Chaffee081010 90171
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UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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In re:
IRENE S. CHAFFEE, Chapter 7
Debtor. Case No.: 07-11636
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SARA CHAFFEE,
Plaintiff, Adv. No.: 07-90171
v.
IRENE S. CHAFFEE,
Defendant.
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APPEARANCES:
Richard Croak, Esq.
Attorney for Defendant
314 Great Oaks Boulevard
Albany, NY 12203
DerOhannesian & DerOhannesian Jennifer Zegarelli, Esq.
Attorneys for Plaintiff Paul DerOhannesian, Esq.
677 Broadway, Suite 202
Albany, NY 12207
Hon. Robert E. Littlefield, Jr., Chief United States Bankruptcy Judge
MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER
Irene S. Chaffee (―Defendant‖) filed a voluntary petition for relief under Chapter 7 of the
Bankruptcy Code. Sara Chaffee (―Plaintiff‖) commenced the above-captioned adversary
proceeding to have certain judgment debt owed to the Plaintiff by the Defendant deemed
nondischargeable pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). The Plaintiff moved for and was denied
summary judgment. Thereafter, this court conducted a trial.
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The court assumes familiarity with its summary judgment order in this action, Chaffee v.
Chaffee (In re Chaffee), Ch. 7 Case No. 07-11636, Adv. No. 07-90171, 2009 Bankr. LEXIS
2644 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 2009), aff’d, 09-MC-0014, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45344
(N.D.N.Y. May 29, 2009). Missing from the summary judgment record was the underlying
complaint in state court and the order awarding damages against the Defendant and in favor of
the Plaintiff. A certified copy of the Decision & Order from the New York State Supreme Court,
submitted as an exhibit at trial, reads in relevant part as follows:
Plaintiff brought this action to recover for injuries she has suffered from
incidents occurring in November 2000 in which she was sexually assaulted on
multiple occasions in her home by her step-father. In addition to causes of action
for assault, battery and negligent infliction of emotional distress against defendant
George Washington Chaffee, plaintiff has also alleged a cause of action for
negligent infliction of emotional distress against Irene Chaffee, her mother.
The cause of action against her mother is based on allegations that the mother
failed to prevent, stop, report, or otherwise acknowledge the sexual abuse. Both
defendants have defaulted in answering the complaint and plaintiff has now
moved for a default judgment against each of them.
CPLR 3215(f) requires a party moving for default judgment to submit either
an affidavit asserting the facts that comprise the claim or a verified complaint, in
which case the verified complaint may serve as the affidavit of merits (Hann v
Morrison, 247 AD2d 706). The court retains the discretionary obligation to
determine whether the applicant has met the burden of stating a prima facie cause
of action and if the court determines that the complaint or affidavit of facts fail to
establish a prima facie case, the applicant is not entitled to the requested relief,
even on default (Dyno v. Rose, 260 AD2d 694).
In support of the application, plaintiff has submitted a copy of the summons
and complaint. In addition, plaintiff has provided an affidavit showing service of
the summons and complaint and proof of defendant’s failure to appear or answer.
In the affidavit by plaintiff, she sets forth the facts supporting each of the seven
causes of action pled in the complaint. The affidavit is sufficient to make out a
prima facie claim with respect to each of the causes of action. Accordingly,
plaintiff is awarded judgment on the issue of liability on the two causes of action
for assault, two causes of action for battery and one cause of action for negligent
infliction of emotional distress against defendant George Washington Chaffee and
one cause of action against Irene Chaffee for negligent infliction of emotional
distress. An inquest on the issue of damages will be conducted on April 3, 2006
at 10:00 a.m. in Room 274 of the Albany County Courthouse. Plaintiff is directed
to serve notice of the inquest upon each of the defendants.
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(Pl.’s Ex. 9 (emphasis added).)1 An inquest on the issue of damages was conducted on
November 27, 2006 before New York State Supreme Court Justice John C. Egan, Jr. The
Defendant appeared at the inquest. Plaintiff was awarded over $3.75 million, which she now
seeks to exclude from Defendant’s discharge in bankruptcy.
Section 523(a)(6) excepts from discharge debts incurred ―for willful and malicious injury
by the debtor to another entity.‖ 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). The Supreme Court of the United States
held that debts arising from negligently or recklessly inflicted injuries do not fall within the
exception from discharge provided by § 523(a)(6). Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57, 64
(1998). In this case, the state court judgment was entered on default and was based on Plaintiff’s
complaint. Neither the complaint nor the accompanying affidavit alleged willful or malicious
conduct. (See Pl.’s Exs. 8, 9, 10.) Rather, the Plaintiff alleged only that the Defendant acted
negligently. As a result, the state court default judgment was based on negligence. Because
New York courts would give preclusive effect to the New York default judgment, this court is
required to do so as well. See Wharton v. Shiver (In re Shiver), 396 B.R. 110, 117–23 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2008) (citations omitted). This court is bound by the liability determination in the state
judgment. Id. Because the state judgment was based only on negligent infliction of emotional
distress, the judgment debt does not fall within the dischargeability exception provided by
§ 523(a)(6).
The record relates harrowing accounts of abuse. While the court is sympathetic to
Plaintiff’s plight, it has no authority to award the requested relief. Presumably for her own good
reasons, Plaintiff sought a judgment based on negligence in the state court action, and
1 This document was received at trial along with a number of other documentary exhibits offered and admitted on
consent. The parties offered no testimony with respect to this document. The court is perplexed as to why the
parties did not address this document, either at trial, or in their subsequently filed memoranda. It only came to light
upon the court’s own review of the exhibits. Had the document come to light earlier, this case would have been
subject to resolution by a dispositive motion.
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successfully obtained a judgment for $3,750,000.00, along with interest of $22,950.00, for a total
judgment of $3,772,950.00. Judgments grounded in negligence, however, are dischargeable in
bankruptcy. Victims seeking redress for their injuries face a difficult choice—plead negligence,
for whatever reason,2 or plead intent, so that the claim falls outside a debtor’s discharge in
bankruptcy. Until and unless Congress amends the Bankruptcy Code, that choice can lead to the
result in this case.
Based upon the foregoing, the complaint is dismissed.
It is so ORDERED.
Dated: August 10, 2010 /s/ Robert E. Littlefield, Jr.
Hon. Robert E. Littlefield, Jr.
Chief United States Bankruptcy Judge
2 Perhaps one reason is that intentional conduct does not constitute an accident so as to fall within a defendant’s
insurance policy coverage.
