Pleading 6001 Ca2b2f49 8563 4ba5 Ba05 92629dcf891c
User Manual: 6001
Open the PDF directly: View PDF .
Page Count: 27
RICHARD D. FARKAS\\C:\CASE FILES\NOVAL-VICTOR\MORITZ-LOUISA ADV HENRIKS -- RICO\MORITZ ADV HENRIKS -- MOTION TO DISMISS RICO COMPLAINT AS SLAPP LAWSUIT.DOC
1
DEFENDANT LOUISA MORITZ’S MOTION TO DISMISS SLAPP LAWSUIT
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Richard Farkas
15300 Ventura Blvd. #504
Sherman Oaks, CA 91403
Phone (818) 789-6001
Fax (818) 789-6002
LAW OFFICES OF RICHARD D. FARKAS
RICHARD D. FARKAS, ESQ. (State Bar No. 89157)
15300 Ventura Boulevard, Suite 504
Sherman Oaks, California 91403
Telephone: (818) 789-6001
Facsimile: (818) 789-6002
E-mail: RichardDF@aol.com
www.RichardFarkas.com
Attorneys for Defendant Louisa Moritz
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
YANA HENRIKS, an individual,
Plaintiff,
vs.
LOUISA MORITZ; VICTOR NOVAL;
TANIA NOVAL; and PHILIP
MARKOWITZ,
Defendants.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Case No.: 2:06-CV-05670-JFW-SH(x)
NOTICE OF MOTION AND SPECIAL
MOTION OF DEFENDANT LOUISA MORITZ
TO DISMISS COMPLAINT AS A SLAPP
LAWSUIT AND FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES
[C.C.P. § 425.16, 42 U.S.C. 1988; F.R.C.P
12(b)(6)]; SUPPORTING DECLARATION AND
EXHIBITS.
[DECLARATION AND EXHIBITS FILED
SEPARATELY.]
[This Motion is made following the conference of
counsel pursuant to Local Rule 7.3, which took place
on March 28, 2007.]
TRIAL DATE: August 7, 2007
DISCOVERY CUT-OFF: None
HEARING DATE: May 7, 2007
HEARING TIME: 1:30 p.m.
PLACE: Courtroom of the
Hon. John F. Walter (Ctrm. 16)
TO PLAINTIFF YANA HENRIKS AND TO HER ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on May 7, 2007, in Courtroom 16 of the United States District
Court located at 312 North Spring Street, Los Angeles, California, 90012 at 1:30 p.m., or as soon
thereafter as counsel can be heard, Defendant LOUISA MORITZ will move this Court, pursuant to
RICHARD D. FARKAS\\C:\CASE FILES\NOVAL-VICTOR\MORITZ-LOUISA ADV HENRIKS -- RICO\MORITZ ADV HENRIKS -- MOTION TO DISMISS RICO COMPLAINT AS SLAPP LAWSUIT.DOC
2
DEFENDANT LOUISA MORITZ’S MOTION TO DISMISS SLAPP LAWSUIT
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Richard Farkas
15300 Ventura Blvd. #504
Sherman Oaks, CA 91403
Phone (818) 789-6001
Fax (818) 789-6002
California Code of Civil Procedure §425.16, 42 U.S.C. 1988, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6) and other applicable Federal authority, for an Order dismissing Louisa Moritz from this
action, on the basis that no claim for relief under the RICO statute may be applied to Defendant
LOUISA MORITZ, and for an award of attorneys’ fees.
This Motion will be based upon this notice, the Memorandum of Points and Authorities
attached hereto, the Declaration of attorney Richard D. Farkas, accompanying exhibits, and upon all
of the records, pleadings and files in this matter, and upon such further arguments and evidence that
may be presented at the time of the hearing of this Motion.
WHEREFORE, Defendant prays that this Motion be granted, that the complaint against
MORITZ be dismissed, that Plaintiff take nothing by her complaint, and that MORITZ be awarded
her fees and costs in defending against this action.
Dated: June 8, 2008 LAW OFFICES OF RICHARD D. FARKAS
By__________________________________
RICHARD D. FARKAS,
Attorneys for Defendant,
LOUISA MORITZ
RICHARD D. FARKAS\\C:\CASE FILES\NOVAL-VICTOR\MORITZ-LOUISA ADV HENRIKS -- RICO\MORITZ ADV HENRIKS -- MOTION TO DISMISS RICO COMPLAINT AS SLAPP LAWSUIT.DOC
3
DEFENDANT LOUISA MORITZ’S MOTION TO DISMISS SLAPP LAWSUIT
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Richard Farkas
15300 Ventura Blvd. #504
Sherman Oaks, CA 91403
Phone (818) 789-6001
Fax (818) 789-6002
I. INTRODUCTION
In her RICO lawsuit pending before this Court, Plaintiff YANA HENRIKS, by and through
her attorney, Philip Dapeer, does nothing but reiterate claims she has asserted in several state court
actions. Moving Party LOUISA MORITZ, an attorney, did nothing—and is alleged to have done
nothing—but represent some of the parties to some of those actions for several months. Based solely
on actions taken in the context of the state court cases, the litigious YANA HENRIKS has now
attempted to spin her previously-asserted state court claims into alleged violations of the Racketeer
Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1961, et seq. Plaintiff’s RICO claim is
merely a regurgitation of the same allegations she has already presented on several separate
occasions.1 The activity plaintiff finds objectionable is defendant MORTIZ’s zealous—albeit
brief—representation of some of HENRICK’s adversaries in state court actions seeking to control a
family trust. The demonstrated lack of merit to plaintiff’s allegations indicates that this suit has been
brought solely to quell defendant MORITZ’s exercise of her constitutional rights to utilize the state
court legal system, to petition and speech, not to vindicate any valid claim.
Plaintiff’s action is a SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation) aimed at
interfering with defendants’ legitimate exercise of their First Amendment and statutory rights. This
Court must follow the mandate of 42 U.S.C. 1988(a) and apply the California anti-SLAPP statute
(C.C.P. § 425.16) in this action, to protect defendant’s fundamental constitutional rights of petition
and speech. F.R.C.P. 12(b)(6), alternatively, would also mandate dismissal of this action.
As discussed below, SLAPP lawsuits frequently mask themselves as ordinary lawsuits.
Plaintiffs win political battles by dragging defendants into court and enmeshing them in protracted
litigation. (See Wilcox v. Superior Court, 27 Cal.App.4th 809, 815-818, 33 Cal.Rptr.2d 446 (1994).)
The California Legislature recognized the chilling effect of SLAPPs on First Amendment rights
when it enacted section 425.16. Federal law does not provide anything analogous to the section
425.16 discovery stay and provisions for early termination of SLAPPs, but has ruled that these
1 See, e.g., Plaintiff’s RICO Case Statement, Exhibit C, in which many of the same claims were made to a
State Court judge. See, also, RICO Case Statement Exhibit F, pages 68 - 92
RICHARD D. FARKAS\\C:\CASE FILES\NOVAL-VICTOR\MORITZ-LOUISA ADV HENRIKS -- RICO\MORITZ ADV HENRIKS -- MOTION TO DISMISS RICO COMPLAINT AS SLAPP LAWSUIT.DOC
4
DEFENDANT LOUISA MORITZ’S MOTION TO DISMISS SLAPP LAWSUIT
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Richard Farkas
15300 Ventura Blvd. #504
Sherman Oaks, CA 91403
Phone (818) 789-6001
Fax (818) 789-6002
provisions made be utilized in the Federal courts. Therefore, this Court must apply section 425.16,
pursuant to section 1988. Because plaintiff cannot establish that there is a probability that she will
prevail on her claims, as required by section 425.16(b), this Court should grant defendant’s special
motion to strike, and award her attorneys’ fees as well.
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2
A. THE PARTIES
i. LOUISA MORITZ
Defendant Louisa Moritz, who brings this motion, is an attorney, having been admitted to the
California State Bar in November, 2004. Ms. Moritz was retained by Tania Noval (another
Defendant named in this action, described below), as well as several of her family members with
respect to disputes concerning family trusts. The opposing party in these disputes is the Plaintiff,
Yana Henriks; Ms. Moritz never represented Ms. Henriks. Ms. Moritz briefly (from approximately
April, 2006 to September, 2006) represented members of the Noval family, having ceased
representing anyone in the Noval family in September, 2006, when she filed substitution of attorney
forms in all of the lawsuits involving the family.
ii. YANA HENRIKS
Plaintiff Yana Henriks, who filed the complaint against Ms. Moritz, is the former live-in
girlfriend of Victor Noval, the brother of Ms. Moritz’s client, Tania Noval. Ms. Henriks (also known
as Gayane Khachatryan), on April 23, 2004, replaced Tania Noval as Trustee of one of the Novals’
family trusts (Brothers’ Irrevocable Trust), and it was her role as Trustee that led to much of the
litigation in which Ms. Moritz was briefly involved.3 As detailed herein, Victor Noval, Tania Noval,
2 Defendant Moritz acknowledges that this Motion must address the sufficiency of the complaint
(and its accompanying RICO Case Statement). This section is intended solely to give the Court
some background of the dispute between Plaintiff and Defendants, to make the otherwise confusing
pleadings more understandable. Defendant is not relying upon the facts in this introduction to
support its Motion to Dismiss.
