Hp Fips 140 2 Users Manual 2d 1B StorageWorks Secure Key Manager Security Policy 1.1 _12_01_08_
FIPS 140-2 to the manual b0080d19-c974-4456-a753-17cf41e6f7fc
2015-02-09
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HP StorageWorks Secure Key Manager (Hardware P/N AJ087B, Version 1.1; Firmware Version:1.1) FIPS 140-2 Security Policy Level 2 Validation Document Version 0.7 December 4, 2008 © 2008 Hewlett-Packard Company This document may be freely reproduced in its original entirety. Security Policy, version 1.0 January 31, 2008 Table of Contents 1 INTRODUCTION ...............................................................................................................................................5 1.1 PURPOSE .........................................................................................................................................................5 1.2 REFERENCES ...................................................................................................................................................5 2 HP STORAGEWORKS SECURE KEY MANAGER .....................................................................................6 2.1 OVERVIEW......................................................................................................................................................6 2.2 CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULE SPECIFICATION ....................................................................................................6 2.3 MODULE INTERFACES ....................................................................................................................................8 2.4 ROLES, SERVICES, AND AUTHENTICATION ...................................................................................................11 2.4.1 Crypto Officer Role..............................................................................................................................11 2.4.2 User Role .............................................................................................................................................12 2.4.3 HP User Role.......................................................................................................................................13 2.4.4 Cluster Member Role ...........................................................................................................................14 2.4.5 Authentication......................................................................................................................................14 2.4.6 Unauthenticated Services ....................................................................................................................15 2.5 PHYSICAL SECURITY ....................................................................................................................................15 2.6 OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT ......................................................................................................................15 2.7 CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY MANAGEMENT ..........................................................................................................15 2.7.1 Keys and CSPs.....................................................................................................................................15 2.7.2 Key Generation....................................................................................................................................19 2.7.3 Key/CSP Zeroization............................................................................................................................19 2.8 SELF-TESTS ..................................................................................................................................................19 2.9 MITIGATION OF OTHER ATTACKS.................................................................................................................20 3 SECURE OPERATION....................................................................................................................................21 3.1 INITIAL SETUP ..............................................................................................................................................21 3.2 INITIALIZATION AND CONFIGURATION .........................................................................................................21 3.2.1 First-Time Initialization.......................................................................................................................21 3.2.2 FIPS Mode Configuration ...................................................................................................................21 3.3 PHYSICAL SECURITY ASSURANCE ................................................................................................................22 3.4 KEY AND CSP ZEROIZATION ........................................................................................................................24 3.5 ERROR STATE ...............................................................................................................................................24 ACRONYMS..............................................................................................................................................................25 HP StorageWorks Secure Key Manager © 2008 Hewlett-Packard Company This document may be freely reproduced in its original entirety. Page 2 of 26 Security Policy, version 1.0 January 31, 2008 Table of Figures FIGURE 1 – DEPLOYMENT ARCHITECTURE OF THE HP STORAGEWORKS SECURE KEY MANAGER ................................6 FIGURE 2 – BLOCK DIAGRAM OF SKM...........................................................................................................................7 FIGURE 3 – FRONT PANEL LEDS ....................................................................................................................................9 FIGURE 4 – REAR PANEL COMPONENTS .......................................................................................................................10 FIGURE 5 – REAR PANEL LEDS ....................................................................................................................................10 