Instructions For The Organization And Maintenance Of Counter Espionage Service Within Military Units Counterespionageunits

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INSTRUCTIONS
FOR THE

ORGANIZATION AND MAINTENANCE
OF THE

COUNTER ESPIONAGE SERVICE
WITHIN

MILITARY UNITS

SUPERCEDING PROVISIONAL
COUNTER ESPIONAGE INSTRUCTIONS
FEBUARY 1916

DECLASSIFIED BY THE
AUTHORITY OF
THE SECRETARY OF THE
ARMY
ODCSMT # 19

3 JUNE 92
DATE

M1-92
CASE #

MI3
AUGUST 1918

War Department,
August 31, 1918.
The following "Instructions f o r the Organization and Maintenance of the Counter Espionage Service within Military
Units," prepared in the Military Intelligence Division, General
Staff, are printed for the information and government of the
Army of the United States.

Approved by the Order of the Secretary of War.

TABLE OF CONTEXTS

I N T R O D U ~...........................................
OS
...........
Banc~;raI. ~Thnctionof the Canter Espionage ServiceSection L C o d d e n t i d Nature ................................
.Section 2. Resnlting Problems ................................
Section 3 . Nature . of the &mice ..............................
Section 4. Enemp Opportunity ................................
Section 5. Counter Organization ..............................
Section 5. Pooling of Information .............................
Section 7 . Scope of the Service ...............................
Section 8. Necessity for Complete Organization .................
b m c u c II. Principles of Organization,
...........
Section 9. Basic Principles ....................
...................................
Section 10. Decentralication
Section L1. Secrecy .............................. L
Man 12 .. Direct Communication ...............................
h m a s I l l Pemnq.$t
Section 13. The'Intclligeace Offleer .............................
Section 1 4. Echelona of Control ................................
Section 15. Number af Operative8 ...............................
$ection 1 6. Number of Echelons ...............................
Section 17. Replacement ......................................
kncm IV. Selectioq9andTraining of Personnel.
Section 18. Qualiflcatians .......................................
Section 19. Rank .;...........................................
Section 243. Special Operatives .........,.......................
Seetion 21 Secnring Personnel ................................
Section 22 Form of Oath .....................................
Section 23. Instruction of Yersonnel ............................
h n c V
~. ~Collection of Idormation
..
Section 2 4 Methoda of Operatives .............................
Section 25. Operatives' Reports ................................
Ekction 26. X)ocumentary Evidence ............................
8ection 27 . Cavering Mail ....................................
Section 28. Keeping Away from .Sqe&s ................. ,.....
Section 29. Work for Executives ................................
Section 30. Other Sources of Information .......................
Handling and Use of Information .
~ T I C L EVL
Section 31. Collation of Material ...............................
Section 32 Local Action ......................................
Section 33. Transmission of I n f o d o n ...................... .
.
Section 34- Addressing C o m n d e n t s .........................

..,-.

..........

ARTICIXV I I . Kejmrts to I~ltelligenceControl .
Sectiurl 35 . Ilirect Corumunicatio~l .............................
Section 36 . K i n d s of Reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Section 37. Irldividual Reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Section 38 . E x a m p l e n f IntIividual Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Section 39 . Special Reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Section 40 . Classification of Cases as to Urgency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Section 41 . Situation Surveys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Section 42. Department and Special Intelligence Officers' S u m z a r i e s
A a n c u VIII . Code.

Section 43. General Remarks ...................................
Section 44. * b i t r a r y Signs .....................................
Section 45. To Encipher .......................................
Section 46. Care in Enciphering ...............................
Section 47. To Decipher ......................................
Section si8 . Caution ...........................................
Section 49. A d d m i n g Telegram!! .............................
Section 50. Tele-g-a phic Requests for Information ................
ARTICLBIX. Continuous Cover.
Section 51. Responsibility of Intelligcnee Otiicer .................
SetSon 52. Group Okrvatian ................ ...............
Section 53. Following Suspects ................................
Section 54. Transfer of Troops ................................
55. ~ e ~ a r t u of
r e Unit ....................................
Section 56. Duty to Succev~or.....*............... .-..........
ARTIC~EXI Liaison with Civilian Agencies.
W i o n 57. In General .............................=...........
Seetion 58. Functions of Department of Justice .................
Section 59. Relatiom with Department of Justice ................
Sextion 60. Internment Procedure .............................
Seetion 61. American Protective League .........................
Section 62. Y. M . C. A.'Lntelligence ............................
Section 63 Local Police .......................................
%ion 64. Other h e a l B i b ..................................
Amcm XI Handling Civilian Personnel
Seetion . Establishments Predominantly Military ..............
Section 66. Establishments Predominantly Civilian ..............
Seetion 67. Plant Protection
Arnmxz XI1. Intelligencs Funds.
Section 68. Proper Uw of Funde ...............................
%Ion 60. Securing and Acwunting for Fun& .................

.

.

.

....................................

This pamphlet wiil be cited as the "C. E. Instructions."

It explains the
internal counter espionage organization of a militarp unit. The pamphlet entitled "Principles of Counter Espionage Organhatior and Control withirr - the
Military Establishment" explains the interrelation of t h e varioua Connter Espionage units ti, each other and to the whole system. It will be cited as the
"C. E. Principles." The two pamphlets, taken together, constitute a working
library for the Xegative Intelligence OfEhr.
Specid attention is invited to the secret nature of these instructions, and of
all instructions, bulletins, codes, and ciphers pertaining to the Counter m i o n age Service. They should be known to no persons other than the C o m m ~ l n d i n g
General or Commanding Officer, the Chief of StafT, the Intelligence Oflicer, and
the A s s i s t a t Intelligence Officer. Brlien rcot i n w e , they should be k e p t i~
a safe.
P

Copies of this pamphlet are issued only to Intelligence OfExrs of independent units. This numbered copy must be receipted for to Military Intelligence
Division by the Intelligence OfEcer who receives it m d who thereupon becomes
responsible for its safekeeping and final disposition. I t is issued to the InteLligence Officer in his official and not in his personal capacity. Should he at any
time cease to be Intelligence Officer of the putieular unit for which the pamphlet
was issued, he must transfer i t to his succamr in offik, if such there be, or return it promptly to Military Intelligence Division. It will not be turned over
under such circumstances to the Commanding Officer, the Chief of S M , o r the
Adjutant. Upon t m a f e r r i n i this pamphlet to a successor, the Intelligence
Officer will require a receipt and transmit the same promptly to Military Intelligence Division, which must know at all times who is responsible for its &y.

The following abbreviations are used throughout this pamphlet:
A-PL-American Protective m e .
C.E, -Counter Espionige.
'
D.J. -Department of Justice.
1.0. -Intelligenct! Of'ficer.
M.I. -hiilit.ary Intelligence.
M.1.D.-Military Intelligence Division, G e l ~ r a lS M .

1. Co~r/ldentkzIS a t ure. Positive Intelligence is a development of the e r vice of s e c i i r i t ~and information familiar to every oEcer as a part of his d i t a r g
education. Its necessity, nature and general functions are well-hewn and
understood. Negative Intelligence or Counter Espionage is, of necersitg, a tonfidehtial service; its existence is known, in a general way, to many offie- b u t
there are few who realize the scope aod nature of the work, and praeticallp none
ouiside the Lntelligence Senice who unde-d
its methods.
2. - Rcs J l i n g Probknrr. This is as it should be, f o r secrecy is essential to
the s u m of this service, but seemy carries with i t one serious disadvsowhich most be overcome before an efficient counter espionage organization can
exist. This disadvantage arises from the fact that. the basic principles of eoanter
espionage form no part of general m i l i t a ~training, and hence the Intelligenet
OfEcer must educate himself, through his OF& studies, without the aid and
advice of other officers such M may be obtained i n nearly every other b e of
military activity. I t follows aLw from the fact that this service is not g e n e d y
understad, that the Intelligence Ofticer must inform himself thoroughly in
order that. he may be able to explain clearly to his Commarider the functions
and needs of his organization, for he must act by the authority of the Commander and the suwes of his work depends largely upon the contidenee repoeed
in him by that officer.
3. Nattirc of the Service. First of all it mu.* be defiuitely u u d e r s W t h a t
Counter Espionage B n i t a separate branch of the service, but is a function
which each military unit must perform for itself, jnst as it provides its own
guard. The Xilitary Intelligence Division, General Staff, is charged with t h e
duty of instructing Intelligence Officers a n d of m-ordinating their work, b u t i t
cannot perform their duties. Nor cm i t provide Intelligence Officers f o r military units, for there is no body of officers h m which such a detail can be made7/
It is sometime practicable to have officers who have-been detailed for Lntelligence duty ordered to Washington for a brief course of instrnction, b u t this
bust not obscure the outstanding principle that Intelligence Officers must, in
the main, be detailed by the branch w i t h which they are to serve, and t h a t i t is
a duty of each commander of a n independent unit to aee to it that his command
is protected by a pmper C. E. s p k m created therein nnder his own authority.
(Principles, See 2).
4. E n c n i y Opporlrirrity. The riipItl a;semhlinr?: a n d hetert~geneousc o m p
sition of our Army have given ample opportunity f o r espionage activity on t h e
part of an astute and unscrupulous enemy. The Counter Espionage S e r v k is
now in actual eonflict with the enemy in the United States, and the multifarious
activities of enemy agents mnstitute a most seriouq meaace to the nccomplkhment
of our mission in the war. The enemyk .secret semi= in the United States is
highly organked; it represents years of preparation by experienced agents a n d
money. Before the entry of the United States
the expenditure of vast sums
into the mar, kflnences of every wrt \rere set to work to stifle legislation looking
tnward n r ~ n a d n w . and
.
accresive m e a s a m were taken to arevent the manll-

-

b

facturr: an(] shij)lrlc.rit of m1,r1itir,r13. S i n c e w a r bec3me a reality the attack h s
1)ecome more s111)tlt:b l ~ tr~orlet h e Icss insistent. Military information is -ugh:
for the use of tht: enerny, d ~ r e c tattack upon o u r resources is made b r m a s of
acts of sabotage, nrld insidious propaganda is d h m i n a t e d to implant :he seeds
of doubt, discontent and disloyalty for the puof weakening moraIe. Information h a s been received which indicates t h e intention of the enemy to place a
representative in every one of our reg;ments. There will be no lack of opportunity nor will it be out of keeping with t h ~ i or bserved methods.
5. Colrnter Organizatiun. To combat snch activities is the mission of t h e
Counter Espionage Service. I n so doing i t must be so organized within each
military unit that every case of disaffection, disloyalty or actual sedition shall
be promptly communicated to headquarters and every suspicious activit? within
the military establishlnent ahall fall within the constant observation of the Intelligence Officer o r his agencies. I n addition i t is necessary that there be a
constant exchange of information by Intelligence Officers among themselves a n d
with the Military Intelligence Division.
6. Poding of Infwma!bn. The central office of the Military Intelligence
Division at Washington examines, collates, records, and files information received from Intelligence Oficers, with whom i t works in the closest c x ~ p e r a t i o n ,
It is, furthermore, snpplied with information by Intelligence Officers in the
American Expeditionary Forby the Shte Department, the Department of
Justice, the United Shtes Secret Service, the Office of Naval Intelligence, o u r
Military Attach& abroad, as well as by the Intelligence Departments of the
Britiah, French and other allied pverhments. A further vast fund of informstion is supplied from miscelIaneous and private sources. Lnformation is at hand
covering the cases of an immense number of persons orporganizatiom whose
actions o r attitude have warranted suspicion. This information is a t the disposal of the Intelligence Serrim and should be drawn upon M y . A t the same
time it is necessary, in order that the central pool of information shall continue
to be useful aa such, that Intelligence Ofl3cers shall promptly report to the Military Lntelligence Division all cases handled by them m that the information
may be available to the Intelligence Service generally. ( S m . 35-42).
7. Scope of the Seruice. The fmction of the Counter Espionage Service
is informational and preventative rather than punitive. Positive Intelligence
collects and disseminates the information upon which are based operations in
the &Id, but it does not conduct wch operatiom. Counter Espionage couects
information upon which the proper authorities m a y act to prevent o r wppress
disloyalty or sedition and to apprehend enemy w e n & or sppath'izera, but i t
does not m r p the function d executive offierzt in makitrg arrests and directing
punishment or that of the Judge Advocate in preparing evidence for courts
martid. (Principles, See. 3).
8- Necessity for Complete Organiurtima. Finally,it is imperative that an
tffective Counter Espionage Service be establhhed immedistely wherever troop
are stationed and that i t be constantly maintained a t a high state of eflciency,
so that nowhere within our Army can the activities of enemy agents or enemy
sympathizers be carried on unobserved- ( StlrJ. 5136).
It ia not intended, nor is it dee'n)ed desirable, to lay down hard and fast
ntles for the interior eamomy of the Counter &pionage Service The problem
of creating it l i e within the province of the Inklligence OfBcer, who mnst solve
it awrding to conditions and cimmstances which will v+ky according to the
locality and composition of the command- T h e following s w t i o 1 1 6 rua offered
as n Q w more than an aid or guide to assist the Intelligence Officer in the
accomplishing of his mission.

