Small Wars Manual Usmc 1940 Pt1

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UNITED STATES Rf ARINE CORPS
1940

U.S. Army Military History Institute

INDEX

UXITED STATES
cOVERNMENT PRlNTlSG OFFICE
WASHINGTOS : 19d0

SWM Ch. I

Basic instincts.

........

...... .. .....

~

~

~~

~

.\tti?odo nrbd henring ............- .....
.
Corrdact of our troops. ......
... . .
..
Summnr.v. ..
.. .
.. - ~- .... .. .~
1V. I?r:latior~sliipwith tllo Stntc Dcpi~rtnle~il:
. ..
Iltrpurtnoce of coopr:rrrtion.. .. . .. ...-.
Pri~~cipleu
praueribed I,? Navy rcgolat,io~i~..
.
C!o~ttaet,\r.itll Stntc: D c ~ ~ L ~ r(:jrrc~~i!i>taI ~ ~ ~ u c I ~ ~
tivca
...... ... . . ....
. . . . .. ... .
V. Tlie cl~airrof co~nman~l-Nary and Maricte Corps:
NIL\.?rcg111atiorls....-.
. . .. ...
.. . .. . . . . - (:o~ltrol of joint olrcrni,io~~s..
. -.. .
.
T h o dircctivc
St%valoffieor
Maritic officor eo~rrmst&di~tg
arliole.. ... ..... .
Marine--Conutabt~Iary.. ... .. . . .... .. .- .. .. .
Direotcontrol by Nnvy I)el>artnretit
VI. Military-civil rolntio~~shil):
Importance. ..... ... .......... ...... ..... .- - ..
Contaot with ~ratiorinlgover~~rslarrt
offieihlr. ..
Cooperation with 1a~v-c:~~force~ncnt
agonoies.. ..........
Contnct with tho inha1,itantu. --..
~

,
.

~

SWM Ch. I1

Clizrptcr 11. O~.galiiantion.
Scdio!: 1. TI?,! estirirntc of t h r situation:
(.;cnclal...
. .
,I h e n,,ss,01,
------------.-l?act,(,l.s i," oon*ider.nd ill ttstimatirrg elrt.To!.
st,.c,,gtl,- ......-.
...-.
.------....
..--.
.
Itclnti\-i. stn.,,gth.. ... ...------.
---..
..
p:lmnl; eoorses of action .....-..-.--..-.....
O\\.KLcoiirses of aution ......-.------......
T h o rh:eisi<,n-....
.-.
Sol,l,ort,ing m1?:
h,nnc~~re
of rui,ply on a roli~ma.-.
... . . .
- - .. - .. - ..... . .. ... ..
Rup1,ly omcers ... . . .. .. .. ..
~

~

....

~

~

Depots, dilmjrs, nnd rlistriliiiting i,ui~ils
..
Clinin of n:sporisiijilit,y........ .
Accunx~tahility
.. .. .. . .. .~
.- - ~ .
.. . . . ..
I'i~l>liof mids...
.. .
Objccti\.c..-~ - ~ .---.
. .
.
Sr~perrisionof rcrjuisitio~~s
.....
Aeetrmrrlntic~nof 8tOl.CS...... ~... . .
Ge~tcml
Importance of stlpl~ly ... . .. . . .. .... . . .
111. Tmmmpartatios:
~

~

~

~

~

~~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

.. ..- .. ..
&lotor traosportatiorn ......
Tmotor-trr~ilert,ril,rsl,oriation......... ...
Tra!,spnrtntion pools.. ....
. .. .
Aviation brariiport.. .-.
.. . . . . . ... .. . . .
Water trar~sportntiorr..-......- .~~.~.. . . .. .
Atiirnr~lttm~xsport.at.io~r
.... .. . ...

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

Pnok mules....
Pack horsc;s. .
Pnok bollz..-.

MeClellnn nack r
Wok squipmrut. ...... ... . ~.
. ~~.~~,
..
Nat,ivc gnckcrs.. ... . . .. . . .... . . . . ..
Marirtcs as packcra
Rull carts .......
Tr:~iuswith comb
~

~

SWIiI Ch. IV

SWM Ch.
'T.\I+I,l<

or (:os~r~s'l:s

Clralbtcr V. lnitilll ol,eratiooi-Conrilmell.
y
~~r,q:~nV~?t~i,w~:
%a4
i-25

6-1
(i-2

fib3
li4
IiL5
6-6
rj 7
6-8

6-9
li-~IO
6-1 I
Ci-12

(it3
(i-14
(i...l~?

Attaclicd units
G:~iclesand intcr

Native troops ......... .... .
Prortlinent native eivili~r
TVe'ertpoas.. ....-.
Amrnuuitioo.. ......
Signal sr(siprnent

"

3

.. ... .

..

B-21

SWM Ch. VI
'l',,l;i,l.:

<'l?s~slcs'rs

<,I,'

l'i,?t,41<.r
Yl.
I

l,,~,l,,Zr? ~ , ~ , t v < ~ ! h - . - l ' < ~ ! , l l ! > ! , < ' ~ , i ,
. I
t i i
t I
l'alltililll,ii.
>Ii.*c<,l!ttr>~~<,,~s
c,~!i~iprfr~&ut
l'rr**... . . . .
~.
I \ , ~t.l.lliiig f!ie ir,riiiiir,r,!:
I ~ v s ~ ~ ~ ~ (of
~ ~f>:<~r,>l
~ i i ~ l ci :I ~i cl l ~
yr
I

'flit field rntiori

i';,,,,.~x<~,,'!yr<,l,l"2,3..

