85%
0.62%
-12.00%
-12.86%
-11.21%
19.05%

- 80 -

Hollywood Boulevard Buffer Area Relative Effect Size by Crime Type
Crime Type

RES

Upper
Confidence
Interval

Lower
Confidence
Interval

All Crime
Violent Crime
Homicide
Aggravated
Assault
Robbery
Battery
Property Crime
Vandalism
Auto Theft
BTFV
Theft
Other

0.95
0.97
1.11

1.58
1.77
13.13

0.31
0.17
-10.91

1.07

2.67

-0.54

0.92
0.93
0.93
0.98
0.86
0.84
1.01
0.93

2.20
1.72
1.73
2.48
2.12
1.99
2.13
4.41

-0.37
0.15
0.13
-0.52
-0.39
-0.31
-0.10
-2.55

Hollywood Boulevard Buffer Area RES and 95% Confidence Intervals

- 81 -

Hollywood Boulevard Buffer Area Descriptive Arrest Statistics
Pre-CCTV Period (25 Months)
Arrest Type
Total Arrests
Drunkenness
Liquor Laws
Narcotics
Prostitution
Weapon
Other

# of
Arrests
1,987
483
21
822
17
18
626

% of
Total
100.00%
24.31%
1.06%
41.37%
0.86%
0.91%
31.50%

Monthly
Rate
79.5
19.3
0.8
32.9
0.7
0.7
25.0

Post-CCTV Period (14 Months)

Variance
232.8
54.9
1.2
51.4
0.8
0.7
50.5

# of
Arrests
1,180
315
10
432
2
22
399

% of
Total
100.00%
26.69%
0.85%
36.61%
0.17%
1.86%
33.81%

Monthly
Rate
84.3
22.5
0.7
30.9
0.1
1.6
28.5

Variance
221.8
22.6
1.1
68.3
0.1
2.1
56.9

Hollywood Boulevard Buffer Area RES by Arrest Type
Arrest Type

RES

Upper
Confidence
Interval

Lower
Confidence
Interval

Total Arrests
Drunkenness
Liquor Laws
Narcotics
Prostitution
Weapon
Other

1.06
0.98
0.82
1.10
2.98
0.74
1.10

1.77
2.11
5.06
2.09
20.78
3.33
2.21

0.34
-0.15
-3.42
0.11
-14.83
-1.85
-0.01

Hollywood Boulevard Buffer Area Arrest RES and 95% Confidence Intervals

- 82 -

% Change
Monthly
Rate
6.05%
16.46%
-14.97%
-6.15%
-78.99%
118.25%
13.82%

Hollywood Box Matched Pair Descriptive Crime Statistics
Crime Type
All Crime
Violent Crime
Homicide
Aggravated
Assault
Robbery
Battery
Property Crime
Vandalism
Auto Theft
BTFV
Theft
Other

Pre-CCTV Period (25 Months)
% of
# of
Monthly
Variance
Total
Crimes
Rate
Crime
6,200
100.00%
248.0
1,540.6
2,434
39.26%
97.4
254.8
9
0.15%
0.4
0.4
690
531
1,204
3,695
625
645
1,178
1,247
71

11.13%
8.56%
19.42%
59.60%
10.08%
10.40%
19.00%
20.11%
1.15%

27.6
21.2
48.2
147.8
25.0
25.8
47.1
49.9
2.8

62.6
30.3
57.7
784.8
54.9
40.4
192.1
91.5
3.7

Post-CCTV Period (14 Months)
% of
Total #
Monthly
Variance
Total
Crimes
Rate
Crime
3,087
100.00%
220.5
473.7
1,314
42.57%
93.9
169.2
2
0.06%
0.1
0.1
302
271
739
1,729
345
274
481
629
44