3 As will be described herein, Ms. Henriks has filed a number of acrimonious charges against the
Noval family and people associated with it, in state and federal courts, and elsewhere. These charges
include applications for restraining orders, and countless claims of civil and criminal wrongdoing
and, in many cases, are substantially identical to her claims in this RICO action.
RICHARD D. FARKAS\\C:\CASE FILES\NOVAL-VICTOR\MORITZ-LOUISA ADV HENRIKS -- RICO\MORITZ ADV HENRIKS -- MOTION TO DISMISS RICO COMPLAINT AS SLAPP LAWSUIT.DOC
5
DEFENDANT LOUISA MORITZ’S MOTION TO DISMISS SLAPP LAWSUIT
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Richard Farkas
15300 Ventura Blvd. #504
Sherman Oaks, CA 91403
Phone (818) 789-6001
Fax (818) 789-6002
and all of Victor Noval’s children (the beneficiaries of the Brothers Irrevocable Trust) requested that
Ms. Henriks step aside as Trustee. Disputes concerning Ms. Henriks’ role as trustee led to much of
the litigation in this complex matter.
iii. TANIA NOVAL
Tania Noval, Ms. Moritz’s former client, is the sister of Victor Noval, and the Settlor,
Trustor, and original trustee to the Brothers’ Irrevocable Trust. Tania Noval, therefore is the aunt of
Victor Noval’s children, who, with her own son, are the beneficiaries of the Brothers’ Irrevocable
Trust. In 2003, during illness of Tania Noval, and while Yana Henriks was romantically involved
with Victor Noval, Yana Henriks assumed the role of Trustee of the Brothers’ Irrevocable Trust.4
The relationship between Victor Noval and Yana Henriks later ended (bitterly), and the Noval family
(Victor, Tania, Tania’s son, and Victor’s children—the beneficiaries) have sought to replace Ms.
Henriks as the Trustee of the family trust. Ms. Henriks has refused, rather engaging in litigation
against the Novals in several courts.
iv. VICTOR NOVAL
As indicated above, Victor Noval is the brother of Tania Noval, the original Trustee of the
Brothers’ Irrevocable Trust. He is also the father of Victor Franco, Jon Hunter, Jake Harrison, and
Victor Peter Noval, beneficiaries of the Brothers’ Irrevocable Trust, and the uncle of Bijan
Nasehipour, the other beneficiary (and Tania Noval’s son). Victor Noval was once romantically
involved with Yana Henriks. He was also, several years ago, indicted and later incarcerated in
connection with a criminal matter concerning his business (unrelated to and long before the
representation by Ms. Moritz). When Mr. Noval was defending himself in the criminal action, he
had Ms. Henriks—then his girlfriend—assume the role of Trustee of the Trust, of which his children
and nephew were beneficiaries. Mr. Noval’s romantic relationship with Yana Henriks subsequently
4 As Tania Noval stated in a May 10, 2006 declaration, attached hereto as Exhibit A, “In late 2003, I
started to have severe rheumatoid arthritis and was be unable to take care of the Trust’s business. I
explained my problem to Yana Henriks, and she assured me that she would be the person most
qualified to be successor trustee during my illness. She informed me of her educational background
and her high position with her employer, Met Life. As a girlfriend of my brother, she was also
believed to be the future stepmother to my nephews, which I stated above, are the beneficiaries of the
Trust.” [Tania Noval Declaration, May 10, 2006, paragraph 3.]
RICHARD D. FARKAS\\C:\CASE FILES\NOVAL-VICTOR\MORITZ-LOUISA ADV HENRIKS -- RICO\MORITZ ADV HENRIKS -- MOTION TO DISMISS RICO COMPLAINT AS SLAPP LAWSUIT.DOC
6
DEFENDANT LOUISA MORITZ’S MOTION TO DISMISS SLAPP LAWSUIT
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Richard Farkas
15300 Ventura Blvd. #504
Sherman Oaks, CA 91403
Phone (818) 789-6001
Fax (818) 789-6002
ended, and resulted in several personal and professional conflicts, including disputes concerning her
continued role as Trustee of the trust established for the benefit of his minor children.5
B. THE UNDERLYING LAWSUITS
As will be illustrated herein, all of the claims brought against Attorney Moritz by Plaintiff
Yana Henriks relate to Ms. Moritz’s filings in several other lawsuits (and communications made in
those actions), on behalf of her clients. The litigation privilege applies in each of these underlying
lawsuits:
i. BLUE WATER SUNSET, LLC, YANA HENRIKS vs. VICTOR NOVAL,
TANIA NOVAL, Los Angeles Superior Court Case Number BC 349115
This declaratory relief action (first referenced in Plaintiff’s RICO Case Statement at page 8,
lines 12-19) was filed in the Los Angeles Superior Court on March 16, 2006 by Yana Henriks and
Blue Water Sunset, LLC, an entity formed by Victor Noval for the benefit of the beneficiaries of the
Brothers Irrevocable Trust. The complaint against Victor and Tania Noval alleges that “An actual
dispute and controversy new [sic] exists as between plaintiff and defendants concerning their
respective rights and duties relative to the defense of plaintiff Blue Water Sunset, LLC….” [A copy
of this declaratory relief action is attached hereto as Exhibit B.] Louisa Moritz was retained to
represent Tania Noval in this case, and represented her through September 12, 2006, when she
substituted out.
In response to the complaint in this action, Tania Noval filed a cross-complaint against Yana
Henriks, attached hereto as Exhibit D. In her cross-complaint, filed by Louisa Moritz, Tania Noval
alleged “Cross-Defendant GAYANE KHACHATRYAN [a.k.a. Yana Henriks] assumed
management and control of BLUE WATER SUNSET, L.L.C., as well as the BROTHERS’
IRREVOCABLE TRUST through fraud, deceit and misrepresentation, as described herein, and
5 The extent of the animosity between Victor Noval and Yana Henriks is evidenced by Victor
Noval’s May 3, 2006 “Answer to Request for Orders to Stop Harassment (in case number BS
102745), in which he declared that “Henriks has told me that she will dedicate her life to ruining
mine and that since she is on disability she has all the time in the world to ruin my life.” [Exhibit C.]
He further alleged, among other things, that Henriks committed insurance fraud, threatened violence
toward him and third parties, and caused him to be “afraid for my life and the life of my family.”
[Exhibit C, page 6.]
RICHARD D. FARKAS\\C:\CASE FILES\NOVAL-VICTOR\MORITZ-LOUISA ADV HENRIKS -- RICO\MORITZ ADV HENRIKS -- MOTION TO DISMISS RICO COMPLAINT AS SLAPP LAWSUIT.DOC
7
DEFENDANT LOUISA MORITZ’S MOTION TO DISMISS SLAPP LAWSUIT
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Richard Farkas
15300 Ventura Blvd. #504
Sherman Oaks, CA 91403
Phone (818) 789-6001
Fax (818) 789-6002
thereafter mismanaged these entities and utilized their assets for her personal gain.” [Tania Noval’s
Cross-complaint ¶ 5. A copy of Tania Noval’s cross-complaint is attached hereto as Exhibit D.] The
lengthy cross-complaint further alleged:
“Cross-Defendant GAYANE KHACHATRYAN, and her attorney, PHILIP DA PEER, ESQ.,
prepared all the documents for the alleged “transfer” of BLUE WATER SUNSET, L.L.C.,
through a $100 “bill of sale”, which they attempted to have TANIA NOVAL, Cross-
Complainant, sign the final copy, and which they explained to TANIA through others they
(Cross-Defendant and her attorney PHILIP DA PEER, ESQ.) needed for the Cross-Defendant
GAYANE KHACHATRYAN, to get standing to sue or represent the LLC in litigation which
BLUE WATER SUNSET, L.L.C. was involved in, and after the litigation was completed,
this “transfer” would be voidable and rescindable at will by Cross-Complainant and Cross-
Defendant would immediately surrender possession and control over BLUE WATER
SUNSET, L.L.C., and return it to Cross-Complainant TANIA NOVAL, who would in turn
deed it over to BROTHERS IRREVOCABLE TRUST, A TRUST formed for the children of
TANIA NOVAL and VICTOR NOVAL.” [Tania Noval cross-complaint, Exhibit D, ¶ 11.]
The disputed agreement described in the preceding paragraph is also relevant to the
contention of Ms. Henriks that Ms. Moritz presented a forged or altered exhibit, discussed below.
Victor Noval, then acting in pro per, also filed a similar cross-complaint against Yana
Henriks. [A copy of Victor Noval’s cross-complaint is attached hereto as Exhibit E.] Mr. Noval’s
cross-complaint against Ms. Henriks set forth causes of action for Breach of Written Contracts,
Intentional Interference with Prospective Business Relations, Breach of Implied Covenant of Good
Faith and Fair Dealing, Unfair Business Practices, Fraud, Conspiracy to Defraud, Negligent
Misrepresentation, Declaratory Relief, Extortion, Accounting, Declaration of Constructive Trust, and
Removal and Surcharge of Trustee.
In the introductory portion of his cross-complaint against Ms. Henriks, Mr. Noval alleged the
following:
“10. This litigation relates to TANIA NOVAL, BLUE WATER SUNSET, L.L.C.,
property of BROTHERS IRREVOCABLE TRUST, of which TANIA NOVAL, Cross-
Complainant is the Trustee.
