IP/WP For ATM/SG/2 F 1725 AI6 WP30 MH370 Australian SAR Response (Australia)

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International Civil Aviation Organization

The Second Meeting of the APANPIRG ATM Sub-Group

(ATM /SG/2)

Hong Kong, China, 4-8 August 2014

Agenda Item 6: AOP, MET, AIM, SAR

MH370 SEARCH AND RESCUE RESPONSE – JRCC AUSTRALIA

(Presented by Australia)

SUMMARY

This paper presents an overview of the Australian SAR

response to Malaysia Airlines

Flight MH370 which went missing following its departure from Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia,

on the 8th March 2014. It also provides a comparison from a SAR perspective between the

MH370 incident and the Air France Flight AF447 incident of 2009 and invites States

involved in the MH370 incident to consider providing inputs to ICAO

for any

improvements to the global and regional SAR system.

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Malaysia Airlines Flight MH370, a Boeing 777-200ER registered 9M-MRO with 239

persons on board, departed Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia for Beijing, China at 071641 UTC 2014 (8th

March local Malaysia time). The aircraft lost contact with Air Traffic Control between Malaysia and

Vietnam with radar information showing the aircraft deviating from its flight planned route 44

minutes after departure.

1.2 An analysis of radar data and subsequent satellite communication (SATCOM) system

signaling messages placed the aircraft in the Australian SAR Region (SRR) along an arc in the

southern part of the Indian Ocean. This arc was considered to be the location where the aircraft’s fuel

was exhausted.

1.3 A surface search of probable impact areas along this arc was coordinated by the

Australian Maritime Safety Authority’s (AMSA’s) JRCC Australia in Canberra from 18th March 2014

to 28th April 2014. The search effort involved a multi-national, civil/military SAR response involving

aircraft and ships from several countries including Australia, China, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand,

Republic of Korea, United Kingdom and the United States of America, plus Australian and

international technical experts and liaison officers. AMSA is very grateful to all the States and their

many personnel involved for their assistance and expertise.

1.4 This paper is limited to outlining the SAR response by Australia within the Australian

SRR and is supported by the PowerPoint Presentation, MH370 Australian SAR Response. As the

underwater search is currently in progress, the incident is subject to investigation and post-SAR

response reviews are yet to be undertaken, this paper does not offer any commentary on potential

lessons learned, findings or similar.

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2. DISCUSSION

Background Information

2.1 Significant basic information (all times UTC):

a) MH370 departed Kuala Lumpur, 7 March 2014 at 1641

b) 1707 – final automatically transmitted position from the aircraft

c) No radio notification from the crew of a problem

d) No radio communications from crew after 1719

e) 1722 – final ATC SSR fix

f) 1725 – deviated from flight planned route

g) 1822 – final primary radar fix

h) Satellite communications log indicated the aircraft continued to fly for another 6

hours until 0019, 8 March

i) No confirmed eye-witness reports

j) No ELT transmissions received

k) 18 March – search in Australian SRR commenced

Search Challenges

2.2 Numerous challenges presented to the search operation. These included:

a) Lack of available and accurate position data about MH370’s actual flight resulted in

vast and changing search areas. Search area changes occurred following continual

analysis and refinement of the limited data available. This then involved

recalculating the drift applicable to new search areas. It also incurred long transit

distances for search vessels as they changed to the new search areas.

b) No distress beacon detections (ELT or others carried on board).

c) Operations in remote oceanic areas at long distances offshore. This limited the

choice of suitable search aircraft assets to those which could operate with sufficient

endurance to transit to and from the search areas with statutory fuel reserves yet still

provide available search time on scene.

d) The elapsed time of 10 days before the search commenced within the Australian

SRR, and the resulting factoring in of oceanic drift, led to large search areas and

wide debris dispersal.

e) Tropical cyclones, one just prior to the search and one during, influenced oceanic

drift modelling.

f) Poor weather and search conditions on a number of days.

g) Transit times for ships to reach aircraft sightings.

h) Availability of ship-borne helicopters to investigate sightings.

i) Time required for satellite imagery analysis before aircraft/ships could be tasked to

investigate possible objects.

j) Multinational civil/military cooperation, coordination and communications.

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k) Media appetite. Use by JRCC Australia’s Media Team of social media helped keep

media and public updated with search information.

l) Large amount of information submitted online and via email from the public which

required processing. This included information submitted by the public globally via

the internet from online crowd sourcing of satellite imagery.

m) Large amount of sea pollution contributed to difficulties for air crew ability to

distinguish between the pollution objects and possible debris from MH370.

n) Availability of a detailed description of cargo carried (colour, type, etc) to enable

correlation against any floating objects sighted.

o) Availability of information regarding aircraft components which are likely to float.

