CSX 29

User Manual: CSX

Open the PDF directly: View PDF PDF.
Page Count: 19

DownloadCSX 29
Open PDF In BrowserView PDF
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION
_________________________________________________________________
PAUL C. BONE, JR.,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
No. 01-2245V
)
CSX INTERMODAL, INC.,
)
)
Defendant.
)
_________________________________________________________________
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT CSX’S MOTION TO DISMISS
_________________________________________________________________

This diversity case arises out of the termination of the
plaintiff’s contract as a truck driver with the defendant CSX
Intermodal, Inc. (CSX) because of a positive drug test. Now before
the court is the August 20, 2001 motion of CSX, pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6), to dismiss the complaint against it for failure to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted.
The allegations in the complaint, as previously summarized in
the court’s June 27, 2001 and August 7, 2001 orders, are as
follows:

On July 30, 1998, the plaintiff, Paul C. Bone, Jr.,

entered a “Contractor Operating Agreement” with CSX in which he
agreed to haul freight for CSX as an independent contractor using
his own equipment.

The contract provided that the performance of

the agreement would be in accordance with all the rules and
regulations of the United States Department of Transportation

(USDOT);

it

required

drivers

of

equipment

“to

satisfactorily

complete a drug screening test as required by and under the
conditions

specified

by

the

DOT,

prior

to

operation

by

that

person;” and it required the plaintiff to “[c]omply with all other
applicable federal, state or local regulations.”

In addition, CSX

was participating in the state of Tennessee’s Drug-Free Workplace
Program, Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 50-9-101 to 50-9-112, which also
required CSX drivers to submit to drug testing pursuant to the
state statute, and CSX’s participation in the program was known to
Bone.
On August 12, 2000, Bone injured his back while working on a
trailer he had just attached to his tractor.

At his supervisor’s

request, he was examined by CSX’s doctor at the facility of
Concentra.

The doctor ordered him to submit to a drug test.

Concentra collected a urine specimen and sent it to LabOne for
testing.

LabOne transmitted the results to MedReview for review.

MedReview reported that the test was positive for marijuana.

As a

result, on August 17, 2000, CSX terminated Bone’s contract.

Bone

claims

that

he

has

applied

for

six

similar

jobs

since

his

termination and has been rejected.
The complaint alleges that the drug test was not required by
the

USDOT

regulations,

that

the

urine

specimen

collected

by

Concentra was not sealed in the presence of Bone as required by
2

USDOT regulations, and that Concentra improperly used a Federal
Drug Testing Custody and Control Form in transmitting the urine
specimen to LabOne for testing. In his complaint, Bone asserts six
separate causes of action against CSX: (1) violation of Tenn. Code
Ann. § 50-9-107(a) & (c); (2) defamation; (3) negligence; (4)
wrongful termination; (5) breach of contractual covenant of good
faith and fair dealing; and (6) invasion of privacy.

(Compl.

Counts One, Two, Three, Four, Five and Six.)
A motion under Rule 12(b)(6) tests whether a claim has been
adequately stated in the complaint.

A 12(b)(6) motion should only

be granted if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove
no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to
relief.

Conley

v.

Gibson,

355

U.S.

42,

45-46

(1957).

In

considering the motion, the court accepts all factual allegations
in the complaint as true, Windsor v. The Tennessean, 719 F.2d 155,
158 (6th Cir. 1983), and all inferences are construed in the
plaintiff's favor, Sinay v. Lamson & Sessions Co., 948 F.2d 1037,
1039-1040 (6th Cir. 1991).

The court, however, need not accept as

true the plaintiff’s legal conclusions and unwarranted factual
inferences.
A.

Mixon v. Ohio, 193 F.3d 389, 399-400 (6th Cir. 1999).

Plaintiff’s Claim for Violation of Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 50-9107(a) & (c)
CSX argues that even if the allegations against it are true,

3

the provisions of Tennessee’s Drug-Free Workplace Programs Act,
codified at Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 50-9-107(a) & (c), do not create a
cause of action in favor a private citizen to redress violations of
the statute.1

This court ruled in an earlier order granting

Concentra’s motion to dismiss that Tenn. Code. Ann. §§ 50-9-107(a)
& (c) does not create a cause of action in favor of a private
citizen to redress violations of the statute.2

In so finding, the

court held that Tennessee’s Drug-Free Workplace Program Act does
not expressly grant a cause of action to an employee and that the
legislature did not intend to create a private cause of action.

