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TECHNICAL REPORT
Working with Allies and Partners
A Cost-Based Analysis of U.S. Air Forces
in Europe
Jennifer D. P. Moroney • Patrick Mills • David T. Orletsky • David E. Thaler
PROJECT AIR FORCE
Prepared for the United States Air Force
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iii
Preface
e U.S. Air Force conducts multiple security cooperation–building partner activities in
Europe. ese activities can be expensive, and a question is whether alternative ways exist to
carry out these activities, possibly at less cost. is research will assist Air Force and particu-
larly U.S. Air Forces in Europe (USAFE) leadership in assessing and costing alternative means
of conducting security cooperation and maintaining relationships with allies and partners in
the U.S. European Command (EUCOM) area of responsibility (AOR) with forward-based
forces. e assessment uses actual cost data and assesses specic proposals for alternative means
of and postures for conducting building-partnership (BP) activities with partner air forces
in the USAFE AOR. e report’s ndings will help the Air Force and the U.S. Department
of Defense (DoD) qualitatively and quantitatively evaluate these proposals and BP activities
within the context of those proposals. e report is intended for USAFE and DoD but will be
of interest to decisionmakers in security cooperation and related elds.
Other RAND Project AIR FORCE documents that address security cooperation and BP
issues include the following:
• Jennifer D. P. Moroney, Kim Cragin, Eric Stephen Gons, Beth Grill, John E. Peters, and
Rachel M. Swanger, International Cooperation with Partner Air Forces, Santa Monica,
Calif.: RAND Corporation, MG-790-AF, 2009
• Jennifer D. P. Moroney, Joe Hogler, Jeerson P. Marquis, Christopher Paul, John E.
Peters, and Beth Grill, Developing an Assessment Framework for U.S. Air Force Building
Partnerships Programs, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, MG-868-AF, 2010.
e research reported here was sponsored by USAFE Plans and Requirements Interna-
tional (A5I) and conducted within the Strategy and Doctrine Program of RAND Project AIR
FORCE as part of a scal year 2011 study, “Cost-Based Analysis of the BP Mission Performed
by Forward-Based Forces in Europe.”
RAND Project AIR FORCE
RAND Project AIR FORCE (PAF), a division of the RAND Corporation, is the U.S. Air
Force’s federally funded research and development center for studies and analyses. PAF pro-
vides the Air Force with independent analyses of policy alternatives aecting the development,
employment, combat readiness, and support of current and future air, space, and cyber forces.
Research is conducted in four programs: Force Modernization and Employment; Manpower,
Personnel, and Training; Resource Management; and Strategy and Doctrine.
v
Contents
Preface ........................................................................................................... iii
Figures ...........................................................................................................vii
Tables ............................................................................................................ xi
Summary .......................................................................................................xiii
Acknowledgments ............................................................................................ xxi
Abbreviations ................................................................................................ xxiii
CHAPTER ONE
Introduction ..................................................................................................... 1
U.S. Air Forces in Europe Faces Diverse Challenges in Building Partnerships in the Area of
Responsibility ................................................................................................ 2
Study Objectives and Research Approach ..................................................................... 4
Study Objectives ............................................................................................... 4
Research Approach ............................................................................................ 4
Organization of is Report .................................................................................... 6
CHAPTER TWO
e Partnership-Building Role of U.S. Air Forces in Europe .......................................... 7
Introduction ...................................................................................................... 7
e Debate About Force Posture, Security Cooperation, and Building Partnerships in Europe ....... 7
All Six Wings of U.S. Air Forces in Europe Engage in Activities to Build Partnerships ................ 9
U.S. Air Forces in Europe Recorded 545 Events in a Year of Collecting Data on Building
Partnerships .................................................................................................10
Wing Interviews and Surveys Provided a More Comprehensive Picture of Eorts by U.S. Air
Forces in Europe to Build Partnerships..................................................................13
Mission .........................................................................................................14
Training ........................................................................................................18
Operational Impact .......................................................................................... 20
Resources ..................................................................................................... 22
Access .......................................................................................................... 23
Summary Observations About Building Partnerships in Europe .........................................25
CHAPTER THREE
Cost Analysis of Alternative Force Postures ..............................................................29
Introduction .....................................................................................................29
Analytical Approach ............................................................................................29
vi Working with Allies and Partners: A Cost-Based Analysis of U.S. Air Forces in Europe
Building Blocks..................................................................................................33
48th Fighter Wing ............................................................................................33
31st Fighter Wing ............................................................................................ 34
52nd Fighter Wing ............................................................................................ 35
100th Air Refueling Wing .................................................................................. 36
86th Airlift Wing ............................................................................................ 36
435th Air Ground Operations Wing .......................................................................37
Alternative Force Postures and Organizing Principles for Analysis ...................................... 38
Cost Analysis ....................................................................................................39
Cost Methodology and Data Sources ..................................................................... 40
Adapting Activities of U.S. Air Forces in Europe to Organizing Principles ...........................41
Building-Block Cost Calculations ......................................................................... 42
Wing Costs for Building Partnerships .................................................................... 44
Aggregate Cost-Analysis Results ........................................................................... 44
Concluding oughts for Cost Comparisons for U.S. Air Forces in Europe ......................... 48
Key Findings from the Cost Analysis .........................................................................51
CHAPTER FOUR
Conclusions and Recommendations .......................................................................53
Conclusions ......................................................................................................53
Mission and Outreach ........................................................................................53
Training and Operational Benets from Building Partnerships ....................................... 54
Tracking and Reporting Processes ......................................................................... 54
Cost ............................................................................................................. 55
Recommendations ..............................................................................................55
Issues ..............................................................................................................57
APPENDIXES
A. Survey Results: U.S. Air Forces in Europe Building Partnerships ..............................59
B. Operating-Cost Comparisons ........................................................................ 103
Bibliography .................................................................................................. 117
vii
Figures
S.1. Costs of Organizing Principle, by Cost Category............................................ xvii
2.1. Access to Bases and Airspace in U.S. Conict with Iran .....................................25
3.1. Analytical Approach Flow Chart ............................................................... 30
3.2. U.S. Air Forces in Europe Partnership-Building Events, by Type ...........................31
3.3. Costs of Wing Activities for Building Partnerships .......................................... 44
3.4. Costs of Organizing Principles, by Cost Category ............................................45
3.5. Costs of Organizing Principles, by Wing ...................................................... 46
3.6. Costs of Organizing Principles Without Event Flying Costs .................................47
3.7. Relative Cost Comparisons of U.S. Air Forces in Europe Wings and Organizing
Principles ............................................................................................49
3.8. Summary of Total Cost Comparisons of Organizing Principles .............................51
A.1. Total Responses, by Wing ....................................................................... 60
A.2. Total Responses, by Specialty ................................................................... 60
A.3. Total Responses, by Rank ........................................................................61
A.4. Level of Participation in Activities to Build Partnerships and Partner Capacity ...........62
A.5. Level of Participation in Activities to Build Partnerships and Partner Capacity,
bySpecialty .........................................................................................62
A.6. Level of Participation in Activities to Build Partnerships and Partner Capacity,
byWing .............................................................................................63
A.7. Frequency of Participation in Activities to Build Partnerships and Partner Capacity .... 64
A.8. Frequency of Participation in Activities to Build Partnerships and Partner Capacity,
by Specialty ........................................................................................ 64
A.9. Frequency of Participation in Activities to Build Partnerships and Partner Capacity,
by Wing .............................................................................................65
A.10. Duration of Participation for Each Activity to Build Partnerships and Partner
Capacity ............................................................................................ 66
A.11. Duration of Participation for Each Activity to Build Partnerships and Partner
Capacity, by Specialty ............................................................................ 66
A.12. Duration of Participation for Each Activity to Build Partnerships and Partner
Capacity, by Wing .................................................................................67
A.13. e Eect at Building Partnerships and Partner Capacity Can Have on the
Ability to Work Eectively with Partner Countries .......................................... 68
A.14. e Eect at Building Partnerships and Partner Capacity Can Have on the
Ability to Work Eectively with Partner Countries, by Specialty .......................... 68
A.15. e Eect at Building Partnerships and Partner Capacity Can Have on the
Ability to Work Eectively with Partner Countries, by Wing ...............................69
A.16. Frequency of Informal Communication with Partner Military Personnel..................70
viii Working with Allies and Partners: A Cost-Based Analysis of U.S. Air Forces in Europe
A.17. Frequency of Informal Communication with Partner Military Personnel,
bySpecialty .........................................................................................70
A.18. Frequency of Informal Communication with Partner Military Personnel, by Wing ......71
A.19. Means of Informal Communication with Partners ............................................72
A.20. Means of Informal Communication with Partners, by Specialty ............................72
A.21. Means of Informal Communication with Partners, by Wing ................................73
A.22. Purpose of Informal Communication with Partners ..........................................74
A.23. Purpose of Informal Communication with Partners, by Specialty ..........................74
A.24. Purpose of Informal Communication with Partners, by Wing ..............................75
A.25. O-Station Training’s Eect on Learning, Currency, and Readiness .......................76
A.26. O-Station Training’s Eect on Learning, Currency, and Readiness, by Specialty .......76
A.27. O-Station Training’s Eect on Learning, Currency, and Readiness, by Wing .......... 77
A.28. Frequency of Building Partnerships and Partner Capacity During O-Station
Training .............................................................................................78
A.29. Frequency of Building Partnerships and Partner Capacity During O-Station
Training, by Specialty .............................................................................78
A.30. Frequency of Building Partnerships and Partner Capacity During O-Station
Training, by Wing .................................................................................79
A.31. Presence of Go-To Personnel Tasked More Frequently for Building Partnerships
and Partner Capacity ............................................................................. 80
A.32. Presence of Go-To Personnel Tasked More Frequently for Building Partnerships
and Partner Capacity, by Specialty ............................................................. 80
A.33. Presence of Go-To Personnel Tasked More Frequently for Building Partnerships
and Partner Capacity, by Wing ..................................................................81
A.34. Rationale for Tasking Go-To Personnel for Events to Build Partnerships and
Partner Capacity ...................................................................................82
A.35. Rationale for Tasking Go-To Personnel for Events to Build Partnerships and
Partner Capacity, by Specialty ....................................................................82
A.36. Rationale for Tasking Go-To Personnel for Events to Build Partnerships and
Partner Capacity, by Wing........................................................................83
A.37. Balance of Taskings for Building Partnerships ................................................ 84
A.38. Balance of Taskings for Building Partnerships, by Specialty ................................ 84
A.39. Balance of Taskings for Building Partnerships, by Wing .....................................85
A.40. Relevance of Activities for Building Partnerships and Partner Capacity to Unit’s
Primary Mission .................................................................................. 86
A.41. Relevance of Building Partnerships and Partner Capacity During Readiness
Training to Unit’s Primary Mission, by Specialty ............................................ 86
A.42. Relevance of Major Events to Unit’s Primary Mission, by Specialty ....................... 87
A.43. Relevance of Military-to-Military Meetings and Conferences to Unit’s Primary
Mission, by Specialty ............................................................................. 87
A.44. Relevance of Foreign Visits to Home Station to Unit’s Primary Mission,
bySpecialty ........................................................................................ 88
A.45. Relevance of Community Relations Activities to Unit’s Primary Mission,
bySpecialty ........................................................................................ 88
A.46. Relevance of Building Partnerships and Partner Capacity During Readiness
Training to Unit’s Primary Mission, by Wing .................................................89
A.47. Relevance of Major Events to Unit’s Primary Mission, byWing ............................89
A.48. Relevance of Military-to-Military Meetings and Conferences to Unit’s Primary
Mission, by Wing ................................................................................. 90
Figures ix
A.49. Relevance of Foreign Visits to Home Station to Unit’s Primary Mission, byWing ...... 90
A.50. Relevance of Community Relations Activities to Unit’s Primary Mission, byWing ......91
A.51. Personal Time Commitment Preparing for or Recovering from Events for Building
Partnerships and Partner Capacity.............................................................. 92
A.52. Personal Time Commitment Preparing for Events for Building Partnerships and
Partner Capacity, by Specialty ................................................................... 92
A.53. Personal Time Commitment Recovering from Events for Building Partnerships and
Partner Capacity, by Specialty ....................................................................93
A.54. Personal Time Commitment Preparing for Events for Building Partnerships and
Partner Capacity, by Wing........................................................................93
A.55. Personal Time Commitment Recovering from Events for Building Partnerships and
Partner Capacity, by Wing....................................................................... 94
A.56. Rate of Participation in Activities for Building Partnerships and Partner Capacity
Before Being Assigned to U.S. Air Forces in Europe ..........................................95
A.57. Rate of Participation in Activities for Building Partnerships and Partner Capacity
Before Being Assigned to U.S. Air Forces in Europe, by Specialty ..........................95
A.58. Rate of Participation in Activities for Building Partnerships and Partner Capacity
Before Being Assigned to U.S. Air Forces in Europe, by Wing ............................. 96
A.59. Partnership-Building or Partner Capacity–Building Event Taskings’ Probability of
Canceling or Postponing Currency Training.................................................. 97
A.60. Partnership-Building or Partner Capacity–Building Event Taskings’ Probability of
Canceling or Postponing Currency Training, by Specialty .................................. 97
A.61. Partnership-Building or Partner Capacity–Building Event Taskings’ Probability of
Canceling or Postponing Currency Training, by Wing ...................................... 98
A.62. Frequency of Currency Training Cancellation Due to Event Tasking for Building
Partnerships and Partner Capacity.............................................................. 99
A.63. Frequency of Currency Training Cancellation Due to Event Tasking for Building
Partnerships and Partner Capacity, by Specialty .............................................. 99
A.64. Frequency of Currency Training Cancellation Due to Event Tasking for Building
Partnerships and Partner Capacity, by Wing ................................................. 100
B.1. Flying-Hour Cost and Usage Comparisons Between U.S. Air Forces in Europe
and the Continental United States ............................................................ 105
B.2. Drivers of Flying-Hour Cost Dierences Between U.S. Air Forces in Europe and
Air Combat Command ......................................................................... 107
B.3. Dierences Between Flying-Hours and Depot-Level Reparable Costs per
Flying-Hour ...................................................................................... 109
B.4. Training Munitions Cost per Flying-Hour ................................................... 110
B.5. Drivers of Higher U.S. Air Forces in Europe KC-135 Flying-Hour Costs ............... 111
B.6. Higher KC-135 Flying-Hour Costs in U.S. Air Forces in Europe Correlate to
Fewer Flying-Hours Per Aircraft ............................................................... 111
B.7. Nonying Costs and Total Aircraft Inventory Comparison Between U.S. Air
Forces in Europe and the Continental United States ........................................ 113
B.8. Drivers of Higher U.S. Air Forces in Europe KC-135 Per-Aircraft Costs................. 114
xi
Tables
S.1. U.S. Air Forces in Europe Wing Activities for Building Partnerships,
September2009–August2010 .................................................................. xiv
2.1. U.S. Air Forces in Europe Wings ................................................................10
2.2. U.S. Air Forces in Europe Wing Activities for Building Partnerships,
September2009–August2010 ...................................................................11
3.1. 48th Fighter Wing Annual Activities for Building Partnerships, Represented by
Building Blocks ................................................................................... 34
3.2. 31st Fighter Wing Annual Activities for Building Partnerships, Represented by
Building Blocks ....................................................................................35
3.3. 52nd Fighter Wing Annual Activities for Building Partnerships, Represented by
Building Blocks ....................................................................................35
3.4. 100th Air Refueling Wing Annual Activities for Building Partnerships, Represented
by Building Blocks ................................................................................ 36
3.5. 86th Airlift Wing Annual Activities for Building Partnerships, Represented by
Building Blocks ....................................................................................37
3.6. 435th Air Ground Operations Wing Annual Activities for Building Partnerships,
Represented by Building Blocks ................................................................ 38
3.7. Analytical Organizing Principles ................................................................39
3.8. Example Building-Block Cost Elements ....................................................... 43
B.1. Air Force Total Operating-Cost Elements .................................................... 104
xiii
Summary
U.S. European Command (EUCOM) views building partnerships (BP) as its highest theater
priority. U.S. Air Forces in Europe (USAFE) seeks to build partnerships and partner capac-
ity in the EUCOM area of responsibility (AOR) for several reasons. First, USAFE supports
integration of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to help ensure that the United
States meets its alliance responsibilities and obligations and maintains leadership in the orga-
nization. Second, partnerships help USAFE units maintain their operational readiness. ird,
partnerships help the United States build interoperability and partner capacity support to out-
of-area operations. Fourth, USAFE conducts engagements with the goal of helping ensure
stability in the AOR and to encourage cooperation among partner countries. Fifth, USAFE
seeks to attain, improve, and maintain access to countries in the AOR. In spite of the potential
benets of USAFE’s BP activities, USAFE’s posture and its BP activities do come with a cost.
In today’s austere scal environment, it is appropriate to assess how the United States and the
U.S. Air Force can build partnerships most eciently while ensuring that the requirements for
maintaining key alliances and partnerships continue to be met. is raises several questions
about the cost of USAFE’s BP activities.
Study Purpose and Approach
is report explores several questions associated with using forward-based forces to build part-
ner capacity. Are there cost savings realized when building partnerships with forward-based
forces? What might be gained or lost from a cost perspective, by moving USAFE forces in the
continental United States (CONUS)? What might those cost dierentials imply about the rela-
tive trade-os of BP from USAFE rather than CONUS? How can the answers to the rst two
questions inform a more strategic risk assessment of moving USAFE forces?
e approach to the research involves four tasks. Task1 characterizes the current policy
debate on security cooperation and force posture in Europe through a review of the literature
and discussions with key policymakers and legislative ocials in Washington. Specically, the
study team set out to gain a better understanding of the extent to which security cooperation
enters the policy and resourcing debates regarding Air Force forward-based posture in Europe.
Task2 develops a framework to describe the current BP approach and environment for
USAFE, drawing on key U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) strategies and plans, such as
the Guidance for Employment of the Force and combatant command (COCOM) theater
campaign plans, as well as specic BP data. e three main sources of data for Air Force BP
eorts in Europe are USAFE’s Building Partnerships Scorecard data, wing- and squadron-
xiv Working with Allies and Partners: A Cost-Based Analysis of U.S. Air Forces in Europe
level interviews and data, and a survey RAND designed and distributed to collect informa-
tion on the routine BP activities of airmen based in Europe. As a result of the ndings from
this data-collection and analysis task, the team was able to identify high-payo BP activities.
Task3 denes several alternative postures for conducting BP activities using a building-block
approach to cost out each high-payo BP activity. Associated costs for each building block
consider marginal changes as a result of specic BP activities. Task4 recommends eciencies
to improve the Air Force’s BP activities in Europe.
Table S.1 shows the number of BP events, by wing, recorded between September 2009
and August 2010 and the number of partners engaged. Of those partners, the table lists the
ones that accounted for about 50percent of reported events; these appear in order of most to
fewest events.1 e table gives examples of areas in which the wing focused its BP activities.
1 In some cases, multiple partners participated in a single event.
Table S.1
U.S. Air Forces in Europe Wing Activities for Building Partnerships, September2009–August2010
Wing
Number of BP
Events
Number of Partners
Engaged
Partners Totaling
50% of Events Examples of BP Activity Focus
31 FW 26 9Italy F-16 operations and
maintenance
Firefighting
Security forces
Flying training deployments
48 FW 119 30 UK, Netherlands Close air support and JTACs
Flying exercises
DACT
Medical
52 FW 56 33 Germany, Belgium,
Netherlands, Poland
DACT
Flying exercises
Munitions
Maintenance
86 AW 46 27 Poland, Germany,
Bulgaria, Belgium,
France, Hungary
Airdrops
Maintenance exchanges
HAW support
100 ARW 44 22 UK, Germany,
Belgium,
Netherlands
Air refueling currency
Transportation operations
SERE training
Security forces training
Open Skies
435 AGOW 42 28 Poland, Germany,
Bulgaria, Italy,
Portugal, Romania
Cargo preparation
Deployable engagement
construction
JTAC training
NOTE: FW = fighter wing. JTAC = joint terminal attack controller. DACT = dissimilar air combat training.
AW=Airlift Wing. HAW = Heavy Airlift Wing. ARW = Aerial Refueling Wing. SERE = survival, evasion, resistance,
and escape. AGOW = Air Ground Operations Wing.
Summary xv
Observations About Building Partnerships in Europe
As Chapter Two discusses, USAFE’s BP activities are varied and numerous and help build and
sustain access, relationships, and partner capabilities. Yet these activities do not appear to enter
the debate over posture in Washington, particularly in Congress. e wings and organizations
assigned to the command work with foreign partners on a routine basis to help achieve U.S.
national security and theater objectives in the AOR and to maximize training for personnel
and units given their home stationing overseas. e study team’s observations capture the
strengths and weaknesses of the current BP approach.
e team identied eight observations from our analysis of the USAFE BP approach and
the specic activities USAFE conducts. First, forward basing facilitates important relationship-
and capacity-building BP activities. Several activities are done primarily because of forward
basing, including nearly daily air refueling, frequent JTAC qualication and training, and
some hosted events.
Second, a signicant portion of USAFE’s BP activities is opportunity-driven, with BP as an
ancillary benet to U.S. training in and with partner countries. Units can apply training funds
for ancillary BP benet; it is unlikely that this practice would be as common from CONUS.
Moreover, USAFE serves as an informal “BP schoolhouse” for the Air Force.
ird, BP-related strategy and objectives at the country and event levels are not clear to the
personnel and units that execute BP activities. Although not everyone who helps build partner-
ships needs to know the commander’s intent (though it would certainly help), the development
of specic objectives at the event level, and of plans at the country level, should be a high prior-
ity, as should denition and prioritization of BP events.
Fourth, although many U.S. units and personnel derive training benet from BP activities
and presence in Europe, some get less benet than others. Most respondents to the RAND survey
viewed BP-related activities as benecial to their own training and readiness. Some events are
not seen as productive in terms of maintaining U.S. readiness, and the need to alter tactics and
narrow information-sharing does, at times, limit training value to U.S. personnel.
Fifth, existing USAFE reporting processes capture only part of the BP level of eort in the com-
mand. is is a DoD-wide shortfall, and USAFE has improved reporting in the past several
years. Data on BP events are often derived from other reporting processes (e.g., after-action
reports [AARs] on training events owing from the unit to the USAFE operations sta). We
supplemented these data through interviews with and surveys of wings and other USAFE
organizations. Lack of a denition of BP event also hampers reporting and analysis.
Sixth, there are some missed BP opportunities. Many of these derive from events that could
be better utilized to help build partnerships. ese include hosting events and maintainer
involvement in BP during o-station training events. In some instances, particularly in the 435
AGOW, respondents believed that they were being underutilized for BP activities.
Seventh, the presence of forward-based forces facilitates coalition operations. e develop-
ment and sustainment of personal and unit relationships enables smoother integration during
combat operations. Having forward-based U.S. forces that are geographically closer to partners
enables repeat visits. Years of interaction with traditional and newer NATO allies have borne
fruit for coalition building and capability.
Eighth, the need to build relationships, capacity, and access in the EUCOM AOR for coalition
operations will continue beyond Iraq and Afghanistan. Cross-COCOM operations and emerging
xvi Working with Allies and Partners: A Cost-Based Analysis of U.S. Air Forces in Europe
operational requirements, such as ballistic missile defense (BMD), will place BP demands on
forward-based forces in Europe.
Observations Related to Costs for Building Partnerships in Europe
Given that the Air Force currently has forces positioned in Europe, USAFE’s BP activities are
relatively ecient. Most of USAFE’s BP costs go to event ying-hours, which are a sunk cost,
because units positioned in USAFE regularly y training missions. Further, many of USAFE’s
BP sorties are own from home station and therefore do not incur additional costs for travel
and deployment. In all, USAFE’s BP activities add only a marginal cost to USAFE’s overall
annual operating costs (roughly 1.5percent). We do not assess the relative value or impact of
USAFE’s BP activities, but USAFE wings accomplish many thousands of hours of BP activities
with partner nations (PNs) for the additional costs that USAFE incurs.
Generating USAFE’s current BP activities from CONUS could greatly increase the marginal
cost of BP. If USAFE’s current BP activities were replicated from CONUS, the marginal cost
to provide BP could increase fourfold, from $59million per year to more than $250million
per year.
If USAFE forces were moved to CONUS, some BP activities would need to be signicantly
curtailed to be cost neutral with regard to direct BP costs. We found that, even when replicating
only about half of USAFE’s status quo BP activities, both the marginal BP costs and the total
operating costs would be more for CONUS than for USAFE’s status quo level of activity.
Finally, although the marginal costs to provide BP in USAFE are very sensitive to whether
forces are located in Europe versus in CONUS, these changes still have a small overall budget impact
relative to total USAFE operating costs. e fact that these costs and savings are so small rela-
tive to the overall operation of USAFE forces ought to turn attention back to the benets of
having USAFE forces provide BP and from being positioned in Europe more generally and to
determining what is risked by changing those things.
Cost-Analysis Summary
Aggregate Cost-Analysis Results
Figure S.1 shows the total costs of each organizing principle, broken out by cost category.
In Figure S.1, our organizing principles are shown on the x-axis. On the y-axis, the height
of each column shows the total annual cost (in millions of dollars) to replicate all BP activities
appropriate to that organizing principle.
On the left, “status quo” shows the costs we estimated for all USAFE-based BP activities
for one year, essentially as they are performed today. Home-station sorties are, in fact, own
from home station; aircraft and team deployments occur for each wing on an annual basis.
e costs reected here make up the total cost to the Air Force but may not all be borne by
USAFE directly (e.g., USAFE would typically transport personnel and equipment by means of
its own organic airlift, thus not incurring the Air Mobility Command [AMC] costs to trans-
port them).
Here, we can see that the event ying costs, at $151million per year, dominate the costs.
One implication of this is that these BP activities, when conducted from USAFE, are relatively
Summary xvii
ecient: ree-quarters of the costs go directly to training. Assuming that those ying-hours
would normally be included in each wing’s training program, the marginal cost of USAFE BP
activities would be approximately $51million per year. Again, not all of these will be borne
by USAFE. For example, some money is provided by EUCOM for Joint Chiefs of Sta (JCS)
exercises and other activities, which would be applied to deployment and TDY costs.
As we move from left to right in the gure, we see that replicating all activities from
CONUS incurs an enormous cost penalty, almost doubling the total costs. TDY costs approxi-
mately double, and deployment costs increase almost tenfold. e modied CONUS option
saves a little because it repackages some of the deployments more eciently and eliminates air
shows and ybys. e rightmost option halves the remaining aircraft-related events, thus bring-
ing the total costs more in line with the status quo. However, less than half of the $186million
goes directly to training, a relatively inecient use of resources.
Recommendations
We provide the following recommendations for U.S. Air Force consideration.
For the Headquarters (HQ) USAFE level, we oer the following recommendations:
• Ensure that BP and security cooperation are included in the force posture debate where
it aects Air Force forces.
– Broaden the understanding within the Air Force and among decisionmakers in DoD
that the marginal cost of BP by USAFE forces is small and that the cost of replicating
Figure S.1
Costs of Organizing Principle, by Cost Category
NOTE: TDY = temporary duty.
RAND TR1241-S.1
20
185 173
79
151
182 177
80
31
55 61
32
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
Status quo
Annual cost ($ millions)
Organizing principle
TDY
Event flying
Deployment
Reduced forward
presence
Reduced
forward presence
(modified)
Reduced
forward presence
(alternave
BP concepts)
xviii Working with Allies and Partners: A Cost-Based Analysis of U.S. Air Forces in Europe
USAFE’s current BP activities from CONUS could be substantially more expensive,
even if BP activities were reduced.
– Make decisions on posture changes to forces in Europe based on an assessment of
whether any savings are worth the risk to access, leadership, and other core U.S. inter-
ests.
– Direct that BP be emphasized in Air Force discussions on force posture in Europe
with key congressional sta, the Oce of the Secretary of Defense, and Department
of State ocials.
• Develop a BP strategy for engagement with European partners post–Operation NEW
DAWN and Operation ENDURING FREEDOM.
– Press eorts to develop air-related country plans in the AOR that enable linkages
between theater objectives and USAFE BP events.
– Seek increased engagement with partners in the eastern region of the AOR focused
on meeting operational requirements of contingencies in the U.S. Central Command
(CENTCOM) AOR. is includes maintaining or expanding access to bases, air-
space, and ranges for both combat and support assets and working with potential coali-
tion partners on related operations.
– Develop options (with EUCOM) for continuing to build partner capacity in niche
areas with new members of NATO and less advanced partners in the AOR for future
coalition operations. Continue pursuing ongoing eorts to build medical, JTAC, cargo
preparation, and other capabilities, as well as institutional capacity.
– Continue close cooperation in training and exercises with advanced partners in the
AOR for future coalition operations. Interoperability and relationship-building at the
individual, unit, and command levels are invaluable and aect both the capability and
willingness to work with the United States in the AOR and beyond.
• Streamline processes for data collection and analysis.
– Consider ways to aggregate BP data and express the Air Force’s BP successes. Use this
report as a rst step in making explicit linkages between force posture and BP.
– Adapt existing reporting regimes across the air sta to capture the BP data required
to make informed resourcing and other decisions. USAFE should determine the types
of BP activities it absolutely needs to track, and it should focus on those specic types
of activities in detail. is may include activities that best support EUCOM’s theater
campaign plan objectives and activities that help to inform resourcing decisions.
– Consider administering an annual survey, similar to the one used for this study, to
supplement BP data already reported. Adapt the survey to answer questions that sup-
port USAFE and EUCOM decisionmaking requirements.
– Dene BP event, perhaps in accordance with the study team’s proposed denition, and
communicate this to the wings. Consider this denition: “A planned or unplanned
activity that builds and sustains relationships with, capabilities of, and access to foreign
partner militaries in accordance with the combatant commander’s theater and country
objectives.” In addition, BP events should be prioritized on the basis of this denition.
– Adopt RAND Project AIR FORCE (PAF) methodology for assessing and costing the
BP level of eort to support resource and other decisions.
Summary xix
For the HQ USAFE level, in coordination with the wings, we oer the following
recommendations:
• Take advantage of additional BP opportunities.
– Develop concepts to expand and standardize hosting events and to take greater BP
advantage of o-station events (especially maintainers).
– At home station, consider increasing frequency of visits of partner countries to Air
Force bases (especially maintainers, logisticians, security forces, and mobility plan-
ners). Ensure that the activities scheduled address specic BP objectives for those part-
ner countries.