“11. Cross-Complainant is informed and believes and thereon alleges that the Cross-
Defendant GAYANE KHACHATRYAN [another name of Yana Henriks], and her attorney,
Cross-defendant PHILIP DAPEER, prepared documents for an alleged “transfer” of BLUE
WATER SUNSET, L.L.C., through a $100 “bill of sale.” BLUE WATER SUNSET, L.L.C.
was an asset belonging to BROTHERS IRREVOCABLE TRUST. Cross-defendants
DAPEER and KHACHATRYAN conspired to have KHACHATRYAN hold title to BLUE
WATER SUNSET (and other assets) as trustee in constructive trust for BROTHERS
IRREVOCABLE TRUST, with the understanding that the asset would be returned to
RICHARD D. FARKAS\\C:\CASE FILES\NOVAL-VICTOR\MORITZ-LOUISA ADV HENRIKS -- RICO\MORITZ ADV HENRIKS -- MOTION TO DISMISS RICO COMPLAINT AS SLAPP LAWSUIT.DOC
8
DEFENDANT LOUISA MORITZ’S MOTION TO DISMISS SLAPP LAWSUIT
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Richard Farkas
15300 Ventura Blvd. #504
Sherman Oaks, CA 91403
Phone (818) 789-6001
Fax (818) 789-6002
BROTHERS IRREVOCABLE TRUST upon the completion of pending litigation.
Accordingly, DAPEER and KHACHATRYAN attempted to have TANIA NOVAL, sign
documents to effectuate this transfer, explaining to TANIA through others they (Cross-
Defendant KHACHATRYAN and her attorney PHILIP DAPEER, ESQ.) needed for the
Cross-Defendant GAYANE KHACHATRYAN, to get standing to sue or represent the LLC
in litigation which BLUE WATER SUNSET, L.L.C. was involved in. After the litigation
was completed, this “transfer” would be voidable and rescindable at will by TANIA NOVAL
and Cross-Defendant KHACHATRYAN would immediately surrender possession and
control over BLUE WATER SUNSET, L.L.C., and return it to Cross-Complainant TANIA
NOVAL, who would in turn deed it over to BROTHERS IRREVOCABLE TRUST, a trust
formed for the children of TANIA NOVAL and VICTOR NOVAL.
“12. The facts are that Cross-Complainant TANIA NOVAL never signed the final
documentation to effectuate the transfer. In effect, KHACHATRYAN acquired a multi-
million dollar asset for $100.00.
“13. Attorney PHILIP DAPEER explained to Cross-Complainant that the “transfer”,
which TANIA NOVAL did not sign, was solely to complete the litigation, which was for the
benefit of BLUE WATER SUNSET, L.L.C. and that Cross-Defendant GAYANE
KHACHATRYAN and himself were the persons best qualified to perform this legal work,
since GAYANE KHACHATRYAN was in her own words “a great litigator” and she would
immediately return the ownership of the properties involved to Cross-Complainant TANIA
NOVAL. The beneficiaries of BROTHERS IRREVOCABLE TRUST were the children of
TANIA NOVAL and her brother VICTOR.” [Victor Noval cross-complaint, Exhibit E, ¶s
10-13.]
In a sworn declaration filed in this action, Tania Noval stated, among other things that Ms.
Henriks engaged in “self-dealing” and “wasted and misappropriated valuable Trust assets.” [A copy
of her Declaration is attached as Exhibit A.] To properly understand the claims of the Noval family
(advanced through the representation of Ms. Moritz), the substantive assertions of Ms. Tania Noval
(in her May 10, 2006 declaration) are set forth at length below:
“2. My name is Tania Noval. I am the Settlor, Trustor and original trustee to the
Brothers Irrevocable Trust (hereafter the “Trust”). This trust was set up for the benefit of my
son and nephews, who are the only beneficiaries of the Trust. This declaration is submitted
in support of the Petition to remove Yana Henriks as Trustee of the Trust, and for related
relief.
“3. In late 2003, I started to have severe rheumatoid arthritis and was unable to take
care of the Trust’s business. I explained my problem to Yana Henriks, and she assured me
that she would be the person most qualified to be successor trustee during my illness. She
informed me of her educational background and her high position with her employer, Met
Life. As a girlfriend of my brother, she was also believed to be the future stepmother to my
nephews, which I stated above, are the beneficiaries of the Trust. Given her excellent
personal history I believed that she indeed would be a trustworthy individual to handle the
future well being of my son and nephews.
“4. I was wrong about Ms. Henriks. She is claiming that Blue Water Sunset L.L.C. is
her property. This is false. This L.L.C. was formed for the benefit of the beneficiaries, and it
RICHARD D. FARKAS\\C:\CASE FILES\NOVAL-VICTOR\MORITZ-LOUISA ADV HENRIKS -- RICO\MORITZ ADV HENRIKS -- MOTION TO DISMISS RICO COMPLAINT AS SLAPP LAWSUIT.DOC
9
DEFENDANT LOUISA MORITZ’S MOTION TO DISMISS SLAPP LAWSUIT
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Richard Farkas
15300 Ventura Blvd. #504
Sherman Oaks, CA 91403
Phone (818) 789-6001
Fax (818) 789-6002
was to be placed in the trust once certain litigation ended. She has tried to sell this L.L.C.
and/or its valuable assets belonging to the trust.
“5. Yana Henriks has ignored numerous requests made by the beneficiaries regarding
accounting and the sale of a Mustang belonging to beneficiary Victor Franco Noval.
“6. Ms. Henriks has been asked (by me, as Settlor, and by all of the beneficiaries,
whose declarations are attached to this Petition) to step down and turn over her position as
Trustee. She has not only completely ignored this but also wrote a letter to my attorney
Louisa Moritz (attached to the Petition) insulting her practice and making false statements.
“7. Henriks wrote letters to my brother telling him that his children (beneficiaries)
don’t care about him and that they do not deserve anything.
“8. Henriks is in the bad habit of threatening people and is well known for
threatening attorneys with reporting them to the bar.
“9. I have personally heard a cassette tape where Henriks threatens my brother. Yana
Henriks has also called our friend Heather Mercado and threatened her life.
“10. Henriks falsely claims that my brother abused her. My brother was married
twice about 10 years each and has never abused mentally or physically his wives or anyone
else.
“11. Henriks has sent me letters via fax insulting me and telling me to “Fasten your
seatbelt”.
“12. Henriks wrote letters to my brother in which she says she is an attorney. (See
attached copy of envelope.)
“13. My brother told me that, after learning of Henriks’ misdeeds, he decided not to
marry her. This resulted in enormous animosity, causing significant harm to the Trust, me,
and the beneficiaries.
“14. My brother applied for a restraining order against Henriks. Upon being notified
of the order, Henriks immediately rushed to the court and sought a restraining order against
my brother who is the father to four of the beneficiaries.
“15. In addition to the foregoing, I am aware of the following acts of Ms. Henriks, to
the detriment of the Trust:
-- She had not made any distributions to the beneficiaries, and has not
communicated with the beneficiaries;
-- She has never provided an accounting relative to the Trust;
-- She has wasted and misappropriated valuable Trust assets;
-- She has initiated litigation against me, as well as against the father of the
beneficiaries (her former boyfriend);
-- She claims to have personally acquired millions of dollars worth of assets
belonging to the Trust for negligible consideration (i.e., $100.00);
-- She has engaged in self-dealing, to the detriment of the Trust and its
beneficiaries;
-- She has filed a restraining order application against the father of some of the
beneficiaries, without good cause;
-- She is assisting, without good cause, through a sham forcible detainer
action, to evict one or more of the beneficiaries from their rightful home;
-- She has threatened our attorney in this action.
“16. The beneficiaries and I all request the court to reinstate my position as trustee.
We have all requested that Ms. Henriks step aside (in writing, attached to this Petition), and
she has failed and refused to do so.
RICHARD D. FARKAS\\C:\CASE FILES\NOVAL-VICTOR\MORITZ-LOUISA ADV HENRIKS -- RICO\MORITZ ADV HENRIKS -- MOTION TO DISMISS RICO COMPLAINT AS SLAPP LAWSUIT.DOC
10
DEFENDANT LOUISA MORITZ’S MOTION TO DISMISS SLAPP LAWSUIT
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Richard Farkas
15300 Ventura Blvd. #504
Sherman Oaks, CA 91403
Phone (818) 789-6001
Fax (818) 789-6002
“17. I have the best interest of my son and nephews at heart, and hereby request the
court to reinstate my original position as trustee to Brothers Irrevocable Trust. We would all
like to have this woman out of our lives forever.” [Tania Noval declaration, May 10, 2006,
Exhibit A.]
ii. IN THE MATTER OF THE BROTHERS IRREVOCABLE TRUST
(Case Number SP006830)
This action was filed in the Probate Court on May 26, 2006 by the Brothers Irrevocable
Trust, acting by and through Tania Noval (represented by Louisa Moritz).6 [A copy of Tania
Noval’s probate filing is attached hereto as Exhibit F.] As noted above, in this action, Tania Noval
declared: “The beneficiaries and I all request the court to reinstate my position as trustee. We have
all requested that Ms. Henriks step aside (in writing, attached to this Petition), and she has failed and
refused to do so. I have the best interest of my son and nephews at heart, and hereby request the
court to reinstate my original position as trustee to Brothers Irrevocable Trust.” [Tania Noval
declaration, Exhibit A, ¶s 16, 17.]