~

.

1.. 'l'l,<.
>l8,7?11:
(;,,,,,,ral
lt:,lc. < # f ,,,:,rvi,
I,':wl<~rs itttl!x ~<>!I ~ > t : t r cl',,
c,f ti, v ~ ~ ~ n t i mBir
i s LI
r ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~r ift k~ v r r c ~ i
~

....
~ilfik,ou.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.. ..
h l n w l i~nr.~~,:ttis,rrfcbr a rillt! ~ > I : t t o o , ~
hlnrrlc I,!<~s

V l . l L t ~ r , , r b ~ ~ i t i w s ~:ttt?
~ ~sco
ilcri~t~
(:tirt,i~tl v i s t u ~ 1r ~ ~ ~ ~

~

,

~

~

~

~

t

l < ~ ~ c ~ ~ ~ l~>~yfir,,
~ t . ~. . i . s. s c ~. ~. .~ .c ~ ~
I L ( ~ ~ ~ o ~ i t t nl>,y
i ~ :~v$:tli t i s s t t ~ .~.e. c. .~.~. . . . . .
S1.,.11rIt,y <,I1 t ! K ! I,L~,~<,I,.... ....................
~%:ellril.v at rcsl,. ..............................

SWM Ch. VTT-

S W N Ch. U(

SWM Ch. X

(.:lri~pt?rI S . ~Lrintioll---Coalillell.
Sectloll \ I . ('~lllbilf s11~1Ort:

Ocriersl discussiol>. .... ... . .. ..- .. - .. Figliting avintiol,. ..- ....... . .. ... .
Att,ack aviatio
~

~

. .. ~~.~ .
Support of marclring colmnnt. . At,tacks on ha
ositious. .. . .
.
.. .
Att,aeks on tor
A v i a t i o ~as~ a n
VII. Air braniiport:
- .. .
General cot>sirlerat,ions
Troop t m n s p o r t a t i i . .
.- .
.. ..
Transl,ortation of stlpl,lics. . .. . .. .. ... .
.
Dropping of sopplics . . ... . ---Evacr~ationof sick a x ~ divorllidcd
- ~.
~~..
(Iliiq,tcr S ,Ri\.or ol~crations.
Sr,rtir,il 1. Kivcr opcratiuns in get~cral:
Nceessity for river opotzti
Ga~~or:ll
charaeteristiea oi
11. Tpgcs a n d clraractcristie~of bo:
Gcnera1L.-. ....
~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

..

Nature of t h e river- .........- - - - -I.o\ver river boats .-.-.
.. - -.
- - - - - .. -Micldlle river boats.. ... .. ..... . . . .
1Joner
.. ... .... ..... .. .
.. rivw boats ..-...
10-9
T y p e s of boats availahlo
. ...
.
.
.-.
.
.
10-10
Metborl of i,ro~olsiorr..
.
.
. .
Influe~ieeof tactical pritrciplcs.. .... . ... . .... 10--11
111. Preparation for river opcrationd:
.. 10-12
hltrodrtatio~,
Organizing tho rivcr patrol . . ... .. . . . . 10-13
10-14
Crews
IIoat procurcmmt.. ..
.. ..
.~~
~- lW15
A r n l a ~ ~ i e annt d equipment. . .
.. . . . . 10--46
1,onding boats .......
. . .. .. ., .. . ...
1G I 7
IV. Occupation of a river:
10-18
T h e missio~i.-.
Ri~nilnrityt o la1
.
10-19
T h o drty's marcll.. .
10-20
10--21
R a t e of movemen
B o a t forrnatiot~.. . .... ... ........ ... .. . 10-22
Roco~maissanceand security. ......- -.. . 10-23
Initial contact wit,h the onomy.. ... ... .. .. .. 18-24
A typiod a ~ n b u s .
h... ..... .. ......... . . . lC-25
T h e atback -.----..
.
- - 18-20
Garrlroning t h e river ............... ... ... 10~-27
~

~~

~~

~

~

~

~

~~

~

~

~

~

~

SWM Ch.

Clragtor XI, D i s a n n x ~ n m of
t &wpulatioIl.
Section I. C;t.,icml ................Estimrrtc xr~dp l x ~

I1 1

.... . .

hlannt?r of eollccf i l i * a r
C>ollcctiligap<:z~ci

ronlro

.

J

.

. ,.

I

y..