– For combat deployments, consider including additional noncommissioned ocer
(NCO) experts (again, maintainers are ideal) in selected BP activities.
xxi
Acknowledgments
We wish to thank several people for their support of the research reported here. Our study
sponsors at U.S. Air Forces in Europe (USAFE), Maj Gen Mark Schissler, Col John Kafer,
Dr.Mark Secan, and Blake Lindner and their teams, provided outstanding support and guid-
ance. We are extremely grateful for the support from the USAFE wings and other organi-
zations we consulted, the 100thAerial Refueling Wing, the 435th Air Ground Operations
Wing, the 86th Airlift Wing, the 31stFighter Wing (FW), 48FW, 52FW, and the Warrior
Preparation Center.
anks to our two reviewers, Alan Vick and Lisa Harrington of RAND, for their thought-
ful and thorough reviews of this report, and to Jerry Sollinger for providing excellent feedback
on early drafts of the report. We are also most appreciative of editorial and other help provided
by our dynamic administrative assistants, Melissa McNulty and Cassandra Tate.
xxiii
Abbreviations
AAR after-action report
AB air base
ACC Air Combat Command
AFPAM Air Force pamphlet
AFRICOM U.S. Africa Command
AFTOC Air Force Total Operating Cost
AGOW Air Ground Operations Wing
AMC Air Mobility Command
AOR area of responsibility
ARW Aerial Refueling Wing
ASOG air operations support group
AW Airlift Wing
BMD ballistic missile defense
BP building partnership
BPC building partner capacity
CAF combat air forces
CAIG Cost Analysis Improvement Group
CAS close air support
CASEVAC casualty evacuation
CENTCOM U.S. Central Command
CFR concept funding request
COA course of action
COCOM combatant command
xxiv Working with Allies and Partners: A Cost-Based Analysis of U.S. Air Forces in Europe
CONUS continental United States
CPFH cost per ying-hour
CRG Contingency Response Group
CSAR combat search and rescue
DACT dissimilar air combat training
DLR depot-level reparable
DOC designed operational capability
DoD U.S. Department of Defense
DTMO Defense Travel Management Oce
ECM electronic countermeasure
EUCOM U.S. European Command
FH ying-hour
FW ghter wing
FY scal year
GCI ground controlled intercept
H AW Heavy Airlift Wing
HQ headquarters
JCS Joint Chiefs of Sta
JTAC joint terminal attack controller
LIMS-EV Logistics, Installation and Mission Support–Enterprise View
M2M military to military
MAJCOM major command
MDS mission design series
MEFPAK Manpower and Equipment Force Packaging System
milair military airlift
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCO noncommissioned ocer
OJT on-the-job training
OMLT operational mentor and liaison team
OOD Operation ODYSSEY DAWN
Abbreviations xxv
OUP Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR
PACAF Pacic Air Forces
PAF RAND Project AIR FORCE
PA X personnel
PCS permanent change of station
PN partner nation
POL petroleum, oil, and lubricants
QDR Quadrennial Defense Review
RAF Royal Air Force
SERE survival, evasion, resistance, and escape
TAI total aircraft inventory
TDY temporary duty
TLP Tactical Leadership Programme
TSCMIS eater Security Cooperation Management Information System
TTP tactics, techniques, and procedures
USAFE U.S. Air Forces in Europe
USAFE/A5I U.S. Air Forces in Europe Plans and Requirements International
USTRANSCOM U.S. Transportation Command
WPC Warrior Preparation Center
1
CHAPTER ONE
Introduction
According to the 2010 U.S. National Security Strategy, “the relationships our Armed Forces
have developed with foreign militaries are a critical component of our global engagement and
support our collective security” (Obama, 2010, p.41). e 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review
(QDR) notes that “central to the security of the United States is a strong transatlantic partner-
ship, which is underpinned by the bilateral relationships between the United States and the
governments of Europe” (U.S. Department of Defense [DoD], 2010, p.57). e QDR identi-
es building partner capacity (BPC) as a mission of increasing emphasis in U.S. defense strat-
egy, with the need to expand capabilities for training partner aviation forces receiving special
attention. us, building partnerships (BP) with European allies and partners, particularly in
aviation, is a critical component of the U.S. strategy of engagement and defense.
Like the other U.S. military services, the U.S. Air Force has a long history of working
with partner countries in Europe for a variety of purposes, including building capacity, as
mentioned already, but also promoting interoperability, building enduring relationships, and
ensuring access to personnel and facilities in the region. Forces assigned to the U.S. Air Forces
in Europe (USAFE) are in Europe principally to be the air component of U.S. European Com-
mand (EUCOM). In addition, they dominate the Air Force’s eorts to build and sustain part-
nerships in the EUCOM area of responsibility (AOR). USAFE forces take part in dedicated BP
events, provide “ancillary benet” to partners through their own operational training in part-
ner countries, and interact with partner personnel, often on a daily basis. ese activities range
from “community relations” events with the host country to training partner countries to
deploy specic capabilities to a coalition operation. ese eorts have helped the United States
maintain a lead position in Europe and facilitate North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
partner support to operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. At the same time, in the current, more
austere scal environment, it is appropriate to assess how the United States and the Air Force
can build partnerships most eciently while ensuring that the requirements for maintaining
key alliances and partnerships continue to be met.
e Air Force provides BP capabilities from outside the AOR as well, including forces
that take part in multinational exercises, train partners on U.S. military equipment, provide
education and training through the international military education and training (IMET)
program, and engage with partner countries through the Air National Guard (ANG) and the
State Partnership Program (SPP).
2 Working with Allies and Partners: A Cost-Based Analysis of U.S. Air Forces in Europe
U.S. Air Forces in Europe Faces Diverse Challenges in Building Partnerships in
the Area of Responsibility
e EUCOM AOR comprises 51 countries with security environments, threat perceptions,
capabilities, and levels of development that are widely varied. Advanced allies with capable,
technologically sophisticated air forces share the AOR with less developed partners with nascent
air forces. Some allies engage with the United States in eorts to counter terrorist groups and a
recalcitrant Iran. Many eastern European allies are relatively new entrants to NATO and seek
to reach alliance standards and deter Russian assertiveness.
e United States’ interests in the AOR are also varied and are among its most important
and enduring. NATO is, according to the U.S. National Security Strategy, “the pre-eminent
security alliance in the world today,” and U.S. relations with its 27 member countries remain
“the cornerstone for U.S. engagement with the world, and a catalyst for international action”
(Obama, 2010, p. 41). European allies have capabilities and political will that enable coalition
operations and have most consistently joined the United States with combat and support forces
in out-of-area contingencies, including Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya. e expansion of the
alliance to countries of the former Warsaw Pact engenders a need to incorporate their forces
into alliance structures and standards. In addition, the United States and key NATO allies
maintain a tactical nuclear storage and delivery capability that requires both U.S. presence and
exercises with allies.
Access to bases and airspace in Europe enables U.S. forces to reach other regions of the
globe and provide freedom of action for the United States. Operations in Libya, the Middle
East, and central Asia would be nearly impossible without the use of Ramstein Air Base (AB)
in Germany and other key sites on the continent. In Europe itself, the United States has a key
interest in maintaining regional stability (e.g., in the Balkans) and in helping integrate Russia
as a U.S. and NATO partner while assuring friends on Russia’s western borders. Finally, the
United States seeks to address shared challenges and threats with its European partners, includ-
ing weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, ballistic missile defense (BMD), and cybersecurity.
EUCOM views BP as its highest theater priority (EUCOM, 2010b, p. 3). According
to the Strategy of Active Security, BP supports the U.S. strategic objectives of “defending the
homeland forward” and “supporting U.S. strategic interests by promoting security and sta-
bility” (EUCOM, 2010b, p. 1). As the air component in the AOR, USAFE seeks to operate
according to EUCOM’s priorities and to support its campaign, operational, and posture plans.
As is discussed in Chapter Two in greater detail, the study team found that USAFE seeks
to build partnerships and partner capacity in the AOR for several reasons. First, of course,
USAFE supports integration in NATO to help ensure that the United States meets its alliance
responsibilities and obligations and maintains leadership in the organization.
Second, partnerships help USAFE units maintain their operational readiness. Access to
ranges, airspace, ground controllers, and foreign capabilities and tactics is critical to the abil-
ity of USAFE wings—particularly their pilots—to maintain currency and meet Air Force
training requirements. Access to eastern European partner countries is especially important
given stringent ight and training restrictions in the UK, Germany, and Italy. In Bulgaria, for
example, C-130Js from Ramstein are able to execute dirt landings that are required as part of
their currency training. Likewise, USAFE ghters can conduct low-level ying and bombing
Introduction 3
runs there and can perform dissimilar air combat training (DACT) against MiG-29s.1 On the
other hand, the availability of Spanish ranges and Dutch ground controlled intercept (GCI)
controllers and F-16s enhances interoperability with multiple allies and presents many training
opportunities to USAFE aircrews. USAFE conducts most of its BP activities in foreign coun-
tries as ancillary to U.S. unit training requirements.
ird, relationships that help the United States build interoperability and partner capac-
ity support to out-of-area operations. us, for example, European air forces have been able
to operate in coalitions with the Air Force in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya in part because
they have trained and exercised together; standardized tactics, techniques, and procedures
(TTP); and developed working relationships. ese activities over many years have enabled
more-advanced European air forces to plan and ght alongside the United States. Likewise,
USAFE seeks to bring less advanced partners into current and future coalition operations by
emphasizing important contributions that do not require well-established air force capabilities
or institutions. USAFE eorts to develop joint terminal attack controller (JTAC) capabili-
ties for Operation ENDURING FREEDOM have included such allies as Lithuania, Estonia,
Slovenia, and Latvia that have no capability to deploy and operate aircraft in overseas contin-
gencies. BP activities have also allowed such countries as Poland to execute cargo preparation
operations on their own to enable deployment on U.S. airlifters to out-of-area operations. Even
as ongoing operations (such as those in Afghanistan) end, these engagements are meant also to
provide a foundation for future interactions, capacity-building eorts, and coalition building
when needed.
Fourth, USAFE conducts engagements with the goal of helping ensure stability in the
AOR and to encourage cooperation among partner countries. USAFE engagement with the
Russian air force (such as senior-leader and counterpart visits or arms control verication dis-
cussions) supports relations between that country and the United States, while Air Force pres-
ence in Europe and BP activities with new NATO allies in the east are intended in part to
assure partners, such as Romania, Bulgaria, and Poland, that are concerned about a resurgence
of Russian aggressiveness on the continent. USAFE has also supported such integrative initia-
tives as Balkan Air Integration and Baltic Air Policing.
Fifth, USAFE seeks to attain, improve, and maintain access to countries in the AOR.
Familiarization with partner procedures, facilities, and airspace—and relationships with per-
sonnel and leadership—help facilitate U.S. operations both within the AOR and in other
theaters. For example, Europe is a key supporting theater for potential operations in the U.S.
Central Command (CENTCOM) AOR.
Having signicant forward-based forces in Europe—USAFE has more than 31,000 per-
sonnel, including more than 6,000 civilians—provides a unique opportunity to conduct BP
activities with allies and partner countries on a regular basis (“Major Commands and Reserve
Components,” 2011, p. 61). e Air Force conducts many of these activities with allies and
partners in conjunction with its own training events. In these cases, the specic BP event, such
as an exercise, subject-matter expert exchange, or senior-level meeting, occurs at the same time
as the Air Force training event. Other BP activities, such as a specic training and capacity-
building event or a “familiarization” visit to a Air Force base in Germany or Italy, are devel-
oped and executed to enhance the skills and knowledge of the partner country’s military.
1 Basing in the UK, Italy, and Germany certainly enables BP in those countries but also with eastern European partners
that bring great training opportunities, increasing the readiness and interoperability of all participants.
4 Working with Allies and Partners: A Cost-Based Analysis of U.S. Air Forces in Europe
Study Objectives and Research Approach
is report considers the nexus between BP and forward-based force posture in the EUCOM
AOR. From a quantitative and qualitative perspective, it assesses a sample of BP activities in
Europe conducted by forward-based forces that occur as part of being stationed in Europe.
e report provides the results of a study conducted for USAFE leadership based on
(1)EUCOM’s determination that BP is the highest priority (and the study team does not chal-
lenge this), (2) USAFE’s internal assessment of what it does in BP, and (3) a cost analysis that
assumes a continuation of the status quo, both in terms of posture and in terms of BP activities
conducted. e study’s scope was, therefore, narrow. It did not include EUCOM’s or USAFE’s
relative importance across the other combatant command (COCOMs) or components or an
assessment from current operational theaters about whether these BP activities translate to the
operational realm. It also assumed no policy change with regard to BP from the Air Force or
DoD.
Study Objectives
is report will assist U.S. Air Force and, particularly, USAFE leadership in assessing and cost-
ing alternative means of conducting security cooperation and maintaining relationships with
allies and partners in the EUCOM AOR with forward-based forces. e assessment uses actual
cost data and evaluates specic proposals for alternative means of and postures for conducting
BP activities with partner air forces in the AOR. e report’s ndings will help the Air Force
and DoD qualitatively and quantitatively evaluate these proposals and BP activities within the
context of those proposals.
e Air Force asked RAND Project AIR FORCE to address the following ve overarch-
ing questions:
1. To what extent do BP activities of Air Force forces in Europe enter into the force posture
debate? How should BP enter the debate?
2. What does a holistic picture of Air Force BP activities in Europe look like? More spe-
cically, in quantitative and qualitative terms, what is an accurate characterization of
the BP activities conducted by Headquarters (HQ) USAFE and the wings assigned to
USAFE?
3. How does USAFE incorporate Air Force BP into Air Force training and exercise plans
and schedules, as well as into daily interactions with allies and partners?
4. What is the overall value of Air Force BP activities in Europe? How do Air Force BP
activities support relationships, building of capabilities, and access in Europe? Which
activities does USAFE consider to be high value?
5. Are there more–cost-eective ways to execute the current slate of Air Force high-value
BP activities in Europe using other force structure mixes, or other venues in the United
States? Which activities can realistically be executed only with forward-based forces?
Research Approach
is study included four discrete research tasks conducted over the course of a year. Task1
focused on the rst research question and attempts to characterize the current policy debate on
security cooperation and force posture in Europe. Specically, the study team set out to under-
stand better the extent to which security cooperation enters the policy and resourcing debates
Introduction 5
regarding Air Force forward-based posture in Europe. e team reviewed key U.S. policy and
planning documents, such as government policy memoranda and cables, as well as reports by
research organizations (see, for example, DoD, 2010; Sustainable Defense Task Force, 2010;
and “Co-Chairs Proposal,” 2010). We then conducted interviews in DoD, the State Depart-
ment, and relevant congressional committees, such as the Senate and House Armed Services
committees, to capture the key arguments. Informed by the review of the literature and inter-
views, we then identied the most-prevalent arguments for and against maintaining the cur-
rent level of U.S. military presence in Europe and noted any perceived benets of security
cooperation activities.
Task2 focused on the second, third, and fourth research questions and develops a frame-
work to describe the current security cooperation approach and environment for the Air Force
in Europe. e team initially focused on reviewing current DoD, COCOM, and Air Force
BP guidance, including the Guidance for Employment of the Force (Oce of the Secretary of
Defense, 2008), the EUCOM eater Campaign Plan (EUCOM, 2010a) and eater Posture
Plan (EUCOM, undated), and the 2011 U.S. Air Force Global Partnership Strategy (Secretary
of the Air Force for International Aairs, 2011), to understand better the key security coopera-
tion objectives at the theater and country levels. Next, the team focused signicant eort on
collecting security cooperation data at the EUCOM, HQ U.S. Air Force, HQ USAFE, and
wing levels to obtain the most complete picture possible. e three main sources of Air Force
BP eorts in Europe are USAFE’s Building Partnerships Scorecard (USAFE, 2010) data, wing-
and squadron-level interviews and data, and a survey RAND researchers designed and distrib-
uted to collect information on the routine BP activities of airmen based in Europe. rough
these data-collection and analysis tasks, the team was able to identify high-payo BP activities.
ese include, for example, activities related to ghter interoperability, JTACs, and expedi-
tionary airlift.2 We linked resource requirements, including funding, manpower, facilities, and
other force structure, to each high-payo activity.
Task3 focused on the fth research question. Our analytical methodology consists of
rst dening the level of BP activity that is required by EUCOM and then evaluating the cost
of dierent force postures to conduct that level of activity. Because a clear requirement for BP
activities does not exist, we used the level of BP activity currently conducted as the baseline
demand for the cost analysis. We began with various databases to identify the level of BP activ-
ity currently conducted by USAFE forces. We use a building-block approach to dening this
level of BP activities. Each building block represents an activity (e.g., deploy 12 aircraft for a
week) that is typically conducted. We also identied the typical frequency of each building
block per year. We presented this representation of each wing’s BP activities to a representa-
tive of each wing and modied it as required. ese building blocks can be combined across
all wings in USAFE to identify the demand for BP activity. We then cost this set of activities
using dierent force postures (e.g., continental United States [CONUS]–based forces). We also
consider variations to this level of activity recognizing that not all activities (e.g., ybys) would
be conducted unless the forces were forward-based. at is, some ybys are conducted only
2 JTAC training involves eorts to select, train, and sustain a cadre of foreign partners capable of providing air-ground
coordination (e.g., close air support [CAS], airdrops). Expeditionary airlift involves eorts to improve partner ability to plan
and execute cargo, passenger, casualty evacuation (CASEVAC), or airdrop missions on U.S. or partner airlifters. Fighter
interoperability involves eorts designed to improve the ability of U.S. and partner ghters and associated support to meet
NATO standards and to train and ght together.
6 Working with Allies and Partners: A Cost-Based Analysis of U.S. Air Forces in Europe
because the requirement is for sorties from home station in USAFE AOR, but aircraft would
not be deployed for the sole purpose of a particular yby. We refer to these dierent force pos-
tures and levels of demand as organizing principles in our analysis. e result of this task is a
comparison of the cost of using CONUS-based forces to conduct the current level of BP activi-
ties and several alternative levels, recognizing that some activities will simply not be conducted
unless the forces are forward-based.
Task4 recommends eciencies to the Air Force’s BP activities in Europe. e team iden-
tied the assumptions underlying each building block and the preferred options that provide
desired BP capabilities at reasonable cost. e team also recommended ways to optimize the
data-collection process to minimize the number of unaccounted-for BP activities.
It is important to note that our research and analysis were limited in the following ways.
First, the research provides anecdotal evidence of the utility of BP eorts, but a qualitative
or quantitative analysis of the relationship between these eorts and key metrics, such as the
amount and quality of U.S. access to European bases, is beyond its scope. Second, the research
analyzes only generally the ability of CONUS-based forces to duplicate the level or types of BP
activity commonly conducted by forces forward-based in Europe. Many factors would come
into play, including rotational limitations, sources of funding, and maintenance requirements.
ird, this project did not analyze the total cost of CONUS versus USAFE units to determine
whether it was more or less expensive to base units in Europe or the United States. e cost
analysis specically focused on the relative cost of conducting the current level of BP activities
using USAFE versus CONUS units. Despite these limitations, the data set for this study is
substantial and provides insight into many key BP-related issues.
Organization of This Report
Chapter Two describes the debate over posture in Europe and characterizes how USAFE wings
engage partner countries, identifying challenges and opportunities that USAFE faces as it
seeks to work with partners while meeting operational readiness requirements. Chapter Two
corresponds to Appendix A, which provides the results of our BP survey with USAFE wings
and HQ elements. Chapter ree presents our cost analysis of the alternative force postures to
conduct BP activities. It includes an overview of our analytical methodology, a representation
of the BP activities conducted by each wing that we analyzed in USAFE, several alternative
force postures that could conduct these BP activities, the details of the cost analysis and cost
data, and the cost of each of the alternative force postures along with the key ndings of this
analysis. Chapter ree is supplemented by Appendix B, which provides the details of the cost
analysis.
Chapter Four synthesizes the results of the analysis and provides the study team’s key
ndings and recommendations for the Air Force and USAFE in particular.
7
CHAPTER TWO
The Partnership-Building Role of U.S. Air Forces in Europe
Introduction
is chapter characterizes the wide-ranging and ubiquitous BP eorts of the Air Force in
Europe and, in particular, details and generally assesses the BP-related activities of forward-
based U.S. forces. e rst section provides an overview of the current force posture and secu-
rity cooperation debate in Europe as it relates to the Air Force. Subsequent sections describe
how USAFE wings engage partner countries, and the authors use results of BP-related report-
ing systems, interviews with USAFE wings, and surveys of USAFE personnel to identify chal-
lenges and opportunities that USAFE faces as it works with partners while meeting operational
readiness requirements.
The Debate About Force Posture, Security Cooperation, and Building
Partnerships in Europe
Security cooperation, especially those activities executed by USAFE, appears to play only a
minor role in the debate about overseas force posture. We draw this observation from both the
literature review and interviews with key U.S. ocials. An interesting case study is the loss of
18 F-16s by the 52nd Fighter Wing (FW) at Spangdahlem AB, Germany, in April 2010, as
a result of Air Force ghter-reduction and cost-saving initiatives. e wing is instrumental in
helping enhance Poland’s air force and support the future Air Force detachment there with
rotational deployments. Yet, our understanding is that perceived security cooperation benets
and potential eects did not factor into that decision.
We found that one of the most-inuential reports on the posture debate came from the
Sustainable Defense Task Force, a group of analysts sponsored by Representative Barney Frank
(D-Massachusetts). e task force’s June 2010 report argues that, in Europe, “the need for
a high-readiness deterrent force is a small fraction of what it once was,” that USAFE force
structure should be reduced by 10,000personnel and one FW equivalent, and that basing
arrangements in eastern Europe should be curtailed (Sustainable Defense Task Force, 2010,
p. 17). However, most notably for the purposes of this study, the topic of security cooperation
conducted by U.S. forces overseas does not appear anywhere in that report. Indeed, the team’s
interviews with key congressional staers conrmed that the Air Force’s BP activities in Europe
and elsewhere are not well understood or even acknowledged at a rudimentary level. More-
over, compared with the U.S. Army in Europe, the Air Force’s role in BP is less understood
8 Working with Allies and Partners: A Cost-Based Analysis of U.S. Air Forces in Europe
and appreciated.1 Our interviews indicate that the Army has reached congressional audiences,
arguing that the funding of its brigade combat teams (BCTs) are not only critical for opera-
tions but also extremely important for partnership and capacity-building activities in Europe.2
A second major observation from our research is that forward-based Air Force forces
regularly engage in BP activities with allies and partner countries during their readiness train-
ing. According to ocials we interviewed, this type of arrangement oers “bang for the buck,”
combining Air Force training requirements with partner-country BP opportunities whenever
possible. Examples include the following: holding noncommissioned ocer (NCO) seminars
with partner enlisted ranks during o-station training events; engaging partner air trac con-
trollers to help facilitate ongoing working relationships for future access; conducting mission
planning and debrief sessions during exercises; and demonstrating capabilities of U.S. equip-
ment to generate partner interest in adding to force structure.
ird, BPC for coalition operations is an important function of airmen based in Europe
and is likely to extend well beyond Afghanistan. Indeed, we found that USAFE and EUCOM
planners are thinking about Air Force BP requirements well beyond the current ght. Opera-
tion ODYSSEY DAWN (OOD) and Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR (OUP) in Libya
were strong catalysts for this type of forward thinking regarding BP. Eorts to enhance
interoperability with the United States’ most reliable partners in NATO facilitated coalition
operations in a rapidly developing, unforeseen contingency operation beyond European bor-
ders. Even small, less capable partners have shown an ability to develop niche capabilities and
contribute to operations in Afghanistan, leaving open opportunities to build their capacity in
other areas for future contingencies.
Fourth, some underreported security cooperation activities of forward-based forces in
Europe have important relationship-building benets. Simply being in the same time zone as
European allies and partners enables routine contacts that help to build lasting relationships.
ese daily, routine activities are often opportunity-driven and possible only with forward-
based forces. ese include aerial refueling, DACT, and air trac control.3
Fifth, there are some practical benets of having forces stationed in Europe, such as dip-
lomatic arrangements, which can enable timely access. For example, forward-based forces and
civil servants enjoy diplomatic status, which essentially means that they are more easily able to
travel on short notice to an allied or partner country, bypassing the ocial and often cumber-
some visit-request process. Additionally, U.S. pilots become familiar with operating in Euro-
pean airspace and working with personnel and procedures from multiple nations.
Sixth, related more to the posture debate, several ocials remarked that, once a U.S.
capability is removed from the European theater, it may be dicult to bring it back. In essence,
the “access threshold” has not been tested and is therefore unclear. Useful access to a partner
nation’s bases, airspace, and armed forces takes years to cultivate but could take much less time
to atrophy if not supported by agreements, frequent use, and, potentially, presence. Establish-
1 Discussions with senior congressional sta members, December 2010.
2 We are certainly not suggesting a connection between the Air Force improving its outreach to Congress and the provi-
sion of additional BP resources. Nonetheless, increasing the value of Air Force BP activities might be used to strengthen an
argument to maintain certain components of the existing force posture in Europe.
3 Although having forces in or near the host nation greatly facilitates BP, there is at least one counterexample in which
military-to-military (M2M) relations are quite close without the United States having any forces based in country. at
example is Australia.
The Partnership-Building Role of U.S. Air Forces in Europe 9
ing the linkage between presence and access is beyond the scope of this analysis; it suces to
note that it would be imprudent to withdraw forces from and curtail activities with Europe
without understanding how it aects U.S. access to this critical region. One does not want to
discover by accident the threshold below which U.S. drawdowns endanger access.
We conclude that BP alone does not justify a large, forward-based presence in Europe;
however, BP activities, undertaken by airmen as part of being stationed in Europe, are a valu-
able tool for promoting and enhancing relationships and building partner-country capability
and capacity. Determining value is extremely challenging, but cost comparisons help to make
the arguments clearer.
All Six Wings of U.S. Air Forces in Europe Engage in Activities to Build
Partnerships
e Air Force’s presence in Europe is, in some ways, a legacy of the Cold War, but the level
of forces and the number of European bases on which Air Force assets reside are a small frac-
tion of what they were when NATO faced the Warsaw Pact across the inter-German border.
Remaining Air Force forces seek to maintain their operational readiness and to enhance rela-
tionships with, and capabilities of, foreign partners. In fact, with their primary training venues
naturally located in Europe, USAFE units must work with foreign partners if for no other
reason than to gain and sustain training partnerships necessary to maintain their operational
readiness.
e study team analyzed six wings and other organizations under USAFE in the AOR;4
Table 2.2 shows each wing, its base, and the key assets and capabilities associated with it. Man-
power at each of the ve aircraft-assigned wings includes not only the pilots and maintainers
for operating the planes but also the logisticians, civil engineers, security forces, medical per-
sonnel, and other agile combat support (ACS) professionals required to sustain and deploy a
combat unit. e 435th Air Ground Operations Wing (AGOW) has no assigned aircraft (it
is collocated with the 86th Airlift Wing [AW]) but elds a wide array of capabilities for expe-
ditionary “open-the-base” operations, tactical air control and weather teams, theater commu-
nications, and other operations. ese capabilities are deployed in 19 geographically separated
units and 14 sites across the AOR (Ramstein AB, 2011). e wing’s manpower includes air
trac controllers, JTACs, civil engineers, medics, and security forces. e 435th Contingency
Response Group (CRG) provides an open-the-base capability but is also formally dual-tasked
as of 2010 to build partner capacity.
All wings engage in BP activities. In addition, USAFE has other organizations dedicated
to BP, including elements of the HQ command and sta at Ramstein and the Warrior Prepara-
tion Center (WPC) at Einsiedlerhof, Germany. Elements of the HQ sta—particularly those
in USAFE’s Directorate of Plans, Programs, and Analyses (AF/A5/8/9)—conduct BP plan-
ning, programming, execution, data collection, and assessment of the command’s BP eorts.
USAFE leaders also expend considerable eort to interact with foreign counterparts. Among
the WPC’s responsibilities are providing initial qualication training to U.S. and coalition
JTAC candidates, supporting the Tactical Leadership Programme (or TLP) in Albacete, Spain,
and supporting the Polygone Electronic Warfare (EW) Range in Bann, Germany. All of these
4 ere are a handful of combat support and air-base wings in USAFE that the team did not analyze.
10 Working with Allies and Partners: A Cost-Based Analysis of U.S. Air Forces in Europe
activities support interoperability among multiple partner countries. In the future, the WPC
will also be responsible for training and interoperability related to BMD in the AOR.
U.S. Air Forces in Europe Recorded 545 Events in a Year of Collecting Data on
Building Partnerships
USAFE has placed a high priority on collecting and analyzing information on the level of
eort expended in the command on BP. is eort is beginning to bear fruit, although, as dis-
cussed later in this chapter and in Chapter ree, signicant challenges remain in accounting
for the myriad of activities in which wings and units engage partner countries. e discussion
in this section provides an introductory description, based on data collected by HQ USAFE,
of BP activities conducted by the six USAFE wings we analyzed. Chapter ree oers a more
detailed analysis of these activities to quantify and cost the wings’ eorts.
USAFE after-action reports (AARs) and the BP scorecard reveal that the command
conducted 545 “BP events” between September 2009 and August 2010.5 About 63percent of
these events involved “traditional” NATO allies—those in the alliance during the Cold War,
such as the UK, Turkey, Germany, and Spain—and Israel. Some 31percent involved new
NATO allies—Poland, Romania, and Hungary—as well as other eastern European coun-
tries, countries in the Caucasus, and Russia. e remainder, or about 6percent, involved Afri-
can countries and others outside of EUCOM’s AOR.
We summarize the BP data collected by USAFE in Table 2.2. e table shows the
number of BP events by wing recorded between September 2009 and August 2010 and
the number of partners engaged. Additional events were conducted by other organizations,
5 e term BP event has not been dened, a challenge addressed later in this chapter.
Table 2.1
U.S. Air Forces in Europe Wings
Wing Base Assets Capabilities
31 FW Aviano AB, Italy F-16CG
A-10
Air defense and strike
CAS
48 FW RAF Lakenheath, UK F-15C
F-15E
HH-60G
Medical Group
Air defense
Strike
Search and rescue
52 FW Spangdahlem AB, Germany F-16CJ Suppression of enemy air
defenses
86 AW Ramstein AB, Germany C-130J
C-21
Other
Tactical airlift
VIP and aeromedical airlift
100 ARW RAF Mildenhall, UK KC-135R Aerial refueling
435 AGOW Ramstein AB, Germany CRG
Air Support Operations
Group
Other assets
Opening contingency bases
JTACs
BPC
NOTE: RAF = Royal Air Force. ARW = Aerial Refueling Wing.