This information was sourced and provided by the aircraft manufacturer. Composite

material components were indicated as the most likely to float following aircraft

impact with the water.

p) Sustainment of large logistical requirements such as air search observers, fuel,

search unit maintenance and resupply requirements, accommodation, etc.

q) Clearly defined division of responsibilities between the search and rescue function

(Annex 12) and the air accident investigation search and recovery function (Annex

13).

Search Area Definition

2.3 For a missing aircraft, RCCs rely on conventional sources of information regarding the

aircraft and its flight in order to calculate and construct a search plan to maximize the chance of

rapidly locating and rescuing survivors. In the absence of the known ditching location, RCCs rely on

information such as the last known position, altitude, speed, flight planned route and/or actual track to

establish a datum as a basis for calculating a search area. In the case of MH370, due to the absence of

conventional data, alternative and non-conventional sources of information were used, possibly for

the first time in their application to a missing aircraft, to assist with development of search areas.

2.4 Analysis of very limited satellite communications data to and from the aircraft during the

flight indicated that following the last primary radar position over the north-west Malacca Strait, the

aircraft continued to fly for an additional 6 hours with information such as track, altitude and speed

flown not available.

2.5 JRCC Australia and the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) jointly determined a

search area strategy correlating information from a Joint Investigation Team (JIT) located in Malaysia

comprised of specialists from Malaysia, China, USA, UK and France, and other government and

academic sources. Analysis work was undertaken independently, collaboratively and by consensus.

The analysis process included independent validation of results.

2.6 The location of the search areas was guided by continuing and innovative analysis by the

JIT of the flight and satellite communications data. The group was faced with the challenge of using

data from a communications satellite system and aircraft performance data to reconstruct the flight

path, in effect using a satellite communications system as a navigation tracking system. Two pieces of

information recorded by a satellite ground station in Perth, Western Australia at the time of a

transmission with the aircraft were used to estimate the track of the aircraft. These transmissions

occurred only 7 times after loss of radar contact.

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2.7 This analysis was supplemented by other information provided to the ATSB during this

period including possible underwater locator beacon (ULB) and hydrophone acoustic detections.

Information regarding the performance and operation of the aircraft was also considered. Over the

duration of the search, search areas were relocated following further refinement and analysis by the

JIT of the available data.

2.8 On 17 March 2014, when JRCC Australia assumed responsibility for the SAR effort in

the Southern Ocean, the JIT had determined the initial search area to be a 600,000 km2 area

approximately 2500km south-west of Perth, Western Australia. As the search areas were refined by

the JIT the search areas gradually moved towards the northeast.

Search Area Definition – Satellite System Information

2.9 This section attempts to provide a very brief overview of how satellite data was used for

search area definition. A far more detailed technical explanation of the complex work undertaken is

available in the ATSB report, MH370 – Definition of Underwater Search Areas (see reference later in

this paper).

2.10 The system used during flight MH370 consisted of the Inmarsat Classic Aero ground

station location at Perth, Western Australia and the Inmarsat Indian Ocean Region (IOR) I-3 satellite

which uses a single global communications beam per satellite and contains no explicit information

relating the mobile terminal location being available.

2.11 In order to connect to the SATCOM system the aircraft transmits a “log-on” request

which is acknowledged by the ground station. Once connected, if the ground station has not heard

from the aircraft within a set time, it will check that the connection is still operational by transmitting

a “Log-on Interrogation” message using the aircraft’s unique identifier. If the aircraft receives this, it

returns a short message that it is still logged onto the network. These processes have been described as

handshakes. Following the last recorded primary radar data at 1822 UTC, 7 handshakes were recorded

by the ground station. The 1st handshake was initiated by the aircraft at 1825 UTC and the last (7th)

handshake was initiated by the aircraft at 0019 UTC. The 2nd to 6th handshakes were initiated by the

ground station.

2.12 Analyses of these transmissions were used to estimate the distance of the aircraft from

the satellite and to estimate the speed and direction the aircraft was travelling relative to the satellite.

A set of 7 rings were plotted on the earth’s surface based on the estimated distance of the aircraft from

the satellite at the handshake times and by combining these three parameters with aircraft

performance constraints, a range of candidate paths were found. There is no information to locate the

aircraft at any single point on a ring however knowledge of the aircraft’s prior location and

performance speed limitations can reduce the ring to an arc.