9.78%
8.78%
23.94%
56.01%
11.18%
8.88%
15.58%
20.38%
1.43%

21.6
19.4
52.8
123.5
24.6
19.6
34.4
44.9
3.1

%
Change
Monthly
Rate
-11.09%
-3.60%
-60.32%

32.3
54.4
55.1
203.3
33.0
36.0
66.6
39.5
3.1

-21.84%
-8.86%
9.60%
-16.44%
-1.43%
-24.14%
-27.09%
-9.93%
10.66%

Post-CCTV Period (14 Months)
# of
% of
Monthly
Variance
Arrests
Total
Rate
4,111
100.00%
293.6
2,649.8
926
22.52%
66.1
217.5
25
0.61%
1.8
5.0
1,337
32.52%
95.5
500.3
103
2.51%
7.4
23.0
68
1.65%
4.9
10.6
1,652
40.18%
118.0
392.0

% Change
Monthly
Rate

Hollywood Box Matched Pair Descriptive Arrest Statistics
Arrest Type
Total Arrests
Drunkenness
Liquor Laws
Narcotics
Prostitution
Weapon
Other

Pre-CCTV Period (25 Months)
# of
% of
Monthly
Variance
Arrests
Total
Rate
6,537
100.00%
261.5
1,051
1,447
22.14%
57.9
300
64
0.98%
2.6
8
2,308
35.31%
92.3
236
294
4.50%
11.8
41
75
1.15%
3.0
3
2,349
35.93%
94.0
659

- 83 -

12.30%
14.28%
-30.25%
3.44%
-37.44%
61.90%
25.59%

Jordan Downs Target Area Descriptive Crime Statistics
Crime Type

All Crime
Violent Crime
Homicide
Aggravated
Assault
Robbery
Battery
Property Crime
Vandalism
Auto Theft
BTFV
Theft
Other

Pre-CCTV Period (45 Months)
% of
# of
Monthly
Variance
Total
Crimes
Rate
Crime

Post-CCTV Period (16 Months)
% of
Total #
Monthly
Variance
Total
Crimes
Rate
Crime

%
Change
Monthly
Rate

535
289
4

1.00
0.54
0.01

11.89
6.42
0.09

23.06
14.11
0.08

170
82
2

1.00
0.48
0.01

10.63
5.13
0.13

27.72
9.32
0.25

-10.63%
-20.20%
40.63%

82
137
66
237
68
68
74
27
9

0.15
0.26
0.12
0.44
0.13
0.13
0.14
0.05
0.02

1.82
3.04
1.47
5.27
1.51
1.51
1.64
0.60
0.20

3.19
5.82
2.39
9.75
3.35
1.85
2.23
0.61
0.21

24
24
32
86
20
23
27
16
2

0.14
0.14
0.19
0.51
0.12
0.14
0.16
0.09
0.01

1.50
1.50
2.00
5.38
1.25
1.44
1.69
1.00
0.13

1.60
2.00
2.67
20.25
2.33
3.73
2.36
1.20
0.12

-17.68%
-50.73%
36.36%
2.06%
-17.28%
-4.87%
2.62%
66.67%
-37.50%

Jordan Downs Target Area RES by Crime Type
Crime Type
All Violent Crime
Homicide
Aggravated Assault
Robbery
Battery
All Property Crime
Vandalism
Car Theft
BTFV
Theft
Total Crime

Relative Size
Effect

Upper
Confidence
Interval

Lower
Confidence
Interval

1.02
0.4
0.61
1.61
0.85
0.65
0.94
0.9
0.36
0.34
0.84

2.99
5.36
2.72
6.38
3.51
2.21
4.53
4.23
1.81
1.89
2.14

-0.96
-4.56
-1.5
-3.17
-1.81
-0.91
-2.65
-2.43
-1.08
-1.22
-0.47

- 84 -

Jordan Downs Target Area Crime RES and 95% Confidence Intervals

Jordan Downs Target Area Descriptive Arrest Statistics
Pre-CCTV Period (45 Months)
Arrest Type

# of
Arrests

Total Arrests
Drunkenness
Liquor Laws
Narcotics
Weapon
Other

441
6
2
147
25
261

Post-CCTV Period (16 Months)