The Petition filed by Ms. Moritz in this case was brought pursuant to the California Probate
Code Section 15404, which provides: “Modification or Termination by Settlor and All Beneficiaries.
(a) If the settlor and all beneficiaries of a trust consent, THEY MAY COMPEL THE
MODIFICATION OR TERMINATION OF THE TRUST.” (Emphasis added.) Attached to the
Petition were the sworn Declarations of the Settlor of this trust (Tania Noval) and all of the
beneficiaries of the Brothers Irrevocable Trust in support of this Petition. Also attached to this
Petition were documents evidencing the requests of the Settlor and all of the Beneficiaries, that Yana
Henricks step down as acting Trustee, and additional documents evidencing the failure and refusal of
Yana Henriks to do so, which necessitated this Petition.
iii. CONSTANTINO NOVAL vs. VICTOR NOVAL (Case Number SC
089359)
6 In her RICO Case Statement, Plaintiff HENRIKS claims that “The Novals, through their attorney,
Louisa Moritz retaliated by initiating probate proceedings in the Los Angeles Superior Court seeking
to remove Yana Henriks as successor trustee of the Brothers Irrevocable Trust.” [RICO Case
Statement, page 8, lines 16-19.]
RICHARD D. FARKAS\\C:\CASE FILES\NOVAL-VICTOR\MORITZ-LOUISA ADV HENRIKS -- RICO\MORITZ ADV HENRIKS -- MOTION TO DISMISS RICO COMPLAINT AS SLAPP LAWSUIT.DOC
11
DEFENDANT LOUISA MORITZ’S MOTION TO DISMISS SLAPP LAWSUIT
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Richard Farkas
15300 Ventura Blvd. #504
Sherman Oaks, CA 91403
Phone (818) 789-6001
Fax (818) 789-6002
This action was a “forcible detainer” complaint filed against Victor Noval (Tania Noval’s
brother) by Victor Noval’s uncle, Constantino Noval.7 Initially, and for a very brief period of time,
Louisa Moritz represented Mr. Noval in this case (she filed a demurrer to the complaint on April 21,
2006, and substituted out on May 31, 2006).
In this action, Victor Noval argued that, although the Plaintiff alleged he was the owner of
the subject residential unit, the Plaintiff obtained title to the property as trustee of a family trust for
the benefit of Defendant’s children. Defendant Victor Noval began occupying the premises upon its
completion in May 2000, and the only occupants of the unit since that time had been Defendant
Victor Noval, Defendant’s wife and children, and (following Defendant’s divorce), Defendant’s
then-girlfriend, Yana Henriks, who had moved out. Plaintiff, who held title only as trustee, had
never occupied the unit since it was completed in May, 2000.
iv. BROTHERS IRREVOCABLE TRUST vs. CONSTANTINO NOVAL,
etc., et al. (Case Number SC 089394)
This case, too, concerns disputes concerning the administration of the Brothers Irrevocable
Trust, as well as who, as Trustee, has the power to administer the Trust. The lawsuit was filed on
April 19, 2006, and was brought by the Law Offices of Louisa Moritz as “Attorneys for Plaintiffs,
the Beneficiaries of Brothers Irrevocable Trusts, BROTHERS IRREVOCABLE TRUST, a
California Trust.” [Complaint, page 1, lines 3, 4.] [A copy of this complaint is attached hereto as
Exhibit G.]
The suit alleges, among other things, that “During 1999, Victor and TANIA NOVAL desired
to establish a trust to acquire and hold real estate and the income, earning and proceeds thereof for
their grandchildren and children respectively. Victorino contributed $1,000,000.00 to the trust,
Shirley DaSilva (Victor’s ex-wife) contributed $62,500.00 and Victor NOVAL contributed
$57,000.00 for a total contribution of $1,119,500.00 to the Brothers Trust. The funds were
transferred to Constantino to buy real estate for the benefit of a trust to set up for the Beneficiaries.
Although repeated assurances were made by DEFENDANT CONSTANTINO, DEFENDANT
7 As noted below, Tania Noval’s son declared that this action to evict Victor Noval was engineered
by Yana Henriks.
RICHARD D. FARKAS\\C:\CASE FILES\NOVAL-VICTOR\MORITZ-LOUISA ADV HENRIKS -- RICO\MORITZ ADV HENRIKS -- MOTION TO DISMISS RICO COMPLAINT AS SLAPP LAWSUIT.DOC
12
DEFENDANT LOUISA MORITZ’S MOTION TO DISMISS SLAPP LAWSUIT
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Richard Farkas
15300 Ventura Blvd. #504
Sherman Oaks, CA 91403
Phone (818) 789-6001
Fax (818) 789-6002
CONSTANTINO never established the trust and, in spite of his promises, used the funds to purchase
seven properties….” [Complaint, Exhibit G, ¶ 10 page 3, line 27 through page 4, line 7.] The suit
then alleges that “Defendant Constantino has made false and intentional misrepresentations to Victor
and TANIA NOVAL in that he intended to set up trust to hold the assets and Property for the benefit
of the beneficiaries,” [Exhibit G, ¶ 13, page 5], and that “The true facts are that … DEFENDANT
was not intending to hold the Assets and Property for the beneficiaries.” [Exhibit G, ¶ 13, page 5.]
v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA vs. MI SUK YI AND PAUL
AMORELLO (United States District Court No. 03-406(B)-CAS)
This is an action in which the family trustee asserted an interest in certain property before the
federal court. Ms. Moritz was never an attorney of record and never appeared as attorney of record
for any party in this case, although she did make a single appearance at a hearing on May 19, 2006.
This hearing was to resolve certain procedural matters following the withdrawal of the forfeiture
attorney representing the trust in that action, and Ms. Moritz appeared to advise the Federal Court of
the status of the disputed trust matters pending in the State Court actions. [A copy of the transcript
of this May 19, 2006 hearing is attached hereto as Exhibit H.]
* * *
C. THE CLAIMS OF YANA HENRIKS IN THE RICO COMPLAINT AND RICO CASE
STATEMENT.
With the general background of the various lawsuits involving Complainant Yana Henriks
described above, Defendant MORITZ will now attempt to address the specific claims of Ms. Henriks
in her RICO complaint as it applies to Defendant Ms. Moritz. As will become apparent, every
action allegedly taken by Defendant Moritz was as an attorney, in connection with pleadings
and statements presented in pending litigation, all of which are protected by the litigation
privilege.
“With respect to the federal forfeiture proceedings, attorney Moritz appeared in the action
and falsely represented to the court that plaintiff Henriks had been removed as trustee of
the Brothers Irrevocable Trust.” [RICO Case Statement, page 10, line 27 through page
11, line 3.]
RICHARD D. FARKAS\\C:\CASE FILES\NOVAL-VICTOR\MORITZ-LOUISA ADV HENRIKS -- RICO\MORITZ ADV HENRIKS -- MOTION TO DISMISS RICO COMPLAINT AS SLAPP LAWSUIT.DOC
13
DEFENDANT LOUISA MORITZ’S MOTION TO DISMISS SLAPP LAWSUIT
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Richard Farkas
15300 Ventura Blvd. #504
Sherman Oaks, CA 91403
Phone (818) 789-6001
Fax (818) 789-6002
The hearing to which Ms. Henriks referred was in the federal case of United States of
America vs. Mi Suk Yi and Paul Amorello, Case number CR 03-406(b)-CAS. [RICO Case Statement,
page 4, lines 14-16.] Ms. Moritz is not, and never has been, an attorney for any of the litigants in
this federal forfeiture case.
At the hearing of May 19, 2006, an issue was whether the petitioner, Brothers Irrevocable
Trust, was a bona fide purchaser for value of certain property. The Trust was a party to that action,
and, on the date of the hearing, Yana Henriks apparently attempted to appear without counsel (prior
counsel for the trust had withdrawn because of a conflict of interest, related to the conflicting claims
concerning the trust of Yana Henriks and Tania Noval). At that hearing, the Court said to Ms.
Henriks: “Ms. Hendriks [sic], we’re going to have [sic] direct you to retain counsel. You can’t
represent yourself. You can’t appear pro se under the rules of the court.” [Exhibit H, page 5, line 23
through page 6, line 1.]
Ms. Moritz, upon the request of her client Tania Noval (who, as noted above, asserts that she
is the Trustee of the Brothers Irrevocable Trust), also appeared at the Federal Court hearing to advise
the Court of the position of the Trust (which, because of the withdrawal of the Trust’s forfeiture
attorney, was unrepresented by counsel).8 Ms. Moritz introduced herself as follows, according to the
transcript: “Your honor, my [name] is Louisa Maritz [sic] and I am representing the trustee of the
brothers irrevocable trust.” [page 12, lines 2-4.] She then advised the Court of her role: “I am only
here to request a continuance because there is a question about the brothers irrevocable trust and the
attorney has resigned and withdrawn and I understand that Your Honor has allowed it and so they are
without an attorney.” [Exhibit H, page 12, lines 16-20.]