As

indicated in the earlier order, the focus of the Act is on the
covered employer, and each section is directed primarily to duties,
obligations, rights, and remedies of the covered employer, not the
employee.

Rather than provide remedies to employees, the Act

penalizes employees by providing for termination and loss of
worker’s compensation benefits if an employee tests positive for
drugs.

The public policy evidenced by the Drug-Free Workplace

Programs Act is dismissal of employees for drug use. Stein v.
Davidson

Hotel

Co.,

945

S.W.2d

714,

718

(Tenn.

1997).

Only

1

CSX also argues that the state statute is preempted by
federal law.
2

For a more detailed analysis, see this court’s June 7,
2001 order granting defendant Concentra’s motion to dismiss.
4

employers that follow the requirements of the Act in implementing
a drug-free workplace are covered by the Act.
50-9-103(5) (1999);

Tenn. Code Ann. §

Hackney v. DRD Mgmt., Inc., No. E1999-02107-

COA-R3-CV, 1999 WL 1577977, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. March 31, 1999).
If the legislature intended for the Act to provide a private cause
of action for employees against their employers, it could have
included the necessary language, but it did not do so.

The court

concludes, as it did in its earlier orders, that no private right
of action is implied under the statute against an employer who
chooses to participate in drug testing of its employees, and CSX’s
motion to dismiss this claim is granted.
B.

Plaintiff’s Claim of Negligence Against CSX
In order to establish negligence under Tennessee law, one must

prove: “(1) a duty of care owed by defendant to plaintiff; (2)
conduct falling below the applicable standard of care that amounts
to a breach of that duty; (3) an injury or loss; (4) cause in fact;
and (5) proximate, or legal, cause.”
P., 937 S.W.2d 891, 894 (Tenn. 1996).

McClung v. Delta Square Ltd.
CSX’s motion to dismiss is

directed primarily to the causation elements: cause in fact and
proximate cause.3

In Tennessee, no claim for negligence can

3

The plaintiff’s response to this portion of CSX’s motion
addresses the duty element of a negligence claim.
CSX has not
argued lack of duty in its motion; thus, the existence of a duty is
not at issue at this time, and the court makes no determination in
5

succeed in the absence of any one of the elements.

Haynes v.

Hamilton County, 883 S.W.2d 606, 611-12 (Tenn. 1994) (citing
Bradshaw v. Daniel, 854 S.W.2d 865, 869 (Tenn. 1993) and McClenahan
v. Cooley, 806 S.W.2d 767, 774 (Tenn. 1991).
As to the use of the form and the positive test results, the
complaint fails to plead causation, an essential element of a claim
for negligence, between any actions on the part of CSX and the
positive drug screen.4

Bone’s complaint fails to establish a

causal connection between the actions of CSX, the use of a DOT form
by Concentra, and the positive test results.

It further fails to

allege any facts supporting actions of CSX which caused the drug
test to be positive.

By failing to assert that any of these events

were caused by CSX in any way, Bone has omitted the requisite
minimal factual assertions needed to support a claim of negligence.
For these reasons, the court finds that Bone has failed to state a
claim of negligence against CSX.
C.

Plaintiff’s Claim for Defamation
Under Tennessee law, to establish a cause of action for

defamation, the plaintiff must plead and prove that: (1) a party

this regard.
4

The complaint pleads a cause of action for negligence in
one conclusory sentence: “Plaintiff asserts against Defendant CSXI
a claim of negligence.” (Compl. Count Six.)
6

published a statement; (2) with knowledge that the statement was
false and defaming to the other; or (3) with reckless disregard for
the truth of the statement; or (4) with negligence in failing to
ascertain the truth of the statement.

Sullivan v. Baptist Mem.