ARTICLE 11.
PRJSCIFI,ES
OF OEGASLZATIOS

9. Basic Principla. The internal organinition of a military unit for C. E.
purposes is bad upon three generai prineiph, namely:
a. Decentralization.
b. Secrecy.
c Direct communication.
10. Decentralization. The principle of CeentraliLation rest3 upon the
conviction that no individnal acting in an executive.capacity can efficiendy %
the activities of more than a limited number of persons under his controL m
e
n
the number of subordinates e x 4 eight o r ten it h m e s necessary to d m trdize by creating subdivisions, each under the personal direction of a separate
executive, the several executives reporting each to hie inrmediate superior. In
like manner it may pmve'necewry
divide and subdivide the main snb-divisions, in order that no one person will be obliged to deal directly with mare w b ordinatea than he can handle dciently.
In the Counter Espionage Senice, where mutt01 is complicated by the
necessity of secrecy, mch decentralization is essential to &ciency, and the
greater the number of ramifications which the development of the spst.em enthe more echelons of deceutralization is it neceesary 'to create.' It is imposgible
to prescribe the degree of decentraliurtion n m r y in the C. E. Semi- of a
military anit. The problem must be eolved by the Intelligence Officer on t h e
p m d , having in view the number of men to be covered and the conditions
under which they aie grouped. (Seca. 13-17).
11. Secrecy. An organization snch as that herein outlined ia d u e l e s s
unlesa its existence is kept inviolably 8ecret. Counter Espionage mnst never be
dimassed by Intelligence Oftlcers except among themselves; the tenn Counter
Espionage must not be nsed in public or in any way which might attract at-tion to the system. It is well established that the most w ~ f u ofl those organizations whose activities are dependent upon eecrecy have been those in which the
members were nnknown, not only to outsiders, but, as f a r as possible, to -4
other as well. I t is, t-herefore, desirable that subordinates know as little about
the general organization and the duties of others aa ia consistent with the fulfillment of their own mission, and, for this reson, d e s & o d d be drawn with ean
so as to tell operatives all they should know withont r e v d i n g what they should
not. These rules of secrecy are no refledion on the loyalty or discretion of
members of the organization but are necessary protective azeasurea. No p t m n
is infallible and one is always in danger of disclosing nnconscioudy to a clever
agent of the enemy, infwmafion w h d o k k m t . One cannot disclose information which one does not h o w , and ignorance becomes a protection
12 Direct Cmmunicafion by other than military channels is the basis
of mocessfnl co-operation among Intelligence Wcers ( P r i n c i p l q Sic. 7 )
and in like mnnner the comrnnnication within,the C..E.organization of a unie
is carried on in disregard of the usual military channels and withont the h o w l edge of oBcers subordinate to the Commander of the unit. It is inadvisable for
the Intelligence Officer to communicate personally with his operatives, ercept
under the most extraordinary circumstances, but all operative4 report d i r d y
to the Intelligence Officer through the mafin (k
25).

ARTICLE 111.

13. The Intelligence Oficer. At the head of the C. E. system of anp unit
is the Intelligence Officvr, or, in a Division, the h i s t a n t Intelligence Offier
for Negative Intelligence. I t is usuajly desirable that this officer should fraogly

be known as such in order to have the advantage of information v o l u n k n d b y
members of the command who are not connected with the C. E. Service, This
rule holds good in dl but the sdlest nnit.8. B u t the fact that this officxr is employed upon Counter Espionage duty ahould not be emphasized and the fwt
that a C. E. organization exists within the comnvtnd must be kept secret. The
methods whereby snch an organization can be m t e d and can function secreur
are herein explained.
14. Echlans of Control. h m c i a t e d with the Intelligence Officer, but a b
solutely under cover as such, ie-an officer who w i l l be designated ss S o . l, who
will c o d t n t e the point of contact betwen the Intelligence Officer and his orin eonneetion with the C. E. work
ganization, but. whose name mast never a&r
Directly under the No. 1will be the ekecntives of the firstechelon of decentralization whom we will call the N m 2, and, assuming two echelons of decentralization, each No. 2 directs personally a limited nnmber of executives of the
second echelon to whom 'we will refer as Nos 3. Each No. 3 controls certain
operatives o i agents who seek information by direct contact with the subjects to
be observed.
Each No. 2 mnst know and be known to the No. 1 and the Nos. 3 under his
immediate control, but Nos. 2 ahould not know or be h w n to each other.
Similarly, each No. 3 m w t know and be known to his No. 2 and the operativea under his immediate charge, but he should not know or be. known to t h e
other Noa 3, nor ahodd he know anything about No. 1.
Likewise, each operative must b o w and;& knovn to his No. 3, b u t should
not h o w or be known by any other operative, nor a h o d d he know anything
about No. 2.
It ia a general rule that- information of vahm to the enemy should not be
entrusted to operatives. Their discretion is always to be suspected and their
fal1liilit.y to be expected. Likewise, when an operative becomes known, a substitute should be found for him. (See. 11).
15. Number of .Operatiuu. -It ia not dmirsb1e b lay down hard and f&t
rnles for the distribution of operativea The organization must be on a scale so
thorough as to leave no loophole for undettcted enemy h v i t y . The determination of the number of operatives adequate to ensure protection wiU be affected
by the composition of the particular unit to be protected Where the pmportjon
of fo~ign-bornaoIdiera is relatively high, o r in units recruited from localities
where influences such as the I. W. W,or comcientions objector pmp~cgandahave
bactive, i t will probably be found wiee to employ more operatives than where
the men are from homes mom strongly American. Again, subdivisions within
the unit may differ among themselves in this
The final allotment must
be left to the discretion of the Intelligence Officer.
~th an &om in m t ~ r P i c e
that each agent in active search of information ehonld bt! &e&ed by awther agent whom he does not know as snch and by

~ ; t . r J ~. I ~ I I I I ~ I I I I I ~ I I , SIICI. A ; C O I ~ I ~ ~bat:er>I I > - , or tr1,41p, 111 u-l~;,-h
itre I * c ~ I I I ; I ~ttlr:1\vt1
I~
tnzetl~crso t h a t it is pos..ible for olle ma,,
t o I)t! i ~ ( - ~ l ~ i ; t i ~iritll
~ i t . ~; Ii I I ( I ~ll)s(brvr
:111y ci.>nlhcr c ~ ft h e mroilp: Olie r ~ p e r ~ : l ivl l~
t ~ r c lj ~
) I ; t t ~ ~ ) r !r :;;::. IJC
;~(tvis;~l,le,
hut sit:,:? r l ~ eco11!1ter-check 1s so i:nporoan; no
operative S ~ I O I I ~ I cr111fi11e
!
his observations ? n his own p l a t m ~ lalorlc : p l n t r ~ \ n sx : + y
tt~)t:r;if~~.v
1 1s
1

a 111111llier
of

~ I C~

I . O ~ I ] ) C Ci:

IIIYII

; ;~:: i ; t i j ~r i l l s c ~ ~ ( l .

special 1111itsthe ( l i s t l . i b ~ ~ iof
i ~ lnperi~tives
~
\\-ill be varied a c c o r d i ~to~
c:ircutlrstit~~~-w.
? ~ i i ti l l ii(*(.or(li\rl(*(j.
w i t h t t ! ~w m e generzl pri1lciplt.s. The ;\:z\jzCt
t o be attailled i : ~general is to cover completely each g r o u p in the milit\??- service. ( S e c . S', .
In general. it may be said that one operative in each f i f t ~men is d s I = b l e
:llld th;lt (jiit2 i : ~
!~lllltlrt-t:1 l l ; r j . be c.,j\.sidered ~ i i ;r~ ; L I ; I I I I Irat,,,
U cocsisZe:lr.
111

with safety

The distrih:iiio~~
o f operatives acc~ri!in~to these nriuciples should be f 3 r i l i tated by the existing orgitriizatioll of troops into administrative o r fighting units.
I n a division camp, of approximate1~-40,300 men, t h e Counter Espionage Organization tc accomplish its mis.io~lwill require a minimum of about 400 men16. lVumbcr of Echelons. Based upon the above estimate i t is obvi'ous t h a t
the sphere of control of the members of the executive echelon imloediatell; h
touch with operatives sho~ildapproximate a battalion a n d t h a t in 'a division t h e
ne-xt higher sphere of co~ltrolshould approximate a brigade, which echelon a n ,
a whole. be conveniently colltrolled b r the Divisional Xo. 1. There a r e m
y
conditions, h o w e ~ e r whieh
,
call for a diEerent arrangement. (Sec. 10).
17. R e p k m e n t . Provision should be made by t h e Intelligence O S e r
for the replacement of subordinates whose connection with the Counter Espionage Service administered by him ma- be s;evel.ed.
If a t a n y time an executive or operative becomes h o r n as a member of :he
Couuter Espionage organization o r b m e s in a n y o t h e r way,,undesirabIe, i t is
necessary a t once to terminate his connection with the organization. This should
be done with discretion to the end that injury to the system may n o t be worked
by disgruntled ex-operatives.
To replace officers or men lost thus, o r by transfer o r casuarty, suitable substitutes should be picked out by their superiors in echelon, a d , after observation
to determine their suitability, listed with the Intelligence Officer, with a view
to their being promptly taken into the organization should necessity arise. This
should be done withont disclosure of the Counter Espionage organization to t h e
men SO listed. The Intelligence Officer shonld have a list, safely and secretly
kept, of all the members of his organization; a n d with thia another list of available substitutes. Such provision will, in case of t h e loss of an executive, obviate t h e loss of executives and operatives nnder him, a n d will enable his Im
quickly to be made god.

18. IZutrlifications: The selection of personnel is the most diEtitult part of
the task of organizing the Cou~lterEspionage Service. The system s - ~ u d s,:,r
falls on the ability of its individi~alexecutives and operatives. Since each elecqtive is to be charged with the organization of the echelon of which he is to be in

control, the greatest care must be exercised in selecting the executi~es, They
must be officers of ability, common sense, and, above all, unquestionable loyalty.
Former experience as organizers and directors of organized activities is a vdnable asset; officers of political experience have been found especially apt. S o
officer should be selected for .amember of one of the-higher echelons concerning
the steadfastness and loyalty of whom there is the least doubt. 3f. I. D. is prepared, upon telegraphic request, to furnish within appmximately two weeks a
complete report upon the reputation of any officer in this regard.
In selecting operatives, the personal attributes of the marl are more important than his former experience. I n fact, former employment as a policed
inan or detective may actually- render a man undesirab!e as an operative, since
he is likely to be suspected by his fellows. Moreover, the police methods of
handling criminals are qliite out of place in the C. D. ~ervjce,and he may sacrifice transmitting information quickly to a desire to secure evidence s&cient to
convict. Operatives, it must be remembered, are infomronts-not private police.
Operatives should have the faculty of keeping their mouths shut and their
eyes open. They should be good listeners, not too talkative, but not so reserved
that they do not make friends easily. They should be' companionable, good
mixera, and not so offensively good in t.heir habits that men who are inclined to
be " p o d fellows" will avoid them. Attractiveness to women may be a positive asaet, since much information may be gained from women whom suspects
frequent; it is a notable fact that onr present enemy htu an exceptional weaknesa for lewd women.
No type o'f man is more e s s e n t i a l out of place in the Intelligence Service
than the one who fancies he is a born Sherlock Eolmes or "gum-shoe artist "
He a t once l a p himaelf open to nnspicion by his "pussy-foot " manner, a n d is
alwaya tempted to'make a cme trt the expense of the eervice.
19. Rank. The que~tionof rank must be worked out to suit the exigencies
of the situation. On the one hand the nature of the organization d e m a n b the
nee of olRcera and men wgardletm of rank, with the eole view of flnding the indiv i d d beat suited to the position. On the other hmd, rank always carries authority, and it ia bad policy to i m p e responsibility materially greater than the
rank warranta On this account, it ia desirable that all erecutivea be of8cera.
Expen'aec has proved t.hat, once the enthusimtic .moperation of executives has
h a secured, d i f f e ~ n t min rank among them are relatively unimportant.
T h e employment of non-eommtsioned oflleess as operatives is not; as a mle,
drnitabls. For the stlcce~efnlperformance of an operative's duties it ig essent
torms with the men he ie ubseming; he must
tial &at he be on the m ~ intimate
,lot be deterred frnm nmoci~tionwith hi8 comrades when off duty by the re-