2.13 The 1st and 7th handshakes in the middle of a flight is not common and can occur for only

a few reasons, including a power interruption to the aircraft satellite data unit (SDU), software failure,

loss of critical systems or loss of link due to aircraft attitude. Analysis determined a best match for a

power interruption to the SDU.

2.14 Using the remaining fuel reported at the last ACARS transmission and various assumed

flight speeds and altitudes, the range of the aircraft could be estimated. Analysis confirmed that the

southern corridor was the only valid solution. Analysis included use of nine previous flights of 9M-

MRO and 87 other aircraft with the same SATCOM terminal equipment in the air at the same time as

MH370.

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2.15 The aircraft satellite transmission at 0019 UTC associated with the 7th arc was possibly

triggered by power interruptions on board the aircraft caused by fuel exhaustion. The time of this

transmission is consistent with the maximum flight times expected for MH370 and therefore the 7th

arc is the focus of the search area.

Other information considered

2.16 Air routes and waypoints were examined to see if there was any correlation with the

possible southern tracks for MH370 obtained from analysis of SATCOM data. There was insufficient

evidence to positively determine whether MH370 intersected any waypoints associated with published

air routes in the Southern Indian Ocean.

2.17 Low frequency hydro-acoustic signals present in the Indian Ocean were examined to

check whether they could provide any information to help define the search area. These signals were

recorded by hydrophones as part of the UN Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organisation

(CTBO) or the Integrated Marine Observing System (IMOS). Curtin University, Perth and the

Australian Defence Science and Technology Organisation (DSTO) analysed these signals for any

underwater sounds they could be associated with an aircraft impact on the water or implosion of

wreckage as the aircraft sank. One acoustic event of interest was identified that occurred at about the

time of the 7th handshake however was incompatible with the satellite to aircraft range derived from

that handshake.

JRCC Drift Planning

2.18 JRCC Australia uses its own custom designed drift modelling program called Net Water

Movement (NWM). For conventional searches, this program has proved a valuable asset to search

planning. Results from NWM are validated and compared against another proprietary drift modelling

program and also validated as soon as possible through the deployment of Self Locating Datum

Marker Buoys (SLDMBs). The SLDMBs are floating devices fitted with a GPS receiver and Iridium

satellite transmitter which provide water current and sea temperature information and may be

deployed by aircraft or vessels. The buoys transmit their position and sea temperature regularly

directly to JRCC Australia. 33 SLDMBs were deployed in this search.

2.19 Due to the magnitude of the MH370 search areas, and taking into account the lessons

learned during the previous search for Air France AF447 of 2009, a drift planning working group was

established to supplement standard JRCC Australia drift planning methods. Its purpose was to ensure

that international best methodology and consensus drift modelling techniques were applied to the

MH370 search areas with the primary aims of:

a) Providing the best possible area to locate floating debris

b) Provide the ability to conduct “Reverse” drift backwards to provide an estimated

splash point, should debris from the aircraft be located.

Search Strategy Working Group (SSWG)

2.20 This group was set up within AMSA to assist JRCC Australia with provision of higher

level strategic oversight and provision of continuity over different JRCC shift teams in support of the

SAR effort. This group also provided ongoing consideration of inputs from analysis of MH370

satellite system information, aircraft performance and pilot human factors considerations to derive

suggested splash point areas which were then passed to the drift planning working group who

generated search areas based on this information.

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Search Effort and Results

2.21 For the 42 days of searching coordinated by JRCC Australia in the Australian SRR

search areas there were:

a) 345 flight sorties

b) 3177 total flight hours

c) Cumulative search area of 4.7 million km2

d) 28 search aircraft used, both civil and military, from Australia, China, Japan,

Malaysia, Republic of Korea and USA

e) Search vessels used, both civil merchant ships and military ships from Australia,

China, Malaysia, UK and USA

2.22 No debris associated with MH370 was identified by the surface search.

Acoustic search

2.23 The ATSB was the lead agency for the search for the Underwater Locator Beacons

(ULBs). On 2 April 2014, the UK defence vessel HMS Echo, using a hull-mounted acoustic system,

reported a possible ULB detection close to the 7th arc. This detection was discounted as being an

artefact of the ship’s sonar equipment. On 4 April 2014, the Chinese Maritime Safety Administration

vessel, MV Haixun 01 were operating pinger detector equipment from a rescue boat which detected a

pulsed signal. On 5 April 2014, the Australian Defence Vessel Ocean Shield equipped with a towed

pinger locator (TPL) system detected an acoustic signal with further detections made on 5 and 8 April,

however none were able to be repeated on a reciprocal track.

