Managing Fraud With EMV
2015-01-11
: Mc Managing Fraud With Emv Managing_Fraud_With_EMV
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For acquirers, effective end-to-end event management should entail: — S haring information about known security vulnerabilities of software and payment devices that have led to past data compromises • Establishing an operations plan that includes ADC event severity matrix rating protocols • Creating a core incident response team consisting of cross-functional management groups • Methodology to assist the payment brands with Risk Communications Guidelines During a data breach event, most organizations Managing Fraud with EMV – A Risk Manager Checklist for Deploying Chip Technology struggle to keep up with the demand for information from various stakeholders. The pressure of knowing outreach to the breached entity and the commitment what to say and to whom can be reduced by develop- Worldwide rollout of EMV continues to gather pace. Several markets and regions around the world have the to stay engaged during the entire ADC event lifecycle ing a risk communications strategy before an ADC completion of EMV migration in sight or are making large strides as they begin to introduce the authentication Proactive Data Security and Education event occurs. Elements of a robust ADC event technology in their regions: Both issuers and acquirers must be committed to communications response framework should include: helping educate and reinforce appropriate data security • A dedicated ADC event communications response practices to their customers, whether they are team that includes members who have direct cardholders, merchants, Third-Party Processors, or other interactions with all the stakeholders that may be types of Data Storage Entities and Data Providers. • Often, savvy cardholders are the first line of defense • Much of Southeast Asia and parts of Africa also operate EMV-enabled payment networks affected by a breach event checklists for response activities based on triggers or from being compromised; therefore, issuers should event timing, contact information for all team focus on cardholder education by: members, and template response materials that include “evergreen” messaging that has been vetted — Recommending cardholders review their payment by the response team and legal counsel card statements often • A stakeholder communications matrix that matches key audiences against internal and external such as phishing and skimming communications channels, delivery dates, and — Promoting the use of online protection measures, such as anti-virus, anti-spyware, and firewall the internal staff responsible for disseminating software the messages — Offering tips on what to do if customers believe • Canada and Mexico are in the early stages of EMV deployment • An ADC event communications plan that includes when it comes to preventing their payment accounts — Providing information about popular fraud scams, • The Single European Payments Area (SEPA) will have a cards payment market that is largely chip-based as of 2011 During an ADC event, consider the following: they are the victim of an ADC or identity theft event — Providing elements of what makes a strong online password • Use simple language without industry jargon • Rely on facts, not speculation Countries where there has not yet been preparation to migrate Countries in which one or more banks are migrating, or have completed migration to EMV chip Countries where penetration of MasterCard Branded EMV cards, EMV POS, or EMV ATMs exceeds 50 % • Express empathy for affected audiences and inform • Acquirers also need to ensure that they are doing all them what to do to mitigate any possible negative they can to protect the integrity of payment card account data, including: impact of an ADC event • Share information regarding what actions are being — Educating value chain partners such as merchants taken to protect customers and processors about what types of sensitive • Incorporate, when possible, zero liability language payment card data can and cannot be stored into cardholder response materials to help address — Establishing an effective Payment Card Industry financial impact concerns Data Security Standard (PCI DSS) program to drive merchant compliance. MasterCard’s acquiring partners can leverage the MasterCard Merchant Education Program to support PCI compliance training activities for merchants Javelin Strategy & Research; Data Breaches: What Should 1 Banks, Payments Firms and Merchants do to Protect Brand Equity and Customer Loyalty? Oct. 2008. 