t r i t I I I : I I to l i ~ r c Ie I
. For this rc;snn it is we11 to be c h a p
i r l the sclcctior~c b f corporals
operatives; d u t y serg?an:s s h o ~ l l dhe e n l p j o ~ - d
only i r l IS^. l t f r:~*(-~ssity
; \\-hIIe r~orl-cotnmissionedofiicers t , f higher rarlk should
he e r r ~ p l ~ ) ~ -~fc da,t all, as s p c ~ i a loperatives. (Sec. 2 0 ) .
'I'hc prorn1,tion of a n operative, even though it comes p a r t l y irl r e c o w i t i o n
o f his slic:ces in t h i s capacity, may irnpair his f r l r t h e r usefu!ness to t h e C . Z.
orgar~izatiorl. ! I ] such cases it is deqirable to retain t h e n a n ' s c+operatic.=1, a
for example. i r i tile selection of a successor. I t is s u g g e t c d t h a t if he is ~ a k e n
into the confidence of his imlnediate superior in echelo~l:a the extent of bekg
given a fraril; explanatioit of tile situation and of the n e c e s i t y for the s p ~ p ? - - ~ e
of h i < cnnnbxtic>:1 ..cith tihe ocgarr ization, h i s sympathy s l i l be kept. F l l ~ S e r more, the way will be open for the later employment of h i s services, if oc-ion
should ar'ise.
,
20. Spccial Operatives. I n certain cases the services of special operz:ives
may become desirable. F o r the purpose of observing ci\-ilians employed i n d
l
numbers, o r transient, about a camp, the use of an enlisted m a n in c i v i l h
clothes has proved successful. To cover the movements of a military suspect
outside the limits of a military rservation, a special operative may be used
where the employment of a regular operative is impossible. F o r such seeces,
non-commissioned officers may well be employed by r e s o n of their p r e s u m a b l y
superior intelligence.
The Intelligence Officer should, therefore, be on the a l e r t to note men v i t h
the necessary qualifications to bc used for special service. 31en who have had
previous detective experience will, in exception to the principles s e t forth above
(Sec. 19), be highly desirable for work of this kind. Preliminary information
as to such men may be obtained from the files of the Personnel Officer. T h e
foregoing must not be construed a s authority to maintain a private detective
force in nearby mmmunities and to usurp the proper functions of the v a r i o u s
civilian agencies which a r e charged primarily with the observation and control
of civilian suspects (Sees. 5864).
21. Sccun'ng'Personml. The greatest discretion will be necessary in picking out a n d approaching ofijcers and men with a view to their selection as executives o r operatives. Under no circumstances must the existence of the organization be revealed. T h e fact that the person making t h e appointment is connected with a n y organization must, therefore, be kept secret. Enemy a g e n t s
wiU be especiaUy an&
to be emphjed. Number 1must circulate freely about
the camp in the process of selecting his N m 2. A ruse may facilitate the desirable-result of enabling No. 1 to circulate freely without exciting undue cornrnent. Thus i t may be found advisable for the No. 1 to be placed nominally
upon some special duty, a t least during the period of o-m n i z a t i o n , so t h a t his
absence from his usual duties will not excite comment.
Experience has shown that a direct and sympathetic appeal to a loyal man 'a
patriotism, made as man t o man by his superior in echelon, a n d laying aside for
this purpose distinction i n rank, is, when conpled with an explanation of the
necessity for beating the enemy a t his own game, nmially ample for enlisting
his eager services. It is elementary that in such an interview a n explanation of
the C. E. System shall be avoided. Tbe man should be cautioned o r reassartd
that "tale-bearing" is not t h e mission desired of him, but t h a t he has ban
selected for a &ion
of the most serious importan= and the -test
delicacy
involving the safety of himself and his comrades and for t h e confounding of
a n unscrupulous foe.
Too much stress k n o t be laid on the fact that breach- of dimipline, except as they reveal disloyalty, a r e not of interest to the C. B. Service.
22. Potm of Oath. I n organizing the Intelligence Service, a form of oath
set forth below has oftcn been p u t to the ope-mtives. The modified name of the

r

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,

..
W;&S

;~ti"j)(ecl

LO

,nirkc ;ne ~ ; l t h

trlorc rc;rtliJy c:t~mj)rcltct~sil)lc.,
;itit! t o ~n;kkc t l ~ copcrativcs' dlrtics , e m more
. 1.;.
;~ttr;iclivc. '1'11t: V ~ L ~ I I tCj !f t11isI O ; ~ : ~ If11;1? bc SC;? grc,,:
;: tile p ~ ~ s3ig,...,g
~ , ~ l ,L

properly irnprcssnl, as sl~ggestctlikbovc!. t v i t l l the fact that tile prtrpoe oE t h e
service is to prcve~ltbetrayal of llimself arltl his comrades. I t s 11s~i s recornn~cnded. The oaths should be p i t to tile men by the 1 s t eclielon of executives.
S K R V I C U F O R PROTECTION AC,,.iII.\IST S P I E S .
To pr0tcc.t my cumrades a n d my cotrntry f r o m t h e prare p?ril of secret encmica withill
our Army anti o u r nation I do hereby enroll mraclf in t h e Scrrice f o r Protection Against
Spies, mid (lo aolcmnly a w a r t o he d w a p ! , on the alert in t h a t Service; to obaerre and report
to
all c i r c u m s t ~ n c e swhich should arouse suspicion
t h a t secret enemies are seeking to betray the Army of the United States, to spread Jirraension among o u r people, to i n j u r e our campe,.equipment or supplies, to cripple o u r industries,
o r otherwise to hinder and clelay our prrparatlon f o r and cnntfuct of this war.
1 do f u r t h e r swear t h a t I will nerer. under any circ~irnst-ancea; directly o r indirect]?, by
word, act or sign, reveal to any person other than
, tLe Intelli'genw Officer, or the Commanding General, or p e m n s designated by them, the exidencs of
the Service for Protcetion Againat Spim, or any like eewicc, nor tbe fact t h a t I zm in any
way engaged in or connected r i t h such service, uor a n y secret t h a t m a y be confided b me
in the wrviee, well knowing t h a t o d y by the stricteat ailcnea axid s e c r q u n I prtdene my
usefulness to t h e nation in this work.
A l l this I do solernl~lyswear upon my honor and before Almightp God, and may He keep
me steadfast.

Iu some Divisiolls this oath 11a.sbeen mimeographed and each operative required to sign a copy which is then r e t ~ ~ r n etod the Intelligence Officer f o r sing.
In others, the oath is memorized and put orally to the operative. In either
instance the operative should be required to repeat the oath a-it is put to him.
23. Insinxiion of Personnel. The Intelligence Officer must ensure the adequate instruction in their duties of the memberi of his organization. He & o d d
prepare a n d issue through No. 1simple mimeographed instructions for the guidance of the executives, embodj-ing in his own words t h e ideas of the preceding
paragraphs. In one division the following method was pursued with success.
Mimeographed sheets were prepared for iguance through the-channeis to the
last echelon of executives. On each sheet wtrs printed a caution t h a t the instructions were to be safeguarded under Iock and key a n d burned by the last executhe operatives were all properly instructed. The instruetioos
tive aa so011
explained in sinrple language tlie desired tactful method of approaching prospective opemtives; the manrrer of saearilig them in, and of properly irnpressiag
them with their mission of high trust and secrecy; the device of assigning them
fictitious names; the fictitious ]lame and P. 0. box to which operatives were to
report ; and the issuing of postage. The instruetions f u r t h e r 'explnined what
were to be the subsequent relations of the last echelon of executives w i t h their
opcratives on-the one hand, and with the I. 0.on the other. They wenc ufEeinl
communications, bearing the authority of the Commanding Genernl, m d d ~ l y
authenticated. Each copy of the instructions was a c c o m p a n i d with the necessary number of mimeographed blank forma of the Oath of Enrollmeot. The last
echelon of &ecutives were instructed to read the appropriate portion-of the
instructions to each operative, at the time he was sworn in, and to require him
to repeat the substance thereof in his own words. In the p r m b of issoanee,
oral instructions were transmitted that snperior echelons of execntives should,
for their information, study the miineograylied sheets before p-ing
them on to
their subordinates.

Short lists of suspects may in similar fashion be furnished to S o . 1 for distribution to the executives concerned. These l h should group W t h e r saspects who will fall under the observation of thz same operatives. They s h d d
state unmistakabl~the precise course of action desired with reference to each
suspect or group oi suspects (as, after a list of names, "To be observed c a r e m y
and reported. ") .
In no instance should such instructions or lists carry information other than
that which is necessary to be known by the last echelon of executives. (Sec. 11).

ARTICLE V

24. dlctltotls of Operaliues. Operatives may initiate investigations of suspected pcrsnrls or be ctirectetl to investigate or keep under surveillance subjects
to whom their attention is directed. The fundamental necessity that operatives
should avoid revealing by word or act the duty npon which they 8re engaged
baa been emphasized. (Sec. 11).
This.caution is particularly applicable to the ordinary operatives who obtain
their information through constant association with the groups wherein t h e y are
placed It mnnot always be followed completely in the case of special operatives
working directlyennder the Intelligence Officer (3ec. 20), but the very fact t h a t
a few of such special operatives are identified may s e n e in a measure to distract attention from the gel~eralC . E. System.
As to the operatives of the former class their duty is simply to proceed
about their routine duties, keeping eyes and ears open and seeking to become
intimate with a11 members of the p u p s which are under their observation. They
will partic~~larly
seek the intimacy of those under sumeillance, if this can be
done withollt exciting suspicion, and will in general be on the alert to know all
that occ~rrswithin their respective groups.
Operatives of the latter class, that is, special operatidk, are more often entrusted with special missions and it is these who should be "planted" a t places
where particular acts of sabotage or the like are expected. The discovery of
such an operative does not necessarily destroy his usefulness, since h e is rarely
detailed for duty among men by whom he is personally well-known a n d he can
be promptly shifted to another scene of activity.
Operatives of this class may occasionally be hidden in hangars o r at other
points where especially destructive sabotage is anticipated in oqler to observe
what occurs during the absence of the men ordinarily on duty t h e n . P r o p e r
arrangements with the p a r d must be made under such eircumstaneen F o r this
purpose it may be feasible to-make use of a man of known loyalty who is n o t
connected with the C. E. System and who acts in the capacity of an operative
for but one occasion. Such a one need know n o t h i n of the general system and
may be employed through his immediate superiors if this course is deemed advisable As a m l e it is more satisfactory to employ special operatives npon cases
of particular importnrlce
25. Operntives' Reports. Operatives will be instructed to report promptly
all cirtumsta~wesof importance wbich fall within their observation and to report
a t least weekly even if there is "nothing to report. "
Except under extraordinarp cireumstanees all reports will be w r i t k n
Written reports are to be mailed to a fictitiom addressee aa arranged f o r by the
I. 0. I n cases of extreme emergency oral r e p o m may be made thmngh the
executive echelons but this practice i. not to be encoura,oed as it tends to reveal
the ~ystem. The executives will ueed to have private conferences with operatives from time to time and the number of these shauld not be unnecessarily increased, Olle I. 0.believed he was promoting efficiency by requiring frequent
~ n f e r e n c e sbetween the members of each echelon from No. 1 down to operatives.

A s a result t h e ~ ~ o ~ ~ - c o m r n i s s i nofficcr
l l e d nf h i s u n i t discovered a German plot
and reported to t h e Commanding Officer the names of t h e conspirators. T h e
report proved to be 3 rather complete rwter of the C . E. service in that unit,
I n order to prever~tthe identification of an operative by the interception of
his reports, a fictitious name should be assigned to each one. To facilihtt the
identification of reports, all operatives in one regiment may be assigned name
beginning with A, arranged, for Illstance, alphabetically in convenient o r d e r ,
e. g., Abbott, Xdams, Ahearn, Allen, etc. Operatives in the next regiment s o u l d
similarly be as.igned names beginning with B, and SO on. Many variatiolls of
this pian ma? be used. The .secret riie of t h e &aisgmnt inteiiigence Uccer s n o u a
contain a complete roster of the Division Intelligence +mice, and this r-rd
should give the fictitious name assigned to each operative.
The transmission of reports must be accomplished in a matter-of-fact ;Fay,
and the letter embodying the report shodd be written in a usual place (as, in
the Y. 51. C. A.), and mailed a t a time when the operative would ordinarily mail
a letkr.
As little mystery as possible in writing a report on the p a r t of the operative
is to be desired. It may be written like any other letter, and supposing the &titiom name to which the report is to be rendered to be! James Black, and the fictitious name of the operative to be Fred Bnnsen, a model report might read as
follows :
"Dear Jim:
Received your letter la& week and I wm r n i g h e glad to get it. franr
sehmidt baa been sending a lot of registered letters from tom lately. The
weather in rotten.
L e t me bear from yon m n ,
Your friend,
Fred Bunsen.