2.24 HMS Echo was tasked to the area of the MV Haixun 01 detections and reported the

detections were unlikely due to seafloor depth, surface noise and the equipment used. A submarine

tasked to the area was unable to get any detections.

2.25 An independent analysis and review of the Ocean Shield acoustic signals recorded

determined the signals were not consistent with the nominal performance standards of the ULB and

noted, whilst unlikely, the signals could be consistent with a damaged ULB. However it was decided

that an ocean floor sonar search should be performed to fully investigate the detections.

2.26 The acoustic search was also supplemented using sonobuoys with an ability to detect

ULB signals which were dropped by Australian AP-3C aircraft. No acoustic detections considered to

be related to ULBs were detected.

2.27 An underwater sonar survey using an autonomous underwater vehicle (AUV) started on

14 April 2014 with 30 missions completed searching an area of 860 km2 with nil debris or wreckage

detected. Further work is being carried out in an attempt to determine the likely source of the Ocean

Shield acoustic detections.

Joint Agency Coordination Centre (JACC)

2.28 On 30 March 2014, the Prime Minister of Australia established the JACC to coordinate

the Australian Government’s support for the search for MH370. The purpose of the JACC is to ensure

the public and other stakeholders, particularly families, are well informed about the progress of the

search. The JACC works closely with the Government of Malaysia, Malaysia Airlines and other

international stakeholders.

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2.29 The JACC does not perform any search, recovery or investigation activities. These

activities remain the responsibility of the expert agencies.

Transition from Surface Search

2.30 On 28th April 2014, the aerial search concluded and the search moved to an underwater

phase.

2.31 Following the completion of the ocean floor search on 28th May 2014, further work has

continued to refine the analysis of both the flight and satellite data by an international team of

specialists from the UK, USA and Australia working both independently and collaboratively. The

team has been able to reach a consensus in identifying a priority underwater search area for the next

phase of the search.

2.32 A priority area of approximately 60,000 km2 has been derived. This area was the subject

of the surface search from Day 21-26. Bathymetry of the ocean floor in areas of this search zone

commenced in mid-May using an ATSB contracted vessel and a Chinese military vessel. Whilst the

bathymetry operation has been in progress, the ATSB has been conducting a process to acquire the

services of a specialist company capable of conducting a deep-water search for MH370 of the priority

area. This intensified search is planned to commence in August 2014 and is expected to take up to 12

months.

Comparison with search for Air France Flight AF447, 2009

2.33 The search for Air France Flight AF447 which crashed into the Atlantic Ocean in 2009

was of a significant scale and presented many challenges. During the search operation for MH370,

Australia has taken note of the valuable experience, lessons learned and recommendations provided in

the French BEA Investigation Reports on AF447.

2.34 Attachment 1 to this paper provides a basic comparison table of the search for AF447

against the MH370 search. It provides an indication of the scale of the challenge and difficulties

facing the search for MH370.

SAR System Improvement

2.35 The MH370 incident has presented a scenario not previously experienced by the global

SAR community. It presents a highly valuable opportunity to the global SAR community to not only

share the experiences and any lessons learned from all the States involved in the SAR response, but to

also improve the existing SAR system where appropriate.

2.36 Annex 12, Search and Rescue, Recommendation 5.9.2 states:

“Each rescue coordination centre should prepare appraisals of actual search and rescue

operations in its region. These appraisals should comprise any pertinent remarks on the

procedures used and on the emergency and survival equipment, and any suggestions for

improvement of those procedures and equipment. Those appraisals which are likely to be

of interest to other States should be submitted to ICAO for information and dissemination

as appropriate.”

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2.37 Recognising that the MH370 operation is continuing and is pending investigation, States

who were involved in the SAR response may not yet have been in a position to collate lessons learned

and opportunities for improvement. Noting that the current ICAO Asia/Pacific Regional SAR Task

Force (APSARTF) is working towards finalising a Regional SAR Plan, due next year, it would be

useful to the task force to gather any information from those States involved in the SAR response that

would improve the Regional SAR Plan.

References

2.38 Sources include:

a) Australian Maritime Safety Authority, JRCC data and media information.

• Link: http://www.amsa.gov.au/media/incidents/mh370-search.asp

b) MH370 – Definition of Underwater Search Areas, report by the Australian Transport

Safety Bureau.

• Link: http://www.atsb.gov.au/media/5243942/ae-2014-054_mh370_searchareas.pdf

3. ACTION BY THE MEETING

3.1 The meeting is invited to:

a) note the information contained in this paper;

b) encourage those States involved in the SAR response to MH370 to develop any

lessons learned and suggestions for improvement to the global/regional SAR system, and

submit these to ICAO APSAR Task Force meeting scheduled for 26-30 January 2015,

and

c) discuss any relevant matters as appropriate.

