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Consultation Paper | CP27/14

CRD IV: Liquidity
November 2014

Prudential Regulation Authority
20 Moorgate
London EC2R 6DA
Prudential Regulation Authority, registered office: 8 Lothbury, London EC2R 7HH.
Registered in England and Wales No: 07854923

Consultation Paper | CP27/14

CRD IV: Liquidity
November 2014

This consultation paper proposes changes to the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) rules and guidance,
to accommodate the introduction of the European Union liquidity coverage requirement.
The Bank of England and the PRA reserve the right to publish any information which it may receive as part
of this consultation.
Information provided in response to this consultation, including personal information, may be subject to
publication or release to other parties or to disclosure, in accordance with access to information regimes
under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 or the Data Protection Act 1998 or otherwise as required by
law or in discharge of our statutory functions.
Please indicate if you regard all, or some of, the information you provide as confidential. If the
Bank of England or the PRA receives a request for disclosure of this information, the Bank of England or
the PRA will take your indication(s) into account, but cannot give an assurance that confidentiality can be
maintained in all circumstances. An automatic confidentiality disclaimer generated by your IT system on
emails will not, of itself, be regarded as binding on the Bank of England and the PRA.
Responses are requested by Friday 27 February 2015.
Please address any comments or enquiries to:
LCR CP responses
Liquidity Policy Team
Prudential Policy Directorate
Bank of England
Threadneedle Street
London
EC2R 8AH
Email: cp27_14@bankofengland.co.uk

Contents

Overview

Section I: Transition to the new liquidity regime
2

Switching off BIPRU 12 and phasing in the LCR

Maintaining the current PRA regulatory returns

Modifications granted under the current regime

Section II: Requirements on firms beyond meeting the LCR
5

Requirements on firms beyond meeting the LCR

Section III: Elements of the new regime not covered by EU legislation
6

Investment firms

UK branches of third country firms

LCR disclosure

Section IV: Cost benefit analysis
9

Cost benefit analysis

Appendices

CRD IV: Liquidity November 2014

1 Overview
1.1 On 10 October 2014, the European Commission published
a delegated act to supplement EU Regulation (EU)
No 575/2013 with regard to the liquidity coverage requirement
for credit institutions (‘Delegated Act’). This legislation is due
to enter into force by 31 December 2014. It will be directly
applicable in the United Kingdom from 1 October 2015.(1)
1.2 In light of this, the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA)
must revoke existing rules where appropriate, and restate its
overall approach to regulating liquidity. The PRA proposes to
revoke the liquidity standards contained in Chapter 12 of the
Prudential sourcebook for Banks, Building Societies and
Investment Firms (BIPRU 12) at the point at which the
Delegated Act applies as a regulatory standard in the European
Union (EU). New rules are proposed to implement the PRA’s
approach to liquidity supervision (Appendix 2). Consequential
amendments will be made to the liquidity reporting
requirements in Chapter 16 of the Supervision handbook
(SUP 16), and to the PRA Fundamental Rules (Appendix 2).
The PRA will consult on further consequential amendments to
its rules that are necessary to implement its new liquidity
regime.(2)
1.3 This consultation paper (CP) seeks views on draft rules and
a draft supervisory statement (Appendix 1) which set out the
PRA’s proposed update to its liquidity regime. This
consultation is relevant to UK banks, building societies and
UK-designated investment firms (‘firms’).(3) It is also relevant
to third country firms that are banks or designated investment
firms, and European Economic Area (EEA) credit institutions
that have a branch in the United Kingdom.

‘Basel III’, a new international regulatory framework for banks,
in June 2013.
1.5 In June 2013, the EU published legislation to implement
Basel III. The legislation replaced the previous capital
requirements directives with two new instruments: the
Capital Requirements Directive (CRD)(5) and the Capital
Requirements Regulation (CRR),(6) collectively known as
CRD IV. The PRA implemented the majority of CRD IV,
including several national discretions relating to the liquidity
regime, in December 2013.(7) The Delegated Act specifies the
general liquidity coverage requirement (LCR) as per
CRR Article 412, and the circumstances under which
competent authorities have to impose specific inflow and
outflow levels on credit institutions in order to capture the
specific risk to which they are exposed, as per CRR Article 460.
1.6 In October 2009, the Financial Services Authority (FSA)
introduced a far-reaching overhaul of the UK liquidity regime,
in FSA PS09/16.(8) This regime was implemented in BIPRU 12,
which was subsequently designated by the PRA. Readers
should note that the PRA’s updated approach to supervising
liquidity risk, as set out here and in the draft supervisory
statement, carries forward the broad principles established in
the previous liquidity regime. In particular, firms should note
that liquidity buffers can — and should — be used in times of
stress (see Appendix 1, paragraphs 6.1 to 6.3).

Background

1.7 The PRA expects this CP to be read in conjunction with the
Delegated Act, the draft supervisory statement and rules set
out in the Appendices, and all relevant European Banking
Authority (EBA) material, in order to gain a full understanding
of the proposed update to its liquidity regime.

1.4 The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS)
introduced the Liquidity Coverage Ratio in 2013.(4) This
standard aims to ensure that a bank has an adequate stock of
unencumbered liquid assets that consists of cash, or assets
that can be converted into cash at little or no loss of value in
private markets, to meet its liquidity needs for a thirty
calendar day liquidity stress scenario. The BCBS highlighted
the importance of liquidity to the functioning of financial
markets and the banking sector, as demonstrated by the
2007–08 crisis: many banks experienced difficulties because
they did not manage their liquidity in a prudent manner. This
contributed to the failure of several institutions. The BCBS
therefore introduced new liquidity standards as part of

(1) European Commission: ‘Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) [No…/.. of XXX] to
supplement EU Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 with regard to liquidity coverage
requirement for Credit Institutions’,
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/docs/regcapital/acts/delegated/141010_
delegated-act-liquidity-coverage_en.pdf.
(2) This will likely be in the form of an Occasional Consultation Paper.
(3) UK-incorporated investment firms regulated by the PRA are referred to as
UK-designated investment firms. This distinguishes them from both non-UK
incorporated designated investment firms and FCA-regulated investment firms.
(4) BCBS, ‘Basel III: The Liquidity Coverage Requirement and liquidity risk monitoring
tools’, January 2013; www.bis.org/publ/bcbs238.pdf.
(5) Directive 2013/36/EU; http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2013:176:0338:0436:EN:PDF.
(6) Regulation (EU) No 575/2013: http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2013:321:0006:0342:EN:PDF.
(7) PRA Policy Statement PS7/13, ‘Strengthening capital standards: implementing
CRD IV, feedback and final rules’, December 2013;
www.bankofengland.co.uk/pra/Documents/publications/ps/2013/ps713.pdf.
(8) FSA Policy Statement 09/16, ‘Strengthening liquidity standards’, October 2009;
www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/policy/ps09_16.pdf.

CRD IV: Liquidity November 2014

1.8 The Delegated Act only applies to credit institutions. To
ensure a consistent approach to liquidity supervision between
UK banks and building societies and UK-designated
investment firms, the PRA proposes to make a rule which will
require UK-designated investment firms to comply with the
obligations laid down in the Delegated Act (see Section III,
Chapter 6). UK-designated investment firms should read any
reference to the Delegated Act in this CP accordingly.

Statutory Obligations

1.9 Until the EEA Joint Committee amends the EEA
Agreement with a view to permitting simultaneous application
of the CRR liquidity standards in the EEA States, the CRR
liquidity standards only apply within the EU. The PRA
proposes to make rules on the assumption that the EEA Joint
Committee will incorporate the CRR liquidity standards into
the EEA Agreement. Before this happens however, the PRA
proposes transitional rules to ensure that:

1.13 The purpose of the revised liquidity regime is to continue
to address a number of market and regulatory failures in
relation to firms’ liquidity risk management, detailed in the
cost benefit analysis section of this document: in this way it
supports the PRA’s general objective of promoting the safety
and soundness of firms. In addition, by fully and clearly
restating the whole liquidity regime, the PRA is helping firms
understand its expectations of them, which also helps the PRA
meet its safety and soundness objective.

• EEA credit institutions with their head offices outside the
EU be treated, in relation to their UK branches, like third
country firms; and
• the level of application of the proposed PRA’s new liquidity
regime mirrors the level of application of the CRR liquidity
standards.
The PRA proposes to revoke these transitional rules when the
CRR liquidity standards are incorporated into the EEA
Agreement. The proposed transitional rules are set out in
Appendices 2.A (Rule 15) and 2.D (Rule 4).

Structure
1.10 This CP is structured as follows:
• Section I details how the PRA proposes to carry out the
transition to its new liquidity regime, taking into account
the Delegated Act that will apply from 1 October 2015.
• Section II explains what requirements the PRA proposes to
place on firms beyond meeting the LCR.
• Section III details the elements of the PRA’s proposed new
regime which will not be covered by EU legislation.
• Section IV contains a cost benefit analysis of the proposals.
1.11 The draft supervisory statement is included as Appendix 1;
the draft rules are included as Appendix 2. Appendix 3
provides a mapping of BIPRU 12 rules to the Internal Liquidity
Adequacy Assessment (ILAA) Part of the PRA Rulebook.

1.12 In discharging its general functions of making rules and
determining the general policy and principles, the PRA must,
so far as is reasonably possible, act in a way that advances its
two objectives: that is, its general objective to promote the
safety and soundness of PRA-authorised persons,(1) and its
secondary objective to facilitate effective competition.(2)

1.14 In light of the introduction from 1 March 2014 of a
statutory secondary competition objective for the PRA, the
PRA has assessed whether the content of this consultation
facilitates effective competition in markets for services
provided by PRA-authorised persons in carrying out regulated
activities. The PRA considers that the transition to the LCR
will put internationally active UK firms on a level playing field
with other, non-UK firms with an international presence: the
LCR is being implemented, albeit in a different form, by all
members of the Basel Committee, and the EU definition of the
LCR will be applied across all EU Member States.
Domestically, the new Pillar 1 regime(3) will put both larger
and smaller UK firms on a level playing field. However, the
PRA recognises that the removal of the simplified Individual
Liquidity Assessment Standards (ILAS)(4) modification will
increase the compliance costs for those firms that previously
benefited from it. Offsetting this, at least partially, the PRA’s
Pillar 2 approach will be proportionate to each firm’s business
model.
1.15 In making its rules and establishing its practices and
procedures the PRA must have regard to the Regulatory
Principles.(5) The PRA considers that this proposal is
compatible with the Regulatory Principles. In particular,
section 3B(1)(a) of the Financial Services and Markets Act
(FSMA) provides that the resources of each regulator should
be used in the most efficient and economic way.
Section 3B(1)(b) of FSMA provides that the principle that a
burden or restriction which is imposed on a person, or, on the
carrying out of an activity, should be proportionate to the
(1) Section 2(b) of the Financial Services and Markets Act (FSMA) 2000 (General
Objective).
(2) Section 2(h) of FSMA 2000 (Secondary Objective).
(3) Please see paragraph 2.3 and the associated footnote for a definition of the Pillar 1
standard.
(4) Please see Chapter 5 for a definition of ILAS.
(5) Section 138J(3)(b) of FSMA 2000.

CRD IV: Liquidity November 2014

benefits, considered in general terms, which are expected to
result from the imposition of that burden or restriction.
1.16 In addition, when consulting on draft rules, the PRA is
required to consider:
• equality and diversity;
• the impact on mutuals; and
• the impact on competition.

impose a higher burden on some smaller firms, including
mutuals, than the current BIPRU 12 regime. That burden,
however, will not be higher than that imposed on other firms
in the new regime. And, as explained above, the PRA’s Pillar 2
approach will be proportionate to each firm’s business model,
which will offset this higher burden, at least partially.

Key proposals
1.21 The main proposals put forward in this CP are as follows:

1.17 The impact on competition is addressed in
paragraph 1.14. The impact on mutuals, and equality and
diversity, are considered below. The PRA is also required to
perform a cost benefit analysis of the impact of its policy
proposals: this is contained in Section IV.

• To revoke BIPRU 12. This includes revoking the simplified
ILAS regime and the requirement on firms to undertake
standardised stress testing.

Equality and Diversity

• To carry forward the broad principles established in
BIPRU 12 into the new regime.

1.18 As a public body, the PRA is subject to the provisions of
the Public Sector Equality Duty (PSED) which forms part of the
Equality Act 2010. The PSED requires that when the PRA is
exercising its public functions, it has due regard to the need for
eliminating unlawful discrimination, advancing equality of
opportunity and fostering good relations between people who
share a protected characteristic. To meet this requirement,
the PRA has performed an assessment of the equality and
diversity implications of any new policy proposal considered.
In general the PRA finds that the issues addressed in this CP do
not give rise to equality and diversity implications.
1.19 The Delegated Act applies directly to PRA-regulated
firms. It contains a number of derogations towards the
eligibility of assets within a firm’s High Quality Liquid Assets
(HQLA) buffer that are only available to firms that are unable
to hold interest-bearing assets for reasons of religious
observance. These derogations support the ability of these
firms to meet the requirements of the Delegated Act.

Impact on mutuals
1.20 The proposal will affect mutuals as they are within scope
of the proposed new rules. The PRA does not expect the
impact on mutuals to be significantly different from the
impact on other firms.(1) Based on a recent survey of the costs
to firms of compliance with Common Reporting (COREP) and
Financial Reporting (FINREP), the PRA estimates that the
impact on mutuals of the LCR reporting requirements will not
be substantially different from that on other similarly sized
(non-mutual) institutions. However, the simplified regime
that was available under BIPRU 12 (ILAS regime), to firms
operating a relatively simple business model, will no longer
apply: firms previously operating under this simplified regime
will have to calculate the same LCR as other firms, whereas
previously they were able to calculate their liquid asset buffer
requirement through a simplified formula. They will also need
to apply the same stress testing approach as other firms. This
means that, aside from reporting costs, the new regime will

• To apply a transition to 100% LCR on 1 January 2018 in the
following steps: an 80% requirement from 1 October 2015,
rising to 90% on 1 January 2017.
• To carry forward existing add-ons not covered in the LCR as
the new Pillar 2 add-ons, until each firm’s next liquidity
review.
• To establish a new rule to require that firms ensure their
systems and processes enable them to report all COREP
liquidity returns daily, as required by the PRA.
• To maintain reporting of FSA047 and FSA048 for a period of
up to two years after the introduction of the full suite of
COREP liquidity returns in 2015.
• To require that firms integrate fully the operational
requirements outlined in Delegated Act Article 8.
• To propose that if pre-positioned assets are not eligible for
inclusion in the HQLA buffer, they cannot be used to meet
the PRA’s quantitative liquidity guidance.
• To propose that UK-designated investment firms be subject
to the obligations stated in the Delegated Act, with any
necessary amendments, to bring their obligations in line
with those applied to UK banks and building societies.
• To propose that third country firms be subject to a
requirement to provide liquidity information on a
whole-firm basis.

(1) Section 138K(2) of FSMA 2000.

CRD IV: Liquidity November 2014

Responses and next steps

• How the PRA is intending to apply requirements beyond the
LCR.

1.22 This consultation closes on Friday 27 February 2015.
Views are welcomed on the proposals made in this CP and
respondents are requested to structure their responses by
chapter.

• The PRA’s specific proposals for UK-designated investment
firms, and for third country firms.
• The content of the draft supervisory statement.

1.23 In particular respondents may wish to comment on:
• The proposed transition path to the LCR, including the
proposal for interim Pillar 2 add-ons.
• The proposal to retain reporting on FSA047 and FSA048 for
up to two years after the introduction of the full suite of
COREP liquidity returns in 2015.

1.24 The PRA intends to discuss with firms their preparations
for the introduction of the LCR, and would welcome their
views on issues arising from its implementation.
1.25 The PRA intends to publish a policy statement with
feedback, final rules and a supervisory statement in 2015.

Section I:
Transition to the new liquidity regime

CRD IV: Liquidity November 2014

2 Switching off BIPRU 12 and phasing
in the LCR
2.1 This chapter sets out the PRA’s proposal for switching off
the current BIPRU 12 regime, withdrawing existing
firm-specific Individual Liquidity Guidance (ILG),(1) and phasing
in the LCR in accordance with CRR Article 412(5). It also
details the PRA’s interim approach to setting Pillar 2
requirements in the new regime, and includes a proposal for
collecting LCR returns in the event that reporting on the
revised template is delayed until after the LCR is introduced
on 1 October 2015.(2)
2.2 Delegated Act Article 38 provides for a phasing-in of the
LCR ratio from 1 October 2015 until 1 January 2018.
Competent authorities are permitted by CRR Article 412(5) to
require domestically authorised institutions, or a subset of
those institutions, to maintain a higher LCR than the minimum
phase-in path, up to 100%, until the LCR is fully introduced at
a rate of 100% in accordance with CRR Article 460.
2.3 The LCR is a Pillar 1 standard, ie it is a set of measures that
applies to all firms in the same way.(3) CRD Articles 104
and 105 provide discretion for competent authorities to set
additional Pillar 2 liquidity requirements. The existing
UK regime is not based on a Pillar 1/Pillar 2 approach. But it is
similar in effect: an individual firm’s ILG is based on a
standardised stress test, and add-ons reflect firm-specific risks.
2.4 The draft supervisory statement is in Appendix 1, and the
draft rules are contained in Appendix 2.B.

understands that it would be operationally difficult for firms
to operate to two such sets at the same time.

LCR phase-in
2.7 The PRA proposes to set the LCR at 80% from 1 October
2015. This requirement would apply until the end of 2016.
The requirement would then rise to 90% on 1 January 2017.
It would reach 100% on 1 January 2018, as required by CRR
(Table A).

Table A Comparison of liquidity coverage requirements during
the transition period
Date

Minimum path —
CRR Article 460

Proposed PRA path

From 1 October 2015

60%

80%

From 1 January 2016

70%

80%

From 1 January 2017

80%

90%

From 1 January 2018

100%

2.8 In choosing the initial minimum requirement for the LCR,
the PRA had regard to the Financial Policy Committee’s
(FPC’s) recommendation to the PRA in June 2013 which stated
that: ‘In assessing the liquidity of banks and building societies,
the PRA should employ, among other measures, the Liquidity
Coverage Ratio (LCR) as defined in the EU’s implementation of
the Basel standard. The minimum requirement should be set
at 80% until 1 January 2015, rising thereafter to reach an LCR
of 100% on 1 January 2018.’(4) The FPC concluded that as a

Proposals
Revoking BIPRU 12 and withdrawing existing ILG
2.5 The PRA proposes to revoke the liquidity standards
contained in BIPRU 12 and to withdraw firm-specific guidance
on liquid asset buffers contained in firms’ ILG, at the point at
which the LCR comes into effect (1 October 2015). This
includes revoking the simplified ILAS regime. The PRA will
send new guidance letters to firms as appropriate, and notably
where firms have existing add-ons. In the interim, the
transitional provisions outlined in the rest of this chapter apply
as a default.
2.6 These proposals ensure that firms are subject to a single
set of liquidity standards at any one time. The PRA

(1) Readers should note that when used with capital letters, or as the acronym ILG, the
term ‘Individual Liquidity Guidance’ refers to the quantitative liquidity requirement
set on firms under BIPRU 12. When used without capital letters, and fully spelt out,
the term ‘individual liquidity guidance’ refers to the more general guidance given to
firms, including qualitative elements.
(2) The Pillar 2 review is any activity on the part of a supervisor to assess a firm’s
compliance with the overall Pillar 2 rule. The review includes an assessment of the
strategies, processes and systems a firm has in place to identify and manage the risks
to which it is exposed or might be exposed and the risk that it might not be able to
meet the obligations in Part Three of the CRR. One part of this review is an
assessment of the adequacy of the financial resources a firm must hold to comply
with any Pillar 1 requirements as well as those resources held for risks not covered
under Pillar 1.
(3) Note, however, that the LCR is not a Pillar 1 ‘minimum’: falling below the applicable
LCR is not automatically associated with breaching the PRA’s Threshold Conditions.
Please see Section 6 of the draft supervisory statement (Appendix 1) for further
details on the PRA’s expectations of firms that fall below the level of quantitative
individual liquidity guidance.
(4) Bank of England, ‘Record of the Financial Policy Meeting’, 18 June 2013, page 2;
www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/records/fpc/pdf/2013/
record1307.pdf.

CRD IV: Liquidity November 2014

general policy, setting this transition path would provide the
banking system with greater flexibility and could support
economic recovery without compromising financial stability.
In particular, the FPC noted that the impact of looser liquidity
requirements on credit conditions was uncertain. But by
removing possible impediments to an expansion of credit
supply, it intended to give the banking system more flexibility
to lend.(1) The PRA confirmed on 28 August 2013 that it
would implement this recommendation.(2)

Box 1
Interim add-on illustration

2.9 The PRA considers that the proposal would provide a
balance between: on the one hand, ensuring that the new
requirements imposed on firms do not represent a significant
weakening of existing standards; and, on the other hand,
ensuring that the transition is not overly abrupt and does not
risk temporarily constraining banks’ ability to extend credit to
the real economy.
2.10 Question: The PRA invites comments on its proposed
transition path to 100% LCR in 2018.

Under BIPRU 12, a firm has an intraday liquidity risk
requirement of £1 billion. If it is required to hold £500 million
of liquidity as an add-on against this risk as at 30 September
2015, then £500 million is the amount that would apply as the
new Pillar 2 add-on as at 1 October 2015, and until the PRA
can conduct the firm’s next liquidity review.

2.14 Question: The PRA invites comments on its proposed
interim Pillar 2 approach.

Reporting
2.15 Delegated Act Article 4(5) requires firms to calculate and
monitor their liquidity positions against the LCR as specified in
the Delegated Act. CRD Article 4(2) also requires the PRA, as
the competent authority, to monitor institutions’ compliance
with CRD IV.

Interim Pillar 2 approach
2.11 As detailed in Section 3 of the draft supervisory
statement, the PRA plans to adopt an interim Pillar 2 approach
based on firms’ existing ILG add-ons. Where current add-ons
relate to risks not captured in the LCR, the PRA proposes to
continue applying them at the same absolute amounts as
previously: these will become the new Pillar 2 add-ons, as an
interim measure until the PRA can carry out a liquidity review
of the firm. Specifically, fixed add-ons that are applicable on
30 September 2015 would continue to apply from 1 October
2015 at the same absolute amounts: this covers all add-ons
except those relating to prime brokerage and derivatives.
Box 1 illustrates the proposed approach with an example.
Initially, and until the PRA can carry out a liquidity review of
the firm, each add-on will apply at the individual level. In
addition, if the firm must comply with CRR Part 6 (Liquidity)
on a consolidated level, then the add-on will also apply at the
consolidated level.
2.12 The type of HQLA held to meet interim ILG add-ons
should be no wider than defined in the Delegated Act, and it
should follow the same composition set out in the Delegated
Act for Levels 1, 2A and 2B assets.
2.13 In due course and as the PRA’s resources permit a review
of each firm’s liquidity, the PRA intends to revise its approach
to assessing liquidity risk management in line with the ‘Draft
Guidelines for common procedures and methodologies for
the supervisory review and evaluation process under
Article 107 (3) of Directive 2013/36/EU’ (‘EBA SREP
guidelines’).(3) The PRA expects firms to have robust processes
in place to identify and manage their liquidity risks until the
PRA is able to set refreshed firm-specific guidance.

2.16 The EBA is revising the COREP LCR template to reflect
the Delegated Act.(4) Firms may face tight deadlines in
implementing the new reporting template. In the event that
reporting on the revised template is delayed until after the
LCR is introduced on 1 October 2015, the PRA will retain the
option to collect the returns via alternative methods for a
limited period, for example using Excel spreadsheets.
2.17 CRD Article 104(1)(j) enables the PRA to impose
additional or more frequent reporting on liquidity positions.
The PRA proposes to make a rule requiring firms to have
systems and controls in place to enable firms to submit all
liquidity COREP returns daily, as required by the PRA. Firms
may also be required to provide additional information
necessary for the purpose of liquidity supervision.
2.18 Question: The PRA invites comments on options for
collecting LCR returns, in the event of a delay in the
implementation of the updated COREP LCR templates.