Ms. Noval did not make a misrepresentation to the Court as claimed by Ms. Henriks. In the
time she was allotted, she explained that there was a petition to remove Ms. Henriks. The transcript
states: “Okay. Your Honor we do have an order9 from the court and we have made—I am the
8 It should be noted that Ms. Noval was never “removed” as trustee. Rather, as she declared, she
resigned because “In late 2003, I started to have severe rheumatoid arthritis and was unable to take
care of the Trust’s business.” [Exhibit A, ¶3.]
9 As noted below, Ms. Moritz’s reference to an “order” was to the state court’s order appointing a
guardian ad litem in the brothers irrevocable trust case.
RICHARD D. FARKAS\\C:\CASE FILES\NOVAL-VICTOR\MORITZ-LOUISA ADV HENRIKS -- RICO\MORITZ ADV HENRIKS -- MOTION TO DISMISS RICO COMPLAINT AS SLAPP LAWSUIT.DOC
14
DEFENDANT LOUISA MORITZ’S MOTION TO DISMISS SLAPP LAWSUIT
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Richard Farkas
15300 Ventura Blvd. #504
Sherman Oaks, CA 91403
Phone (818) 789-6001
Fax (818) 789-6002
attorney for the present trustee Tanya Noval and we have made a petition to remove the previous
trustee.” [page 13, lines 10-13.] The Court clearly understood that the litigation concerning the
actual trustee was unresolved, and pending in the state court. Specifically, the Court responded:
“Well, you’ll do that over in another court…. Obviously there is a dispute between the Novals and
the current trustee. I’m well aware of that and you’re going to have to get that problem resolved
across the street because I am going to proceed with my case on my schedule and not sit around and
wait for this matter to be resolved over in state court.” [Exhibit H, page 13, lines 14-21.] Ms. Moritz
then responded, accurately, “Well, we have an ex parte application for next Friday.” [Exhibit H,
page 13, lines 22-23.]
Ms. Moritz, after this hearing, never again appeared in this federal action and, to Defendant’s
knowledge, the issue as to the appropriate trustee has never again been raised in that court. The
Trustee disputes continue to be litigated.
“She [Ms Henriks] has also initiated another lawsuit in the Los Angeles Superior Court
on behalf of The Brothers Irrevocable Trust against Victor’s uncle, case number
SC089394 That [sic] action was brought without my [sic] knowledge or consent as the
trustee.” [RICO Case Statement, page 11, lines 3-7.]
The factual background of this litigation is described above. Although Ms. Moritz filed this
action as “Attorneys for Plaintiffs, the Beneficiaries of Brothers Irrevocable Trusts, BROTHERS
IRREVOCABLE TRUST, a California Trust,” there was no “misrepresentation” concerning her
role.10 To the contrary, Ms. Moritz filed this action with the express consent of Tania Noval (who
asserted her role as Trustee in then-pending case number SP 006830) and the beneficiaries
themselves, who oppose the actions of Yana Henriks.11
10 In her RICO Case Statement, Ms. Henriks writes: “attorney Moritz appeared in the action and
falsely represented to the court that plaintiff Henriks had been removed as the trustee of The
Brothers Irrevocable Trust.” [RICO Case Statement, page 10, line 28 through page 11, line 3.]
11 On April 6, 2006, all five (5) of the young beneficiaries of the Brothers’ Irrevocable Trust signed
a document stating that they “hereby agree and assent to the rescission of the above cited document
[rescinding Tania Noval’s resignation] and to the removal of Yana Henriks … as Trustee of the
Brothers’ Irrevocable Trust and further agree and assent to the immediate reinstatement of Tania
Noval as Trustee of the Brothers’ Irrevocable Trust effective April 6, 2006.” [Exhibit I.]
RICHARD D. FARKAS\\C:\CASE FILES\NOVAL-VICTOR\MORITZ-LOUISA ADV HENRIKS -- RICO\MORITZ ADV HENRIKS -- MOTION TO DISMISS RICO COMPLAINT AS SLAPP LAWSUIT.DOC
15
DEFENDANT LOUISA MORITZ’S MOTION TO DISMISS SLAPP LAWSUIT
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Richard Farkas
15300 Ventura Blvd. #504
Sherman Oaks, CA 91403
Phone (818) 789-6001
Fax (818) 789-6002
The authority of Ms. Moritz to act for Tania Noval is not disputed, and it is clear from the
pleadings and Tania Noval’s declaration (above) that Tania Noval maintains that she is the legal
Trustee. The position is supported by the beneficiaries as well. For example, attached to the Answer
of Victor Noval to Ms. Henriks’ restraining order application is a Declaration of Tania Noval’s son,
Bijan Nasehipour, who states that Yana Henriks “Is trying to get back at him [Victor Noval] by
hurting me and his sons.” Concerning the “forcible detainer” action filed against Victor Noval, 21-
year-old Bijan declared that “I saw a letter where Yana Henriks says she’s going to evict us from our
condo in Marina del Rey. She knows this condo belongs to our trust and she has absolutely no right
to do this.” He further declares that “All the beneficiaries sent a letter to Yana Henriks requesting
documents, accounting and information… and she has completely ignored our request. We also
asked her to remove herself as trustee and she has ignored this too.”
As noted above, in seeking to remove Ms. Henriks as Trustee, Ms. Moritz relied, in part, on
California Probate Code Section 15404, which provides for “Modification or Termination by Settlor
and All Beneficiaries.” The desires of Ms. Moritz’s client, Tania Noval, were properly advanced by
Ms. Moritz, and supported by Tania Noval, as evidenced by her Declaration. The desire of the
beneficiaries is similarly supported by Mr. Nasehipour’s declaration, in which he concludes: “I know
that having Yana Henriks as trustee of our trust will be detrimental to all the beneficiaries well being.
I would like my mother, Tania Noval to resume her position as trustee.” [Exhibit C, page 12.]
“Defendants filed with the court what purported to be a letter in the handwriting of Victor
Noval and signed by plaintiff Yana Henriks wherein plaintiff Yana Henriks allegedly
agreed that she was holding her ownership interest in Blue Water Sunset, L.L.C. in a
representative capacity. That document, upon examination by a forensic hand-writing
expert, is a forgery….” [RICO Case Statement, page 9, lines 19-27.]
Ms. Henriks, in asserting presentation of an altered or forged exhibit, is referring to a dispute
concerning the validity of the signature on an undated, handwritten letter produced by Victor Noval,
purporting to bear the signature of Yana Henriks. This letter concludes with a statement that “I,
Yana Henriks, will transfer BWS [presumably Blue Water Sunset, an asset which is the subject of
the litigation] to Brothers Trust after litigation with Phil is over. The $100 transfer is only being
done so Yana can have standing in court with [illegible]. This is a confidential memo and will not be
disclosed.” This document, obtained by Ms. Moritz from her client, appears to contain the signature
RICHARD D. FARKAS\\C:\CASE FILES\NOVAL-VICTOR\MORITZ-LOUISA ADV HENRIKS -- RICO\MORITZ ADV HENRIKS -- MOTION TO DISMISS RICO COMPLAINT AS SLAPP LAWSUIT.DOC
16
DEFENDANT LOUISA MORITZ’S MOTION TO DISMISS SLAPP LAWSUIT
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Richard Farkas
15300 Ventura Blvd. #504
Sherman Oaks, CA 91403
Phone (818) 789-6001
Fax (818) 789-6002
of Yana Henriks, and states, in part, that Ms. Henriks would transfer one of the contested assets to
the Brothers Irrevocable Trust, as Ms. Moritz’s client maintained. Ms. Henriks, in this litigation,
denied that this was her signature. [A copy of the disputed letter is attached hereto as Exhibit J, and
to Plaintiff’s RICO Case Statement, Exhibit I, page 171.]
Ms. Moritz vehemently denies that she ever knowingly presented a forged or altered exhibit,
to the Court or to any other party. In this hotly-contested litigation, in which all parties claim the
others have committed criminal and tortuous acts, the validity of the handwritten letter is a matter of
dispute. Victor Noval declared that the statements of Yana Henriks “were false, in that Cross-
Defendant GAYANE KHACHATRYAN [Yana Henriks] did not intend to step aside as represented.
To the contrary, Cross-Defendant GAYANE KHACHATRYAN planned to appropriate for herself
the property owned by BLUE WATER SUNSET, L.L.C., an interest adverse to Beneficiaries of
BROTHERS IRREVOCABLE TRUST, and information presented by Cross-defendant to Cross-
Complainant to the contrary was false and fraudulent.” [see, e.g., Exhibit E, ¶48.] With respect to
this particular document, after its authenticity was challenged, Ms. Moritz retained Joe B. Alexander,
M.D., a medical doctor and Certified Forensic Document Examiner. This professional handwriting
expert evaluated the document and concluded (under penalty of perjury) that “It is my professional
opinion, as a Certified Forensic Document Examiner, that the signature on the questioned document
has significant similarities to the signature of the author that penned the known comparison
documents, and I am therefore clearly convinced that in fact, Yana Hendricks is the author of the
signature on the questioned handwritten letter.” [Exhibit K, ¶ 6.] Dr. Alexander also declared: “It is
my further opinion that the signature on the questioned document shows the effects of medication
and/or intentional disguise such as signing with the non-dominant hand possible in order to disavow
the authorship at a later date.” [Exhibit K, ¶ 7.] Although Ms. Henriks, too, obtained a handwriting
expert who rendered a contrary opinion, there is no evidence whatsoever that Ms. Moritz in any way
presented evidence that was altered or forged, with knowledge that it was anything other than
genuine. To the contrary, Ms. Moritz advanced the sworn assertions of her client, in addition to
Victor Noval (who produced the letter), and the Certified Forensic Document Examiner.