It will be observed that proper names reported are b e g u n with mad letters,
and that information conveyed is surrounded with matter of a purely trivial
nature. With such precautions, a person looking over the writer's shoulder is
not likely to have his attention attracded.
Operatives should be required to give the full name of persons reported o r
otherwise to indicate the subject with such particularity t h a t there can be n o
doubt as to the identity of the person reported.
A t the time of the organization of the Intelligence Service, postage mu& be
furnished to the operatives to cover reports for a t least a number of w e e h Thb
poetage should be issued to the operatives in ca& by the last echelon of exemtives, who will then hold their men. accountable. These disbursements will be
certified through the channels to the Intelligence Of3cer, who will reimburse the
.
executives concerned, also through the channels, h m Intelligence fun&
The plan for sending and m i k i n g maiIed reports mnst necessarily vary,
but it is usual for the Intelligence Officer to rent a P o s t O 5 a box under an assumed name or under the name of a fictitious corporation (e. g., "The Southeru
Novelty Co."), to which such reports may be sent. This must be done by ament with the Postmaster in moet instances,
The Post O&e box retained as snegested above s h o d d preferably be i n t h e
Post Ofltlce of the nearest village or town, rather than m the Camp Post me,
so that the fictitioui name given may not eeem to be c o w & with the military
establishment. The Intelligence Ofticer should cause this box to be emptied at
frequent intervals by No. 1 or by his confidential orderly o r clerk He s h o d d
nevir empty the box in person
26. Documentary Etdemx. Letters and other docnments found in the
possession of suspects frequently have a value not sppreciated by an inesperie n d person -Aninnocent looking document may contain a d e message which

e s j , c r t , o r ~riterlirie:itrons In syniy,;ittlrtlc Ink, which
can be detcetecl ;~rldtieveloped only bv laboratory m e t h d ~ . A1. I. D. is pmpii~.ecit o handle mrtttcrs of these k i n d s It is highly desirable, therefore, that,
whenever practic:;lblt*, original documents be forwarded to JI. I. D. for examination. When it is inlpracticrible to forward originals. photographic copies should
be sent. Amateur attempts to bring out invisible writing shoultl be avoided, f o r
they are ~ ~ s l i a l fl yr ~ ~ i t l eant1
s s f r q u e n t l y destroy the writing so that i: c3nnot &
decipherell a t n later time by expert...
hiessiiges obviously in code or in cipher, which defeat local attempts st Zeciphement, shotlld be transmitted immediately to 31. I. D. for the purpclse. T h e
same disposition is to be made of messages in foreign languages which cannot &
translated on the spot.
Exact notes should be made of the time, place, and circumstances undzr
which each document was seized and the documents should be initialed o r otherwise marked for identification by the seizing officer so that he may be able a
identify them later in court, if aecssary. A t a recent trial for circulating s&
tiom literature in camps, very little of the r a s t amount of printed matter seized
and sent in by the Intelligence O£Ecers was available a s evidence f o r t h e reason
that it could not be identified as coming from a n y particular camp.
27. Cwering .Wail Atotter. Information of the greatest importance is ofderivable from the intercepting of mail matter. The question of exsminiq
mail is, however, one of great delicacy. No legal right exists for the opening of
sealed mail traveling within the United States. Mail matter is rrnder the j
&
diction of the Postal authorities so long as it remains in the custody of any Poffice employee. It seems to become subject to the military jurisdiction as soon
as it is delivered to the military authorities Thus, mail in the hands of a maii
orderly is under military control, but soldiers delegated to assist in a camp
branch of a post office are to be regarded as postal emplo~eesand n o t as mail
orderlies, The actual disrihution of the mail to the enlisted men is usually at,
complished by soldier mail orderlies or m ~ n p a n yclerks, who are clearly n o t employees of the Post Office. This suggests that an intelligent use of mail orderlies or company clerk.. may solve the problem of the occasionally desirable inspection of military suspects' mail. In some divisions many or all of the mail orderlies are Intelligence operatives.
It is possible that the bulk of the mail which it is desired to examine will
pass thmugh the camp Post Office. But tbe shrewder suspects may have mail
sent to other addresses, necessitating m p e r a t i o n with the general Post Wce
I n these cases, the Post Office should invariably be approached through the local
agents of D. J. A11 D. J . agents have the rights of Postal Lnspectom with regard
to mail mgtkr, and most of them have had experience in the collection of information from mail. To secure their co-operation will not only be in accord with
the desiree of the Post Office Dept., but will facilitate greatly the work of -the
Assistant Intelligence Officer.
A Post Office l k p e e t o r or D. J. agent has no authority to open mail b u t he
may inspect i t and take t r a c i n e of the envelope for record and comparison, A
not infrequent device for locating a fugitive is to take t r a c i n g of the mail delivered to someone to whom he is expected to write and to follow up t h e clues
furnished by handwriting and post-wka
28. Keeping Away Prom Suspects. Experience has proved that it is usually undesirable for I. 0 . ' ~
t o come into personal amtact with suspectg. Many of
these men are so clever and plausible that if allowed to plead their own cases
before the I. 0.the effect might be to nullify important work done by operatives
Personal interviews would have the further unfortunate effect of identifying
the I. 0. too closely with t5e system of which i t is desired to keep sspects in

can t)e dcc11)ltc.rctl o r ~ lI)_\.~

4\11

ignorance. I t is best .as a rule to keep the relations of the I. 0 . with suspects
entirely impersonal, but circumstances maF mnder this course impractiuble- I f
it becomes necessary to interrogate a suspec-t the Judge Advocate may b in a
pa4 tion to render valuable assistance.
29. W w k for Ezecutives. I t is to be noted that the duties of members of
executive echelons, after the organization has been pu; into operation, are largeS U ~ ~ N ~ S O VThere
.
is danger that they will, on thii account, lose intenst in
their work. The w i g n m e n t to them of any t a s b which may serve to 6 t h - d a *
their activity and make them feel that they are indispensable- may have the
d e c t of keeping many an efficient executive h m degenerating into an indzerent automaton. T h e n officers are to be p h a d under snrveillance mch duty
will fall natnrally on the executives, who wilI function practically ss o p e r ~ t i v e s ,
or i t may be folmd desirable under such circumstances to appoint officers a
special operatives for the particular o w u i o n
30. Other Sources of Infornuation. Besides the information gained from
the tuxtociation of operatives with the groups to be h m e d (Seen 24, 23), and
the information furnished by other intelligence agencis, (See 33), the Coenm
Espionage Service must arrange to cover special cases wch as tourista and other
persons visiting camp, or persons not in o r around the camp but conneckd with
suspects o r suspected activities. It must have the -peration
of and m p e m
with the local agents of the Department of Justice (this by the channel of the
Intelligence Officer and the D.J. agent). It must cover the elassea of maiI corning to camp. It must watch the newspapers and other publiestiom in c h d a t i o n
amo-ngthe men and i t is well to establish a waste paper baaket ceneofip. (58-64).
Much information is derived from volunteer informants-or t h e h a i l policc
The hope of rewards for the e a p t m of d m n , gentrally keeG the local police
on the alert a n d their co-operation a h o d d be sought.

ARTICLE VI.

HANDLINGAND UBE OF INFOBMATION.

31. CoUutwn of Material. The enemy's clandestine operatione in the
United States are organized on such a large and gpstemetic scale that it is nsary to gain a comprehensive "bird'seye" view of simultaneous activities
throughout the country to understand and control them.
I t is manifestly i m p i b l e for any local or branch Intelligence office to
&ect such comprehensive collation and it is equally evident that d o r t a k, do m
would only involve nseless time and labor and regelt in the duplication of work
I t is essential that information be forwarded promptly for collation as well
as for reference to such branches of the Intelligence Service as it may affect. It
should be noted that the bearing of information from one locality on the s i t u s
tion in another may not be apparent locally but becomes evident when seen from
the point of view of the central office of collation.
Department, Division, and local Intelligence Oficere are responsible for
the collection and verification of information, each within hia provinq and forwarding it to the Military Intelligenca Diviaion in time to be of value. They
should examine the information available and make wch collation as is n e a s
sary in the cases of persona, parties, or activities within their respective Depart
men& Divisions, or localities, but & o d d not nndertake the general collation
which lies, more properly, within the province of the Military Intelligence
Division.
Information from the operatives r n d be transmitied aa promptly as prscticable to the Intelligence Officer, -in whom office the information is. extracted
and forwarded and the original reporb burned.
The &ion of the rreveral echelons of executives is solely that of inguring
that the operatives get the information and send it in. They are in no way responsible for the culling or collation of information and n d not see the information which goes through them if such examination delaya or jeopardizes
tmmmkion. Their duty is one of organization.
I t is the Intelligence mcer who is responsible for the warnination, culling,
the linea of investisummarizing and forwarding of hformation and
gation which his secret sel-via will carry out, and it is he who ia the oonnedion
between the secret and the known organizations, and between the Counter Eepionage Service and the Commander of hia unit.
I t is essential that the I. 0.of any large onit have a private &ce, which
shall be large enough to accommodate the oface eqnipment and an adequate
oBce force. He will need the assistance of mveral confidential clerka, non-commhioned oillcera and privates, of whom one a t least ahodd be an expert &enogmpher, and another, if possible, aeqnaintd with ofice gpgtems and %g
methods. The oBce must have the m a 1 equipment of de& typewriter, telephone, fllhg apparatus, ete., including a d e and a loeldng steel filing cabinet
This equipment should be obtained from the Quartermaster.
The I. 0.should install a completc filing system, affording facilities for
comprehensive and cross-indexed records of soapeets and the members of the
organization. A card-sptem "tickler" will be found useful for keeping track

I r ~ civit111;il
l
1tcpot.t~; t i l t 1 oi h*r 111atters w h i c h need a t t e n t i o n at
periodical or irrcgrllar f r ~ t ~ l rirltcrvals.
c
.\ sinlple d i a o~r desk memors3dum
calenclar may be t~sccl f o r this pllrposc i i the I. 0. prefer-.
hiany Dirision
I. O.'s have found alphabetiail filing rnom pl-aeticablc than the decimal s p t e m ;
it should be reinforced by cross-files for each separate u i t , (e. g., a crossfile for
all the suspects in a certain brigade or battalion) in order that a comprchensiue
view of the situation i l l ally particular unit m a y be gained a t any time.
A card for operatives' records which has been ;wed with success b y some
I. 0 . ' ~is described as follows:
Under a space wherein is entered the aperative's tnle name, fictitiol~sn a m e
aud organization, the card is ruled verticd_r into thirty-one columns, representing days of the month, and horizontally into twenty-four lines, giving two l i n e s
for each day of each month of the year. I n the upper space is checked t h e date
of receipt of ordinary reports and in the lower the date of receipt of special reports. On the reverse of the card may be entered data of date of appointmenf
time and amount of polrtage issued, nature of reports returned, and estimate of
the ability of the operative. A simpler d may be used in the ame of execmi
tives, with lists of the executives or operatives of the next echelon controUed by
the executive concerned. One of the chief merits of some w c h system is t h a t
upon the transfer of executives or operatires from one C.. E. organization to
another the I. 0. of the first organization can simply forward the cards of ther
executives and operatives concerned, thus pntting the aecond I. 0.in i m m e d i a e
possession of necessary data, without labor to the first I. 0.
32. Loco1 Action. The methods of co-operation with the C. E. system generally and of keeping in touch with 31. I. D. necessarily occnpy a large p& of
this pamphlet, but this must not obscnn the fact t h a t the primary duty of t h e
T. 0. is to report promptly to his own commander m c h cases aa require local:
action and aid him in deciding npon the proper action by furiiiehing all available information upon the subject. In t h i s regard the C. E. Service f u n c t i o n s
exactly as doe8 the Positive Intelligence Service of a combat unit in t h e fieldI n such matters, M. I. D. is much more interested in what has been done t h a n
in the f a d that something should be done about it.
The ides of aysternatic precaution is a, new in our Army that t h e n is need
for explanation and constant insistence on i t s value. I n some Divisions memoranda have been issued with the authority of the Commanding General, to be
read by officers to their men or to be made the wbject of informal. tal& d i e
ing attention to the necessity for both o h m and men to refrain from d i d g i n q
information of value to the enemy. Men must be warned againat writing letters
home about troop movements, sending *-car&
from ports of embarkation indicating dates of sailing, discussing army matters in public places or with strangers, revealing in a hundred careless wa-n detaih inkresting to hostile ears and
eyes. An I. 0.by the exercise of a little ingenuity m a y adapt this suggestion
tq his needs.
The use of poetem on company bulletin boards offera p i b i l i t i e s . They
should be used with discretion, not so frequently as to blunt their novelty, and
not left on the board 80 long as to grow stale.
33. Trammission of I n f o n n n t k n . Foll advantage should be taken of the
privilege of direct communication to transmit promptly to the point w h e n i t
may be of use, all information gained by one Intelligence €)f£icsr
regarding m a t
ters of interest to f i e I. 0.a t another station. A t the same time every I. 0.
should feel free to ask directly of any other I. 0.such cooperation and assistance
a s he may need. (See Principles, Secs. 7, 3, 9). Copies of all such lateral eommunications will be transmitted sinlultaneously to the proper "intelligence control. " (Principles, Sec. 6 ) .
of perio(7ic;if