~

hlcns~rrcsfolio\\ iigg di+annan~t,\~t
11-10
C'il:il,tcr S I I , hrttrrd nat.ivc orgstriaatiolls.
i
I. Ooocral:
1,ocal arnred forces. ... _.
.. .. . . .
. . 12-1
t:l i i t c d Slnles i u t e r v c l l t i o ~ ~-... ~
.
12.3
ItestomtWn of nrlthority tu iucnl go\ r~.~rrr:otit..12-3
Forlrlatio,~of a co~iital~olnry
.... - ~.-. . 12.-.&
11. Orgntriaation of a oonstnl,ular\-:
Plauning agency- ... . . .
.
12-6
. .. ..... .. . . 1 2 . ~
:'.lq>rornl of plalis.. ... .
12-7
J,ocnl ercative law .... ... ... .... ......
United Sistes creative laws ....... .
. 12-8
C:ompo"ition
.
12--9
I>utics arrrl powcrs ...
..
. 12-10
... .... . . 12--11
size o f f ,. .. .
Acln~i~ristrative
organiaat,iori. ­ ... . ....
12 12
R t p p l y and cqnip~ncnt
. . .. - . . .
. 12--13
Itecorrls nnrl reports. . . . . .
... . . . 12-14
Fiaancrs .....
12--16
Itrernitiltn--12~~lti
12--17
.... 1 2 18
Military eoortn.. ... .
. .. . .. .
111. Operatioris and trairrirli.:
12-19
Recruits
~

,

Others.

.....

Troop leadinfi..

IV. Aurilinrv forces:
lirlmn anil rrlral aacn
Spcaial agents.. .
Auxiliary anits

..

.

12-26

SWM Ch.XI11

Cl,:lrlicr XII. .\rnled native orgi?nia;ltion~-~~C!~~tli~~rtt~~l
S ~ ~ c t iV.
~ ~Civil
l i arld nlilitilry r f ~ l : ~ t i ~ ~ ~ ~ s l ~ i ~ ~ : I':IY,
1lelstio11to civil pun-cr.. .............
12~~2:
Rciatiorl to ITuited S t a t e s f o r c c s . .
12 '28
Cl>r~),tr.r
XIIT, Miiitury gu~em~rrmrt.
,

Scctiun I. Ocncr:tl:
1 ............................
13.1
1)cfinitions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
13~2
i\1it~lorit?iorcsercis~~of
nriiit:l~.~
grrrarr~l~~r:nI,..
13-3
F u ~ ~ c t i o of
n s inilitnr3- govarl:r~rt!iiLin grrrt:ml I;%-&
By ~\-lromesereisctl
1

~

11. Establislr~~~elit
am1 ndmil~istratioli uf iruilit:,~.!.
,;,,,,~l--.-~~~>~~ti,l,,
1':tr.
l.&-i2
118-tructio~lof ,t>rsoilt~cl. . .. .
1.1-13
1.1. I4
1.ll i

I11 I!!cct<,rxlmissio,i:
Chairman
~.
~

~. . .

~~

~.

~

~

~

I .&. I f ;

.

Rle,liral of lice^...
I ) < l ~ l ~ r t ~ r /,IES'l'S.
CONVOYS .\SD C!OSVOY ~S(!OIi'l'S.
A\-I'L'rloX.
IIIYEIt OI'EILATIOSS.
DlS~\Il%l~\I!fi~X'l'
CJF I~OI'I~l..\'l'I~')S.
.\ltIllCI) x > ~ r l Y l ~oIli:>\Slz'\'rIoss.
:
SlILIThltY COYCRK311I:ST.
SIIPGILVISICJSi>FCI.E:I"~IOSS.
\T1'l'&11)1~'~\V'\l..

UNCLASSIFIED

SMALL WARS MANUAL
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

INTRODUCTION
I'ar.

Fnse

~~ECTIO1
N. ( : E W E I ~ \ L

CH:II~ACTERISTICS..
.... 1- 1 to 1- 6
11. STr<.~recr..
........................
1- 7 t,o 1- 9
111. I'SYCHOLOGY
.......
1-10 to 1-17
IV. ~ i l l tllr tii:tki~rgof rrvaties.)
It liils ~ I ' P I Ii t i t i111brc1ke11p c ) l i c ~of
tlte I'rcsidr~r~t
of llle U n i t e d Stittes so to itrtcl.pret. their p w e r s , beginning w i t h th? t i ~ l i rof Presielt~lrtJ'lfevson ciovn to tile p m s c i ~ twit11
the e s c e p t , i o n of President I h ~ c h a n t t ~ i .
6. 'I'he followillg pertilkent e x t r i ~ c t sfro111 li. S. N s t ~ yK o g u l n t i o l ~ s
are c i t e d :