The Partnership-Building Role of U.S. Air Forces in Europe 11
including HQ USAFE and the WPC.6 Of those partners, the table lists the ones that together
participated in about 50percent of reported events; these appear in order of most to fewest
events.7 Finally, the table gives examples of areas in which the wing focused its BP activities.
e 31FW had the lowest number of both events and partners during the period ana-
lyzed. Italy participated in more than half of the events reported for the wing. e 31st natu-
rally worked closely with its host, Italy, and focused in particular on F-16 operations and
maintenance and reghting and security procedures. Other partners engaged included Spain,
Romania, Slovenia, and Bulgaria. Personnel from the 31st conducted ying and weapon train-
ing deployments and DACT in Spain, maintenance NCO training familiarization in Bulgaria
and Romania, and JTAC training with the Slovenians. e wing also used Slovakian ranges to
prepare for an out-of-area deployment.
Reported data indicated that the 48 FW had, by far, the largest number of BP events
during the period at 119 and worked with 30 partner countries. e UK dominated the wing’s
BP activities with 74 events, while the next largest, the Netherlands, participated in 15. Events
with the UK involved dissimilar air combat and air-to-ground (including JTAC) training,
6 ough we discuss the activities of HQ USAFE and the WPC later, the data we attained on them were less detailed than
those of the wings. us, we do not include them in Table 2.2, nor do we include them in the cost analysis provided in the
next chapter.
7 In some cases, multiple partners participated in a single event.
Table 2.2
U.S. Air Forces in Europe Wing Activities for Building Partnerships, September2009–August2010
Wing
Number of BP
Events
Number of
Partners
Engaged
Partners Totaling
50% of Events Examples of BP Activity Focus
31 FW, Aviano AB, Italy 26 9Italy F-16 operations and maintenance
Firefighting
Security forces
Flying training deployments
48 FW, RAF Lakenheath,
UK
119 30 UK, Netherlands CAS and JTACs
Flying exercises
DACT
Medical
52 FW, Spangdahlem
AB, Germany
56 33 Germany,
Belgium,
Netherlands,
Poland
DACT
Flying exercises
Munitions
Maintenance
86 AW, Ramstein AB,
Germany
46 27 Poland, Germany,
Bulgaria, Belgium,
France, Hungary
Airdrops
Maintenance exchanges
HAW support
100 ARW, RAF
Mildenhall, UK
44 22 UK, Germany,
Belgium,
Netherlands
Air refueling currency
Transportation operations
SERE training
Security forces training
Open Skies treaty
435 AGOW, Ramstein
AB, Germany
42 28 Poland, Germany,
Bulgaria, Italy,
Portugal,
Romania
Cargo preparation
Deployable engagement
construction
JTAC training
NOTE: HAW = Heavy Airlift Wing. SERE = survival, evasion, resistance, and escape.
12 Working with Allies and Partners: A Cost-Based Analysis of U.S. Air Forces in Europe
combat search and rescue (CSAR), and medical or health-related events (including medical
evacuation, or MEDEVAC) through the 48th Medical Group and a regional medical center
at RAF Lakenheath. e 48 FW conducted several training events with UK and Dutch air-
craft, as well as ground controllers. Other partners with multiple events included France,
Spain, Sweden, Germany, and Poland. e wing participated in the TLP in Spain; multilateral
NATO exercises, such as ALLIED STRIKE in Germany and FRISIAN FLAG in the Nether-
lands; and engine maintenance operations in Poland. e wing also trained with smaller part-
ners in Baltic and Icelandic air policing events in Lithuania and Iceland, respectively; medical
familiarization in Moldova; and CSAR familiarization in Romania.
e 52 FW reportedly conducted 56 BP events with 33 partner countries. Seventeen of
these events involved the host country, Germany, while events involving Belgium, the Neth-
erlands, and Poland (which is now ying F-16s) totaled about eight each. Types of events
varied considerably and included DACT; NATO and Joint Chiefs of Sta (JCS) exercises, such
as ALLIED STRIKE and BRILLIANT ARDENT; maintenance interoperability training;
munitions operations; and ight safety. Notably, the wing reported some events with partner
countries from outside the AOR, including Canada (hosting senior leaders) and Africa, in
coordination with the 17th Air Force (17AF), in Ghana (working-dog procedure familiariza-
tion), Morocco (F-16 maintenance), and a group of other African countries (an M2M event
to develop basic aircraft and vehicle maintenance and logistics programs for North Africa and
trans-Sahel partners).
Other USAFE units also supported BP events in the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM)
AOR. One of these units is the 86 AW, which partnered with Mali, Nigeria, South Africa, and
other countries on separate occasions. e 86th participated in AFRICOM’s MONASTERY
exercise in South Africa and FLINTLOCK in the trans-Sahel and conducted maintenance
familiarization with Malian and Nigerian counterparts. But the vast majority of 86 AW BP
events were in the AOR. Poland, which has ve U.S.-supplied C-130Es at Powidz AB, par-
ticipated in the most with eight, and these included airdrops and maintenance exchanges,
as well as initiation of a “sister-wing” relationship with the Polish 3 AW. e 86th also con-
ducted airdrops in Bulgaria and, in Hungary, supported the HAW at Papa AB, a consortium
of 12European countries that operates three C-17 cargo aircraft. Lastly, the wing demon-
strated C-130J capabilities in Israel while completing training requirements for aircrew, and it
supported interoperability training with the Israelis.
More than one-third of the events reported by the 100 ARW involved the UK and Ger-
many, with another 20 partners rounding out the remaining events. Activities conducted with
advanced partners often involved aerial refueling training, whereby U.S. KC-135R pilots and
boom operators met currency requirements along with allied ghter pilots. However, the wing
also conducted BP events not related to aerial refueling, including transportation operations
(Croatia), SERE training concepts (UK), security forces training (UK), and engine mainte-
nance support (UK). Finally, the wing supported missions over Russia in compliance with the
Open Skies treaty.
e 435 AGOW executed a wide range of BP events with 28 partner countries during the
year of analysis. Poland, Germany, and Bulgaria participated in the most events; these included
cargo preparation activities with Bulgaria and Poland and JTAC and deployable engagement
construction in Germany. e wing also participated in engagements with Serbia, Geor-
gia, Cyprus, Albania, and Portugal, to name a few. Other BP activities the 435th conducted
included aireld site surveys, tactical weather training, and combat communication support.
The Partnership-Building Role of U.S. Air Forces in Europe 13
Note that the stas at HQ USAFE and the WPC also engaged multiple partners in a
wide variety of eorts. HQ USAFE reported more than 120BP events during the period in
about 37 of the 51 countries in the AOR. Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Croatia, and Poland
were among the highest instances, suggesting a focus on eastern European allies. Many of
these events were M2M and technical exchanges and senior-leader interactions. For example,
exchanges with Bulgaria often involved standardization and evaluation procedures, surveys,
studies, and conferences. ose with Croatia involved familiarization with air sovereignty
operations, JTAC training, and water purication equipment. Some events also focused on
more-advanced allies in the West, including Germany, France, and the UK; these featured
senior-leader visits, conferences on elements of airpower, and participation in regional training
events.
WPC reporting during the period between September 2009 and August 2010 was rela-
tively light. ese included one report of the JTAC qualication course performed at RAF
Lakenheath for 15 Belgian, Finnish, German, and Slovenian students; support for the JCS
exercise FLEXIBLE RESPONSE involving Germany and Italy; and support for an operational
mentor and liaison team (OMLT) event to help Hungarian, Slovenian, and Polish OMLT
members better understand CAS for a mission in Afghanistan. e reporting during this
period did not adequately represent the WPC’s BP activities, according to RAND interviews
with WPC command and sta.8
e preceding discussion provides a general overview of a year of USAFE BP activi-
ties. e activities highlighted include events involving USAFE aircraft, technical and M2M
exchanges, senior-leader visits, and interoperability training. An additional type of activity,
community relations, comprised about 20percent of reported events. Every wing and organi-
zation in USAFE engages partners in these “good-neighbor” activities, often in the communi-
ties surrounding the home station. Community relations include ybys for commemorations,
base tours for community leaders, and meetings with mayors. It should be noted that commu-
nity activities are not limited to U.S. forces overseas; every base, whether located overseas or
in the United States, engages in them to ensure productive, friendly relations with the citizens
living nearby and with local and state governments.
Wing Interviews and Surveys Provided a More Comprehensive Picture of
Efforts by U.S. Air Forces in Europe to Build Partnerships
e RAND team supplemented data collected by HQ USAFE by visiting the six wings, the
WPC, and the HQ itself to engage commanders, stas, pilots, maintainers, civil engineers,
medics, and personnel in other career elds in focused discussions on their experiences in
BP. In addition, the team developed and conducted an online survey of the same organiza-
tions to systematically attain BP-related information and quantify some of the results.9 ese
eorts provided a more comprehensive and nuanced view of USAFE’s BP eorts than could be
8 Little reporting about WPC activities was found in the data during the period analyzed, but this was due to lack of
reporting, not activity. e center began rectifying this as of the beginning of 2011 (author discussions with WPC ocials,
May 2011).
9 e study team received outstanding support for the wing visits and surveys from leaders and stas at HQ USAFE and
the wings themselves.
14 Working with Allies and Partners: A Cost-Based Analysis of U.S. Air Forces in Europe
derived from the data alone. ey revealed challenges and opportunities that USAFE faces as
it seeks to meet U.S. and theater objectives in the AOR.
e RAND team held focused discussions during visits to the wings and other organiza-
tions between November 2010 and May 2011.10 ese discussions often were held with groups
of about ve to 15 people and were divided by specialty (e.g., pilots, air trac controllers) but,
at times, included multiple specialties. In addition, the team had separate discussions with
wing and organization leadership. e survey was online from April to June and asked respon-
dents for information about frequency and length of participation in BP events, communica-
tion with foreign partners, the eect of BP on individual and unit training, and resources (in
particular, manpower) required to build partnerships. e survey questionnaire and results can
be found in Appendix A.
e discussion in this section provides observations that emerged from the interviews and
survey. We categorize the observations as follows:
• Mission: the extent to which the BP mission is guided by strategy or opportunity in the
AOR
• Training: how BP events aect and are aected by the requirement of U.S. units to main-
tain operational readiness
• Operational impact: qualitative insights into the eects of partnerships on contingency
operations
• Resources: the availability of funding and skilled manpower to implement BP eorts
• Access: how eorts to build partnerships might relate to U.S. access to partner countries.
Many of the examples provided in the discussion are in terms of three capabilities that USAFE
seeks to build, sustain, and enhance with partners and that were deemed by USAFE and the
RAND team to be high value in terms of BP:
• JTACs: eorts to select, train, and sustain a cadre of foreign partners capable of providing
air-ground coordination (e.g., CAS, airdrops)
• Expeditionary airlift: eorts to improve partner ability to plan and execute cargo, passen-
ger, CASEVAC, or airdrop missions on U.S. or partner airlifters
• Fighter interoperability: eorts designed to improve the ability of U.S. and partner ghters
and associated support to meet NATO standards and to train and ght together.
Mission
A common refrain during wing interviews was that BP in USAFE appears to be opportunity-
rather than strategy-driven. USAFE organizations do seek to build partnerships as an “ancil-
lary benet” of their own training eorts, but only some of the BP element is based on top-
down guidance. Wing personnel do not believe that they are seeing the “big picture” of BP in
the AOR, and, in particular, the commander’s BP intent of individual events often is not clear.
HQ USAFE has recently developed a “white cell,” whose purpose is to take advantage of BP
opportunities when they arise and to provide some guidance to participating units. But numer-
10 e team visited the 48 FW and 100 ARW in the UK in March 2011; the 31 FW in Italy and the 52 FW, 435 AGOW,
86 AW, and WPC in Germany in May 2011; and HQ USAFE in Germany in November 2010 and May 2011.
The Partnership-Building Role of U.S. Air Forces in Europe 15
ous interlocutors at the wing level maintained that their guidance is to “go out and do good”
without actionable, BP-related tasks.
In some respects, this lack of guidance that some wing personnel lamented may be appro-
priate. First, not every airman on a BP-related deployment needs to know and understand the
commander’s intent, although such knowledge can serve as motivation for even the most-junior
participants. But certainly wing leadership, planners, and mission commanders need to have a
sense of what specic objectives the United States seeks to achieve in a given partner country
and how the capabilities covered during a particular BP event t into those objectives. In some
cases, this sense of purpose and overarching strategy is present, but often it is lacking. Second,
for forward-based forces that operate continuously in partner countries, many BP events may
naturally be opportunity-driven. In fact, forward basing allows USAFE to quickly take advan-
tage of emerging opportunities and to derive ancillary BP benet from normal training activi-
ties. F-15Es from the 48 FW can enable short-notice upgrades of UK and other JTACs because
of the wing’s presence at Lakenheath; likewise, the KC-135Rs from the 100ARW Mildenhall
can provide aerial refueling to partner-country aircraft on virtually a moment’s notice. But
even opportunity-driven events must be placed in a strategic context.
Detailed, air-related country plans would help provide this context. Such plans would
provide HQ USAFE and wing planners with objectives to be achieved and training and capa-
bility milestones to be met, and they would allow planners to tailor events to help implement
the plans. Initiatives are under way at HQ Air Force (as part of Campaign Support Plan devel-
opment) and at HQ USAFE to develop and standardize such plans. ese would be of enor-
mous value to promoting cost-eective eorts to plan and execute BP events, whether they are
opportunity- or strategy-driven.
Better country planning could also help USAFE take advantage of missed opportunities
noted during the wing visits. For example, few maintainers involved in discussions with us at
the wings stated that they had engaged with partner-country personnel during training events
either at home station or on deployment. Nearly half of maintainers and logisticians who
responded to the RAND survey said they did not participate in BP-related activities. Many
maintainers stated that their activities during o-station training events were limited solely to
sortie generation and that they rarely, if ever, “crossed the tarmac” to engage with foreign main-
tenance personnel. A focus on sortie generation is, of course, warranted, but such events could
also be opportunities for structured seminars with host-country maintainers—even those in
eastern Europe who work on aircraft that are dierent from U.S. aircraft—on such areas as
aircraft safety and toolbox organization and control. ese could support objectives related to
both expeditionary airlift and ghter interoperability.
A second example of missed opportunity is during hosted events, those events in which
foreign partners visit U.S. bases in Europe to observe operations or learn U.S. training tech-
niques. Some of these events, when they are focused and have clear objectives, can have impor-
tant BP eects on partners. For instance, visits by the Poles on separate occasions to observe
U.S. operations at Spangdahlem (ghter operations and hydrazine fuel servicing), Ramstein
(apparently every three months, including to observe preparations for aeromedical missions),
and Aviano (F-16 maintenance operations) were heralded by many discussants as having impor-
tant eects on the growing U.S.-Polish partnership and on Polish operational capability of its
F-16s and C-130Es. On the other hand, several hosting events discussed during wing visits
were much less fruitful, because either the wing or the personnel hosting the visit were unclear
about objectives and appropriate schedule; these reportedly turned into “shopping trips” for
16 Working with Allies and Partners: A Cost-Based Analysis of U.S. Air Forces in Europe
the visitors, who took advantage of their travel to Germany, the UK, or Italy. Hosting events,
if planned carefully, can have great impact in terms of BP and partner capacity.
Finally, some units reported that they felt underutilized for BP. In particular, organiza-
tions in the 435 AGOW, including the CRG, believed that they had the capacity to do more.
Although the CRG has only recently been “dual-hatted” to build partnerships in addition to
opening bases, it has been conducting dedicated BP activities for many years. One example of
this is the CRG’s work with the Poles in the past ten years to enable expeditionary airlift for
coalition operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Beginning with basic concepts of cargo plan-
ning, the Poles are now capable of doing their own planning, preparation, handling, and
loading for airlift by U.S. aircraft. Moreover, they are applying U.S.-based concepts to their
C-130E operations, reportedly improving their own ability to perform expeditionary airlift.
To get the most benet out of a more strategically oriented approach to the mission of BP,
it is important that decisionmakers have the fullest possible visibility into the activities being
pursued throughout the command. Such visibility is critical for assessments, planning, prioriti-
zation, resourcing decisions, and advocacy. BP is an area of relatively recent focus across DoD.
Reporting (or management information) systems do not yet adequately capture DoD’s BP
activities in a way that supports such decisionmaking. USAFE has worked hard to improve the
accounting of its BP eorts, particularly for advocacy purposes, but its reporting processes also
are not optimized for BP. USAFE’s processes for reporting BP activities—like those of other
DoD organizations—is plagued by inconsistent application, terminology, and data. BP-related
data often are gleaned from AARs that units send to respective stas in the HQ (i.e., ying
units to HQ USAFE Operations, or AF/A3, support units to Logistics and Installations, or AF/
A4/7). Specic information on cost, number of aircraft and personnel, and tasks accomplished
are often incomplete or missing. Moreover, not all BP events are reported, whereas other events
that have little or no BP value are reported and counted as equivalent to high-value events.
Lack of a basic denition of BP event promotes some of these inconsistencies. Without a
denition, it is dicult to provide guidance on what data should and should not be collected to
those in the units or stas with responsibility for BP reporting. With this in mind, we oer the
following denition of BP event for consideration: A planned or unplanned activity that initi-
ates, builds, and sustains relationships with, capabilities of, and access to foreign partner mili-
taries, leaders, governments, and populations in accordance with the combatant commander’s
theater and country objectives. is is a relatively broad denition, but there are important
concepts within it. First, the fact that an activity can be unplanned ensures the inclusion of
“pop-up” opportunities. Second, BP activities should work toward sustaining a relationship,
inasmuch as “one-o” visits—those in which there is little or no follow-up for months or
years—may actually harm a relationship by raising a potential partner’s expectations of future
collaboration with the United States. ird, the audience is not only the partner’s military but
also the leaders, other nonmilitary parts of the partner’s government, and its citizens. Lastly—
and perhaps most importantly—the event must help achieve the COCOM’s theater, regional,
and country objectives. As mentioned previously, more-systematic country planning, particu-
larly from the Air Force and air component perspective, would facilitate clear linkages between
event goals and tasks on the one hand and country and theater objectives on the other.
e denition also contains the seeds of a means of valuing and prioritizing BP events.
For example, how important to COCOM priorities is U.S. participation in a particular air
show? What is the comparative value of a chance meeting and discussion on the tarmac about
aircraft safety between a U.S. maintainer and a Bulgarian counterpart, and a seminar for Bul-
The Partnership-Building Role of U.S. Air Forces in Europe 17
garian 7-level equivalents taught by a U.S. senior master sergeant? Or of o-station training
that involves teaching the Greeks about U.S. processes for generating ghter sorties and a visit
to Aviano by Greek maintainers to observe the end-to-end process in action?
e following list provides suggested criteria for valuing and prioritizing BP events:
• Benet for U.S. training. It is particularly important, and often of highest priority, that
an event help participating U.S. personnel and units meet their training and readiness
requirements.
• Level and rank of U.S. and partner personnel. Depending on the type of event, more expe-
rience on both sides would help ensure that the appropriate skills are properly taught and
learned.
• Partner’s ability to absorb the skill or capability imparted. An event must match a capabil-
ity being emphasized with the partner’s capacity to understand it and incorporate it into
training and operations.
• Durability of skill or capability imparted. BP concepts that “train the trainer” facilitate
absorption and sustainment of a skill or concept into a partner’s military. e focus of this
criterion is the sustainability of a skill or capability.
• Relevance to interoperability. is would help evaluate the extent to which an event enables
the Air Force and its partners to share procedures, tactics, concepts of operation, and
other important components of a successful coalition operation.
• Relevance to operational capability. is refers to whether an event helps improve a part-
ner’s ability to conduct military operations in accordance with the COCOM’s and air
component’s objectives and as established in the country plan.
• Relevance to ongoing or future contingency operations. Related to interoperability and oper-
ational capability, this would determine the applicability of an event to meeting opera-
tional objectives in particular scenarios (e.g., Libya, Afghanistan).
• Relevance to institutional capacity. A partner’s capacity for training, logistics, planning,
programming and budgeting, personnel management, and other important functions of
military institutions provides the foundation for a sustainable and operable national mili-
tary organization and one that is able to learn and improve.
• Relevance to military professionalization. Events focused on professionalizing a foreign mil-
itary are intended to encourage adherence to democratic human rights and legal norms
and to civilian authority.
• Relevance to access. Access to foreign leaders, bases, airspace, and intelligence is critical to
enabling U.S. global reach.
• Relevance to good neighborliness and U.S. image. is measures the utility of an event to
promoting positive attitudes toward the United States and U.S. presence and to facilitat-
ing cooperation between U.S. forces and local communities.
• Potential for sustained U.S. partnership and interest in U.S. concepts and equipment. is
nal criterion evaluates whether an event entices a partner to pursue further BP interac-
tions with the United States and potentially to buy U.S. services or equipment.
ese criteria could be prioritized dierently for each partner country engaged based on
COCOM and air component objectives and the focus of U.S. policy in the region. Moreover,
it should be noted that these criteria could apply not only to single events but also to long-term
exchanges (e.g., when a U.S. ocer is assigned for a year to a partner’s planning sta).
18 Working with Allies and Partners: A Cost-Based Analysis of U.S. Air Forces in Europe
It is important to emphasize that any enhancements in BP reporting should avoid increas-
ing the workload on wing and unit personnel. In other words, they should not add to the exist-
ing reporting burden on units. A holistic approach to improving BP reporting would be pur-
sued in the context of streamlining existing management information processes across other
key functions, including after-action reporting.
Training
e rst criterion listed in the previous section refers to benets of BP activities to U.S. training.
is is of key importance to both USAFE and the wings and squadrons assigned to it. Much
of the training for attaining qualications, maintaining currency, and conducting upgrades in
USAFE-assigned units—and, for some units, all training—is carried out in partner countries.
Although USAFE units do conduct some training in CONUS (e.g., at Red Flag), it would be
very expensive and time-consuming to do the majority of training events across the Atlantic.
As such, USAFE must forge and sustain relationships with countries in the AOR to gain access
to their ranges and airspace and to train with them. Longstanding relationships with tradi-
tional allies, such as the UK, the Netherlands, and Germany, provide opportunities for U.S.
personnel to train with other capable air forces, while emerging relationships with newer allies,
such as Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, and Hungary, open opportunities for U.S. training in less
restrictive ranges and airspace than are available elsewhere in the AOR. One respondent to
the RAND survey remarked that “working BPC signicantly opens up more training areas,
ranges, and events—all of which are of great benet to the squadron, [Air Force], and more
importantly [in the] long term, NATO.” And, as indicated previously, through required U.S.
training, USAFE and its wings seek opportunities for ancillary BP benet.
In the RAND survey, about half of the respondents reported that they take the oppor-
tunity to build partnerships and “impart ancillary BP benet” during all or most o-station
training events; about one-third said that they very rarely or never see this benet. Interest-
ingly, two-thirds of respondents from operations groups (e.g., pilots) answered “all” or “most,”
while about the same proportion of logistics personnel (largely maintainers) answered “some”
or “very rarely/never,” reinforcing the point made in the previous section about missed oppor-
tunities. e survey also revealed that, for the most part, USAFE personnel get benet from
training in foreign countries and with foreign personnel. A plurality of 44percent responded
that conducting training o-station in foreign countries is very benecial for their learning,
currency requirements, and unit training, while one-third said that it is somewhat benecial.
But, at times, HQ USAFE and wing commanders must make trade-os between meet-
ing training requirements and BP, and, although many USAFE personnel get training benet
from BP events, they also face training challenges. Each specialty has training requirements to
maintain current qualications or to upgrade—for example, ghter pilots must meet Ready
Aircrew Program (RAP) requirements of ying-hours per month of certain types and quality.
Units (e.g., squadrons) have readiness requirements they must meet for levels of supplies, work-
ing equipment, and trained personnel to generate sorties and execute missions dened in their
designed operational capability (DOC) statements. Maintaining needed levels of currency and
readiness is a challenge even for squadrons in CONUS; in Europe, where BP is also a high
priority, the eort to maintain unit readiness can be even more challenging. Wing personnel
in USAFE often talk of the paucity of “white space” on the training calendar—periods of time
when units can do nontraining activities. Some BP events provide little or no training value
and thus are seen not only as occupying this white space (if any) but also as eating into train-
The Partnership-Building Role of U.S. Air Forces in Europe 19
ing time. Other events provide high training value, which is of greater value to U.S. personnel.
However, many of these events help build relationships among U.S. and partner-nation (PN)
individuals and units, so the overall value may transcend the training value.
e training value of BP events can vary depending on the type of U.S. unit and aircraft
or other equipment, the goal of a training event, the level of sophistication of the partners, the
availability of ranges and other training environments, and other factors. For example, the abil-
ity of U.S. strike or CAS aircraft (including F-15Es, A-10s, and F-16s) to work with both U.S.
and foreign JTACs at ranges in Croatia enables those U.S. pilots both to maintain currency in
controlled bombing missions and to encounter dierent levels of capability among controllers;
at the same time, these events ensure qualication and currency of the foreign JTACs them-
selves. In fact, it appears that, of the three key capabilities used as high-value examples in this
section (JTACs, expeditionary airlift, and ghter interoperability), the ability of USAFE units
to work with JTACs provides the most training utility. e C-130Js out of Ramstein perform
airdrops with eastern European paratroopers that help airlift pilots maintain currency in these
operations, and, during some of the events, they can take training advantage of access to dirt
landing strips and to airspace that allows them to conduct tactical approaches that they cannot
execute in Germany. Likewise, U.S. ghters in Europe are able to do DACT with foreign pilots
ying Typhoons, MiG-29s, and Tornados. is training provides U.S. pilots with adaptive
skills and allows them to experience missions against pilots with dierent tactics, capabili-
ties, and procedures, and it helps prepare U.S. pilots for both combat against adversaries and
combat integration with allies.
On the other hand, some training involving partners appears less benecial to U.S. cur-
rency and readiness requirements. PN air forces have less advanced capabilities than those of
the Air Force—with some trying to maintain just a basic capacity to eld an air force—and
U.S. tactics must, at times, be adjusted to account for this in ways that detract from U.S. train-
ing. Events related to ghter interoperability appear to be the most problematic. For instance,
it is a challenge to nd adequate air-to-air training for U.S. pilots apart from UK Typhoons
and Tornados, particularly those ying F-15Cs at Lakenheath. ere are multiple reasons for
this, including lack of ranges, the need to “dial back” skills and tactics during exercises to
match partner capabilities and meet nondisclosure requirements, and restrictions in the AOR
on important training regimens, such as launches of AIM-120 air-to-air missiles. On this last
point, there is even uncertainty about mission capability of the AIM-120s because pilots are
rarely able to use them in live-re training events (and live-re training using AIM-120s is
expensive). USAFE will also likely experience interoperability and training challenges with the
introduction of the F-35 into the command.11
Other squadrons and wings in USAFE also face training challenges of varying diculty.
One survey respondent notes that “any time participating in exercises where we must limit our
tactics or training due to host-country or self-imposed limitations is detrimental to combat
readiness and learning objectives of upgrades.” Another laments that “almost every training
item I need to accomplish is harder to reach, more expensive, takes longer, and has a longer
wait time than when done stateside.” About 20percent of respondents claim that currency
training (for an individual or a unit) is, at times, postponed, canceled, or waived because of
BP needs; 21percent of these suggest that this occurs, on average, as much as once every three
11 Interoperability will be a challenge even within the Air Force when the F-35 comes on line.
20 Working with Allies and Partners: A Cost-Based Analysis of U.S. Air Forces in Europe
months. Pilots and others from the operations groups appear to face the most training chal-
lenges, with 35percent of them stating that they experience some postponement or cancella-
tion of currency training due to BP needs.
All in all, training in Europe has both benets and drawbacks. Given that Air Force units
are forward-based in Europe, they seek training opportunities in partner countries and with
partner personnel that maximize their ability to meet training requirements and preserve unit
readiness. As they plan for and execute their training regimens, they seek opportunities for BP
and BPC where practicable. As such, BP is often an ancillary benet of U.S. training and thus
can be considered a “free commodity” derived from that training and the resources applied to
it.
It is interesting to note that, given the emphasis in DoD on BP and on improving the
military’s ability to work in dierent cultures, languages, and environments, assignment to
USAFE can provide immense benet to the BP training of U.S. airmen. About 76percent of
survey respondents stated that they had not worked with foreign partners in BP events before
coming to USAFE. Yet, 74percent say that they now work with partners in USAFE. In prac-
tical terms, then, USAFE serves as a real-world BP “schoolhouse” for the Air Force because
many airmen in USAFE frequently work with foreign partners and must understand their
procedures and environment to ensure the success of day-to-day operations.
Operational Impact
Many USAFE BP eorts facilitate planning, combat, and support operations with current
and potential coalition partners. Operation IRAQI FREEDOM and Operation ENDURING
FREEDOM have provided the impetus for these eorts in the past ten years, as allies and part-
ners have sought to contribute to operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. But activities to enhance
the capacity of partners and improve interoperability among NATO allies in Europe predate
2001 and extend back to the post–World War II and Cold War eras. ese decades of BP activ-
ities have helped traditional NATO allies forge relatively modern and capable air forces that
can operate together in complex combat environments. And, since the fall of the Soviet Union,
new allies have emerged that are taking similar paths toward having more-capable air forces.
JTAC capabilities represent an area of USAFE BP focus that enables both developed and
less developed partners to contribute to out-of-area contingencies, particularly in Iraq and
Afghanistan. JTACs have been indispensible during these operations for calling in CASEVAC,
airdrop, and strike missions. e vast majority of JTACs in Afghanistan are from the United
States or UK. However, other countries, including Italy, Belgium, Poland, and Estonia, have
contributed JTACs to operations there.12 is capability not only is critical to the success of
eorts in Afghanistan but also provides a means for smaller countries, such as Estonia, that
want to contribute to develop a new capacity and provide forces to a high-priority contingency.
Moreover, JTAC capabilities can be seen as an important opening for countries that had not
been able to conduct coalition operations in the past to enhance future contributions even
beyond JTAC capabilities.