2 Ponemon Institute; U.S. Cost of a Data Breach Study, 2009 As of Q2 2009, there were 487 million MasterCard branded cards (including Maestro) compliant with EMV, 14 million EMV capable POS terminals, and over 3,000 active MasterCard Chip migration projects underway in 119 countries (www.mastercard.com/us/merchant/support/ merchant_education.html) 6 MasterCard Academy of Risk Management MasterCard Academy of Risk Management 7 The secure data authentication provided by chip When a chip transaction does occur, the additional EMV provides a significant opportunity to manage technology protects both online and offline chip authorization data will give issuers additional down the risk of card transactions. Use of the chip transactions against counterfeit fraud. Given the information that can be used to detect fraud attacks. cryptogram to properly handle chip card and POS ongoing spread of EMV technology around the world, The following key authorization checks should authentication means that valuable fraud resources what other steps should issuers take to protect their be considered: need not be directed to checking out the authenticity investment as the chip infrastructure matures? • Authenticate the card using the cryptogram received of transactions which are obviously not counterfeit. Card Issuance Considerations in the authorization message. Although an invalid The technical platform provided by EMV is very The first and most important consideration in deploying cryptogram can be caused by data integrity issues, powerful. However, it is crucial that banks also EMV technology is to ensure that there is no risk of an invalid cryptogram is a clear indication of a higher consider how EMV, and in particular the introduction track data cross-contamination with data stolen from risk transaction of PIN, impacts cardholders. Simple measures that one interface being used to produce counterfeit cards • Review the Terminal and Card Risk Management encourage cardholders to use and remember their using a different technology. Simply personalizing chip information received. This will reveal why the PIN are important to a smooth transition. For example, cards without the complete magnetic stripe track 2 data transaction came online and subsequent tracking of offering PIN change functionality at ATMs enhances By verifying this dynamic signature, the terminal can this information across a sequence of transactions the likelihood of cardholders remembering their PIN authenticate the card and confirm the legitimacy of will help to identify unusual card usage patterns without writing it down for a fraudster to discover. means that if chip transaction data is compromised, then it cannot be used to create a counterfeit magnetic stripe card (i.e., using a Card Validation Code [CVC] 1 in the track 2 equivalent data element on the chip so sensitive data, including the AC and the proof that the card has verified the PIN. that track data copied to the magnetic stripe can be detected). used for the transaction. It is particularly important to validate that the card that supports PIN has successfully The big advantage of CDA is that it not only provides the dynamic aspects of DDA (hence protection against The opportunity to switch from signature verification • Check what cardholder verification method has been checked the PIN if the terminal supports PIN • Manage the use of signature fallback. Many issuers cloning), but also ensures the integrity of sensitive data will allow signature to be used instead of PIN, communicated between the card and terminal, hence especially as cardholders become accustomed protecting against complicated wedge attacks. to using PIN. But the exception can be a trade addition, replacement of signature with PIN is a Optimizing Authorization Processes off between customer service and fraud risk and positive step for merchants resulting in reduced Although chip technology gives the issuer the exception handling and streamlining POS processing opportunity to manage the volume of online (e.g., signed slip handling, objective acceptance). authorizations — so they can match their risk control In addition, issuers should take appropriate steps to against their operations and performance objectives — employ appropriate authentication technologies it must be remembered that chip technology should be moving beyond Static Data Authentication (SDA). used hand-in-hand with transaction fraud controls and While Dynamic Data Authentication (DDA) provides a predictive fraud systems to fight the fraudster. higher degree of security that protects against chip A primary consideration is transactions that have been data cloning, the most secure EMV implementation completed as technical fallback from chip to magnetic uses Combined Dynamic Data Authentication/ stripe. These transactions can be fraud prone as the Application Cryptogram Generation (CDA), where the fraudster seeks to avoid the protection of the chip by card produces a dynamic digital signature on a random disabling it. The risk of fallback transactions should be challenge that it has received from the terminal and carefully considered and action taken either to contact other sensitive data, and on the value of the Application cardholders or decline transactions where there is Cryptogram (AC) generated by the card. significant risk. The frequency of fallback should be to PIN is another option to consider. Issuer-controlled PIN is a step forward from subjective signature-checking, which relies on the diligence of the merchant. In Although the migration to the chip technology gives the banks a vital tool in the fight against fraud, it is not the technology alone that creates a total solution. Rather, it is the way the bank uses the opportunity. By following the above simple steps, banks can deliver on the business case for the investment in chip and give a better service to their cardholders. once PIN is well established, signature fallback transactions should be considered as higher risk tracked and cards that appear prone to failure should be quickly replaced. 