% of
Total

Monthly
Rate

Variance

100.00%
1.36%
0.45%
33.33%
5.67%
59.18%

9.80
0.13
0.04
3.27
0.56
5.80

77.28
0.17
0.04
12.09
0.72
49.09

# of
Arrests
292
16
5
98
3
170

% of
Total

Monthly
Rate

100.00%
5.48%
1.71%
33.56%
1.03%
58.22%

18.25
1.00
0.31
6.13
0.19
10.63

Jordan Downs Target Area RES by Arrest Type
Arrest Type

RES

Upper
Confidence
Interval

Lower
Confidence
Interval

Total Arrests
Drunkenness
Narcotics
Weapon
Other

0.61
0.25
0.72
1.88
0.52

5.33
2.97
6.37
8.08
4.67

-4.11
-2.47
-4.94
-4.32
-3.63

- 85 -

Variance
4,493.74
15.11
1.76
522.51
0.62
1,551.13

%
Change
Monthly
Rate
86.22%
650.00%
603.13%
87.50%
-66.25%
83.19%

Jordan Downs Target Area Arrest RES and 95% Confidence Intervals

Jordan Downs Buffer Area Descriptive Crime Statistics
Pre-CCTV Period (45 Months)

Post-CCTV Period (16 Months)

%
Change
Monthly
Crime
Rate

# of
Crimes

% of
Total
Crime

Monthly
Rate

Variance

# of
Crimes

% of Total
Crime

Monthly
Rate

Variance

All Crime
Violent Crime

285
134

100.00%
47.02%

6.33
2.98

9.09
3.79

91
42

100.00%
46.15%

5.69
2.63

11.03
3.05

Homicide
Aggravated
Assault
Robbery
Battery
Property
Crime
Vandalism
Auto Theft
BTFV
Theft
Other

1.05%

0.07

0.06

0.00%

0.00

-10.20%
-11.85%
100.00%

43
60
28

15.09%
21.05%
9.82%

0.96
1.33
0.62

1.13
1.45
0.69

11
20
11

12.09%
21.98%
12.09%

0.69
1.25
0.69

1.56
1.27
0.50

-28.05%
-6.25%
10.49%

147
39
60
42
6
4

51.58%
13.68%
21.05%
14.74%
2.11%
1.40%

3.27
0.87
1.33
0.93
0.13
0.09

5.97
1.53
1.50
0.61
0.12
0.13

47
12
16
10
9
2

51.65%
13.19%
17.58%
10.99%
9.89%
2.20%

2.94
0.75
1.00
0.63
0.56
0.13

3.93
1.00
1.07
0.78
1.20
0.25

-10.08%
-13.46%
-25.00%
-33.04%
321.88%
40.63%

Crime Type

- 86 -

Jordan Downs Buffer Area RES by Crime Type
Buffer RES

RES

Upper Confidence
Interval

Lower Confidence
Interval

All Violent Crime
Aggravated Assault
Robbery
Battery
All Property Crime
Vandalism
Car Theft
BTFV
Theft
Total Crime

0.92
0.70
0.85
1.05
0.73
0.90
1.14
0.56
0.13
0.83

2.87
4.08
3.42
4.98
2.48
4.71
4.91
3.05
1.09
2.29

-1.03
-2.68
-1.73
-2.88
-1.01
-2.92
-2.62
-1.93
-0.82
-0.62

Jordan Downs Buffer Area Crime RES and 95% Confidence Intervals

Jordan Downs Buffer Area Descriptive Arrest Statistics
Arrest Type
Total Arrests
Drunkenness
Narcotics
Weapon
Other

Pre-CCTV Period (45 Months)
# of
% of
Monthly
Arrests Total
Rate
Variance
186
100.00%
4.13
10.6
1
0.54%
0.02
0.0
65
34.95%
1.44
2.0
12
6.45%
0.27
0.3
108
58.06%
2.40
6.1

Post-CCTV Period (16 Months)
# of
% of
Monthly
Arrests
Total
Rate
Variance
87
100.00%
5.44
11.46
2
2.30%
0.13
0.25
26
29.89%
1.63
1.85
0
0.00%
0.00
0.00
59
67.82%
3.69
8.50

- 87 -

% Change
Monthly
Rate
31.55%
462.50%
12.50%
-100.00%
53.65%

Jordan Downs Buffer Area RES by Arrest Type
Arrest Type
Total Arrests
Drunkenness
Narcotics
Other