Ou ocensioll wilere injury to tht. IToitrrl Stitt,,s or to citicr-nr tlterrof iia eo~rl~ lintt,nt:ttionnl
~~s
i n n or t r e z t t ~
mittccl or tlrrcat~.ncd,in violntiun uf the i ~ r i u e i ~uf
right, tlkc Conulliuldt~rin Citic,f sllilll eollsolt xith tlie diylozr~aticrt*yrrr;e~ttntI~v
l l IS tbc~gntrity of the rase
or colts111 of thr i:llit& Ytrrtes nlld titlie ~ ~ l rr;t+.~s
rlcol;tnda, rr,lrortirlg ienntdi;ltc,is to tlbt, Sc~<.rt.tnr~
of the S s v y $111 the fnrte. Tlrt*
res~)oaslbilit?for nll? rtction take11 by :I nitv:%lferur. Iro%~c~rc~l~,
rtvts wlrr,lly u&mn
Ill? <.0l11l11n11dinl tiffircr th<~rt',lf.
Tlic use of fore? nF:lin.it e foreign rind fricodly state. or ngarirut s!t?,tao wltlkirt
tire tc,rvitories tilrTeof, is illegal. 'I'ile right. of self-prt,at.l'\atioll. Iho!wrt,r, i s a
right a l i i ~ ~I~~~lorlgn
h
tu stiitrs ns \veil ils to i!~dii.iti~!i~ls.
ilnti in tlw c:tsf: of stat(,s
O I I J l11.t~
.
it illellldeY tile Iirotectioll of the sti~tt',its h ~ l t ( , r 1. 11kd ils ~ I ( ~ ~ ; P ~ S S ~:111(1
nad 1,rop"rty uf its eitiwns llgilirrst 8rbitrit1.y I.~(,~CIIR>,
i,(.t~~itl
or i~rtlx-~~diog,
~ v l ~ ? r e it)hye stiitr or it8 c i t i z e ~ ~
I I rI S I ~s t t f f ~ ril.r~!pz~t.itl~lf:
i n j l ~ ~ . yTit(%
.
~n~lditionr;
eilllirrg for the itnrlli~~itionof fbv riglit of s ( . l f . ~ ~ r ~ ~ s e ~ r(~zulnot
\ ~ z ~ l i to ~ ~d! t.iined
iwfort.hand, i ~ s terost be l e f t to tlie si>nad j,lrlqart,~tt of n*slx,nsilde offltrtrs, \x~ho
asre lo l ~ r f < > r tiat.ir
l ~ b einti~xin titi* rrslr,vt with 1011 ~ ~ ~ s s i lcrnlrer jtrid fvrbesnrncr.
151 i ~ er iwe sl~ellforct: Ire ext.rein.d i l l tinrc of In'>cct:olher\vis*. tlliu~11% 1111 I I ~ ) V ~ ~ C I I tion of t h e rigilt of st~lf-pn?sc~rvstiolr
iis sl,orC (ltdinetl. I t loltst lltt ttscvl o n l ~sir
it 1118t resort. I I I I ~t1lf.n oniy to the crtc~nt\vhiAl is ;tlra~lnte~ly
lr<.eur#aryto w w r r i ~rliahthe eutl re,lnIred. It crln rlcvrr be raercined tyitli vitw. t o istlictleg ~ u s i s l l e ~ e e ft or acts already contolitted.
FVlbenvrer, i n tile h ~ ~ ~ r i i e ~ iol
t i othe
n ninn.e-rnentiot~ecl 1~rilr.ipies. it altttll 1%eorxlr. ot~cc!ssnr).to itmd itrl armed forre in foreign territory on o a : i ~ u i oof~ ~in,litieal
~list!$ri,:kxiro \(.I~,.I.L:
tile luorl rnttl1oritit.x itre nliiti,le to give adcflstite prutecti<,tt
the
of na.1, itnthoriti?~,or of ~ n m t !one of tl,c?ra, nhall
10 life iind I ) U < I I P T
~ ~asscmt
,
lirxt bc obtt~lacd,if it ettrr he done without rirt,jndice to tirn istc~restxinrolvctrl.
1)oe to titc: ensi: with wlrirl> tl~cXuvy I ) ~ ~ [ m r t n i crt11
t ~ ~ tI*. rfomainlrir'ilted from
ail parts of ttte world, I W rc,nr!nn~lrlt.r ill cl,ir.f, llng otllct,r, o r crrn,~nruaiirtgoincer
sl~iiii1sat1r. ilil ~ ~ i t i ~ r ~tio~ the
t t ~rc.prcrt,~~Uttire
m
of trzir fon.igll gorerrtrut.ot. or
dt.antritl tltc l~c,rforrnrl~~rc
tililt rrn~st.
of :tny s r r r i w Prola rrllp suclt ~el&rc.xot!tntire
t ~ e! rt*etttacl within n 1irnitr.d tlme, without firat cornnranicistirlg with the S u r y
I>el>aartmt.ntexcept in eatrttllre nlsw rvtlt%realcll llctioll i s lfivrswry to wlr'e life.
(U. S. Nnvp 11opnl~ttiu1,s. NI1. 722, 723, illld 724.1

c. The use of the forces of the United States in f01xig11 c ~ o t ~ ~ ~ I . r i e ~
to protect tlie l i v e s and property of A m e r i c a n citizens resident in
thosr, countries does not. necessarily c o n s t i t n t e an act of war, arrd is,
therefore, not ecluivalent to a declaration of war. The President, as
chief e x e c u t i v e of the nation, cllarged with the responuihility of the
lives and property of United States citizens n b m a d , has the authority
to use the forces of t,lw United States to secure such prutect.iorr i n
foreign countries.
%T*71341'-10-2