(1) Bank of England Financial Stability Report, June 2013, page 70;
www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/fsr/2013/fsrfull1306.pdf.
(2) Bank of England News Release, 28 August 2013;
www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/news/2013/099.aspx.
(3) EBA, ‘Guidelines for common procedures and methodologies review and evaluation
process (SREP)’, www.eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/748829/EBA-CP-201414+%28CP+on+draft+SREP+Guidelines%29.pdf. Please note that these are being
finalised and that the EBA expects to issue the final version at the end of 2014.
(4) The Bank is party to this working group.

CRD IV: Liquidity November 2014

3 Maintaining the current PRA
regulatory returns
3.1 This chapter sets out the PRA’s proposals for maintaining
existing liquidity returns alongside the new reporting
requirements, for a limited, transitional period. These are
delivered by proposed rules changes to SUP 16.12 and to the
Glossary of definitions, both contained in Appendix 2.

1 October 2015. UK branches of EEA firms that have their
head office outside the EU (ie Iceland, Liechtenstein and
Norway) should follow the transitional reporting
arrangements proposed for UK branches of third country firms
outlined in Chapter 7.

Proposals

3.5 During the transition, the PRA proposes that firms that
currently report on the basis of a Defined Liquidity Group
(DLG) by modification or DLG by default should continue to
do so.(3) However firms in a UK DLG by modification will no
longer be required to submit solo returns. Third country firms
that have a whole-firm liquidity modification (WFLM) granted
under BIPRU 12 in relation to their UK branches should
continue to report on the basis of the whole firm (or at any
other reporting level or frequency the whole-firm liquidity
modification may require), for a transitional period as detailed
in paragraphs 7.15 and 7.16. The PRA will be prepared to
consider changes to the reporting basis or frequency if
requested by a firm (for example, if firms are supervised as a
single liquidity subgroup under Article 8 of the CRR, they may
want to avoid reporting on two concurrent sets of liquidity
subgroups).

3.2 In order to facilitate the supervision of liquidity in the
initial period following the introduction of the LCR as a
regulatory requirement, the PRA proposes to keep in place, for
a limited period, the requirement to report some of the PRA's
current liquidity returns. The PRA proposes to retain the
requirement to submit the ‘daily flows’ and ‘enhanced
mismatch’ reports (FSA047 and FSA048) for up to two years
after the introduction of the full suite of COREP liquidity
returns, but in any event not beyond the point at which the
LCR must be phased in at 100% in accordance with the
Delegated Act. These reports are central to the PRA’s
supervision of liquidity. They provide a daily breakdown of
firms’ inflows and outflows, which will not be available in the
new COREP LCR templates.(1)
3.3 The PRA further proposes to stop requiring returns
FSA050, FSA052 and FSA054 in the new regime. The last
reporting date for these returns would be as at 30 September
2015 for FSA050 and FSA054. For FSA052 (a weekly report),
the last reporting date would be 2 October 2015. In the event
that the introduction of the additional liquidity monitoring
metrics (AMMs) is delayed, the PRA proposes to maintain the
requirement to report returns FSA050, FSA052 and FSA054,
until the first date at which the AMMs start being collected by
the PRA.(2) The PRA proposes to maintain FSA051 and FSA053
beyond 1 October 2015, but expects that this will be for not
more than six months, unless the AMMs are delayed by more
than this. These two reports provide valuable information on
sources of wholesale funding (FSA051) and Financial Services
Compensation Scheme coverage (FSA053). The PRA will need
time to assess how to replace these data.
3.4 Following the application of the LCR, the PRA will no
longer retain responsibility for the supervision of branches of
EU credit institutions. The PRA therefore proposes to stop
collecting liquidity reports in relation to these branches from

3.6 In making these proposals, the PRA aims to ensure a
smooth transition to the new regime in two ways:
i.

The PRA and firms will be able to use data from the PRA’s
current returns to facilitate the process of assuring the
quality of the new data, especially with regard to the
contractual maturity ladder. The PRA’s experience in
implementing the current regime indicates that firms
need time to bring new reporting up to the required
standard: a transition without an initial period of dual
reporting may jeopardise the PRA’s safety and soundness
objective.

(1) A daily breakdown up to seven days will be available in the additional monitoring
metrics, when these reports start being collected.
(2) EBA, ‘Implementing Technical Standards (ITS) on additional liquidity monitoring
metrics’, www.eba.europa.eu/regulation-and-policy/liquidity-risk/draftimplementing-technical-standards-on-additional-liquidity-monitoring-metrics.
(3) See PRA glossary for a definition of the terms Defined Liquidity Group by
modification or by default; http://fshandbook.info/FS/html/PRA/Glossary.

ii.

CRD IV: Liquidity November 2014

The PRA will have time to assess the differences between
the information currently submitted and the data to be
submitted under the new regime. This will allow it to
refine the framework for Pillar 2, for example with regard
to standardised stress testing. As part of this, the PRA will
study further the combined and final set of COREP
liquidity returns and, in light of this, will consider the case
for setting up any new PRA reporting requirement beyond
the COREP liquidity returns. The PRA notes that it would
be unhelpful to switch off current PRA reporting
requirements, only to reinstate them at a later stage.

3.7 The PRA’s intention in temporarily retaining existing
reporting is not to hold firms to a shadow regulatory standard.
From the cutover date of 1 October 2015, firms’ liquidity
positions will no longer be measured against the ILG.
3.8 As explained in Chapter 5, BIPRU 12.5 will be revoked.
Nonetheless, for reporting purposes, firms should continue to
use the guidance currently contained in BIPRU 12.5 regarding
what classifications to use when completing the returns (for
example, for the classification of their Type A/Type B
corporate or retail deposits).

3.9 Questions: The PRA invites comments on its proposals
to:
• Retain the requirement to submit the ‘daily flows’ and
‘enhanced mismatch’ reports (FSA047 and FSA 048) for up
to two years after the introduction of the full suite of
COREP liquidity returns in 2015.
• Stop requiring returns FSA050, FSA052 and FSA054. The
last reporting date for these returns would be as at
30 September 2015 for FSA050 and FSA054. For FSA052 (a
weekly report), the last reporting date would be 2 October
2015. In the event that the introduction of the AMMs is
delayed, the requirement to report returns FSA050, FSA052
and FSA054 would be maintained until the first date at
which the AMMs start being collected by the PRA.
• Maintain FSA051 and FSA053 beyond 1 October 2015, with
the expectation that this will be for not more than
six months, unless the AMMs are delayed by more than this.

CRD IV: Liquidity November 2014

4 Modifications granted under the
current regime
4.1 This chapter sets out the PRA’s proposals in relation to the
treatment of BIPRU 12 and SUP 16.12 liquidity modifications
granted to firms in accordance with section 138A of FSMA.
4.2 The PRA offers three kinds of modifications under its
current liquidity regime:
i.

ii.

Intragroup liquidity modification: this permits
PRA-regulated firms incorporated in the United Kingdom
to rely on liquidity support from elsewhere in their group.
Such modifications create either a UK DLG where all the
firms are established in the United Kingdom, or a
non-UK DLG where the UK firm is reliant on its overseas
parent. For UK DLGs, the PRA sets liquidity guidance at
the level of the group (although the individual legal
entities within the DLG typically continue to report at the
legal entity level, albeit on a less frequent basis).
WFLM: this permits an overseas bank, in relation to its
UK branch, to rely on the availability of liquidity resources
from elsewhere within the firm.

iii. Simplified ILAS waiver: for firms that operate a relatively
simple business model, this allows a firm to calculate the
size and content of its liquid assets buffer according to a
simplified approach.
4.3 As set out in Chapter 2, the Delegated Act is due to apply
from 1 October 2015, and the PRA will update its existing
liquidity regime accordingly and revoke BIPRU 12. This means
that after that time, firms will no longer be able to rely on
these modifications and will not be expected to comply with
them.
4.4 Under CRR Article 8, firms can apply for a permission
which has a similar purpose to the intragroup liquidity
modification: the PRA, as the competent authority, may waive
(in full or in part) the application of the liquidity requirements
in the CRR to a firm and to all or some of its subsidiaries and
may supervise them as a single liquidity subgroup.
4.5 Following the revocation of BIPRU 12, WFLMs will cease
to have effect. There is no equivalent to the WFLM in the CRR.
Once the LCR applies in the EU, responsibility for regulating

the liquidity risk of UK branches of EU credit institutions will
pass to the EU home state regulator.
4.6 UK branches of non-EU credit institutions are not subject
to the liquidity provisions of the CRR. As such, responsibility
for their liquidity supervision will remain with the PRA. When
BIPRU 12 ceases to be in force, the WFLMs which UK branches
of non-EU credit institutions have in place will cease to have
effect.
4.7 For a period of transition, non-EU credit institutions
would continue to submit their PRA regulatory returns in
relation to their UK branches, in line with their previous
modification: the PRA will modify SUP 16.12, and the
definition of WFLM in the PRA Glossary, to reflect this.
Chapter 7 sets out in full the PRA’s proposals for liquidity
requirements in respect of UK branches of third country firms,
including transitional arrangements.
4.8 UK branches of EEA credit institutions that have their
head office outside the EU (ie Iceland, Liechtenstein and
Norway) will be subject to the same regime as for non-EEA
States, as per paragraph 1.9.
4.9 The simplified ILAS waiver has no equivalent in the CRR or
the Delegated Act. Once the PRA revokes BIPRU 12, simplified
ILAS waivers will no longer have effect. All firms in scope must
meet the LCR.
4.10 Firms that have been granted WFLMs, intragroup
liquidity modifications and simplified ILAS modifications that
expire before BIPRU 12 ceases to have effect on 30 September
2015 will need to apply for a renewal if they want to continue
to rely on the modification up to that point.
4.11 Given the short period of time for which these renewals
will be in place, the PRA has established a streamlined process
for these three types of modification, with the aim of
minimising the resource burden on both firms and the PRA,
while continuing to ensure that the statutory tests in
section 138(A) of FSMA are met.(1)
(1) See www.bankofengland.co.uk/pra/Pages/authorisations/waivers/extending_
modifications.aspx.

4.12 Firms that wish to renew or vary other types of PRA
liquidity modifications, or that wish to apply for a liquidity
modification for the first time, should contact their supervisor.

CRD IV: Liquidity November 2014

Section II:
Requirements on firms beyond
meeting the LCR

CRD IV: Liquidity November 2014

5 Requirements on firms beyond
meeting the LCR
5.1 This chapter explains the PRA’s proposals for requirements
on firms with regard to liquidity that go beyond the
obligations laid down in the Delegated Act. The chapter also
explains the PRA’s approach to assessing whether firms meet
these requirements — its review and evaluation process.
5.2 The LCR is a Pillar 1 standard, ie it applies to all firms in the
same way. As such it could fail to capture some important
sources of liquidity risk for particular firms. Therefore, it is
appropriate to set additional requirements on firms, such as
requirements relating to their liquidity risk management: such
measures are sometimes described as Pillar 2 requirements.
5.3 The introduction of CRD IV and the recent consultation on
the EBA SREP guidelines have prompted the PRA to review its
approach to liquidity and funding risk: this chapter provides
an overview of how the PRA is updating its overall approach to
regulating liquidity risk.
5.4 The proposed new rules are contained in the ILAA Part of
the Rulebook (see Appendix 2.A). The PRA’s expectations on
how firms should comply with these rules are provided
separately in the draft supervisory statement (see Appendix 1).
The draft rules, the draft supervisory statement, and the
EBA SREP guidelines should be read together to gain a full
understanding of the updated liquidity regime and of the
PRA’s expectations of firms.
5.5 The chapter is structured as follows: first, it details the
level of application of the ILAA rules. Second, it provides a
checklist of those rules carried over or deleted from BIPRU 12.
Finally, it provides a brief overview of the overall regime, as set
out in the draft supervisory statement (Appendix 1) and draft
rules (Appendix 2).

Level of application of the ILAA rules

example, only a firm that is an EU parent institution must
comply with the overall liquidity adequacy rule (OLAR) on a
consolidated basis.(2) This was not previously part of the
BIPRU 12 regime.
5.8 Where firms have parent undertakings or subsidiaries not
subject to the CRD, they must ensure that these implement
arrangements, processes and mechanisms that are consistent
and well integrated. Firms must also ensure that those parent
undertakings or subsidiaries are able to produce any data and
information relevant to the purpose of supervision. This is
consistent with the PRA’s current approach.(3)
5.9 The PRA is required under CRD IV to apply the Liquidity
Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process (L-SREP)(4) and any
supervisory measures in accordance with the level of
application of the requirements set out in the CRD IV
framework. Therefore, the ILAA Part of the PRA Rulebook,
including the requirement to carry out an Internal Liquidity
Adequacy Assessment Process (ILAAP), applies on an
individual basis. And it applies on a consolidated basis, where
firms must comply with CRR Part 6 (Liquidity) on a
consolidated basis. This enables the PRA to carry out L-SREPs
and to apply supervisory measures at both individual and
consolidated level, where appropriate.

Summary of rules carried forward and
deleted(5)
5.10 The PRA currently sets out its requirements and
expectations on firms in respect of their identification,
measurement, management and monitoring of liquidity risk in
BIPRU 12.2, 12.3, 12.4, 12.5 and 12.6. This section explains
which rules the PRA proposes to maintain, and which rules it
proposes to delete. It also explains one proposed new rule.

5.6 The PRA proposes that the rules will apply on an individual
basis, a consolidated basis, and a sub-consolidated basis where
appropriate.
5.7 However, only those firms that are under an obligation to
comply with CRR Part 6 on a consolidated basis must also
comply with these PRA rules on a consolidated basis.(1) For

(1) The level of application of CRR Part 6 on a consolidated basis is set out in
CRR Article 11(3) and Article 12.
(2) See the draft supervisory statement in Appendix 1 for a definition of OLAR.
(3) SYSC 12.1.13R(2)(e).
(4) See paragraphs 5.30 to 5.34 for more details on the L-SREP process.
(5) See Appendix 3 for a mapping of BIPRU 12 rules to the ILAA Part of the Rulebook.

CRD IV: Liquidity November 2014

Proposed new rule

Simplified ILAS regime

5.11 As noted in paragraph 2.17, CRD Article 104(1)(j) enables
the PRA to require additional or more frequent reporting on
liquidity positions. And CRR Article 414 requires that firms
submit liquidity returns daily when they do not meet, or
expect not to meet, the LCR requirement (unless exempted by
the relevant competent authority). As explained in
paragraph 2.17, the PRA proposes a new rule to require that
firms ensure that their systems and processes enable them to
report all liquidity COREP returns daily, as required by the
PRA.

5.17 The PRA proposes to delete BIPRU 12.6, as detailed in
Chapter 4.

5.12 Question: The PRA invites comments on its proposal for
a new rule to require that firms ensure that their systems and
processes enable them to report all COREP liquidity returns
daily, as required by the PRA.

BIPRU 12 rules carried forward
5.13 For the ILAA rules, the PRA proposes to carry forward
selected rules from BIPRU 12 which are relevant to the new
regime. They include:
• the requirement that firms hold adequate liquidity;
• the requirement that firms assess whether they hold enough
liquidity and document that assessment;
• the specification of some of the elements that firms need to
undertake in carrying out that assessment (notably around
liquidity stress testing); and

Standardised stress testing
5.18 The proposed ILAA rules contained in Appendix 2.A
no longer specify the criteria of a standardised stress test of
the type articulated in BIPRU 12.5.
5.19 The PRA proposes to maintain the granularity of
assumptions around the risk drivers (currently in BIPRU 12.5).
However this will be incorporated in the firm-specific stress
test requirement.

Overview of regime
PRA’s expectations of firms
Overall liquidity adequacy rule
5.20 The LCR is a Pillar 1 standard, ie it is a set of measures
that applies to all firms in the same way. As such it could fail
to capture some important sources of liquidity risk for
particular firms. The LCR also does not measure whether firms
have in place adequate systems and processes for managing
liquidity risk. It follows that a firm cannot only rely on
meeting the LCR in order to be confident that it is
appropriately resilient to liquidity risk. Firms must ensure that
their liquidity and funding risks are comprehensively captured
and managed. The PRA sets this as a requirement through its
overarching rule, OLAR.

• requirements on specific aspects of liquidity risk
management.

5.21 The PRA views firms’ responsibilities with regard to OLAR
to be of paramount importance. Underlying OLAR is the PRA’s
expectation that firms manage their liquidity risk prudently
and take responsibility themselves for doing so.

5.14 To ensure ongoing compliance with the CRD, the PRA
proposes to carry forward the BIPRU 12 rules that relate to
liquidity risk management and that transpose CRD
Article 86.(1)

5.22 Quantitative requirements should encompass liquidity
needs across all time horizons in severe but plausible stresses,
for all relevant risk drivers.

5.15 BIPRU 12 rules which remain relevant to the new regime
and which will therefore be carried forward include,
substantially, those relating to:
• the overall liquidity adequacy rule;
• liquidity risk management (ie those rules that implement
CRD Article 86);
• stress testing;
• ILAA; and
• asset encumbrance.

5.23 Qualitative requirements cover the need for robust
governance, strategies, policies, systems and processes,
transfer pricing, collateral management, funding
diversification, market access and funding plans, in order to
identify, measure, manage and monitor liquidity risk over
meaningful time horizons. All of these must be tailored to the
firm. Qualitative requirements also include the requirement
for firms to prepare a liquidity contingency plan, which should
be informed by the results of firms’ liquidity stress testing.

Proposals for rules to delete
5.16 The PRA is proposing to revoke the whole of BIPRU 12, as
explained in Chapter 1. Firms should note that this means, in
particular, that the following rules will cease to apply.

(1) CRD Article 86 (‘Liquidity risk’) requires that competent authorities ensure that firms
have in place ‘robust strategies, policies, processes and systems’ for managing their
liquidity risk, including in respect of several important specific aspects of liquidity risk
management, including stress testing and liquidity recovery plans.

CRD IV: Liquidity November 2014

Internal Liquidity Adequacy Assessment Process

Liquidity Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process

5.24 Firms are required to document their assessment of
overall liquidity adequacy and their compliance with the ILAA
rules. The document is referred to as the ILAAP document. It
serves two main purposes:

5.30 The L-SREP builds upon the process known as the PRA’s
Supervisory Liquidity Review Process under BIPRU 12, and is a
process consistent with the EBA SREP guidelines.

• it provides the management body with all qualitative and
quantitative information necessary to approve the risk
appetite,(1) including a description of the systems, processes
and methodologies for measuring and managing liquidity
risk; and

5.31 The draft supervisory statement in Appendix 1 provides
information on the PRA’s approach:
• to assessing whether firms have adequately covered their
risks (replacing sections of BIPRU 12.9 primarily, also 12.2
and 12.5);

• it provides a basis for the PRA’s supervisory assessment of
the firm’s overall approach to liquidity management.

• to setting additional liquidity requirements (replacing
BIPRU 12.5 and 12.9); and

Stress testing

• when firms fall below the level of quantitative individual
liquidity guidance (replacing sections of BIPRU 12.9).

5.25 Firms’ own stress testing remains the primary
quantitative component of the overall liquidity adequacy
assessment. Requirements and expectations are broadly
unchanged compared to BIPRU 12, however the PRA proposes
some changes with regard to risk drivers, set out below.
5.26 As explained in paragraph 5.18, there will no longer be a
standardised stress test of the type articulated in BIPRU 12.5.
The PRA proposes to move the rules requiring analysis of the
risk drivers from BIPRU 12.5 so that they sit within the
requirements for firms’ own stress tests. While BIPRU 12.5 will
cease to apply, the PRA views it as desirable to maintain the
granularity and common language that the risk drivers have
brought to the process of managing liquidity risk, and so this is
captured in the draft supervisory statement.
5.27 The complete list of risk drivers contained in the draft
supervisory statement combines the risk drivers listed in the
EBA SREP guidelines and some additional risk drivers listed in
the proposed rules. Firms should refer to the draft supervisory
statement for a full list of risk drivers and analyse whether
these are relevant to them. Firms should note that the PRA
has enhanced the suite of risk drivers in the proposed rules to
incorporate analysis of internalisation risk, where applicable to
the firm.(2)
5.28 Question: The PRA invites, in particular, comments on
the proposed risk driver on internalisation risk.

Asset encumbrance
5.29 The rule around the management of asset encumbrance
was recently added to BIPRU 12 and the rule will be carried
forward in substance.(3) The requirement on firms to identify,
monitor and manage the risks associated with asset
encumbrance to within reasonable parameters will therefore
continue to apply.

5.32 With regards to the last point, the information provided
in the draft supervisory statement will replace the information
in the PRA’s legacy supervisory statement SS4/13 ‘Liquidity
and capital regime for UK banks and building societies:
adjustments in relation to FPC statement’.(4) The information
on liquidity in SS4/13 is specific to the BIPRU 12 regime and
will cease to apply when BIPRU 12 is revoked.
5.33 As mentioned above, the proposed ILAA rules contained
in Appendix 2.A no longer specify the criteria of a standardised
stress test of the type articulated in BIPRU 12.5. In due course,
the PRA may undertake standardised stress tests to assess
risks not captured under the LCR, as a cross-check on the LCR
and to support cross-firm analysis.
5.34 The standardised stress tests will be based on the
LCR reporting templates and the AMMs, which may need to be
augmented with further reporting. The PRA will conduct a gap
analysis: additional data may be necessary.

Setting individual liquidity guidance
5.35 Following the L-SREP, the PRA will give firms liquidity
guidance, advising a firm of the amount and quality of liquid
assets which the PRA consider are appropriate, having regard
to the liquidity risk profile of the firm. The draft supervisory
(1) The PRA expects firms to articulate for themselves the amount of risk they are
willing to take across different business lines to achieve their strategic objectives.
This risk appetite should be consistent with the PRA’s objective, and the firm should
pay appropriate attention to identifying, measuring and controlling risks, including
those arising in unlikely but very severe scenarios. Please also see The Prudential
Regulation Authority’s approach to banking supervision, June 2014;
www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/praapproach/
bankingappr1406.pdf.
(2) Internationalisation risk occurs where firm or customer long positions are funded
using the proceeds from customer short trades. See paragraph 2.8(xiv) of the draft
supervisory statement for a detailed definition.
(3) PRA Policy Statement PS4/14, ‘Responses to CP5/14’, May 2014;
www.bankofengland.co.uk/pra/Documents/publications/ps/2014/ps414.pdf.
(4) PRA Supervisory Statement SS4/13, ‘Liquidity and capital regime for UK banks and
building societies: adjustments in relation to interim FPC statement’, April 2013;
www.bankofengland.co.uk/pra/Pages/publications/adjustmentstothepra.aspx.

CRD IV: Liquidity November 2014

statement outlines in more detail what a typical guidance
would contain.

5.39 Question: The PRA invites comments on its proposals in
relation to managing the HQLA buffer.

5.36 The PRA will review its proposed quantitative
assessment framework, including its interim Pillar 2 approach,
at a later date. This review will consider the PRA’s approach to
trapped liquidity between different group entities and
elements set out in the Delegated Act which require the PRA
to take specific actions.