8 MasterCard Academy of Risk Management MasterCard Academy of Risk Management 9 The secure data authentication provided by chip When a chip transaction does occur, the additional EMV provides a significant opportunity to manage technology protects both online and offline chip authorization data will give issuers additional down the risk of card transactions. Use of the chip transactions against counterfeit fraud. Given the information that can be used to detect fraud attacks. cryptogram to properly handle chip card and POS ongoing spread of EMV technology around the world, The following key authorization checks should authentication means that valuable fraud resources what other steps should issuers take to protect their be considered: need not be directed to checking out the authenticity investment as the chip infrastructure matures? • Authenticate the card using the cryptogram received of transactions which are obviously not counterfeit. Card Issuance Considerations in the authorization message. Although an invalid The technical platform provided by EMV is very The first and most important consideration in deploying cryptogram can be caused by data integrity issues, powerful. However, it is crucial that banks also EMV technology is to ensure that there is no risk of an invalid cryptogram is a clear indication of a higher consider how EMV, and in particular the introduction track data cross-contamination with data stolen from risk transaction of PIN, impacts cardholders. Simple measures that one interface being used to produce counterfeit cards • Review the Terminal and Card Risk Management encourage cardholders to use and remember their using a different technology. Simply personalizing chip information received. This will reveal why the PIN are important to a smooth transition. For example, cards without the complete magnetic stripe track 2 data transaction came online and subsequent tracking of offering PIN change functionality at ATMs enhances By verifying this dynamic signature, the terminal can this information across a sequence of transactions the likelihood of cardholders remembering their PIN authenticate the card and confirm the legitimacy of will help to identify unusual card usage patterns without writing it down for a fraudster to discover. means that if chip transaction data is compromised, then it cannot be used to create a counterfeit magnetic stripe card (i.e., using a Card Validation Code [CVC] 1 in the track 2 equivalent data element on the chip so sensitive data, including the AC and the proof that the card has verified the PIN. that track data copied to the magnetic stripe can be detected). used for the transaction. It is particularly important to validate that the card that supports PIN has successfully The big advantage of CDA is that it not only provides the dynamic aspects of DDA (hence protection against The opportunity to switch from signature verification • Check what cardholder verification method has been checked the PIN if the terminal supports PIN • Manage the use of signature fallback. Many issuers cloning), but also ensures the integrity of sensitive data will allow signature to be used instead of PIN, communicated between the card and terminal, hence especially as cardholders become accustomed protecting against complicated wedge attacks. to using PIN. But the exception can be a trade addition, replacement of signature with PIN is a Optimizing Authorization Processes off between customer service and fraud risk and positive step for merchants resulting in reduced Although chip technology gives the issuer the exception handling and streamlining POS processing opportunity to manage the volume of online (e.g., signed slip handling, objective acceptance). authorizations — so they can match their risk control In addition, issuers should take appropriate steps to against their operations and performance objectives — employ appropriate authentication technologies it must be remembered that chip technology should be moving beyond Static Data Authentication (SDA). used hand-in-hand with transaction fraud controls and While Dynamic Data Authentication (DDA) provides a predictive fraud systems to fight the fraudster. higher degree of security that protects against chip A primary consideration is transactions that have been data cloning, the most secure EMV implementation completed as technical fallback from chip to magnetic uses Combined Dynamic Data Authentication/ stripe. These transactions can be fraud prone