:3

rl. The 11i.itory c r f lltr I'rlitc.rI Htrrtt~s4111xrr; tlrat i n spite rrf t l ~
i-:tryi~:g tnlr,rl of tllr kirvigl~pllicy of ;ir~crc.rding:~clrni~rir;tratic~ns~
114~.i~rtorp<>scd
o r ii~tt~r\-cnt.d
tllis (;ovc?rilrrtrr~~t
in t111!: ~ f f ~ iof
rs O ~ ~ I P P
~t:its!s wit11 re~r~;~rlzttl>lr
sf~g111:irity:
:$11c1 it I I I : I ~kx! "!niicit)ilte*l that the
I I T tr follr,~~rrl
i l l tllz ftttnm. It is well that
i;:tlnc ge11cr:xl I I ~ O U ~ < ~ I will
tltt* iinitc*ri St:~trsxlnly I)? ~r~u~p:~r.ccl
for ally etnergency which map
IH-CIIP ~ s l ~ c t l it
~ cis~ rI l~tt1vvi111of ~*itl~c-r
l i ~ t i ~ ~or
~ v~iI~~l y s i disaster,
c~l
I
I
r i ~ l t s t iI ~ 1~ 1 i I I I I I ~ I .I I X I ~ I :IS
I S these conditions
<::III 1.w pmlictcsl, t t ~ l c l:IStltt.sc, plans : I I I I ~ ~>rci~nrsttio~~s
can IJCunderf : ~ k r ~the
i , IT~iitc.rl Staftas .;lroul(l 1x2 w:lcly for c~if!tcrof the% elncrg i c :tttc~tirr~l
~l
~>I:III$.
~ ~ r r ~ l i ~ rp~r qi ~ :~~ar zr tyt i o ~ ~ s ,
gi~rrci(:swit11 s l r ~ ~ t ~ ~ :IIIII
org:i~~iz:ttii~~t~
~ t~~~t ~ti ir ~oi ~r t g~ . ,
~ ~ ~ I I ~ I I I I fI I~~ ~
I I l~ ,~ r ~
:IIIII
I--4. Functions o f hc:idcluarters Marine Corps.--,I. Srrlall wnrs,
g~-~rt*rttlly
Iwir~gt l ~ r *c-s~'rt:tic~l~
I V II l l < . rt~,sl>crr~sit~ilit
i1.s of tlre I'resirlc~~t,
in protecting i \ r ~ ~ ~ ~ r iirrt~~rcsts.
c . : ~ ~ r l i €6. 111111 11rctj>erty:111mntl,:IN: therefc~rc!i-on~l~~ctc*il
irr :I Il&;itlncnr.
cliffon-nt frt~rrxnrrtjor \varf:lre. 111 small
wsr.;, cli~tloa~scy
II:I,S rltit (,e:~st~tl
fir ftt~~clio
rirlcl
~ r tlro State Ihepartmt+nt
c,xe.et\.ises II rc111str ~ ~ar~tl
t t ( r ~ r ~ t r o l l iil~flnt:r~ro
t~g
over th15 rnilitsry opentions. T l ~ cv t ~ yi~icr~tisewlro ln~wc~nnlly
pire.: inslrt~rtiot~s
withctut
tlcticl~kof ('ongres*.
b. Tht! I'resiil~~rtt.wlto 118s ~ K - ~ ! I I ir~forrlre~i
of :I given nituntiori in
1;o111ofr,tu!ign < b o r ~ ~tl~tr~ucpt~
~ l r y the usl~nlageant:ier a t llis 
r ~ l C I I I : I ~ ~I I I I I I I ~ I P I S o f I I ~ ~ I O
111:iy
~ I , 11cb
. si'lrt
:IFIIt<*rtrrit~ntiottto c11111ri1lt l w .si111:1tii111. S I I I ~t11:11.1: 1111, I V : I ~ f o r Z I I I ~
I ~ ( I < I ~ I ts o follir~s. 'I'i~is V ~ I I ~ I I : isI ~ge11t!r61lly
~
C ~ I I I I ~ ~ I Si tI€ : ~1i1~1ri11e
~
clrt:rcl~tr~u~rts
o r r~tixt.il f ~ r l r c b so f rt~:~rilies
a l ~ da:iilors frntrt s l ~ i p s: ~ ttlir
critical init~ls. Owing to its lirrriit.d ~w1mnt11.1 I I t t ~ : ~ c t . i oof
~ ~ t11r
trftttr seizi~rg11
v n ~ r g n n will
~ l oftcsn I*. r?stt.ic-tcd to nth ttctive df5fe11';~
criticnl entrr alch as IIII ittll)ortatrt seslxrrt o r otItc!r city, the cttl~itnlof
$1 colttitry crr distnrtwxl rct.t!its i ~ fli~nitrxlexteait.
c. >Yc:cot~dphave.-'rla!
nrrivt~lo f rrr~tforc:cmentsn~irlge11rr:11 milit a r y oyii!ratior~i;it1 llrcitr fielle
".
in this respect. Each situation presents eertt~iilcllaractenstics peculiar to itself; in one instarlee officers were clothed with almost unli~~ritecl
li~iliti~ry
t~uthority\vitliill t h e l a ~ rand our treaty rights; in
i ~ ~ r o t l ~lcw
r r , authority \v:ls exercised owr the population; I I I I ~in the
tllird i n s t t ~ ~ ~
the
e eforces of mup:ltioi~had abwllutely no jr~dicinlauthority. Tire ahselice of srlcl~nutl~orityis often a dwidecl lrantlicap to
o ~ rdiscltilrge of their responsihilitic?~. If the
fc!rws o f o c c u ~ ~ ~ ~i nt i tlre
lociil jurlicial systen~i s wealc, or irrokel~tlo~vnentirely, i t is better to
endow the ~nilitl~ry
a~~thorities
wit11 temporary and legal jrtdicinl
powers ill onler to avoid ernbarrrrssi~rgsituatiolrs which m i ~ yrestllt
from illegi~lussumption.
(S) During this phase tile marines act 21sa reservo in support of tlie
irative forces and are actively eniployed only in grave emergencies.
'The marines are successively wit11dl;lwn to the larger centem, t.lms
affordingabetter means for caring for tire health, comfort, arid mcreation of the comn~and.
(j.