Shari’ah-compliant firms

Managing HQLA buffers
5.37 Firms are reminded of their obligations to integrate fully
the operational requirements set out in Delegated Act
Article 8 in their liquidity and funding risk management when
managing their HQLA buffer.
5.38 These obligations are covered in more detail in the draft
supervisory statement. These cover in particular, but not only,
the ability to demonstrate that:
• The HQLA buffer is appropriately diversified to enable the
firm to monetise HQLAs in a short timeframe without
significant loss of value. Firms are expected to have
appropriate internal limits and controls in place to achieve
this.
• The currency denomination of assets is not an obstacle to
using assets when meeting outflows in a specific currency in
stress. To restrict currency mismatches, Delegated Act
Article 8(6) gives the PRA the option to set limits on the
proportion of net liquidity outflows in a currency that can be
met during stress by holding HQLAs not denominated in
that currency.
• When liquid assets are being held in the held-to-maturity
portfolio, this does not create barriers to a firm’s ability to
monetise these assets. Where appropriate, the PRA may ask
a firm to review its policies and procedures to ensure that it
retains full ability to monetise its HQLA buffer.

5.40 The Delegated Act contains a number of derogations
from the eligibility of assets within a firm’s liquidity buffer.
These derogations are only available to firms that are unable
for reasons of religious observance to hold interest-bearing
assets. The PRA expects that firms that currently qualify as
Shari’ah-compliant — as per the Glossary of definitions in the
PRA Handbook — would be eligible to benefit from these
derogations. The general and operational requirements stated
in Delegated Act Articles 7(6) and 8(6) may require these firms
to apply judgement in determining whether they meet these
requirements. The draft supervisory statement (Appendix 1)
sets out the PRA’s expectations in relation to these
requirements.

Pre-positioning
5.41 The PRA, in line with the wider Bank of England,
encourages participating firms to pre-position sufficient
eligible collateral with the Bank of England at all times, to
ensure they are able to draw under the Discount Window
Facility (DWF) quickly and smoothly should the need arise.
Firms are advised to pre-position eligible collateral at least a
day before a drawing. In particular, firms seeking to
pre-position loan collateral or own-name securitisations are
advised to do so well in advance, given the longer time
required to pre-position more complex assets.(1)
5.42 A firm can count assets pre-positioned at the Bank of
England to meet the PRA’s quantitative individual liquidity
guidance, if these assets are eligible for inclusion in the
HQLA buffer under the Delegated Act. If pre-positioned assets
are not eligible for inclusion in the HQLA buffer, they cannot
be used to meet the PRA’s quantitative liquidity guidance.

(1) Bank of England, ‘The Bank of England’s Sterling Monetary Framework’, updated
November 2014 (‘Red Book’), paragraphs 63 (ILTR) and 75 (DWF);
www.bankofengland.co.uk/markets/Documents/money/publications/redbook.pdf.

Section III:
EIements of the new regime not
covered by EU legislation

CRD IV: Liquidity November 2014

6 Investment firms
6.1 This chapter sets out the PRA’s proposed approach to the
treatment of UK-designated investment firms,(1) given that the
Delegated Act only applies to credit institutions.
6.2 The PRA currently requires that UK-designated
investment firms be subject to the same liquidity regime as
PRA-authorised credit institutions, on the basis that a wide
variety of business models can be adversely affected by the
same liquidity stress event (as demonstrated in the recent
financial crisis). CRR Article 412(5) provides Member States
with the discretion to apply national provisions for liquidity
requirements before binding standards are fully introduced in
the EU. CRR Articles 6(4) and 11(3) also provide Member
States with discretion to exempt investment firms from the
liquidity provisions of CRR Part 6.
6.3 CRR Article 508(2) mandates the European Commission
to report on whether and how the LCR should apply to
investment firms and following the submission of that report,
to submit a legislative proposal (if deemed appropriate).
Following the conclusion of the European Commission review,
the PRA will review the appropriateness of its proposed regime
for UK-designated investment firms.
6.4 The PRA assesses that there would be benefits in applying
the same liquidity regime to UK-designated investment firms
as for credit institutions. In particular, an identical liquidity
regime provides greater transparency over the availability of
liquidity resources across a mixed banking group, which in turn
supports more effective supervision by the PRA over these
groups for liquidity purposes. A cost benefit analysis of the
PRA’s proposed regime, including for UK-designated
investment firms, is presented in Chapter 9. The PRA notes
that, if the European Commission review results in a different
regime for investment firms, this may result in UK-designated
investment firms incurring costs in order to make the
transition to the new regime.
6.5 The proposed rules are contained in Appendix 2.C.

Proposals

societies. To achieve this outcome, the PRA proposes to make
a rule by which UK-designated investment firms will be
subject to the obligations stated in the Delegated Act, with
any necessary amendments, to bring their obligations fully
into line with those applying to UK banks and building
societies.

Level of application of the LCR for investment firms
6.7 The PRA proposes that PRA-designated investment firms
comply with the obligations laid down in the Delegated Act on
an individual and on a consolidated level in line with the
general level of application of the liquidity requirements in
CRR Part 6.
6.8 Where the PRA is the consolidating supervisor and the
consolidation group includes investment firms which may be
subject to different national liquid assets buffer requirements,
for the purpose of calculating the liquidity coverage ratio on a
consolidated basis, the definitions of liquid assets and the
outflow and inflow rates laid down in the Delegated Act
should be used.

Reporting of the LCR by investment firms
6.9 Under CRR Part 6, Title II (liquidity reporting),
UK-designated investment firms are required to report the
current COREP LCR return. The EBA is developing an updated
version of the COREP LCR template, in order to ensure
alignment between the provisions of the Delegated Act and
the reporting obligations stipulated in CRR Part 6, Title II.
6.10 However, this could result in UK-designated investment
firms being required to submit both the original and new
versions of the COREP LCR return.(2) The PRA is proposing in
this consultation to make rules which would avoid this
potential situation. If it is clarified at a later date that the new
LCR template will replace the original LCR template for
investment firms, these rules will not be necessary.
6.11 Specifically, the PRA proposes to exercise the discretions
contained in CRR Articles 6(4) and 11(3) to exempt
UK-designated investment firms from the application of

Application of the LCR to investment firms
6.6 As noted above, the Delegated Act will apply directly to
credit institutions. But it will not apply to investment firms.
The PRA proposes to set the same requirements for
UK-designated investment firms as for UK banks and building

(1) See footnote 3 on page 5 for a definition of UK-designated investment firms.
(2) The dual reporting requirement arises because, first, the provisions of CRR Part 6
Title II require that UK investment firms continue to report the original LCR template;
and second, because the PRA proposes that UK investment firms report against the
updated version of the COREP LCR template, as this will reflect the provisions of the
Delegated Act.

CRD IV: Liquidity November 2014

CRR Part 6, Title II (liquidity reporting) and Title III (reporting
on stable funding), and to make a rule requiring UK-designated
investment firms to submit the updated COREP LCR return as
well as the additional liquidity monitoring metrics and the
stable funding return. This will ensure that UK-designated
investment firms are held to only one set of COREP reporting
requirements (the updated version).

scale and complexity,(1) the PRA judges that it would be
proportionate to exempt these firms from the provisions of
CRR Part 6 Titles II and III, so that the PRA can apply a
requirement that these firms report the new COREP LCR
returns. The PRA would update the announcement made in
PRA CP05/13, in which the PRA stated its intention not to
apply the discretions contained in CRR Articles 6(4)
and 11(3).(2)

6.12 The PRA’s proposal to exercise the discretions contained
in CRR Articles 6(4) and 11(3) is based on a consideration of
the conditions contained in both Articles, namely that
competent authorities should take account of the ‘nature,
scale and complexity’ of the investment firms’ activities. On
the basis that the designation of investment firms for
regulation by the PRA involves a consideration of their nature,

6.13 The PRA’s proposal only applies in the context of the
PRA’s approach to setting a reporting requirement for
UK-designated investment firms under the LCR: it does not
impact on the wider CRR requirements as these apply to
investment firms.

(1) PRA Statement of Policy, ‘Designation of investment firms for prudential supervision
by the Prudential Regulation Authority’, March 2013;
www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/other/pra/designationofinvestm
entfirms.pdf.
(2) PRA Consultation Paper CP5/13, ‘Strengthening capital standards: implementing
CRD IV’, August 2013;
www.bankofengland.co.uk/pra/Documents/publications/cp/2013/cp513.pdf.

CRD IV: Liquidity November 2014

7 UK branches of third country firms
7.1 This chapter outlines the PRA’s proposed treatment of
UK branches of third country firms that are either banks or
designated investment firms (‘relevant third country firms’)
under the PRA’s new liquidity regime.
7.2 The CRR does not apply to relevant third country firms.
7.3 In September 2014, the PRA published its approach to the
supervision of branches of international banks (PS8/14(1) and
SS10/14)(2). Under this new approach, non-EEA branches that
fall outside the PRA’s risk appetite will not be allowed to
operate in the United Kingdom.(3) The proposed liquidity
regime for UK branches of non-EEA credit institutions is
aligned with this approach.

Proposals
7.4 The CRR does not apply to relevant third country firms.
As BIPRU 12 is revoked, its requirements (OLAR, for example)
will no longer apply to branches. However, the PRA proposes
that relevant third country firms with UK branches be subject
to a requirement to provide liquidity information on a
whole-firm basis.
7.5 The PRA proposes to treat UK branches of EEA banks or
designated investment firms that have their head office
outside the EU(4) in the same way as UK branches of relevant
third country firms. This will apply until the EEA Agreement
has been amended by the EEA Joint Committee with a view to
permitting simultaneous application of the CRR liquidity
standards in the EEA States (as explained in paragraph 1.9).
7.6 The proposed rules are contained in Appendix 2.D.

Reporting for UK branches of third country firms
7.7 The proposed liquidity regime in respect of UK branches of
relevant third country firms is intended to ensure that the
PRA has:
• assurance that the firm has adequate liquidity, consistent
with the PRA’s safety and soundness objective; and
• information on a firm’s liquidity which is broadly equivalent
to the information it receives on UK branches of EU firms
that fulfil the provisions of CRD Article 158(2).

7.8 The PRA proposes that all relevant third country firms
with UK branches that come within the PRA’s risk appetite be
required to submit liquidity data on a whole-firm basis. These
firms will be required to submit a subset of the COREP
liquidity reports, specifically the updated LCR template and
contractual maturity ladder return. The PRA will require firms
to submit this information in eXtensible Business Reporting
Language (XBRL) format, consistent with the format adopted
for the submission of the wider suite of COREP returns.
7.9 The PRA proposes that firms be required to submit these
returns on a monthly basis, and that firms report the specified
returns in a single, consolidated currency. PRA supervisors
may ask firms to provide a currency breakdown if they have
concerns over the convertibility of a specific currency that a
firm has material business in, or if the PRA’s supervisory
approach requires the firm to report against all of its material
currencies.
7.10 The PRA will consider applications on a case-by-case
basis, in relation to the following aspects of the reporting
requirement placed on relevant third country firms operating a
UK branch:
• Scope of liquidity information: firms may apply to submit
their liquidity information on a consolidated group basis,
rather than at the default whole-firm level, if they can
demonstrate to the PRA that their home state liquidity
requirements are set at a similar level.
• Frequency of liquidity reports: firms may apply to submit
their liquidity information on a less frequent basis than the
default monthly requirement. The PRA will take a range of
factors into account when making a final decision on any
individual application, including considering the firm’s
relative systemic importance and its liquidity risk profile.

(1) PRA Policy Statement PS8/14, ‘Supervising international banks: the Prudential
Regulation Authority’s approach to branch supervision’, September 2014;
www.bankofengland.co.uk/pra/Documents/publications/ps/2014/ps814.pdf.
(2) PRA Supervisory Statement SS10/14, ‘Supervising international banks: the Prudential
Regulation Authority’s approach to branch supervision’, September 2014;
www.bankofengland.co.uk/pra/Documents/publications/ss/2014/ss1014.pdf.
(3) Where the PRA would not be content with a firm operating as a branch in the
United Kingdom in view of its lack of home state equivalence and/or the level of
assurance over resolution, or where the PRA would not be content with a firm
undertaking critical economic functions while operating as a branch in the
United Kingdom.
(4) Namely, UK branches of third country firms that are either banks or designated
investment firms with their head office in Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway.

CRD IV: Liquidity November 2014

Firms wishing to apply for a specific permission to modify
these requirements should submit a formal application
through the PRA waiver process.

this interim period, firms that hold a WFLM will be required to
continue reporting their existing PRA regulatory returns.
Those firms that are currently required to meet the PRA’s
liquidity requirements at a branch level will continue to be
subject to this self-sufficiency requirement. The PRA expects
firms to re-apply for WFLMs if these expire during the
transition period.

7.11 The PRA expects the incremental costs of these proposals
to be low, and that they will be driven mainly by changes to
firms’ reporting systems. The majority of UK branches of
relevant third country firms currently opt out of
self-sufficiency (the default requirement under the PRA’s
current liquidity regime for both UK branches of EEA banks
and non-EEA banks). Instead these firms hold a WFLM, which
requires them to provide liquidity information on a whole-firm
basis. In this respect, the proposed new regime is not
significantly different to the current situation, in practice.
7.12 However, the incremental cost impact for relevant third
country firms may be greater than for PRA-regulated
UK incorporated firms, due to the costs associated with
creating data according to the LCR. Chapter 9 of this CP
contains more information on the cost benefit analysis of the
proposed regime for relevant third country firms with
UK branches.
7.13 The main benefit of the proposed regime is that it would
facilitate greater comparability of liquidity information across
firms supervised by the PRA, as the population of
PRA-regulated firms would be required to submit this
information through the designated COREP returns. This
would allow PRA supervisory teams to conduct a more
effective analysis in relation to a firm’s liquidity risk profile.
7.14 Question: The PRA invites feedback on the potential
costs involved in adjusting IT and reporting systems to meet
the proposed regime.

Transition period for reporting
7.15 Relevant third country firms with branches in the
United Kingdom should not be required to start reporting the
COREP LCR return and contractual maturity ladders at the
same time as firms which are directly subject to the CRR.
Instead, the PRA proposes to give relevant third country firms
a transition period during which to prepare the appropriate
reporting systems. This will apply unless the implementation
date for reporting for firms subject to the CRR is delayed. In

7.16 It is proposed that the transition regime will last for
six months from the date at which the LCR applies. After this
period, the PRA proposes that all relevant third country firms
with branches in the United Kingdom be required to start
reporting the updated LCR template and contractual maturity
ladder return, at whole-firm level. In addition, all such firms
would be required to continue reporting the regulatory returns
FSA047, FSA048, FSA051 and FSA053 in line with the PRA’s
proposals for credit institutions and UK-designated investment
firms detailed in Chapter 3.

Resolution planning
7.17 For a relevant third country firm to operate in the
United Kingdom as a branch, the PRA must have received
assurance over resolution, including the availability of liquidity
in recovery or resolution situations: this is in line with the
PRA’s approach to supervising UK branches of international
banks. The PRA’s standard approach to liquidity supervision of
UK branches of relevant third country firms is therefore to
obtain whole entity liquidity information, and not to require
the relevant third country firms to hold liquidity in their
UK branches.
7.18 However, as the PRA implements its approach to the
supervision of branches of international banks, there may be
instances during the transition stage where there are material
concerns over the level of assurance the PRA has gained from
the home state supervisor over resolution or their liquidity
regime. Even when the approach is fully implemented,
assurance over resolution can change over time. In these
circumstances, the PRA will consider using its powers to
require relevant third country firms to hold liquidity resources
in their UK branch until an appropriate level of assurance is
received. The PRA expects this to be the exception rather than
the norm. It will assess this on a case-by-case basis.

CRD IV: Liquidity November 2014

8 LCR disclosure
8.1 This chapter outlines the PRA’s proposals with regards to
disclosure requirements relating to the LCR.

increase the effectiveness of market discipline and support the
PRA’s safety and soundness objective and financial stability.

8.2 The BCBS published an LCR disclosure template in
January 2014.(1) These standards have not been implemented
through CRD IV. The BCBS proposed an implementation date
of 1 January 2015, although this was based on the LCR being
adopted as a regulatory requirement on the same date. The
LCR will only come into effect on 1 October 2015 in the EU.

8.5 However, disclosures enabling market participants to
deduce the use of Bank of England liquidity assistance may
make that assistance less effective and harm the financial
system and the broader economy by undermining confidence.
This is particularly the case if published information frustrates
liquidity assistance being disclosed in an orderly way. These
consequences could threaten the PRA's safety and soundness
objective and be a cause of financial instability.

8.3 An EBA working group is currently in the process of
designing revised COREP templates for reporting the LCR as it
is specified in the Delegated Act.(2) There is a number of
places where definitions are not yet fully standardised. It is
only when firms start reporting their LCR according to the
revised COREP templates that the PRA can begin to have
some assurance that any LCR figures firms choose to disclose
will be calculated using standardised definitions and
calculation methods. Any earlier disclosure would be based on
firms’ own definitions and calculations. This would achieve
neither transparency nor comparability. This position is
consistent with the recommendations of the Enhanced
Disclosure Task Force,(3) which has cautioned about premature
disclosure of new regulatory ratios where important elements
of regulation remain subject to change.
8.4 Providing the disclosures set out in the BCBS template
ought to enable market participants to make better
assessments about the liquidity risk management of firms. It
ought, too, to facilitate peer group comparison. As a result,
firms' transparency will be increased. That may in turn

Proposals
8.6 The PRA recognises that investors expect firms to disclose
some information regarding their performance against
forthcoming regulatory standards, during the period of
transition to these standards. The PRA will not set a disclosure
requirement before the LCR is in effect as a regulatory
requirement, supported by appropriate and reliable
supervisory reporting, in October 2015. For year-end 2014
reporting, and until the PRA has made a decision, firms should
provide a qualitative discussion of how they plan to meet the
LCR.
8.7 Should firms choose to disclose information about their
LCRs, the PRA expects them not to disclose information that
could lead to premature disclosure of covert liquidity
assistance, unless compliance with their legal obligations with
regard to disclosure makes such disclosure unavoidable.

(1) BCBS, ‘Liquidity Coverage Ratio disclosure standards’, January 2014;
www.bis.org/publ/bcbs272.pdf.
(2) The Bank is party to this working group.
(3) Enhanced Disclosure Taskforce, ‘Enhancing the Risk Disclosure of Banks’, 29 October
2012, pages 10 (Recommendation 4) and 31:
www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_121029.pdf.

Section IV:
Cost benefit analysis

CRD IV: Liquidity November 2014

9 Cost benefit analysis
9.1 This chapter sets out an analysis of the costs and benefits
of introducing the proposed update to the liquidity regime in
the United Kingdom. This includes evaluating the policy
choices proposed in regard of the national discretions
permitted under the Delegated Act, and further proposals not
covered under the new EU legislation. All numerical
estimates are indicative as they are subject to substantial
uncertainty and highly sensitive to the underlying
assumptions.
9.2 A detailed exposition of the benefits of quantitative
liquidity regulation is available in the EBA’s December 2013
Report(1) and the FSA’s 2007 Discussion Paper.(2) This section
is largely based on the key findings from both papers. It also
draws from the PRA’s 2013 Approach to Banking Supervision
document (‘the approach document’).(3)

1 Analysis of market and regulatory failures
being addressed
What are the market and regulatory failures being
addressed?
9.3 Prudential regulation helps to address market failures that
prevail in the banking industry. The approach document
identifies the following broad categories:
• Information asymmetries mean that firms can
underestimate the cost associated with liquidity stress and
have inadequate liquidity risk management. These
information asymmetries arise because liquidity risk is a
complex area: assessing it requires technical expertise and
access to a wide range of detailed, sensitive data. To some
extent, the problem of information asymmetries arises for
any corporate where ownership and control are separate.
But it is particularly acute in the area of banks’ liquidity
management, due to the opacity of banks’ balance sheets
and the particular challenges of assessing liquidity risk. Even
when data are available, it is very difficult to assess liquidity
risk using statistical techniques, as liquidity crises are low
probability, high impact events.
• A separate collective action problem stems from the
difficulty of ascertaining the liquidity position of a firm.
Investors and depositors may not be able to price a firm’s
liquidity risk correctly, and in a competitive environment
this provides an incentive to underprice the risk: once one

firm has started underpricing, there is no incentive for other
firms to price correctly.
• Information asymmetries are exacerbated by collective
action problems among depositors: all depositors in a
bank might withdraw their deposits at the same time, only
because they all expect other depositors to do the same.
The fear of a bank run is enough to generate a bank run.(4)
• Deposit guarantees and central bank facilities exist to
mitigate this problem. But in turn this generates moral
hazard, as the availability of these guarantees and facilities
reduces firms’ incentives to manage their liquidity risk
prudently.

What are the consequences of these failures?
9.4 The above failures and externalities make banks more
vulnerable to individual or market-wide liquidity stresses (eg a
run on their deposits, or a closure of wholesale markets). In
such situations, they are more likely to resort to asset ‘fire
sales’ — offloading a substantial amount of assets to raise
cash at short notice. This can put downward pressure on the
price of the sold assets to such a degree that firms are unable
to cover their outflows, raising the risk of an individual
institution failing.
9.5 Increased vulnerability at one institution may have
systemic implications: first, asset fire sales increase the risk of
liquidity stress at other institutions as the price of all similar
assets are affected, reducing the ability of other firms to raise
cash from their liquid asset holdings; and second, because loss
of confidence in one institution may quickly spread to others.
9.6 The cost of solving liquidity stresses may be shifted to
public balance sheets, either through the extension of
emergency liquidity assistance, or through injections of capital
to vulnerable institutions.
(1) EBA (2013), ‘Report on impact assessment for liquidity measures under Article 509(1)
of the CRR’, 20 December, page 24;
www.eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/16145/EBA+BS+2013+415+Report+regarding
+LCR+impact.pdf.
(2) FSA Discussion Paper 07/7, ‘Review of the liquidity requirements for banks and
building societies’, December 2007, pages 16–20;
www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/discussion/dp07_07.pdf.
(3) The Prudential Regulation Authority’s approach to banking supervision, June 2014,
Box 3, page 12; www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/praapproach/
bankingappr1406.pdf.
(4) Douglas, W and Diamond, F (2007), ‘Banks and Liquidity Creation: A Simple
Exposition of the Diamond-Dybvig Model’, Richmond Economic Quarterly, Spring,
Vol. 93, No. 2, pages 189–200; www.rich.frb.org/publications/research/
economic_quarterly/2007/spring/pdf/diamond.pdf.

CRD IV: Liquidity November 2014

What are the benefits of the new legislation and the
proposed transition?

National discretion to retain existing quantitative
requirements

9.7 The purpose of the new legislation is to ensure that
individual firms internalise the true cost of liquidity risk,
thereby reducing the likelihood of individual failure, of
contagion to other firms, and of these private costs being
borne by public balance sheets. The LCR will also enable a
bank to survive a stress period for a few weeks: this provides
authorities time to assess the situation and prepare an
appropriate reaction.

9.13 The PRA proposes to revoke the existing liquidity
standards in BIPRU 12 and withdraw firm-specific guidance
contained in firms’ ILGs when the LCR comes into effect
(although individual add-ons will continue to apply, as
detailed in paragraphs 2.11 to 2.13). However, the PRA
proposes to continue with parts of the existing liquidity
reporting until the transition to new reporting requirements is
complete. This will act as a check for supervisors and firms to
ensure that the new regime is adequately capturing all
significant liquidity risks. However, there may be additional
risks and costs from running dual reporting for some time.

9.8 The proposed transition ensures that the new
requirements imposed on firms do not represent a significant
weakening of banks’ existing standards of liquidity risk
management through the adjustment period. The gradual
nature of the transition path will also allow firms more
flexibility in adjusting their balance sheet structures and
liquidity risk management to the new standard.

2 Scope
9.9 The scope of the proposals includes all UK banks, building
societies and UK-designated investment firms. Firms in these
categories will be required to maintain levels of liquidity
buffers that enable them to meet their liabilities, including in
periods of stress. Firms will be required to comply with the
new regulatory requirements at an individual level, and at a
consolidated level where appropriate.