When enli3tefl lncn o r oficem under suspicion or investigation bv the
Counter Espionage Oficer are transferred to an organization outside that
tht
Intelligence Officer previo~~slyh andling the matter, it is considered im
portant that all records and information concerning the man so t r a c ~ f e r r c dbe
promptly .sent to the Intelligence Officer of the organitation to which the t-fer
is made. (Sec. 53).
To enable this to be done, it is suggested that the Counter Espionage organization keep in s u c h touch with all men under suspicion ss to be able promptly to report any prospective transfer, or at least a transfer actually made. .
I n reporting transfern the number and paragraph of the S ~ i a Order
l
uhould be given in each case. This will enable the Intelligence Officerto who=
station the transfer has been made to locate the rmrn quickly by reference to t h e
file of orders a t headquartera.
To make a further check on such transfers and to keep a constant watch
on a11 of the men, co-operation of the Personnel OfEce, which has the cards of
each man, is advisable. I t frequently happena that information is received of
men who have not yet reported. In such cases, dummy can3a are placed in thc
file9 of the Personnel Office so that as won as the men report the Intelligence
OAcer is notified.
Facta having any Counter Espionage significance should be h o w n only t6
the Intelligence Officer, but a confidential arrangement may be made w i t h the
Personnel W6cer by which any change in the etatns of men w h w names a r e
given the ereo on riel Ofeoer by the Intelligence Officer w i l l at once be reported to
the latter. Better to effectuate this plan, it is well to have an operative stationed
in the Personnel Ofice. (Sec. 53).
Ln transmitting information c a n must be taken to include aU data necessary to a full andemtanding of the crrae by t$e ofl3cer receiving the w e , w e t h e r
with all available information as to h h personality, anficodents and physical
description. The data upon the classification card of an officer or aoldier is
helpful.
Reporta from the Department of Jnstica, OfBce of Naval Intelligence, American Protective League, and eirnilar murcq and letters from private informants,
should in all cases be treated as rtrictly mwntd. W h e n these arc aent to
1. 0 . k for their assistance in investigation of a case, the a o m of the information should not be divulged, except to commigsioned ofRccrs of the Intelligence
Serviee, who should be carefully instructed aa to their abeolnte secrecy. (Sec.59).
34. Addressing Cowcspondcncc. The direct communication authorized
for nae: by the Intelligence Service k subject to the following rules:

of

a. All communications to I. O.'s am indoeal in two envelop&, the icner
one being addressd to "Ibtelligena O i B a r 4 d d e n t i a . L "
b.. The outer envelope will be addreseed to the " Chief of S W " of Divisions and Porta of Embarkation ; to the "Commanding General" of
Geographic Departments ; and to the "Commanding Offleer" of all
other units except as indicated in Rule c.
c Communications addressed to Camps from which a Division haa moved
will be addressed to the " Commanding General" of that camp.
d. Communications to M. I. D. will be addressed to "Director of Military
Intelligence, Washington, D. C. "
e. Communicatione to M. I. D. that indicate dates of movements of t r o o p
should be inclosed in au inner envelope a d d r d to "Chief, M. I. 3
-Confidential. "

ARTICLE \'TI

REPORTSTO INTELIJGESL'E C~STROL

35. Direct C'ot~tntrtnlc~twn.The Intelligence &ntml of every
md
station which reports to the commander of a gecrgraphical Department
the
Department I. 0. The Intelligence Control of all other units, including Dtpecment Headquarters, is M. I. D. (See Principles, Sec 7 ) . 811 Intelligence mers
report directly to their Intelligence Control on aLl cases of other than t d h g
importance and send to the Lntelligence Cantrol copies of all communicatio~ls
pddressed to other Intelligence Ol5cera and individuals In addition, Lntelligence OfEem who report to Department Intelligence Officers will sirnnltan~~uslp
aend copy to M. I. D.; and Intelligence Officers within Departments, but not reporting thereto, will, on reporting to M. I. D., e n d to the Department L 0.
copies of all reports concerning mattem which map be of interest to him in maintaining his current estimate of the situation within the Department. (See 6).
This last means that carrea which concern the unit exclusively and are
not likely to d e c t the situation outside, need not be mported to the Depart
ment I. 0.by Intelligence Officers who are not nnder Department contrd, but
that all awes which in any way d e c t the general aituation o r are likely t6 have
m d c a t i o n s within the Department outside of the unit invo1v"ed shodd be reported both to the Department I. 0. and ta 36. I. D. If i t k difficult to decide
which cases should be so sent, give the Department I. 0. the benefit of t h e
doubt. (See Principles, Sec. 12).
36. Kin& of Reports. Four quite difTerent aorta of reports a n indicated
and attention is directed to the distinctions clearly to be d x w n between t h e m
They are :
a. Individual Reports.
b. Special Reporta
c Situation Surveys.
d. Summaries.
Each of these reporta m I a h to a different class of information and it m
highly undesirable to mingle matter of two or more clasaee in the same dommen& for the m u o n that each class of information r e a i v e s special treatment
in M. I. D. and if the same document must parrs thn,ugh aeveral procesees there
is much unnecessary delay and in the end there is difacnlty in properly filing
the paper. The nature of each of these r e p o h Is explained in the f o l l o h g
sect ions. ( Secs. 37-39).
37. I n d i v i d d Reports. Every specific case ia made the mbject of an
individual report, that is, a report of that individual case. T h k permits prompt
handling of the case and accurate filing of the report with other papera in the
same matter. Individual Reporta will be rendered in the form p m r i b e d for
military correspondence. They should carr_p. aa their subject the name of the
suspect reported, his rank and organization (if a member of the Military Estsblishment) or his known a d d m (if a civilian). Such Individual Reports Bhonld
be rendered immediately upon the discovery of faeta tending to indicate enemy
activity or disloyalty to the United Statea Subsequent Individual R e p *
should thereafter be rendered, as hereinaftzr prescribed, for the purpose of

kccping the h1ilit;rry 1 1 1 tell ixcr~c-c1)ivisioll apprised of ~rlbsequentdeQlopmenk5.
Individual Reports to he rendered trs herein prescribed should, in all c a s a
where the facts reportetl r o ~ d c rthis possible, adhere as closely a s mar be to the
following instructions, paragraphs to be nt~mberedas indicated; sub-beds n-1
not be lettered :
(1) Facts, actions, or strrtcmzllts giving rise to sllspicion of the individual
reported.
( 2 ) Associates, correspondel~ts, known relatires, or connectious of the
suspect.
0)In so far as known,
a. Character and history of the suspect, including Service Record if
a soldier.
b. Suspect's citizenship status, race, and place and date of birth.
c. Such facts as may be ascertainable indicating former residences,
place.. of employment, and locatiom of relatives, of t h e suspect;
with any other known facts which may be of aid in initiating collateral investigation.
(4) Source or sources of information reported; known reliability of such
SOurce8.
(5) Disposition taken, contemplated, or desired ,with reference to t h e
suspect
At the bottom of the sheet will appear a notation indicating copies furnished
to other investigating agencies to whom this report may be of interest and to
which they may have been transmitted. An example of an Individual Report
follows. (See. 38).
Subsequent to an initial Individual Rcport, further such reporta &odd be
mndered whenever new developmenta m r . Such wbsequent reports will follow the form prescribed above, s~ibjectto the following modificatiom. Above
paragraph One will be a reference to previom Individual Reports on t h e same
subject, stating dates when such reporb were rendered. Subsequent paragraph
will embody new information; and the final paragraph will be resemed for a
statement of action taken, contemplated, or desired in this case.
It is the desire of the Military Intelligence Division to be kept constantly
informed of developments. To this end, m n t i ~ u h gcaaes of interest will be reported at intervals of not more than thirty d a p . Periodical Individual Reports
covering such continuing cases may be brief, and may state merely, first, t h a t
no new developmentti have been ascertained; and second, that snspect is being
continned under observation, and the nature of the surveillance being exercised.
A case not defhitely disposed-of, where s u r v e i l l a m is being maintained by the
Intelligence Officer, should be carried in the manner prescribed in this paragraph, until final disposition.
Care should be taken that carbon copies carry all the information shown on
the original so that the officer reoeiuing the same may be fully informed. Carbons of reports written on letter heads must reproduce enough of the letter head
to enable the recipient to determine the place of origin.
38. Example of Individ?tal fieport.
CAMP HOWABD
Kalamaroo, Miehigna
June 4, 1918.

From: Intslligenca Oilleer, 100th Division.
To: Director of Militaq Intelligence.
8nbjett: Hana &hmidt, 8ergeant Battery B, 389th Field hrtLUeq.
1, 8ehmidt soems to make a practice of talking to new ' 'wlects" and to make a break
in tba eonvenation when other noncommissioned o5cam join the group. Yestsrday an
operative from another regiment u u c e in with the new men, and reports that Behmidt says

t h a t Ilc is " a f r a i d " t h a t we cml ncvcr c.ouc1tlc.r Ccr~ncror,t h a t t h e F r e n c h a m a b u t to qoif
:inti Germany ia g c t t i n g g r e a t .stores of focbtl allti a oillion e x - p r i s o n e r s f r o m Ru=iA
3. A eecret inspection o f his barrncka bag revealed n o t h i n g o f i n t e r e s t except a -rn
copy of "Under Fire," the w a r - l ~ o r r o r sIjook, a~rcithe f o l l o ~ i n gaddrUI a memo MJohn Keller, " Warchter u. Anzicgcr," St. 1,oais; J!inna B a r l e h r , 251 State St., at. h i r ;
Fritz von Relhorn, G c n e r d Deli\.ery, \Vilmio@on, Lklsware. Ychmidt w,-as riaited by tk
Rev. Kaltenhach, t r n r e l i n ~ II,uthernn paator, when the h t t c r wazi here, and a e e o r d i r q tb
Sergeant M c G r ~ g o r of his I3nttery, i.s intimatc w i t h Henrp Weibel, 3 W t h Field Art*,
reportcd by your ofice to l a v e been pro-German at his b o r n . A g e n t Brown of the Dcprrtrrient of Justice, reports t h a t Schmidt frequently r i r i i s two G e r m a n families, Dettelbach w d
Ludwig, in town here. lit- ,neb ail nrail at Gerlernl P e l i r e r iu t o w n p o s t office.
3. Schmidt's papers pllo~oh e was born ill I'ienna. Austria, i n 1891, came to t h i s ~09nt.v
August, 1900, 3. S. "Presiclcnt Lincoln" a t New Tork. n a t u r v l i z e d by n a t u r a l i a t i o r of
father, Johann Schmidt, in 1906, a t Blanton, Witwonsin. X e r t r e l a t i r e , f a t h e r at 2801 T;t;rEaot
St., Blanton, W i a , home addre.- same. Worked assembling room Boosch k Z o m b Co., RO&CEter, N. Y., from 1914 until d r a f t e d a t Camp J a c t w n , August 29, 1 9 1 7 ; t r a n s f e r r e d here
from Camp Jackeon, J a n u a r y 12, 1918.
4. One of our operatives, o f Germau blood, who reported t h i a man a n d in thorocaghly
trustworthy, is becoming i n t i m a t e with Schmidt, and will k a d him on.
5. Juatiee Agent Brown in inve&igat.ing connection Kith DettaIbLeh. and L u d w i g q aad
h- arranged with P o s t m m t e r t o inspect all mail addressed to Bchmidt. Lnvestigation at
Blanton and Rochester a n d check o n entry into thin c o a n t v and n a t u r a l i z a t i o n of f a t h r ia
c h i r e d . Also investigation of permna named in memo-book.

J O B S L. WITHLVGTON,
Cap&,
Unitod 8tstea Army,
Athtelligenee O 6 m .
Carbon eopiea to
Captain Britton, a t . Louie.
Intelligence Officer, Camp Jnckmn, 8. C.