RICHARD D. FARKAS\\C:\CASE FILES\NOVAL-VICTOR\MORITZ-LOUISA ADV HENRIKS -- RICO\MORITZ ADV HENRIKS -- MOTION TO DISMISS RICO COMPLAINT AS SLAPP LAWSUIT.DOC
17
DEFENDANT LOUISA MORITZ’S MOTION TO DISMISS SLAPP LAWSUIT
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Richard Farkas
15300 Ventura Blvd. #504
Sherman Oaks, CA 91403
Phone (818) 789-6001
Fax (818) 789-6002
In any event, it is clear that every action alleged to have been done by Defendant MORITZ
was in her capacity as an attorney, filing pleadings and presenting evidence on behalf of her clients.12
Such actions cannot form the basis for a RICO claim, and must be dismissed pursuant to the
authorities presented herein.
III. 42 U.S.C. 1988 REQUIRES APPLICATION OF CALIFORNIA CODE OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE SECTION 425.16 IN THIS CASE. 13
42 U.S.C. 1988(a) provides:
The jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters conferred on the courts by the provisions of
titles 13, 24, and 70 of the Revised Statutes for the protection of all persons in the United
States in their civil rights, and for their vindication, shall be exercised and enforced in
conformity with the laws of the United States, so far as such laws are suitable to carry the
same into effect; but in all cases where they are not adapted to the object, or are deficient in
the provisions necessary to furnish suitable remedies and punish offenses against law, the
common law, as modified and changed by the constitution and statutes of the State wherein
the court having jurisdiction is held, so far as the same is not inconsistent with the
Constitution and laws of the United States, shall be extended to and govern the said courts in
the trial and disposition of the cause, and if it is of a criminal nature, in the infliction of
punishment on the party found guilty. [Emphasis added.]14
12 Indeed, this is confirmed by even a cursory review of Henriks’ RICO Case Statement. She
contends that “Moritz was involved in several litigation matters….” [RICO Case Statement, page 2,
lines 19-20.] She states that Moritz “became directly involved in the dissolution action, the
declaratory relief action and the probate proceeds as attorney….” [RICO Case Statement, page 2,
lines 24-26.] She states that Moritz presented documents “to the Los Angeles Superior Court….”
[RICO Case Statement, page 2, line 27.] Elsewhere, she asserts that Moritz’s arguments were
“asserted in judicial proceedings.” [RICO Case Statement, page 7, lines 22-23.] She then states that
“attorney, Louisa Moritz, retaliated by initiating probate proceedings in the Los Angeles Superior
Court….” [RICO Case Statement, page 8, lines 16-18.] Enumerating the alleged “racketeering acts,”
Henriks merely asserts that Moritz “filed an altered trust agreement in the probate proceedings,”
[RICO Case Statement, page 9, lines 11-12], “filed with the court what purported to be a letter,”
[RICO Case Statement, page 9, lines 20-21], “filed [cross-complaints] in the declaratory relief
action” [RICO Case Statement, page 10, lines 23-24], “appeared in the action,” [RICO Case
Statement, page 10, line 28] and “Moritz filed a lis pendens.” [RICO Case Statement, page 11, line
8.] These are, on their face, privileged actions that cannot proceed through Plaintiff’s SLAPP
lawsuit.
13 “California’s Anti-SLAPP provisions may be applied to pendant state law claims in federal
question cases.” Globetrotter Software, Inc. v. Elan Computer Group, Inc., 63 F. Supp. 2d 1127 (N.
D. Cal. 1999)
14 Section 1988 was enacted to "fill in the gaps" in federal law in order to provide the widest
possible protection for civil rights. As the United States Supreme Court observed in Robertson v.
Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 591 (1978), "This statute recognizes that in certain areas federal law is
unsuited or insufficient to furnish suitable remedies."
RICHARD D. FARKAS\\C:\CASE FILES\NOVAL-VICTOR\MORITZ-LOUISA ADV HENRIKS -- RICO\MORITZ ADV HENRIKS -- MOTION TO DISMISS RICO COMPLAINT AS SLAPP LAWSUIT.DOC
18
DEFENDANT LOUISA MORITZ’S MOTION TO DISMISS SLAPP LAWSUIT
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Richard Farkas
15300 Ventura Blvd. #504
Sherman Oaks, CA 91403
Phone (818) 789-6001
Fax (818) 789-6002
A. THE INSIDIOUS NATURE OF SLAPPS REQUIRES A MECHANISM
TAILORED TO CURBING THEIR HARMFUL EFFECTS ON FIRST AMENDMENT
RIGHTS.
SLAPPs are lawsuits aimed at silencing a plaintiff’s opponents. The purpose of a SLAPP is
not to win, but to intimidate the SLAPP defendant and to chill petition and/or free speech rights. The
court in Wilcox v. Superior Court, 27 Cal.App.4th 809, 816, 33 Cal.Rptr.2d 446 (1994), explained
the characteristics of SLAPP suits as follows:
SLAPP suits are brought to obtain an economic advantage over the defendant, not to
vindicate a legally cognizable right of the plaintiff. Indeed, one of the common characteristics
of a SLAPP suit is its lack of merit. But lack of merit is not of concern to the plaintiff
because the plaintiff does not expect to succeed in the lawsuit; only to tie up the defendants’
resources for a sufficient length of time to accomplish plaintiff’s underlying objective. As
long as the defendant is forced to devote its time, energy and financial resources to
combating the lawsuit, its ability to combat the plaintiff in the political arena is substantially
diminished. [Citations omitted]
Thus, while SLAPP suits “masquerade as ordinary lawsuits,” the conceptual features which
reveal them as SLAPPs are that they are generally meritless suits brought by large private interests to
deter common citizens from exercising their political or legal rights or to punish them for doing so.
[Citations omitted]
Therefore, since plaintiffs who bring SLAPPs can “win” simply by dragging victims into
court and draining their (and the courts’) resources, these suits must be identified and dismissed at
the earliest possible moment.
As the court noted in Wilcox, supra, the California Legislature was aware that pleading-based
motions such as demurrers and motions to strike are ineffective in dealing with SLAPPs because a
plaintiff may satisfy basic pleading requirements by making constitutionally protected behavior
appear as defamation, interference with business relations, or restraint of trade. Therefore, the
Legislature provided that in the special anti-SLAPP motion to strike, the court is to consider, in
addition to the pleadings, supporting and opposing affidavits stating facts upon which the liability or
defense is based. (C.C.P. s. 425.16(b), See also Wilcox, supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at 822.)
B. THIS COURT MUST LOOK TO CALIFORNIA COMMON LAW AS MODIFIED
AND CHANGED IN ITS STATUTES AND CONSTITUTION.
RICHARD D. FARKAS\\C:\CASE FILES\NOVAL-VICTOR\MORITZ-LOUISA ADV HENRIKS -- RICO\MORITZ ADV HENRIKS -- MOTION TO DISMISS RICO COMPLAINT AS SLAPP LAWSUIT.DOC
19
DEFENDANT LOUISA MORITZ’S MOTION TO DISMISS SLAPP LAWSUIT
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Richard Farkas
15300 Ventura Blvd. #504
Sherman Oaks, CA 91403
Phone (818) 789-6001
Fax (818) 789-6002
As discussed above, the federal court is to look to the state law reflected in the statutes and
constitution of the state. Here, the California anti-SLAPP statute specifically addresses the gap in
federal law by providing a “suitable remedy” against SLAPPs by providing a discovery stay and
early termination of the claim. The California Legislature recognized both the growth of SLAPP
suits and the ineffectiveness of existing California procedures, such as motions to strike and motions
for summary judgment. (Wilcox, supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at 820.)
In response to the need to protect the rights of speech and petition, in 1992 the Legislature
overwhelmingly passed section 425.16, which provides that any cause of action arising from a
defendant’s exercise of the constitutional right to petition the government or to speak out in
connection with a public issue shall be subject to a special motion to strike unless the plaintiff can
establish that it has a probability of prevailing on the merits of its claims.
The purpose of section 425.16 is set forth in subsection (a) of the statute:
(a) The Legislature finds and declares that there has been a disturbing increase in lawsuits
brought primarily to chill the valid exercise of the constitutional rights of freedom of speech
and petition for the redress of grievances. The Legislature finds and declares that it is in the
public interest to encourage continued participation in matters of public significance, and that
this participation should not be chilled through the judicial process.