National discretion to set the transition path up to
LCR of 100% in 2018
9.14 The PRA proposes to set an initial LCR level of 80% in
2015 and 2016 and 90% in 2017. It would then reach 100% in
2018 as required in the CRR. However, CRR Article 460 allows
for the transition path to start at 60% (Chart 1). Chapter 2
explains why the PRA is proposing a faster transition path.
Chart 1 PRA transition path compared to CRR transition
path(a)
PRA transition (modelled)
PRA requirement

CRR transition (modelled)
CRR requirement
Per cent

100
95
90

9.10 Chapter 7 explains the PRA’s proposals for both the
transitional and end-state liquidity regime that will apply to
third country firms in relation to their UK branches when the
LCR comes into effect.

85
80
75
70
65

3 Estimating the costs of the discretionary
elements
9.11 The CP focuses on three areas where the PRA has
national discretion. This section considers the potential costs
of each of these in turn.

60
55
LCR comes into effect (October 2015)
2015

50
0

Sources: Bank of England and CRR.
(a) The solid lines represent the CRR legal requirement and the proposed PRA transition path.
The dashed lines represent the assumption made in this assessment regarding how banks will
effect the transition in practice: namely that banks will adjust linearly to achieve the binding
requirement on 1 January of each year.

National discretion to set Pillar 2 requirements
9.12 The PRA proposes to set required amounts of Pillar 2
buffers at a level that reflects material risks not covered by the
LCR — but captured in the current BIPRU 12 regime. As
explained in Chapter 2, the PRA intends to carry across the
relevant add-ons at their current nominal values for each
individual firm. As a result, the proposed transition for Pillar 2
will not involve any extra requirements on firms. As such, an
impact analysis is not required.

9.15 This section analyses the costs and benefits of the
proposal. It is structured as follows: it details the rationale
behind the selection of a baseline scenario to assess the
impact of the LCR and the transition period. It then describes
the data used, including uncertainties about the chosen data.
Next, it evaluates likely adjustment strategies at
individual-bank level. Results are then aggregated to the
UK industry level. Finally, this section evaluates the
macroeconomic costs arising from the adjustment, and
highlights potential sources of overestimation or
underestimation of costs.

CRD IV: Liquidity November 2014

The policy baseline scenario
9.16 A baseline scenario is designed as the best possible
projection of the macroeconomic and financial conjuncture,
absent the proposed regulation or policy action. The baseline
serves as a primary point of comparison for all proposed policy
actions.
9.17 The following two counterfactual, hypothetical paths are
used to assess the benefits and costs of the proposed
transition path:
i.

a ‘no change’ scenario, where it is assumed that the
current BIPRU 12 regime continues to apply as before and
that the PRA would not apply the LCR. Although not
applying the LCR is legally not an option, this provides an
obvious starting point; or

ii.

a ‘CRR path’ scenario, where the PRA applies the lowest
possible transition path allowed by the CRR.

9.18 It would be preferable to assess the costs and benefits of
the proposed changes to a single counterfactual scenario. In
this case, the obvious comparison would be to the CRR path.
However, the CRR path starts at 60% LCR, a level much below
the current average LCR of UK firms. So to use this as the
starting point would imply loosening liquidity requirements for
all UK firms in the early stages of the transition.
9.19 In addition, CRR Article 415(3) allows competent
authorities to keep their own liquidity requirements in place
until the end of the LCR transition period (1 January 2018).
This means that it is appropriate for the PRA to consider the
current UK regime as one valid alternative, for the period of
time where the regime is stricter than the proposed CRR
transition path.
9.20 The cost of the adjustment from the current regime to
the minimum adjustment path allowed in the CRR (the
compulsory element) is evaluated first. The incremental cost
over and above the CRR minimum path of the faster
adjustment path proposed in this CP (the discretionary
element) is evaluated in a second step.
9.21 The existing UK liquidity regime means that most firms
are already holding liquid assets well above the 60% threshold
prescribed by the CRR for 2015. To reflect this, the PRA
proposes a transitional path more in line with the level of
liquid assets UK firms already hold. This transitional path will
contribute to a swifter transition to the LCR and ensure that
all firms continue to hold strong liquidity buffers to face
adverse liquidity shocks, until the transition period is
complete.
9.22 In addition, while there are ongoing costs to maintaining
an existing liquidity buffer, these are lower than the costs of

building up such a buffer in the first place. By contrast, the
benefits of holding a liquidity buffer are identical regardless of
whether the buffer is new or pre-existing. So the PRA’s
proposed transition path — compared to the CRR path — will
ensure that firms do not incur additional costs from having to
rebuild liquidity buffers after a period where looser
requirements applied (which would be the case if the PRA
were to follow the CRR transition path).
9.23 As mentioned in paragraph 1.8, the Delegated Act only
applies to credit institutions. To ensure a consistent approach
to liquidity supervision between UK banks and building
societies and UK-designated investment firms, the PRA
proposes to make a rule which will require UK-designated
investment firms to comply with the obligations laid down in
the Delegated Act. This means that investment firms will be
undergoing the same transition as credit institutions from
BIPRU 12 to LCR. Therefore, the baseline scenarios proposed
here also apply to investment firms.

Data, and dealing with the risk of sample bias
9.24 The simulation is based on data for 80 firms, including
some investment firms. However, the new rules will apply to
just over 200 firms. This means there is a risk that the sample
is not sufficiently representative of the full population of firms.
The following paragraphs explain why the assessment is based
on a restricted sample, and discuss how data from alternative
samples help mitigate concerns about the risk of sample bias.
9.25 The quantitative assessment undertaken for this paper
uses data provided on a voluntary and best-efforts basis by
80 firms, in the context of the Basel Quantitative Impact
study (QIS) undertaken in September 2013. These data are
provided based on the Basel definition of the LCR, and do not
reflect the EU definition agreed in the Delegated Act.(1) It is
likely that the potential HQLA shortfall is overestimated in
this analysis, owing to these differences. In order to improve
the coverage of firms, an alternative would be to use the data
currently reported by UK firms subject to the current regime
and attempt to map this to the EU definition of the LCR.
However, this mapping would be too unreliable and unsuitable
for this impact assessment.
9.26 The 80-firm sample shows a high level of compliance
with the proposed LCR. More than 97% of the firms in the
sample already comply with the initial combined Pillar 1 and
Pillar 2 requirements and just over 12% will need to increase
their LCR through the transition to comply with the end-point
requirement. In addition, the 80-firm sample does not show a
(1) To adjust for the particularities of some domestic banking systems, the Delegated
Act allows a wider range of assets to be eligible for the LCR calculation compared to
the Basel definition. It also includes some additional adjustments on the calculation
of net outflows. However, the impact of these differences depends on each bank’s
business model. The data necessary to undertake a full comparison of the LCR based
on the Basel III definition versus the Delegated Act definition are not yet available.

CRD IV: Liquidity November 2014

significant impact on those business models identified by the
EBA as more vulnerable.(1) However, given the partial
coverage of the population of firms that will be subject to the
LCR there is a risk that the business models in the 80-firm
sample are not sufficiently representative of the whole
population.

proportion of short-term intra-financial sector loans and
short-term wholesale funding. A related study by the EBA
found that European banks followed a variety of strategies to
maintain the same balance sheet size.(3) These include:

9.27 Updates of these voluntary data are only used to assess
progress over the period for the banks that report in both
periods: they are not used as the basis for the actual
calculations, owing to smaller sample sizes. In an update of
the QIS with data as at December 2013, the majority of firms
previously recorded as having an LCR below 100% in
September improved their LCR in December. A further
voluntary data sample from June 2014 shows that those banks
with shortfalls in 2013 have continued to make progress to
comply with either the transition path or the end-point
requirement. However, these more recent samples are smaller
and are therefore not entirely comparable with the
September 2013 sample.

Evaluating the cost to firms — micro impact assessment
9.28 This section estimates the private costs to firms of
adjusting their liquidity positions to the PRA’s proposed LCR
transition path, compared to the baseline scenarios outlined
above. The PRA assessed first the costs to banks of adjusting
from the counterfactual scenario (where firms are assumed to
remain on the current regime) to the CRR minimum transition
path (the compulsory element). The PRA subsequently
assessed the incremental cost to firms transitioning to the
slightly faster transition path proposed by the PRA (the
discretionary element).
9.29 Most firms that provided data on a voluntary basis in the
September 2013 QIS met an 80% LCR level already. As a
result, the impact of a transition to 80% LCR in 2015 is small.
9.30 Improvements in LCR positions apparent in the
December 2013 QIS data suggest that banks may be following
a faster transition path than that proposed by the PRA. This
may have been prompted by market and peer pressure to
demonstrate compliance with the forthcoming LCR regulatory
requirement. However, it is not possible to know with
certainty whether this trend will continue. Therefore, it is
assumed here that banks follow the proposed regulatory
transitional path (modelled as per the dashed lines shown in
Chart 1).
9.31 A study by the Bank of England and the Bank for
International Settlements (BIS) of the transition by UK banks
to the BIPRU 12 regime showed that, in response, banks
adjusted both their asset and liability structures, with no
overall impact on balance sheet size.(2) This study found that
UK banks increased the proportion of HQLAs and funding from
more stable non-financial deposits while reducing the

replacing non-HQLA assets with HQLAs;

ii.

adjusting liabilities only — reducing short-term unstable
funding and increasing long-term funding; or

iii. adjusting the structure of both their assets and liabilities.
The EBA study found that a combination of strategies could
substantially reduce a bank’s adjustment costs.
9.32 Consistent with these two studies, it is assumed that
firms close their shortfall through pursuing a mixed strategy:
it is assumed that firms replace some non-HQLAs with a
mixed portfolio of HQLAs, and that they replace short-term
intra-financial sector funding with longer-term deposits. Both
elements of this strategy contribute equally to reducing firms’
HQLA shortfall. This adjustment strategy might lead to a
conservative estimate as banks might implement other
adjustment strategies at a lower cost (as shown in the EBA
LCR impact assessment), for example by reducing outflows or
by increasing inflows.
9.33 Historical international data on spreads from 2004 to
2012(4) are used to estimate the cost of replacing non-liquid
assets with liquid assets. The higher the quality of an asset,
the lower its yield tends to be: therefore, spreads between
HQLAs and non-HQLAs are usually negative. In particular, in
the data used here, spreads between Level 1 HQLAs and
non-HQLAs range from -400 basis points to -170 basis points.
The maximum observed range of spreads for the HQLA
portfolio is applied in the scenario calculations. For the
liability side it is assumed that firms replace interbank deposits
due within one month (and therefore attracting a 100%
outflow rate), with retail deposits that attract only a 5%
outflow rate in the LCR calculation. Based on historical
averages, it is assumed that this switch costs on average
200 basis points.(5)

(1) EBA, ‘Report on impact assessment for liquidity measures under Article 509(1) of the
CRR’, 20 December 2013, page 12;
www.eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/16145/EBA+BS+2013+415+Report+regarding
+LCR+impact.pdf. In the EU as a whole a greater proportion of European banks from
these categories appears to be affected by larger LCR shortfalls.
(2) Banerjee, R and Mio, H (2014), ‘The impact of liquidity regulation on banks’,
BIS Working Paper No 470; www.bis.org/publ/work470.pdf.
(3) See footnote 1 above.
(4) From Bloomberg and other market data providers; spreads were calculated from
average yields to maturity of Bank of America/Merrill Lynch bonds indices for each
asset category.
(5) Ibid. This spread is an historical average calculated from several studies of European
banks’ data on the cost of terming out debt.

CRD IV: Liquidity November 2014

9.34 UK firms are currently close to compliance with an 80%
LCR. If firms maintain current levels of liquidity the proposed
PRA adjustment path will provide them with time to assess a
range of options to either reduce outflows, increase inflows, or
substitute non-HQLAs with HQLAs. By contrast, the CRR
minimum path would take longer to bind, requiring firms to
increase their buffers only from 2016.
9.35 The expected private cost to firms of reaching 100% LCR
is the same under any transitional path, for given spreads
between HQLAs and non-HQLAs, and given the same cost of
adjustment the maturity of liabilities. However, the actual
private cost to firms of adjusting over a longer transition
period may be lower, if the transition gives firms more
flexibility to choose alternative cost-effective adjustment
strategies.

Chart 2 Cost pass through (per pound lent) under
CRR and PRA transition paths
Cost per unit of credit (basis points)
3.0

2.5
PRA

2.0

1.5
CRR

1.0

0.5

0.0
Q4
2015

Q3
16

Q3
17

Q1
18

Q1
19

Sources: Bank of England and CRR.

Evaluating the macroeconomic impact
9.36 The macroeconomic impact assumes that banks pass on
to their customers the incremental cost of substituting
non-HQLAs with HQLAs and of replacing short-term
wholesale funding with deposits. It is assumed that the
average unit cost of bank credit rises in line with the cost of
the adjustment strategy outlined. Bank of England banking
sector data for 2013 Q4(1) are used to estimate the amount of
deposits and the total portfolio of loans and other facilities for
UK-resident and overseas customers.(2) Based on these data, it
is estimated that the proportion of loans available for repricing
each quarter is 7.2% of the overall amount of loans
outstanding.
9.37 The ability of banks to pass through those private costs
to their customers might vary depending on the market they
operate in. It is assumed that European banks are largely
compliant with the 60% LCR starting requirement and
dominate European markets: this limits UK firms’ ability to
re-price loans in these markets. It is therefore assumed that
UK firms re-price loans in those markets according to the CRR
minimum transition path described in Chart 1.
9.38 Chart 2 shows the incremental cost of credit using a
linear interpolation (as shown in Chart 1). The relatively small
amount of loans that can be re-priced initially generates
relatively higher pass through in the PRA path. Note that the
scale of the adjustment (in basis points) is very small.
These estimates are in line with those of the EBA LCR
impact assessment.
9.39 The macroeconomic costs of the proposed transition
path arise from the reduced provision of credit and its higher
cost. For consistency with the analysis conducted to evaluate
the costs and benefits of CRD IV,(3) the PRA use the NiGEM
model to evaluate these costs, per unit of credit.(4) The cost
estimates shown in Chart 2 suggest that the costs are
negligible or small and fall within the model’s margin of error.

In the PRA transition path the fall in the level of credit occurs
earlier that in the CRR transition path, but by the end the total
impact on the level of credit is the same in both cases. The
overall level of credit falls by just under 0.18% in both
transition paths compared with the hypothetical baseline of
no LCR transition.
9.40 This very modest impact is in line with the results of the
EBA impact assessment for the United Kingdom. By the end of
the transition, the level of real GDP falls by 0.003% and
0.005% in the CRR and PRA paths respectively, driven by the
higher cost of credit to households and businesses. In the long
run, the higher cost of investment leads to a permanently
lower level of physical capital, and a permanent reduction in
the level of GDP, compared to the hypothetical baseline of no
LCR transition. The initial, short-run fall in real GDP growth is
counterbalanced by a fall in inflation: this reduces Bank rate,
under the assumption that the inflation target remains
unchanged. Therefore, in the long run, the impact on real GDP
growth is negligible.
9.41 Finally, the macroeconomic benefits of the proposed
transition path stem from a higher level of liquidity in the
banking sector, with a positive impact on financial stability
through mitigating the market and regulatory failures
described at the start of the chapter. Here the probability of a
crisis falls by 0.6 basis points in the long run in both
(1) Bank of England M4 and M4 lending, and monetary financial institutions
consolidated balance sheet.
(2) Some studies find that the price of non-financial loans did not respond to the
UK liquidity regulations imposed during the financial crisis (see Banerjee and
Mio (2014)). Given of the international scope of LCR, its proposed application to
both credit institutions and investment firms, and the stronger growth of
non-financial loans compared to when the Banerjee and Mio study was undertaken,
this assessment assumes that banks will recover some of the private costs from their
customers.
(3) PRA Consultation Paper CP5/13, ‘Strengthening capital standards: implementing
CRD IV’, August 2013, Chapter 5;
www.bankofengland.co.uk/pra/Documents/publications/cp/2013/cp513.pdf.
(4) FSA Occasional Paper Series No. 42, ‘Measuring the impact of prudential policy on the
macroeconomy’, May 2012; www.fsa.gov.uk/static/pubs/occpapers/op42.pdf.

CRD IV: Liquidity November 2014

scenarios.(1) In the case of the PRA path, the maximum
incremental effect on financial stability is reached by the end
of 2015, while in the case of the CRR path this maximum
effect occurs later.

Potential sources of underestimation

Potential sources of underestimation or overestimation
of costs
9.42 In designing the scenarios, a number of assumptions
have been made which could result in overestimating the
likely cost of the proposed transition path. Other assumptions
may result in underestimating these costs.

Potential sources of overestimation of the costs of the
transition path
9.43 There are a number of assumptions which could make
the assessment carried out above too conservative.
• As mentioned above, the data used to perform this
assessment are based on the Basel definition of the LCR. It
is likely that this results in overestimating firms’ HQLA
shortfall.
• It is assumed that banks adjust to the LCR transition path
partly by replacing some non-liquid assets with
lower-yielding, liquid assets eligible for the LCR. This is the
most expensive adjustment strategy. That said, it was
estimated in the EBA’s impact assessment report that
increasing HQLA holdings was the principal strategy
adopted by firms adjusting to the new standard.(2)
• HQLAs generally carry lower capital risk weights than
non-HQLAs. Therefore, all else equal, firms increasing their
holdings of HQLAs will see their capital ratios rise, which
should reduce their overall funding costs. Funding costs are
also positively impacted by higher investor confidence in
firms which are demonstrating higher levels of liquidity and
better liquidity risk management.
• Given the small size of the shortfall and the diverse level of
compliance to the LCR by European firms, there are
uncertainties about how much competitive constraints bind
on UK firms when repricing loans to overseas customers
(ie in markets where UK firms are likely to be competing
with European firms). The assumption made in
paragraph 9.37 is therefore conservative.
• It is assumed that the size of banks’ loan portfolios remains
constant, and that new lending is generated through ‘churn’
(existing loans are renewed when they mature). Firms
recover the cost of the transition path by repricing these
new loans. However, if loan portfolios were to expand
during the transition period, the costs of the transition to
LCR would be spread out more widely, and therefore
represent a smaller increase per unit of lending.

9.44 The following assumptions may result in
underestimating the cost of the transition to LCR.
• Firms might adjust more quickly than required by the PRA,
particularly if there is market or peer pressure to
demonstrate an ability to meet the steady-state LCR
minimum requirement of 100% much sooner than 2018.
A faster adjustment may be more costly: for example, if
firms attempt to lengthen the term of existing sight deposits
over a shorter period of time, they may be forced to seek
types of funding that attract higher outflow rates (in the
LCR calculation) than term retail deposits. However, the
pressure from markets to adjust more quickly is not a direct
response to the LCR transition path being proposed by the
PRA.
• The effect of many banks in many different countries
adjusting to the LCR standard will be to increase the
demand for assets eligible as HQLAs. This could push up the
price of such assets, reducing their yield. That could make
the adjustment from higher-yielding assets to HQLAs more
costly than estimated here. However, increasing the
proportion of HQLAs is one of several possible adjustment
strategies: banks can be expected to choose a combination
of strategies which they deem to be most cost-effective. If
the price of HQLAs was to increase markedly, banks would
adjust strategies accordingly. In addition, the proposed
transition path is spread out over three years, making it less
likely to cause a sudden sharp increase in demand for
HQLAs.

4 Additional compliance costs
9.45 In addition to the costs considered above, firms will need
to adapt their systems to report the required data items
relating to the calculation of the LCR. They will also need to
devote management time to implement the changes, and
ensure staff are adequately trained to manage liquidity risk
reporting under the new regime. UK branches of third country
firms will have to report the LCR of the firm or group they are
legally part of.
9.46 To estimate the incremental compliance costs of the
new regulatory reporting requirements, the PRA used
information from a survey of firms asked to estimate the cost
of COREP and FINREP.(3)

(1) Ibid. This assessment consider only the marginal benefits of liquidity above those
benefits from the current United Kingdom and other elements of CRR and CRD IV
eg capital regulation.
(2) EBA (2013), ‘Report on impact assessment for liquidity measures under Article 509(1)
of the CRR’, 20 December, page 35;
www.eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/16145/EBA+BS+2013+415+Report+regarding
+LCR+impact.pdf.
(3) FSA Consultation Paper CP09/13, ‘Strengthening liquidity standards 2: liquidity
reporting’, April 2009, pages 32–33; www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/cp/cp09_13.pdf.

CRD IV: Liquidity November 2014

9.47 The PRA has extrapolated the above costs to the entire
set of affected firms and across firm types and sizes (Table B).
There are approximately 200 UK banks and building societies
already reporting the LCR through COREP, for which the PRA
has estimated that total ongoing costs will be £36 million,
with a one-off cost of up to £46 million for updating the
systems and filling the new regulatory returns. The nine
investment firms already reporting the LCR are expected to
incur an ongoing cost of £1 million and a one-off cost of
£0.2 million. The PRA estimates that the 23 non-EEA groups
or firms with a branch in the United Kingdom and already
reporting COREP will incur ongoing costs of up to £4 million
and a one-off cost of up to £9 million. And it estimates that
the 42 groups or firms not reporting the LCR and with a
branch in the United Kingdom will incur total ongoing costs of
£8 million and one-off costs of £18 million.
Table B Costs to firms of reporting the LCR
Total one-off
costs (£ millions)

Total ongoing
costs (£ millions)

Firms included in the scope of the CRR for
liquidity reporting

Banks

Building societies
Additional firms required by the PRA to report the LCR
Investment firms

27.2

0.2

Non-EEA groups or firms with a branch in the United Kingdom
and where another entity reports already the LCR

Non-EEA groups or firms with a branch in the United Kingdom
and where no other entity reports the LCR

73.2

Total

9.48 The PRA does not expect the new regulation to
significantly raise or reduce the costs of entering the
UK banking sector. UK firms are already subject to liquidity
regulation: new entrants already incur costs from setting up
both a compliant liquidity risk management strategy and
adequate reporting.
9.49 The PRA estimates that the additional compliance costs
on smaller firms of the LCR reporting requirements will be
proportionally lower than that of other larger firms because of
the smaller scope of activities conducted by these firms.

5 Effects on competition
9.50 The PRA judges that, overall, there is no material impact
on competition from the PRA’s proposals.
9.51 The proposals in this CP allow for uniform treatment of
all firms with regards to Pillar 1 requirements, thus meeting
both PRA objectives. The proposed transition path for Pillar 2
requirements set out in Chapter 2 of this document reflects a
bank-by-bank approach, and sets specific liquidity risk
management requirements proportional to each firm’s risk

profile. Nonetheless, the PRA will aim to ensure consistency
in its application of the Pillar 2 regime.
9.52 The markets in which the population of affected firms
operate cover products most closely associated with the credit
intermediation process, including: deposit-taking, retail and
wholesale lending, and interbank lending. However, the
affected firms also operate in a number of other markets for
similar or complementary products such as: venture
capital/private equity, securitisation, repurchase agreements,
securities lending and borrowing, over the counter derivatives
and asset management. The PRA has not considered a strict
definition of markets in this discussion. A more complete
definition should consider products that perform very similar
functions whether currently used for this purpose or not
(‘imperfect substitutes’), and consider those firms not
currently in the market that could supply these products.
9.53 Non-banks are not captured under the scope of the
regulation and are included in this empirical assessment.
However banks compete successfully with non-banks in
certain markets. Given the negligible private costs that the
banking industry will incur when complying with the LCR in
the United Kingdom, it is not expected that competition with
non-banks will have any additional impact.
9.54 Non-UK firms will also need to comply with 100% LCR
by 2018. However, their chosen transition paths may be
different to that chosen by the United Kingdom. In the
United States, firms are expected to be compliant with a
100% LCR (on the US definition) by 1 January 2017 — a faster
transition path than that proposed by the PRA in this CP.
Similarly, Belgium requires compliance with a 100% LCR level
from 1 January 2015, and the Netherlands from October 2015.
Germany on the other hand, is setting an LCR minimum of
60% in 2015. The variety of transition paths chosen by other
countries, including other EU Member States, indicates that
the United Kingdom is not an outlier and suggests that the
effects of the PRA’s transition path on competition with
non-UK firms will be limited in aggregate.
9.55 The PRA is required to consider the competition impact
on UK firms, compared to operating in jurisdictions which do
not apply any form of liquidity regulation. However, all
members of BCBS are implementing the LCR. The BCBS is
currently reviewing members’ progress with implementation
through its Regulatory Consistency Assessment Program
(RCAP).(1)
9.56 Because the transition is binding on a subset of firms
only, those firms might resort to strategies that affect their
business models (for example, by reducing short-term
(1) BCBS, ‘Basel III Consistency Assessment Programme (RCAP)’, October 2013;
www.bis.org/publ/bcbs264.pdf.

outflows and increasing short-term inflows). This could have
unpredictable impacts on competition, but given the shortfalls
are small any impact related to such a change is likely to be
small too.