as the Application Cryptogram Generation (CDA), where the fraudster seeks to avoid the protection of the chip by card produces a dynamic digital signature on a random disabling it. The risk of fallback transactions should be challenge that it has received from the terminal and carefully considered and action taken either to contact other sensitive data, and on the value of the Application cardholders or decline transactions where there is Cryptogram (AC) generated by the card. significant risk. The frequency of fallback should be to PIN is another option to consider. Issuer-controlled PIN is a step forward from subjective signature-checking, which relies on the diligence of the merchant. In Although the migration to the chip technology gives the banks a vital tool in the fight against fraud, it is not the technology alone that creates a total solution. Rather, it is the way the bank uses the opportunity. By following the above simple steps, banks can deliver on the business case for the investment in chip and give a better service to their cardholders. once PIN is well established, signature fallback transactions should be considered as higher risk tracked and cards that appear prone to failure should be quickly replaced. 8 MasterCard Academy of Risk Management MasterCard Academy of Risk Management 9 EMV PAYMENT CARDS SECURITY MEASURES TO PREVENT WEDGE ATTACKS Earlier this year, reports by media alleged EMV payment cards are vulnerable to wedge or “man-in-the-middle” attacks. Wedge attacks, as described in the reports, occur when a fraudster inserts a wedge device between a lost or stolen card and point-of-sale (POS) terminal, thereby causing the terminal to erroneously determine that the card has been verified by the PIN. Additional allegations also claim that issuers may not be able to detect that a wedge attack has occurred during the online authorization process. In response to these allegations, EMVCo — the global standard for credit and debit payment cards based on chip card technology — issued a statement to ensure that the marketplace understands the robust security measures EMV cards employ to prevent wedge-type attacks from succeeding. MasterCard supports EMVCo’s position on the matter. The complete statement can be read at www.emvco.com. Understanding Terminal Manipulation at the Point of Sale One of the best places to obtain unnoticed access to card data plus PIN and ultimately access to clean money can be at the point of sale (POS). Whether acting independently, or in collusion with a merchant, criminals are developing an in-depth understanding of the function and vulnerabilities of many of the terminals deployed today — and they’re working around the clock to exploit that knowledge and commit fraud. In 2008, more than 280 million account details were compromised. This resulted in the re-sale price of account data falling dramatically. However, when track 2 data including the PIN was compromised, the price remained high. Terminal Fraud – Defeating the Security of Terminals The one thing you can be certain of is that criminals are focused on exploiting the weakest link in any layer This wedge, or man-in-the-middle attack, is technically difficult and suitable countermeasures are already of the transaction environment. They almost invariably seek out the least challenging route to easy money. available when the full picture of the payment process is taken into account. The interoperability and security Unfortunately, they are also very clever, or they have access to people who are very clever. features provided by the EMV card-terminal specifications are building blocks for the payment systems and financial institutions that design their products and processes in accordance with wider risk management needs. Indeed, history proves that the criminal will target the terminal that is easiest to get into. For example, in the United States, fuel pumps are among the easiest and most attractive targets because of their location — they sit in the open often unattended and typically have very high transaction volume. Generally, there is only one key which will unlock every pump and grant access to the payment terminal hardware, and the physical security surrounding the pay at the pump is poor at best. The opportunity to launch the wedge attack is The risks and challenges faced by fraudsters limited and countermeasures do exist: would be major. They must: • The attack is focused exclusively on lost and stolen • Steal a card Once a criminal has access, • Install the card into wedge electronics so that it can investigators familiar with fraud. This fraud type has additional controls in place to mitigate it outside EMV and by its nature the fraud is limited to the single stolen card • The attack is not relevant to ATM transactions and does not compromise the valid PIN • Countermeasures are already available either explicitly in EMV, or within payment system products and networks, or within issuer host be used unobtrusively • Perform the attack before the card is reported stolen • Risk