39. Special Reports. Special reports are made of circumstances which
cannot properly form the subject of a n individual report. Such reports will bt
rendered in a form appropriate to the subject but approaching 8b f a r as @ble the form prescribed for indiyidual rep-Sudden changes in local con&
tions or a new situation involving morale may be appropriate subjects f o r
~pecialreports, as may a n accumulation of minor matters, each not important
enough to warrant a n individnal report but significant in the aggregate. Any
matter of interest to M. I. D. and not appropriate for an Individual Report m a y
properly be sent in a special report. Such reporta should, however, be confined
to a single subject althonghathat subject may include a number of incidents.
40. CZussiftcation o f Cases /u to Urgency. Cases a r e subject to classification as to urgency as follows:
C k s A. Matter which rrhould be brought to the attention of the Director
of Military Intelligence, immediately. Cases of this class should be reported at
once by telegraph o r cable, using the C. E. code. R e p o h by telegraph o r cable
should be conBrmed simultar~eouslgby mail. Confirmation should include t h e
usual Lndividual o'r Special Report as well a s the quotation of the despatch.
Class R. Matter which shot~ldnot be delayed, but which can safely a w a i t
the course of mail. Caser, of this elass sholild be reported by mail immediately.
They may.be in the usual form of Individual or Special Report and may be forwarded w'ithout letter of transmittal, but shol~ldbear on their face in red t h e
stamp : Immediate.
C h s C. Matter which should be brought to the attention of M. I. D., b u t
,not requiring immediate action. Reports of this kind should be made in t h e
£ o m prescribed for Individual or Special Reports and forwarded in dne course.
41. Siiuutwn Surveys. Each I. 0.will render to his intelligence control
and to M. I. D. a weekly situatiou estimate (on Monday) for the purpose of
informing him of the general conditions a t the station of the I. 0. Such reporta
are primarily a s u w e g of the military situation and are not handled as individual cases but are fled .for reference with the papers of that particular station,
/ I/

aggre~vitewill c b ~ i ; t l ) l e thr: oficcm o f 11. 1. D. to f o r m an adequate
and
conception of the circumstanc:es !~rldcrw hich each I. 0.is working M, that pl.ompt
nrld intelligent action may he takcr~upon particular matters as they arise.
Each Situation Survey will bear at its head tht following information:
Name of Commandir~gGeneral (or Commanding O 5 c e r ) .
Name of Chief of Staff (or Acting Chief of Staff).
Name of Intelligence Officer (or Acting Intelligence Officer).
Name of Assistant Intelligence Officer.
The following items are suggmted as pertinent for a Divisional Same?:
Strength of Division and Auxiliary Units, Status of C . E. organization, Morak,
Health, Rations, Conscientious 0bjectors, Enemy or Pacifist Propaganda, A ttitude of Foreign-born Selectives, Recreational Activities, Relations between one
station and another, and the local sitnation generally.
The Survey of fixed posts and other units will naturally differ somewhat
as to the items included. Only matters of general interest in forming an estimate of the military situation will be reported.
I n addition to the Situation Survey (Military) required of all Intelligence
O5cera, there mhy be required of Department a n d Special Intelligence Officers
and of Intelligence OBcers a t fixed pmts a further report aa to civil and political
conditions in the vicinity of their station8 which will be forwarded as a aeparate
document in the form prescribed by M. I. D. This will be known as the Sitnation Survey (Civil) and will be m entitled.
42. Departnrent and S p e c d Intelligence 0-3'
8ummarict. A fourth
variety of report ie required of Department and Special Intelligence Offirxra
only. This is the monthly nrmnurry of civilian caseq reqnired on the L88t day
of each month for the purpose of giving a general survey of t h e ~ i t n s t i o nas regards this class of c a w . Nothing ~ho111dbe included in these summaries which
haa not been reported in an individlial or apecial report a n d each entry &odd
refer ta the date of the individnal or special report in which the matter is detailed. Each entry should be of telegraphic brevity and &ate simply the subject, the nature of the case and its p m n t status. Every current case a h o d d
be c a m e d in each succeeding summary until i t is finally reported as d d .
The cases will be listed in the summaries according to the followhg classification,
so far as applicable.
~ L A ~ ~ I P ' I c A T I oBY
N 'SUBJECT.

L CURRENT:
A. Enemy Activity.
1. Espionage.

-

a. Government mxrets.
b. Military information.
c. General information.
2. 8abotage.
a. Life and Health.
I. Civilians.
If. Troop.
b. Damage of cmps, factories, s h i p , material, ete., by erpl*
sion, arson, e t c
3. Propaganda.
a Political.
b. Pacifktic.
c. Pro-enemy.
d. Misrepresentation.

4. Treason.
a. Government or military employees.
b. Civilians.
5. Industrial.
a. Fraudulent contracts.

b. Labor agitation.
c. Obstruction of manufactnrea
d. Supplying enemy.
6. Suspicious Circumstances.
a. Character or connections.
b. Conduct or activity of unusual nature.
c Snl;lpected disloyalty.
B. Criminal Activity.
1. Cases referable to Department of Justice.
2. Cases teferable to other Civil authorities.
3. Violations of Military Law,e k , referable to othw Military Anthorities.

11. CuasED.
'

(Same subheadings a8 I).

It ia not intended, of course, to limit, obstruct, or diaconrsge the activities of
the Intelligence OfEcer along lines not covered by the forms of Summary. On tht
contrary, recommendations are invited aa to amplification o r modifleation of the
form ao as to meet the requirements which may have been overlosked in ita p r e p
aration. In csse the subheads prove hufflcient to cover the cases to be noted,
appropriate subheads may be added by the LntzUigence Offlcer.,.

ARTICLE VIII.

CODE.

43. General Remarks. The code herein promulgated is so simple t h a t i t
may readily be memorized and thereafter messages may be enciphered a n d deciphered without resort to this pamphlet. I t is, however, very difficult to decipher by one who has not the key and is considered one of the safest of the
simple ciphers in this regard.
44. Arbitrary Signs. To secure accuracy in proper names and prevent
occasional doubt in regard to sentence ends, upecial rises are assigned to three
letters in addition to their normal llses in spelling worda: the letter k indicates
that the next letter is a capital; q indicates the end of a word; and z indicates
a period. I t is not necessary to use these signs when no doubt can arise from
their omission ; but nome.? of persons a d pkrces, however familiar, should always
be definitely indicated by capitalization. The end sign should be used after a
proper name when it is followed by a word not capitalized; when the following
word is capitalized, the end sign may be omitted, since the k indicates s d i c i e n t l y
that a new word is beginning. ( F o r distinction, see Step % below).
45. To Encipher:
a. Prepare your message by writing it out with the necessary indicationa of capitals, word-ends, etc.
b. ~ u l kon your paper four vertical colllmn~of six lines each to receive the message.
c. P u t a - sign (dash) in the following spaces; in colnmn 1, spaces
1, 3, and 5; in column 2, spaces 2, 4, and 6; in column 3, spaces
1and 3 ; in column 4, space 5.
d. Now insert the letters of yopr message in the d l e d spaces of the
diagram in regular order ho&mtaUy, beginning a t the top.
If
the message is too long for a single diagram, make m o t h e r a n d
e.
continue it. Do this as often aa is necessary to write the complete
measage. But be &re not to begin to write in any diagram until
you have filled the preceding one.
f. If the message does not fill out the last diagram, fill it o u t with such
worda as "period, " "stop, " "end," o r with nulls. Always fiU out
the diagram complc f ely.
g. Now substitute for each letter in the first two lines of each diagram
the letter which follows it in alphabetical order; that iq change
a to b, b to c, etc.
h. Now take out the letters of each diagram vcrticaUy in regular order;
that is, all of colnmn 1before any of column 2, all of column 2 before column 3, e t ~ .
i. Divide into groups of five and send.
k. The code address of this office is "MilstafF, Washington," but a telegraph operator may properly refuse to accept this a d b . In this
event, the telegram should be addressed to "Director of Military
Intelligence, Wftshington. "
'

1. Example :

-

hfilstaff, Washington.
>!,. !c!?cr Wz.,P
.. . T . I . . ~ - . : . .
~ i k d i n g s ,~ a i ~ Me.
a,

;ei&r &ay

ilirs. 3. Y.

UJ

.xi~i

(Signed) Waters.
Step a : M y letter May seven re k Goldstein q he sent letter today to Mrs.
k R k P k Giddiw k Talps k Mo.

Steps b, c, d, e, f
1

2

3

:

4

1

2

3

E - K G

3 -T-E
4 R - M A

-0-L

5
6

-E

-Y

4

-N-R

1 -hf-Y
2 L-E'r

D - S T
I-

s-

E - V E

N - Q H

4

3

4

T-TE

-KG-

L-PA
-KY.-

0 - D A

1 - D D

0-,,-3p

- R.T-

3

2

1

- Y - T
0 - b f R
- S - K
R - K P

-L-E

2

1

1 2 3 4

-E-S
E - N T

-1-N

G - S K
-T-A

Step g :
1

2

3

4

1 -N-Z
2 M - F U
3 -T-E
4 R - M A
5

-YS-

'6

E-VE

1 2 3 - 1 :

1

- 0 - S
F - L H
-0-L
I ) - S T

-F-T

- E I N - Q H

2

3

4

F - O U

-L-E
T - T E
-RTO - D A

2

3

4

1

2

3

-Z-U
P - N S
- 8 - K

- J - 0

R-KP
-KG.-

L-PA
-KM-

I - D D

0 - X P

4

E-TL
-T-A

Steps h and i :
M i l s t d , Washington.
MRENT

YFIldsV

SHLTH
KNKGD

FTOFL
USKPD

ROTTD
HLOST

FDNOO

ELSIQ

TUElUi

PRIZS
O
W

KTPMX

Waters 27.

46. Care in Enciphetilrg. Remember always that the message h to bt
written into the d i a g r a m hmizontaUy and taken from the diagram v e r f ~ y .
Also that in preparing the message for eending each d i m should produce
exactly fifteen letters or three code words. If this does not check out go back
a t once and find the error. Care in t h i ~regard will save mnch useless delay.

47.

6

To Decipher :
a. The number of letters in a rneesage in this cipher ia always a multiple of fifteen. If a message when received does not contain the correct number of letters, or cannot be deciphered, ask the telegraph
company for a "service" on i t Thia cmta nothing. If it is still
unintelligible wire the sender to repeat. T h b must be paid for.
b. Prepare a d c i e n t number of diagrams to receive the meaage.
Each diagram will receive 15 letters. They a n prepared exactly a8
in sending a message. (See To Enciphr, parsgraphs b and c).
c. Insert the letters in vertical order in the unfilled spaces of the diagram, beginning a t the upper left hand corner; that is, fill first
column 1, then 2, 3, and 4 in succession, then psss to the next diagram, and so on.
d. Now substitute for each letter in the upper half of each diagram
(lines 1 and 2) the letter which precedes it in alphabetical order.
e. Read off the message horizonfolly in each diagram. Complek the
reading of each diagram before going on to the next.
f. Divide the message into words according to the eense, omittiog the
signal letters.

/

17

I f the mclssagc h a s been ~ntltilatedeither b~ the enciphemr or by
the telegraph operator, begin at the unintelligible spot and try out
t h e prottutle supposit.ions: 1-That one or more letters were put in
wrong spaces. %
T
tahthc encipherer forgct to make t h e substitutions in lines 1 and 2. &That the encipherer made substitutions
when they should not have been made. &That one o r more letters
were incorrectly transmitted by telegraph.
If the message is unintelligible from the very beginning, the encipherer may have p u t it np vertieall?. ioetead of horizontally.
h. h i s s a g e as received :
M,I. O.,Fort Blank.
QNENE
FORJE OORUT EDFCX
UDDBL
FLXLV
LTOSA
0 JOT1

SRXNS

BO IEN

TDIUR

BNPDE
ATXKN

SSLSE
BVZXO

IHUER
XDTV5

O

m

QmJP

XJKSO

ChurchilL
Steps a and b (Arrangement of message in diagrams) :
1 2 3 4

1

1 2 3 4

- S-F - I-E

1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
1
-N-8
-U-B

-B-8

2 L-NL
3 --A-X

F-OD
-E-F

U-JB

T-EL

0-RC

-0U-

D-ON
-0T-

R-TY

D-I

4

5 -QN6 0-ICV

N-LE

0--FO
-T-I
N-TE

S P-61R

k-EN

B--8H

-E-U

-L-X

- S S-

-RN-

T-TV
-R-E

D-XT
-AKI - N o

1 2 3 4

-V-Q

JU

X--

-H-K
D-KJ
-X

T

8-

O

P

Step c (Decipherment of letters in linee 1 and 2) :
1 2 3 4
1

-R-E

2 K-MK
3 -A-X
4 T-EL
5 -QN6 0 - E V

1 2 3 4
I-D
E-NC

-E-P

0-RC

-0UR-TM

I t 3 4
-C-H
T- I A A - - R G
-E-U
-L-X
N-LE
D-ON
-83-0TD-IS P - E R
1 2 3 4

-A-R

l t 3 4 1 e 3 4
-DM-A
-T-A
N-EN
8 - S U
-T-I
-R-E
N-TE
D-XT

-RN-

-AX-

M-EN

I-HO

- 1 2 8 &

-U-P
IT
-E-K

W-

D-KJ

-X

8-

T - O P

Steps d and e (Division of message into womb, e t c ) :
Do not diecharge
"Re M. PLxteI. No evidence for court mart*
unless permsnent internment assured. Taking up with D. J."