6 Impact on Shari’ah-compliant firms
9.57 Delegated Act Article 12(1)(f) allows firms which are
unable to hold interest-bearing assets for reasons of religious
observance to include non-interest bearing assets in their
liquidity buffer, provided these assets meet certain criteria.
9.58 The PRA expects that firms that meet the current
definition of Shari’ah-compliant will be eligible for this
treatment. The categories of eligible assets and haircuts that
apply to these firms under the Delegated Act are not
significantly different from the current PRA liquidity regime for
Shari’ah-compliant firms. As a result, the PRA does not expect
any major cost increase or changes in the composition and
liquidity of the HQLA buffer of Shari’ah-compliant firms from
these changes.

CRD IV: Liquidity November 2014

Appendices
1

Draft supervisory statement — The PRA’s approach to supervising liquidity and funding risk

Draft rules

2.A

CRR Firms: Internal Liquidity Adequacy Assessment Instrument [Year]

2.B

CRR Firms: Liquidity Coverage Requirement — Transitional Provision Instrument [Year]

2.C

CRR Firms: Liquidity Coverage Requirement — UK-Designated Investment Firms Instrument [Year]

2.D

Non-CRR Firms: Liquidity Reporting Instrument [Year]

2.E

Liquidity Standards Consequential Instrument [Year]

Mapping of BIPRU 12 rules to the ILAA Part of the PRA Rulebook

Appendix 1

Draft supervisory statement — The PRA’s
approach to supervising liquidity and funding
risk
1

Introduction

1.1 This supervisory statement is aimed at firms to which
CRD IV(1) applies. The introduction of CRD IV and the recent
consultation by the European Banking Authority (EBA) on new
guidelines for the Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process
under Directive 2013/36/EU Article 107(3)(2) (‘EBA SREP
guidelines’) have prompted the Prudential Regulation
Authority (PRA) to review its approach to liquidity and funding
risk. By clearly setting out its approach, the PRA enables firms
to understand its expectations of them: this helps the PRA
meet its safety and soundness objective. It also helps to
ensure that the PRA’s resources are used efficiently.
1.2 The European Commission delegated act to supplement
EU Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 with regard to the liquidity
coverage requirement for credit institutions (‘Delegated Act’)
will apply from 1 October 2015.(3) This legislation will be
directly applicable in the United Kingdom.
1.3 This statement supplements the requirements in the
Delegated Act, which specifies in detail the liquidity coverage
requirement (LCR) provided for in Article 412 (1) of Regulation
(EU) No 575/2013 (CRR). It provides further detail in relation
to the high-level expectations outlined in the PRA’s approach
document.(4) The supervisory statement sets out the PRA’s
expectations in relation to firms’ management of their
liquidity and funding risks. In particular, the supervisory
statement explains the PRA’s expectations in relation to the
requirements contained in the Internal Liquidity Adequacy
Assessment Part of the PRA Rulebook (ILAA rules).
1.4 The Delegated Act only applies to credit institutions.
UK-designated investment firms must comply with the
obligations laid down in the Delegated Act as they apply to
credit institutions, by virtue of rule 2.1 of the UK-designated
investment firms Part of the PRA Rulebook. They should read
references in this statement to the Delegated Act accordingly.
1.5 The PRA is required under CRD IV to apply the Liquidity
Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process (L-SREP) and any
supervisory measures in accordance with the level of
application of the requirements set out in CRD IV. Therefore,
the ILAA rules, including the requirement to carry out an
Internal Liquidity Adequacy Assessment Process (ILAAP),
applies on an individual basis and on a consolidated basis
where firms must comply with CRR Part 6 (Liquidity) on a
consolidated basis. This enables the PRA to carry out an
L-SREP and to apply supervisory measures at both individual
and consolidated level where appropriate.

1.6 The PRA’s approach is informed by the forthcoming
EBA SREP guidelines. The PRA expects firms to have regard to
the detail contained in Titles 8 and 9 of the EBA SREP
guidelines to understand the PRA’s expectations of them, in
respect of liquidity and funding risk management. The rules
should be read in conjunction with the supervisory statement
and the EBA SREP guidelines, to gain a full understanding of
the updated liquidity regime and of the PRA’s expectations of
firms.
1.7 This supervisory statement also sets out how the PRA will
set individual liquidity guidance(5) as part of the new regime
and details transitional arrangements regarding Pillar 2
requirements. It also addresses the PRA’s expectations of
firms that fall below their quantitative individual liquidity
guidance, and the treatment of collateral pre-positioned for
use in the Bank of England’s liquidity insurance facilities.

2 PRA expectations of firms’ liquidity risk
management
Overall liquidity adequacy
2.1 The PRA’s approach to liquidity supervision is based on the
principle that a firm must have adequate levels of liquidity
resources and a prudent funding profile, and that it
comprehensively manages and controls liquidity and funding
risk. The firm itself is responsible for the effective
management of its liquidity and funding risk. This overarching
principle is set out in the overall liquidity adequacy rule
(OLAR) in Chapter 2 of the ILAA rules, and supplemented by
Chapter 3 of the ILAA rules on overall strategies, processes
and systems.
2.2 For the purposes of OLAR, liquidity resources are not
confined to the amount or value of a firm’s marketable, or
otherwise realisable, assets. Rather, in assessing the adequacy
of those resources, a firm should have regard to the overall
character of the liquidity resources available to it, which
enable it to meet its liabilities as they fall due.
(1) CRD IV implements the international regulatory framework for banks know as
Basel III in Europe. The legislation comprises two instruments: the Capital
Requirements Regulation (575/2013) (CRR) and the Capital Requirements Directive
(2013/36/EU)(CRD), jointly known as ‘CRD IV’.
(2) European Banking Authority, ‘Guidelines for common procedures and methodologies
review and evaluation process (SREP)’, www.eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/
748829/EBA-CP-2014-14+%28CP+on+draft+SREP+Guidelines%29.pdf. Please note
that these are in the process of being finalised post-consultation. The EBA expects to
issue the final version at the end of 2014.
(3) European Commission: ‘Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) [No…/.. of XXX] to
supplement EU Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 with regard to liquidity coverage
requirement for Credit Institutions’,
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/docs/regcapital/acts/delegated/141010_d
elegated-act-liquidity-coverage_en.pdf.
(4) The Prudential Regulation Authority’s approach to banking supervision, June 2014;
www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/praapproach/
bankingappr1406.pdf.
(5) Readers should note that when used with capital letters, or as the acronym ‘ILG’, the
term ‘Individual Liquidity Guidance’ refers to the quantitative liquidity requirement
set on firms under BIPRU 12. When used without capital letters, and fully spelt out,
the term ‘individual liquidity guidance’ refers to the more general guidance given to
firms, including qualitative elements.

Appendix 1

2.3 The LCR specified by the Delegated Act is distinct from,
and does not replace, the concept of overall liquidity
adequacy. The LCR applies to all firms in scope: it is a set of
rules that apply to all firms and therefore could fail to capture
firm-specific risks. The LCR also does not capture any of the
qualitative arrangements that the PRA requires a firm to
implement to ensure compliance with OLAR. It follows that a
firm cannot rely solely on meeting the LCR in order to satisfy
OLAR.

firms should include, where appropriate, the following
assumptions, which are discussed in detail in the EBA SREP
guidelines.
i.

The run-off of retail funding
This includes an assessment of the response of different
components of the retail book that share common
features, eg guarantee cover, maturity, interest rate
sensitivity, customer type, product type, deposit size, or
the channel through which they were acquired.

ii.

The reduction of secured and unsecured wholesale
funding
This includes an assessment of the type and geographical
location of the counterparty, the level of creditor
seniority, the nature of the relationship the firm has with
the counterparty, the type of underlying collateral (if
applicable), and the speed of outflow. The risk of
shortening tenors should also be assessed.

Internal Liquidity Adequacy Assessment Process
2.4 The ILAA rules include requirements on firms to identify,
measure, manage and monitor liquidity and funding risk across
different time horizons, consistent with the risk appetite
established by the firm’s management body. A firm must
carry out an ILAAP in accordance with the ILAA rules, and the
ILAAP should be proportionate to the nature, scale and
complexity of the firm’s activities, as set out in Chapter 13 of
the ILAA rules. As part of the ILAAP, the firm should undertake
a regular assessment of whether its liquidity resources are
sufficient to cover the major sources of risk to the firm’s ability
to meet its liabilities as they fall due. Central to this process is
an appropriate and clearly articulated risk appetite defining
the duration and type of stress that the firm aims to survive.
The ILAAP should be recorded in a document (ILAAP
document). This should be updated annually by the firm, or
more frequently if changes in the business, strategy, nature or
scale of its activities or operational environment suggest that
the current level of liquidity resources or the firm’s funding
profile is no longer adequate.
2.5 The PRA will take into account the criteria referred to in
the forthcoming EBA SREP guidelines when reviewing a firm’s
ILAAP document and assessing a firm’s compliance with OLAR.
In particular, the PRA expects a firm to demonstrate in its
ILAAP document that it complies with the requirements
outlined in paragraphs 2.6 to 2.13 below.

Stress testing
2.6 Comprehensive, robust stress testing is a vital component
of ensuring compliance with OLAR rule. The PRA expects
firms to consider in their stress testing the impact of a range
of severe but plausible stress scenarios on their cash flows,
liquidity resources, profitability, solvency, asset encumbrance
and survival horizon. Stress scenarios should be selected to
reveal the vulnerabilities of the firm’s funding, including for
example, a vulnerability to previously liquid markets becoming
unexpectedly illiquid. External stress testing scenarios should
include a macroeconomic stress. The PRA expects the degree
of conservatism of the scenarios and assumptions to be
discussed in the ILAAP document.
2.7 In analysing the key risk drivers set out in Chapter 11 of
the ILAA rules, the PRA expects firms to make appropriate
assumptions, both quantitative and qualitative. In particular,

iii. The correlation, concentration and inadequate
diversification between funding types
Firms should include an assessment that takes into
account instrument type, markets, currency, liability term
structure, counterparty and market access, as appropriate.
Where diversification is sought, its effectiveness should be
considered.
iv. Additional contingent off-balance sheet exposures
Firms should include, where appropriate, an assessment of
derivative cash flows caused by maturity, exercise,
repricing, margin calls, a change in the value of posted
collateral, substitution and sleeper collateral, volatile
market conditions or buy-out requests. Firms should also
consider funding commitments (eg facilities, undrawn
loans and mortgages, overdrafts and credit cards),
guarantees and trade finance contracts, as well as facilities
to support securitisation vehicles, including sponsored and
third-party structures.
v. Funding tenors
Firms should consider vulnerabilities within the term
structure due to external, internal or contractual events
(eg where the funding provider has call options).
vi. The impact of a deterioration in the firm’s credit rating
Firms should consider all types of contractual and
behavioural outflows resulting from credit downgrades of
varying magnitude, the types of collateral which may be
required and the speed of outflow, to the extent
appropriate.

Appendix 1

vii. Foreign exchange (FX) convertibility and access to
FX markets
Firms should calculate stressed outflows by individual
currency and tenor where appropriate. This information
must support an assessment of how the shortfalls can be
funded in a stressed market with impaired access to
FX markets and loss of convertibility.
viii. The ability to transfer liquidity across entities, sectors
and countries
Firms should assess the implicit intragroup support
required in stress, or a failure of a group entity to repay
loans in a timely manner, where appropriate. This
assessment should include considering existing legal,
regulatory and operational limitations to potential
transfers of liquidity and unencumbered assets among
entities, business lines, countries and currencies.
ix. Estimates of future balance sheet growth
This should include considering how planned or forecast
balance sheets may behave in stress and whether the
firm’s risk appetite(1) would be breached.
x. The impact on a firm’s reputation or franchise
Firms should include an assessment of implicit liquidity
requirements arising from a need to roll over assets, to
extend or maintain other forms of liquidity support, or to
permit premature termination of retail term or notice
liabilities for reputational reasons or to protect the
franchise, as appropriate. Firms should also bear in mind
that responses to a liquidity stress cannot include actions
that would significantly damage their franchise.
2.8 In addition, the PRA also expects firms to consider, where
appropriate, the quantitative and qualitative assumptions for
the following risk drivers, which are not explicitly addressed in
the EBA SREP guidelines.
i.

ii.

Intraday risk
Firms should assess intraday liquidity risk, that is, the risk
of timing mismatches arising from direct and indirect
membership in relevant payment or settlement systems.
Firms should ensure that they have sufficient liquidity at
all times to maintain normal payment activity if:
incoming payments are delayed by several hours or until
close to the end of the day; credit lines are withdrawn
and require full collateralisation; or large individual
customers default on their payments. The PRA assesses
that intraday liquidity risk exposures are material for
many firms and firms are expected to demonstrate robust
analysis as outlined above.
Marketable asset risk
Firms should include a consideration of how factors
affecting their ability to liquidate assets or monetise those

through repurchase agreements may change in stress,
where appropriate. This should include market access,
haircuts, timelines, pricing, operational capacity or
eligibility.
iii. Non-marketable asset risk
The PRA defines non-marketable assets as being those
assets which cannot be monetised via repo or outright
sale. They could be monetised, for example, via the
securitisation market or as covered bonds. Firms should
include an assessment of how factors affecting the
liquidity of those assets (eg counterparty stress, whether
market access is frequent and established, early
amortisation triggers, or financing of warehoused assets)
may change under stress.
iv. Internalisation risk
Internalisation risk occurs where firm or customer long
positions are funded using the proceeds from customer
short trades. When clients close out their short positions
and these arrangements unwind, this may generate
substantial liquidity outflows for a firm. Internalisation
and netting efficiencies within synthetic prime brokerage
also give rise to liquidity risk which should be measured
and assessed as part of a firm’s stress testing, where
appropriate.
2.9 Consistent with Chapter 11 of the ILAA rules, the PRA
expects the results of the stress testing exercise to be
presented to the firm’s management body on a regular basis.

Assessment of stress factors which are not specified in
the Delegated Act
2.10 Firms are reminded of their obligation to comply with
the specific requirements of Delegated Act Article 23 when
completing their ILAAP. Article 23 requires firms to undertake
their own regular assessment of the likelihood and potential
volume of liquidity outflows during thirty calendar days, for all
products or services which meet the following two conditions:
• the products or services are not referred to in Articles 27
to 31; and
• firms either offer or sponsor these products or services, or
purchasers would consider these to be associated with the
firm.

(1) The PRA expects firms to articulate for themselves the amount of risk they are willing
to take across different business lines to achieve their strategic objectives. This risk
appetite should be consistent with the PRA’s objective, and the firm should pay
appropriate attention to identifying, measuring and controlling risks, including those
arising in unlikely but very severe scenarios. Please also see The Prudential Regulation
Authority’s approach to banking supervision, June 2014;
www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/praapproach/
bankingappr1406.pdf.

Appendix 1

Firms should refer to Article 23 of the Delegated Act for
further details, including a non-exhaustive list of such
products. The PRA will assess firms’ individual assessments of
such stress factors at least annually, reach a conclusion
regarding appropriate methodologies, and report these
conclusions to the EBA.

out the L-SREP, the PRA will undertake the following in a
manner which is proportionate to the nature, scale and
complexity of a firm’s activities:

ILAAP governance
2.11 The PRA expects the ILAAP to be the responsibility of a
firm’s management body.(1) The ILAAP document must be
approved by the management body and must meet the risk
appetite approved by the management body and the firm’s
approach for measuring and managing liquidity and funding
risk. The management body is also expected to ensure that
the ILAAP is well integrated into management processes and
the firm’s decision-making culture.

Liquidity contingency plan
2.12 Chapter 12 of the ILAA rules sets out the requirements a
firm needs to meet in relation to its liquidity contingency plan.
In addition, the PRA already requires firms to prepare a
recovery plan.(2) To the extent that the broader recovery plan
addresses the requirements for liquidity contingency plans,
firms do not have to submit a separate liquidity contingency
plan. However, regardless of whether this is addressed in the
liquidity contingency plan, or in the broader recovery plan,
firms’ arrangements should reflect the specific requirements of
good liquidity management, and must be cross-referenced,
where appropriate, in the ILAAP document. In particular, these
arrangements should be informed by the results of firms’
liquidity stress testing. The PRA expects to review these
arrangements as part of its review of firms’ liquidity
management.

Transfer pricing system
2.13 As part of its compliance with Chapter 6 of the ILAA
rules, the PRA expects a firm to ensure that the costs, benefits
and risks relating to liquidity are fully incorporated into firms’
product pricing, performance measurement and incentives,
and new product and transaction approval processes. All
significant business lines should be included, whether on or
off-balance sheet. Both stressed and business as usual costs
should be assessed. The process should be transparent and
understood by business line management, and regularly
reviewed to ensure it remains appropriately calibrated.

3 The Liquidity Supervisory Review and
Evaluation Process (L-SREP)
3.1 Building on previous liquidity reviews and ongoing
supervisory activities, the PRA will carry out an L-SREP. This
process will be consistent with the EBA SREP Guidelines. The
outcome of the L-SREP informs the setting of a firm’s
individual liquidity guidance (see Section 4 below). In carrying

• review the arrangements, strategies, and processes
implemented by a firm to comply with the liquidity
standards laid down in the ILAA rules, CRR Part 6 (Liquidity)
and the Delegated Act. This includes reviewing firms’
COREP liquidity returns;
• evaluate the liquidity risk and funding risks to which the firm
is or might be exposed;
• assess the risks that the firm poses to the financial system;
and
• evaluate the further liquidity and funding risks revealed by
stress testing.
Based on this assessment, the PRA will:
• quantify specific individual liquidity guidance;
• determine specific qualitative individual liquidity guidance;
and
• determine firms’ overall liquidity risk scoring.
The first two bullet points are addressed in Section 4 on
setting individual liquidity guidance.
3.2 The quantitative assessment will review whether the firm
has correctly identified its liquidity needs across appropriate
time horizons in severe but plausible stresses in its ILAAP
document, for all relevant risk drivers.
3.3 The qualitative assessment will review the governance
arrangements of the firm, its risk management culture, and
the ability of members of the management body to perform
their duties. The degree of involvement of the management
body will be taken into account, as will the appropriateness of
the internal processes and systems underlying the ILAAP. The
qualitative review also covers the firm’s risk appetite, liquidity
contingency plans and non-stressed funding plans, collateral
management, the ability to monetise High Quality Liquid
Assets (HQLAs) and wider liquidity in a timely fashion,
intraday arrangements, market access and asset encumbrance.
3.4 The PRA may need to request further information and
meet with the management body and other representatives of
a firm, to evaluate fully the comprehensiveness of the ILAAP
(1) As defined in the PRA Handbook; http://fshandbook.info/FS/html/PRA/Glossary.
(2) PRA Consultation Paper CP13/14, ‘Implementing the Bank Recovery and Resolution
Directive’, July 2014, Annex C;
www.bankofengland.co.uk/pra/Documents/publications/cp/2014/cp1314.pdf.

Appendix 1

and the adequacy of the governance arrangements around it.
The management body should be able to demonstrate an
understanding of the ILAAP consistent with its taking
responsibility for it. And the management of the firm at
appropriate levels should be prepared to discuss and defend all
aspects of the ILAAP, covering both quantitative and
qualitative components. Additionally, the PRA will consider
the business model of the firm and the advocated rationale for
the model, as well as the firm’s expectations regarding the
future market and economic environment and how they might
affect its liquidity position and funding profile.
3.5 The PRA will review if a firm accurately and consistently
complies with the obligations of the Delegated Act, including
whether a firm is appropriately applying the outflow rates
cited in the Delegated Act.
3.6 The PRA will assess what requirements, beyond that of
meeting the LCR, should be requested of firms as part of the
L-SREP. It may provide further clarification on its quantitative
assessment framework, including for Pillar 2, once the
EBA SREP guidelines have been finalised and the PRA has had
an opportunity to assess them. The EBA SREP guidelines also
ask competent authorities to design generic scenarios and
assumptions and incorporate these into a stress model. This
stress model will be driven off the data supplied in the
Common Reporting (COREP) LCR reporting templates and
additional liquidity monitoring metrics (AMMs), but additional
data may be necessary.
3.7 On the basis of the L-SREP, the PRA will determine
whether the arrangements, strategies, processes and
mechanisms implemented by a firm and the liquidity it holds
provide sound management and adequate coverage of its
risks.

Setting individual liquidity guidance

4.1 Following the L-SREP, the PRA will give individual liquidity
guidance, advising a firm of the amount and quality of HQLAs
which the PRA considers are appropriate, having regard to the
liquidity risk profile of the firm. In giving individual liquidity
guidance, the PRA will also advise the firm of what it considers
to be a prudent funding profile for the firm. Compliance with
individual liquidity guidance does not necessarily imply
compliance with OLAR.
4.2 The type of liquid assets that a firm will be allowed to
hold to satisfy the PRA’s individual liquidity guidance will be
no wider than defined in the Delegated Act. Quantitative
guidance will extend beyond the liquidity buffer the firm is
required to maintain under the LCR and will cover liquidity
risks to which the firm is exposed to but which are not
captured by the LCR (Pillar 2 quantitative requirements).
Qualitative guidance will include actions required to mitigate

those risks identified as inconsistent with the PRA’s objectives.
Where appropriate, the PRA may also set specific guidance on
pre-positioning collateral at the Bank of England.
4.3 Typically, individual liquidity guidance given to firms will
cover the following areas:
•
•
•
•

whether the quantity of HQLAs held is sufficient;
whether the quality of HQLAs held is appropriate;
whether the firm’s funding profile is appropriate; and
any further qualitative arrangements the firm should
undertake to mitigate its liquidity risk.

4.4 The PRA is adopting an interim Pillar 2 approach based on
firms’ existing Individual Liquidity Guidance (ILG) add-ons.
Where current ILG add-ons relate to risks not captured by the
LCR, the PRA will continue to apply them at the same absolute
amounts as previously, and until the firm’s next L-SREP can be
undertaken. Where a firm needs more clarity on its interim
Pillar 2 add-ons, it should contact its PRA supervisor in a
timely manner.
4.5 The PRA proposes that, in due course, Pillar 2 add-ons be
set separately at both the individual and consolidated levels,
consistent with the level of application of the LCR. Initially
however, the interim ILG add-ons carried over will apply at
both the individual and consolidated levels. This approach will
apply until the firm’s next L-SREP can be undertaken.
4.6 The type of HQLAs held to meet interim ILG add-ons
should be no wider than defined in the Delegated Act and
follow the same composition by asset level as set out in the
Delegated Act. Nonetheless, the quality of HQLAs should be
appropriate to mitigate firm-specific risks(1) and be consistent
with OLAR.
4.7 Delegated Act Article 23 requires competent authorities
to determine outflow rates for those products or services
which are not addressed by the Delegated Act and for which
the likelihood and potential volume of liquidity flows are
material. The PRA will adopt an interim approach to define
material liquidity flows for LCR reporting and determine
appropriate outflow rates for these products or services.
4.8 The PRA will review its proposed quantitative assessment
framework, including its interim Pillar 2 approach, at a later
date. This review will consider the PRA’s approach to trapped
liquidity between and within different group entities and
elements set out in the Delegated Act which require the PRA
to take specific actions.