FIGURE 6 – FIPS COMPLIANCE IN CLI .........................................................................................................................22 FIGURE 7 – FIPS COMPLIANCE IN WEB ADMINISTRATION INTERFACE .........................................................................22 FIGURE 8 – TAMPER-EVIDENCE LABELS ......................................................................................................................23 FIGURE 9 – TAMPER-EVIDENCE LABELS OVER POWER SUPPLIES .................................................................................23 HP StorageWorks Secure Key Manager © 2008 Hewlett-Packard Company This document may be freely reproduced in its original entirety. Page 3 of 26 Security Policy, version 1.0 January 31, 2008 Table of Tables TABLE 1 – SECURITY LEVEL PER FIPS 140-2 SECTION...................................................................................................6 TABLE 2 – LOGICAL INTERFACE AND PHYSICAL PORTS MAPPING ..................................................................................8 TABLE 3 – FRONT PANEL LED DEFINITIONS ..................................................................................................................9 TABLE 4 – REAR PANEL COMPONENTS DESCRIPTIONS .................................................................................................10 TABLE 5 – REAR PANEL LED DEFINITIONS ..................................................................................................................11 TABLE 6 – CRYPTO OFFICER SERVICES ........................................................................................................................11 TABLE 7 – USER SERVICES ...........................................................................................................................................13 TABLE 8 – HP USER SERVICES .....................................................................................................................................13 TABLE 9 – CLUSTER MEMBER SERVICES ......................................................................................................................14 TABLE 10 – ROLES AND AUTHENTICATIONS ................................................................................................................14 TABLE 11 – LIST OF CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEYS, CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY COMPONENTS, AND CSPS FOR SSH....................15 TABLE 12 – LIST OF CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEYS, CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY COMPONENTS, AND CSPS FOR TLS....................16 TABLE 13 – CIPHER SUITES SUPPORTED BY THE MODULE’S TLS IMPLEMENTATION IN FIPS MODE ...........................17 TABLE 14 – OTHER CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEYS, CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY COMPONENTS, AND CSPS ...................................17 TABLE 15 – ACRONYMS ...............................................................................................................................................25 HP StorageWorks Secure Key Manager © 2008 Hewlett-Packard Company This document may be freely reproduced in its original entirety. Page 4 of 26 Security Policy, version 1.0 January 31, 2008 1 Introduction 1.1 Purpose This document is a non-proprietary Cryptographic Module Security Policy for the HP StorageWorks Secure Key Manager (SKM) from Hewlett-Packard Company. Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) 140-2, Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, specifies the U.S. and Canadian Governments’ requirements for cryptographic modules. The following pages describe how HP’s SKM meets these requirements and how to use the SKM in a mode of operation compliant with FIPS 140-2. This policy was prepared as part of the Level 2 FIPS 140-2 validation of the HP StorageWorks Secure Key Manager. More information about FIPS 140-2 and the Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP) is available at the website of the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST): http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/index.html. In this document, the HP StorageWorks Secure Key Manager is referred to as the SKM, the module, or the device. 1.2 References This document deals only with the operations and capabilities of the module in the technical terms of a FIPS 140-2 cryptographic module security policy. More information is available on the module from the following sources: • The HP website (http://www.hp.com) contains information on the full line of products from HP. • The CMVP website (http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/index.html) contains contact information for answers to technical or sales-related questions for the module. HP StorageWorks Secure Key Manager © 2008 Hewlett-Packard Company This document may be freely reproduced in its original entirety. Page 5 of 26 Security Policy, version 1.0 January 31, 2008 2 HP StorageWorks Secure Key Manager 2.1 Overview HP provides a range of security products for banking, the Internet, and enterprise security applications. These products use encryption technology—often embedded in hardware—to safeguard sensitive data, such as financial transactions over private and public networks and to offload security processing from the server. The HP StorageWorks Secure Key Manager is a hardened server that provides security policy and key management services to encrypting client devices and applications. After enrollment, clients, such as storage systems, application servers and databases, make requests to the SKM for creation and management of cryptographic keys and related metadata. Client applications can access the SKM via its Key Management Service (KMS) server. Configuration and management can be performed via web administration, Secure Shell (SSH), or serial console. Status-monitoring interfaces include a dedicated FIPS status interface, a health check interface, and Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP). The deployment architecture of the HP StorageWorks Secure Key Manager is shown in Figure 1 below. Web Server Application Server Database Storage System HP StorageWorks Secure Key Manager Figure 1 – Deployment