Hosp., 995 S.W.2d 569, 571 (Tenn. 1999).
CSX asserts that it published the results of the drug test
only to Bone’s future employers who specifically sought that
information. For that reason, CSX contends that it has a qualified
or conditional privilege to make the communications in question.
Tennessee recognizes a conditional public interest privilege in
situations such as the one at bar to prevent such defamation
actions:
Qualified
privilege
extends
to
all
communications made in good faith upon any
subject-matter
in
which
the
party
communicating has an interest, or in reference
to which he has a duty to a person having a
corresponding interest or duty . . . . The
rule announced is necessary in order that full
and unrestricted communication concerning a
matter in which the parties have an interest
may be had. It is grounded in public policy
as well as reason.

Southern Ice Co. v . Black, 198 S.W. 861, 863 (Tenn. 1916).

When

a statement has been found to be conditionally privileged, the only
way to succeed in a defamation claim is to prove actual or express
malice. Pate v. Service Merchandise Co., 959 S.W.2d 569 (Tenn. Ct.

7

App. 1997).

Bone did not plead any facts in his complaint that

would support an allegation of actual or express malice on the part
of CSX.

Bone pled only in his complaint that CSX, on February 1,

2001, in response to an inquiry for employment verification from L
& O Trucking, faxed a written response indicating that Bone tested
positive for a controlled substance.

(Compl. ¶ 24.)

Further, the statement made by CSX to L & O Trucking was
necessary, not only for the interest any future employer may have
in Bone’s drug test results, but also because CSX was required by
federal regulations to do so.

49 C.F.R. § 382.405(h) states that

an employer “shall release information regarding a driver’s records
as

directed

by

the

specific,

written

consent

of

the

driver

authorizing release of the information to an identified third
person.”

Attached to Bone’s complaint is a copy of the request

from L & O Trucking which includes a release signed by Bone
authorizing CSX to provide information to L & O Trucking Company.
The release states: “I am authorizing you to release any and all
information regarding my services, character, and conduct while I
was employed by your company and you are released from any and all
liability which may result from furnishing such information.” Bone
was aware that this information would include the results of his
drug test, yet he authorized its release along with any other
information CSX could provide regarding his employment with the
8

company. Thus, CSX was simply following Bone’s own instructions as
well as federal law. In summary, Bone has failed to state a claim
of defamation against CSX, and CSX’s motion to dismiss this claim
is granted.
D.

Plaintiff’s Claim for Wrongful Termination
In his complaint, Bone pleads a one-sentence claim of wrongful

termination: “Plaintiff asserts against Defendant CSXI a claim of
wrongful termination.”

(Compl. ¶ 26.)

Bone asserts no facts in

the complaint on which this claim of wrongful termination is based.
Indeed, Bone does not even allege in the complaint that the
positive drug test result was false or incorrect. Nor does Bone
allege

in

his

complaint

that

CSX

did

anything

improper

in

administering the drug test or terminating Bone for a positive drug
test.

The only factual allegation of conduct on the part of CSX is

that CSX ordered a drug test which “was not required by the USDOT
regulations because the ‘accident’ which caused Mr. Bone’s injury
did not occur while he was operating the truck.”

(Compl. ¶ 14.)

Although the complaint alleges that the drug test was not required,
the complaint does not allege that the drug test was impermissible
under USDOT regulations or state law as a random drug test.
Assuming arguendo, that Bone’s wrongful discharge cause of
action is premised on the administration of the drug test by CSX
allegedly in contravention of USDOT regulations, this fact in and
9

of itself does not give rise to an action for wrongful termination
under Tennessee law. “[Tennessee] courts have recognized a very
limited cause of action for wrongful discharge based on a violation
of clear public policy.” Stein v. Davidson Hotel Co., 1996 Tenn.
App. LEXIS 280, at *15 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 8, 1996), aff’d 945
S.W.2d 714 (Tenn. 1997)(“). See also Rushing v. Hershey ChocolateMemphis, No. 99-5802, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 27392, at *9 (6th Cir.
October 19, 2000).

The court finds no allegation of a violation of

clear public policy.
Moreover, in accordance with the terms of the agreement
between the parties, Bone is an independent contractor.
party disputes this fact.

Neither

As an independent contractor, Bone has

no claim for wrongful termination.