(1) For example, where the PRA advises a firm of an amount of HQLAs which the PRA
considers appropriate to mitigate intraday liquidity risk, the PRA expects the firm to
be able to liquidate these HQLAs on an intraday basis, as required.

Appendix 1

Managing the HQLA buffer

5.1 Firms are expected to integrate fully the operational
requirements set out in Delegated Act Article 8 in their
liquidity and funding risk management when managing their
buffer of HQLAs. An important aim of these requirements is
to maintain a firm’s ability to convert HQLAs into cash within
a short timeframe.
5.2 As part of giving individual liquidity guidance, the PRA will
set out its expectations of a firm’s compliance with these
operational requirements and the PRA may also ask a firm to
take specific actions, where appropriate. The PRA’s approach
to evaluating how a firm manages its liquidity buffer will be
adapted to each firm’s size, complexity, business model and
risk management practices.
5.3 The PRA expects firms to consider the cumulative stressed
low point of their cash flows both within the 30-day horizon
and within the context of survival days along the potentially
longer horizon of their own risk appetite. Daily granularity is
necessary for this analysis.
5.4 The PRA expects firms to focus particularly, but not solely,
on the following principles in paragraphs 5.5 to 5.13.

Ability to monetise
5.5 Firms are reminded of their obligation to have in place
appropriate internal investment policies and procedures to
control and monitor the composition of their HQLA buffer.
This also includes having appropriate internal limits and
controls to ensure that their ability to monetise HQLAs in
stress is not limited in any way.
5.6 In particular, while accounting classifications remain
decisions for firms, where firms hold HQLAs in the
held-to-maturity portfolio, they should be able to
demonstrate that this does not create barriers to their ability
to monetise these assets.
5.7 The PRA may ask a firm to review its policies and
procedures to ensure that it retains full ability to monetise its
HQLA buffer (note this will not cover those assets exempt by
Delegated Act Article 8(4) from the requirement to be
monetised periodically). In so doing, the PRA will take a
proportionate approach to assessing the evidence, based on
the firm’s business model.

Diversification of assets
5.8 Firms are reminded of their obligation to have in place
appropriate internal limits and controls to ensure that they
appropriately diversify their HQLA buffer. This should be
sufficient to demonstrate that their ability to monetise HQLAs
in a short time frame without significant loss of value is not
compromised by exposure to a common risk factor. In

addition, the PRA expects larger firms to take into account the
absolute size of their HQLA holdings and to be able to
monetise these without compromising on either speed of
disposal or price and the impact of their actions on the wider
market and on financial stability.
5.9 Firms should have due regard to their own business model
when determining the appropriate level of diversification in
their buffer. In particular, they should consider whether a
particular asset holding exposes them to wrong-way risk.(1)
Conversely, they should also consider whether their choice of
assets is appropriate given their ability to manage properly the
risk in that asset, and to access the relevant repo or sale
market.
5.10 In accordance with Delegated Act Article 8(1), the PRA
may set requirements on a firm to enforce increased
diversification of the HQLA buffer, or conversely to restrict
holdings of particular asset classes. This may include
requirements on a firm’s liquidity management practices or
investment policies. Under CRD Article 103, the PRA may also
restrict holdings of particular asset classes if it observes that
this exposes several firms to a common set of risk factors.

Consistent currency denomination
5.11 Currency conversion is an additional step between
monetising HQLA and using HQLA to meet specific outflows.
Therefore, the PRA will also review whether the currency
denomination of assets is an obstacle to firms using their
assets when meeting outflows in a specific currency in stress.
5.12 The PRA reminds firms that Delegated Act Article 8(6)
gives the PRA, as the competent authority, the option to
restrict currency mismatches by setting limits on the
proportion of net liquidity outflows in a currency that can be
met by holding HQLA not denominated in that currency. The
PRA may apply this discretion through a range of firm-specific
measures, including setting LCRs by currency on significant
currencies (therefore including the reporting currency).

Transferability of funds
5.13 In assessing the stress tests carried out by firms under
Chapter 11 of the ILAA rules, the PRA will review whether a
firm places appropriate emphasis on the risk that, in severely
stressed circumstances, liquidity might not be freely
transferred between and within group entities, across national
borders, as well as between currencies. Consistent with
Chapter 8 of the ILAA rules, the PRA will expect firms to
demonstrate that there are no legal or practical impediments
to the actual flow of liquidity across the firm and, as
appropriate, across the group.

(1) Wrong-way risk is the risk that occurs when exposure to a counterparty is adversely
correlated with the credit quality of that counterparty.

Appendix 1

Eligibility of non-interest bearing assets, including
sukuk(1)
5.14 Delegated Act Article 12(1)(f) allows firms to include
non-interest bearing assets in their liquidity buffer, provided
these assets meet certain criteria, and if these firms are unable
for reasons of religious observance to hold interest-bearing
assets, in accordance with their statutes of incorporation. The
PRA expects that this provision will apply to firms whose
entire operations are structured and conducted in accordance
with Islamic commercial jurisprudence and its investment
principles. However, firms should satisfy themselves that their
assets are eligible for inclusion in their HQLA buffers.
5.15 These firms may also benefit from the derogation
available under Delegated Act Article 12 which allows
competent authorities not to apply two specific criteria that
determine the eligibility of corporate debt securities for
inclusion in a firm’s Level 2B HQLA buffer: these two criteria
are the minimum issue size and maximum time to maturity.
The PRA expects that a number of sukuk will meet the
conditions that allow the PRA to exercise this discretion.
Firms that consider they would be eligible to benefit from
these derogations should apply to the PRA for a permission.
5.16 Delegated Act Article 7 requires firms to assess whether a
trading venue provides for an active and sizable market, in
order to confirm that assets that are not listed on recognised
exchanges are tradable via outright sale. In particular, firms
are required to take into account the minimum criteria
specified in Delegated Act Article 7(6)(a) and (b) when making
this assessment. The PRA acknowledges that firms will need
to exercise judgement in deciding whether these criteria are
met in relation to specific assets, including sukuk. It is the
responsibility of firms to satisfy themselves that their assets
are eligible for inclusion in their HQLA buffers. Firms should
contact their PRA supervisor if, after completing their
assessment, they are still unsure whether their assets meet the
requirement stated in the Delegated Act.
5.17 When considering the option of restricting currency
mismatches under Delegated Act Article 8, the PRA will take
into account all relevant considerations: this will include
considerations relevant to firms that, for reasons of religious
observance, are unable to hold interest-bearing assets.

6 PRA’s expectations of firms that fall
below the level of quantitative individual
liquidity guidance
6.1 A firm may use its HQLA buffer to cover its net liquidity
outflows during stress periods, as set out in Delegated Act
Article 4, thereby falling below the applicable LCR. For the
avoidance of doubt, this means that the firm will have already
fallen below the level of assets required to meet any

additional quantitative liquidity guidance that the PRA has
given the firm. Liquidity buffers can and should be used in
times of stress: a firm can fall below the level of HQLAs it is
required to hold under the LCR and still meet the Threshold
Conditions as defined in the PRA’s approach document.(2) The
introduction of the LCR will not lead to a change in that
approach.
6.2 If a firm’s liquidity buffer falls, or is expected to fall, below
the level advised in the individual liquidity guidance, or if a
firm’s funding profile ceases or is expected to cease to
conform to that advised in the individual liquidity guidance, a
firm is expected to notify the PRA immediately. It should then
agree a plan with the PRA setting out the timely restoration of
compliance with the advised guidance. The plan should
include actions documented in the firm’s liquidity contingency
plan. Firms are reminded of their obligations in CRR
Article 414 to notify the PRA immediately where it does not,
or expects not to, meet the applicable LCR.
6.3 Upon receipt of the firm’s plan, the PRA will judge how
rapidly it expects the firm to rebuild its liquidity buffer. In
exercising its judgement, the PRA will take into account both
current and forecast macroeconomic and financial conditions.
The PRA’s response will also be proportionate to the drivers,
magnitude, duration and frequency of the firm’s shortfall. It
will take into account the amount of pre-positioned collateral
at the Bank of England, or the amount available for drawing at
other central banks to which the firm has access.

7 Role of collateral pre-positioned for use
in the Bank of England’s liquidity insurance
facilities
7.1 The Bank of England announced a number of changes to
its liquidity insurance facilities in October 2013.(3) These
changes are designed to increase the availability and flexibility
of liquidity insurance, by providing liquidity at longer
maturities, against a wider range of collateral, at a lower cost
and with greater predictability of access. The certainty with
which a firm can expect to be able to access the Bank of
England’s facilities has been reinforced through a presumption
that all firms that meet Threshold Conditions may sign up for
the Sterling Monetary Framework and have full access to use
the Bank of England’s facilities.

(1) Certificates of equal value representing an undivided interest in the ownership of
specified assets or investments acquired or to be acquired and that comply with
Islamic commercial jurisprudence and its investment principles, but excluding shares.
(2) Firms have to be able to meet their liabilities on an ongoing basis with sufficient
confidence, including in stressed circumstances, consistent with their safety and
soundness, Bank of England, The Prudential Regulation Authority’s approach to banking
supervision, June 2014; www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/
praapproach/bankingappr1406.pdf.
(3) Bank of England (2013), ‘Liquidity Insurance at the Bank of England: developments in
the Sterling Monetary Framework’, October; www.bankofengland.co.uk/markets/
Documents/money/publications/liquidityinsurance.pdf.

Appendix 1

7.2 The terms of the Bank of England’s liquidity insurance
facilities are set to ensure counterparties have the incentive to
manage their liquidity primarily through private markets in
normal times. Consistent with this, for limited liquidity
shocks, it is appropriate for firms to draw initially on their
holdings of HQLAs. For larger or more severe liquidity
outflows, the Bank of England expects firms to consider using
the Discount Window Facility or other liquidity insurance
facilities alongside, rather than after, using a significant
proportion of their liquidity buffer. As noted in the PRA’s
approach document, the PRA expects firms to have credible
options in their recovery plans for restoring their HQLAs
following firm-specific or market-wide stress.

7.4 The PRA continues to expect firms to have robust levels of
pre-positioning. However, the PRA also acknowledges the
need for flexibility for firms to be able to use these assets to
access market funding. The PRA may set explicit requirements
of firms for pre-positioning where appropriate, and may
provide additional guidance to firms in stress.

7.3 A firm can count assets pre-positioned at the Bank of
England to meet the PRA’s quantitative liquidity guidance, if
these assets are eligible for inclusion in the HQLA buffer under
the Delegated Act. If pre-positioned assets are not eligible for
inclusion in the HQLA buffer, they cannot be used to meet the
PRA’s quantitative liquidity guidance.

7.5 Assets pre-positioned at the Bank of England may be of
varying quality, and some of these assets may have been
monetised. The Bank of England previously stated that it will
let firms know what proportion of their Level A, B and C assets
have been encumbered,(1) but it will not specify which quality
of asset has been monetised first. For reporting purposes,
firms with pre-positioned assets that have been partially
monetised can assume that assets are encumbered in order of
increasing liquidity.

(1) Bank of England (2010), ‘Extending eligible collateral in the Discount Window Facility
and information transparency for asset-backed securitisations’, March, page 5;
www.bankofengland.co.uk/markets/Documents/money/publications/condocmar10.pdf.

Appendix 2.A

PRA RULEBOOK: CRR FIRMS: INTERNAL LIQUIDITY ADEQUACY ASSESSMENT
INSTRUMENT [YEAR]
Powers exercised
A. The Prudential Regulation Authority (“PRA”) makes this instrument in the exercise of the following
powers and related provisions in the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (“the Act”):
(1) section 137G (the PRA’s general rules); and
(2) section 137T (general supplementary powers).
B. The rule-making powers referred to above are specified for the purpose of section 138G(2) (Rulemaking instrument) of the Act.
Pre-conditions to making
C. In accordance with section 138J of the Act (Consultation by the PRA), the PRA consulted the
Financial Conduct Authority. After consulting, the PRA published a draft of proposed rules and
had regard to representations made.
PRA Rulebook: CRR Firms: Internal Liquidity Adequacy Assessment Instrument [YEAR]
D. The PRA makes the rules in the Annex to this instrument.
Commencement
E. This instrument comes into force on [Date].
Citation
F. This instrument may be cited as the PRA Rulebook: CRR Firms: Internal Liquidity Adequacy
Assessment Instrument [YEAR].
By order of the Board of the Prudential Regulation Authority
[DATE]

Page 1 of 11

Appendix 2.A

Annex
In this Annex, the text is all new and is not underlined.
Part

INTERNAL LIQUIDITY ADEQUACY ASSESSMENT
Chapter content
1. APPLICATION AND DEFINITIONS
2. OVERALL LIQUIDITY ADEQUACY RULE
3. OVERALL STRATEGIES, PROCESSES AND SYSTEMS
4. LIQUIDITY RISK APPETITE AND FUNDING RISK APPETITE
5. INTRA-DAY MANAGEMENT OF LIQUIDITY
6. TRANSFER PRICING SYSTEM
7. MANAGEMENT OF COLLATERAL
8. MANAGING LIQUIDITY ACROSS LEGAL ENTITIES, BUSINESS LINES, COUNTRIES
AND CURRENCIES
9. FUNDING DIVERSIFICATION AND MARKET ACCESS
10. MANAGEMENT OF ASSET ENCUMBRANCE
11. STRESS TESTING
12. LIQUIDITY CONTINGENCY PLAN
13. INTERNAL LIQUIDITY ADEQUACY ASSESSMENT PROCESS
14. APPLICATION OF THIS PART ON AN INDIVIDUAL BASIS AND A CONSOLIDATED
BASIS
15. TRANSITIONAL PROVISION
Links

Page 2 of 11

Appendix 2.A

APPLICATION AND DEFINITIONS

1.1

This Part applies to a CRR firm.

1.2

In this Part, the following definitions shall apply:
consolidation group
means the undertakings included in the scope of consolidation pursuant to Articles
18(1), 19(1), 19(3) and 23 of the CRR.
EEA parent institution
means a parent institution in an EEA State which is not a subsidiary of another
institution authorised in an EEA State or of a financial holding company or mixed
financial holding company set up in any EEA State.
EEA parent financial holding company
means a parent financial holding company in an EEA State which is not a subsidiary
of an institution authorised in any EEA State or of another financial holding company
or mixed financial holding company set up in any EEA State.
EEA parent mixed financial holding company
means a parent mixed financial holding company in an EEA State which is not a
subsidiary of an institution authorised in any EEA State or of another financial holding
company or mixed financial holding company set up in any EEA State.
funding risk
means the risk that a firm does not have stable sources of funding in the medium and
long term to enable it to meet is financial obligations, such as payments or collateral
calls, as they fall due, either at all or only at excessive cost.
Internal Liquidity Adequacy Assessment Process (ILAAP)
means the process for the identification, measurement, management and monitoring
of liquidity implemented by the firm in accordance with 3 - 13.
liquidity contingency plan
a plan for dealing with liquidity crises as required by 12.1.
liquidity risk
means the risk that a firm, although solvent, does not have available sufficient
financial resources to enable it to meet its obligations as they fall due.
overall liquidity adequacy rule
means the rule in 2.1.

1.3

Unless otherwise defined, any italicised expression used in this Part and in the CRR has the
same meaning as in the CRR.

Page 3 of 11

Appendix 2.A

OVERALL LIQUIDITY ADEQUACY RULE

2.1

A firm must at all times maintain liquidity resources which are adequate, both as to amount
and quality, to ensure that there is no significant risk that its liabilities cannot be met as they
fall due.

2.2

For the purposes of the overall liquidity adequacy rule:
(1)

(2)

3
3.1

a firm also must ensure that:
(a)

its liquidity resources contain an adequate buffer of high quality,
unencumbered assets; and

(b)

it maintains a prudent funding profile;

a firm may not include liquidity resources that may be made available through
emergency liquidity assistance from a central bank.

OVERALL STRATEGIES, PROCESSES AND SYSTEMS
As part of the overall liquidity adequacy rule, a firm must have in place robust strategies,
policies, processes and systems that enable it to identify, measure, manage and monitor
liquidity risk and funding risk over an appropriate set of time horizons, including intra-day, so
as to ensure that it maintains adequate levels of liquidity buffers and an appropriate funding
profile. These strategies, policies, processes and systems must be tailored to business lines,
currencies, branches and legal entities and must include adequate allocation mechanisms of
liquidity costs, benefits and risks.

[Note: Art. 86(1) of the CRD]
3.2

The strategies, policies, processes and systems referred to in 3.1 must be proportionate to
the complexity, risk profile and scope of operation of the firm, and the liquidity risk appetite
and funding risk appetite set by the firm’s management body in accordance with Chapter 4
(Liquidity risk appetite and funding risk appetite), and must reflect the firm’s importance in
each country in which it carries on business.

[Note: Art. 86(2) (part) of the CRD]
3.3

A firm must, taking into account the nature, scale and complexity of its activities, have liquidity
risk profiles and funding risk profiles that are consistent with and not in excess of those
necessary for a well-functioning and robust system.

[Note: Art. 86(3) of the CRD]
3.4

A firm must put in place risk management policies to define its approach to asset
encumbrance, as well as procedures and controls that ensure that the risks associated with
collateral management and asset encumbrance are adequately identified, monitored and
managed.

3.5

A firm must ensure that its systems and processes enable it, at the request of the PRA, to:
(1)

report the items referred to in Title II and Title III of Part Six of the CRR at least daily;
and
Page 4 of 11

Appendix 2.A
(2)

4
4.1

produce and transmit to the PRA any data and information necessary for the purpose
of monitoring the firm’s compliance with this Part.

LIQUIDITY RISK APPETITE AND FUNDING RISK APPETITE
A firm must ensure that:
(1)

its management body establishes the firm's liquidity risk appetite and funding risk
appetite and that this is appropriately documented;

(2)

its liquidity risk appetite and funding risk appetite is appropriate for its business
strategy and reflects its financial condition and funding capacity; and

(3)

its liquidity risk appetite and funding risk appetite is communicated to all relevant
business lines.

[Note: Art. 86(2) (part) of the CRD]

INTRA-DAY MANAGEMENT OF LIQUIDITY

5.1

A firm must actively manage its intra-day liquidity positions and any related risks so that it is
able to meet its payment and settlement obligations on a timely basis.

5.2

For the purposes of 5.1, a firm must ensure that its intra-day liquidity management
arrangements enable it:

6
6.1

(1)

to meet its payment and settlement obligations on a timely basis under both normal
financial conditions and under the stresses required by 11.3;

(2)

to identify and prioritise the most time-critical payment and settlement obligations; and

(3)

in relation to the markets in which it is active and the currencies in which it has
significant positions, to measure, monitor and deal with intra-day liquidity risk. A firm
must in particular be able to:
(a)

measure expected daily gross liquidity inflows and outflows, anticipate the
intra-day timing of these flows where possible, and forecast the range of
potential net funding shortfalls that might arise at different points during the
day; and

(b)

manage the timing of its liquidity outflows such that priority is given to the
firm’s most time-critical payment obligations.

TRANSFER PRICING SYSTEM
A firm must implement an adequate transfer pricing system to ensure that it accurately
quantifies liquidity costs, benefits and risk in relation to all significant business activities.

Page 5 of 11

Appendix 2.A
7

MANAGEMENT OF COLLATERAL

7.1

A firm must actively manage collateral positions.

7.2

A firm must distinguish between pledged and unencumbered assets that are available at all
times, in particular during emergency situations. A firm must also take into account the legal
entity in which assets reside, the country where assets are legally recorded either in a register
or in an account as well as their eligibility and must monitor how assets can be mobilised in a
timely manner.

[Note: Art. 86(5) of the CRD]

MANAGING LIQUIDITY ACROSS LEGAL ENTITIES, BUSINESS LINES, COUNTRIES
AND CURRENCIES

8.1

A firm must actively manage its liquidity risk exposures and related funding needs and take
into account:
(1)

existing legal, regulatory and operational limitations to potential transfers of liquidity
and unencumbered assets amongst entities, both within and outside the EEA; and
[Note: Art. 86(6) of the CRD]

(2)

any other constraints on the transferability of liquidity and unencumbered assets
across business lines, countries and currencies.

FUNDING DIVERSIFICATION AND MARKET ACCESS

9.1

A firm must ensure that it has access to funding which is adequately diversified, both as to
source and tenor.

9.2

A firm must develop methodologies for the identification, measurement, management and
monitoring of funding positions. Those methodologies must include the current and projected
material cash-flows in and arising from assets, liabilities, off-balance-sheet items, including
contingent liabilities and the possible impact of reputational risk.

[Note: Art. 86(4) of the CRD]

MANAGEMENT OF ASSET ENCUMBRANCE

10.1

A firm must actively manage its asset encumbrance position.

10.2

For the purpose of 10.1 a firm must ensure that:
(1)

its risk management policies take into account:
(a)

the firm’s business model;

(b)

the countries in which it operates;

(c)

the specificities of the funding markets; and
Page 6 of 11

Appendix 2.A
(d)
(2)

10.3

its management body receives timely information on:
(a)

the current and expected level and types of asset encumbrance and related
sources of encumbrance, such as secured funding or other transactions;

(b)

the amount, expected level and credit quality of unencumbered assets that
are capable of being encumbered, specifying the volume of assets available
for encumbrance; and

(c)

the expected amount, level and types of additional encumbrance that may
result from stress scenarios.

For the purpose of this Chapter a firm must treat an asset as encumbered if it is subject to
any form of arrangement to secure, collateralise or credit enhance any transaction.

11
11.1

the macroeconomic situation; and

STRESS TESTING
A firm must consider different liquidity risk mitigation tools, including a system of limits and
liquidity buffers in order to be able to withstand a range of different stress events and an
adequately diversified funding structure and access to funding sources. It must review those
arrangements regularly.

[Note: Art. 86(7) of the CRD]
11.2

A firm must consider alternative scenarios on liquidity positions and on risk mitigants and
must review the assumptions underlying decisions concerning the funding position at least
annually. For these purposes, alternative scenarios must address, in particular, off-balance
sheet items and other contingent liabilities, including those of securitisation special purpose
entities or other special purpose entities, as referred to in the CRR in relation to which the firm
acts as sponsor or provides material liquidity support.

[Note: Art. 86(8) of the CRD]
11.3

A firm must:
(1)

(2)

conduct on a regular basis appropriate stress tests so as to:
(a)

identify sources of potential liquidity strain;

(b)

ensure that current liquidity exposures continue to conform to the liquidity risk
and funding risk appetite established by that firm's management body; and

(c)

identify the effects on that firm's assumptions about pricing; and

analyse on a regular basis the separate and combined impact of possible future
liquidity stresses on its:
(a)

cash flows;

(b)

liquidity position;

(c)

profitability; and

Page 7 of 11

Appendix 2.A
(d)
11.4

solvency.

A firm must consider the potential impact of institution-specific, market-wide and combined
alternative scenarios. Different time periods and varying degrees of stressed conditions must
be considered.