Speed is of the essence in dealing with SLAPPs, as it is whenever First Amendment rights
are in jeopardy. (Franchise Realty Interstate Corp. v. San Francisco Local Joint Executive Board of
Culinary Workers, 542 F.2d 1076, 1086 (9th Cir. 1976) (when complaint seeks to suppress or punish
First Amendment rights it should be “properly nipped in the bud by the trial judge”).) California’s
anti-SLAPP legislation provides an accelerated review process for potential SLAPP suits previously
unavailable under California law.15
The California Legislature further provided that, in the absence of good cause shown, SLAPP
plaintiffs would be required to establish the merits of their claims before any discovery is taken. This
15 A special motion to strike may be filed within sixty days of service of the complaint or at any
later time in the court’s discretion, and the motion will be heard within thirty days after service
unless the docket condition of the court requires a later hearing. (C.C.P. s. 425.16(f), (g).) This
Court, on March 21, 2007, granted Defendant’s motion to vacate her default, and directed Defendant
to file a responsive pleading by April 9, 2007; a 12(b)(6) or Anti-SLAPP motion, therefore, is timely.
RICHARD D. FARKAS\\C:\CASE FILES\NOVAL-VICTOR\MORITZ-LOUISA ADV HENRIKS -- RICO\MORITZ ADV HENRIKS -- MOTION TO DISMISS RICO COMPLAINT AS SLAPP LAWSUIT.DOC
20
DEFENDANT LOUISA MORITZ’S MOTION TO DISMISS SLAPP LAWSUIT
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Richard Farkas
15300 Ventura Blvd. #504
Sherman Oaks, CA 91403
Phone (818) 789-6001
Fax (818) 789-6002
stay on discovery was adopted in response to the common strategy of SLAPP plaintiffs to attempt to
dredge up after-the-fact justifications for meritless suits as part of an overall tactic to punish
opponents for the exercise of their First Amendment rights. Thus, section 425.16 provides a tailor-
made response to SLAPP suits to deal with their pernicious effects.
IV. DEFENDANT’S SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE MUST BE GRANTED BECAUSE
HER ACTIVITIES WERE IN FURTHERANCE OF THEIR HER RIGHTS (AND THE
RIGHTS OF HER CLIENTS) TO PETITION AND SPEECH, PROTECTED BY THE
CALIFORNIA LITIGATION PRIVILEGE, AND BECAUSE PLAINTIFF CANNOT SHOW
A PROBABILITY THAT SHE WILL PREVAIL ON HER CLAIM.
California cases applying section 425.16 have established a two-pronged analysis, as follows:
1. To come within the purview of the anti-SLAPP statute, defendants must make a prima
facie showing that plaintiff’s causes of action “arise from any act of [defendants] in furtherance of
[defendants’] right of petition or free speech under the United States or California Constitution in
connection with a public issue.”
2. The burden then shifts to plaintiff to show that “there is a probability that the plaintiff will
prevail on the claim.” 16
A. PLAINTIFF’S RICO CAUSE OF ACTION ARISES SOLELY FROM ACTS IN
FURTHERANCE OF DEFENDANT’S RIGHTS TO FREE SPEECH AND PETITION.
Included in the definition of an “act in furtherance of a person’s right of petition or free
speech” are the following:
[1] Any written or oral statement or writing made before a legislative, executive, or judicial
proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by law; [2] any written or oral
statement or writing made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a
legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law; or
[3] any written or oral statement or writing made in a place open to the public or a public
forum in connection with an issue of public interest.17
B. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE SECTION 425.16 APPLIES BECAUSE PLAINTIFF’S
CLAIM ARISES FROM PRIVILEGED ACTS WITHIN THE SCOPE OF SECTION 425.16.
16 (C.C.P. s. 425.16(b); Dixon v. Superior Court, 30 Cal.App.4th 733, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 687, 695-97
(1994); Wilcox v. Superior Court, 27 Cal.App.4th 809, 820-24, 33 Cal.Rptr.2d 446 (1994).) The
point of the anti-SLAPP statute is to prevent the inevitable chill on free speech and petitioning of the
government that results from protracted litigation from a baseless SLAPP suit. (See, e.g., Wilcox,
supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at 815-18.)
17 (C.C.P. s. 425.16(e) (bracketed numbers added).) Note that the complained-of activities need
only be in connection with an official proceeding, not at an official proceeding. (Id.; Wilcox, supra,
27 Cal.App.4th at 820.)
RICHARD D. FARKAS\\C:\CASE FILES\NOVAL-VICTOR\MORITZ-LOUISA ADV HENRIKS -- RICO\MORITZ ADV HENRIKS -- MOTION TO DISMISS RICO COMPLAINT AS SLAPP LAWSUIT.DOC
21
DEFENDANT LOUISA MORITZ’S MOTION TO DISMISS SLAPP LAWSUIT
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Richard Farkas
15300 Ventura Blvd. #504
Sherman Oaks, CA 91403
Phone (818) 789-6001
Fax (818) 789-6002
Code of Civil Procedure Section 425.16 applies to Henriks’ RICO claim because Moritz’s
communications in connection with pending or anticipated litigation are protected by the United
States and California Constitutions, and fall within the protections of Civil Code Section 47, entitling
her to the benefits of Section 425.16. Briggs, v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity (1999) 19
Cal.4th 1106, at 1115 [communications within the protection of the litigation privilege of Civil Code
section 47 are equally entitled to the benefits of section 425.16.].
Henriks’ RICO cause of action arises from filings and communications relating to legal actions
to which Henricks was a party. Such communications and filings are well within the litigation
privilege set forth in Civil Code § 47. The scope of the litigation privilege is very broad. In
Albertson v. Raboff (1956) 46 Cal.2d 375, the Court held that to be privileged, the communications
need not address the merits, or the issues actually before the court. Rather, the communications need
only have some connection to, or be reasonably related to the litigation to be protected by Section
47. Id. at 380381. In subsequent cases, this broad application of the litigation privilege has been
upheld numerous times. See Profile Structures, Inc. v. Long Beach Bldg. Material Co. (1986) 181
Cal.App.3d 437, 442 (a matter need not be pertinent, relevant or material in a technical sense to any
issue if it has some connection or relation to the proceedings]; see also Abraham v. Lancaster
Community Hospital (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 796 at 816-819 [enumerating cases from various
appellate districts upholding the privilege using a broad scope). It is the context in which the
statements are made that will bear upon the question of privilege. Sacramento Brewing Co. v.
Desmond, Miller & Desmond (1999) 75 Cal.App4th 1082,1090.
Further, if there is any doubt as to whether an adequate relationship or connection exists, such
doubt must be resolved in favor of a finding of privilege. See Profile Structures, supra, at 442; see
also Izzi v. Rellas (1980) 104 Cal.App.3d 254,263. Stated another way, privilege can only be denied
if the matter is so irrelevant that no reasonable man could doubt its irrelevancy. See Lewis v. Linn
(1962) 209 Cal.App.2d 394, 399. Moritz’s privileged filings and communications also fall within
the scope of Section 425.16 because they represent constitutionally protected speech. There is no
indication that the statements were of an “illegal” nature, punishable under the penal code, or that
RICHARD D. FARKAS\\C:\CASE FILES\NOVAL-VICTOR\MORITZ-LOUISA ADV HENRIKS -- RICO\MORITZ ADV HENRIKS -- MOTION TO DISMISS RICO COMPLAINT AS SLAPP LAWSUIT.DOC
22
DEFENDANT LOUISA MORITZ’S MOTION TO DISMISS SLAPP LAWSUIT
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Richard Farkas
15300 Ventura Blvd. #504
Sherman Oaks, CA 91403
Phone (818) 789-6001
Fax (818) 789-6002
they encompass conduct outside the protections offered by Section 425.16. See generally, Flatley v.
Mauro (2006) 39 Cal4th 299,323 -325.
C. PLAINTIFF CANNOT SHOW A PROBABILITY THAT SHE WILL PREVAIL
ON HER CLAIM.
Once defendants have shown that the anti-SLAPP statute applies, the burden shifts to
plaintiff to show a probability of success on the merits. (C.C.P. s. 425.16(b); Wilcox, supra, 27
Cal.App.4th at 820-24.) Plaintiff also bears the burden of negating defendant’s defenses, such as the
constitutional privilege to petition the government. (C.C.P. s. 425.16(b).) Most importantly for the
instant lawsuit, plaintiff must show its probability of success by admissible evidence. (Wilcox, supra,
27 Cal.App.4th at 830.) As discussed at length, plaintiff’s vague allegations, do not meet this
criterion.
Since California Code of Civil Procedure Section 425.16 applies here, the burden shifts to
Henriks to establish a probability of prevailing on the merits in her claims against Moritz. See Code
of Civil Procedure Section 425.16 (b) (1). To meet that burden, Henriks must state and substantiate
a legally sufficient claim—i.e. she must “demonstrate that the complaint is both legally sufficient
and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the
evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited.” Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal. 4th 82, 88. The
plaintiff must first show that defendant’s purported constitutional defenses are not applicable as a
matter of law, or otherwise establish facts which, if accepted, would negate such defenses. Wilcox v
Superior Court (1994, 2nd Dist) 27 Cal.App.4th 809 (disapproved in part by Equilon Enterprises v
Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal4th 53. Plaintiff must establish both that that her case is
meritorious, and that she is likely to prevail -this plaintiff cannot meet those requirements.