4f3. Cauiion. Code m e m q p must be handled with the greatest care. After
being decoded they should invariably be p a r a p h d before tmmmhsion to
any other person whatsoever. A eode measage and its tramlation a h o d d be kept
as far apart aa p i b l e ; they must never be filed together, o r d t d t t e d together as " e o d m t i a n copiea" AlI papen, d in codbg and decoding
should be burned as soon & they have mmed their parpoe~
49. Addrasing Tclcgr-.
Telegrams for IntelIigena Mkers, either
coded ar clear, will be addressed d i d y to the Intelligence Officer and not to
the Commanding OEcer.
The number of this pamphlet is i d e n t i d - with the "Station Number" aasigned to the Intelligence Officer to whom it ie kned, and in sending telegrams,
the I. 0.should add this number to his signature for purpoee of- identification,
thus-' ' Bryan 526. "
50. T>-aplru Reqwrts for Znfomroiion. Telegraphic q n e s b for information are made by giving the name of the individual or organization and
the word "answer. "
The answer for the Military Intelligence Division to a request for information will be in the same formIn the c a ~ enothing is known of the aubject the telegram in reply will give
the name of the individual or organization and the word "none."

51. H e s p o ? ~ s i b i l i t oyf lnlelligc?rce Oflcer. The importance of complete and
contiriuous cover of every militdry unit has beer, emphasized, (See Sets. 8, 17,
and Principles, S e a . 2, 24). Each Intelligence Officer will take every s t e p
within his power to effectuate this end by
a. Creating and maintaining an efficient organization within his own u n i t
and keeping hi. I. D. informed of the situation.
b. Reporting to M. I. D. his observations as to conditions without his unit
which may call for action by that Division.
c. Aiding and advising other I n t e l l i ~ n c eOfficers when requested to do so.
d. Promptly informing other Intelligence OEcers of circumstances =hi&
fall within his knowledge and which should be known to them.
e. Taking steps to cause the organization of a proper C. E. Service w i t h i n
the remaining troops when liis unit is about to move.
f. Instructing and advising his successor and turning over to him all information and files relative to local mnditions and cases which remain
behind.
g. Doing all things necesmry to promote a cloeely knit and harmonious o r ganization throughout the entire Army.
52. Group Obsetvaiion. The duty of Group Observer is assigned b y
M. I. D. to one of several Intelligence Ofliccm whose units are grouped geographically but are not under a single local command (Principles, See 10). T h e
officer so aseigned is usually the one whose duties seem to give him the broadest
view of the situation but other considerations, such as permanency, may controlIt is to be remembered that a Group Obsemer, as mch, hrrs no authority over the
other unita of hia group, but merely reporb the I d situation to M. I. D. Grow
Control may be assumed only by concurrence of the various commanders concerned and permission of M. I. D. (Principles, Sec. 11).
. he duty to inform the I- 0.of a uuit to which
53. FoUoioing 8 ~ e c f s T
a suspect ie transferred has been indicated, ( S e c 33, and Principles, S e e 9 ) .
Thia requires close co-operation with the Peraomel Officer (Sec. 33) and prompt
action by the I. 0.of the unit from which the transfer is made. The complete
record and physical description of the transferred suspect should be trammitted in each instance. I n the case of traveling civilian
care should
be taken. to transmit all facts n e m a r y to identification of the subject and to a n
understanding of the nature of hie activities
54. Transfer of Troops. If any silbdivision of a military unit is transl
feqred to another station, the I. 0.should promptly report to the I. 0.at the
new station the name of the highest executive in the subdivision in order that
there may be no interruption in the functioning of the C. E. System within the
rmit. Simultaneously he should transmit to the I. 0.a t the new station all data
pertaining to'suspects within the transferred unit.
Similar measures should be taken upon the transfer from one unit to a n other of a single successful executive or operative, or of a single mqpeck Upon
the transfer of a body of troops proper a w e n t s should be made with the
highest C. E. executive therein to maintain proper cover in transit. (Principla,
Sec. 25 ) .
,//

-

-

55. . Dcpartttre o/ 17ttiC. I'articnlar care should be taken prior to the dcparture of a unit to pmvide for a proper C. E. Service in the remaining troops
in order that there may be no hiatus in cover. To this end the records of tbe
o6ce should be thoroughly overhauled and a proper separation be made so t h a t
all information regarding local conditions and suspects remaining behind may
be turned over to the new organbation. I t is also desirable to provide, ao far rs
may be, for the installation of an independent C. E. Service in the =mining
units in a s complete a form a s possible, prior to the departure of the principal
unit. The 3lilitary Intclligencc Dirision sho111d be fnliy infarmed of the statns
in this regard both as to the n a t ~ l r eof the organization left behind, the names of
the new Commander and I. 0. respectively, and approximately the number and
disposition of the t m p s left on thc ground. (Principlq Secs. 13, 23).
56. Duty t o 8ucccssor. Each I. 0.should at all timea remember that be
may have a successor and should therefore make and file wch records and mem*
randa as will enable that enccessor to take np the duties of the office with the
least poaiible loea of efficiency. It is always desirable to secure t h e appoint
ment of a aucceseor prior to the departure of the old I. 0.
If the I. 0.is transferred from the unit to which he has been attached, o r
is otherwise relieved, he should turn over to his successor, if one has been appoinM, the records and files of his office, giving the new I. 0.all possible information as to the personnel and operation of the C. E. ayatem. If h e leaves before the appointment of a successor he should give his No. 1 such instructions as
will enable the latter to "carry on" until a new I. 0. has been appointed. He
will, in any case, inform Bi. I. D.a t once regarding his prospective transfer, and
arrange to hare M. I. D. kept in the closest touch with the local situation,

57. I n C e ~ i e r c l l . The rlecesqity fur mtiibliuhing immediate liaison w i t h civilian apents o r organizations ~cvhichinay be of aid in thc furtherance of intalligence work is of fl~lldarneutiililnyorta:lce in the operation of the C . E. s y s t e ~ t
Among tlic civilian aids, official rrnd ullofficial, whose co-ope.ration ie desirable,
are the Department of .Justice, the American Protective League, the Y. M-C. A
Intelligence, local postmasterr, ci~stoms authorities, sheriffs, police, milmad
agents and detectives, private detectives in the employ of industrial pIants,
managers of telephone and telegrapl~ offices, managers a n d clerks of hotels.
(Sec. 30).
58. F~cnctioitof Departncestt of ./ti-qtice. The Department of Justice is responsible for the prosecution of offenders against the Federal Law. Its a g e n t 4
in their investigation. seek not only to gain information, b u t to prepare cases
for prosecution by sec~iriugevidence in the form which will be necessary i n
court. I t is Iiighly desirable, therefore, that all cases which may fall within t h e i r
province be reported to them ;is soon as practicable, so t h a t they may e x a m i n e
*
evidence wheu fresh.
I t is sometime^ difficult to determine the exact line of demarcation between
military and civil jurisdiction, and it is best to allow a ccrtain degree of l a t i t u d e
which will result in Ilepartment of Justice co-opration in certain purel_r rnilittlry cases and military co-operat.ion in certain federal cases.
The fact that a case has bcen t l ~ r n e dover to the Department of Justice
agcnt does not necessarily affect its valile as military intelligence.
The Department of Justice liaq exclusive control of the matter of internment
of alien enemics. All civilian suspectq fall properly within the scope of D. J.,
and Illtelligence Officers act in such matters only as co-operating agents. Therefore, it is proper to take no steps in the field of civilian investigation w i t h o u t
t.he knowledge and consent of the local D. .J. agents o r employees. In like manner, D. J. sllould ~lnciertake 110 investigation^ in military camps without t h e
knowledge of the I. 0. thereof. Tlie fullctiorls of D. J.. include many matters of
no particular interest to 3filitiiry Jntelligencc, but in the particulars above mentioned ttieir interest is mutual. Since thc beginnilig of the war, D. J. has placed
its service a t the disposal of M. 1. Tllc burden thus =umcd has been heavy a n d
the
Intellige~~ce
Service must a p ~ ~ r e c i a thitt
t e fact and c o ~ ~ d uitself
ct
accordingly.
b
The
cliltivntion
of
clom a n d
59. Relations with Deprtrtrrtent of J u t i c e .
cordial relat.ions with the local L). .J. agents is especially k) be desired. D; J. cooperates with t.hc ~nilitarya~tthoriticsi l l every posqible way, and the prompt excfianpe o f inforrnatiori betweell 31. 1. 1). atid 1): .J. is mi~tuallyhelpful to t h e
highest degree.
o i i local 1). -J. itgents on niatters of
There shorlld be frank c o ~ i s ~ ~ l t n t iwit.11
and s\~I)ortiir~;~tio~i
to tlie ger~eralplatis of I). .J. in 1natt.ers which
~ n u t ~ i interest,
al
fali within its pccnliar fitltl. '1'l!11swill bc avoided rivalry and dl~plicationO F
effort, and instead there will I)(? the f r i c l ~ d l yco-opcratiori of two agencies opernting i l l similar but b. no lnyirns iclcntic*;~IGelds of ct1tle:rvor.
The practice of givi11,v the 14)c;il I). .J. ajier~t,a desk in tile office of tile I. O.,
or of having uniformed r ~ p ~ r i ~ t - ircp;)rt.
r e . < to tho officc of thc D. .J., is not apvr

td. for it is not desirable to ;~ci\.ert~se
the intinlate relations of t t e t x o oitices,
hut otherwise the liaison c;lri Iiardly bc t.oo close. Special operatl~esshould be
placed a t the disposal of D. .I., i f desired, a n d conference should be frequent.
No operations shollld be undertaken outside the a m p by special operatives in
civilian clothes without the knowledge of D. J.
Copies of all cornrnu~~ications
of more than passing interest between the
1. 0. and the local D. J. agent should be forwarded to 3i. I. D. But while the
I. 0. and the local D. ,J. agent should t h t ~ qfreely co-operate, it is important t h a t
Intelligence O5cers shall not call upon the Department of Juatioe a t large to
conduct investigations or to furnish information from distant poizlts. Such requests will be made through M. I. D. to the Chief of the Bureau of Investigation
in:i* Washington.
It is to be borne in mind that the privilege of access to D. J. reports has
never before been granted to any other agency, and the trust repused in Military Intelligence in this regard, which is shared by no other g o v e m e n t branch,
must not be abused (Sec. 33). These reports are highly confidential and copies
may not be sent, neither may they be quoted as a source of information to anyone
but an I. 0. To others, say simply "Iufonnation is received" o r some similar
phrase. Note: As a general rule, never reveal any source of information exapt
to officers or investigators of the Intelligence .Service, whose entire discretion
may be relied upon.
60. I n t m n r e n t Procedure. By agreement with'the Department of Justice,
the following procedure will hold in connection with requests by m y officers or
agents engaged in Military TnteUigence work
When it is considered necessary or desirable that an enemy alien be interned,
request will be made upon the nearest United States District Attorney, giving
the name, location and all idormation concerning the person's activities, which
make it desirable that the internment be accomplished. The actual arrest of the
person to be interned will be made under the direction of the United States District Attorney.
I t ia provided that "an enemy alien whom there may be reasonable cause
to believe to be aiding or about to aid the enemy o r who may be at large to the
danger of the public peace o r safe@. . .wiH be subject to summary arrest. ..and 1
to confinement" (Proclamation of April 6, 1917).
I n order to intern an alien enemy, D. J. wishes to be informed of fscts
showing reasonable probability of danger. These facts may, if necessary, be
based on confidential representations from the I. O., giving the information discovered by his under-cover operatives, without revealing their identity. Opiniona
as distinguiafied from facts are not considered, but there is no-p a r t i d a r form
in which the h c t s must be presented, that ia, there is no need for afildavita
Therefore, it is necessary to report with some parficularity just what the
man has said or done and also the surrounding circums&nces, for one who has
been goaded into disloyal statements is not necessarily dangerom Names of
witnare also desirable, and it may be well to have the man interviewed by
the Judge Advocate and the r d t reported The :&--virnnment and activities
of the subject while a t home'kin llao pertineJi't 2 these f a c b can be^ adduced
The responsibility for athe internment nstd with D. J., and the decision is
usually made by the United S t a h District Attorney acting upon information
furnished to him by the D. J. agent or I. 0.o r both, and, if neceswuy, after a
personal interview with the subjeet D. J. is anxiom to do as requested by Military Intelligence, but i t must have more substantial basis for action than mere
repuest-.