USAFE is helping expand the pool of JTACs in Europe for out-of-area operations in two
ways. First, the WPC oers six courses per year that provide initial JTAC qualications to both
U.S. and coalition students. ese courses produced 87 graduates in scal year (FY) 2010 from
12 Author correspondence with ocials at the WPC, May 2011.
The Partnership-Building Role of U.S. Air Forces in Europe 21
Latvia, Poland, Lithuania, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Hungary, and several other partner
countries. Each course involves academic study and eld training with eight simulated and
actual control events, including with actual aircraft and live munitions. After going through
the course, graduates return to their units to conduct mission qualication training with four
additional controls. is is the second area in which USAFE supports JTAC training: provid-
ing aircraft and U.S. JTACs to complete partner JTAC qualications and to maintain their
currency over time. is includes participation in the annual, multinational air-ground exer-
cise, ALLIED STRIKE. In this way, multiple countries, including new NATO allies, can
provide important contributions to ongoing coalition operations outside the AOR.13 For some
smaller partners, JTACs have become a niche capability and source of national pride and can
provide an opening for development of other capabilities as warranted.14
USAFE eorts over many years to enhance ghter interoperability in the alliance helped
make possible NATO operations over Libya. Interoperability applies at both the tactical and
operational levels and includes mission planning; incorporation of intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance; air tasking; and mission execution. RAND discussions at the wings indi-
cated that combined training, as well as routine interactions among operators at exercises and
other types of events, contributed immensely to smooth integration during coalition opera-
tions. Multinational exercises, such as ANATOLIAN EAGLE, ALLIED STRIKE, and FRI-
SIAN FLAG, as well as courses at the ten-country TLP in Spain, which provides mission
commander training to non-U.S. ghter pilots, help raise coalition standards and synchronize
tactics and procedures well before any contingency operation occurs.
Pointing out that “wars are come-as-you-are,” many interlocutors—including some
USAFE leadership—emphasized that the relationships built with foreign planners and pilots
during exercises were indispensible in coalition operations, particularly rapidly developing
ones, such as OOD and OUP over Libya. One survey respondent stated that “the more we
can train with our NATO partners the better the cooperation will be when the time comes
to execute.” Many indicated that the relationships forged during steady-state activities made it
easier to integrate and ght together during contingency operations because U.S. and partner
personnel had worked together before. As one discussant put it, “it’s sort of along the same
lines as [U.S.] units training together—making friends, contacts, and building cohesiveness,”
which, as another pointed out, has “been vital in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM and
OOD/OUP to be able to work alongside them.” In practical terms, one interlocutor empha-
sized that “communications barriers occur in combat. It is better to nd that specic verbiage
is confusing in a training scenario rather than nding out in combat.”15
e RAND survey indicates, in fact, that many USAFE airmen forge relationships and
have ongoing, informal communication with partner personnel. is includes not only rela-
tionships with partner military personnel but also local political leaders, as well as contractors
in partner countries who provide services and supplies to visiting U.S. forces during engage-
13 One ocial described Polish JTACs as “very impressive,” and, after several years of USAFE-Polish JTAC courses and
engagements, the Poles have developed their own JTAC training pipeline.
14 Other niche capabilities mentioned include eld medical care, search and rescue, setting up an aireld (with perimeter
security and communications), heavy construction, and cargo movement.
15 e project team did not have the opportunity to speak with U.S. or NATO commanders involved in the Libya opera-
tion, nor was the team privy to AARs that could provide more empirical insight into the eects of previous BP activities on
operational outcomes.
22 Working with Allies and Partners: A Cost-Based Analysis of U.S. Air Forces in Europe
ments. About one-third of respondents estimated that they engaged in informal communica-
tion with partner personnel at least once a month, while another 22percent communicated
once every three to six months. Half of these communications were face-to-face, with another
44percent by email or telephone. A small but growing percentage of these communications
was by texting, chatting, and Skype. And, in several interviews, discussants mentioned Face-
book as a means of communication with partners. ese informal communications involved
maintaining personal relationships (32percent), preparing for upcoming events (30percent),
discussing and resolving technical issues (27percent), and evaluating past events (11percent).
In sum, interviews in USAFE suggest that BP events in which USAFE units participate
on a continuing basis serve to raise partner ability to contribute to contingency operations,
enhance interoperability, and provide “intangibles” that facilitate integration when the alliance
must execute combat missions. is is not to say that coalition operations run as smoothly or
easily as U.S.-only operations. But BP activities in USAFE appear to facilitate operations with
the United States’ most reliable NATO allies and coalition partners, increase the number of
partners able to contribute to operations, and—because of improved core and niche capabili-
ties across a wide array of partners in the AOR—potentially expand the number of partners
willing to contribute to operations.16
Resources
Although central accounts (e.g., EUCOM) fund a signicant number of BP events, many
resources come from USAFE unit training and result from the expenditure of U.S. training
funds that are part of budgets that the U.S. Air Force allocates to major commands (MAJ-
COMs), such as USAFE. As such, it is a free commodity to EUCOM and other sponsors of
activities with foreign partners oered by USAFE airmen as a matter of course. To be clear, we
note that USAFE training funds are not used to train partners but rather to train U.S. units
in partner countries where foreign military personnel receive ancillary benet from interaction
with USAFE airmen and assets. For a partner to attain maximum benet, the partner govern-
ment must apply its own resources to its participation in an event; the lack of availability of
partner resources sometimes limits the extent to which a partner can participate in these events
with U.S. forces. e point is that even routine USAFE unit training results in benets to part-
ners, and unit training funds make this possible, almost by default. is constitutes a benet of
being present in the region, a benet that CONUS-based forces are unable to duplicate.
As indicated previously, BP is EUCOM’s top priority per its Strategy for Active Security
(SAS). USAFE, as it seeks to maintain the readiness of the forces assigned to it, must translate
that priority into action. Yet, despite the high priority accorded to BP, this mission does not
appear in unit DOC statements. DOC statements lay out the missions that units are to be able
to perform, and they drive training, resources, and evaluation of both the unit and its com-
mander. us, if a unit performs a mission that does not appear in its DOC statement, the
unit does not formally train to execute the mission, the resources the unit receives for opera-
tions do not take the mission into account, and the unit’s ability to perform the mission is not
assessed. At the individual level, personnel are not given skills required to do the mission well,
16 Decisions to participate in coalition operations, of course, derive from many, often more-important, factors beyond
possession of capability. Moreover, participation can serve political rather than operational purposes. e study team was
unable to analytically determine political willingness or operational eectiveness from BP activities.
The Partnership-Building Role of U.S. Air Forces in Europe 23
they perform the mission in addition to those included in the DOC statement, and they are
neither evaluated nor rewarded for doing it well (e.g., it does not benet career progression).17
Most USAFE personnel understand that BP is a high priority in the AOR and view BP
as one of their primary missions. Seventypercent of survey respondents state that BP is an
important part of their readiness training missions. But they point out that “manning does not
appear to take into account this critical mission.” One respondent remarked that
there is a dierence between what our unit DOC statement species and what we under-
stand the overarching mission and goals of 3rd AF, USAFE, [and] EUCOM are. e
bottom line is that EUCOM desires BP participation [and] that is part of our mission no
matter what we are actually tasked with in the DOC statement. However, we are not nec-
essarily funded, trained, [or] equipped to execute BP in addition to or in combination with
DOC requirements.
Because of this, whether BP events are funded by outside sources or as beneciaries of unit
training and funds, any additional manpower needed to conduct the BP component of an
event can be taken “out of hide”—i.e., it is an additional, unfunded requirement.
Supervisors and commanders of ights, squadrons, wings, and stas who completed the
RAND survey believe that their manning should be, on average, about 3percent higher than
what they currently have to account for the additional demands of BP activities. Many units
are assigned fewer personnel than they are authorized, so, in some cases, lling authoriza-
tions could help alleviate the BP manning challenge. In other cases, assigning personnel to
100percent of authorizations would not suce, so manpower requirements might need to be
reassessed if BP-related activities are to be taken into account. However, it is a rare case when
a commander anywhere in the Air Force believes that his or her unit is “adequately manned;”
BP is just one of several activities that could create this perception.
is resourcing challenge for USAFE and its wings does not necessarily indicate that
DOC statements should be changed to reect the additional demands of BP among forward-
based forces. e importance of BP relative to other demands on units must be established
before the Air Force institutes changes in training, resourcing, and career progression based
on this mission.
Access
USAFE conducts numerous BP activities designed to gain, maintain, and expand access to
partner countries in both the EUCOM and AFRICOM AORs. Building relationships with
foreign personnel is one form of access, whereby USAFE can help promote U.S. national inter-
ests and, in some cases, enable access to partner military and civilian leadership. BP-related
interactions help pave the way for peacetime access to bases, ranges, and airspace as well. is
access is critical to providing training opportunities for USAFE and other Air Force units. It
can also facilitate U.S. military operations in or from the AOR.18 A case in point is access to
Aviano AB, where years of USAFE eorts to build trust and joint procedures between U.S. and
17 In a future posture that has BP as a priority, the logic would shift from “Do what you can within available resources
without disrupting training” to “Make BP priority the unit mission, rather than a secondary mission done more or less with
spare capacity.”
18 For more information on how basing access is negotiated and how it plays politically within partner countries, as well as
between host and guest, see Cooley, 2008.
24 Working with Allies and Partners: A Cost-Based Analysis of U.S. Air Forces in Europe
Italian air trac controllers provided the only means to enable high-intensity air operations
from that critical base during OOD and OUP.19 Even in Africa, site surveys and assessments of
airelds and partner assets can lead a partner to request additional interaction and assistance.
Note that peacetime BP activities do not guarantee wartime access; the relationship
between U.S. interactions with foreign partners and presence in partner countries on one hand
and the amount of access granted at critical times on the other is not clear. Turkey provides a
notable example of a close, established partner refusing to support U.S. operations in a time of
need, as it did in the lead-up to Operation IRAQI FREEDOM in 2003. However, when inter-
ests of the United States and its partners coincide, the familiarization, procedures, agreements,
and relationships forged over time are crucial to facilitating rapid response to crises either by
U.S. forces alone or in coalition with allies and friends.
Although previous BP activities and relationships may not be a major determinant of
willingness to cooperate in specic situations, laying the groundwork for cooperation and
support of contingency operations is important in terms of allowing access once a decision
is taken. Cross-COCOM access requirements may drive some BP activities in the EUCOM
AOR even after cessation of operations in Afghanistan. Concurrent analysis in RAND Project
AIR FORCE (PAF) on future CENTCOM operational requirements suggests that access to
bases and airspace in eastern portions of the EUCOM AOR, for example, could be crucial in
the event of a large-scale U.S. conict with Iran.20 Iran’s growing ballistic missile and rocket
arsenal threatens U.S. air operations at bases across the Persian Gulf in Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC) countries. Moreover, the United States may not be able to count on political
cooperation from all of its key partners or access to important bases and airspace. us, the
PAF analysis suggests that Air Force planners must consider dispersal options that are both
farther away (to improve survivability against short-range ballistic missile attack on air bases)
and provide options for enlisting more partners as a hedge against denial of access by some. A
BP focus on access to partners in the eastern parts of the AOR is therefore warranted.
Figure 2.1 depicts locations in the EUCOM AOR where U.S. strike aircraft could be
based in a crisis or conict with Iran. e gure also shows air corridors from these bases to
targets in Iran (note that some corridors pass through the airspace of countries outside the
AOR). Bases are considered appropriate if they can support U.S. F-16s either currently or with
some development, are within refueling range of key targets in Iran (enabling 1.5 to more than
two sorties per day), and are not vulnerable to debilitating missile attacks. e bases are also
rated higher if aircraft overy fewer countries on their way to and from Iran. Bases in the AOR
located in Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Israel, Greece, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Turkey are
considered most appropriate and useful in a large conict with Iran. From these bases, there
are four air corridors to Iran: over the Black Sea and through the Caucasus (overy two coun-
tries); through Turkey (one country); through Israel, Jordan, and Iraq or Saudi Arabia (one to
three countries); and through Egypt and Saudi Arabia (two countries).
It may be worthwhile for USAFE to conduct activities that promote access to bases and
airspace in these countries for CENTCOM contingencies. Most of the EUCOM partner
countries noted above have multiple bases that are appropriate to consider. In these coun-
19 e Italians have very strict qualications for air trac controllers, and only those U.S. controllers who had mastered
these qualications (taking approximately six months) are allowed to operate at Aviano.
20 Many thanks to RAND colleagues David Frelinger and Jacob Heim for sharing their analysis of Air Force posture
requirements to support U.S. strikes against Iran. Results of that study had not been published as of April 2012.
The Partnership-Building Role of U.S. Air Forces in Europe 25
tries, examples of these activities include those that promote improvements to bases that are
already appropriate and expanded understandings and agreements over their use. In Poland
and Hungary, only one or two bases are identied as appropriate. To ensure that the United
States retains multiple options, USAFE might consider site surveys of candidate airelds in
southeastern Poland and eastern Hungary to expand the number potentially available to U.S.
forces. At the same time, BP planners in USAFE may be wise to expand and exercise overight
rights in the Caucasus, Turkey, and Israel. Finally, BP events in countries of the eastern part of
the AOR could include deployments of combat and support aircraft to familiarize U.S. forces
with operations in these areas, to habituate the partners to U.S. presence and capability, and
for deterrent options when necessary.
Aside from Iran scenarios, other operational requirements are emerging that call for
important BP activities with countries in the EUCOM AOR in part to gain and maintain
access and to enhance the ability of U.S. partners to operate as a coalition. Among these are the
need to defend against ballistic missile attack and to respond rapidly to contingencies in North
Africa and the Middle East. Some perennial requirements for access will remain, particularly
for global reach through Europe, control and exercise of tactical nuclear assets remaining in
the AOR, and assurance of U.S. partners in eastern Europe and the Caucasus vis-à-vis Russia.
Summary Observations About Building Partnerships in Europe
In sum, USAFE’s BP activities are both varied and numerous and help build and sustain
access, relationships, and partner capabilities. Yet, these activities do not appear to enter the
debate over posture, particularly in Congress. e wings and organizations assigned to the
Figure 2.1
Access to Bases and Airspace in U.S. Conflict with
Iran
RAND TR1241-2.1
Basing
Overflight
26 Working with Allies and Partners: A Cost-Based Analysis of U.S. Air Forces in Europe
command work with foreign partners on a routine basis both to help achieve U.S. national
security and theater objectives in the AOR and to maximize training for personnel and units
given their home stationing overseas.
Drawing from our review of the data and interviews, we identify eight key observations
from our analysis of the USAFE BP approach and the specic activities USAFE conducts.
First, forward basing facilitates important relationship- and capacity-building BP activities. Some
activities are done primarily because of forward basing, including nearly daily air refueling,
frequent JTAC qualication and training, and some hosted events.
Second, a signicant portion of USAFE’s BP activities is opportunity-driven, with BP as an
ancillary benet to U.S. training in and with partner countries. Units can apply training funds
for ancillary BP benet; it is unlikely that this practice would be as common from CONUS.
Moreover, USAFE serves as an informal BP schoolhouse for the Air Force.
ird, although those executing BP at the wing level are familiar with broad national
security objectives, linkages to strategy and objectives at the country and event level are not as clear.
Not everyone who helps build partnerships needs to know the commander’s intent (though it
would certainly help); however, the development of specic objectives at the event level and of
plans at the country level should be a high priority, as should denition and prioritization of
BP events.
Fourth, although many U.S. units and personnel derive training benet from BP activities
and presence in Europe, some get less benet than others. Most respondents to the RAND survey
viewed BP-related activities as benecial to their own training and readiness. Some events are
not seen as productive in terms of maintaining U.S. readiness, and the need to alter tactics and
narrow information-sharing does at times limit training value to U.S. personnel.
Fifth, existing USAFE reporting processes capture only part of the BP level of eort in the
command. is is a DoD-wide shortfall, and USAFE has improved reporting in the past sev-
eral years. Data on BP events is often derived from other reporting processes (e.g., AARs on
training events owing from the unit to the USAFE operations sta). We supplemented these
data through interviews with and surveys of wings and other USAFE organizations. Lack of a
denition of BP event also hampers reporting and analysis.
Sixth, there are some missed BP opportunities. Many of these derive from events that could
be better utilized to help build partnerships. ese include hosting events and maintainer
involvement in BP during o-station training events. In some instances, particularly in the 435
AGOW, there was a belief that they were being underutilized for BP activities.
Seventh, anecdotally, we found evidence that suggests that the presence of forward-based
forces facilitates coalition operations.21 e development and sustainment of personal and unit
relationships enable smoother integration during combat operations. ey also allow high
revisit rates to partners that require it to increase their capacity for operations out of area. Years
of interaction with traditional, as well as newer, NATO allies have borne fruit for coalition
building and capability.
Eighth, and also based on anecdotal evidence, the need to build relationships, capacity, and
access in the EUCOM AOR for coalition operations will continue beyond Iraq and Afghanistan.
Cross-COCOM operations and emerging operational requirements, such as BMD, will place
BP demands on forward-based forces in Europe.
21 However, to make this point denitive, we note that data from ongoing operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, or perhaps
Libya would be needed.
The Partnership-Building Role of U.S. Air Forces in Europe 27
Based on the characterization in this chapter of USAFE’s BP environment, the next chap-
ter analyzes the activities of USAFE wings in detail. It estimates the costs to the Air Force of
conducting BP in Europe and compares these with the costs of doing the same events from
CONUS.
29
CHAPTER THREE
Cost Analysis of Alternative Force Postures
Introduction
is chapter presents our cost analysis of alternative force postures to conduct BP activities. We
divide the chapter into ve sections. e rst presents an overview of our analytical method-
ology. e second oers a representation of the BP activities conducted by each wing that we
analyzed in USAFE. We use this representation as the demand for BP activities in the analysis.
In the third section, we identify several alternative force postures that could conduct these BP
activities. e fourth discusses the details of the cost analysis and cost data. e last section
presents the cost of each of the alternative force postures along with the key ndings of this
analysis.
Analytical Approach
In this analysis, we consider dierent force postures to conduct the BP activities currently
being done by USAFE units. Our approach holds constant the overall Air Force force struc-
ture and varies the location of those forces to assess the cost impact. We use as a baseline
demand USAFE’s current BP activities and then consider alternative force postures to meet
that demand. We consider CONUS-based forces to be the primary force posture alternative
for conducting BP in USAFE. We also consider excursions on this force posture by reducing
or eliminating some of the activities that will likely be lost if forward-based forces are not avail-
able. We cost these alternative force postures and draw conclusions based on this analysis.
At the outset of this analysis, we anticipated having a documented level of BP activities
that could be used as the demand in this analysis. However, as Chapter Two indicates, this
does not exist. Various documents identify and describe BP activities, but these documents do
not provide sucient detail to cost alternative force postures. As a result, the BP demand level
analyzed here is our best representation of the BP activities currently conducted by USAFE
forces. In eect, the analysis considers and costs alternative force postures for the same force
structure to conduct the same level of BP activities currently conducted by USAFE.
e approach consists of several steps. Figure 3.1 presents the analytical approach in a
ow chart. In this section, we step through each of these blocks on the ow chart and describe
the approach.
e rst step in this analysis was to collect data on BP activities conducted by USAFE
forces. is analysis requires a detailed description of the level and character of BP activities
that are currently conducted. It is not surprising that there is not a single, complete, consistent
30 Working with Allies and Partners: A Cost-Based Analysis of U.S. Air Forces in Europe
source of data that we could use to identify the demand. Multiple databases contain required
data and provide insight into the activities; we use these databases to piece together a represen-
tation of the BP activities currently being conducted by USAFE forces. ese databases include
(1) the scorecard database, (2)AARs, (3) the EUCOM CFR, and (4) the TSCMIS. Each of
these provided a dierent part of the story. As is typically the case when collecting data on a
complex activity, such as BP, the databases are not entirely consistent or complete.
e baseline database for this analysis was the scorecard database, which was provided
by USAFE Operations and Analysis (USAFE/A9). HQ USAFE personnel compile these data
from multiple sources, the primary of which is wing-level entries. is database provided a sig-
nicant amount of detail on the activities conducted and was the basis for our understanding
of the types and levels of activities being conducted. We combined the data found in this data-
base with information contained in the other databases to develop our picture of BP activities.
We then used other databases to augment and rene our understanding of the actual nature
of the activities. In some cases, we could match an AAR and TSCMIS entry with a particular
entry in the scorecard entry. ese other databases allowed us to better understand the size
and scope of various activities. For example, we might have an entry in the scorecard data that
discusses a deployment of aircraft for a BP activity. e AAR and TSCMIS entry might then
provide an understanding of the number of aircraft, duration of event, number of personnel,
and other important aspects of the activity.
e second step in the process was to analyze the data collected. We began by cat-
egorizing the BP events. We identied two ways to characterize the data. e rst is by the
objective of the activity and then link to categorize the objectives. Examples of categories
Figure 3.1
Analytical Approach Flow Chart
NOTE: CFR = concept funding request. TSCMIS = Theater Security Cooperation Management Information
System.
RAND TR1241-3.1
Step 5:
Cost building
blocks using
different force
postures
Step 2:
Analyze data
•Categorize
•Identify similar events
•Eliminate non-BP activities
Step 3:
Identify and develop
activity building blocks
Step 4:
Refine and verify
representation of annual
level of events using
building blocks
Step 6:
Implications of reduced
USAFE forward presence
•Marginal cost changes
•Activities not completed
Excursions
resulting
from
different
force
postures
Step 1:
Collect available data
•Scorecard database
•AARs
•EUCOM CFR
•TSCMIS
Cost Analysis of Alternative Force Postures 31
are enhancing community relations, improving basing or overight access to countries, and
enhancing interoperability with partner countries. Figure 3.2 shows the breakout by category
for all events in our database. In this gure, aircraft events are activities that require aircraft
and are either ying sorties or events that are best done with an aircraft (e.g., airlift load-
ing exercise). ese events can either be from a unit’s home station or require deployment
to another base. e community relations activities include meeting with the local mayor
and similar activities. Interoperability events focus on enhancing interoperability with PNs.
M2M events are meetings and other events involving personnel from the United States and
PNs. Access events include events that are designed to enhance base or airspace access with
PNs. Other events include military construction and humanitarian relief. is breakout of
activities provides insight into the activities.
e second categorization of the data focuses on the force element required to conduct
the BP activities. Examples of this include deployment of a squadron of aircraft, ying sorties
from home station, and sending a few temporary-duty (TDY) personnel to work with a partner
country.
Categorizing the events by objective is important to understand the focus of the activity.
We used this categorization to understand what BP activities were conducted and to eliminate,
for the purposes of the analysis, what we dened as non-BP activities. For the purposes of the
analysis in this chapter, we applied a rigid denition of a BP activity as needing to directly
enhance the warghting potential of the United States or a partner country or both. We
identied community relations activities as non-BP. ese activities include relationships with
local ocials and the community at large. Personnel at all U.S. bases—both in CONUS and
overseas—generally conduct community relations activities. Although these interactions are
important, they are made because the base exists and would not be conducted in a dierent
force posture that did not include that particular base. at is, elimination of the base would
mean that the need to have good relations with the local community and keep local ocials
Figure 3.2
U.S. Air Forces in Europe Partnership-Building Events, by Type
NOTE: We found 545 total events.
RAND TR1241-3.2
32 Working with Allies and Partners: A Cost-Based Analysis of U.S. Air Forces in Europe
informed would go away. Because the purpose of this analysis is to evaluate the cost and capa-
bility of dierent force postures to provide BP, we excluded community relations as part of the
quantied demand.
Categorizing the events by force element provides a quantiable level of demand that can
be duplicated with other force postures to conduct the BP. is provides the level of demand
used in this analysis. As discussed already, these force elements dene the elements necessary to
conduct the BP activity. We called these force elements building blocks in this analysis (step3
in Figure 3.1). We represent each wing’s annual BP activities by a set of these building blocks.
Our methodological construct is to identify these building blocks of BP demand, deter-
mine the number of each of these building blocks conducted by each wing and then USAFE
forces as a whole, and then cost out this level of activity using alternative force postures. e
building blocks provide a mechanism for understanding the types and number of activities
conducted. is construct provides a manageable approach to cost dierent BP activities and
permits evaluation of alternative force postures and various excursions. For each wing, we
describe the building blocks in sucient detail to conduct the cost analysis (see Appendix B).
We also identify the number of times per year each activity represented by a building block
was conducted. is set of building blocks and the frequency per year is specic to a particu-
lar wing and represents that wing’s level of annual BP activity. But it also represents a level of
BP activity that could be conducted by a dierent wing with the same mission design series
(MDS), allowing us to evaluate dierent force postures. e underlying assumption is that
any wing can conduct the BP activity with equal eectiveness (as long as it has the same type
of capability MDS). at is, an activity that requires deployment of six F-16s for a week in a
partner country can be conducted equally well by any F-16 unit. is approach provides the
means to conduct an equally eective, varying cost analysis. Later in this chapter, we present a
detailed discussion of the specic building blocks.
e study team developed a representation of the BP demand using the building-block
methodology, then discussed it with a representative from each wing, shown in step 4 in
Figure3.1. ese conversations validated the approach that our building blocks largely repre-
sented the activities the wings were performing. As a result of these conversations, we made
changes to the building blocks and the number of events per year. Later in this document, we
present the BP demand level for each wing using the building-block methodology.
e next step was to cost each building block for the dierent force postures (step 5 in
Figure3.1). We used accepted cost approaches and data for the cost analysis. We break down
each BP activity by its component parts, including ying-hours, aircraft deployment costs, and
personnel costs. We then sum these appropriate cost elements to obtain the cost for each build-
ing block in each of the dierent force postures analyzed. Using this and the number of times
each building-block activity was conducted for each wing, we could then determine the total
cost of a wing’s annual BP activities under dierent force postures.
Step 6 in Figure3.1 shows that the results of the cost analysis were considered in two
ways. e rst was the marginal cost dierence between the force postures; the second was a
recognition that some activities may simply be eliminated, if the forces are not forward based.
For example, certain ybys are likely to be conducted only if forces are close by and would
likely be eliminated if conducting it would require an aircraft deployment. We analyzed this by
running excursions. Some excursions are an exception to the equal-eectiveness analysis, but
we thought they were important to investigate because all activities are unlikely to continue
unchanged (e.g., ybys of certain events), with a reduction in forward basing.
Cost Analysis of Alternative Force Postures 33
Building Blocks
is section describes the building blocks and annual frequency of those building blocks for
each wing that was used to represent the demand for BP activities in this analysis. We pres-
ent the set of building blocks for each of the USAFE wings individually in this section. We
discussed each set of building blocks and annual frequency with a representative from each
wing to ensure that we provided a suitable representation of the level of BP activities that are
typically conducted. We modied the building blocks and frequency as required in order to
get a reasonable representation of the type and level of BP activities conducted during a year.
We divided the building blocks into ve broad classes: aircraft deployments, personnel
(not including aircraft) deployments (i.e., TDY), sorties own from home station, senior-leader
events, and base hosting events. Each class can have multiple building blocks representing dif-
ferent sizes of activities and durations. First, aircraft deployments involve deployment of air-
craft, personnel, and maintenance packages to a partner country to enhance interoperability
and access. Second, we characterize personnel deployments as events that do not involve the
deployment of aircraft. ese events typically involve personnel either ying on commercial
airlift or using ground transportation with perhaps a small amount of equipment. If the activ-
ity is large enough, a C-130 may be used to transport the personnel and equipment. Examples
of this would be maintenance or security forces personnel going to a partner country to con-
duct a BP activity.
e third major class is sorties own from home station. ese activities, as their name
implies, do not require a deployment of aircraft. ese include ghter sorties to work with
partner aircraft or ground personnel (e.g., JTACS or GCI), tanker sorties to enhance interop-
erability with partner countries by conducting aerial refueling hook-ups, or airlift sorties to
participate in partner airdrop training. ese activities would require deployment of aircraft if
forward-based forces were not present.
e fourth set of activities involves senior-leader visits. We characterize this as a single
operational support airlift (OSA) sortie to transport personnel to a partner country for high-
level meetings. e nal class is hosting activities. Similar to the sorties from home station,
these events take advantage of the proximity of forward-based forces to the partner countries
by accounting for activities in which personnel from partner countries go to a U.S. base to
observe operations. is takes advantage of the forward-based facilities to enhance interoper-
ability and the capability of the partner. An example of this is personnel coming to Ramstein
AB to observe a large airlift operation.
We tailored the building blocks to represent the BP activities conducted by each wing.
Compiling the building blocks and frequency for all the units provides a representation of the
annual BP activities conducted by USAFE. Next, we present the set of building blocks used to
represent the activities from each wing.
48th Fighter Wing
Table 3.1 shows the building-block representation for a year of BP activities for the 48 FW.1 For
each building block, we have a wing-specic description of the activities. To a very large degree,
all wings held the same types of events, and we could therefore use the same types of building
1 Details of 48 FW BP activities were conrmed by 48 FW personnel during multiple phone and email contacts in July
and August 2011.
34 Working with Allies and Partners: A Cost-Based Analysis of U.S. Air Forces in Europe
blocks to represent the activities. Although there is a lot of similarity in the descriptions across
the wings, each description represents the specic wing. In the case of the 48 FW, a large air-
craft deployment event is described as 12 aircraft for 15days. Other wings may deploy more or
fewer aircraft for a dierent length of time.
Based at RAF Lakenheath in the UK, the 48 FW operates both F-15Cs and F-15Es. e
48 FW BP activities can be roughly characterized by about 20 aircraft deployment events per
year of dierent sizes and durations, about 20 personnel deployments (TDY) deployments of
dierent sizes, an M2M meeting every couple of months, hosting a delegation about once per
quarter, one senior-leader visit per year, and about 1,700 sorties own from home station.
31st Fighter Wing
Table 3.2 presents the building blocks representing the yearly BP activities for the 31 FW.2 e
31 FW is based at Aviano AB in Italy and operates F-16s. BP activities consist of about one
large aircraft deployment every couple of months. In addition, the 31 FW deploys aircraft to
about one air show per year. ere are about ten personnel deployments per year—half small
and half large. ere are about 15training exercises per year at the ranges in Slovakia and
Croatia. All of these sorties are own from home station. Each lasts about four days and con-
sists of about eight sorties per day—two two-ships during the day and two two-ships at night.
Personnel are deployed to the training range to support these operations. For about 12 of the
15, a small team consisting of 15 personnel is required at the range. About three of the 15 train-
ing exercises are JTAC events and require larger personnel deployments. ese are included in
the large-team deployments discussed earlier. e 31 FW also participates in about ve M2M
meetings per year, has about two senior-leader events, and hosts a team to Aviano about once
every couple of months.
2 Details of 31 FW BP activities were conrmed by 31 FW personnel during multiple phone and email contacts in July
and August 2011.
Table 3.1
48th Fighter Wing Annual Activities for Building Partnerships, Represented by
Building Blocks
Building Block Details Frequency
Large-aircraft deployment 12 aircraft, 200 PAX, 15 days, 100 sorties 5
Small-aircraft deployment 6 aircraft, 100 PAX, 15 days, 50 sorties 10
Air-show deployment 2 aircraft, 8 PAX, 5 days 6
Large-team deployment 40 PAX, 10 days 5
Small-team deployment 6 PAX, 10 days 14
Home-station sorties 8 sorties per day for 5 days 12
Flybys 4 sorties per event 4
M2M, large 10 PAX, 4 days 6
Senior leader 1 C-21 sortie 1
Hosting Teams visiting U.S. base 4
NOTE: PAX = personnel.