RES

Upper Confidence
Interval

Lower
Confidence
Interval

0.87
0.33
1.20
0.62

3.03
5.75
4.68
2.58

-1.29
-5.09
-2.29
-1.34

Jordan Downs Buffer Area Arrest RES and 95% Confidence Intervals

Nickerson Gardens Control Area Descriptive Crime Statistics
Crime Type

All Crime
Violent Crime
Homicide
Aggravated
Assault
Robbery
Battery
Property
Crime
Vandalism
Auto Theft
BTFV
Theft
Other

Pre-CCTV Period (45 Months)
% of
# of
Monthly
Variance
Total
Crimes
Rate
Crime

Post-CCTV Period (16 Months)
% of
# of
Monthly
Variance
Total
Crimes
Rate
Crime

%
Change
Monthly
Rate

1,032
517
10

100.00%
50.10%
0.97%

22.93
11.49
0.22

54.70
17.53
0.22

275
149
2

100.00%
54.18%
0.73%

17.19
9.31
0.13

27.36
10.10
0.12

-25.05%
-18.94%
-43.75%

146
213
148

14.15%
20.64%
14.34%

3.24
4.73
3.29

4.10
8.29
3.66

26
60
61

9.45%
21.82%
22.18%

1.63
3.75
3.81

2.52
4.47
4.83

-49.91%
-20.77%
15.92%

507
163
141
143
60
8

49.13%
15.79%
13.66%
13.86%
5.81%
0.78%

11.27
3.62
3.13
3.18
1.33
0.18

21.61
4.56
4.07
5.47
1.55
0.15

119
45
43
19
12
7

43.27%
16.36%
15.64%
6.91%
4.36%
2.55%

7.44
2.81
2.69
1.19
0.75
0.44

12.80
2.83
2.76
2.43
0.87
0.26

-33.99%
-22.35%
-14.23%
-62.63%
-43.75%
146.09%

- 88 -

Nickerson Gardens Descriptive Arrest Statistics
Pre-CCTV Period (45 Months)
Arrest Type
Total
Arrests
Drunkenness
Liquor Laws
Narcotics
Weapon
Other

Post-CCTV Period (16 Months)

# of
Arrests

% of
Total

Monthly
Rate

Variance

# of
Arrests

% of Total

Monthly
Rate

Variance

1,830
60
0
773
31
966

100.00%
3.28%
0.00%
42.24%
1.69%
52.79%

40.67
1.33
0.00
17.18
0.69
21.47

700.55
7.14
0.00
101.47
1.13
311.03

743
40
0
370
7
326

100.00%
5.38%
0.00%
49.80%
0.94%
43.88%

46.44
2.50
0.00
23.13
0.44
20.38

187.20
6.80
0.00
54.65
0.26
63.32

- 89 -

%
Change
Monthly
Rate
14.19%
87.50%
#DIV/0!
34.62%
-36.49%
-5.09%

APPENDIX D
Video Camera Specifications
Jordan Downs: Sony Ipela
Hollywood: Pelco Spectra III
Color or day/night
Color or day/night
Autofocus, lowlight optics
Autofocus, lowlight optics
Frames per sec.: Max 25
Shutter Speed 1/2 – 1/30,000
Shutter speed Max 1 – 1/10,000
360-degree rotation
360-degree rotation
180-degree object tracking (autoflip)
180-degree object tracking
Pan: 360 deg. at 150 deg./sec – .1 deg/sec.
Pan: 340 deg. at 300 deg./sec.
Tilt: +2 deg. to -92 deg. at 200 deg./sec.
Tilt: 115 deg. at 300 deg./sec.
Zoom (color: 16x optical, 8x digital)
Zoom: 26x optical 312x digital
Zoom (day/night: 18x optical, 10x digital)
Resolution 450 lines
Resolution 470 lines
Multiple image-compression formats
Compatible w/fiber optic transmitters
Audio support
Multilanguage onscreen menus
Manual/auto white balance
Manual/auto white balance
Backlight compensation
Onscreen compass
Frame integration (clear, smooth images)
Color or day/night

Source Exif Data:

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Author                          : David Green
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Subject                         : 5
Format                          : application/pdf
Creator                         : David Green
Title                           : Measuring the Effects of Video Surveillance on Crime
Page Layout                     : OneColumn
Page Count                      : 91

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