It

rrr 9t

is

important that a full report be tranrunitted to M. I. D. either. before
.T - aq a rule- will not n r d

+ha time ~f t h ~
~ ~ n l wfnr
a t i n t ~ m r n ~ nfnr
t

w i t h o u t ;l for~nirl o l , i ! ~ i l , r l f r : , , ~31.
~ I . I). ;LS t', ;lie iiesirabilit~ofe: ; :
action rcq ~ ~ e s t eby
d the I. 0.
111 case it is l l e c a s a r y to provide for t h e internment of an enlisvd man, h i s
discharge must first be provitlcd for by proper represeutations n a d e to T h e
Adjutant General of the Army. The clischarge of the man shouid be accomplished after authority therefor h a s been received but not until the representstive of the Department of .Justice has arrived to take charge of t h e man in
question.
There are many degrees of remedy less than internment for duration of t h e
war. A man may be arrested for a week, a month, two months, a n d discharged
with a warning. He may be arrested and discharged under parole, either with
or without bond, or with or without a supervisor. H e may be ordered to go to a
certain part of the country and remain there, or he may be sent to an internment
camp for two months, six months o r a year, and then paroled. I n m y cases a
man is put under bond, if he can furnish one, and in many cases he 24 p u t under
a supervisor, who must be an American citizen and who is tegpnsible f o r him and
his good behavior.
61. Amertcan Proieciive Leagtie. This is a body made up of three hundred thousand citizens covering nearly eveF- locality in the United States,
who have volunteered to make local investigations f o r the Department of Jtutice. A branch office is maintaiuecl in the office of Ji. I. D. and through this
office the League conducts a very large number of investigations f o r Military
Intelligence, Intelligence OEWI-s will do well to get in touch through D. J.
with the local representative of the League, if such there be, and make use of hie
organization, in-co-operation with D. f ., for local invorti&tions not ieqniring
great finesse. (Principles, Sec. 26).
There are other volnnteer organizations of like charakter bat it is not wise
to encourage the multiplication of such agencies, a n d if & P. L. has the &Id
adequately covered it is not advisable to seek the m p e r a t i o n of other volnnteer bodies. I n no case should sllch organizationf be used without the specific
consent of M. I. D.
The name and address of the nearest A. P. L. representative may be secured
from M, I. D.
62. Y.M. C. A. I d c U i g e n u . The Y. 3f. C. A. has, with the sanction of
M. I. D., established an Intelligence Service among its workers which has done
mo& excellent work and should be fostered a n d encouraged by Military Intelligence.
The fact that such a service exists is not generally known to the Y.3f. C. A,
'and the Intelligence Headquarters is quite distinct from the General Y.M. C. &
Headquarters. Herein lies its greatest strength and Milihry Intelligence mast
be careful not to uncover the situation to outsiders o r even to members of the
Y. M. C. A.
The Chief of Y. 31. C. A. Intelligence is Mr. W. G. Low, Jr., Room 1154,
200 Fifth Avenue, New York City, who was trained by Military Intelligence
Division and is in constant touch with M. I, D.
Intelligence Agents have been appointed in most of the Camps and large
cities and in' most of these there has been established within the Y. M. C . &
personnel a C. E. service similar to that of the h ~
The
-advantage
.
of such
an organization is obvioos.
Y.M. C. A. Agents have been illstructed not to make themselves known to
the 1 4 Intelligence O E a x but to await his first advances However, they are
also instructed to co-operate to the fullest extent with local Intelligence Officers
when approached for that purpose. Therefore, if this co-operation is desired,
the Intelligence Officer must take steps to get in toueh wiA&the Y. bC. C. b Intelligence Agent and to indieate h i s d e s i ~ pLiaison having been e s t a b w e d , the

,

t'1irttlt.r c'c)llr>cU
01' 1.116 1 ~ ~ f .i g~t * tll t .l c ' ( )lli.'c.~. 1 i)cl (lictatcri
],is ow-71 jl1secntion of cases,
you a r e informed that you will be guided by the following instructions :
(a)"That whenever it appears that action is necessary, within y o u r diviof cases disaision, department o r locality, to secure evidence for the
ing with the unauthorized sale of liquor, of bribery, of white slavery
of
d r a f t evasion, a n d of other c m of violation of the civil law, yon will direct
your officers handling such cases to work in co-operation with the Department
of Justice, a n d you will require them to make the necessary arrangements with
local agents of the Department of Justice so that expeusea necessarily incurred
in seeking evidence will be taken care of by that Department.11
( b ) T h a t whenever it appears that it shall be' necessary to hire interpreters, spies or guides (under proper authority), provision should be made to
cover the expenses o f such employees under appropriations f o r Lncidental Expenses, Quartermaster Corps (S. S. & T.),and yon a r e informed that the word
hire as here used will be interpreted to cover snch necessary expenses of spies
as may be determined as necessary and adrisable by the officer employing said
persons.
L. /?

(c.)

wl!c.r~!:\.crit a ; , l \ y ; ! r i tl1;11. it. is Ilet.m<;\r?- t h ; \ t eyl,cln-;.c m a y he i n the prosec~~tion
of the rlecessary activity to obtain information for

'!'!liit

c:urretl i l l
t l ~ c3lilitary 1r:telligencre Section, War College Division, Gencral S t a f f , (which
'
8 - .

I
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I . .

I

.

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itls~,where the expenditures might be ope11 to .q~iestionb - the r i ~ x d i t o rof - h e

Li'ar Department, under the appropriiltions above referred to for Incidental
Expenses, Quartermaster Corps, or in u s e s where it is inadvisable t h a t t h e expendit~iresbe stated on votichcn which wol~ldpaass in due collrse t h r o u g h :he
ordinary channels of correspor~dence in the Quartermaster Corps. t h a t these
expenses should be covered by special confidential vo~lchersand be s u b m i t t e d t o
the proper disbursing officer of the funds of the Military Information Section,
OEce of The Chief of Staff, .and who would be one of either of t h e t h r e e following :
( a ) Divisional Intelligence Officer ;
( b ) Departmental Intelligence Officer;
(c) Disbursing Officer, Military Information Section, Office of T h e Chief
of Staff.
By order of the Secretary of W a r :

J. B. WILSOS,
Adjutant General,
Intelligence Officers of units going abroad will not take with them t h e nuexpended balance of Intelligence funds remaining in their hands, b u t will rcturn the same, properly invoiced, to M. I, D.
69. Securing and Accounting for Funds.
( a ) F u n d s can be furnished in regular course approximately t w o w e k s
a f k r requisition is received by 31. I. D., o r in case of extreme emergency, may be
.sent immediately. The Intelligence Officer receiving such funds becomes a Disblirsing Officer and mlist be part.icularly careful to account for t h e same i n
proper form if he would avoid much serious embarrassment in the future.
( b ) Standard W a r Departnrent Form No.' 330 will be used in t h e p a p i e n t
of newspaper subscriptions, purchase of maps, items of miscellaneous ofiice expense, such as postage stamps, post-office box rent, rent of typewriter (where
necessary) ; hire of automobile for any special trips, a n d any expense other than
personal.
( e ) Standard W a r Department Form No. 335 will be used in t h e p a y m e n t
of 'personal service, such as drafting and messenger service, clerieal services,
hire of agents, payment. of their expenses, e t c When reimburn,me=lts a r e m a d e
tn:agent for expenses incurred, he should furnish a n itemized l i s t of expenses,
certified as to correctness and justness, and signed. This list should 'accompany
voucher in amount current, and duplicate should be filed with retgined-copy of
voucher to be produced if ever called upon to do so.
( d ) Each voucher should show date, article, q u a n t ~ t y ,and price. (In t h e
case of postage stamps, show denomination and quantity). It should be signed
exactly as billed. The Officer disbursing t.his fund certifies to the voucher, aa to
correctness
(e) Where payment is ~n-adeby Treasury

Check, the proper entries a r e
made on voucher in spaces provided. If payment is made by cash, payee should
sign receipt a t foot of volicher in addition. All ehecks not Trea.g\iry c h e c h a r e
eonsidered cash.
( f ) Where an Officer reimburses himself for expenditures, receipts f o r
items should be forwarded with the voucher.
(g) The duplicate or the memorandum copy of the vouchers should be held
by the Officer for his own files.

(11 :I 0 . C. K. I.'ot.rrc ,Yo. t i . ('o~,titlelliiaIv s I i i c f i c r wilt be used where applicnblr. 'l'lie ilsc of t h i s vo~ichrrw;rs approred bc tllc Chmptroller of t h e T
m
Ilry to ellable the IVar Dep;trtme~~t
t o c a r r y ~ I cnniidcntial
I
work where " i t
\\'t)111,1

!I(* I)rcai~:(];c.;;+]
t r , t 1 1 ~! ~ * r l , i r . ; > * . . r .n :

'... -.'

.

....

- 1 . .

. r u . . . c

.~- .

L..C

.LL.&-

iclits," and it is r ~ o tdesired that it be 11sod i u d i s c r i m i n a t e l for p u r m for
which it w;ts never inteuded. Quarterly espcllditures should be a c c o u n d for
011 one colrfide~~tial
volicller, which should be submitted in duplicate, us5ng t h e
blue sheet for driplieate cop:..
( i ) Every item uucler the confidential voucher m u s t be supported b_r certified sub-vouchern, showirlg purpose, date and place. A n agent paid under the
Confidential voucher, should, where not prejudicial to his work, submit an rrpense account similar to that mentioned in Paragraph (c), b u t in this
the
account should be forwarded with the Confidential voucher. These should be
receipted wherever possible. Where no receipt is possible, a sub-voucher in t h e
form of a certificate by the officer is required.
(I;) As all sub-vouchers to the Confidential Voucher a r e retained in the
Military Intelligence Division, t.here is no objection to giving names of r e c i p i e n t s

SAMPLE
FORMS
OF CERTIFICATES.
Covering Items Under Confidential Vouchers.
I-Where receipt is obtained: .
"I certify that the above expenditures were actually made, are correct a n d just; that I have not been reimbursed therefor; and rtceipts
are attached."
'2-Where
receipt is not obtained:
"I certify that I paid John Doe $. ..... on ........ for coniidential information, for which i t was impracticable to o b ~ an r e c e i p t "
"I certify that I paid Richard Roe $. ...... f o r services a n d actual
expenses from ........ to ........ while on t r i p obtaining con3dential
information, a n d that owing to nature of w o r k i t was impracticable to
obtain r e c e i p k "
"I certify t h a t ......... I paid a civilian $. ..... for confidential
information, e t c "
(1) A t the end of each quarter (September 30; h e e m b e r 31; March 31 ;
June 30), all sub-vouchers to the Confidential Voucher a r e listed on an a b s t r a c t ;
this list and all sub-vouchers are attached to the blue (duplicate) of F o r m 6
0.C. S., and original a n d duplicatev are both forwarded with t h e account,
(m) AU volichers f o r a Quarter are listed on F o n n 329-b, (abstract) and
totaled, and this total is transferred to the credit side of Form 320-b ( A c c o u n t
Current).
(n) The Account Current should have the proper information filled in the
heading, giving t h e name of the office, the Officer's name, his official designatiou
and period f o r which rendered. The debit side should show the amount the
officer is responsible for, as balance from last account, through funds transferred to him (name of officer and date of transfer), o r through War Warrant
(nnmber a n d datk).
(0) The name of the appropriation "Contingencies, Military Information
Section, General Staff Corps" should be shown in the blank column. On t h e
line "Balance d u e the. United States" should appear t h e difference between the
amount the officer is respnqible for and the total of the abstract.
( p ) The certificate at the foot of t.he account c m n t (lower right hand
corner) should be wmpleted and signed. If the Officer has cash on hand a disinterested party should verify and complete certificate in the lower left hand
comer.

(q) On the reverse of A c c o u ~ ~Current
t
ou the debit side of cash account,

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cash. The difference, "Cash carried forward to next account" should
with the item "Cash in office safe." (Military Attach& show this in the money
of the country where stationed).
( r ) The account cnrrent should be filled in on the first fold, a d the first
indorsement should be compIeted and signed.
(s) In the event the Intellige~lceOfficer transfers all his funds, h e will use
Form 326 (Invoice of Funds Transferred) and submit a final account current.
( t ) All money accounts will be rendered quarterly in compliance with paragraph 1100, Army Regulations, 1913, and forwarded to the XiIitary htelligence Division, General Staff.
t
(a) Quarterly reports must be submitted whether or not disbnrsementa
have been made.
.
(v) Literal compliance with the foregoing instructiohs is absolutely neces1:-4

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(w) Intelligence OfEcers are warned that the W a r Department holds 4
disbursing officer: personally accountable for Government funds in hie pagsession, a n d that the amount of all funds not properly accounted f o r will be deducted from his pay.
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Modify Date                     : 2008:03:15 06:40:02-05:00
Create Date                     : 2006:09:14 15:24:43-05:00
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Title                           :  Instructions for the organization and maintenance of the Counter Espionage Service within military units
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