Cost Analysis of Alternative Force Postures 35
52nd Fighter Wing
Table 3.3 shows the representation of annual BP activity for the 52 FW.3 e 52 FW is located
at Spangdahlem AB, Germany, and operates both F-16CJs and A-10s. e 52 FW has about
ten deployments per year for supporting BP activities. ese are roughly split 50/50 between
the F-16s and the A-10s. For each MDS, there are about two large-aircraft deployments and
3 Details of 52 FW BP activities were conrmed by 52 FW personnel during multiple phone and email contacts in July
and August 2011.
Table 3.2
31st Fighter Wing Annual Activities for Building Partnerships, Represented by
Building Blocks
Building Block Details Frequency
Large-aircraft deployment 16 aircraft, 250 PAX, 15 days, 200 sorties 6
Air-show deployment 2 aircraft, 10 PAX, 5 days 1
Large-team deployment 40 PAX, 10 days 5
Training-range personnel
deployment
15 PAX, 10 days 12
Small-team short deployment 4 PAX, 5 days 5
Home-station sorties Ranges in Slovakia and Croatia, 8 sorties per
day, 4 days
15
M2M, large 10 PAX, 4 days 5
Senior leader 1 C-21 sortie 2
Hosting Teams visiting U.S. base 6
Table 3.3
52nd Fighter Wing Annual Activities for Building Partnerships, Represented by
Building Blocks
Building Block Details Frequency
Large-aircraft deployment A-10: 10 aircraft, 250 PAX, 30 days 2
Large-aircraft deployment F-16: 16 aircraft, 250 PAX, 30 days 2
Small-aircraft deployment 4 aircraft, 40 PAX, 30 days (3 annual
per MDS)
6
Air-show deployment 2 aircraft, 10 PAX, 5 days 5
Large-team deployment 40 PAX, 10 days 1
Small-team deployment 4 PAX, 5 days 9
Home-station sorties 2 to 4 aircraft 10
Flybys 4-aircraft flyover 6
M2M, large 10 PAX, 4 days 5
Senior leader 1 C-21 sortie 4
Hosting Teams visiting U.S. base 8
36 Working with Allies and Partners: A Cost-Based Analysis of U.S. Air Forces in Europe
three small-aircraft deployments. In addition, this wing participates in about ve air-show
aircraft deployments per year. e 52 FW also has about ten personnel deployments in a typi-
cal year. e vast majority of these are small teams consisting of a few people going TDY for
a week. A typical year of BP also includes sorties from home station. In all, there are about
16events per year for both interoperability sorties and ybys. ere are about ve M2M events
and four senior-leader events per year. Finally, it is judged that about eight teams from partner
countries visit Spangdahlem per year.
100th Air Refueling Wing
Table 3.4 summarizes the 100 ARW’s annual BP activities.
e 100 ARW, located at RAF Mildenhall in the UK, operates KC-135Rs. Most of the
100th’s BP activities involve the use of its aircraft, and most of these are sorties own from
home station. Partner countries request sorties from the 100th to practice air refueling, and the
100th matches its own pilots’ currency requirements with PN requests. ese missions, there-
fore, meet Air Force and PN training needs simultaneously. e 100th ies more than 200
such sorties a year (out of about 1,500 total sorties), tanking more than 1,600 PN receivers.
is annual activity level represents about 17 to 18 sorties per month, so we created a monthly
building block to represent them.4
Occasionally, the 100th will send an aircraft to a PN for a few days to accomplish the
same purpose. ese involve one KC-135 and four personnel (the crew) for four days. ere are
about nine such training deployments per year. ere are also about a dozen air-show deploy-
ments per year, with the same operating footprint as the small-aircraft deployments.5
e personnel deployments were few and relatively small. ese involved about four per-
sonnel for ve days at a time, and there were four per year. ere was one M2M event per year,
with ten personnel for four days. ere were three hosting events per year.
86th Airlift Wing
e 86 AW, located at Ramstein AB, operates C-130s, C-21s, and other passenger aircraft.
Table 3.5 summarizes that wing’s annual BP activities.
4 Sortie data were derived from 100 ARW annual sortie records in a spreadsheet provided by 100 ARW personnel via email
in August 2011.
5 Details of 100 ARW BP activities were conrmed by 100 ARW personnel by phone interview on August 29, 2011.
Table 3.4
100th Air Refueling Wing Annual Activities for Building
Partnerships, Represented by Building Blocks
Building Block Details Frequency
Sorties 18 KC-135 sorties 12
Small aircraft 1 aircraft, 4 PAX, 4 days 9
Air-show deployment 1 aircraft, 4 PAX, 4 days 12
Small-team deployment 4 PAX, 5 days 4
M2M, large 10 PAX, 4 days 1
Hosting Teams visiting U.S. base 3
Cost Analysis of Alternative Force Postures 37
Like those of the 100th, most of the 86 AW’s BP activities involve aircraft. e large- and
small-aircraft deployments involve either one or two C-130s, with 100 or 150 personnel, for
about a week. A handful of these simply involve the 86th’s pilots ying with PN aircraft, but
most involve airdrop practice for PN ground forces. e 86th’s pilots y to the PN, accom-
plishing their own training and currency in the process. While there, they take PN ground
forces up and give them the opportunity to practice their own airdropping. ey often give
many hundreds of PN ground forces this practice with each deployment. ese deployments
occur in a wide range of countries, including Poland, Bulgaria, Italy, and Macedonia.6
e 86th’s C-21s constantly deploy to and from PN airelds, providing helpful practice
for the USAFE C-21 pilots and the local AB crew. ey accomplish about 18 of these per
year. Air-show deployments, of which there are about 15 per year, include one aircraft, usually
C-130s, with four personnel (the crew) for three days. Finally, there are about seven small-team
deployments per year, each with four personnel for four days.
435th Air Ground Operations Wing
Table 3.6 summarizes the 435 AGOW’s annual BP activities. To capture the granularity of
the 435th’s BP activities, we divide them into three groups: the CRG, the 4th Air Operations
Support Group (ASOG), and the 7th Weather Squadron. e CRG’s activities comprise the
lion’s share. Two main types of activities dominate their personnel deployments. e rst are
access-related. Personnel from the CRG visit ports, survey airelds, mark runways, and some-
times install mobile aireld arresting systems. ese activities aim to enable USAFE’s access
to PN airelds.
e second kind of dominant personnel deployment is cargo preparation. Many PNs
deploying to operations in Iraq or Afghanistan have little experience deploying on U.S. cargo
aircraft. ey need to load their equipment and have it pass inspection. e CRG gets tasked
to help with this process. A few CRG personnel deploy to the PN where aircraft (usually Air
Force C-17s) will be picking them up. e CRG personnel either load the equipment them-
selves or show the PN personnel how to properly load and secure the equipment so it passes
inspection. e ground unit is then prepared to deploy onward.
ere are a few more team deployments per year that do not fall into the above categories,
including support to exercises and familiarization of PN air forces with Air Force TTP. Viewed
6 Details of 86 AW BP activities were conrmed by 86 AW personnel via phone interview in July 2011.
Table 3.5
86th Airlift Wing Annual Activities for Building Partnerships,
Represented by Building Blocks
Building Block Details Frequency
Large aircraft 2 C-130s, 150 PAX, 1 week 12
Small aircraft 2 C-130s, 100 PAX, 1 week 12
Off-station trainer 1 C-21, 3 PAX, 4 days 18
Air-show deployment 1 aircraft, 4 PAX, 3 days 15
Small-team deployment 10 PAX, 4 days 7
38 Working with Allies and Partners: A Cost-Based Analysis of U.S. Air Forces in Europe
through our lens of building blocks, these team deployments amount to three large deploy-
ments; six small, long deployments; and 28 small, short deployments.
e CRG also conducts four M2M activities per year and one hosting event per year.
Finally, the CRG accomplishes many construction projects. It does about 20 per year, each
involving 30personnel for about a month.
e 4 ASOG’s BP activities mostly comprise JTAC training. e ASOG has its own
JTACs who regularly train with Air Force aircraft to maintain currency and advance their
skills. e ASOG tries to involve PN air personnel as much as possible for mutual benet.
e team deployments listed in Table 3.6 reect this. Each year, there are a dozen or so of
these deployments. Two are larger, longer deployments, with about 30 personnel deployed for
two weeks. e rest are smaller, with ve personnel each. ree are longer, lasting about three
weeks, and six are shorter, lasting about ten days each.7
e 7th Weather Squadron conducts a few BP activities each year. e squadron conducts
two bilateral exercises each year, shown in Table3.6 as large deployments with ten personnel
for two weeks. It also conducts several traveling contact teams (TCTs), with ve personnel for
ve days. We capture this as four per year.8
Alternative Force Postures and Organizing Principles for Analysis
In this analysis, we evaluated dierent force postures to provide the BP activities. Primarily, we
looked at a status quo in which forces were forward-based in Europe and a reduced-forward-
presence option in which forces are deployed from CONUS to conduct activities. Because it is
unlikely that all activities (e.g., some ybys) will take place if aircraft cannot conduct these mis-
7 Details of 4 ASOG activities were derived from a document provided by 4 ASOG personnel on July 15, 2011.
8 Details of 7th Weather Squadron activities were conrmed via telephone interview on July 15, 2011.
Table 3.6
435th Air Ground Operations Wing Annual Activities for Building Partnerships, Represented by
Building Blocks
Building Block
435 CRG 4 ASOG 7th Weather Squadron
Details Frequency Details Frequency Details Frequency
Large-team
deployment
10 PAX, 7 days 3 30 PAX,
14days
2 10 PAX,
14days
2
Small-
team long
deployment
3 PAX, 30 days 6 5 PAX, 21days 3
Small-
team short
deployment
3 PAX, 5 days 28 5 PAX, 10days 6 5 PAX, 5days 4
M2M 10 PAX, 4 days 4
Hosting Teams visiting
U.S. base
1
Construction
project
30 PAX,
30days
20
Cost Analysis of Alternative Force Postures 39
sions from home station, we then looked at two modications to the reduced-forward-presence
option in which activities are eliminated or reduced. e rst of these modications eliminates
ybys and air-show deployments. is modication also assumes that small-aircraft deploy-
ments will no longer be conducted from CONUS. If there is an unexpected maintenance issue
on an aircraft that has been deployed a few hundred miles from home station, maintenance
items, personnel, or a replacement aircraft can be own from home station quickly. However,
this is not the case for aircraft deployed several thousand miles from home station in CONUS.
For cases in which the aircraft are deployed from CONUS, we assumed that activities will
either be combined and own with larger deployment packages or eliminated. For the second
case, we considered whether activities would be reduced or eliminated. roughout this analy-
sis, we refer to these four cases as organizing principles. Table 3.7 presents the four cases consid-
ered and their eects on the various building blocks.
Cost Analysis
e purpose of our cost analysis was to capture the total cost of BP activities supported by
USAFE and then to calculate the cost of alternative means of providing those activities. In this
section, we describe our method for calculating costs, including our data sources. We then
Table 3.7
Analytical Organizing Principles
Building Block Status Quo
Reduced Forward
Presence
Reduced Forward
Presence, Modified
Reduced Forward
Presence, Alternative
BP Concepts
Large-aircraft
deployment
Forward-based CONUS CONUS CONUS: reduce
Small-aircraft
deployment
Forward-based CONUS CONUS: eliminate CONUS: reduce or
eliminate
Air-show
deployment
Forward-based CONUS Eliminate Eliminate
Large-team
deployment
Forward-based CONUS CONUS CONUS
Small-team
deployment
Forward-based CONUS CONUS CONUS
Training-range
personnel
deployment
Forward-based Deployments from
CONUS
Deployments from
CONUS
Deployments from
CONUS: reduce
Home-station sorties Forward-based Deployments from
CONUS
Deployments from
CONUS
Deployments from
CONUS: reduce
Flybys Forward-based Deployments from
CONUS
Eliminate Eliminate
M2M, large Forward-based CONUS CONUS CONUS
Senior leader Forward-based CONUS CONUS CONUS
Hosting Forward-based CONUS CONUS CONUS
40 Working with Allies and Partners: A Cost-Based Analysis of U.S. Air Forces in Europe
show the results of our quantitative analysis for the status quo of USAFE BP activities and
compare them with results of our alternative organizing principles.
At the time this report was being nalized, the Air Force announced plans to cut the A-10
squadron from Spangdahlem AB. Although our building-block analysis described in the previ-
ous section includes Spangdahlem’s A-10 BP activities, we chose to assess the costs of providing
BP given the anticipated drawdown of those aircraft. erefore, the cost analysis that follows
excludes the costs associated with the A-10 squadron from the 52 FW. is does not change
any of our conclusions, only the relative costs of each of the alternatives we explore.
Cost Methodology and Data Sources
We analyzed the costs of USAFE activities with a detailed, data-driven methodology. We
broke down each BP activity by its component parts and calculated the costs of each element.
We then summed these to show a total cost for each building block. We sought to capture
the total costs the Air Force would incur to support each cost element and building block. In
practice, some costs would not be billed directly to USAFE. For example, USAFE might use
its organic airlift to move a unit, whereas a CONUS unit would incur charges from AMC to
move people or equipment. Also, some USAFE BP activities are paid for by EUCOM out of
its own budget. When we calculated costs, we included all of these, irrespective of the ultimate
billpayer.
For a given building block, a unit could incur three types of costs: deployment or rede-
ployment, event ying-hours, and TDY. In the sections that follow, we discuss each of these
cost elements and the data sources we used.
Deployment costs include the ying-hours used to get the Air Force aircraft from home
station to the PN aireld where they will operate, the cost to transport the maintenance equip-
ment to keep the aircraft operating, and the cost to transport the personnel performing the BP
mission.
We derived cost per ying-hour (CPFH) for each aircraft from the Air Force Total Oper-
ating Cost (AFTOC) database.9 For each MDS, we took the cost elements that vary by ying-
hour and divided them by the total ying-hours for that MDS. We averaged the costs from
2008 to 2010. We show the details of these calculations in Appendix B.
We calculated the average distance from one European country to another to approxi-
mate the deployment distance for a typical aircraft deployment. We estimated this to be 500
miles, given that some deployments would be longer and some shorter. We then determined
the typical block speed of each MDS to determine the average ight time for each MDS.10
With the ight time and CPFH, we could calculate the cost to deploy each MDS. We multi-
plied this cost by the number of aircraft in each deployment.
All Air Force aircraft require some ground equipment to launch and recover sorties, as
well as maintenance equipment to do repairs for longer deployments. To estimate the amount
of equipment needed to support each MDS, we looked to the Manpower and Equipment Force
Packaging System (MEFPAK) to see what deployments of dierent sizes would require. When
9 Data from AFTOC database for 2008–2010.
10 Aircraft block speed is an aircraft’s true airspeed adjusted in relation to length of sortie to compensate for takeo, climb-
out, letdown, instrument approach, and landing. Air Force Pamphlet (AFPAM)10-1403 lists the block speeds for mobil-
ity aircraft. We took these as stated for mobility aircraft and adjusted the combat aircraft ight speeds based on the rough
proportions the document laid out. See AFPAM 10-1403, 2011.
Cost Analysis of Alternative Force Postures 41
our building blocks were smaller than the smallest force packages, we scaled them down,
taking into account economies of scale. We assumed that mobility aircraft can self-deploy their
personnel and equipment, so only ghters incur this additional cost.
To estimate the cost to the Air Force of deploying this maintenance equipment to and
from home station, we used standard Air Mobility Command (AMC) rates and applied them
to the cargo being transported.11 For travel within Europe, we found this to be $1.073 per
pound for cargo and $245 per person for passengers.12 We acknowledge that, on some occa-
sions, USAFE personnel drive their own cars to a PN base to do BP activities. We understand
that this is the exception and, for the sake of simplicity of our cost analysis, assume that all
personnel y on military airlift (milair).
e Defense Travel Management Oce (DTMO), an oce in DoD, provides detailed
per diem rates for travel to a range of countries and cities in the world.13 Rather than do a
record-by-record calculation of each historical BP event, we surveyed the range of costs found
on the DTMO website and found the range to be usually between $200 and $400 per day per
person (including hotel and food) for destination countries in western and eastern Europe that
USAFE forces are most likely to visit. We estimated the total TDY cost for USAFE BP activities
generally to be $300 per person per night, including hotel, food, and ground transportation.
During a BP activity, the only cost incurred other than TDY costs (if any) are the cost to
operate the aircraft. We calculated this by estimating the number of hours own during the
mission and multiplying by the CPFH we described earlier. Redeployment costs simply mirror
the deployment costs described earlier. Only aircraft missions will include ying-hour costs
and the deployment of maintenance equipment.
Adapting Activities of U.S. Air Forces in Europe to Organizing Principles
In order to create alternative courses of action (COAs), we had to adapt some of the inputs and
sometimes the building blocks themselves. We now discuss these changes and the implications
they have for building-block costs.
For the alternative organizing principles, we made two sets of changes to the building
blocks themselves (not including what is actually included in the total organizing-principle
calculation). First, all BP activities are generated from CONUS, so all deployment factors (e.g.,
distance, time, cost) are adjusted for a deployment from CONUS to Europe. is includes
changing the milair rates, so cargo increases from $1.073 per pound to $2.62 per pound and
plane tickets increase from $243 to $1,400 per person each way. e deployment distance
increases from 500 miles to 5,000 miles (the approximate distance from the middle of the
United States to the middle of Europe), so the deployment ying-hours go up by an order of
magnitude (though aircraft sorties become slightly more ecient because of longer duration).
For ghters, we also add a tanker air bridge to help deploy (and redeploy) the aircraft,
such that each six-ship of ghters requires two KC-135 sorties. is adds about $33,000 each
way to the deployment costs of a six-ship of ghters.14
11 FY 2011 U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) tari rates, derived from data provided to RAND.
12 FY 2011 USTRANSCOM tari rates.
13 DTMO, undated, queried August26, 2011.
14 e planning factors and assumptions for the air bridge are adapted from a RAND analysis of alternatives for KC-135
recapitalization. e analysis is not releasable to the public.
42 Working with Allies and Partners: A Cost-Based Analysis of U.S. Air Forces in Europe
e second change is that we repackaged any sorties own from home station into dis-
crete deployment packages of aircraft and personnel and assign to them deployment and TDY
costs. So, for example, what had been 18 KC-135 sorties own each month from home station
(by the 100 ARW) became a one-week deployment of four KC-135s each month. ese aircraft
would y the same total number of sorties the original building block contained but would
have to deploy forward and redeploy to accomplish them. When we calculate total organizing-
principle costs later, we include these increased deployment costs and adapted home-station
sorties.
Building-Block Cost Calculations
In this section, we review the details of a few example building blocks in order to show the
substance of the cost analysis. Because each wing’s version of the same general building block
(e.g., small aircraft deployment, large-team deployment) diers from the other wings, the per-
mutations are too many to show here in detail. Instead, we show a few building-block examples
to illustrate the details of our cost-analysis method and then show the aggregate results.
Table 3.8 shows the detailed costs for three of USAFE’s BP building blocks.
We start from the left with the 52 FW large-aircraft deployment and go from the top
down to discuss each data element. e 52 FW ies F-16s, so we based our costs and factors
on that MDS. is building block has 16 aircraft and 250 people deploying for 15 days. Given
wing input, we estimated that they y 480 sorties (16aircraft ying one sortie per day for
15days). ese sorties average 2.5 hours, resulting in 1,200 ying-hours during the BP event.
Given the average distance to deploy within Europe (500 miles), the estimated block speed of
an F-16 (424 mph, not shown here), the average deployment time within Europe for an F-16
would be approximately 1.18 hours.15 According to our data analysis (shown in Appendix B),
the average CPFH in USAFE for an F-16 is $6,442. TDY costs are $300 per person per day,
and each person’s plane ticket costs $245 each way. Shipping costs for equipment are $1.073
per pound, and, according to MEFPAK data, that deployment would require 100 short tons
of aerospace ground equipment.
When we total each set of costs, we nd that the plane tickets cost $57,330 (we decrement
the number of plane tickets by the number of aircraft to reect the pilots ying their own air-
craft). It costs $214,600 to deploy the unit equipment and another $7,597 to y the six aircraft.
All of these costs are one way. erefore, the total cost to deploy and redeploy the unit for this
building block is $1,274,387.
e event ying cost is simply the total ying-hours during the event times the CPFH,
which equals $7,730,396. e TDY costs equal the people times the days times the daily TDY
cost. In this case, this totals $2,250,000. e total cost to generate one building block one
time, then, is $11,254,783, and this wing typically ies three of them per year. Keep in mind
that the event ying-hours, which are usually for the USAFE wing’s own training, come out of
the regular ying-hour budget. In this case, the event ying-hours are a little more than half
of that cost.
Next, we describe the home-station sorties own by the 100 ARW at RAF Mildenhall.
As described earlier, the 100th regularly ies air refueling sorties from home station to provide
opportunity for PN air forces to practice receiving. Some of the data cells are blank because
15 Estimated block speed is the true airspeed in knots under zero wind conditions adjusted in relation to the length of the
sortie to compensate for takeo, climb-out, descent, instrument approach, and landing.
Cost Analysis of Alternative Force Postures 43
these sorties are own from home station. is building block has KC-135s ying from home
station (thus no deployment inputs), accomplishing 18sorties, each with an average duration
of 5.2 hours, resulting in a total of 93.6 ying-hours for this building block.
is building block requires no deployment of aircraft or equipment, so those cells are
also blank. We calculated a CPFH for USAFE’s KC-135s of $8,214. As we move down the list,
we see that there is no cost for plane tickets, shipping equipment, or deploying the aircraft,
so the total deployment cost is zero. e event ying cost is again the ying-hours times the
CPFH, or $768,842. ere is no TDY cost, because no one leaves the base. Finally, the 100th
performs this building block (i.e., that many tanking sorties) once per month.
For the last example, we discuss the 435 CRG’s large-team deployment. is event has no
aircraft costs, only costs for personnel. is building block has ten people deploying for seven
days. e plane tickets cost $2,450 each way, so the total deployment cost equals $4,900. e
TDY costs for ten people deploying for seven days equals $21,000, so the total building-block
Table 3.8
Example Building-Block Cost Elements
Building Block 52 FW Large Aircraft 100 ARW Sorties CRG Large Team
MDS F-16 KC-135
Number of aircraft 16
People 250 10
Days 30 7
Sorties 480 18
Total flying-hours 1,200 93.6
Hours per sortie (number of flying-hours
divided by the number of sorties)
2.5 5.2
Deployed flying-hours (average distance to
deploy within Europe divided by the estimated
block speed of the aircraft)
1.18
Tons of equipment 100
CPFH ($) 6,442 8,214
TDY ($) 300 300 300
Plane tickets, each ($) 245 245 245
Shipping cost ($ per pound) 1.073 1.073
Plane tickets, total ($) 57,330 —2,450
Equipment shipping ($) 572,267 — —
Aircraft deployment ($) 7,597 — —
Deployment cost ($) 1,274,387 —4,900
Event flying cost ($) 7,730,396 768,842 —
TDY cost ($) 2,250,000 —21,000
Building-block cost ($) 11,254,783 768,842 25,900
Occurrences per year 312 3
44 Working with Allies and Partners: A Cost-Based Analysis of U.S. Air Forces in Europe
cost equals $25,900. e 435 CRG typically does three iterations of this building block per
year.
Wing Costs for Building Partnerships
In this section, we show the total costs of each wing’s BP activities as they currently operate.
Figure 3.3 shows these costs for one year.
e 100 ARW’s BP activities cost about $12million per year. Most of these are home-
station sorties, so it is relatively inexpensive in relation to most other wings. e ghter wings
total about $40million, $107million, and $26million per year for the 31st, 48th, and 52nd,
respectively. One reason that the 48th’s costs are signicantly higher than those of the other
ghter wings is that the 478th ies F-15s, which have a much higher CPFH than F-16s. For
comparison, note that the $87million for event ying-hours for the 48 FW is roughly 11per-
cent of that wing’s annual ying-hour budget.16
e 86 AW activities total about $14million per year, about half of which is event ying-
hours. Finally, the 435 AGOW costs a comparatively low $2.5million per year. Without air-
craft, the 435th looks rather small compared with the other wings.
ese total costs we calculated are not reected exactly in any USAFE data set; our costs
should be higher. As we discussed earlier in this report, some BP events are not currently cap-
tured in USAFE’s data-collecting regime. e wing building-block costs provided here are
based on our synthesis of USAFE data and direct input from each wing. Further, we capture
costs from a total Air Force perspective, not simply the direct costs paid by USAFE.
Aggregate Cost-Analysis Results
Figure 3.4 shows the total costs of each organizing principle, broken out by cost category.
16 AFTOC database data for 2008–2010.
Figure 3.3
Costs of Wing Activities for Building Partnerships
NOTE: We found 545 total events.
RAND TR1241-3.3
20
40
60
80
100
120
100
ARW
31
FW
48
FW
Wing
52
FW
86
AW
435
AGOW
Annual cost ($ millions)
TDY
Event flying
Deployment
Cost Analysis of Alternative Force Postures 45
In Figure 3.4, our organizing principles are shown on the x-axis. On the y-axis, the height
of each column shows the total annual cost (in millions of dollars) to replicate all BP activities
appropriate to that organizing principle (we explained earlier in this chapter which organizing
principles included which types of building blocks). e value of each cost category is shown
inside each colored column (in millions of dollars).
On the left, “status quo” shows the costs we estimated for all USAFE-based BP activities
for one year, essentially as they are performed today. Home-station sorties are, in fact, own
from home station, and aircraft and team deployments occur (as we understand them) for each
wing on an annual basis. Keep in mind that the costs reected here are the total cost to the
Air Force but may not all be borne by USAFE directly (e.g., USAFE would typically transport
personnel and equipment by means of its own organic airlift, thus not incurring the AMC
costs to transport them).
Here, we can see that the event ying costs, at $151million per year, dominate the costs.
One implication of this is that these BP activities, when conducted from USAFE, are relatively
ecient: ree-quarters of the costs go directly to training. Assuming that those ying-hours
would normally be included in each wing’s training program, we nd that the marginal cost of
USAFE BP activities would be approximately $51million per year. Again, not all of these will
be borne by USAFE. For example, some money is provided by EUCOM for JCS exercises and
other activities, which would be applied to deployment and TDY costs.
Moving from left to right, we see that replicating all activities from CONUS incurs an
enormous cost penalty, almost doubling the total costs. TDY costs approximately double, and
deployment costs increase almost tenfold. e modied CONUS option saves a little because
it repackages some of the deployments more eciently and eliminates air shows and ybys.
Figure 3.4
Costs of Organizing Principles, by Cost Category
RAND TR1241-3.4
20
185 173
79
151
182 177
80
31
55 61
32
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
Status quo
Annual cost ($ millions)
Organizing principle
TDY
Event flying
Deployment
Reduced forward
presence
Reduced
forward presence
(modified)
Reduced
forward presence
(alternave
BP concepts)
46 Working with Allies and Partners: A Cost-Based Analysis of U.S. Air Forces in Europe
e rightmost option halves the remaining aircraft-related events, thus bringing the total costs
more in line with the status quo. However, less than half of the $186million goes directly to
training, a relatively inecient use of resources.
We now look at these data in a slightly dierent way to explore some of the policy trade
space. Figure 3.5 shows the same data as Figure3.4, but divided by wing rather than by cost
category.
Ideally, when assessing alternative means of providing BP, one could dierentiate among
types of activities. Should the Air Force provide as much JTAC training as it does today for
NATO countries? More? Less? What would happen if advanced USAFE partners did not have
the opportunity to do DACT with Air Force forces? Answering these questions could provide
a kind of menu of options for considering the costs and benets of particular BP activities.
Unfortunately, the data available on USAFE BP activities do not provide enough granu-
larity to explore those questions in detail. Indeed, if decisionmakers were considering posture
changes for forces in Europe, it would be informative to see the costs of each activity to weigh
their perceived value against the costs and risks of moving forces.
Figure 3.5 shows our annual BP costs according to the wing that provides them. is
oers a tool (albeit a crude one) to help think through the specic costs incurred or saved by
performing each wing’s BP activities from USAFE or CONUS.
We now display these one more time, to focus on the cost dierentials between operat-
ing from USAFE and CONUS. Figure 3.6 shows the same data as the previous two charts,
excluding all event ying-hour costs, given that each wing would y its needed training sorties
whether or not it also oered BP benet.
Figure 3.5
Costs of Organizing Principles, by Wing
RAND TR1241-3.5
Status quo
Annual cost ($ millions)
Reduced forward
presence
Reduced
forward presence
(modified)
Reduced
forward presence
(alternave
BP concepts)
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
Organizing principle
435 AGOW
100 ARW
86 AW
48 FW
31 FW
52 FW
Cost Analysis of Alternative Force Postures 47
As shown in Figure 3.6, status quo costs about $51million per year as a marginal cost to
provide current BP activities in USAFE. e dierence between the status quo and each of the
alternative organizing principles is $189million, $182million, and $59million, respectively.
When each of these costs is viewed as “the marginal cost to provide BP activities in USAFE,”
the status quo seems obviously superior from a cost perspective.
However, two potential costs that USAFE could incur might change the relative costs.
First, HQ USAFE manages an aircrew training fund that is an additional source of training
money above and beyond each wing’s annual ying-hour budget. is money, managed by
USAFE Training (USAFE/A3T) and dispensed to USAFE’s wings, is essentially a marginal
cost that USAFE incurs to have forces forward positioned in Europe and keep them trained.
e training fund covers a range of expenses, such as travel per diem, transportation, air travel,
and freight shipping. It does not include ying-hours.
From a posture perspective, one could add the size of that fund to the “status quo” column
on the left to help think about the relative cost savings of providing BP from USAFE rather
than from CONUS. However, this is possible only if part of the decision calculus is to pull
forces currently positioned in USAFE back to CONUS to operate from there (e.g., reposition-
ing the 31 FW from Aviano back to CONUS), thereby eliminating that unit’s consumption of
the aircrew training fund.
e FY 2011 aircrew training fund budget was $1.56million for the mobility air forces
(MAF) and $26.98million for the combat air forces (CAF).17 So, returning to Figure 3.6, we
see that, even with the training fund, the marginal cost to provide BP from USAFE (status
17 Aircrew training fund budget numbers were provided via email on September 30, 2011, by USAFE Directorate of Air
and Space Operations, Operations and Training Branch (USAFE/A3TO) personnel.