Although Tennessee has not

squarely addressed this issue, many other courts have concluded
that

an

wrongful

independent
termination.

contractor
Courts

may
in

not

sue

California,

his

employer

North

for

Carolina,

Wisconsin, Oklahoma, Minnesota and Indiana have all held that a
plaintiff cannot recover for wrongful termination unless he is an
employee rather than an independent contractor.

See Abramson v.

NME Hosps., Inc., 241 Cal. Rptr. 396, 399 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987);
Robinson v. Ladd Furniture, Inc., 872 F. Supp. 248, 253 (M.D.N.C.
1994); Ziehlsdorf v. American Family Ins. Group, 461 N.W.2d 448,
450 (Wisc. Ct. App. 1990); Rosenfeld v. Thirteenth Street Corp.,
10

1989 Okla. LEXIS 105, at *22 (Okla. 1989); HDH, Inc. v. Rush
Trucking, Inc., 1992 Minn. App. LEXIS 453, *4-*5 (Minn. Ct. App.
1992); Morgan Drive Away, Inc. v. Brant, 489 N.E.2d 933, 933-34
(Ind. 1986). This court concludes that the Tennessee Supreme Court
would agree with the premise that a cause of action for wrongful
termination

is

not

available

to

an

independent

contractor.

Accordingly, Bone’s claim for wrongful termination cannot stand,
and CSX’s motion to dismiss this claim is granted.
Interestingly, in his written response to CSX’s motion to
dismiss, Bone argues that his claim of wrongful termination is
based on the lack of a thirty-day written notice of termination.
This issue has nothing to do with a cause of action for wrongful
termination and was not pled in the complaint, but rather is
relevant to a possible breach of contract claim against CSX, which
Bone has not pled in his complaint either.

Nevertheless, CSX has

obliged Bone by counter-arguing the same point. Although it is
irrelevant to the claim of wrongful termination, both parties have
briefed the issue and the court will discuss the claim anyway.
The contract between CSX and Bone states that:
This agreement shall continue in effect for a
period of thirty (30) days from execution, and
thereafter continuously for successive thirty
(30)
day
periods,
unless
canceled
by
CONTRACTOR or CSXI by oral notice followed by
written notice sent by certified mail to the
last known address to the other party.
11

(Contract ¶ 25.)5’6

In Kippen v. American Automatic Typewriter

Co., the Ninth Circuit found that the defendant could be terminated
for cause from his franchise contract for alcohol consumption
irrespective of his status of employee or independent contractor.
Kippen, 324 F.2d 742 (9th Cir. 1963).

Kippen was cited with

approval by the Tennessee Court of Appeals when it found that
“[t]he distinction [between employee and independent contractor] is
of no logical significance when considering the employer’s right to
terminate an employment contract for cause.” Curtis v. Reeves, 736
S.W.2d 108, 112 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987).

Further, the court in

Curtis agreed with the following C.J.S. reference:
As a general proposition, any act of the
servant which injures or has a tendency to
injure his master’s business, interests, or
reputation will justify the dismissal of the
servant. . . . .
56 C.J.S. Master and Servant, § 42(a).

As a freight carrier

governed in part by federal laws and regulations, CSX had the right
to terminate Bone when he failed the drug test.

Pursuant to the

5

The full copy of the contract was not attached to the
complaint.
Upon request, the complete contract was faxed at a
later date to this court by CSX’s counsel.
6

The method of terminating a contract after thirty day’s
notice is indicative of an independent contractor-employer
relationship. See Maisers v. Arrow Transfer and Storage Co., 639
S.W.2d 654, 656 (Tenn. 1982)(citing Curtis v. Hamilton Block Co.,
466 S.W.2d 220 (1971)).
12

Code of Federal Regulations, if an employer has actual knowledge
that a driver has tested positive for a controlled substance, the
employer can no longer permit him to perform “safety-sensitive
functions.”
truck

on

49 C.F.R. § 382.215.

crowded

highways

is

Driving an eighteen-wheeled

just

such

a

“safety-sensitive

function,” requiring all possible care and alertness on the part of
the operator.
Another Tennessee court of appeals court has held a reasonable
notice of termination is not necessary in some situations. Roberts
v. Federal Express, 1991 Tenn App. LEXIS 494 (Tenn. Ct. App. June
18, 1991).