[Note: Art. 86(9) of the CRD]
11.5

In carrying out the liquidity stress tests required by 11.3, a firm must make appropriate
assumptions around the major sources of risk, including the major sources of risk in each of
the following categories where they are relevant to the firm given the nature and scale of its
business:
(1)

retail funding risk;

(2)

wholesale secured and unsecured funding risk;

(3)

risks arising from the correlation between funding markets and lack of diversification
between funding types;

(4)

off-balance sheet funding risk;

(5)

risks arising from the firm’s funding tenors;

(6)

risks associated with a deterioration of a firm’s credit rating;

(7)

cross currency funding risk;

(8)

risk that liquidity resources cannot be transferred across entities, sectors and
countries;

(9)

funding risks resulting from estimates of future balance sheet growth;

(10)

franchise risk;

(11)

intra-day risk;

(12)

marketable assets funding risk;

(13)

non-marketable assets risk; and

(14)

internalisation risk.

11.6

A firm must ensure that its management body reviews regularly the stresses and scenarios
tested to ensure that their nature and severity remain appropriate and relevant to the firm.

11.7

A firm must ensure that the results of its stress tests are:
(1)

reviewed by its senior management;

(2)

reported to that firm's management body, specifically highlighting any vulnerabilities
identified and proposing appropriate remedial action;

(3)

reflected in the processes, strategies and systems established in accordance with
3.1;

(4)

used to develop effective liquidity contingency plans;

Page 8 of 11

Appendix 2.A

11.8

(5)

integrated into that firm's business planning process and day-to-day risk
management; and

(6)

taken into account when setting internal limits for the management of that firm's
liquidity risk exposure.

A firm must report the results of its liquidity stress tests to the PRA in a timely manner.

12
12.1

LIQUIDITY CONTINGENCY PLAN
A firm must adjust its strategies, internal policies and limits on liquidity risk and funding risk
and develop an effective liquidity contingency plan, taking into account the outcome of the
alternative scenarios referred to in 11.2.

[Note: Art. 86(10) of the CRD]
12.2

The liquidity contingency plan must include strategies to address the contingent encumbrance
resulting from relevant stress events including downgrades in the firm’s credit rating,
devaluation of pledged assets and increases in margin requirements.

12.3

The liquidity contingency plan must also set out adequate strategies and proper
implementation measures in order to address possible liquidity shortfalls, including in relation
to branches established in another EEA State. Those plans must be tested at least annually,
updated on the basis of the outcome of the alternative scenarios set out in 11.2, and be
reported to and approved by the firm's senior management, so that internal policies and
processes can be adjusted accordingly.

[Note: Art. 86(11) (part) of the CRD]
12.4

A firm must take the necessary operational steps in advance to ensure that liquidity
contingency plans can be implemented immediately, including holding collateral immediately
available for central bank funding. This includes holding collateral where necessary in the
currency of another EEA State or currency of a third country to which the firm has exposures,
and where operationally necessary within the territory of an EEA State or third country to
whose currency it is exposed.

[Note: Art. 86(11) (part) of the CRD]

13
13.1

INTERNAL LIQUIDITY ADEQUACY ASSESSMENT PROCESS
A firm must ensure that:
(1)

it regularly, but at least annually, reviews its ILAAP;

(2)

carries out an internal assessment of the adequacy of its liquidity in accordance with
its ILAAP;

(3)

the assessment in (2) is proportionate to the nature, scale and complexity of its
activities and includes an assessment of:
(a)

the adequacy of its liquidity resources to cover the risks identified in
accordance with this Part;

Page 9 of 11

Appendix 2.A

(4)

(b)

the methodologies and assumptions applied for risk measurement and
liquidity management;

(c)

the results of the stress tests required by 11.3; and

(d)

the firm’s compliance with this Part;

its ILAAP identifies those of the measures set out in its liquidity contingency plans
that it would implement.

13.2

A firm must maintain a record of its ILAAP for at least three years.

13.3

A firm must ensure that its management body approves the firm’s ILAAP.

APPLICATION OF THIS PART ON AN INDIVIDUAL BASIS AND A CONSOLIDATED
BASIS

14.1

This Part applies to a firm on an individual basis whether or not it also applies to the firm on a
consolidated basis or a sub-consolidated basis.

[Note: Art 109(1) of the CRD]
14.2

Where a firm is a member of a consolidation group, the firm must ensure that the
arrangements, processes and mechanisms at the level of the consolidation group of which it
is a member comply with the obligations set out in 3 to 13 on a consolidated basis (or a subconsolidated basis).

14.3

Compliance with 14.2 must enable the consolidation group to have arrangements, processes
and mechanisms that are consistent and well integrated and that any data relevant to the
purpose of supervision can be produced.

[Note: Art 109(2) (part) of the CRD]
14.4

A UK bank or building society which is an EEA parent institution must comply with this Part on
the basis of its consolidated situation.

14.5

A UK designated investment firm which is an EEA parent institution must comply with this
Part on the basis of its consolidated situation if the firm is an investment firm that is authorised
to provide the investment services and activities listed in points (3) and (6) of Section A of
Annex I to Directive 2004/39/EC.

14.6

A UK bank or building society controlled by an EEA parent financial holding company or by an
EEA parent mixed financial holding company must comply with this Part on the basis of the
consolidated situation of that holding company if the PRA is responsible for supervision of the
UK bank or building society on a consolidated basis under Article 111 of the CRD.

14.7

A UK designated investment firm controlled by an EEA parent financial holding company or
by an EEA parent mixed financial holding company must comply with this Part on the basis of
the consolidated situation of that holding company if:
(1)

the firm is an investment firm that is authorised to provide the investment services
and activities listed in points (3) and (6) of Section A of Annex I to Directive
2004/39/EC;

Page 10 of 11

Appendix 2.A

14.8

(2)

there is no subsidiary of the holding company which is a credit institution that is
supervised under the CRD; and

(3)

the PRA is responsible for the supervision of the UK designated investment firm on a
consolidated basis under Article 111 of the CRD.

If this Part applies to a firm on a consolidated basis, the firm must carry out consolidation to
the extent and in the manner prescribed in Articles 18(1), 19(1), 19(3), 23 and 24 of the CRR.

15.1

TRANSITIONAL PROVISION

In 1.2 and 14.4 to 14.7:
(1)

any reference to EEA is to be read as a reference to EU; and

(2)

any reference to EEA State is to be read as a reference to Member State.

Page 11 of 11

Appendix 2.B

PRA RULEBOOK: CRR FIRMS: LIQUIDITY COVERAGE REQUIREMENT –
TRANSITIONAL PROVISION INSTRUMENT [YEAR]
Powers exercised
A. The Prudential Regulation Authority (“PRA”) makes this instrument in the exercise of the following
powers and related provisions in the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (“the Act”):
(1) section 137G (the PRA’s general rules); and
(2) section 137T (general supplementary powers).
B. The rule-making powers referred to above are specified for the purpose of section 138G(2) (Rulemaking instrument) of the Act.
Pre-conditions to making
C. In accordance with section 138J of the Act (Consultation by the PRA), the PRA consulted the
Financial Conduct Authority. After consulting, the PRA published a draft of proposed rules and
had regard to representations made.
PRA Rulebook: CRR Fi rms: Liquidity Coverage Requirement Ratio – Transitional Provision
Instrument [YEAR]
D. The PRA makes the rules in the Annex to this instrument.
Commencement
E. This instrument comes into force on 1 October 2015.
Citation
F. This instrument may be cited as the PRA Rulebook: CRR Firms: Liquidity Coverage Requirement
Ratio – Transitional Provision Instrument [YEAR]
By order of the Board of the Prudential Regulation Authority
[DATE]

Page 1 of 3

Appendix 2.B

Annex
In this Annex, the text is all new and is not underlined.
Part

LIQUIDITY COVERAGE REQUIREMENT –
TRANSITIONAL PROVISION
Chapter content
1. APPLICATION AND DEFINITIONS
2. TRANSITIONAL PROVISIONS

Links

Page 2 of 3

Appendix 2.B

APPLICATION AND DEFINITIONS

1.1

This Part applies to:

1.2

(1)

a UK bank; or

(2)

a building society.

In this Part, the following definitions shall apply:
liquidity coverage ratio
means the ratio calculated in accordance with Article 4 of the Commission Delegated
Regulation (EU) No [number]1.

TRANSITIONAL PROVISION

2.1

The applicable liquidity coverage ratio for the purpose of Article 412(5) CRR shall be:
(1)

80% as from 1 October 2015;

(2)

90% as from 1 January 2017; and

(3)

100% as from 1 January 2018.

Replace with Official Journal number of Commission Delegated Regulation made under article 460
of the CRR.
Page 3 of 3

Appendix 2.C

PRA RULEBOOK: CRR FIRMS: LIQUIDITY COVERAGE REQUIREMENT – UK DESIGNATED
INVESTMENT FIRMS INSTRUMENT [YEAR]
Powers exercised
A. The Prudential Regulation Authority (“PRA”) makes this instrument in the exercise of the following
powers and related provisions in the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (“the Act”):
(1) section 137G (the PRA’s general rules); and
(2) section 137T (general supplementary powers).
B. The rule-making powers referred to above are specified for the purpose of section 138G(2) (Rulemaking instrument) of the Act.
Pre-conditions to making
C. In accordance with section 138J of the Act (Consultation by the PRA), the PRA consulted the
Financial Conduct Authority. After consulting, the PRA published a draft of proposed rules and
had regard to representations made.
PRA Rulebook: CRR Firms: Liquidity Coverage Requirement – UK Designated Investment
Firms Instrument [YEAR]
D. The PRA makes the rules in the Annex to this instrument.
Commencement
E. This instrument comes into force on [Date].
Citation
F. This instrument may be cited as the PRA Rulebook: CRR Firms: Liquidity Coverage Requirement
– UK Designated Investment Firms Instrument [Year].
By order of the Board of the Prudential Regulation Authority
[DATE]

Appendix 2.C

Annex
In this Annex, the text is all new and is not underlined.
Part

LIQUIDITY COVERAGE REQUIREMENT – UK
DESIGNATED INVESTMENT FIRMS
Chapter content
1. APPLICATION AND DEFINITIONS
2. LIQUIDITY COVERAGE REQUIREMENT
3. COMPLIANCE WITH LIQUIDITY REPORTING
4. APPLICATION OF THIS PART ON AN INDIVIDUAL BASIS AND A CONSOLIDATED
BASIS
5. TRANSITIONAL PROVISIONS
Links

Appendix 2.C

APPLICATION AND DEFINITIONS

1.1

This Part applies to a UK designated investment firm.

1.2

In this Part, the following definitions shall apply:
COREP Regulation
means the Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 680/2014 of 16 April 2014
laying down implementing technical standards with regard to supervisory reporting of
institutions according to Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament
and the Council, as amended by [Commission Implementing Regulation on additional
1
liquidity monitoring metrics] .
Delegated Regulation
2

means Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) [number] .
EEA parent institution
means a parent institution in an EEA State which is not a subsidiary of another
institution authorised in an EEA State or of a financial holding company or mixed
financial holding company set up in any EEA State.
EEA parent financial holding company
means a parent financial holding company in an EEA State which is not a subsidiary
of an institution authorised in any EEA State or of another financial holding company
or mixed financial holding company set up in any EEA State.
EEA parent mixed financial holding company
means a parent mixed financial holding company in an EEA State which is not a
subsidiary of an institution authorised in any EEA State or of another financial holding
company or mixed financial holding company set up in any EEA State.
liquidity coverage ratio
means the ratio calculated in accordance with Article 4 of the Delegated Regulation.
1.3

Unless otherwise defined, any italicised expression used in this Part and in the CRR has the
same meaning as in the CRR.

2
2.1

LIQUIDITY COVERAGE REQUIREMENT
(1)

For the purpose of complying with Article 412 (1) of the CRR, a firm must comply with
the obligations set out in the Delegated Regulation as they apply to a credit institution
supervised under the CRD, subject to the modifications in (2).

Replace with ITS to be adopted by the Commission in accordance with CRR Art 415(3)(b).
Replace with Official Journal number of Commission Delegated Regulation made under article 460
of the CRR
2

Appendix 2.C
(2)

For the purposes of (1):
(a)

the provisions in Article 2(3) of the Delegated Regulation do not apply where
Article 12 of the CRR applies;

(b)

the provisions in Article 2(3)(d) and Article 37 of the Delegated Regulation do
not apply; and

(c)

any reference to competent authority means a reference to the PRA.

COMPLIANCE WITH LIQUIDITY REPORTING

3.1

In accordance with Article 6(4) and Article 11(3) of the CRR, a firm is exempt from complying
with the obligations laid down in Title II and Title III of Part Six of the CRR on an individual
basis and on a consolidated basis.

3.2

(1)

A firm must comply with the reporting requirements laid down in Articles 2, 3, 15 , 16,
16(b) and 18 of the COREP Regulation as they apply to a credit institution supervised
under the CRD.

(2)

For these purposes of (1), the words “according to Article 415 of Regulation (EU) No
575/2013” in Articles 15, 16 and 16b of the COREP Regulation are construed as
references to the obligations set out in (1).

APPLICATION OF THIS PART ON AN INDIVIDUAL BASIS AND A CONSOLIDATED
BASIS

4.1

This Part applies to a firm on an individual basis whether or not it also applies to the firm on a
consolidated basis.

4.2

A firm which is an EEA parent institution must comply with this Part on the basis of its
consolidated situation if the firm is an investment firm that is authorised to provide the
investment services and activities listed in points (3) and (6) of Section A of Annex I to
Directive 2004/39/EC.

4.3

A firm controlled by an EEA parent financial holding company or by an EEA parent mixed
financial holding company must comply with this Part on the basis of the consolidated
situation of that holding company if:

(1)

the firm is an investment firm that is authorised to provide the investment services
and activities listed in points (3) and (6) of Section A of Annex I to Directive
2004/39/EC;

(2)

there is no subsidiary of the holding company which is a credit institution that is
supervised under the CRD; and

(3)

the PRA is responsible for the supervision of the UK designated investment firm on a
consolidated basis under Article 111 of the CRD.

Replace with reference to the updated Liquidity Coverage Templates under the COREP Regulation.

Appendix 2.C
4.4

If this Part applies to a firm on a consolidated basis, the firm must carry out consolidation to
the extent and in the manner prescribed in Articles 18(1), 19(1), 19(3) 23 and 24 of the CRR.

5
5.1

5.2

TRANSITIONAL PROVISIONS
The applicable liquidity coverage ratio for the purpose of Article 38 (2) of the Delegated
Regulation shall be:
(1)

80% as from 1 October 2015;

(2)

90% as from 1 January 2017; and

(3)

100% as from 1 January 2018.

In 1.2, 4.2 and 4.3:
(1)

any reference to EEA is to be read as a reference to EU; and

(2)

any reference to EEA State is to be read as a reference to Member State.

Appendix 2.D

PRA RULEBOOK: NON-CRR FIRMS: LIQUIDITY REPORTING INSTRUMENT [YEAR]
Powers exercised
A. The Prudential Regulation Authority (“PRA”) makes this instrument in the exercise of the following
powers and related provisions in the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (“the Act”):
(1) section 137G (the PRA’s general rules); and
(2) section 137T (general supplementary powers).
B. The rule-making powers referred to above are specified for the purpose of section 138G(2) (Rulemaking instrument) of the Act.
Pre-conditions to making
C. In accordance with section 138J of the Act (Consultation by the PRA), the PRA consulted the
Financial Conduct Authority. After consulting, the PRA published a draft of proposed rules and
had regard to representations made.
PRA Rulebook: Non-CRR Firms: Liquidity Reporting Instrument [YEAR]
D. The PRA makes the rules in the Annex to this instrument.
Commencement
E. This instrument comes into force on 1 April 2016.
Citation
F. This instrument may be cited as the PRA Rulebook: Non-CRR Firms: Liquidity Reporting
Instrument [YEAR].
By order of the Board of the Prudential Regulation Authority
[DATE]

Page 1 of 3

Appendix 2.D

Annex
In this Annex, the text is all new and is not underlined.
Part

LIQUIDITY REPORTING
Chapter content
1. APPLICATION
2. COMPLIANCE WITH CRR LIQUIDITY REPORTING
3. SYSTEMS, PROCESSES AND MECHANISMS
4. TRANSITIONAL PROVISION
Links

Page 2 of 3

Appendix 2.D

APPLICATION

1.1

This Part applies to every third country firm that is a bank or a designated investment firm.

COMPLIANCE WITH CRR LIQUIDITY REPORTING

2.1

A firm must comply with the reporting requirements laid down in Titles II and III of Part 6 of the
CRR on an individual basis as they apply to a credit institution supervised under the CRD,
subject to the modifications in 2.2.

2.2

The modifications referred to in 2.1 are that the provisions in Article 16b (1) (b) and (c) of the
Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 680/2014 of 16 April 2014 laying down
implementing technical standards with regard to supervisory reporting of institutions according
to Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and the Council, as amended by
[Commission Implementing Regulation on additional liquidity monitoring metrics]1, do not
apply.

SYSTEMS, PROCESSES AND MECHANISMS

3.1

A firm must put in place systems, processes and mechanisms that enable it, at the request of
the PRA, to report:
(1)

report the items referred to in the reporting requirements in 2.1 at least daily; and

(2)

produce and transmit to the PRA any data and information necessary for the purpose
of liquidity supervision.

TRANSITIONAL PROVISION

4.1

In 1.1 the reference to third country firm is to be read as a reference to a firm which has its
registered office (or, if it has no registered office, its head office) outside the European Union.

Replace with Implementing Technical Standards to be adopted by the Commission in accordance
with CRR Art 415(3)(b).
Page 3 of 3

Appendix 2.E

LIQUIDITY STANDARDS CONSEQUENTIALS INSTRUMENT [YEAR]
Powers exercised
A. The Prudential Regulation Authority (“PRA”) makes this instrument in the exercise of the
following powers and related provisions in the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000
(“the Act”):
(1) section 137G (The PRA’s general rules); and
(2) section 137T (General supplementary powers).
B. The rule-making powers referred to above are specified for the purpose of section
138G(2) (Rule-making instrument) of the Act.
Pre-conditions to making
C. In accordance with section 138J of the Act (Consultation by the PRA), the PRA consulted
the Financial Conduct Authority. After consulting, the PRA published a draft of proposed
rules and had regard to representations made.
Commencement
D. Annex A to Annex D and Annex F to this instrument come into force on 1 October 2015.
E. Annex E to this instrument shall come into force on the date specified by a subsequent
PRA Board Instrument.

Amendments to the Handbook
F. The modules of the PRA Handbook of rules and guidance listed in column (1) below are
amended in accordance with the Annexes to this instrument listed in column (2).
(1)
Glossary of definitions
Senior Management Arrangements, Systems and Controls sourcebook
(SYSC)
Prudential sourcebook for Banks, Building Societies and Investment
Firms (BIPRU)
Supervision manual (SUP)
Supervision manual (SUP)

(2)
Annex A
Annex B
Annex C
Annex D
Annex E

Amendments to the Rulebook
G. The PRA Rulebook: Fundamental Rules is amended in accordance with Annex F to this
instrument.
Citation
H. This instrument may be cited as the Liquidity Standards Consequentials Instrument
[YEAR].
By order of the Board of the Prudential Regulation Authority
[DATE]
Page 1 of 22

Appendix 2.E

Annex A
Amendments to the Glossary of definitions
In this Annex, underlining indicates new text and striking through indicates deleted text.
Insert the following new definitions and amendments in the appropriate alphabetical order.
ILAS BIPRU firm

(A) In the PRA Handbook:
a firm falling into BIPRU 12.1.1R, but excluding a firm that is:
(a)

an exempt full scope BIPRU investment firm; or a UK
bank; or

(b)

a BIPRU limited licence firm; or a building society; or

(c)

a BIPRU limited activity firm; or a UK designated
investment firm; or

(d)

an exempt BIPRU commodities firm. a third country
reporting firm that has a branch in the United
Kingdom.

...
intra-group liquidity
modification

a modification to the overall liquidity adequacy rule of the kind
described in BIPRU 12.8.7G as in effect on 30 September 2015
granted to a firm and in effect on that date.

...
low frequency
liquidity reporting
firm

any of the following:
(a)

a simplified ILAS BIPRU firm; or

(b)

a standard ILAS BIPRU firm whose most recent annual
report and accounts show balance sheet assets of less than £5
billion (or its equivalent in foreign currency translated into
sterling at the balance sheet date); or

(c)

a standard ILAS BIPRU firm that meets the following
conditions:
(i)

it does not have any annual report and accounts and
it has been too recently established to be required to
have produced any;

Page 2 of 22

Appendix 2.E

(ii)

it has submitted a projected balance sheet to the FCA
or PRA (as the case may be) as part of an application
for a Part 4A permission or a variation of one; and

(iii)

the most recent such balance sheet shows that the firm
will meet the size condition in (b) in all periods
covered by that projection.

In respect of an incoming EEA firm or a third country BIPRU
reporting firm that is also a standard ILAS BIPRU firm and which
reports on the basis of its branch operation in the United Kingdom, if
the balance sheet assets attributable to the UK branch can be
determined from the firm's most recent annual report and accounts
(or, if applicable, the projected balance sheet) or any data item
submitted by the firm, then paragraphs (b) and (c) apply at the level
of the branch rather than of the firm.
...
overall liquidity
adequacy rule

BIPRU 12.2.1R as in effect on 30 September 2015.

...
simplified ILAS

the approach to the calculation of the liquid assets buffer of a
simplified ILAS BIPRU firm described in BIPRU 12.6 as in effect on
30 September 2015.

...
simplified ILAS
BIPRU firm

an ILAS BIPRU firm that, in accordance with the procedures in
BIPRU 12 (Liquidity) as in effect on 30 September 2015, iswas
using the simplified ILAS on that date.

...
third country
reporting firm

one of the following:
(1)

(2)

an overseas firm that:
(a)

is a bank;

(b)

is not an EEA firm; and

(c)

has its head office outside the EEA; or

an EEA bank that has its registered office (or if it has no
registered office, its head office) outside the EU.

Page 3 of 22

Appendix 2.E

...
whole-firm liquidity
modification

a modification to the overall liquidity adequacy rule of the kind
described in BIPRU 12.8.22G as in effect on 30 September 2015
granted to a firm and in effect on that date.

Page 4 of 22

Appendix 2.E

Annex B
Amendments to the Senior Management Arrangements, Systems and Controls
sourcebook (SYSC)
In this Annex, underlining indicates new text and striking through indicates deleted text.
12.1

Application

...
CRR firms and non-CRR firms that are parent financial holding companies in
a Member State
12.1.13 R If this rule applies under SYSC 12.1.14R to a firm, the firm must:
(1) ...
(2) ensure that the risk management processes and internal control
mechanisms at the level of any consolidation group or non-EEA sub-group
of which it is a member comply with the obligations set out in the
following provisions on a consolidated (or sub-consolidated) basis:
(a) ...
…
(e) BIPRU 12.3.4 R, BIPRU 12.3.5 R, BIPRU 12.3.7A R, BIPRU 12.3.8
R , BIPRU 12.3.22A R, BIPRU 12.3.22B R, BIPRU 12.3.27 R, BIPRU
12.4.-2 R, BIPRU 12.4.-1 R, BIPRU 12.4.5A R, BIPRU 12.4.10 R
,BIPRU 12.4.11 R and BIPRU 12.4.11A R; [deleted]
(f)

…

Page 5 of 22

Appendix 2.E

Annex C
Amendments to the Prudential sourcebook for Banks, Building Societies and
Investment Firms (BIPRU)
The entirety of part 2 of the Annex to Prudential sourcebook for Banks, Building Societies
and Investment Firms (Liquidity Standards) Amendments Instrument 2013 is revoked.
BIPRU 12, BIPRU Schedule 3 and BIPRU Schedule 6 are deleted in their entirety.