Architecture of the HP StorageWorks Secure Key Manager 2.2 Cryptographic Module Specification The HP StorageWorks Secure Key Manager is validated at FIPS 140-2 section levels shown in Table 1 – Security Level per FIPS 140-2 Section. Table 1 – Security Level per FIPS 140-2 Section Section Section Title Level 1 Cryptographic Module Specification 3 2 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 2 3 Roles, Services, and Authentication 3 4 Finite State Model 2 5 Physical Security 2 6 Operational Environment 7 Cryptographic Key Management 2 8 EMI/EMC 2 9 Self-Tests 2 N/A HP StorageWorks Secure Key Manager © 2008 Hewlett-Packard Company This document may be freely reproduced in its original entirety. Page 6 of 26 Security Policy, version 1.0 January 31, 2008 Section Section Title 10 Design Assurance 11 Mitigation of Other Attacks Level 2 N/A The block diagram of the module is given in Figure 2 – Block Diagram of SKM. The cryptographic boundary is clearly shown in the figure. Figure 2 – Block Diagram of SKM In the FIPS mode of operation, the module implements the following Approved algorithms: • • • • • Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) encryption and decryption: 128, 192, and 256 bits, in Electronic Codebook (ECB) and Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) modes (certificate # 653) Triple Data Encryption Standard (3DES) encryption and decryption: 112 and 168 bits, in ECB and CBC modes (certificate # 604) Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA)-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512 (certificate # 847) Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC) SHA-1 and HMAC SHA-256 (certificate # 470) Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman (RSA) American National Standard Institute (ANSI) X9.31 key generation, signature generation, and signature verification: 1024 and 2048 bits (certificate # 302) HP StorageWorks Secure Key Manager © 2008 Hewlett-Packard Company This document may be freely reproduced in its original entirety. Page 7 of 26 Security Policy, version 1.0 • • • January 31, 2008 Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) PQG generation, key generation, signature generation, and signature verification: 1024 bits (certificate # 244) ANSI X9.31 Appendix A.2.4 with 2-key 3DES Deterministic Random Number Generator (DRNG) (certificate # 375) Diffie-Hellman key agreement (SP 800-56A, vendor affirmed; key establishment methodology provides 80 bits of encryption strength) In the FIPS mode of operation, the module implements the following non-approved algorithms: • • A non-approved Random Number Generator (RNG) to seed the ANSI X9.31 DRNG The following commercially-available protocols for key establishment: o Transport Layer Security (TLS) 1.0/ Secure Socket Layer (SSL) 3.1 protocol using RSA 1024 and 2048 bits for key transport. Caveat: The RSA 1024- and 2048-bit key wrapping and key establishment provide 80 and 112 bits of encryption strength, respectively. In the non-FIPS mode of operation, the module also implements DES, MD5, RC4, and 512- and 768-bit RSA for signature generation and verification, and key establishment. 2.3 Module Interfaces FIPS 140-2 defines four logical interfaces: • • • • Data Input Data Output Control Input Status Output The module features the following physical ports and LEDs: • • • • • • • Serial port (RS232 DB9) Ethernet 10/100/1000 RJ-45 ports (Network Interface Card [NIC], quantity: 2) Mouse port (PS/2) Keyboard port (PS/2) Monitor port (VGA DB15) Power input (115VAC) LEDs (six on the front panel and seven on the rear panel) The logical interfaces and their physical port mappings are described in Table 2 – Logical Interface and Physical Ports Mapping. Table 2 – Logical Interface and Physical Ports Mapping Logical Interface Physical Ports Data Input Keyboard, serial, Ethernet Data Output Monitor, serial, Ethernet Control Input Keyboard, mouse, serial, Ethernet Status Output Monitor, serial, Ethernet, LEDs There are no buttons or ports on the front panel. There are six LEDs on the front panel. See Figure 3 – Front Panel LEDs. HP StorageWorks Secure Key Manager © 2008 Hewlett-Packard Company This document may be freely reproduced in its original entirety. Page 8 of 26 Security Policy, version 1.0 January 31, 2008 Figure 3 – Front Panel LEDs Descriptions of the LEDs are given in Table 3 – Front Panel LED Definitions. Table 3 – Front Panel LED Definitions Item Description Status 1 Power On/Standby button and system power LED Green = System is on. Amber = System is shut down, but power is still applied. Off = Power cord is not attached, power supply failure has occurred, no power supplies are installed, facility power is not available, or disconnected power button cable. 2 Unit Identifier (UID) button/LED Blue = Identification is activated. Off = Identification is deactivated. 3 Internal health LED Green = System health is normal. Amber = System health is degraded. To identify the component in a degraded state, refer to “HP Systems Insight Display and LEDs”. Red = System health is critical. To identify the component in a critical state, refer to “HP Systems Insight Display and LEDs”. Off = System health is normal (when in standby mode). 4 External health LED (power supply) Green = Power supply health is normal. Amber = Power redundancy failure occurred. Off = Power supply health is normal when in standby mode. 5 NIC 1 link/activity LED 6 NIC 2 link/activity LED Green = Network link exists. Flashing green = Network link and activity exist. Off = No link to network exists. If power is off, the front panel LED is not active. View the LEDs on the RJ-45 connector for status by referring to the rear panel LEDs. Green = Network link exists. Flashing green = Network link and activity exist. Off = No link to network exists. If power is off, the front panel LED is not active. View the LEDs on the RJ-45 connector for status by referring to the rear panel LEDs The components on the rear panel are illustrated in Figure 4 – Rear Panel Components. HP StorageWorks Secure Key Manager © 2008 Hewlett-Packard Company This document may be freely reproduced in its original entirety. Page 9 of 26 Security Policy, version 1.0 January 31, 2008 Figure 4 – Rear Panel Components Descriptions of components on the rear panel are given in Table 