The plaintiff in Roberts sued his employer upon

termination, claiming that he did not receive reasonable notice of
termination implicit in an at will employment contract.

The court

held that because the plaintiff had violated company policy and the
law

by

smoking

marijuana

and

allegedly

stealing

some

of

his

employer’s goods, no dismissal notice was warranted even if there
was

a

notice

contract.

requirement

implicit

in

an

at

will

employment

Id. at *16.

Additionally, a state court in Illinois has addressed a
contract provision similar to the one involved in the present case.
H. Vincent Allen & Associates, Inc. v. Weiss, 379 N.E.2d 765 (Ill.
1978).

In Weiss, an employee brought an action against his

employer for terminating him without the contractually provided
13

ninety-day

notice.

The

contract

was

duration.

Weiss, 379 N.E.2d at 772.

otherwise

silent

as

to

The court found that the

contract was for employment at will subject to termination by
either party after submitting a ninety-day notice.

Nevertheless,

the court emphasized that “this fact does not and cannot eliminate
the basic principle of the law regarding employment contracts which
gives the employer the right of discharge for good cause even
though such right is not stated in the agreement . . . .”
Regardless of Bone’s status as an employee or independent
contractor, CSX was not required to give thirty days written notice
to Bone as stated in the contract.

The positive drug test results

were grounds for termination, whether stated in the contract as
grounds or not.

Federal regulations, state law, and CSX’s concern

for safety and liability exposure were sufficient reasons to
discharge

Bone

for

cause,

making

notice

unnecessary.

Bone

therefore has failed to state a wrongful termination claim upon
which relief can be granted.
E.

Plaintiff’s Claim for Breach of Contractual Covenant of Good
Faith and Fair Dealing
Bone

argues

that

by

terminating

him,

CSX

breached

the

contractually implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
Tennessee, however, recognizes an implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing in employment-at-will contracts only in very

14

narrow circumstances. Shelby v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 842 F. Supp.
999, 1013 (M.D. Tenn. 1993)(explaining that the theory that good
faith and fair dealing is implied in every employment contract is
a theory few courts have accepted); Whittaker v. Care-More, Inc.,
621 S.W. 2d 395 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981); contra Williams v. Maremont
, 776 S.W.2d 78, 81 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988).
Nevertheless, Bone has alleged no facts to support his claim,
simply

stating

in

his

complaint,

“Plaintiff

asserts

against

Defendant CSXI a claim of breach of contractual covenant of good
faith and fair dealing.” Without more factual basis, this court is
left with the inevitable conclusion that no claim has been stated
with respect to this issue.
Bone argues in his written response to CSX’s motion to dismiss
that CSX breached its covenant of good faith and fair dealing by
administering
standards.

a

drug

test

that

was

not

compliant

with

USDOT

Again, the complaint fails to plead that the drug test

was administered in contravention of the USDOT regulations, state
law, or the contract.

The contract, moreover, states that CSX

would adhere to the laws of the state as well as the federal
government.

Tennessee’s Drug-Free Workplace Program Act permits

any lawful testing of employees for drugs in addition to the
minimum testing required by the statute.
106 (b).
15

Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-9-

More importantly, the claim of breach of contractual good
faith and fair dealing itself cannot stand alone; it “is not a
cause of action in and of itself but as a part of breach of
contract cause of action.”
888,

894

(Tenn.

Ct.

App.

Lyons v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 26 S.W.3d
2000).

Bone

has

failed

to

plead

sufficiently a breach of contract claim upon which relief can be
granted, and as this claim for breach of contractual covenant of
good faith and fair dealing cannot stand as a separate action, this
claim must be dismissed.
F.

Plaintiff’s Claim for Tortious Invasion of Privacy
Bone argues in response to CSX’s motion to dismiss that CSX

invaded his privacy by intruding upon his seclusion, one of the
four privacy law torts recognized in Tennessee.7

See Major v.