Figure 3.6
Costs of Organizing Principles Without Event Flying Costs
RAND TR1241-3.6
Status quo
Annual cost ($ millions)
Reduced forward
presence
Reduced
forward presence
(modified)
Reduced
forward presence
(alternave
BP concepts)
20
185 173
79
31
55 61
32
50
100
150
200
250
300
Organizing principle
TDY
Deployment
48 Working with Allies and Partners: A Cost-Based Analysis of U.S. Air Forces in Europe
quo) is lower than the cost of any of the CONUS alternatives we explored. e second cost
USAFE could incur to have forces positioned forward is simply the relative cost dierence
between operating like forces in USAFE rather than in CONUS. If forces were more expensive
to operate in USAFE, whatever the cause, one could reason that pulling those forces back to
CONUS, simply because of the cost dierential, would save money. We entertain that ques-
tion in more depth in Appendix B, but the next section provides a brief overview.
In our operating-cost comparisons, we saw that USAFE incurs signicantly lower CPFH
than does Air Combat Command (ACC) for CAF MDS. CPFH, for example, were usu-
ally about 20 to 25percent less in USAFE. Most costs for CAF MDS are driven by signi-
cantly lower consumption of training munitions and depot-level reparables (DLRs). We argue
that this is probably due to dierent operating conditions (e.g., less-strenuous ying, more-
restrictive ying conditions) and the nonlinear failure rates of spare parts.18 (USAFE ies more
hours per aircraft than does ACC, so the nonlinearity of part failures would logically reduce
the per-ying-hour costs.)
Nonying costs (e.g., personal and base support) appeared to be very similar between
USAFE and ACC for the same CAF MDS, given the dierences in wing size and potential
USAFE cost-sharing arrangements.
For the KC-135, we saw that both ying-hour and nonying operating costs were signi-
cantly more expensive in USAFE than in AMC. ese dierences may be due to fewer ying-
hours per aircraft (so part failures, which are often sublinear, are amortized over fewer ying-
hours) and to the small wing size of the 100 ARW.
Concluding Thoughts for Cost Comparisons for U.S. Air Forces in Europe
So what does all this imply for our analysis? e point of these cost comparisons is to under-
stand two things. First, without changing USAFE’s baseline level of BP activities, what might
the cost dierentials summarized in the previous section imply about the relative trade-os of
doing BP from USAFE versus CONUS? Second, how can the answers to the rst question
inform a more strategic risk assessment of moving USAFE forces?
We laid out several organizing principles earlier in this chapter that entertain essentially
two alternatives: (1) operating aircraft from forward-positioned bases in USAFE and perform-
ing (or not performing) BP and (2) repositioning those aircraft back to CONUS to operate
them and performing BP (at whatever level) in USAFE by deploying forces forward. From a
total cost perspective, assessing those two alternatives requires an assessment of two compo-
nents: the direct operating costs associated with basing and ying a unit’s aircraft and the mar-
ginal costs associated with performing BP activities.
To address these questions, we performed a few more calculations to bring this into focus.
Figure 3.7 shows the rst of these comparisons.
Figure 3.7 shows, for four USAFE wings, the net dierence in annual operating budget
when comparing USAFE’s status quo and our various organizing principles.19 Each column
18 HQ USAFE personnel conrmed that USAFE CAF pilots use signicantly fewer munitions than their ACC coun-
terparts because of European range restrictions. ey informed us that, to return to full readiness before a deployment,
USAFE CAF pilots visit RED FLAG to fully requalify to re required munitions (teleconference on September 30, 2011,
with USAFE Plans and Requirements International [USAFE/A5I] personnel).
19 In this cost comparison, we ignore any one-time costs associated with moving a unit and instead focus on the dominant
recurring costs.
Cost Analysis of Alternative Force Postures 49
includes the entire ying-hour budget, plus all nonying costs (e.g., personnel, base support),
and shows the net dierence (cost or savings) from the status quo as articulated in our building-
block analysis earlier (i.e., today’s USAFE operations as currently reected in the cost data). If a
column is above zero, there is an additional cost over the status quo; if a column is below zero,
it implies a net savings over the status quo. “Status quo, no BP” shows the total annual budget
for each USAFE wing under current operating and basing assumptions, with no BP. (ese are
simply AFTOC costs minus the marginal cost to add BP calculated from our building-block
analysis, i.e., the deployment or redeployment costs and TDY costs.) is option includes the
cost of the aircrew training fund.20
e baseline status quo and the rst column (status quo, no BP) include one additional
cost. DoD incurs additional marginal costs in pay and permanent change of station (PCS)
moves to support each person in a permanent overseas position. We estimated these costs using
recent budget data provided by the Air Force (Department of the Air Force, 2011). We esti-
mated the average annual cost to sustain a permanent overseas position to be about $25,000
20 We distributed the total aircrew training fund across these wings by prorating the cost based on the relative number of
annual ying-hours each wing ew.
Figure 3.7
Relative Cost Comparisons of U.S. Air Forces in Europe Wings and Organizing
Principles
NOTE: CONUS 1 = entire wing is moved to CONUS, operates as ACC currently does, and performs
BP under the organizing principle of reduced forward presence. CONUS2 = same as CONUS1
but under the organizing principle of reduced forward presence modified. CONUS3 = same as
CONUS1 but under the organizing principle of reduced forward presence with alternative BP
concepts. CONUS, no BP = same as CONUS1 but performing no USAFE BP from CONUS.
RAND TR1241-3.7
–100
–50
0
50
100
150
Aviano
(31st)
Lakenheath
(48th)
Mildenhall
(100th)
Spangdahlem
(52nd)
Difference from status quo ($ millions)
Base (wing)
Status quo, no BP
CONUS 1
CONUS 2
CONUS 3
CONUS, no BP
50 Working with Allies and Partners: A Cost-Based Analysis of U.S. Air Forces in Europe
per year, including both overseas pay and PCS.21 Each wing’s total includes these marginal
costs for all mission-related personnel (e.g., pilots, maintainers) and additional base support
personnel who would be realigned if the operational unit moved.22 is helps capture the rela-
tive cost of maintaining each wing in USAFE versus CONUS.
Farther to the right, “CONUS 1” shows the potential cost dierence if the entire wing
moved to CONUS, operated as ACC currently does, and performed BP according to our
“reduced forward presence” organizing principle (thus saving those marginal pay and PCS
costs described earlier). “CONUS 2” shows the same cost dierence as “CONUS1” except
using our “reduced forward presence, modied” organizing principle. “CONUS 3” shows the
same cost dierence as “CONUS 1” and “CONUS 2” except using our “reduced forward pres-
ence, alternative BP concepts” organizing principle. Finally, “CONUS, no BP” shows the cost
dierence if the entire wing moved to CONUS but performed no USAFE BP from CONUS.
We must make clear that these calculations assume that USAFE aircraft repositioned
to CONUS would eventually be operated and based as their ACC and AMC counterparts
are today. at assumption seems reasonable for basing because smaller squadrons of aircraft
would likely be absorbed by larger wings and would gain their natural economies of scale.
It also is reasonable to think that the aircraft would be operated the same. Our analysis in
Appendix B shows that there is not a signicant dierence between the experience levels of
pilots and maintainers between USAFE and ACC or AMC (for USAFE’s MDSs), so we can
assume that the pilots would need the same type of training and that the maintainers would
exhibit the same expertise and judgment. Further, any restrictions present in Europe would no
longer apply to the repositioned forces, so their training regimens, if currently dierent, would
presumably fall in line with those more typical of ACC and AMC.
e results in Figure 3.7 are mixed. In general, the USAFE options are less expensive than
the CONUS options. For Lakenheath, BP activities must be halved to become less expensive
than USAFE. For Mildenhall, because of the relatively high operating costs for the KC-135s,
all CONUS options are less expensive than those for USAFE. Keep in mind that all of these
dierences are within a few percentage points of total annual operating costs.
For illustration, we show the total cost of all ve USAFE wings with aircraft (including
the 86 AW), with the same ve policy options along the x-axis, plus the baseline status quo
costs.23
We observe several things from Figure 3.8. First, conducting today’s USAFE BP activities
from USAFE is, on the whole, less expensive than replicating them from CONUS. USAFE
BP activities would need to be halved to become cost-competitive with USAFE’s current BP
activities. Status quo with BP and CONUS 3 are virtually identical. CONUS, no BP, is about
3percent less expensive than status quo with BP and about 2percent less than status quo with-
out BP. All of these costs are extremely close (USAFE’s operating budget has changed more
than 2 to 3percent per year in recent years), and they do not include any costs to relocate the
21 We estimated pay separately for ocer and enlisted but show the estimate based on a weighted average of personnel
balance between current ocer and enlisted positions. We assume that most USAFE positions would include dependents,
which adds slightly to the pay increase.
22 Analysis of AFTOC data showed a marginal increase or decrease of 0.4 base support personnel for each mission-related
person. So, a decrease of 1,000 mission personnel from a unit would take with it approximately 400 base support personnel.
23 For these calculations, we exclude the 86 AW’s C-21s. In the context of these posture options, moving the C-21s back to
CONUS and replicating their current sorties to European countries seemed unrealistic.
Cost Analysis of Alternative Force Postures 51
units back to CONUS units and provide facilities for them to operate. is implies that, in
order to be cost-competitive in the long run, all ve of these wings would have to be relocated
to CONUS and all BP activities would have to be ceased.
For the 100 ARW and 86 AW, the ying and basing costs are apparently less in CONUS
than USAFE, so selectively moving those units (odd as that might be given the realities of
USAFE’s current bases and operations) could theoretically garner an annual cost savings in the
tens of millions of dollars. e key policy question, then, is what is at risk by moving some or all
USAFE’s forces, and is that worth a few million dollars per year?
Key Findings from the Cost Analysis
We now summarize the key ndings from our cost analysis. ese four ndings assume a xed
force structure and baseline level of BP activity.
USAFE’s current BP activities are relatively ecient. For aircraft events, the majority of the
event costs go to event ying-hours. Because these ying-hours are already part of the training
budget, they are a sunk cost, providing BP for “free” as an ancillary benet. Nonaircraft events
do not take advantage of this sunk cost, but they are a small percentage of the overall annual
costs of BP in USAFE (about 2percent). Second, USAFE wings spend about 7 to 12percent of
their ying-hours on BP activities. All things considered, they are able to leverage a signicant
portion of their ying-hour budgets (thousands of hours per year) toward BP. ird, USAFE
wings accomplish a signicant amount of BP with sorties own from home station and there-
fore do not incur additional costs for travel and deployment. We estimate that, in a given year,
Figure 3.8
Summary of Total Cost Comparisons of Organizing Principles
RAND TR1241-3.8
3,773 3,819 3,943 3,935 3,812 3,690
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000
3,500
4,000
4,500
Status quo,
no BP
Status quo
with BP
CONUS 1 CONUS 2 CONUS 3 CONUS,
no BP
Total annual operang budget ($ millions)
Organizing principle
52 Working with Allies and Partners: A Cost-Based Analysis of U.S. Air Forces in Europe
some ghter wings would y one-third to one-half of their BP ying-hours from home station,
and the 100 ARW would y nearly all of its BP ying-hours from home station.
USAFE’s current BP activities add only a marginal cost to USAFE’s overall annual operating
costs (roughly 1.5percent). We did not assess the relative value of USAFE’s current BP activi-
ties, nor their contribution to EUCOM or U.S. strategic objectives, but USAFE wings accom-
plish many thousands of hours of BP activities with PNs for the additional costs they incur.
Generating USAFE’s current BP activities from CONUS could greatly increase the mar-
ginal cost of providing BP. If USAFE’s current BP activities were replicated from CONUS, the
marginal cost to provide BP could increase more than fourfold, from $51million per year to
$240million per year.
If USAFE forces were moved to CONUS, some BP activities would need to be signicantly
curtailed to be cost neutral with regard to direct BP costs. In our fourth organizing principle, we
assessed the cost of replicating only about half of USAFE’s status quo BP activities. Even then,
the marginal BP costs (see Figure 3.6) would be more for CONUS than for USAFE’s status
quo of activities, and the total operating costs (see Figure 3.9) would be comparable. Strategi-
cally, however, halving BP activities could have a deleterious eect on the U.S. ability to sustain
access, build capability, and maintain relationships in a theater critical to U.S. alliances and
global reach.
Finally, although the marginal costs to provide BP in USAFE are very sensitive to whether
forces are located in Europe versus CONUS, these changes still have a small overall budget impact
relative to total USAFE operating costs. e changes we contemplated could potentially change
the budget by up to a few percentage points; USAFE’s operating costs have changed by that
much or more from year to year recently. Ultimately, many of the costs and savings we have
contemplated in the discussion in this chapter are small when compared with the USAFE
budget: the aircrew training fund, the cost to provide BP, the additional cost to provide BP
from CONUS, and potential costs or savings in unit training costs from operating USAFE
forces in CONUS. All of these costs matter from the standpoint of prudent management and
spending taxpayer dollars wisely. But the fact that these costs and savings are so small relative
to the overall operation of USAFE forces ought to turn attention back to the benets of having
USAFE forces provide BP and from being positioned in Europe more generally and to what is
risked by changing those things.
53
CHAPTER FOUR
Conclusions and Recommendations
Overall, the study team’s conclusion is that, provided DoD’s priorities do not change and if
the United States maintains the current presence and posture in Europe, USAFE’s BP eorts
are cost-eective. Our analysis indicates that USAFE forces are doing BP as part of their daily
routine. BP permeates the everyday activities of the HQ sta, as well as those of the six wings
we surveyed. BP is often included as a core element of USAFE training and certainly contrib-
utes to increased eectiveness of coalition operations. Our analysis also indicates some missed
opportunities that, if addressed, can help to better capture the USAFE BP “story,” as well as
potentially make USAFE BP activities more eective and ecient.
is nal chapter includes two main sections. e rst presents and discusses the study
team’s key conclusions under four main categories: mission and outreach, training and opera-
tional benets from BP, tracking and reporting processes, and cost. ese categories ow from
the more-signicant issues identied and discussed in Chapters Two and ree. e nal sec-
tion presents the team’s recommendations to the Air Force.
Conclusions
Mission and Outreach
USAFE does not appear to have adequately communicated its BP story in Europe in such a way as
to aect the posture debate or to at least illustrate USAFE’s peacetime BP mission. e depth and
breadth of USAFE’s BP activities are largely unknown outside of USAFE and certain oces
in DoD and the Department of State. Key legislative committees in Congress are poised to
make decisions regarding basing in Europe and are doing so without in-depth knowledge of
the benets of forward-based forces in helping to enable eective coalition operations, for
example. More-targeted outreach to key congressional committees, the State Department, and
policymakers in DoD on the Air Force BP mission in Europe would be a useful way to add BP
into the debate on posture.
Forward basing facilitates important relationship- and capacity-building BP activities. ere
are some activities that can be done only from close in. Although security cooperation is not a
primary driver of force posture in Europe, BP activities conducted with forward-based forces
enable eective relationships, build partner capability and capacity, and help ensure access.
A signicant portion of USAFE’s BP activities is opportunity-driven rather than part of a
broader country strategy. BP is often an ancillary benet to U.S. training in and with partner
countries. USAFE units exploit BP opportunities in the context of their own training; BP ben-
et is often a “free commodity” that accrues when USAFE units apply training funds. It is less
54 Working with Allies and Partners: A Cost-Based Analysis of U.S. Air Forces in Europe
likely that CONUS-based forces could do the same, at least not at the same rate as Europe-
based units. BP in Europe would likely suer under CONUS basing options, yet the strategic
eects of such a drop-o have not been adequately analyzed.
BP-related strategy and objectives at the country and event levels are not clear to the person-
nel and units that execute BP activities. Often, the broader picture and commander’s intent for
specic BP activities are not apparent at the wing level. It is not necessary for all airmen to have
in-depth knowledge of the strategy behind each BP activity, but certainly wing and squadron
leadership should have a clear understanding of the specic objectives and broader USAFE
vision for the partner country so that they can execute eectively.
Training and Operational Benefits from Building Partnerships
Although many U.S. units and personnel derive training benet from BP activities and presence in
Europe, some get less benet than others. Overall, we found that wing leadership and sta tend
to view BP through the lens of supporting their own training and readiness requirements.
Most respondents to our survey viewed BP-related activities as benecial to their own training
and readiness. Some events are not seen as productive in terms of maintaining U.S. readiness,
including air shows, ybys, and air policing events. Overall, there are unique training oppor-
tunities that include allies and partners for every type of unit, but not every opportunity helps
to maintain readiness.
e presence of forward-based forces can serve to facilitate coalition operations. According
to discussions with USAFE personnel, the frequent, long-term interactions and collocation
with partners that forward basing aords individuals and units in USAFE makes it easier to
quickly initiate planning and operations from the AOR and in outside regions. e need to
build relationships, capabilities, and access in the EUCOM AOR for coalition operations will
continue beyond Iraq and Afghanistan. Partnerships with European friends and allies will be
needed to sustain stability, deterrence, and assurance on the continent and to execute potential
contingency operations—both from and with European PNs—in Africa, the Middle East,
and beyond. Emerging requirements in such areas as BMD and cyber warfare will continue to
drive cooperative eorts.
Some missed BP opportunities are worth pursuing. USAFE is taking advantage of opportu-
nities to work with partners during training and exercises at and o home station mainly in
eastern Europe, but more could be done. Many of these derive from events that could be better
utilized to help build partnerships. ese include hosting events and maintainer involvement
in BP during o-station training events. In some instances, particularly in the 435 AGOW,
respondents expressed a belief that they were being underutilized for BP activities.
Tracking and Reporting Processes
Existing USAFE reporting processes capture part of the BP level of eort in the command, but more
BP events are occurring than is apparent from HQ-level data. Air Force BP events are broader
and more numerous than those reported to HQ USAFE. ey include community relations
activities with the host country, familiarization visits to Air Force bases, and focused down-
range training to improve a partner’s capacity for coalition operations. With many BP activi-
ties being opportunity-driven from the wing level, some opportunities taken do not become
opportunities reported.
BP data are subject to several reporting chains depending on the nature of the event and who
is executing it. No single reporting regime captures security cooperation events. is is a DoD-
Conclusions and Recommendations 55
wide shortfall, and USAFE has improved reporting in the past several years. Data on BP events
are often derived from other reporting processes (e.g., AARs on training events owing from
the unit to the USAFE operations sta). As a result, there is inconsistent or nonexistent report-
ing on important information that would support decisionmaking on force planning and pos-
ture, resources, and prioritization of activities.
ere is some confusion at the wing level as to what exactly constitutes a BP event. Is it a
planned and resourced activity? Does BP include tours of U.S. facilities by partner-country
ocials? Does it include impromptu events in which partner-country airmen observe or par-
ticipate in Air Force training downrange? Overall, there is no clear denition of what actually
is a BP event. e lack of a denition of BP event also hampers reporting and analysis.
Cost
USAFE’s BP activities are relatively ecient. For aircraft events, the majority of the event costs
go to event ying-hours. Because these ying-hours are already part of the training budget,
they are a sunk cost, providing BP for free as an ancillary benet. Second, USAFE wings spend
about 7 to 12percent of their ying-hours on BP activities. All things considered, they are
able to leverage a signicant portion of their ying-hour budgets toward BP. ird, USAFE
wings accomplish a signicant amount of BP with sorties own from home station, which are
essentially free. We estimate that, in a given year, some FWs would y one-third to one-half
of their BP ying-hours from home station, and the 100 ARW would y nearly all of its BP
ying-hours from home station.
USAFE’s BP activities add only a marginal cost to USAFE’s overall annual operating costs
(roughly 1.5 percent). Evaluating the value of these activities is beyond the scope of this
research, but USAFE wings accomplish many thousands of hours of BP activities with PNs for
those additional costs.
Generating USAFE’s BP activities from CONUS incurs signicant additional expenses.
Deployment costs for USAFE BP activities would increase signicantly if replicated from
CONUS—in some cases, by an order of magnitude. Further, USAFE’s CAF wings appear to
have lower operating costs than those in CONUS, so the cost dierential could be more.
If USAFE forces were moved to CONUS, some BP activities would need to be signicantly
curtailed to be cost neutral with regard to direct BP costs. In our fourth organizing principle, we
assessed the cost of replicating only about half of USAFE’s status quo BP activities. Even then,
both the marginal BP costs and the total operating costs would be more for CONUS than for
USAFE’s status quo of activities.
Recommendations
We direct our recommendations to HQ-level elements of USAFE and USAFE working in
conjunction with the wings.
For the HQ USAFE level, we recommend the following actions:
• Ensure that BP and security cooperation are included in the force posture debate when it
aects Air Force forces.
– Broaden the understanding within the Air Force and among decisionmakers in DoD
that the marginal cost of BP by USAFE forces is small, assuming that the current pos-
56 Working with Allies and Partners: A Cost-Based Analysis of U.S. Air Forces in Europe
ture remains the same, and that the cost of replicating USAFE’s current BP activities
from CONUS could be substantially higher, even if BP activities were reduced.
– Make decisions on posture changes to forces in Europe based on an assessment of
whether any savings are worth the risk to access, leadership, and other core U.S. inter-
ests.
– Direct that BP be emphasized in Air Force discussions on force posture in Europe
with key congressional sta, the Oce of the Secretary of Defense, and Department
of State ocials.
For USAFE working in conjunction with the wings, we recommend the following actions:
• Develop a BP strategy for engagement with European partners post–Operation NEW
DAWN and Operation ENDURING FREEDOM.
– Press eorts to develop air-related country plans in the AOR that enable linkages
between theater objectives and USAFE BP events. Develop means of pushing this
information to wings and other USAFE organizations.
– Seek increased engagement with partners in the eastern region of the AOR focused
on meeting operational requirements of contingencies in the CENTCOM AOR. is
includes maintaining or expanding access to bases, airspace, and ranges by both combat
and support assets and working with potential coalition partners on related operations.
– Develop options (with EUCOM) for continuing to build partner capacity in niche
areas with new members of NATO and less advanced partners in the AOR for future
coalition operations. Continue pursuing ongoing eorts to build medical, JTAC, cargo
preparation, and other capabilities, as well as institutional capacity.
– Continue close cooperation in training and exercises with advanced partners in the
AOR for future coalition operations. Interoperability and relationship-building at the
individual, unit, and command levels are invaluable and aect both the capability and
willingness to work with the United States in the AOR and beyond. is applies also
to emerging air forces, such as that of Poland, which could someday become advanced
partners.
• Streamline processes for data collection and analysis.
– Consider ways to aggregate BP data and express the Air Force’s BP successes. Use this
report as a rst step in making explicit linkages between force posture and BP.
– Adapt existing reporting regimes across the air sta to capture the BP data required to
make informed resourcing and other decisions. USAFE should determine the types of
BP activities it absolutely needs to track, then focus on those specic types of activities
in detail. is may include activities that best support EUCOM’s eater Campaign
Plan objectives and activities that help to inform resourcing decisions.
– Consider administering an annual survey, similar to the one used for this study, to
supplement BP data already reported. Adapt the survey to answer questions that sup-
port USAFE and EUCOM decisionmaking requirements.
– Dene BP event, perhaps in accordance with the study team’s proposed denition, and
communicate this to the wings. We recommend that the Air Force consider adopting
this denition: A BP event is a planned or unplanned activity that builds and sus-
tains relationships with, capabilities of, or access to foreign partner militaries in accor-
Conclusions and Recommendations 57
dance with the combatant commander’s theater and country objectives. In addition,
BP events should be prioritized on the basis of this denition.
– Adopt PAF methodology for assessing and costing BP level of eort to support resource
and other decisions.
For the HQ USAFE level in coordination with the wings, we recommend the following
actions:
• Take advantage of additional BP opportunities.
– Develop concepts to expand and standardize hosting events and to take greater BP
advantage of o-station events (especially maintainers) and share ideas with HQ
USAFE.
– At home station, consider increasing the frequency of visits by partner countries to
USAFE bases (especially maintainers, logisticians, security forces, and mobility plan-
ners). Ensure that the activities scheduled address specic BP objectives for those part-
ner countries.
– Downrange, consider including additional NCO experts (again, maintainers are ideal)
in selected BP activities.
Issues
As stated in Chapter One, the scope of this research was limited. It did not include EUCOM’s
or USAFE’s relative importance across the other COCOMs or components or an assessment
from current operational theaters about whether these BP activities translate to the operational
realm. It also assumed no policy change with regard to BP from the Air Force or DoD.
e limited scope of the research and analysis oers opportunities for further work in
this eld. First of all, we did not have an opportunity to assess the relationships between pres-
ence, BP and security cooperation, and access in other AORs. A similar level of analysis would
be very useful for U.S. Pacic Command (PACOM) and CENTCOM AORs, which are also
contemplating basing options. Second, we did not focus our analysis on how and when partner
countries grant access to or withhold access from U.S. forces. ese decisions could be based
on a historical analysis and case studies of partner willingness in peacetime, crisis, and con-
ict. ird, we did not have the time to assess in any comprehensive way the eectiveness of BP
activities in the USAFE AOR. Although outside the scope of this eort, a deeper level of analy-
sis of the real benets of USAFE BP activities for the U.S. and partner countries is warranted
in order to make informed decisions about where to continue, cut, or change existing BP
programs and activities in specic countries. Fourth, the team identied data collection and
reporting to supporting decisionmaking on BP as an issue, according to our review of the data
and interviews, and suggested several possible ways to address this issue. However, a deeper
study of the processes and reporting mechanisms is likely to reveal the best COAs. Fifth,
we did not have the opportunity to comprehensively assess cost trade-os between basing
forces in USAFE versus in CONUS. In our analysis, we uncovered cost dierences between
USAFE and CONUS that we were not entirely able to explain. Further analysis could dig
deeper into how each command diers in training requirements and operational restrictions to
58 Working with Allies and Partners: A Cost-Based Analysis of U.S. Air Forces in Europe
better understand future implications of reposturing USAFE’s forces. Such analysis could also
include the costs to rebase ying wings in CONUS.
59
APPENDIX A
Survey Results: U.S. Air Forces in Europe Building Partnerships
is appendix provides the details of the study team’s BP survey administered to USAFE forces
in the spring and summer of 2011. e rst section shows the survey template. e second pro-
vides the results. e survey template was approved by the Air Force and by RAND’s Human
Subjects Protection Committee.
Survey Template
e survey instructions read as follows:
RAND Project AIR FORCE is conducting a study for [the commander of USAFE] to
characterize and cost U.S. Air Force eorts to build partnerships and partner capacity (BP/
BPC) in the USEUCOM AoR. is study is to be completed by October 2011. To help
us assess the BP environment in which USAFE operates, we are asking you, as sta and
operators in the eld, to help us understand the opportunities and challenges you encoun-
ter in the context of formal and informal engagements with foreign military partners in
[EUCOM].
We request that you complete the attached questionnaire. is should take you no more
than 15 minutes.
Participation in this survey is voluntary. Let us know if you do not want to participate or
you want to stop at any time. You should feel free to skip any questions that you prefer not
to answer. ere will be no negative consequences for you personally that result from your
decision to participate or not.
RAND will keep your responses strictly condential. We will not disclose your identity or
information that identies you to anyone outside the research project, including the USAF,
except as required by law. If you have any questions or concerns regarding your participa-
tion in this research, please contact the project co-leader, Mr. David aler (thaler@rand.
org, 703-413-1100, ext. 5221), or the Human Subjects Protection Committee at RAND,
[1776] Main Street, Santa Monica, CA 90407, 310-393-0411, ext. 6369.
ank you, in advance, for your time, your honesty, and your input.
60 Working with Allies and Partners: A Cost-Based Analysis of U.S. Air Forces in Europe
Responses
We received total responses from 742 participants (see FiguresA.1–A.3).
Figure A.1
Total Responses, by Wing
RAND TR1241-A.1
Response
Wing
HQ
USAFE
86
AW
52
FW
48
FW
435
AGOW
31
FW
100
ARW
Other
Figure A.2
Total Responses, by Specialty
RAND TR1241-A.2
Response
Specialty
Survey Results: U.S. Air Forces in Europe Building Partnerships 61
Figure A.3
Total Responses, by Rank
RAND TR1241-A.3
NCO
3%
1. Please indicate the following information.
Your squadron/division
Your flight (if applicable)
Your rank
Your duty [Air Force specialty code]: (ex: K11M3, 2A691)
2. How long in total (whether continuously or not) have you been assigned to USAFE?
If less than a year, please enter “0” for years and then enter the number of months.
Years
Months
Average response was four years.
3. Do you participate in USAFE in activities that you would classify as BP/BPC? is
includes major events, day-to-day interactions, informal communications, and com-
munity relations with host-/partner-country personnel. (See FiguresA.4–A.6.)
Yes
No
62 Working with Allies and Partners: A Cost-Based Analysis of U.S. Air Forces in Europe
Figure A.4
Level of Participation in Activities to Build Partnerships and
Partner Capacity
NOTE: The survey item read, “Do you participate in USAFE in activities
that you would classify as BP/BPC? This includes major events, day-to-day
interactions, informal communications, and community relations with
host-/partner-nation personnel.”
RAND TR1241-A.4
Figure A.5
Level of Participation in Activities to Build Partnerships and Partner Capacity,
bySpecialty
NOTE: The survey item read, “Do you participate in USAFE in activities that you would classify
as BP/BPC? This includes major events, day-to-day interactions, informal communications, and
community relations with host-/partner-nation personnel.”
RAND TR1241-A.5
Response
Specialty
Survey Results: U.S. Air Forces in Europe Building Partnerships 63
Figure A.6
Level of Participation in Activities to Build Partnerships and Partner Capacity,
byWing
NOTE: The survey item read, “Do you participate in USAFE in activities that you would classify
as BP/BPC? This includes major events, day-to-day interactions, informal communications, and
community relations with host-/partner-nation personnel.”
RAND TR1241-A.6
Response
Wing
HQ
USAFE
86
AW
52
FW
48
FW
435
AGOW
31
FW
100
ARW
Other
4. If yes, how frequently do you participate in these activities? (See FiguresA.7–A.9.)
Never
Less than once a year
Once a year
Once every 6 months
Once every 3 months
Once a month
Twice a month
More than twice a month (please specify)
64 Working with Allies and Partners: A Cost-Based Analysis of U.S. Air Forces in Europe
Figure A.7
Frequency of Participation in Activities to Build Partnerships and Partner Capacity
Response (%)
NOTE: The survey item read, “Do you participate in USAFE in activities that you would classify
as BP/BPC? This includes major events, day-to-day interactions, informal communications, and
community relations with host-/partner-nation personnel. If yes, how frequently?”