detection by the merchant during the fraud attempt with the resulting legal consequences • Hope that the issuer does not have intelligent fraud detection based on behavioral and geographic data this type of attack report that it only takes crooks about 30 seconds to remove the entire card device from a gas pump and replace it with an identical one fitted with electronic skimmers. systems. Indeed, the issuer can already detect if the PIN has not been verified and can decline or refer the transaction in order to minimize risks associated with signature fallback While such an attack might be theoretically possible, it would be extremely difficult and expensive to carry out successfully. Current compensating controls are likely to detect or limit the fraud. The possible financial gain from the attack is minimal while the risk of a declined transaction or exposure of the fraudster is significant. 10 MasterCard Academy of Risk Management MasterCard Academy of Risk Management 11
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14:27:47-04:00, 2010:04:07 14:28:04-04:00, 2010:04:07 14:28:39-04:00, 2010:04:07 14:28:59-04:00, 2010:04:07 14:32:52-04:00, 2010:04:07 14:57:39-04:00, 2010:04:07 15:01:07-04:00, 2010:04:07 15:02:54-04:00, 2010:04:07 15:33:40-04:00, 2010:04:07 16:11:30-04:00, 2010:04:07 16:23:44-04:00, 2010:04:07 16:29:21-04:00, 2010:04:07 16:38:45-04:00, 2010:04:07 16:52:02-04:00, 2010:04:07 17:01:56-04:00, 2010:04:07 17:03:45-04:00, 2010:04:07 17:05:01-04:00, 2010:04:08 09:57:14-04:00, 2010:04:08 10:30:36-04:00, 2010:04:08 10:31:58-04:00, 2010:04:08 11:11-04:00, 2010:04:08 11:21:53-04:00, 2010:04:08 11:48:20-04:00, 2010:04:08 15:21:23-04:00, 2010:04:08 15:29:40-04:00, 2010:04:08 15:31:40-04:00, 2010:04:08 15:34:41-04:00, 2010:04:08 15:37:36-04:00, 2010:04:08 15:39:36-04:00, 2010:04:08 15:40:28-04:00, 2010:04:08 16:07:19-04:00, 2010:04:08 16:08:12-04:00, 2010:04:08 16:10:03-04:00, 2010:04:08 16:11:23-04:00, 2010:04:08 16:25:52-04:00, 2010:04:08 16:38:04-04:00, 2010:04:08 16:44:23-04:00, 2010:04:08 16:46:55-04:00, 2010:04:08 16:46:55-04:00, 2010:04:08 16:48-04:00, 2010:04:08 16:48-04:00, 2010:04:08 16:48:37-04:00, 2010:04:08 16:48:37-04:00, 2010:04:08 17:06:41-04:00, 2010:04:12 10:35:30-04:00, 2010:04:12 10:37:17-04:00, 2010:04:13 11:46:36-04:00, 2010:04:13 11:46:38-04:00, 2010:04:13 11:58:06-04:00, 2010:04:13 11:58:07-04:00, 2010:04:13 12:10:15-04:00, 2010:04:13 12:10:18-04:00, 2010:04:13 12:10:37-04:00, 2010:04:13 12:10:42-04:00, 2010:04:13 12:11:17-04:00, 2010:04:13 12:14:44-04:00, 2010:04:13 12:14:44-04:00, 2010:04:13 12:26:08-04:00, 2010:04:13 12:26:08-04:00, 2010:04:13 12:48:55-04:00, 2010:04:13 12:48:55-04:00, 2010:04:13 13:42:21-04:00, 2010:04:13 13:42:21-04:00, 2010:04:13 13:45:15-04:00, 2010:04:13 13:45:15-04:00, 2010:04:13 13:48:20-04:00, 2010:04:13 13:48:20-04:00, 2010:04:13 13:55:29-04:00, 2010:04:13 13:55:29-04:00, 2010:04:13 14:25:19-04:00, 2010:04:13 14:42:25-04:00, 2010:04:13 14:45:56-04:00, 2010:04:13 16:15:23-04:00, 2010:04:13 16:15:27-04:00, 2010:04:13 16:37:34-04:00, 2010:04:14 09:10:01-04:00, 2010:04:14 09:10:02-04:00, 2010:04:14 09:24:05-04:00, 2010:04:14 09:24:07-04:00, 2010:04:14 10:04:02-04:00, 2010:04:14 10:04:03-04:00, 2010:04:14 10:14:14-04:00, 2010:04:14 10:45:43-04:00, 2010:04:14 10:45:43-04:00, 2010:04:14 11:03:19-04:00, 2010:04:14 11:03:20-04:00, 2010:04:14 11:05:04-04:00, 2010:04:14 11:05:04-04:00, 2010:04:14 11:05:43-04:00, 2010:04:14 11:13:49-04:00, 2010:04:14 11:13:49-04:00, 2010:04:14 11:15:59-04:00, 2010:04:20 09:59:58-04:00, 2010:04:20 10:13:30-04:00, 2010:04:20 10:20:12-04:00, 2010:04:20 10:29:27-04:00, 2010:04:20 10:33:50-04:00, 2010:04:20 11:08:10-04:00, 2010:04:20 11:28:46-04:00, 2010:04:20 11:30:45-04:00, 2010:04:20 11:46:21-04:00, 2010:04:20 13:15:56-04:00, 2010:04:20 13:18:09-04:00, 2010:04:20 13:49:11-04:00, 2010:04:20 13:55:08-04:00, 2010:04:21 10:15:52-04:00, 2010:04:21 10:32:04-04:00, 2010:04:21 10:54:48-04:00, 2010:04:21 11:12:38-04:00, 2010:04:21 11:15:38-04:00, 2010:04:21 14:30:26-04:00, 2010:04:21 14:30:26-04:00, 2010:04:21 14:31:22-04:00, 2010:04:21 14:38:33-04:00, 2010:04:22 08:37:59-04:00, 2010:04:22 08:41:16-04:00, 2010:04:22 08:42:24-04:00, 2010:04:22 11:56:49-04:00, 2010:04:22 14:01:02-04:00, 2010:04:22 14:02:41-04:00, 2010:04:22 14:34:03-04:00, 2010:04:22 16:53:33-04:00, 2010:04:22 16:56:50-04:00, 2010:04:22 17:44:58-04:00, 2010:04:23 08:38:01-04:00, 2010:04:23 08:38:40-04:00, 2010:04:23 08:38:40-04:00, 2010:04:23 08:43:56-04:00, 2010:04:23 09:05:45-04:00, 2010:04:23 09:12:25-04:00, 2010:04:23 09:41:06-04:00, 2010:04:23 09:43:35-04:00, 2010:04:27 13:10:07-04:00, 2010:04:27 13:10:46-04:00, 2010:04:27 13:19:19-04:00, 2010:04:27 13:32:40-04:00, 2010:04:27 14:22:30-04:00, 2010:04:27 16:56:04-04:00, 2010:04:28 06:29:56-04:00, 2010:04:28 06:29:56-04:00, 2010:04:28 06:34:29-04:00 History Software Agent : Adobe InDesign 6.0, Adobe InDesign 6.0, Adobe InDesign 6.0, Adobe InDesign 6.0, Adobe InDesign 6.0, Adobe InDesign 6.0, Adobe InDesign 6.0, Adobe InDesign 6.0, Adobe InDesign 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