4 – Rear Panel Components Descriptions. Table 4 – Rear Panel Components Descriptions Item Definition 1 PCI Express expansion slot 1 (Blocked) 2 PCI Express expansion slot 2 (Blocked) 3 Power supply bay 2 4 Power supply bay 1 5 NIC connector 1 (Ethernet) 6 NIC connector 2 (Ethernet) 7 Keyboard connector 8 Mouse connector 9 Video connector 10 Serial connector 11 Universal Serial Bus (USB) connector 1 (Blocked) 12 USB connector 2 (Blocked) 13 Integrated Lights-Out (iLO) 2 NIC connector (Blocked) The seven LEDs on the rear panel are illustrated in Figure 5 – Rear Panel LEDs. Figure 5 – Rear Panel LEDs HP StorageWorks Secure Key Manager © 2008 Hewlett-Packard Company This document may be freely reproduced in its original entirety. Page 10 of 26 Security Policy, version 1.0 January 31, 2008 Descriptions of LEDs on the rear panel are given in Table 5 – Rear Panel LED Definitions. Table 5 – Rear Panel LED Definitions Item Description Status 1 10/100/1000 NIC 1 activity LED Green = Activity exists. Flashing green = Activity exists. Off = No activity exists. 2 10/100/1000 NIC 1 link LED Green = Link exists. Off = No link exists. 3 10/100/1000 NIC 2 activity LED Green = Activity exists. Flashing green = Activity exists. Off = No activity exists. 4 10/100/1000 NIC 2 link LED Green = Link exists. Off = No link exists. 5 UID LED Blue = Identification is activated. Off = Identification is deactivated. 6 Power supply 2 LED Green = Normal Off = System is off or power supply has failed 7 Power supply 1 LED Green = Normal Off = System is off or power supply has failed 2.4 Roles, Services, and Authentication The module supports four authorized roles: • • • • Crypto Officer User HP User Cluster Member All roles require identity-based authentication. 2.4.1 Crypto Officer Role The Crypto Officer accesses the module via the Web Management Console and/or the Command Line Interface (CLI). This role provides all services that are necessary for the secure management of the module. Table 6 shows the services for the Crypto Officer role under the FIPS mode of operation. The purpose of each service is shown in the first column (“Service”), and the corresponding function is described in the second column (“Description”). The keys and Critical Security Parameters (CSPs) in the rightmost column correspond to the keys and CSPs introduced in Section 2.7.1. Table 6 – Crypto Officer Services Service Authenticate to SKM Description Authenticate to SKM with a username and the associated password Keys/CSPs Crypto Officer passwords – read; TLS/SSH keys – read HP StorageWorks Secure Key Manager © 2008 Hewlett-Packard Company This document may be freely reproduced in its original entirety. Page 11 of 26 Security Policy, version 1.0 January 31, 2008 Service Description Keys/CSPs Perform first-time initialization Configure the module when it is used for the first time Crypto Officer (admin) password – write; Kdsa public/private – write; Krsa private – write; Krsa private – write; Log signing RSA key – write; Log signature verification RSA key – write; KRsaPub – write; KRsaPriv – write. Upgrade firmware Upgrade firmware (firmware must be FIPSvalidated) Firmware upgrade key – read Configure FIPS mode Enable/disable FIPS mode None Manage keys Manage all client keys that are stored within the module. This includes the generation, storage, export (only public keys), import, and zeroization of keys. Client keys – write, read, delete; PKEK – write, read, delete. Manage clusters Manage all clusters that are defined within the module. This includes the creation, joining, and removal of a cluster from the module. Cluster Member passwords – write, delete Manage services Manage all services supported by the module. This includes the starting and stopping of all services. None Manage operators Create, modify, or delete module operators (Crypto Officers and Users). Crypto Officer passwords – write, delete; User passwords – write, delete Manage certificates Create/import/revoke certificates KRsaPub – write, read, delete; KRsaPriv – write, read, delete; CARsaPub – write, read, delete; CARsaPriv – write, read, delete; Client RSA public keys – read. Reset factory settings Rollback to the default firmware shipped with the module All keys/CSPs – delete Restore default configuration Delete the current configuration file and restores the default configuration settings None Restore configuration file Restore a previously backed up configuration file None Backup configuration file Back up a configuration file None Zeroize all keys/CSPs Zeroize all keys and CSPs in the module All keys and CSPs – delete 2.4.2 User Role The User role is associated with external applications or clients that connect to the KMS via its XML interface. Users in this role may exercise services—such as key generation and management—based on configured or predefined permissions. See Table 7 – User Services for details. The keys and CSPs in the rightmost column correspond to the keys and CSPs introduced in Section 2.7.1. HP StorageWorks Secure Key Manager © 2008 Hewlett-Packard Company This document may be freely reproduced in its original entirety. Page 12 of 26 Security Policy, version 1.0 January 31, 2008 Table 7 – User Services Service Description Keys/CSPs Authenticate to SKM Authenticate to SKM with a username and the associated password User passwords – read Generate key Generate a cryptographic key Client keys – write; PKEK – write. Modify key meta data Change the key owner or update/add/delete the custom attributes None Delete key Delete a cryptographic key Client keys – delete; PKEK – delete. Query key meta data Import key Output key names and meta data that the User is allowed to access Client keys – read; Import key Client keys – write; PKEK – read. PKEK – write. Export key Export a cryptographic key Client keys – read; PKEK – read. Export Certificate Export a certificate Client certificate – read Clone Key Clone an existing key under a different key name Client keys – write, read; Generate random number Generate a random number ANSI X9.31 DRNG seed – write, read, delete Manage operators Only users with administration permission can create, modify, or delete module operators User passwords – write, delete 2.4.3 PKEK – write, read. HP User Role The HP User role can reset the module to an uninitialized state in the event that