S W X 1-6

<;v,x>;1t,\1,
<'i~:\~~~\ri'~i~l~'rll.'5
j. Izijth ~~/rc~~t.~r,-.-%VitlicIr:i1si11
fro111 t l i ~ t1rr:ttcr of olwratiolw.
'
'llrV1Ic:PPH
Firi:&lly,w l t t : ~ortlt*r
~
i s rt~sturx*~I~
or \<-tlrt~
I l r c ~rt~q~~nsi1)lt.
~li~tisi.
~trc*pnyi::"fll tu I~at~riiee
t11r. sitrtation \vitl~(~tci
o t t ~ r rs11111Htrt.the tr00j)S
,
117 i t 1 1 l I
I
I
I I I ~ r t l r i t - . Ilris [~rocessii
progn-s~irsfvorri tlrr h:~ckcntmtv crr irlt~l.ior~trt\v:~rd,
ill the P T ? I - C ' ~ C
orulcr trr tllc 
I K ~ I srrd
I 1,vcr
tcs~lttticltte~
rlt~sc~lo~w~cl
rill lx! otlri~r\vit~:zof :III :tItogc~tl~<~r
d i l r ~ ~ r t l~{ ir1~~t1 , I I I ~ I ~ ~ T I : I ~ PillI I 3-eZry
ditft+n'r~tIlr~~:ttcmo f o ~ r : t i r r s I
r i r i t t i r i clifft~r?~ri
rt~r*tt~ocls
~ I , I ~ I tJrc1~1
II
o f 1 1 1 ~lV(1rl11 \\':lr. St1r11 :trc, (111: stt~irll \Y>ISS
w11icIi ~ ~ r t ~ ~ l ~ ~i ts! c111is
r i lI~I I :~I I IcI IlI I ~ .
b. 'I'ltr*rtbis I, +:id Inrk of I I ~ I !ltoriti~ti1.1.It~stsi t i t 1116' ~ r r ~ ~ l l(~1111)10yetl
:~tIs
i r l S I I I ~ I I I \r;:rs, IIo\vt~vt~r~
111<>rts
i~ 11rol111l1ly
I I O 111i1it:ir~y
org:rr~iz:rtic~t~
of tliv sis, of tlrr I:. S, >l:~rirrr~
C:c~r,[~s
in tllr \sorld wllicll I I I I ~11:rcl :is
iirr this kind of conrhirt. Ttris exprielicn
tc~oc.:lr ~,titrtirilleslu~rit~ti(~~:
11:rsI~runp~irrtul:rinrost t?crtircly in s~llnll\vitl?i irgainst pcn~rlyorgnt~izerl
titld t:iguipln~il nativt. irn~g~clars.Wit11 a11 the, practical advt111t:iges
we c*rrjoyt!dirr those aiunl t11:d ex~tr?rit-~ice
rrntst rrirt 1e:id to an unc1t.rc.ibin~atc,ilf the mocLrn irrc!flxl~lar, sopplit?tl with r~rodern aims arid
~ ~ I I I I I I I I I If
~ . rrr:~t.ines 11:1ve 1.uson1r ~ccostomeilto eirsg victories
i r ~t he prr~t,tlrey trrrrst riow pm[P:tn< t l c m ~ l w sfor. tl~e
owt. irrc~griltr~!s
i~rcre~rsca(l
tatfort rvllieh \sill lia necessary to irrsrtre victory io the fatt~r(!,
Tlrr ftittrr.c*rvirirorlant ning be its \sc!ll arrncal ns t.hf:y an!; Ire will I~cs
:tt~lt. t o concerrtratc8 a anttrericnl ~tip~rirrrity
:lg:titt?it iscrlttt<~ddct:rcI:llrric:t~Is:it t l i c ~tirrx!, r111c1 pl~rct~
lrc* ~ I I ~ ~ ~ as
I s it1
c s ti16; rn~st,III; will I>:IIT :I
o f I l i t trail.;. 1111:cour~lry,irlrd t l i n i~~kr~ilritrrnts;
1horr111~11
krrrralt~clp~.
tltlrl lrt. will lri~sat11t. itlll('r(~~it
:rt)ility (O \vitlr.itit:~il111 1111: IIIL~IIVIII
ell)tbttit a ~ v l ~ i t ~ r
stiiclcr;, srlcll ns clirririlt~11nt1rli.;eare, to s grc>stol.extc~r~t
1l.tn11. All tl~r?et i n c ~ r r rtilv:tr~t:r~t~s,
~~l
colribiriiop lrriri~itis~
curtrrir~gI~IIII
r~a~dc.rrt
fttaratrtrlrt, \sill nc!igIr heavily irt tlre halrrrrce agrriilst tdre n l ~ l vrtnl~~gv
of itit) rrirrirrc. f(lrrt!ii itr ougnnisutiorr. t~qirij~rr~t!nL,
i~itcllige~~ec,
I I I I ~l
i i i if 1 ci~ri.lcs$itarlscity is prmitted tcr warp gi:~~tl
jrcdgmertt.
s. rlltlatrgl~srarrll wnts pretient n special prirk~lenrveqtiirisg 1r:cuticul:~rhetical arkti ftchrticul rnc?rrs~tres~
principles of
tl~trirnr~~tltablc.
war r.nrrmirr t.Itc3 basis of tlies~oplnticrnn and xwloirir tlrcr gm:ttest
itlg<~~ntity
irt t,treir npyrlieatic,~~.A s u rcgular war rltnrer takes exactly

..