………………………….

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Attachment 1 - Comparison Table – AF447 versus MH370

The following table has been compiled from information sourced from:

• the French BEA investigation reports into the accident on 1st June 2009 of, Air France

Airbus A330, Flight 447, Rio de Janeiro to Paris, and

• search information from JRCC Australia for missing Malaysia Airlines Boeing 777,

Flight MH370, Kuala Lumpur to Beijing, 8th March 2014.

Links:

FINAL REPORT:

http://www.bea.aero/docspa/2009/f-cp090601.en/pdf/f-cp090601.en.pdf

SEA SEARCH OPERATIONS REPORT:

http://www.bea.aero/fr/enquetes/vol.af.447/sea.search.ops.af447.05.11.2012.en.pdf

Full AF447 Investigation website:

http://www.bea.aero/en/enquetes/flight.af.447/flight.af.447.php

AF447

MH370

Flight Planned Route

Was on planned route when

reported missing.

Deviated significantly from

planned route to take up

unknown route.

Last Known Position

Was reporting by ACARS

every 10 minutes.

ACARS failure messages from

AF447 were received by Air

France including a Last Known

Position (LKP).

Initial ACARS reporting up till

disappeared.

No further data other than

satellite pings via INMARSAT.

Speed

Known = Mach 0.82 derived

from ACARS message

information.

Unknown.

Search Area

Initial Search Area:

40NM (74KM) radius centred

on Last Known Position (LKP)

= 17,000 square KM.

Initial Australian Search

Area:

693,170 square KM = 40 times

larger than AF447 initial search

area.

Cumulative Australian search

area total 18MAR to 28APR

(last day of search for surface

debris):

Almost 4.7 million square KM.

Surface Search

26 days.

In Australian SRR = 43 days.

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This was based on no further

bodies or aircraft debris being

found for the final 9 days of the

search.

- Aircraft search

operations ceased.

- Ship search operations

ceased, except for

French Navy vessels

which remained

conducting acoustic

search for the ULBs.

Australian surface search from

17MAR to 28APR14.

First Floating Debris

Found

Day 5 about 70KM from LKP.

NOTE – the BEA report states

that this (distance) considerably

complicated the search for the

underwater wreckage.

Nil associated with MH370.

Floating Debris/Bodies

Marine pollution contributed to

confusion in the early days of

the search. Air searches found

lots of debris – it was difficult

for air crews to distinguish

between marine pollution and

small debris that may have been

from AF447. It was not until

ships arrived in the area

working with aircraft that debris

was able to be identified

properly.

About 50 bodies were

recovered by ships.

Same experience with marine

pollution.

“Drift Committee”

An expert working group of

experts in SAR drift,

oceanography, meteorology, etc

attempted to estimate the crash

location through “reverse drift”

calculations.

Similar expert working group

formed within JRCC Australia.

Nil surface debris located to

allow “reverse drift” calculation.

Satellite imagery

No useful results.

Images from civil and military

satellites were used.

Aircraft flown to investigate

objects detected by satellite

failed to identify debris from

AF447.

Similar experience for JRCC

Australia.

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Datum Buoys deployed

9

33

Underwater Search

Duration 2 years.

To be determined.

ULB Search

No signals detected from the

flight recorders.

Some acoustic detections. Some

discounted, some undetermined.

Further analysis work continues.

Wreckage Location

6.5NM (12KM) from LKP.

Depth 3900 metres.

Wreckage found following

detection by AUVs of a

concentration of SONAR

returns.

2 further months were spent

recovering the flight recorders

and aircraft parts, mapping

debris and recovering human

remains.

Unknown.

Search area depth 3800-4800

metres.

Discovery of accident site

2APR11 (671 days or 1 year

10 months after AF447 went

missing) – concentration of

Sonar returns.

3APR11 – wreckage formally

identified (photos from AUV).

Wreckage spread over area of

10,000 square metres.

Few large parts found.

Underwater search for

flight recorders

Search for flight recorders a

major challenge due to the

number of items spread out on

the sea floor.

1MAY11 – Flight data recorder

located and raised by ROV.

2MAY11 - Cockpit voice

recorder located. It was raised

3MAY11.

Cost of SAR Operation

Estimated 80 million Euro

Cost of Undersea

Operation

Estimated 31 million Euro

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Total Cost of SAR and

Undersea Operations

Estimated 111 million Euro