Page 6 of 22

Appendix 2.E

Annex D
Amendments to the Supervisory manual (SUP)
The entirety of part 5 of the Annex of the Capital Requirements Regulation (Reporting)
Amendment Instrument 2013 is revoked.
In this Annex, underlining indicates new text and striking through indicates deleted text,
unless otherwise stated.
16.12

Integrated Regulatory Reporting

...
16.12.4A

RAG 1 includes an incoming EEA firm exercising a BCD right through a
UK branch.[deleted]

Group liquidity reporting
16.12.4B

Reporting at group level for liquidity purposes by firms falling within
BIPRU 12 (Liquidity) is by reference to defined liquidity groups.
Guidance about the different types of defined liquidity groups and related
material is set out in SUP 16 Annex 26 (Guidance on designated liquidity
groups in SUP 16.12).[deleted]

Regulated Activity Group 1
SUP 16.12.5R is deleted in its entirety. This text is not shown.
16.12.5A

Description
of data item

Prudential category of firm, applicable data items and reporting format (Note 1)
UK bank

The applicable data items and forms or reports referred to in SUP
16.12.4R are set out according to firm type in the table below:

Building
society

Non-EEA
bank

EEA bank
that has its
registered
office (or,
if it has no
registered
office, its
head office)
outside the
EU that has
permission
to accept
deposits,
other than
one with
permission
for cross
border
services

Page 7 of 22

[deleted]

Credit
union

Dormant
account fund
operator
(note 15)

Appendix 2.E

only

Annual report
and accounts

No standard format

No standard
format, but
in English

Annual report
and accounts
of the mixedactivity
holding
company
(note 9)

No standard format

Solvency
statement
(note 10)

No standard format

Balance sheet

FSA001 (note 2)

FSA001
(note 2)

Income
statement

FSA002 (note 2)

FSA002
(note 2)

CQ; CY

FSA002

Capital
adequacy

CQ; CY

[deleted]

Market risk

FSA005 (notes 2, 4)

FSA005
(notes 2, 4)

Market risk supplementar
y

FSA006 (note 5)

Large
exposures
Exposures
between core
UK group
and non-core
large
exposures
group

No standard
format

CQ; CY

FSA018 (note 12)

Liquidity
(other than
stock)

FSA018
(note 12)

FSA011

Forecast data

FSA014 (note 11)

FSA014
(note 11)

Solo
consolidation
data

FSA016 (note 7)

FSA016
(note 7)

Interest rate
gap report

FSA017

CQ; CY

Page 8 of 22

Appendix 2.E

Sectoral
information,
including
arrears and
impairment

FSA015
(Note 2)

IRB portfolio
risk

FSA045 (note 13)

FSA045
(note 13)

Daily Flows

FSA047 (Notes 16, 20
and 22)

FSA047
(Notes 16,
20 and 22)

FSA047
(Notes 16,
18, 20 and
22)

Enhanced
Mismatch
Report

FSA048 (Notes 16, 20
and 22)

FSA048
(Notes 16,
20 and 22)

FSA048
(Notes 16,
18, 20 and
22)

Funding
Concentration

FSA051 (Notes 17, 21
and 22)

FSA051
(Notes 17,
21 and 22)

FSA051
(Notes 17,
19, 21 and
22)

Retail and
corporate
funding

FSA053 (Notes 17, 21
and 22)

FSA053
(Notes 17,
21 and 22)

FSA053
(Notes 17,
19, 21 and
22)

Note 1

When submitting the completed data item required, a firm must use the format of the data item set out in SUP 16
Annex 24R, except for credit union reports that are in SUP 16 Annex 14R. Guidance notes for completion of the data
items are contained in SUP 16 Annex 25G (or Annex 15G for credit unions).

Note 2

Firms that are members of a UK consolidation group are also required to submit this data item on a UK consolidation
group basis. Firms' attention is drawn to SUP 16.3.25G regarding a single submission for all firms in the group.

Note 3

[deleted]

Note 4

For PRA-authorised persons lines 62 to 64 only are applicable. These lines apply to a firm that applies add-ons to their
market risk capital calculation under the RNIV framework. For further guidance on how to complete the form PRAauthorised persons may refer to SUP 16.12.25A R.

Note 5

Only applicable to firms with a VaR model permission.

Note 6

[deleted]

Note 7

Only applicable to a firm that has a solo consolidation waiver.

Note 8

[deleted]

Note 9

[deleted]

Note 10

[deleted]

Note 11

Members of a UK consolidation group should only submit this data item at the UK consolidation group level.

Note 12

Only applicable to a firm that has both a core UK group and a non-core large exposures group.

Note 13

Only applicable to firms that have an IRB permission.

Note 14

[deleted]

Page 9 of 22

Appendix 2.E

Note 15

Only applies to a dormant account fund operator that does not fall into any of the other prudential categories in this
table.

Note 16

A firm must complete this item separately on each of the following bases that are applicable.
(1) It must complete it on a solo basis (including on the basis of the firm's UK branch). Therefore even if it has a solo
consolidation waiver it must complete the item on an unconsolidated basis by reference to the firm alone.
(2) If it is a group liquidity reporting firm in a DLG by default and is a UK lead regulated firm, it must complete the
item on the basis of that group.
(3) If it is a group liquidity reporting firm in a UK DLG by modification, it must complete the item on the basis of that
group and (1) does not apply.
(4) If it is a group liquidity reporting firm in a non-UK DLG by modification, it must complete the item on the basis of
that group.

Note 17

A firm must complete this item separately on each of the following bases that are applicable.
(1) It must complete it on a solo basis (including on the basis of the firm's UK branch) unless it is a group liquidity
reporting firm in a UK DLG by modification. Therefore even if it has a solo consolidation waiver it must complete the
item on an unconsolidated basis by reference to the firm alone.
(2) If it is a group liquidity reporting firm in a UK DLG by modification, it must complete the item on the basis of that
group.

Note 18

(1) If the firm has a whole-firm liquidity modification, it must complete this item on the basis of the whole firm (or at
any other reporting level the whole-firm liquidity modification may have required) and not just its UK branch.
(2) Otherwise the firm must complete this item by reference to the activities of its branch operation in the United
Kingdom in accordance with SUP 16.12.3R (1)(a)(iv).

Note 19

(1) If the firm has a whole-firm liquidity modification there is no obligation to report this item.
(2) Otherwise the firm must complete this item by reference to the activities of its branch operation in the United
Kingdom in accordance with SUP 16.12.3R (1)(a)(iv).

Note 20

(1) This item must be reported in the reporting currency.
(2) If any data element is in a currency or currencies other than the reporting currency, all currencies (including the
reporting currency) must be combined into a figure in the reporting currency.
(3) In addition, all material currencies (which may include the reporting currency) must each be recorded separately
(translated into the reporting currency). However if:
(a) the reporting frequency is (whether under a rule or under a waiver) quarterly or less than quarterly; or
(b) the only material currency is the reporting currency;
(3) does not apply.
(4) If there are more than three material currencies for this data item, (3) only applies to the three largest in amount. A
firm must identify the largest in amount in accordance with the following procedure.
(a) For each currency, take the largest of the asset or liability figure as referred to in the definition of material currency.
(b) Take the three largest figures from the resulting list of amounts.
(5) The date as at which the calculations for the purposes of the definition of material currency are carried out is the
last day of the reporting period in question.
(6) The reporting currency for this data item is whichever of the following currencies the firm chooses, namely USD
(the United States Dollar), EUR (the euro), GBP (sterling), JPY (the Japanese Yen), CHF (the Swiss Franc), CAD (the
Canadian Dollar) or SEK (the Swedish Krona).

Note 21

Note 20 applies, except that paragraphs (3), (4) and (5) do not apply, meaning that material currencies must not be
recorded separately.

Note 22

Any changes to reporting requirements caused by a firm receiving an intra-group liquidity modification or a whole-firm
liquidity modification (or a variation to one) do not take effect until the first day of the next reporting period applicable
under the changed reporting requirements for the data item in question if the firm receives that intra-group liquidity
modification, whole-firm liquidity modification or variation part of the way through such a period. If the change is that
the firm does not have to report a particular data item or does not have to report it at a particular reporting level, the
firm must nevertheless report that item or at that reporting level for any reporting period that has already begun. This
paragraph is subject to anything that the intra-group liquidity modification or a whole-firm liquidity modification says
to the contrary.

Note 23

Only applicable to firms that hold securitisation positions in the trading book and/ or are the originator or sponsor of
securitisations held in the trading book.

Note 24

[deleted]

Page 10 of 22

Appendix 2.E

…
16.12.11B

The applicable data items referred to in SUP 16.12.4R for UK
designated investment firms are set out below:

Description of data item

Applicable data items (Note 1)

…
Daily flows

FSA047 (Notes 10, 13, and 15 and
16)

Enhanced Mismatch Report

FSA048 (Notes 10, 13, and 15 and
16)

Liquidity Buffer Qualifying Securities

FSA050 (Notes 11, 14, 15 and 16)

Funding Concentration

FSA051 (Notes 11, 14, and 15 and
16)

Pricing data

FSA052 (Notes 11, 15, 16 and 17)

Retail and corporate funding

FSA053 (Notes 11, 14, and 15 and
16)

Currency Analysis

FSA054 (Notes 11, 14, 15 and 16)

Systems and Controls Questionnaire

FSA055 (Notes 12 and 16)

…
Note
10

A firm must complete this item separately on each of the following
bases (if applicable).
(1) It must complete it on a solo basis. Therefore even if it has an
individual consolidation permission it must complete the item on an
unconsolidated basis by reference to the firm alone.
(2) If it is a group liquidity reporting firm in a DLG by default and
is a UK lead regulated firm, it must complete the item on the basis
of that group.
(3) If it is a group liquidity reporting firm in a UK DLG by
modification, it must complete the item on the basis of that group
and (1) does not apply.
(4) If it is a group liquidity reporting firm in a non-UK DLG by
modification, it must complete the item on the basis of that group.

…
Page 11 of 22

Appendix 2.E

Note
12

If it is a non-ILAS BIPRU firm, it must complete it on a solo basis.
Therefore even if it has an individual consolidation permission it
must complete the item on an unconsolidated basis by reference to
the firm alone. [deleted]

…
Note
16

FSA047, FSA048, FSA050, FSA051, FSA052, FSA053 and
FSA054 must be completed by an ILAS BIPRU firm. An ILAS
BIPRU firm does not need to complete FSA055. A non-ILAS
BIPRU firm must complete FSA055 and does not need to complete
FSA047, FSA048, FSA050, FSA051, FSA052, FSA053 and
FSA054. [deleted]

Note
17

This data item must be reported only in the currencies named in
FSA052, so that liabilities in GBP are reported in GBP in rows 1 to
4, those in USD are reported in USD in rows 5 to 8, and those in
Euro are reported in Euro in rows 9 to 12. Liabilities in other
currencies are not to be reported. [deleted]

…
…
Regulated Activity Group 4
16.12.15B

The applicable data items referred to in SUP 16.12.4R for UK designated
investment firms are set out below:

Description of data item

Applicable data items (Note 1)

…
Daily Flows

FSA047 (Notes 7,10, and 12 and
13)

Enhanced Mismatch Report

FSA048 (Notes 7,10, and 12 and
13)

Liquidity Buffer Qualifying Securities

FSA050 (Notes 8, 11, 12 and 13)

Funding Concentration

FSA051 (Notes 8, 11, and 12 and
13)

Pricing data

FSA052 (Notes 8, 12, 13 and 14)

Page 12 of 22

Appendix 2.E

Retail and corporate funding

FSA053 (Notes 8, 11, and 12 and
13)

Currency Analysis

FSA054 (Notes 8, 11, 12 and 13)

Pricing data

FSA052 (Notes 8, 12, 13 and 14)

Systems and Control Questionnaire

FSA055 (Notes 9 and 13)

…
Note 7

A firm must complete this item separately on each of the
following bases (if applicable).
(1) It must complete it on a solo basis. Therefore even if it has an
individual consolidation permission it must complete the item on
an unconsolidated basis by reference to the firm alone.
(2) If it is a group liquidity reporting firm in a DLG by default
and is a UK lead regulated firm, it must complete the item on the
basis of that group.
(3) If it is a group liquidity reporting firm in a UK DLG by
modification, it must complete the item on the basis of that
group and (1) does not apply.
(4) If it is a group liquidity reporting firm in a non-UK DLG by
modification, it must complete the item on the basis of that
group.

Note 9

If it is a non-ILAS BIPRU firm, it must complete it on a solo
basis. Therefore even if it has an individual consolidation
permission it must complete the item on an unconsolidated basis
by reference to the firm alone.[deleted]

…
Note 13

FSA047, FSA048, FSA050, FSA051, FSA052, FSA053 and
FSA054 must be completed by an ILAS BIPRU firm. An ILAS
BIPRU firm does not need to complete FSA055. A non-ILAS
BIPRU firm must complete FSA055 and does not need to
complete FSA047, FSA048, FSA050, FSA051, FSA052,
FSA053 and FSA054.[deleted]

Note 14

This data item must be reported only in the currencies named in
FSA052, so that liabilities in GBP are reported in GBP in rows 1
to 4, those in USD are reported in USD in rows 5 to 8, and those
in Euro are reported in Euro in rows 9 to 12. Liabilities in other
currencies are not to be reported.[deleted]
Page 13 of 22

Appendix 2.E

…
…
Regulated Activity Group 7
16.12.22C

The applicable data items referred to in SUP 16.12.4R for UK
designated investment firms are set out in the table below:

Description of data item

Applicable data item (Note 1)

…
Daily Flows

FSA047 (Notes 6, 9, and 11 and 12)

Enhanced Mismatch Report

FSA048 (Notes 6, 9, and 11 and 12)

Liquidity Buffer Qualifying
Securities

FSA050 (Notes 7, 10, 11 and 12)

Funding Concentration

FSA051 (Notes 7, 10, and 11 and 12)

Pricing Data

FSA052 (Note 7, 10, 12 and 13)

Retail and corporate funding

FSA053 (Notes 7, 10, and 11 and 12)

Currency Analysis

FSA054 (Notes 7, 10, 11 and 12)

Systems and Controls Questionnaire

FSA055 (Notes 8 and 12)

…
Note 6

A firm must complete this item separately on each of the
following bases (if applicable).
(1) It must complete it on a solo basis. Therefore even if it has
an individual consolidation permission it must complete the item
on an unconsolidated basis by reference to the firm alone.
(2) If it is a group liquidity reporting firm in a DLG by default
and is a UK lead regulated firm, it must complete the item on
the basis of that group.
(3) If it is a group liquidity reporting firm in a UK DLG by
modification, it must complete the item on the basis of that
group and (1) does not apply.
(4) If it is a group liquidity reporting firm in a non-UK DLG by
modification, it must complete the item on the basis of that
group

Page 14 of 22

Appendix 2.E

Note 8

If it is a non-ILAS BIPRU firm, it must complete it on a solo
basis. Therefore even if it has an individual consolidation
permission it must complete the item on an unconsolidated basis
by reference to the firm alone.[deleted]

…
Note 12

FSA047, FSA048, FSA050, FSA051, FSA052, FSA053 and
FSA054 must be completed by an ILAS BIPRU firm. An ILAS
BIPRU firm does not need to complete FSA055. A non-ILAS
BIPRU firm must complete FSA055 and does not need to
complete FSA047, FSA048, FSA050, FSA051, FSA052,
FSA053 and FSA054.[deleted]

Note 13

This data item must be reported only in the currencies named in
FSA052, so that liabilities in GBP are reported in GBP in rows 1
to 4, those in USD are reported in USD in rows 5 to 8, and those
in Euro are reported in Euro in rows 9 to 12. Liabilities in other
currencies are not to be reported.[deleted]

…
…
Regulated Activity Group 8
16.12.25C

The applicable data items referred to in SUP 16.12.4R are set out in the
table below:

Description of data item

Applicable data item (Note 1)

…
Daily flows

FSA047 (Notes 9, 12, and 14 and 15)

Enhanced Mismatch Report

FSA048 (Notes 9, 12, 14 and 15)

Liquidity Buffer Qualifying
Securities

FSA050 (Notes 10, 13, 14 and 15)

Funding Concentration

FSA051 (Notes 10, 13, and 14 and
15)

Pricing data

FSA052 (Notes 10, 14, 15 and 16)

Retail and corporate funding

FSA053 (Notes 10, 13, and 14 and

Page 15 of 22

Appendix 2.E

15)
Currency Analysis

FSA054 (Notes 10, 13, 14 and 15)

Systems and Controls Questionnaire

FSA055(Notes 11 and 15)

Note 9

A firm must complete this item separately on each of the
following bases (if applicable).
(1) It must complete it on a solo basis. Therefore even if it
has an individual consolidation permission it must complete
the item on an unconsolidated basis by reference to the firm
alone.
(2) If it a group liquidity reporting firm in a DLG by default
and is a UK lead regulated firm, it must complete the item on
the basis of that group.
(3) If it is a group liquidity reporting firm in a UK DLG by
modification, it must complete the item on the basis of that
group and (1) does not apply.
(4) If it is a group liquidity reporting firm in a non-UK DLG
by modification, it must complete the item on the basis of that
group.

…
Note 11

If it is a non-ILAS BIPRU firm, it must complete it on a solo
basis. Therefore even if it has an individual consolidation
permission it must complete the item on an unconsolidated
basis by reference to the firm alone.[deleted]

…
Note 15

FSA047, FSA048, FSA050, FSA051, FSA052, FSA053 and
FSA054 must be completed by an ILAS BIPRU firm. An
ILAS BIPRU firm does not need to complete FSA055. A
non-ILAS BIPRU firm must complete FSA055 and does not
need to complete FSA047, FSA048, FSA050, FSA051,
FSA052, FSA053 and FSA054.[deleted]

Note 16

This data item must be reported only in the currencies named
in FSA052, so that liabilities in GBP are reported in GBP in
rows 1 to 4, those in USD are reported in USD in rows 5 to 8,
and those in Euro are reported in Euro in rows 9 to 12.
Liabilities in other currencies are not to be reported. [deleted]

…

Page 16 of 22

Appendix 2.E

…
16
Annex
26

Guidance on designated liquidity groups in SUP 16.12

The entirety of SUP 16 Annex 26 (Guidance on designated liquidity groups in SUP 16.12) is
deleted. The deleted text is not shown.

Page 17 of 22

Appendix 2.E

Annex E
Amendments to the Supervisory manual (SUP)
In this Annex, underlining indicates new text and striking through indicates deleted text,
unless otherwise stated.
16.12

Integrated Regulatory Reporting

...
Regulated Activity Group 1
SUP 16.12.5R is deleted in its entirety. This text is not shown.
16.12.5A

The applicable data items and forms or reports referred to in SUP
16.12.4R are set out according to firm type in the table below:

...
Description
of data item

Prudential category of firm, applicable data items and reporting format (Note 1)
UK bank

Building
society

Non-EEA
bank

Daily Flows

FSA047 (Notes 16, 20
and 22)

FSA047
(Notes 16,
20 and 22)

FSA047
(Notes 16,
18, 20 and
22)

Enhanced
Mismatch
Report

FSA048 (Notes 16, 20
and 22)

FSA048
(Notes 16,
20 and 22)

FSA048
(Notes 16,
18, 20 and
22)

[deleted]

Credit
union

Dormant
account fund
operator
(note 15)

…

…
Note 17

Page 18 of 22

Appendix 2.E

group and (1) does not apply.[deleted]
…
Note 21

Note 20 applies, except that paragraphs (3), (4) and (5) do not apply, meaning that material currencies must not be
recorded separately.[deleted]

…
16.12.11B

The applicable data items referred to in SUP 16.12.4R for UK
designated investment firms are set out below:

Description of data item

Applicable data items (Note 1)

…
Funding Concentration

FSA051 (Notes 11, 14 and 15)

…
Retail and corporate funding

FSA053 (Notes 11, 14 and 15)

…
Note
11

A firm must complete this item separately on each of the following
bases that are applicable.
(1) It must complete it on a solo basis unless it is a group liquidity
reporting firm in a UK DLG by modification. Therefore even if it
has an individual consolidation permission it must complete the
item on an unconsolidated basis by reference to the firm alone.
(2) If it is a group liquidity reporting firm in a UK DLG by
modification, it must complete the item on the basis of that
group.[deleted]

…
Note
14

Note 13 applies, except that paragraphs (3), (4) and (5) do not
apply, meaning that material currencies must not be recorded
separately.[deleted]

...
…
Regulated Activity Group 4
16.12.15B

The applicable data items referred to in SUP 16.12.4R for UK designated
investment firms are set out below:

Description of data item

Applicable data items (Note 1)

…

Page 19 of 22

Appendix 2.E

Funding Concentration

FSA051 (Notes 8, 11 and 12)

…
Retail and corporate funding

FSA053 (Notes 8, 11 and 12)

…
Note 8

A firm must complete this item separately on each of the
following bases that are applicable.
(1) It must complete it on a solo basis unless it is a group
liquidity reporting firm in a UK DLG by modification. Therefore
even if it has an individual consolidation permission it must
complete the item on an unconsolidated basis by reference to the
firm alone.
(2) If it is a group liquidity reporting firm in a UK DLG by
modification, it must complete the item on the basis of that
group.[deleted]

…
Note 11

Note 10 applies, except that paragraphs (3), (4), and (5) do not
apply, meaning that material currencies must not be recorded
separately.[deleted]

…
…
Regulated Activity Group 7
16.12.22C

The applicable data items referred to in SUP 16.12.4R for UK
designated investment firms are set out in the table below:

Description of data item

Applicable data item (Note 1)

…
Funding Concentration

FSA051 (Notes 7, 10 and 11)

Retail and corporate funding

FSA053 (Notes 7, 10 and 11)

…
Note 7

A firm must complete this item separately on each of the
following bases that are applicable.
(1) It must complete it on a solo basis unless it is a group
liquidity reporting firm in a UK DLG by modification. Therefore
even if it has an individual consolidation permission it must
complete the item on an unconsolidated basis by reference to the
Page 20 of 22

Appendix 2.E

firm alone.
(2) If it is a group liquidity reporting firm in a UK DLG by
modification, it must complete the item on the basis of that
group.[deleted]
…
Note 10

Note 9 applies, except that paragraphs (3), (4) and (5) do not
apply, meaning that material currencies must not be recorded
separately.[deleted]

…
…
Regulated Activity Group 8
16.12.25C

The applicable data items referred to in SUP 16.12.4R are set out in the
table below:

Description of data item

Applicable data item (Note 1)

…
Funding Concentration

FSA051 (Notes 10, 13 and 14)

…
Retail and corporate funding

FSA053 (Notes 10, 13 and 14)

…
Note 10

A firm must complete this item separately on each of the
following bases that are applicable.
(1) It must complete it on a solo basis unless it is a group
liquidity reporting firm in a UK DLG by modification.
Therefore even if it has an individual consolidation
permission it must complete the item on an unconsolidated
basis by reference to the firm alone.
(2) If it is a group liquidity reporting firm in a UK DLG by
modification, it must complete the item on the basis of that
group.[deleted]

…
Note 13

Note 24 applies, except that paragraphs (3), (4) and (5) do not
apply, meaning that material currencies must not be recorded
separately.[deleted]

…

Page 21 of 22

Appendix 2.E

Annex F
Amendments to the Fundamental Rules
In this Annex new text is underlined and deleted text is struck through.
3

RESTRICTIONS

3.1

The Fundamental Rules apply to every firm, except that:
(1)

...

(2)

for an incoming EEA firm that is a credit institution without a top-up
permission, Fundamental Rule 4 applies only in relation to the liquidity of a
branch established in the UK does not apply; and

(3)

...

Page 22 of 22

Appendix 3

Mapping of BIPRU 12 rules to the ILAA Part of the PRA Rulebook

Appendix 3

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