.

8

the forrxi of any of Its predecessors, so, eren to a greater degree is each
small war somewhat different from anyt.liing ~ v h i c hbas preceded it.
One. must ever b e on guard to prevent, his views lxxorning fixed as to
procedure. or methods. Small Tars clemand the highest type of leaderslrip directed by intelligence, reso~trcefnlness.and ir~ge~toity.S n ~ : ~ l l
wars are conceived in uncertainty, a r e coadi~ctedoften 1vit11precarious
respoilsibility and doubtfi~l authority, under indeterininate oiders
lackilig specific instri~ct,ioiis.
d. Formulation of foreign policy in our form of goveniment is n o t it
fonctitnl of the military. Relations o f the United States v i t h foreign
states a r e controlletl by thS esecutive artd legisletivc bmr~chesof the
Government. These policies are of course bincling upon the f o x e s of
itrtervention, and in t h e absence of more specific inst~~tctions,
the con?.
mander in the firlil looks to them f o r guidiritce. F o r this reason all
officers sl~onldfarniliurize.thexnselves ~vithcurrent policies. A knowledge of the history of i~lte,rventions,and the displays of force and
otlier measures sliort. of war employed by our Government in the Fast,
are essential to tl~oroughcomprehension of our relatio~iswit11 foreign
states insofar as tliese matters are concenled.

SWM 1-7

SECTION
I1
STRATEGY
I?,T.

The biasiv of tho strutcs

1-7
1-8
1--9

I';,;..
11

12
14

1-3. The basis of t h e strategy.-<.
'1'1111111ilitn1.ystrategy of s n ~ a l i
wars is more directly associated with tlw politic:~lstrategy of tlic
campaign than is the case in major operations. In the 1:ltter case, war
is undertaken only as e last 1.osol.t after :ill diplomatic means of
adjusting differences hare failed and the military commander's ol~jective ordi~mrilybecomes the enemy's armed forces.
b. Diplomatic agencies tnsually condmt negotitrtions with a view to
arrivir~gat x peaceful solution of the problen~on a basis compi~tible
with both national honor and treaty stipl~lations. iilthough the outcome of such negotiations ctften results in a friendly settternent, the
military forces should be prepared f o r the, possibility of an m~fttvorable
termination of the proceedings. The mobilization of i~rmcdforces
constitutes a highly effective weapon for forcing the opponent to accede t o national demands nvithout resort to war. \Vhc?n a time limit
for peaceful settlement is prescribed by ultimatum the military-navtll
forces must be prepared to initiate operations up011 expiration o f the
time. limit.
G. I n small mars, either diplomacy has not been exllaosteil o r tlie
party that opposes the settlement of the political question cannot
reached diplomt~tically. Small wtir situations are nsually a phase of,
or an operation t:~k'ing place co~~currently
with, diplomatic effort.
The political aothorities do not relinquish active participation ill the
negations and they ordinarily continue to exert considerable influence
on t h e militz~ry campaign. The military leader in snch operations
thos finds himself limite'd to certain lines of action :ts to the strategy
and even as to the tactics of the campaign, This feature has been so
marked in past oprations, that marines have been referred to as State
Department Troops in small wars. In certain c a s e of this kind the
State Department has even dktated the size of t h e force to be sent to
the theater of operations. The State Departmer~tmaterially influ-