all Crypto Officer passwords are lost, or when a self-test permanently fails. See Table 8 – HP User Services. The keys and CSPs in the rightmost column correspond to the keys and CSPs introduced in Section 2.7.1. Table 8 – HP User Services Service Description Keys/CSPs Authenticate to the module Authenticate to SKM with a signed token HP User RSA public key – read Reset factory settings Rollback to the default firmware shipped with the module All keys/CSPs – delete Restore default configuration Delete the current configuration file and restores the default configuration settings None HP StorageWorks Secure Key Manager © 2008 Hewlett-Packard Company This document may be freely reproduced in its original entirety. Page 13 of 26 Security Policy, version 1.0 January 31, 2008 Service Description Zeroize all keys/CSPs 2.4.4 Keys/CSPs Zeroize all keys/CSPs in the module All keys/CSPs – delete Cluster Member Role The Cluster Member role is associated with other SKMs that can connect to this SKM and access cluster services. See Table 9 – Cluster Member Services. The keys and CSPs in the rightmost column correspond to the keys and CSPs introduced in Section 2.7.1. Table 9 – Cluster Member Services Service Description Keys/CSPs Authenticate Cluster Member Authenticate to SKM via TLS Cluster Member passwords – read; Cluster key – read; Cluster Member RsaPub – read Receive Configuration File Update the module’s configuration settings None Zeroize Key Delete a specific key Cluster key – delete Backup Configuration File Back up a configuration file None 2.4.5 Authentication The module performs identity-based authentication for the four roles. Two authentication schemes are used: authentication with certificate in TLS and authentication with password. See Table 10 – Roles and Authentications for a detailed description. Table 10 – Roles and Authentications Role Authentication Crypto Officer Username and password with optional digital certificate User Username and password and/or digital certificate HP User Digital certificate Cluster Member Digital certificate over TLS The 1024-bit RSA signature on a digital certificate provides 80-bits of security. There are 280 possibilities. The probability of a successful random guess is 2-80. Since 10-6 » 2-80, a random attempt is very unlikely to succeed. At least 80 bits of data must be transmitted for one attempt. (The actual number of bits that need to be transmitted for one attempt is much greater than 80. We are considering the worst case scenario.) The processor used by the module has a working frequency of 3.0 gigabytes, hence, at most 60×3.0×109 bits of data can be transmitted in 60 seconds. Since 80 bits are necessary for one attempt, at most (60×3.0×109)/80 = 2.25×109 attempts are possible in 60 seconds. However, there exist 280 possibilities. (2.25×109)/280 = 1.86×10-15 « 10-5. The probability of a successful certificate attempt in 60 seconds is considerably less than 10-5. Passwords in the module must consist of eight or more characters from the set of 90 human-readable numeric, alphabetic (upper and lower case), and special character symbols. Excluding those combinations that do not meet password constraints (see Section 2.7.1 – Keys and CSPs), the size of the password space is about 608. The probability of a successful random guess is 60-8. Since 10-6 » 60-8, a random attempt is very unlikely to succeed. After six unsuccessful attempts, the module will be locked down for 60 seconds; i.e., at most six trials are possible HP StorageWorks Secure Key Manager © 2008 Hewlett-Packard Company This document may be freely reproduced in its original entirety. Page 14 of 26 Security Policy, version 1.0 January 31, 2008 in 60 seconds. Since 10-5 » 6×60-8, the probability of a successful password attempt in 60 seconds is considerably less than 10-5. 2.4.6 Unauthenticated Services The following services do not require authentication: • • • • • • SNMP statistics FIPS status services Health check services Network Time Protocol (NTP) services Initiation of self-tests by rebooting the SKM Negotiation of the XML protocol version for communications with the KMS SNMP is used only for sending statistical information (SNMP traps). FIPS status and health check are status-report services, unrelated to security or cryptography. NTP is a date/time synchronization service that does not involve keys or CSPs. Initiation of self-tests and negotiation of the XML protocol version do not involve keys or CSPs. 2.5 Physical Security The module was tested and found conformant to the EMI/EMC requirements specified by Title 47 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 15, Subpart B, Unintentional Radiators, Digital Devices, Class A (that is, for business use). The HP StorageWorks Secure Key Manager is a multi-chip standalone cryptographic module. The entire contents of the module, including all hardware, software, firmware, and data, are enclosed in a metal case. The case is opaque and must be sealed using tamper-evident labels in order to prevent the case cover from being removed without signs of tampering. All circuits in the module are coated with commercial standard passivation. Once the module has been configured to meet FIPS 140-2 Level 2 requirements, the module cannot be accessed without signs of tampering. See Section 3.3 – Physical Security Assurance of this document for more information. 2.6 Operational Environment The operational environment requirements do not apply to the HP StorageWorks Secure Key Manager—the module does not provide a general purpose operating system and only allows the updating of image components after checking an RSA signature on the new firmware image. Crypto Officers can install a new firmware image on the SKM by downloading the image to the SKM. This image is signed by an RSA private key (which never enters the module). The SKM verifies the signature on the new firmware image using the public key stored in the module. If the verification passes, the upgrade is allowed. Otherwise the upgrade process fails and the old image is reused. 