RAND TR1241-A.7
Frequency
Daily/
almost daily
Twice a
month
Once a
month
Once every
3 months
Once every
6 months
Once a
year
Less than
once a year
7
17
26
22
13
5
10
Figure A.8
Frequency of Participation in Activities to Build Partnerships and Partner Capacity,
by Specialty
NOTE: The survey item read, “Do you participate in USAFE in activities that you would classify
as BP/BPC? This includes major events, day-to-day interactions, informal communications,
and community relations with host-/partner-nation personnel. If yes, how frequently?”
RAND TR1241-A.8
Response
Frequency
Daily/
almost
daily
Twice a
month
Once a
month
Once
every 3
months
Once
every 6
months
Once a
year
Less than
once a
year
Survey Results: U.S. Air Forces in Europe Building Partnerships 65
Figure A.9
Frequency of Participation in Activities to Build Partnerships and Partner Capacity,
by Wing
NOTE: The survey item read, “Do you participate in USAFE in activities that you would classify
as BP/BPC? This includes major events, day-to-day interactions, informal communications,
and community relations with host-/partner-nation personnel. If yes, how frequently?”
RAND TR1241-A.9
Response
Frequency
Daily/
almost
daily
Twice a
month
Once a
month
Once
every 3
months
Once
every 6
months
Once a
year
Less than
once a
year
52 FW
31 FW100 ARW
HQ USAFE 86 AW
48 FW435 AGOW
Other
5. On average, what is the duration of your participation in each activity? (See
FiguresA.10–A.12.)
15–30 days
7–14days
3–6 days
1–2 days
Less than a day
66 Working with Allies and Partners: A Cost-Based Analysis of U.S. Air Forces in Europe
Figure A.10
Duration of Participation for Each Activity to Build Partnerships and Partner
Capacity
NOTE: The survey item read, “On average, what is the duration of your participation
in each activity?”
RAND TR1241-A.10
Response (%)
Duration
Less than
a day
1–2
days
3–6
days
7–14
days
15–30
days
16
14
19
14
37
Figure A.11
Duration of Participation for Each Activity to Build Partnerships and Partner
Capacity, by Specialty
NOTE: The survey item read, “On average, what is the duration of your participation
in each activity?”
RAND TR1241-A.11
Response
Duration
Less than
a day
1–2
days
3–6
days
7–14
days
15–30
days
Survey Results: U.S. Air Forces in Europe Building Partnerships 67
Figure A.12
Duration of Participation for Each Activity to Build Partnerships and Partner
Capacity, by Wing
NOTE: The survey item read, “On average, what is the duration of your participation
in each activity?”
RAND TR1241-A.12
Response
Duration
Less than
a day
1–2
days
3–6
days
7–14
days
15–30
days
52 FW
31 FW100 ARW
HQ USAFE86 AW
48 FW435 AGOW
Other
6. What eect has your participation had on your ability to work eectively with host-/
partner-country personnel of other cultures and languages? (See FiguresA.13–A.15.)
Significantly enhanced my ability to work with partners
Somewhat enhanced my ability to work with partners
Maintained or reinforced an ability I already had to work with partners (please explain existing
ability)
68 Working with Allies and Partners: A Cost-Based Analysis of U.S. Air Forces in Europe
Figure A.13
The Effect That Building Partnerships and Partner Capacity Can
Have on the Ability to Work Effectively with Partner Countries
NOTE: The survey item read, “What effect has your participation had
on your ability to work effectively with host-/partner-nation personnel
of other cultures and languages?”
RAND TR1241-A.13
Significantly
enhanced
34%
Somewhat
enhanced
43%
Maintained or
reinforced
23%
Figure A.14
The Effect That Building Partnerships and Partner Capacity Can Have on the
Ability to Work Effectively with Partner Countries, by Specialty
NOTE: The survey item read, “What effect has your participation had on your ability to work
effectively with host-/partner-nation personnel of other cultures and languages?”
RAND TR1241-A.14
Response
Specialty
Significantly enhanced Maintained or reinforcedSomewhat enhanced
Survey Results: U.S. Air Forces in Europe Building Partnerships 69
Figure A.15
The Effect That Building Partnerships and Partner Capacity Can Have on the
Ability to Work Effectively with Partner Countries, by Wing
NOTE: The survey item read, “What effect has your participation had on your ability to work
effectively with host-/partner-nation personnel of other cultures and languages?”
RAND TR1241-A.15
Response
Wing
Significantly enhanced Maintained or reinforcedSomewhat enhanced
HQ
USAFE
86
AW
52
FW
48
FW
435
AGOW
31
FW
100
ARW
Other
7. On average, how often do you communicate informally (i.e., not in the context of a
planned BP/BPC event involving you or your unit) with host-/partner-country mili-
tary personnel? (See FiguresA.16–A.18.)
Never
Less than once a year
Once a year
Once every 6 months
Once every 3 months
Once a month
Twice a month
More than twice a month (please specify)
70 Working with Allies and Partners: A Cost-Based Analysis of U.S. Air Forces in Europe
Figure A.16
Frequency of Informal Communication with Partner Military Personnel
NOTE: The survey item read, “On average, how often do you communicate informally
(i.e., not in the context of a planned BP/BPC event involving you or your unit) with
host-/partner-nation military personnel?”
RAND TR1241-A.16
Response (%)
Frequency
More than
twice a
month
Twice a
month
Once a
month
Once
every 3
months
Once
every 6
months
Once a
year
Less than
once a
year
Never
7
10
12
10
6
9
32
14
Figure A.17
Frequency of Informal Communication with Partner Military Personnel,
bySpecialty
NOTE: The survey item read, “On average, how often do you communicate informally
(i.e., not in the context of a planned BP/BPC event involving you or your unit) with
host-/partner-nation military personnel?”
RAND TR1241-A.17
Response
Frequency
More than
twice a
month
Twice a
month
Once a
month
Once
every 3
months
Once
every 6
months
Once a
year
Less than
once a
year
Never
Survey Results: U.S. Air Forces in Europe Building Partnerships 71
Figure A.18
Frequency of Informal Communication with Partner Military Personnel, by
Wing
NOTE: The survey item read, “On average, how often do you communicate informally
(i.e., not in the context of a planned BP/BPC event involving you or your unit) with
host-/partner-nation military personnel?”
RAND TR1241-A.18
Response
Frequency
More than
twice a
month
Twice a
month
Once a
month
Once
every 3
months
Once
every 6
months
Once a
year
Less than
once a
year
Never
52 FW
31 FW100 ARW
HQ USAFE86 AW
48 FW435 AGOW
Other
8. About what percentage of your informal communication with host-/partner-country
personnel is carried on through the following channels? (See FiguresA.19–A.21.)
Telephone
Email
Texting
Internet (e.g., chat, Skype)
Face to face
72 Working with Allies and Partners: A Cost-Based Analysis of U.S. Air Forces in Europe
Figure A.19
Means of Informal Communication with Partners
NOTE: The survey item read, “About what percentage of your informal
communication with host-/partner-nation personnel is carried on through
the following channels?”
RAND TR1241-A.19
Face to face
51%
Figure A.20
Means of Informal Communication with Partners, by Specialty
NOTE: The survey item read, “About what percentage of your informal communication
with host-/partner-nation personnel is carried on through the following channels?”
RAND TR1241-A.20
Response (%)
Channel
Face to faceChat, Skype,
or similar
TextingEmailTelephone
55
46
43
60
1
222
5
0
111
3
34
25
33
40
16
15
16
18
1515
49
Survey Results: U.S. Air Forces in Europe Building Partnerships 73
Figure A.21
Means of Informal Communication with Partners, by Wing
NOTE: The survey item read, “About what percentage of your informal communication
with host-/partner-nation personnel is carried on through the following channels?”
RAND TR1241-A.21
Response (%)
Channel
Face to faceChat, Skype,
or similar
TextingEmailTelephone
52 FW31 FW100 ARW HQ USAFE 86 AW48 FW435 AGOW Other
9. About what percentage of your informal communication with host-/partner-country
personnel is dedicated to the following? (See FigureA.22–A.24.)
Discussing/resolving technical issues (e.g., maintenance problem on partner aircraft)
Maintaining personal relationship (e.g., small talk, discussing family)
Preparing for upcoming U.S. event with the partner military
Evaluating a previous event with the partner military
Other (please specify)
74 Working with Allies and Partners: A Cost-Based Analysis of U.S. Air Forces in Europe
Figure A.22
Purpose of Informal Communication with Partners
NOTE: The survey item read, “About what percentage of your informal
communication with host-/partner-nation personnel is dedicated to the
following topics?”
RAND TR1241-A.22
Maintaining
personal
relationships
32%
Discussing/
resolving
technical issues
27%
Preparing for an
upcoming event
30%
Evaluating a
previous event
11%
Figure A.23
Purpose of Informal Communication with Partners, by Specialty
NOTE: The survey item read, “About what percentage of your informal communication
with host-/partner-nation personnel is carried on through the following topics?”
RAND TR1241-A.23
Response (%)
Topic
Maintaining
personal
relationships
Discussing/
resolving
technical issues
Preparing for an
upcoming event
with the partner
Evaluating a
previous event
with the partner
9
11
9
11
31
21
39
27
21
25
39
27
29
37
29
31
23
35
31
16
Survey Results: U.S. Air Forces in Europe Building Partnerships 75
Figure A.24
Purpose of Informal Communication with Partners, by Wing
NOTE: The survey item read, “About what percentage of your informal communication
with host-/partner-nation personnel is dedicated to the following topics?”
RAND TR1241-A.24
Response (%)
Topic
Maintaining
personal
relationships
Discussing/
resolving
technical issues
Preparing for an
upcoming event
with the partner
Evaluating a
previous event
with the partner
52 FW31 FW100 ARW HQ USAFE86 AW48 FW435 AGOW Other
10. At times, currency and upgrade training is conducted o home station in foreign
countries. Generally, how would you describe the eect on learning, currency,
and unit readiness of conducting training o station in foreign countries? (See
FiguresA.25–A.27.)
Very beneficial to learning, currency, and readiness
Somewhat beneficial to learning, currency, and readiness
Does not affect learning, currency, or readiness
Somewhat detrimental to learning, currency, and readiness
Very detrimental to learning, currency, and readiness
Comments?
76 Working with Allies and Partners: A Cost-Based Analysis of U.S. Air Forces in Europe
Figure A.25
Off-Station Training’s Effect on Learning, Currency, and Readiness
NOTE: The survey item read, “At times, currency and upgrade training is
conducted off home station in foreign nations. Generally, how would you
describe the effect on learning, currency, and unit readiness of conducting
training off station in foreign nations?”
RAND TR1241-A.25
No effect
14%
Somewhat
beneficial
33%
Very beneficial
44%
Somewhat
detrimental
Very
detrimental
Figure A.26
Off-Station Training’s Effect on Learning, Currency, and Readiness, by Specialty
NOTE: The survey item read, “At times, currency and upgrade training is conducted off home
station in foreign nations. Generally, how would you describe the effect on learning, currency,
and unit readiness of conducting training off station in foreign nations?”
RAND TR1241-A.26
No
effect
Somewhat
beneficial
Somewhat
detrimental
Very
detrimental
Effect
Response
Very
beneficial
Survey Results: U.S. Air Forces in Europe Building Partnerships 77
Figure A.27
Off-Station Training’s Effect on Learning, Currency, and Readiness, by Wing
NOTE: The survey item read, “At times, currency and upgrade training is conducted off home
station in foreign nations. Generally, how would you describe the effect on learning, currency,
and unit readiness of conducting training off station in foreign nations?”
RAND TR1241-A.27
No
effect
Somewhat
beneficial
Somewhat
detrimental
Very
detrimental
Effect
Response
Very
beneficial
52 FW
31 FW100 ARW
HQ USAFE86 AW
48 FW435 AGOW
Other
11. When you do o-station training, how often do you take the opportunity to inter-
act, share information, and establish relationships with host-/partner-country mili-
tary personnel? In other words, how frequently do you impart “ancillary benet” to
the partner by conducting BP/BPC activities while you are present for training? (See
FiguresA.28–A.30.)
Every training event conducted off station
Most training events conducted off station
Some training events conducted off station
Very rarely or never on training events conducted off station
78 Working with Allies and Partners: A Cost-Based Analysis of U.S. Air Forces in Europe
Figure A.28
Frequency of Building Partnerships and Partner Capacity During Off-
Station Training (ancillary benefits)
Some off-station
training events
21%
NOTE: The survey item read, “When you do off-station training, how often
do you take the opportunity to interact, share information, and establish
relationships with host-/partner-nation military personnel? In other words,
how frequently do you impart ‘ancillary benefit’ to the partner by conducting
BP/BPC activities while you are present for training?”
RAND TR1241-A.28
Figure A.29
Frequency of Building Partnerships and Partner Capacity During Off-Station Training
(ancillary benefits), by Specialty
NOTE: The survey item read, “When you do off-station training, how often do you take the
opportunity to interact, share information, and establish relationships with host-/partner-nation
military personnel? In other words, how frequently do you impart ‘ancillary benefit’ to the
partner by conducting BP/BPC activities while you are present for training?”
RAND TR1241-A.29
Some off-station
training events
Most off-station
training events
Very rarely
or never
Frequency
Response
Every off-station
training event
Survey Results: U.S. Air Forces in Europe Building Partnerships 79
Figure A.30
Frequency of Building Partnerships and Partner Capacity During Off-Station Training
(ancillary benefits), by Wing
NOTE: The survey item read, “When you do off-station training, how often do you take the
opportunity to interact, share information, and establish relationships with host-/partner-nation
military personnel? In other words, how frequently do you impart ‘ancillary benefit’ to the
partner by conducting BP/BPC activities while you are present for training?”
RAND TR1241-A.30
Some off-station
training events
Most off-station
training events
Very rarely
or never
Frequency
Response
Every off-station
training event
52 FW
31 FW100 ARW
HQ USAFE86 AW
48 FW435 AGOW
Other
Questions 12 and 13 are aimed at operational units; they are less relevant to HQ sta. If
you are a member of the HQ sta, you may decide to answer these questions based on previous
experience or skip to Question 14.
12. Does your unit or division have “go-to” personnel (in any career eld) who are
tasked more frequently than others to conduct BP/BPC events with foreign part-
ners? (See FiguresA.31–A.33.)
Yes, the same “go-to” personnel seem to be tasked to do BP/BPC events
No, taskings for BP/BPC events are generally spread across the unit
80 Working with Allies and Partners: A Cost-Based Analysis of U.S. Air Forces in Europe
Figure A.31
Presence of Go-To Personnel Tasked More Frequently for
Building Partnerships and Partner Capacity
NOTE: The survey item read, “Does your unit or division have ‘go-to’
personnel (in any career field) who are tasked more frequently than
others to conduct BP/BPC events with foreign partners?”
RAND TR1241-A.31
Figure A.32
Presence of Go-To Personnel Tasked More Frequently for Building Partnerships
and Partner Capacity, by Specialty
NOTE: The survey item read, “Does your unit or division have ‘go-to’ personnel
(in any career field) who are tasked more frequently than others to conduct BP/BPC
events with foreign partners?”
RAND TR1241-A.32
Specialty
Response
Survey Results: U.S. Air Forces in Europe Building Partnerships 81
Figure A.33
Presence of Go-To Personnel Tasked More Frequently for Building
Partnerships and Partner Capacity, by Wing
NOTE: The survey item read, “Does your unit or division have ‘go-to’ personnel
(in any career field) who are tasked more frequently than others to conduct BP/BPC
events with foreign partners?”
RAND TR1241-A.33
Wing
Response
HQ
USAFE
86
AW
52
FW
48
FW
435
AGOW
31
FW
100
ARW
Other
13. If yes, why do you think this is? (See FiguresA.34–A.36.)
Seniority
Training (including advisory training)
Experience
All of the above
Other (please specify)
82 Working with Allies and Partners: A Cost-Based Analysis of U.S. Air Forces in Europe
Figure A.34
Rationale for Tasking Go-To Personnel for Events to Build
Partnerships and Partner Capacity
NOTE: The survey item read, “Does your unit or division have ‘go-to’
personnel (in any career field) who are tasked more frequently than
others to conduct BP/BPC events with foreign partners? If so, why
do you think this is?”
RAND TR1241-A.34
Figure A.35
Rationale for Tasking Go-To Personnel for Events to Build Partnerships and
Partner Capacity, by Specialty
NOTE: The survey item read, “Does your unit or division have ‘go-to’ personnel
(in any career field) who are tasked more frequently than others to conduct BP/BPC
events with foreign partners? If so, why do you think this is?”
RAND TR1241-A.35
Specialty
Response
Survey Results: U.S. Air Forces in Europe Building Partnerships 83
Figure A.36
Rationale for Tasking Go-To Personnel for Events to Build Partnerships and
Partner Capacity, by Wing
NOTE: The survey item read, “Does your unit or division have ‘go-to’ personnel
(in any career field) who are tasked more frequently than others to conduct BP/BPC
events with foreign partners? If so, why do you think this is?”
RAND TR1241-A.36
Wing
Response
HQ
USAFE
86
AW
52
FW
48
FW
435
AGOW
31
FW
100
ARW
Other
14. Do the more-senior personnel in your division often get tasked for BP/BPC events
with foreign partners, or is it often a fair mix of junior and senior personnel? (See
FiguresA.37–A.39.)
Taskings to participate in events often fall to senior personnel
Taskings to participate in events often are balanced between junior and senior personnel
It depends (please explain)
84 Working with Allies and Partners: A Cost-Based Analysis of U.S. Air Forces in Europe
Figure A.37
Balance of Taskings for Building Partnerships
NOTE: The survey item read, “Do the more-senior personnel in
your division often get tasked for BP/BPC events with foreign
partners, or is it often a fair mix of junior and senior personnel?”
RAND TR1241-A.37
Figure A.38
Balance of Taskings for Building Partnerships, by Specialty
NOTE: The survey item read, “Do the more-senior personnel in your division often
get tasked for BP/BPC events with foreign partners, or is it often a fair mix of junior
and senior personnel?”
RAND TR1241-A.38
Specialty
Response
Survey Results: U.S. Air Forces in Europe Building Partnerships 85
Figure A.39
Balance of Taskings for Building Partnerships, by Wing
NOTE: The survey item read, “Do the more-senior personnel in your division often
get tasked for BP/BPC events with foreign partners, or is it often a fair mix of junior
and senior personnel?”
RAND TR1241-A.39
Wing
Response
HQ
USAFE
86
AW
52
FW
48
FW
435
AGOW
31
FW
100
ARW
Other
15. Do you feel that participation in BP/BPC activities is part of your unit’s or division’s
primary mission or not part of that primary mission? Please select one for each type
of event. Community relations activities includes air shows and community events
involving local citizens. (See FiguresA.40–A.50.)
Part of Mission Not Part of Mission
BP/BPC during readiness training
Major events (e.g., exercises)
M2M meetings or conferences
Foreign visits to home station
Community relations activities
86 Working with Allies and Partners: A Cost-Based Analysis of U.S. Air Forces in Europe
Figure A.40
Relevance of Activities for Building Partnerships and Partner Capacity to Unit’s
Primary Mission
NOTE: The survey item read, “Do you feel that participation in BP/BPC activities is part of
your unit’s or division’s primary mission or not part of that primary mission? Please select
one for each type of event. Community relations activities includes air shows and
community events involving local citizens.”
RAND TR1241-A.40
Activity
Response (%)
Foreign visits to
home station
M2M
meetings/conferences
Major events
(e.g., exercises)
BP/BPC during
readiness training
Community
relations activities
Part of mission Not part of mission
64
40
60
29
71
19
81
30
70
26
Figure A.41
Relevance of Building Partnerships and Partner Capacity During Readiness
Training to Unit’s Primary Mission, by Specialty
NOTE: The survey item read, “Do you feel that participation in BP/BPC activities is part of
your unit’s or division’s primary mission or not part of that primary mission? Please select
one for each type of event. Community relations activities includes air shows and
community events involving local citizens.”
RAND TR1241-A.41
Specialty
Response
Part of mission Not part of mission
Survey Results: U.S. Air Forces in Europe Building Partnerships 87
Figure A.42
Relevance of Major Events (e.g., exercises) to Unit’s Primary Mission, by
Specialty
NOTE: The survey item read, “Do you feel that participation in BP/BPC activities is part of
your unit’s or division’s primary mission or not part of that primary mission? Please select
one for each type of event. Community relations activities includes air shows and
community events involving local citizens.”
RAND TR1241-A.42
Specialty
Response
Part of mission Not part of mission
Figure A.43
Relevance of Military-to-Military Meetings and Conferences to Unit’s Primary
Mission, by Specialty
NOTE: The survey item read, “Do you feel that participation in BP/BPC activities is part of
your unit’s or division’s primary mission or not part of that primary mission? Please select
one for each type of event. Community relations activities includes air shows and
community events involving local citizens.”
RAND TR1241-A.43
Specialty
Response
Part of mission Not part of mission
88 Working with Allies and Partners: A Cost-Based Analysis of U.S. Air Forces in Europe
Figure A.44
Relevance of Foreign Visits to Home Station to Unit’s Primary Mission,
bySpecialty
NOTE: The survey item read, “Do you feel that participation in BP/BPC activities is part of
your unit’s or division’s primary mission or not part of that primary mission? Please select
one for each type of event. Community relations activities includes air shows and
community events involving local citizens.”
RAND TR1241-A.44
Specialty
Response
Part of mission Not part of mission
Figure A.45
Relevance of Community Relations Activities to Unit’s Primary Mission,
bySpecialty
NOTE: The survey item read, “Do you feel that participation in BP/BPC activities is part of
your unit’s or division’s primary mission or not part of that primary mission? Please select
one for each type of event. Community relations activities includes air shows and
community events involving local citizens.”
RAND TR1241-A.45
Specialty
Response
Part of mission Not part of mission
Survey Results: U.S. Air Forces in Europe Building Partnerships 89
Figure A.46
Relevance of Building Partnerships and Partner Capacity During Readiness
Training to Unit’s Primary Mission, by Wing
NOTE: The survey item read, “Do you feel that participation in BP/BPC activities is
part of your unit’s or division’s primary mission or not part of that primary mission?
Please select one for each type of event. Community relations activities includes
air shows and community events involving local citizens.”
RAND TR1241-A.46
Wing
Response
HQ
USAFE
86
AW
52
FW
48
FW
435
AGOW
31
FW
100
ARW
Other
Part of mission Not part of mission
Figure A.47
Relevance of Major Events (e.g., exercises) to Unit’s Primary Mission,
byWing
NOTE: The survey item read, “Do you feel that participation in BP/BPC activities is
part of your unit’s or division’s primary mission or not part of that primary mission?
Please select one for each type of event. Community relations activities includes
air shows and community events involving local citizens.”
RAND TR1241-A.47
Wing
Response
HQ
USAFE
86
AW
52
FW
48
FW
435
AGOW
31
FW
100
ARW
Other
Part of mission Not part of mission
90 Working with Allies and Partners: A Cost-Based Analysis of U.S. Air Forces in Europe
Figure A.48
Relevance of Military-to-Military Meetings and Conferences to Unit’s
Primary Mission, by Wing
NOTE: The survey item read, “Do you feel that participation in BP/BPC activities is
part of your unit’s or division’s primary mission or not part of that primary mission?
Please select one for each type of event. Community relations activities includes
air shows and community events involving local citizens.”
RAND TR1241-A.48
Wing
Response
HQ
USAFE
86
AW
52
FW
48
FW
435
AGOW
31
FW
100
ARW
Other
Part of mission Not part of mission
Figure A.49
Relevance of Foreign Visits to Home Station to Unit’s Primary Mission,
byWing
NOTE: The survey item read, “Do you feel that participation in BP/BPC activities is
part of your unit’s or division’s primary mission or not part of that primary mission?
Please select one for each type of event. Community relations activities includes
air shows and community events involving local citizens.”
RAND TR1241-A.49
Wing
Response
HQ
USAFE
86
AW
52
FW
48
FW
435
AGOW
31
FW
100
ARW
Other
Part of mission Not part of mission
Survey Results: U.S. Air Forces in Europe Building Partnerships 91
Figure A.50
Relevance of Community Relations Activities to Unit’s Primary Mission,
byWing
NOTE: The survey item read, “Do you feel that participation in BP/BPC activities is
part of your unit’s or division’s primary mission or not part of that primary mission?
Please select one for each type of event. Community relations activities includes
air shows and community events involving local citizens.”
RAND TR1241-A.50
Wing
Response
HQ
USAFE
86
AW
52
FW
48
FW
435
AGOW
31
FW
100
ARW
Other
Part of mission Not part of mission
16. When you are participating in a dedicated BP/BPC event (whether exercises, con-
ferences, seminars, etc.), what is your approximate personal time commitment pre-
paring for or recovering from an event? Please include paperwork, travel planning,
preparatory communication with partner-country personnel, after-action reporting,
postponing or making up training, etc. (See FiguresA.51–A.55.)
Preparing for an Event Recovering from an Event
More than 7 days
4–7 days
1–3 days
Less than 1 day
92 Working with Allies and Partners: A Cost-Based Analysis of U.S. Air Forces in Europe
Figure A.51
Personal Time Commitment Preparing for or Recovering from Events for
Building Partnerships and Partner Capacity
NOTE: The survey item read, “When you are participating in a dedicated BP/BPC event
(whether exercises, conferences, seminars, or something else), what is your approximate
personal time commitment preparing for or recovering from an event? Please include
paperwork, travel planning, preparatory communication with partner-nation personnel,
after-action reporting, postponing or making up training, and other activities.”
RAND TR1241-A.51
Commitment
Response (%)
1–3 days4–7 daysMore than 7 days Less than 1 day
Preparing Recovering
18.5
42
22
17
21
11
38.5
30
Figure A.52
Personal Time Commitment Preparing for Events for Building Partnerships and
Partner Capacity, by Specialty
NOTE: The survey item read, “When you are participating in a dedicated BP/BPC event
(whether exercises, conferences, seminars, or something else), what is your approximate
personal time commitment preparing for or recovering from an event? Please include
paperwork, travel planning, preparatory communication with partner-nation personnel,
after-action reporting, postponing or making up training, and other activities.”
RAND TR1241-A.52
Commitment
Response
1–3 days4–7 daysMore than 7 days Less than 1 day
Survey Results: U.S. Air Forces in Europe Building Partnerships 93
Figure A.53
Personal Time Commitment Recovering from Events for Building Partnerships
and Partner Capacity, by Specialty
NOTE: The survey item read, “When you are participating in a dedicated BP/BPC event
(whether exercises, conferences, seminars, or something else), what is your approximate
personal time commitment preparing for or recovering from an event? Please include
paperwork, travel planning, preparatory communication with partner-nation personnel,
after-action reporting, postponing or making up training, and other activities.”
RAND TR1241-A.53
Commitment
Response
1–3 days4–7 daysMore than 7 days Less than 1 day
Figure A.54
Personal Time Commitment Preparing for Events for Building Partnerships and
Partner Capacity, by Wing
NOTE: The survey item read, “When you are participating in a dedicated BP/BPC event
(whether exercises, conferences, seminars, or something else), what is your approximate
personal time commitment preparing for or recovering from an event? Please include
paperwork, travel planning, preparatory communication with partner-nation personnel,
after-action reporting, postponing or making up training, and other activities.”
RAND TR1241-A.54
Commitment
Response
1–3 days4–7 daysMore than 7 days Less than 1 day
52 FW
31 FW100 ARW
HQ USAFE86 AW
48 FW435 AGOW
Other
94 Working with Allies and Partners: A Cost-Based Analysis of U.S. Air Forces in Europe
Figure A.55
Personal Time Commitment Recovering from Events for Building Partnerships
and Partner Capacity, by Wing
NOTE: The survey item read, “When you are participating in a dedicated BP/BPC event
(whether exercises, conferences, seminars, or something else), what is your approximate
personal time commitment preparing for or recovering from an event? Please include
paperwork, travel planning, preparatory communication with partner-nation personnel,
after-action reporting, postponing or making up training, and other activities.”
RAND TR1241-A.55
Commitment
Response
1–3 days4–7 daysMore than 7 days Less than 1 day
52 FW
31 FW100 ARW
HQ USAFE86 AW
48 FW435 AGOW
Other
17. When you were assigned to other commands, did you participate in similar BP/BPC
activities with partner countries?
Yes
No
If yes, please explain. (See FiguresA.56.–A.58.)
Survey Results: U.S. Air Forces in Europe Building Partnerships 95
Figure A.56
Rate of Participation in Activities for Building Partnerships
and Partner Capacity Before Being Assigned to U.S. Air
Forces in Europe
NOTE: The survey item read, “When you were assigned to other
commands, did you participate in similar BP/BPC activities with
partner nations?”
RAND TR1241-A.56
Figure A.57
Rate of Participation in Activities for Building Partnerships and Partner
Capacity Before Being Assigned to U.S. Air Forces in Europe, by Specialty
NOTE: The survey item read, “When you were assigned to other commands, did you
participate in similar BP/BPC activities with partner nations?”
RAND TR1241-A.57
Specialty
Response
96 Working with Allies and Partners: A Cost-Based Analysis of U.S. Air Forces in Europe
Figure A.58
Rate of Participation in Activities for Building Partnerships and Partner Capacity
Before Being Assigned to U.S. Air Forces in Europe, by Wing
NOTE: The survey item read, “When you were assigned to other commands, did you
participate in similar BP/BPC activities with partner nations?”
RAND TR1241-A.58
Wing
Response
HQ
USAFE
86
AW
52
FW
48
FW
435
AGOW
31
FW
100
ARW
Other
18. Do you have any other insights you would like to share regarding building partner-
ships with and capacity of countries in the EUCOM AOR?
If you are a commander or supervisor of a ight or squadron, or a branch or division chief
or director on the HQ sta, please answer the following questions:
19. Have you or your unit or division ever needed to postpone or cancel currency train-
ing for yourself or your unit—or have the training requirements been waived—
because of BP event taskings? (See FiguresA.59–A.61.)
Yes
No
Survey Results: U.S. Air Forces in Europe Building Partnerships 97
Figure A.59
Partnership-Building or Partner Capacity–Building Event
Taskings’ Probability of Canceling or Postponing Currency
Training
NOTE: The survey item read, “Have you or your unit or division
ever needed to postpone or cancel currency training for yourself
or your unit, or have the training requirements been waived
because of BP event taskings?”
RAND TR1241-A.59
Figure A.60
Partnership-Building or Partner Capacity–Building Event Taskings’
Probability of Canceling or Postponing Currency Training, by Specialty
NOTE: The survey item read, “Have you or your unit or division ever needed to
postpone or cancel currency training for yourself or your unit, or have the training
requirements been waived because of BP event taskings?”