In the context of this case, the litigation privilege continues to be relevant to the second prong
of an anti-SLAPP analysis because it presents a “substantive defense plaintiff must overcome to
demonstrate a probability of prevailing.” Flatley, supra, at 323. The litigation privilege, as codified
RICHARD D. FARKAS\\C:\CASE FILES\NOVAL-VICTOR\MORITZ-LOUISA ADV HENRIKS -- RICO\MORITZ ADV HENRIKS -- MOTION TO DISMISS RICO COMPLAINT AS SLAPP LAWSUIT.DOC
23
DEFENDANT LOUISA MORITZ’S MOTION TO DISMISS SLAPP LAWSUIT
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Richard Farkas
15300 Ventura Blvd. #504
Sherman Oaks, CA 91403
Phone (818) 789-6001
Fax (818) 789-6002
at Civil Code § 47, is very broad, and as discussed more fully above, encompasses legal arguments
and filings, and even communications between counsel that is related to the litigation, even if the
communications do not address issues actually before the court. [See Albertson supra ;see also
Profile Structures, Inc., supra.] In this case, Henriks cannot overcome the defendant’s litigation
privilege defense, and thus will be unable to establish that she is likely to prevail on her claim. The
filings she alleges were actionable were allegedly made by Defendant Moritz in connection with
pending litigation, and were all subject to the litigation privilege. Henriks will be unable to
establish any probability of prevailing on the merits of her RICO action against Moritz, since the
litigation privilege will completely bar her action as it is based entirely on filings and arguments in
litigation in which Henriks was involved.
In sum, plaintiff cannot show a probability of success on her claims because she has no
admissible evidence of anything other than lawful petitioning activity, protected by the First
Amendment and statutory privileges.
V. CONCLUSION
Both prongs of the Anti-SLAPP Statute analysis are satisfied here. Under the Anti-SLAPP
statute, this Court should strike the plaintiff’s claim. The plaintiff’s claim arises from the exercise of
Defendant Moritz’s right to petition and free expression, putting it well within the statutory
definition. In addition, plaintiff cannot establish a likelihood of prevailing on the merits of her claim,
because the defendant may employ the complete defense of the litigation privilege of Civil Code
section 47. Given that the alleged conduct is constitutionally protected, and any claim based upon
the alleged conduct will be barred by the litigation privilege, both prongs of the Anti-SLAPP
analysis are satisfied. This Defendant therefore respectfully requests this Court to strike the
plaintiff’s claim that is based upon constitutionally protected and privileged conduct, in its entirety.
For the foregoing reasons, the California anti-SLAPP statute (C.C.P. § 425.16) must be applied
by this Court. Since defendants’ activities were in furtherance of their rights to petition and speech,
and plaintiff cannot show a probability of prevailing on the merits, the RICO complaint must be
RICHARD D. FARKAS\\C:\CASE FILES\NOVAL-VICTOR\MORITZ-LOUISA ADV HENRIKS -- RICO\MORITZ ADV HENRIKS -- MOTION TO DISMISS RICO COMPLAINT AS SLAPP LAWSUIT.DOC
24
DEFENDANT LOUISA MORITZ’S MOTION TO DISMISS SLAPP LAWSUIT
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Richard Farkas
15300 Ventura Blvd. #504
Sherman Oaks, CA 91403
Phone (818) 789-6001
Fax (818) 789-6002
stricken in its entirety pursuant to section 425.16. In addition, defendant asks this Court to award her
attorney’s fees and costs under C.C.P. section 425.16(c).
Dated: June 8, 2008 LAW OFFICES OF RICHARD D. FARKAS
By__________________________________
RICHARD D. FARKAS
Attorneys for Defendant,
LOUISA MORITZ
RICHARD D. FARKAS\\C:\CASE FILES\NOVAL-VICTOR\MORITZ-LOUISA ADV HENRIKS -- RICO\MORITZ ADV HENRIKS -- MOTION TO DISMISS RICO COMPLAINT AS SLAPP LAWSUIT.DOC
25
DEFENDANT LOUISA MORITZ’S MOTION TO DISMISS SLAPP LAWSUIT
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Richard Farkas
15300 Ventura Blvd. #504
Sherman Oaks, CA 91403
Phone (818) 789-6001
Fax (818) 789-6002
SUPPLEMENTAL DECLARATION OF RICHARD D. FARKAS
(re: Compliance with Local Rule 7.3)
I, RICHARD D. FARKAS, declare:
1. I am an attorney duly licensed to practice law in the State of California and am the
principal of the Law Offices of Richard D. Farkas, attorneys of record for Defendant LOUISA
MORITZ in this action. This Supplemental Declaration is made to specifically to detail my efforts to
“meet and confer” with opposing counsel pursuant to Local Rule 7.3 before filing this Special “Anti-
SLAPP Motion” to Strike the Plaintiff’s RICO complaint against Defendant Moritz.
2. The following facts are within my personal knowledge and I could testify to same if called
as a witness herein.
3. On March 28, 2007, I prepared a letter to Plaintiff’s attorney, Philip Dapeer. A true and
correct copy of that letter is attached hereto as Exhibit L, and incorporated by this reference.
4. In my March 28, 2007 letter to Mr. Dapeer, I wrote, in part, “to request that you
voluntarily dismiss the lawsuit of Yana Henriks your office filed against my client, Louisa Moritz.
Her RICO action is a SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation), subject to a special
motion to strike.”
5. In my March 28, 2007 letter to Mr. Dapeer, after detailing my reasons, I concluded: “we
request that you immediately dismiss Ms. Henriks’ lawsuit against Ms. Moritz. Failure to do so will
leave us with no alternative but to file our Motion to Strike, which will necessarily seek to recover
Ms. Moritz’s fees and costs.” [Exhibit L.]
5. I sent my March 28, 2007 letter by facsimile to Mr. Dapeer on the morning of March 28,
2007. Mr. Dapeer called me on the telephone on the afternoon of March 29, 2007, and we discussed
RICHARD D. FARKAS\\C:\CASE FILES\NOVAL-VICTOR\MORITZ-LOUISA ADV HENRIKS -- RICO\MORITZ ADV HENRIKS -- MOTION TO DISMISS RICO COMPLAINT AS SLAPP LAWSUIT.DOC
26
DEFENDANT LOUISA MORITZ’S MOTION TO DISMISS SLAPP LAWSUIT
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Richard Farkas
15300 Ventura Blvd. #504
Sherman Oaks, CA 91403
Phone (818) 789-6001
Fax (818) 789-6002
the substance of this letter (as well as some of the background of this litigation). At the conclusion
of our conversation, he said that he would communicate with his client, to determine how to proceed.
During our conversation, it was clear that we did not agree that the Plaintiff’s contentions against
Defendant Moritz were subject to an anti-SLAPP motion.
6. As of the date of this Declaration, I have not heard from Mr. Dapeer since our March 29,
2007 conversation concerning the subject of this motion.
I declare under penalty of perjury, under the laws of the United States of America, that the
foregoing is true and correct.
Executed this ____ day of ________________, 2007, at Sherman Oaks, California.
By ____________________________________
RICHARD D. FARKAS, Declarant
RICHARD D. FARKAS\\C:\CASE FILES\NOVAL-VICTOR\MORITZ-LOUISA ADV HENRIKS -- RICO\MORITZ ADV HENRIKS -- MOTION TO DISMISS RICO COMPLAINT AS SLAPP LAWSUIT.DOC
27
DEFENDANT LOUISA MORITZ’S MOTION TO DISMISS SLAPP LAWSUIT
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Richard Farkas
15300 Ventura Blvd. #504
Sherman Oaks, CA 91403
Phone (818) 789-6001
Fax (818) 789-6002
Tania Henriks vs. Louisa Moritz, Victor Noval, Tania Noval, etc., et al..
United States District Court Case No. 2:06-cv-05670-JFW-SH
PROOF OF SERVICE
I am a resident of the State of California, I am over the age of 18 years, and I am not a party to
this lawsuit. My business address is Law Offices of Richard D. Farkas, 15300 Ventura Boulevard,
Suite 504, Sherman Oaks, California 91403. On the date listed below, I served the following
document(s):
NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION OF DEFENDANT LOUISA MORITZ TO STRIKE
PLAINTIFF’S SLAPP COMPLAINT
_ by transmitting via facsimile the document(s) listed above to the fax number(s) set forth below on this
date before 5 p.m. Our facsimile machine reported the “send” as successful.
XX by placing the document(s) listed above in a sealed envelope with postage thereon fully prepaid, in the
United States mail at Los Angeles, California, addressed as set forth below.
I am readily familiar with the firm’s practice of collecting and processing correspondence for mailing.
According to that practice, items are deposited with the United States mail on that same day with postage
thereon fully prepaid. I am aware that, on motion of the party served, service is presumed invalid if postal
cancellation date or postage meter date is more than one day after the date of deposit for mailing stated in
the affidavit.
_ by placing the document(s) listed above in a sealed envelope with postage thereon fully prepaid,
deposited with Federal Express Corporation on the same date set out below in the ordinary course of
business; that on the date set below, I caused to be served a true copy of the attached document(s).
_ by causing personal delivery of the document(s) listed above to the indicated recipient(s) at the address
set forth below.
_ by personally delivering the document(s) listed above to the person at the address set forth below.
Philip D Dapeer
Philip D Dapeer Law Offices
699 Hampshire Road, Suite 105
Westlake Village, CA 91361-2379
Jon Hugh Freis
Jon H Freis Law Offices
120 El Camino Dr.
Beverly Hills, CA 90212
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the
foregoing is true and correct.
Dated: April __, 2007 ____________________________
KERRI CONAWAY