2.7 Cryptographic Key Management 2.7.1 Keys and CSPs The SSH and TLS protocols employed by the FIPS mode of the module are security-related. Table 11 – List of Cryptographic Keys, Cryptographic Key Components, and CSPs for SSH and Table 12 – List of Cryptographic Keys, Cryptographic Key Components, and CSPs for TLS, introduce cryptographic keys, key components, and CSPs involved in the two protocols, respectively. Table 11 – List of Cryptographic Keys, Cryptographic Key Components, and CSPs for SSH Key Key Type Generation / Input Output Storage Zeroization HP StorageWorks Secure Key Manager © 2008 Hewlett-Packard Company This document may be freely reproduced in its original entirety. Use Page 15 of 26 Security Policy, version 1.0 January 31, 2008 Key Key Type Generation / Input Output Storage DH public param 1024-bit DiffieHellman public parameters Generated by ANSI X9.31 DRNG during session initialization In In volatile plaintext memory Upon session termination Negotiate SSH Ks and SSH Khmac DH private param 1024-bit DiffieHellman private parameters Generated by ANSI X9.31 DRNG during session initialization Never Upon session termination Negotiate SSH Ks and SSH Khmac Kdsa public 1024-bit DSA public keys Generated by ANSI X9.31 DRNG during first-time initialization In In non-volatile plaintext memory At operator delete Verify the or zeroize request signature of the server’s message. Kdsa private 1024-bit DSA private keys Generated by ANSI X9.31 DRNG during first-time initialization Never At operator delete Sign the or zeroize request server’s message. Krsa public 1024-bit RSA public keys Generated by ANSI X9.31 DRNG during first-time initialization In In non-volatile plaintext memory At operator delete Verify the or zeroize request signature of the server’s message. Krsa private 1024-bit RSA private keys Generated by ANSI X9.31 DRNG during first-time initialization Never In non-volatile memory At operator delete Sign the or zeroize request server’s message. SSH Ks SSH session Diffie-Hellman key 168-bit 3DES key, agreement 128-, 192-, 256-bit AES key Never In volatile memory Upon session Encrypt and termination or decrypt data when a new Ks is generated (after a certain timeout) SSH Khmac SSH session 512- Diffie-Hellman key bit HMAC key agreement Never In volatile memory Upon session Authenticate termination or data when a new Khmac is generated (after a certain timeout) In volatile memory In non-volatile memory Zeroization Use Notice that SSH version 2 is explicitly accepted for use in FIPS mode, according to section 7.1 of the NIST FIPS 140-2 Implementation Guidance. Table 12 – List of Cryptographic Keys, Cryptographic Key Components, and CSPs for TLS Key Generation / Input Key Type Output Storage Zeroization Use Pre-MS TLS pre-master secret Input in encrypted form from client Never In volatile memory Upon session termination Derive MS MS TLS master secret Derived from Pre- Never MS using FIPS Approved key derivation function In volatile memory Upon session termination Derive TLS Ks and TLS Khmac HP StorageWorks Secure Key Manager © 2008 Hewlett-Packard Company This document may be freely reproduced in its original entirety. Page 16 of 26 Security Policy, version 1.0 Key January 31, 2008 Generation / Input Key Type Output Storage Zeroization Use KRsaPub Server RSA public key (1024- or 2048bit) Generated by ANSI X9.31 DRNG during first-time initialization In plaintext In nona X509 volatile certificate. memory At operator delete request KRsaPriv Server RSA private key (1024- or 2048bit) Generated by ANSI X9.31 DRNG during first-time initialization Never At operator Server delete or decrypts Prezeroize request MS. Server generates signatures CARsaPub Certificate Authority Generated by (CA) RSA public key ANSI X9.31 (1024- or 2048-bit) DRNG during first-time initialization In plaintext In nonvolatile memory At operator delete request CARsaPriv CA RSA private key (1024- or 2048-bit) Generated by ANSI X9.31 DRNG during first-time initialization never In nonvolatile memory At operator Sign server delete or certificates zeroize request Cluster Member RsaPub Cluster Member RSA public key (1024- or 2048-bit) Input in plaintext Never In volatile memory Upon session termination Verify Cluster Member signatures TLS Ks TLS session AES or Derived from MS 3DES symmetric key(s) Never In volatile memory Upon session termination Encrypt and decrypt data TLS Khmac TLS session HMAC key Never In volatile memory Upon session termination Authenticate data Derived from MS In nonvolatile memory Client encrypts Pre-MS. Client verifies server signatures Verify CA signatures Table 13 details all cipher suites supported by the TLS protocol implemented by the module. The suite names in the first column match the definitions in RFC 2246 and RFC 4346. Table 13 – Cipher Suites Supported by the Module’s TLS Implementation in FIPS Mode Suite Name Authentication Key Transport Symmetric Cryptography Hash TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA RSA RSA AES (256-bit) SHA-1 TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA RSA RSA AES (128-bit) SHA-1 TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA RSA RSA 3DES (168-bit) SHA-1 Other CSPs are tabulated in Table 14. Table 14 – Other Cryptographic Keys, Cryptographic Key Components, and CSPs Key Key Type Generation / Input Output Storage Zeroization HP StorageWorks Secure Key Manager © 2008 Hewlett-Packard Company This document may be freely reproduced in its original entirety. Use Page 17 of 26 Security Policy, version 1.0 January 31, 2008 Key Type Generation / Input Client AES key 128, 192 or 256-bit AES key Generated by ANSI X9.31 DRNG Via TLS in encrypted form (encrypted with TLS Ks) per client’s request Encrypted in non-volatile memory Per client’s Encrypt request or zeroize plaintexts/decrypt request ciphertexts Client 3DES key 3DES key Generated by ANSI X9.31 DRNG Via TLS in encrypted form (encrypted with TLS Ks) per client’s request Encrypted in non-volatile memory Per client’s Encrypt request or zeroize plaintexts/decrypt request ciphertexts Client RSA public keys RSA public key Generated by ANSI X9.31 DRNG Via TLS in encrypted form (encrypted with TLS Ks) per client’s request Encrypted in non-volatile memory At operator delete Sign messages/verify signatures Client RSA keys RSA private keys Generated by ANSI X9.31 DRNG Via TLS in encrypted form (encrypted with TLS Ks) per client’s request Encrypted in non-volatile memory Per client’s Sign request or zeroize messages/verify request signatures Client HMAC keys HMAC keys Generated by ANSI X9.31 DRNG Via TLS