RAND TR1241-A.60
Specialty
Response
98 Working with Allies and Partners: A Cost-Based Analysis of U.S. Air Forces in Europe
Figure A.61
Partnership-Building or Partner Capacity–Building Event Taskings’ Probability
of Canceling or Postponing Currency Training, by Wing
NOTE: The survey item read, “Have you or your unit or division ever needed to postpone
or cancel currency training for yourself or your unit, or have the training requirements
been waived because of BP event taskings?”
RAND TR1241-A.61
Wing
Response
HQ
USAFE
86
AW
52
FW
48
FW
435
AGOW
31
FW
100
ARW
Other
20. If yes, how often, on average, do you or your unit or division need to postpone or
cancel currency training or have the training requirements been waived due to BP/
BPC event taskings? (See FiguresA.62–A.64.)
Less than once a year
Once a year
Once every 6 months
Once every 3 months
Once a month
Twice a month
More than twice a month (please specify)
Survey Results: U.S. Air Forces in Europe Building Partnerships 99
Figure A.62
Frequency of Currency Training Cancellation Due to Event Tasking for Building Partnerships
and Partner Capacity
NOTE: The survey item read, “Have you or your unit or division ever needed to postpone or cancel
currency training for yourself or your unit, or have the training requirements been waived because of BP
event taskings? If yes, how often on average do you or your unit or division need to postpone or cancel
currency training or have the training requirements been waived because of BP/BPC event taskings?”
RAND TR1241-A.62
Response (%)
Frequency
More than twice
a month
Twice a
month
Once a
month
Once every
3 months
Once every
6 months
Once every
year
8
1
6
33
31
21
Figure A.63
Frequency of Currency Training Cancellation Due to Event Tasking for Building
Partnerships and Partner Capacity, by Specialty
NOTE: The survey item read, “Have you or your unit or division ever needed to postpone or
cancel currency training for yourself or your unit, or have the training requirements been
waived because of BP event taskings? If yes, how often on average do you or your unit or
division need to postpone or cancel currency training or have the training requirements been
waived because of BP/BPC event taskings?”
RAND TR1241-A.63
Response
Frequency
More than twice
a month
Twice a
month
Once a
month
Once every
3 months
Once every
6 months
Once every
year
4
3
4
1
0
1
1
0
1
0 0 0
8
17
16
3
0
44 4
5
111
0
1
0 0 0 0
Logistics Medical Operations Support Other
100 Working with Allies and Partners: A Cost-Based Analysis of U.S. Air Forces in Europe
Figure A.64
Frequency of Currency Training Cancellation Due to Event Tasking for Building
Partnerships and Partner Capacity, by Wing
NOTE: The survey item read, “Have you or your unit or division ever needed to postpone or
cancel currency training for yourself or your unit, or have the training requirements been
waived because of BP event taskings? If yes, how often on average do you or your unit or
division need to postpone or cancel currency training or have the training requirements been
waived because of BP/BPC event taskings?”
RAND TR1241-A.64
Response
Frequency
More than twice
a month
Twice a
month
Once a
month
Once every
3 months
Once every
6 months
Once every
year
0
2
1
2
0
1
0
2 2
0 0
1
5
4 4
1
0
1
6
12
13
2
0
1
0
2
1
0 0 0
3
1 1
0 0
1
222
0
1
0
1
0
2
0 0 0
100 ARW 31 FW 435 AGOW 48 FW
52 FW 86 AW HQ USAFE Other
21. How many manpower authorizations does your organization have?
Authorized (spaces) in your organization
Average response was 363.
22. How many personnel are actually assigned to your organization?
Assigned (faces) to your organization
Average response was 334.
23. BP/BPC activities require resources, including personnel and equipment from your
organization. If BP/BPC activities in any way delay or inhibit the ability of your
organization to maintain readiness, about how many more personnel should your
organization have assigned to be able to conduct BP/BPC activities without aecting
day-to-day operations and training, including on-the-job training (OJT)?
More who should be assigned to your organization
Average response was 10.2 more personnel; equal to a 3-percent increase in total
manpower per organization.
Survey Results: U.S. Air Forces in Europe Building Partnerships 101
24. What additional equipment should your organization have, if any, to enable you to
conduct BP/BPC activities without aecting day-to-day operations and training,
including OJT?
103
APPENDIX B
Operating-Cost Comparisons
e purpose of this appendix is to calculate operating costs for USAFE’s wings and compare
them with those of comparable wings in CONUS. Our aims are twofold. First, we need to
accurately calculate the cost per ying-hour for each USAFE MDS to feed the building-block
calculations in Chapter ree. Second, when entering a larger discussion of the value of pos-
turing forces in CONUS versus USAFE to perform BP, we want to accurately capture any cost
dierences to operate like aircraft in either AOR.
Air Force Operating-Cost Data
To perform our cost comparisons, we queried data from the AFTOC database, the standard
database for performing this kind of cost analysis. We made two types of cost comparisons.
First, we compared the ying-hour costs to see whether operating aircraft in USAFE costs
more or less than in CONUS. Some costs, such as fuel, training munitions, and repair parts,
vary with the number of ying-hours. In the second case, we compared the nonying costs of
USAFE wings with those of CONUS wings. Such costs as personnel, facilities, and some depot
maintenance costs are not driven by ying, so we amortize them dierently. We walk through
some detailed cost and usage metrics in the succeeding sections with some overall conclusions
about relative operating costs.
In order to accurately separate ying costs from other costs, we looked to the AFTOC
database to address its cost elements. Table B.1 shows our results.
In Table B.1, we show some of the granular cost categories in the AFTOC database.
AFTOC divides its cost data into six broad categories, called Cost Analysis Improvement
Group (CAIGs). ese CAIGs are further divided into levels 2, 3, and 4. At level 4, the lowest
level, there are 72categories. We assigned each cost category to either a ying-hour group or
aircraft group. Costs in the ying-hour group vary mostly by the total ying-hours own. We
therefore amortize these total costs across the total ying-hours for an MDS. Costs in the air-
craft group vary mostly by other factors, such as the size of the unit. For our analysis, we amor-
tize these costs according to the number of total aircraft inventory (TAI) owned by that unit.1
A couple of important caveats are necessary here. First, costs that vary with aircraft usage
do not all vary linearly with ying-hours. Some costs, such as aviation fuel, vary relatively lin-
early with ying-hours, but training sorties can have very dierent proles, in which aircraft
1 Aircraft TAI are drawn from the Logistics, Installations and Mission Support–Enterprise View (LIMS-EV) online
database.
104 Working with Allies and Partners: A Cost-Based Analysis of U.S. Air Forces in Europe
operate at dierent speeds, using dierent maneuvers. Flying an aircraft aggressively for one
hour could burn signicantly more fuel than a less aggressive hour of ying. Further, spare-
parts consumption does not vary perfectly linearly with ying-hours. Again, sorties themselves
can dier, but the modes of wear and failure for dierent spare parts can vary by hours of usage,
Table B.1
Air Force Total Operating-Cost Elements
CAIG Level 1 CAIG Level 2 CAIG Level 3
CAIG Level4/
Description Flying-Hours Aircraft
Unit personnel x
Unit operations Operating
material
Energy (fuel,
POL, electricity)
Aviation fuel x
POL x
Electricity x
Training
munitions and
expendables
Training munitions
and expendables
x
Other operations
material
x
Support services x
TDY x
Maintenance Organizational
maintenance and
support
Consumables x
Repair parts x
DLRs Flying DLRs x
Nonflying DLRs x
Contract
maintenance
services
x
N/A N/A
Depot
maintenance
Government
depot repair
Aircraft x
Missile x
Engine x
Other x
Contractor depot
repair
Aircraft x
Engine x
Other x
Sustaining
support
x
Continuing
system
improvements
x
Indirect support x
NOTE: POL = petroleum, oil, and lubricants.
Operating-Cost Comparisons 105
calendar time (for failure modes involving corrosion), or number of sorties (e.g., the turning o
and on of an item, such as an engine or electronic part). CPFH is not a perfect metric.
Second, nonying operating costs do not vary totally independently of ying-hours.
Regression analysis of AFTOC data showed that ying-hours do have a small but nontrivial
eect on some nonying costs, but these costs are driven primarily by factors other than air-
craft usage. AFTOC is the standard Air Force data source for this type of cost analysis, and
we use accepted methods for parsing these costs, but we must accept some of the limitations of
doing this kind of cost analysis up-front. We now discuss these cost comparisons.
Flying Costs
Flying-Hour Costs Differ Between U.S. Air Forces in Europe and Continental U.S. Wings
Figure B.1 shows CPFH and aircraft usage for USAFE and CONUS wings for ve MDSs.
In Figure B.1, the x-axis shows ve groupings of MDS for aircraft operated in USAFE
and CONUS. (For CAF platforms, we included ACC costs for CONUS; for the KC-135, we
included AMC costs for CONUS.) e third set shows data for the F-16C Block 40/42, also
known as the CG; the fourth set shows data for the F-16C Block 50/52, also known as the CJ,
or high-speed antiradiation missile (HARM) shooter. We excluded the two-seater F-16D, a
trainer, of which USAFE only has a few. Each pair of columns shows data for both USAFE and
CONUS. e columns, tied to the y-axis on the left, show CPFH; the dots, tied to the y-axis
on the right, show ying-hours per TAI (FH/TAI). e TAI metric shows the relative amount
of ying each aircraft gets in a time period. All data are for 2008–2010.
Figure B.1
Flying-Hour Cost and Usage Comparisons Between U.S. Air Forces in Europe and the
Continental United States
NOTE: U = USAFE; C = CONUS.
RAND TR1241-B.1
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
10,000
12,000
14,000
16,000
18,000
20,000
U C U C U C U C U C
A-10A/C F-15C/D/E F-16C-40/42 F-16C-50/52 KC-135R/T
FH/TAI
CPFH ($)
MDS
CPFH
FH/TAI
106 Working with Allies and Partners: A Cost-Based Analysis of U.S. Air Forces in Europe
We observe a few things on this chart. First, all the CAF platforms have lower CPFH in
USAFE by a signicant margin. Second, nearly all the CAF platforms have higher FH/TAI, so
they y more hours per aircraft per year than those in ACC. ird, KC-135 CPFH is signi-
cantly higher in USAFE than in AMC. Fourth, the FH/TAI is lower in USAFE than AMC,
so USAFE ies its KC-135s signicantly less per aircraft (nearly half as much) than AMC. We
address each of these dierences in the following sections.
Why Are U.S. Air Forces in Europe’s Combat Air Forces Flying-Hour Costs Less Than Air
Combat Command’s?
To determine why USAFE’s CAF CPFH are consistently lower than ACC’s, we dug deeper
into the AFTOC data from which these costs are derived. Figure B.2 shows the key drivers of
ACC’s CAF CPFH increase over USAFE’s costs. We included in this graph only cost elements
that were higher for ACC than USAFE (which was most of them).
In Figure B.2, the x-axis shows each MDS grouping for USAFE’s CAF aircraft, plus the
base from which each operates, for reference. e colored columns represent the percentage of
the cost increase of ACC over USAFE. Flying DLRs are reparable aircraft parts that are not
usually repaired at wing level (i.e., home station) but are removed, replaced, and shipped to a
depot maintenance facility to be repaired. For all MDS groupings, DLR costs drove about 55
to 65percent of the cost dierential, training munitions drove about 20percent, and aviation
fuel and other costs drove the remainder. For the F-16C Block40/42, training munitions drove
nearly half the cost dierence, and, for the Block 50/52, aviation fuel drove a more signicant
portion than for the other MDSs.
On the whole, the per-unit costs of fuel, DLRs, and training munitions should not vary
signicantly between ACC and USAFE.2 We explored ve possible explanations as to why
USAFE’s CPFH for these categories are lower: dierences in aircraft operation, dierences in
reporting, dierences in fault observation, nonlinearity of spare-parts failure, and dierences
in deterioration mechanisms.
We draw our rst three hypotheses from past research on air operations supporting
Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. Pyles and Shulman (1995) ana-
lyzed spare-parts consumption during these two operations and observed markedly higher
consumption rates for several ghter MDSs during combat than during garrison operations
(Pyles and Shulman, 1995). During those operations, F-15Cs experienced signicantly more
failures per aircraft than those in garrison. e authors reported that (1)those pilots probably
utilized threat-related subsystems to the fullest, turning on and operating subsystems that may
not have been exercised as much in garrison, and (2) those pilots were probably “scrupulous
about ensuring that all aircraft subsystems were operating at their fullest potential” (Pyles and
Shulman, 1995)—i.e., they reported errors they might not have in garrison. e rst point sug-
gests they operated the aircraft dierently, causing more faults by increased usage; the second
point suggests they had reason to report more faults than they might otherwise. In the same
analysis, Pyles and Shulman observed that F-16Cs and EF-111As operated with more restric-
tions in the war than in garrison and that they generally observed (and therefore reported)
fewer faults than during garrison operations.
2 Our AFTOC data showed no systematic dierence even in fuel CPFH between CONUS and USAFE, which one might
expect given regional fuel price dierences. ere may be an actual dierence in fuel costs that AFTOC does not reveal.
Operating-Cost Comparisons 107
e third hypothesis is that, in some conditions, faults may be more or less observable.
Pyles and Shulman reported that, before deploying, the F-111s tested their electronic counter-
measure (ECM) gear and observed an increase in breaks. “Once combat operations began and
the Iraqi Air Defense System became less active, aircrews received little feedback on their air-
borne jamming eectiveness, so break rates diminished again” (Pyles and Shulman, 1995). So,
the F-111s may have experienced the same (or similar) failures of their ECM gear, but, because
there was no one to report back to them their ECM eectiveness, they could not observe it
themselves.
Our fourth hypothesis is that spare-parts failures do not increase exactly linearly with
increased ying-hours, which we explained earlier in this appendix. So, as an aircraft ies
more hours per year, the breakage and therefore consumption of DLRs slows in proportion to
ying-hours (i.e., the DLR consumption increases sublinearly).
e nal hypothesis is that the conditions in USAFE could dier in a way that aects the
spare-parts deterioration mechanisms. As we stated earlier in this appendix, parts failure can be
driven by usage, calendar time, or other factors. A damper or saltier environment could cause
faster deterioration or wear of parts than a drier, cleaner environment.
Considering these hypotheses in light of what we already know of USAFE’s operations
and environment, we nd two of them to be most compelling: dierences in operation and
nonlinear parts failure. We explain why.
Figure B.2
Drivers of Flying-Hour Cost Differences Between U.S. Air Forces in Europe and Air Combat
Command
RAND TR1241-B.2
0
25
50
75
100
A-10A/C
(Spangdahlem)
F-15C/D/E
(Lakenheath)
F-16C-40/42
(Aviano)
F-16C-50/52
(Spangdahlem)
Percentage of cost difference
MDS (base)
Other FH costs
Aviaon fuel
Training munions
DLRs
108 Working with Allies and Partners: A Cost-Based Analysis of U.S. Air Forces in Europe
We found two plausible reasons that USAFE could operate its aircraft dierently than
ACC. First, USAFE pilots and maintainers could be more experienced than those in ACC.
is is a tempting explanation because more-experienced pilots would likely need dierent
(and probably less-aggressive) training, and they would drop fewer training munitions.3 More-
experienced maintainers would likely remove fewer DLRs because they would be more able to
properly diagnose problems, and, if they did remove a DLR, they would arguably be more able
to x that DLR at home station rather than sending it to depot and incurring that additional
cost.
To explore this, we analyzed Air Force personnel data to assess potential grade and skill
dierences between USAFE and ACC but found no compelling dierence in assigned person-
nel between USAFE and ACC.4 We compared ghter pilot grades and enlisted maintainer
grades and skills. USAFE’s ghter pilots actually appear to be a little less experienced than
ACC’s (slightly more O-3s and slightly fewer O-4s and O-5s). USAFE’s maintainers show
almost identical grade distributions to ACC. Regarding skill level, USAFE’s maintainers were
ever so slightly more experienced. For one Air Force specialty code (AFSC), aerospace main-
tenance (2A5), USAFE had signicantly more 7-levels than ACC and fewer 3-levels, possibly
enough to cause an observable dierence in maintenance actions.5
Ultimately, USAFE pilots and maintainers could be exhibiting the behaviors we list
above, even if they were not due to a dierence in experience. We are unable to determine this
conclusively.6
e second and more plausible explanation for USAFE operating its aircraft dierently
than ACC is the known restrictions in western Europe for operating military aircraft. It could
be that the ranges most immediately available to USAFE’s wings do not enable them to y the
same maneuvers they normally would, making for less strenuous sorties (and thus lower DLR
failure). Also, many of the subsystems that contribute to DLR consumption are ECM and
other electronics. It is plausible that the countries where USAFE forces are based place restric-
tions on the use of these subsystems (because of their proximity to densely populated areas),
leading to fewer failures of these subsystems (similar to the Operation DESERT STORM
example).
One nal explanation is the sublinear failure of DLRs. If USAFE units y more hours per
year per aircraft, parts costs would be amortized over a larger number of hours. is is essen-
tially what we found. Figure B.3 shows the dierences between USAFE and ACC for FH/TAI
and DLR CPFH.
In Figure B.3, the left column in each pair shows the FH/TAI of USAFE over ACC. So
for the A-10A/C, the column shows a positive 16-percent dierence. at means that USAFE
ew its A-10s about 16percent more ying-hours per aircraft than ACC during our observed
time period. e right column shows the DLR CPFH dierence from USAFE to ACC. For
the A-10, USAFE’s listed DLR CPFH was 76percent less than ACC’s.
3 It is also possible that more-experienced pilots might have a higher tolerance for minor subsystem faults and would not
report them as readily as a less experienced pilot might.
4 Air Force personnel data, calendar year 2009.
5 One could analyze depot maintenance data to pinpoint actual demand from each wing, but such analysis was outside
the scope of this research.
6 When forces actually deploy to expeditionary operating locations (not just to forward-positioned garrison bases), they
usually take more-experienced personnel.
Operating-Cost Comparisons 109
In three out of four cases, the FH/TAI is higher and the DLR CPFH lower. We could
argue here that USAFE units must y farther to usable ranges and thus incur a penalty for each
sortie to transit to and from these ranges. It is true that, to do some training, CAF units in
western European bases must travel to eastern European ranges. Our building-block analysis
suggests that the deployment or redeployment penalty would be on the order of 1percent of
ying-hours, not 20percent.
On the other hand, the F-16C Block 40/42, at Aviano, has lower FH/TAI and DLR
CPFH. One might expect the lower FH/TAI to produce a higher DLR CPFH, but it does
not in this case. For some aircraft, longer sorties may play a role in the increased annual
ying-hours and decreased CPFH, but that does not seem to consistently explain the variation
between USAFE and ACC.
We show one nal comparison. Recall from Figure B.2 that training munitions consti-
tuted about 20percent of the lower CPFH for USAFE units relative to ACC. Figure B.4 shows
the munitions CPFH gures for these same units.
In Figure B.4, the x-axis shows four CAF MDSs we have been discussing. Each pair of
columns shows data for both USAFE and CONUS. e columns, tied to the y-axis on the left,
show only the CPFH for training munitions.
USAFE’s CPFH for training munitions is, in most cases, an order of magnitude less than
ACC’s. For the F-16C Block 50/52, USAFE’s costs are about one-quarter of ACC’s. e higher
FH/TAI would mitigate that dierence some, but there appears to be some signicant opera-
tional dierence between the two MAJCOMs. HQ USAFE personnel conrmed that USAFE
CAF pilots use signicantly fewer munitions than their ACC counterparts do because of Euro-
Figure B.3
Differences Between Flying-Hours and Depot-Level Reparable Costs per Flying-Hour
RAND TR1241-B.3
16% 27%
–10%
25%
–76%
–24% –35% –26%
–100
–80
–60
–40
–20
0
20
40
A-10A/C
(Spangdahlem)
F-15C/D/E
(Lakenheath)
F-16C B40/42
(Aviano)
F-16C B50/52
(Spangdahlem)
Difference from USAFE to ACC (%)
MDS (base)
FH/TAI
DLR CPFH
110 Working with Allies and Partners: A Cost-Based Analysis of U.S. Air Forces in Europe
pean range restrictions. ey informed us that, to return to full readiness before a deployment,
USAFE CAF pilots visit RED FLAG to fully requalify to re required munitions.7
All things considered, we consistently observe a lower CPFH for these CAF aircraft in
USAFE than at ACC.8 We now address the question of why the KC-135 CPFH is signicantly
more expensive in USAFE than CONUS.
Why Are U.S. Air Forces in Europe’s KC-135 Flying-Hour Costs Higher Than Air Mobility
Command’s?
Again, we dug more deeply into the AFTOC data to see what drove the cost dierences.
FigureB.5 shows the key drivers of USAFE’s KC-135 CPFH increase over AMC. We included
only those cost categories for which USAFE’s costs were higher than AMC’s.
As shown in Figure B.5, engine and DLR consumption are each about 40percent of the
cost increase, repair parts (non-DLRs) another 10percent, and other costs another 10percent.
Can ying-hours explain the dierence in parts consumption? Figure B.6 shows the dierence
between USAFE and AMC for KC-135 FH/TAI, ying DLR CPFH, and engine CPFH.
In Figure B.6, each column shows the dierence in the metric comparing USAFE with
AMC. For the leftmost column, USAFE’s KC-135 FH/TAI was 46percent lower than AMC’s
for our observed time period. USAFE’s DLR and engine CPFH were 89percent and 97per-
cent higher than AMC’s, respectively. Roughly speaking, USAFE ew its KC-135s about half
7 Teleconference on September 30, 2011, with USAFE/A5I personnel.
8 For argument’s sake, we also amortized the ying-hour costs across each wing’s aircraft to see whether the net cost
that USAFE incurred per aircraft per year diered. We found that, when ying-hour costs were amortized across aircraft,
USAFE’s costs either were a wash with ACC or were signicantly less expensive, conrming our other ndings.
Figure B.4
Training Munitions Cost per Flying-Hour
NOTE: U = USAFE; C = CONUS.
RAND TR1241-B.4
200
400
600
800
1,000
1,200
1,400
1,600
U C U C U C U C
A-10A/C F-15C/D/E F-16C-40/42 F-16C-50/52
Training munions CPFH ($)
MAJCOM MDS
Operating-Cost Comparisons 111
Figure B.5
Drivers of Higher U.S. Air Forces in Europe KC-135 Flying-Hour
Costs
RAND TR1241-B.5
Flying DLRs
Repair parts
Engine
Other
Figure B.6
Higher KC-135 Flying-Hour Costs in U.S. Air Forces in Europe
Correlate to Fewer Flying-Hours Per Aircraft
RAND TR1241-B.6
–46%
89% 97%
–60
–40
–20
0
20
40
60
80
100
FH/TAI Flying DLR CPFH
Flying-hours
Engine CPFH
Difference from USAFE to ACC (%)
112 Working with Allies and Partners: A Cost-Based Analysis of U.S. Air Forces in Europe
as many hours per aircraft and consumed about twice as many ying DLRs per ying-hour.
As with our earlier discussion, one could argue that DLR and engine consumption do not vary
linearly with ying-hours.
Does USAFE y shorter sorties than AMC? We do know that, in calendar year 2010,
USAFE’s average KC-135 sortie duration was about 4.3 hours.9 We do not know the value of
AMC’s KC-135 average sortie duration. Ultimately, correlation does not necessarily mean cau-
sation, but this seems like a reasonable explanation in light of our discussion earlier about the
sublinear increase in parts failures.
Another possible explanation could be an increased operation of and reporting of failures
for certain electronic subsystems. Europe has more-restrictive regulations for collision avoid-
ance than the United States, as well as higher density of air trac in some areas. We know
from our analysis that the 100 ARW regularly travels to other countries to do tanking missions
with PNs (Chapter Two notes that the 100th engaged with 22 dierent nations during the
year we analyzed), and they would traverse several countries for many of these trips. It could
be that these KC-135s operate subsystems involving collision avoidance or types of naviga-
tion more than they would in the United States and that they more fastidiously report failures
to ensure that these systems meet the stringent standards Europe requires. It is unlikely that
dierences in operations would explain the entire scale of the CPFH dierences, but it could
feasibly contribute.10
We have thus far addressed ying-hour costs. We now turn our attention to nonying
operating costs, such as personnel and base support.
Nonflying Costs
How Do U.S. Air Forces in Europe’s Nonflying Operating Costs Compare with Those in the
Continental United States?
Figure B.7 shows the AFTOC nonying costs and TAI for each command.
In Figure B.7, the x-axis shows ve groupings of MDS for aircraft operated in USAFE and
CONUS, the same as Figure B.1 earlier in this appendix. Each pair of columns or dots shows
data for both USAFE and CONUS. e columns, tied to the y-axis on the left, show cost per
aircraft in millions of dollars; the dots, tied to the y-axis on the right, show TAI.
We observe several things here. First, for CAF aircraft, USAFE operates signicantly
fewer aircraft of each MDS than does ACC, which is no surprise. Second, the nonying oper-
ating costs per aircraft are very similar between the two commands. When we look at the CAF
aircraft, we nd that the percentage dierence between the two commands is in the single
digits, and, in one case, USAFE’s costs are marginally higher than ACC (F-16C Block 50/52).
One might expect higher costs in USAFE than in ACC for some MDSs because most
ghter wings have 72 aircraft, but most of USAFE’s CAF wings have fewer than that. us,
ACC’s basing arrangements are arguably more ecient and should be less expensive per air-
9 Sortie data were derived from 100 ARW annual sortie records in a spreadsheet provided by 100 ARW personnel via email
in August 2011.
10 For argument’s sake, we also amortized the ying-hour costs by aircraft to see whether the net cost that USAFE incurred
per aircraft per year diered. We note that, when amortized this way, the net annual ying-hour cost per aircraft was
50percent less in USAFE than in AMC.
Operating-Cost Comparisons 113
craft. is supposed dierence could be oset by cost-sharing arrangements that USAFE has
with its host-nation governments, but we cannot establish that from the available data.11 Ulti-
mately, the cost dierences for these CAF aircraft are in the tens of millions of dollars per
year. To put that in perspective, we note that the total nonying costs for these CAF aircraft
in USAFE is about $1.7 billion.12
e outlier in FigureB.7 is again the KC-135. Here, we can see that the KC-135’s nony-
ing cost per aircraft is signicantly higher in USAFE than in AMC.
Why Are U.S. Air Forces in Europe’s KC-135 Non–Flying-Related Costs Higher Than Air
Mobility Command’s?
Figure B.8 shows the drivers of higher USAFE KC-135 per-aircraft costs. Here, we see that
higher nonying costs are driven primarily by unit personnel, then by depot maintenance (air-
craft costs), then by indirect support. Unit personnel includes all personnel associated with the
ying wing (e.g., operations and maintenance groups). Depot maintenance includes depot costs
that are not associated with ying-related consumables. is could include the labor necessary
for inspections, wiring replacement, or corrosion repair. Indirect support includes primarily
base operating support and some medical and administrative personnel costs.
11 During the course of this research, HQ USAFE personnel reported that USAFE benets from donated land and cost-
sharing arrangements that help defray some of its operating costs, but we do not know their scope.
12 As a side note, Spangdahlem has two dierent MDSs, the A-10 and F-16C Block 50. e cost dierence for these two—
the A-10 lower in USAFE and the F-16C Block 50 higher—is essentially a wash.
Figure B.7
Nonflying Costs and Total Aircraft Inventory Comparison Between U.S. Air Forces in
Europe and the Continental United States
NOTE: U = USAFE; C = CONUS.
RAND TR1241-B.7
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
0
5
10
15
20
25
U C U C U C U C U C
A-10A/C F-15C/D/E F-16C-40/42 F-16C-50/52 KC-135R/T
TAI
Cost per aircra ($ millions)
MDS
Cost per aircra
TAI
114 Working with Allies and Partners: A Cost-Based Analysis of U.S. Air Forces in Europe
It is not clear why per-aircraft depot maintenance costs would be so much higher for
USAFE aircraft than for AMC aircraft (USAFE’s related depot cost per aircraft is fully 42per-
cent higher than AMC’s). Generally, depot maintainers go through the same inspections for
each aircraft, incurring essentially the same labor costs. USAFE’s aircraft could be subject to
more corrosion because of their operating environment (located about 30–50 miles from the
coast), it could be that they are older and incur more costs to replace some parts or remedy
corrosion.
Unit personnel and indirect support cost dierences may have a more obvious explana-
tion. USAFE operates only 15 KC-135s, and it is the only ying USAFE unit at RAF Milden-
hall.13 e 100ARW supports these aircraft alone and has its own operations, maintenance,
and mission support groups. us, one squadron of aircraft bears the cost of all these groups.
AMC’s KC-135s are usually based with several squadrons, so those wings’ support costs are
amortized across many more aircraft.
We might be tempted to look to Pacic Air Forces (PACAF), which also only has one
squadron of KC-135s, to see whether its per-aircraft costs are similarly high. ey are not. But
PACAF’s KC-135s are bedded down at Kadena AB, which has four other ying squadrons
on base, thus spreading out its mission support and other costs across more squadrons. We
could argue, then, that USAFE’s per-aircraft KC-135 costs are high primarily because they are
bedded down relatively ineciently.
Concluding Thoughts
We went through the exercise of comparing operating costs between USAFE and CONUS
for two reasons. First, we sought to accurately portray USAFE’s CPFH statistics to feed our
BP building-block calculations for each wing. In Chapter ree, we use the CPFH numbers
shown in this appendix.
13 e gure of 15 KC-135s in USAFE is an average number of TAI owned per year for 2008–2010, taken from the LIMS-
EV database.
Figure B.8
Drivers of Higher U.S. Air Forces in Europe KC-135 Per-Aircraft Costs
RAND TR1241-B.8
57%
31%
24%
Unit personnel
Depot maintenance (aircra)
Indirect support
Operating-Cost Comparisons 115
e second reason is to feed a larger discussion of the relative costs, benets, and risks of
performing BP from forward-positioned forces in USAFE versus doing them from CONUS.
In our cost analysis, we observed signicant cost dierences between USAFE and CONUS,
and, in the preceding discussion, we sought to explain them the best that we could. Some dif-
ferences have fairly strong explanations; others are not as easily explained. But these cost dier-
ences do, in fact, exist, and they held true even when we varied some of the parameters in our
analysis, such as the time span we observed.
In a larger discussion about the value of forward-positioned forces, a fair question is this:
If some of USAFE’s forces were actually repositioned to CONUS, how would operating costs
change? In Chapter ree, we analyze the direct costs of performing BP from USAFE and
CONUS, but, from a total cost perspective, those direct BP costs are a fraction of the total
operating cost of those units. Because we observed markedly dierent operating costs between
USAFE and CONUS (for ying and basing aircraft), it is fair to ask what the total cost would
be for actual posture changes. We take up this question at the end of Chapter ree and use
the operating costs assessed in this appendix.
117
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