Charter Lakeside Hospital, Inc., 1990 Tenn. App. LEXIS 621, *10-11
(Tenn Ct. App. 1990); Rest. 2d Torts § 652B.
Under Tennessee law, to establish a claim for intrusion, Bone
must show: 1) CSX intentionally intruded upon his solitude or
seclusion; 2) CSX is subject to liability to Bone for invasion of
his privacy; and 3) the intrusion must be highly offensive to a
reasonable person.

Rest. 2d, Torts § 652B. Bone’s allegation of a

7

The complaint itself does not specify intrusion upon
seclusion but merely pleads invasion of privacy generally:
“Plaintiff asserts against defendant CSXI a claim of tortious
invasion of privacy.” (Compl. Count Five.)
16

privacy intrusion is deficient, however, for two reasons.

First,

Bone has not set forth any facts that would establish the elements
necessary to state a claim of intrusion upon his seclusion.

He has

not demonstrated how or why CSX would be liable to him for the
actual drug test or the positive result.
the test was highly offensive to him.

He also has not pled that
Second, as previously

stated, he has not alleged that CSX improperly conducted a random
drug test; he merely alleges that a post-accident drug test was not
required by the USDOT regulations because he was not operating his
vehicle at the time of the accident.

(Compl. ¶ 14.)

In Stein v. Davidson Hotel Co., an employee argued that she
was “forced” to take a drug test by her employer and therefore the
test was an intrusion upon her seclusion. Stein, 1996 Tenn. App.
LEXIS 280, *25 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 8, 1996), aff’d 945 S.W.2d 714
(Tenn. 1997).

The court pointed out, however, that the employee

had signed a form consenting to be tested for drugs and had thereby
waived her right to sue for invasion of privacy.

Id. at *26.

Further, the court noted that the employee had been put on notice
of the drug testing policy far in advance of the actual test and
had expressed no concerns about it.

Id.

Other courts agree that

when an employee has notice that he could be tested for drugs, he
cannot assert an invasion of privacy claim against his employer.
See Rushing v. Hershey Chocolate-Memphis, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS
17

27392, *9 (October 19, 2000)(stating that “Tennessee and other
courts have indicated that employers may require an employee to
take

drug

tests

related

to

employment

without

committing

an

invasion of privacy.”); Baggs v. Eagle-Pilcher Indus., 750 F. Supp.
264, 272 (W.D. Mich. 1990)(explaining that because the need for
drug testing originates from the business relationship, employers
may delve into normally private areas of an employee’s life).
In the case at bar, Bone signed a contract with CSX which
expressly stated that he could be subjected to drug screening and
that

CSX

followed

state

transportation services.

and

federal

regulations

(Contract ¶ 10(f),(g).)

regarding

CSX follows

Tennessee’s Drug-Free Workplace Program, Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-9-107
(a) & (c), which allows employers to test for drugs and alcohol.
Further, Bone knew that he could be subjected to random drug
testing and in fact stated in his complaint that “[d]uring his
employ with CSXI, [he] participated in random drug testing.”
(Compl. ¶ 8.)
Because Bone has failed to allege all elements of the claim of
intrusion upon his seclusion, and because of Tennessee’s reluctance
to allow such a claim to be brought at all against employers, the
court finds that Bone has failed to state a claim for invasion of
privacy.
For the foregoing reasons, CSX’s motion to dismiss is granted
in the entirety.

As there are no more remaining claims or

18

defendants, the clerk is directed to enter final judgment.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 11th day of October, 2001.
___________________________________
DIANE K. VESCOVO
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

19



Source Exif Data:
File Type                       : PDF
File Type Extension             : pdf
MIME Type                       : application/pdf
PDF Version                     : 1.6
Linearized                      : Yes
Create Date                     : 2011:01:18 11:14:17-06:00
Modify Date                     : 2011:01:18 11:14:17-06:00
XMP Toolkit                     : Adobe XMP Core 4.2.1-c043 52.372728, 2009/01/18-15:08:04
Metadata Date                   : 2011:01:18 11:14:17-06:00
Format                          : application/pdf
Document ID                     : uuid:c10ca1da-779a-4dc2-bdcb-141c54f58527
Instance ID                     : uuid:54e97262-eba4-4cbe-aff5-ca219a95e32d
Page Count                      : 19
EXIF Metadata provided by EXIF.tools

Navigation menu