in encrypted form (encrypted with TLS Ks) per client’s request Encrypted in non-volatile memory Per client’s Compute keyedrequest or zeroize MACs request Client certificate X.509 certificate Input in ciphertext over TLS Via TLS in encrypted form (encrypted with TLS Ks) per client’s request In non-volatile memory Per client’s request or by zeroize request Crypto Officer passwords Character string Input in plaintext Never In non-volatile memory At operator delete Authenticate or by zeroize Crypto Officer request User passwords Character string Input in plaintext Never In non-volatile memory At operator delete Authenticate or by zeroize User request Cluster Member password Character string Input in ciphertext over TLS Never In non-volatile memory At operator delete When a device or zeroize request attempts to become a Cluster Member HP User RSA public key 2048-bit RSA Input in public key plaintext at factory Never In non-volatile memory At installation of a Authenticate HP patch or new User firmware Cluster key Character string Never In non-volatile memory At operator delete Authenticate or by zeroize Cluster Member request Firmware upgrade key 1024-bit RSA Input in public key plaintext at factory Never In non-volatile memory When new Used in firmware firmware upgrade upgrade integrity key is input test Key Input in ciphertext over TLS Output Storage Zeroization HP StorageWorks Secure Key Manager © 2008 Hewlett-Packard Company This document may be freely reproduced in its original entirety. Use Encrypt data/verify signatures Page 18 of 26 Security Policy, version 1.0 Key January 31, 2008 Generation / Input Key Type Output Storage Zeroization Use Log signing 1024-bit RSA Generated by Never keys public and ANSI X9.31 private keys DRNG at firsttime initialization In non-volatile memory When new log signing keys are generated on demand by Crypto Officer Sign logs and verify signature on logs ANSI X9.31 DRNG seed DRNG seed Generated by Never non-Approved RNG In non-volatile memory When module is powered off Initialize ANSI X9.31 DRNG PKEK Generated by ANSI X9.31 DRNG In non-volatile memory At operator delete Encrypt client or by zeroize keys request 2.7.2 256-bit AES key In encrypted form for backup purposes only Key Generation The module uses an ANSI X9.31 DRNG with 2-key 3DES to generate cryptographic keys. This DRNG is a FIPS 140-2 approved DRNG as specified in Annex C to FIPS PUB 140-2. 2.7.3 Key/CSP Zeroization All ephemeral keys are stored in volatile memory in plaintext. Ephemeral keys are zeroized when they are no longer used. Other keys and CSPs are stored in non-volatile memory with client keys being stored in encrypted form. To zeroize all keys and CSPs in the module, the Crypto Officer should execute the reset factory settings zeroize command at the serial console interface. For security reasons, this command is available only through the serial console. 2.8 Self-Tests The device implements two types of self-tests: power-up self-tests and conditional self-tests. Power-up self-tests include the following tests: • • • • • • • • • • • • • • Firmware integrity tests Known Answer Test (KAT) on 3DES KAT on AES KAT on SHA-1 KAT on SHA-256 KAT on SHA-384 KAT on SHA-512 KAT on HMAC SHA-1 KAT on HMAC SHA-256 KAT on ANSI X9.31 DRNG KAT on Diffie-Hellman KAT on SSH Key Derivation Function KAT on RSA signature generation and verification Pairwise consistency test on DSA signature generation and verification Conditional self-tests include the following tests: HP StorageWorks Secure Key Manager © 2008 Hewlett-Packard Company This document may be freely reproduced in its original entirety. Page 19 of 26 Security Policy, version 1.0 • • • • • • January 31, 2008 Pairwise consistency test for new DSA keys Pairwise consistency test for new RSA keys Continuous random number generator test on ANSI X9.31 DRNG Continuous random number generator test on non-Approved RNG Firmware upgrade integrity test Diffie-Hellman primitive test The module has two error states: a Soft Error state and a Fatal Error state. When one or more power-up self-tests fail, the module may enter either the Fatal Error state or the Soft Error State. When a conditional self-test fails, the module enters the Soft Error state. See Section 3 of this document for more information. 2.9 Mitigation of Other Attacks This section is not applicable. No claim is made that the module mitigates against any attacks beyond the FIPS 1402 Level 2 requirements for this validation. HP StorageWorks Secure Key Manager © 2008 Hewlett-Packard Company This document may be freely reproduced in its original entirety. Page 20 of 26 Security Policy, version 1.0 January 31, 2008 3 Secure Operation The HP StorageWorks Secure Key Manager meets Level 2 requirements for FIPS 140-2. The sections below describe how to place and keep the module in the FIPS mode of operation. 3.1 Initial Setup The device should be unpacked and inspected according to the User Guide. The User Guide also contains installation and configuration instructions, maintenance information, safety tips, and other information. The device itself must be affixed with tamper-evident labels that are included in the packaging. See Figure 8 – TamperEvidence Labels for locations of tamper-evidence labels. 3.2 Initialization and Configuration 3.2.1 First-Time Initialization When the module is turned on for the first time, it will prompt the operator for a password for a default Crypto Officer. The module cannot proceed to the next state until the operator provides a password that conforms to the password policy described in Section 2.7.1. The default username associated with the entered password is “admin”. During the first-time initialization, the operator must configure minimum settings for the module to operate correctly. The operator will be prompted to configure the following settings via the serial interface: • • • • • 3.2.2 Date, Time, Time zone IP Address/Netmask Hostname Gateway Management Port FIPS Mode Configuration In order to comply with FIPS 140-2 Level 2 requirements, the following functionality must be disabled on the SKM: • • • • • • • Global keys File Transfer Protocol (FTP) for importing certificates and downloading and restoring backup files Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) authentication Use of the following algorithms: RC4, MD5, DES, RSA-512, RSA-768 SSL 3.0 Hot-swappable drive capability RSA encryption and decryption operations (note, however, that RSA encryption and decryption associated with TLS handshakes and Sign and Sign Verify are permitted) These functions need not be disabled individually. There are two approaches to configuring the module such that it works in the Approved FIPS mode of operation: Through a command line interface, such as SSH or serial console, the Crypto Officer should use the fips compliant command to enable the FIPS mode of operation. This will alter various server settings as described above. See Figure 6 – FIPS Compliance in CLI. The fips server command is used for the FIPS status server configuration. The show fips status command returns the current FIPS mode configuration. HP StorageWorks Secure Key Manager © 2008 Hewlett-Packard Company This document may be freely reproduced in its original entirety. Page 21 of 26 Security Policy, version 1.0 January 31, 2008 Figure 6 – FIPS Compliance in CLI In the web administration interface, the Crypto Officer should use the “High Security Configuration” page to enable and disable FIPS compliance. To enable the Approved FIPS mode of operation, click on the “Set FIPS Compliant” button. See Figure 7 – FIPS Compliance in Web Administration Interface. This will alter various server settings as described above. Figure 7 – FIPS Compliance in Web Administration Interface In the web administration interface, the User can review the FIPS mode configuration by reading the “High Security Configuration” page. The Crypto Officer must zeroize all keys when switching from the Approved FIPS mode of operation to the nonFIPS mode and vice versa. 3.3 Physical Security Assurance Serialized tamper-evidence labels have been applied at four locations on the metal casing. See Figure 8 – TamperEvidence Labels. The tamper-evidence labels have a special adhesive backing to adhere to the module’s surface. The tamper-evidence labels have individual, unique serial numbers. They should be inspected periodically and compared to the previously-recorded serial numbers to verify that fresh labels have not been applied to a tampered module. HP StorageWorks Secure Key Manager © 2008 Hewlett-Packard Company This document may be freely reproduced in its original entirety. Page 22 of 26 Security Policy, version 1.0 January 31, 2008 Figure 8 – Tamper-Evidence Labels Figure 9 provides a better view of the positioning of the tamper-evidence labels over the power supplies. Figure 9 – Tamper-Evidence Labels over Power Supplies HP StorageWorks Secure Key Manager © 2008 Hewlett-Packard Company This document may be freely reproduced in its original entirety. Page 23 of 26 Security Policy, version 1.0 January 31, 2008 3.4 Key and CSP Zeroization To zeroize all keys and CSPs in the module, the Crypto Officer should execute reset factory settings zeroize command in the serial console interface. Notice that, for security reasons, the command cannot be initiated from the SSH interface. When switching between different modes of operations (FIPS and non-FIPS), the Crypto Officer must zeroize all CSPs. 3.5 Error State The module has two error states: a Soft Error state and a Fatal Error state. When a power-up self-test fails, the module may enter either the Fatal Error state or the Soft Error State. When a conditional self-test fails, the module will enter the Soft Error state. The module can recover from the Fatal Error state if power is cycled or if the SKM is rebooted. An HP User can reset the module when it is in the Fatal Error State. No other services are available in the Fatal Error state. The module can recover from the Soft Error state if power is cycled. With the exception of the firmware upgrade integrity test and Diffie-Hellman primitive test, the only service that is available in the Soft Error state is the FIPS status output via port 9081 (default). A User can connect to port 9081 and find the error message indicating the failure of FIPS self-tests. Access to port 9081 does not require authentication. HP StorageWorks Secure Key Manager © 2008 Hewlett-Packard Company This document may be freely reproduced in its original entirety. Page 24 of 26 Security Policy, version 1.0 January 31, 2008 Acronyms Table 15 – Acronyms Acronym Definition 3DES Triple Data Encryption Standard AES Advanced Encryption Standard ANSI American National Standard Institute BIOS Basic Input/Output System CA Certificate Authority CBC Cipher Block Chaining CLI Command Line Interface CMVP Cryptographic Module Validation Program CPU Central Processing Unit CRC Cyclic Redundancy Check CRL Certificate Revocation List CSP Critical Security Parameter DES Data Encryption Standard DRNG Deterministic Random Number Generator DSA Digital Signature Algorithm ECB Electronic Codebook EMC Electromagnetic Compatibility EMI Electromagnetic Interference FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard FTP File Transfer Protocol HDD Hard Drive HMAC Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code HP Hewlett-Packard IDE Integrated Drive Electronics iLO Integrated Lights-Out I/O Input/Output IP Internet Protocol ISA Instruction Set Architecture KAT Known Answer Test KMS Key Management Service LDAP Lightweight Directory Access Protocol LED Light Emitting Diode MAC Message Authentication Code N/A Not Applicable HP StorageWorks Secure Key Manager © 2008 Hewlett-Packard Company This document may be freely reproduced in its original entirety. Page 25 of 26 Security Policy, version 1.0 January 31, 2008 Acronym Definition NIC Network Interface Card NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology NTP Network Time Protocol PCI Peripheral Component Interconnect PRNG Pseudo Random Number Generator RFC Request for Comments RNG Random Number Generator RSA Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman SHA Secure Hash Algorithm SKM Secure Key Manager SNMP Simple Network Management Protocol SSH Secure Shell SSL Secure Socket Layer TLS Transport Layer Security UID Unit Identifier USB Universal Serial Bus VGA Video Graphics Array XML Extensible Markup Language HP StorageWorks Secure Key Manager © 2008 Hewlett-Packard Company This document may be freely reproduced in its original entirety. Page 26 of 26
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