SWM 1-8
STRATEGY

ences tlle strategy and tactics by orders and instructions ~ d ~ i care
ll
prornulgi~teclthrough the Navy Department or throng11 diplomatic
re~wesenti~tives.
(I. State Department officials represent the Governmer~tin foreign
comltries. T l ~ eforce genelxlly nearest at, llalld t o back up thr a~lthority o f these agents is tile Navy. 1 x 1 such operations the Navy is prrforrrii~rgits ~rormalfunction, and has, as il componeirt part of its
organizatio~l,the Fleet SIarir~eForce, organized, equipped, arrd trained
to perf<,r111dnty of this nntave. After tlre Force has landed, tile coilimander afloat g e ~ ~ e r a l linfluences
y
the operations ol~lyto the extent
nec,essttry t r ~i~ls~zre
tlreir col~troln ~ ~dircction
cl
i n iiceordance with tlre
policy of tlie instructions that he h a s received frovr~higher authority.
'Ie supports anil ccoopcretes vit11 t h e Force to the l i ~ r ~ofi t his a h i l i t ~ .
111t h e 1:dter stages of tile operation tlre loct~l11aval c o ~ r ~ ~ ~ l a rrnny
lder
relincluisl~practic:~llyall control ill order to carry orrt roi~tir~e
duties
elsu\vllrr~. I n suc11 cnse tlre general o l ~ e r s t i o ~
plan
~ s is directed by, or
tlirot~gli,the ofice of tlie N:tr:ll Operations in Waslrington.
c. Wars of i ~ ~ t e r r e l r t liarr
i i ) ~ ~two classifications ; i~rterre~ltion
i n tile
interntrl, or interveiltion in tile external affairs o f ililotl~erstate. 111terventio~rill tile it~trnlalaffairs of a state inay be u n d e r t a k n ~to
restore orderl to s r ~ s t agoverl~mental
i~~
authority, t o obtain redress, or
to enfi>rcetl~t:fr~lfilrnri~t
of obligations binding hetTeeu t l ~ tmo
e
states.
Interventio~iiir tl!e esternal tlffnirs of a state m a y bn t l ~ en:sult of L:
treaty wlrich anthorizes one state t o aid nnotller its a nltitter of political
expediency, to avoid mom serious corisnquences W ~ I R I Ithe interests of
o t l ~ e sr tates are in~;olved,or to gi~iricert~tir~
tidrantagc!~not ohtai~~able
ollrerwise. It. ~ r ~ be
a ysimply :ti1 intervention to enforce certain opinions o r to propug:lte certaii~doctri~lcs,principles, or stairdards. For
cxamplc, in tl~ese(lags \vl~enpenlicioiis propagt~ndais ernployed io
spread revolutioi~nrydoctrines, it is cooceival~letlmt tlie Ciiited States
nrigllt i ~ ~ l e r v cto
~ ~i,r?vent
t?
the development. of political disafkctio~~
\vl~iclltllrc:~tcns the orr1.tl11.o~of a friendly state and i~ldirect,lyiufll~encesour OKII security.
1-8. Nature of t h e operations.-a.
Irregular t,roops may disregard, i ~ pr art or entirely, Ir~telmationiilLiim a n d the Rules of Laird
Warfare, in their conduct of hostilities. Cornmantiers in t h e field
~rrustbe prepared t o protect. tl~ernselvesagainst practices and
of cornbat not sanctiorlecl ky the Rnles of War.
6. F r c q ~ ~ e n t lirregulars
y
kill a n d roll peaceful citixl~si
ol.)tirin supplies \ \ - l ~ i care
l ~ then secreted in remote stronghi~lds. Seizure or &estrnction o f S I I C ~sources of siipply is a n important factor
13

SWM 1-8
STI\>\TEGY

in reducing their means of resistance. Such methods of operation
must be stndiecl and i~dsptedto the psycl~ological reaction they will
[~rotlncen p o ~the.
~ op[~onents. Interventions or occapations are osually peaceful and altruistic. i~ccordixtgly,the ir~ethoclsof procedtire
nmst rigidly conforrrl to this pnrpost,; but when forced to resort to
arms t o carry out tire object of the i~~tervention,
t h e opertttion must
be pnrsued e~~ergeticrllly
and expeditiously in order to overcome the
resiskance as quickly rts possible.
e. T h e cnmpaigrr plan tuld stratc.gy must he ildnpted to the charsictor of the people encountered. Nationti1 policy i~ndthe precepts
of civilized proceilure d e n ~ n ~tlr:~t
~ d our leal lings wit11 other p o p l e s
he maintnined on it high-moral p18111. Ho~vever,t h e military strittegy
of tlie csrnpaipii :tnrl the tactics enlployed by tlin co~nm:~nderin the
firlrl lrlnst he iidapted to the sitoiition in order to accom~lisllthe
nlission ~vitl~ont
delay.
d. After u study lrzis k e n inade of the i~eoplem l ~ orrill oplmse the
intervention, the strategicnl phtn is e~rol~ed.The milititry strntegical
11Ian sltor~lilirrclu(lr thocr tnenns wllicl~~villt~cco~nplisll
the purpose
in view quickly a n d con11)letely. Strategy sho111d atten~ptto gain
psyclrological riscendixncy over the outltm. or i~lsargentelenlent prior
to hostilities. Re~nnnheringthe political mission ~\.Iiich dictates the
lnilitary strategy OE smitll \V:IPS, one or Inore of t h e fo11o1villg basic
modes of prt~ednremay be decicled upon, depending upon the. situation :
(1) Attempt to attain the. aims of the interventio~~
1)y a simple,
clerir, ant1 forceful declaratio~iof the position and intention of the
occupying force, this n-itl~outthreat or ~iromise.
(2) B y a denionstration of thc power ~ v l ~ icould
c l ~ be cmployecl to
r,< I .L .L Y out theso intentions.
(Hj 'Shr displity of tht. nnrnl or military force rrithin tho rlrerl
inrolvecl.
(4) The actnt~l:~pplicrrtionof armc!(l force. Ihuing tlrr t r a ~ ~ s i t o r y
stage o r prior to actire nrilitiiry opcr;ttions, care shr,old ht? taken to
avoid the commission of :illy acts that ntight precipitttt(? :L breach.
Oncii ar~nerlforce is resortrd to, it iihould be applied nit11 ileter~r~inat,ior~a n d to the fsxtent reqoire.d by the situittion. Situations mny
ilevelop so rapi(1ly t l ~ i the
~ t transition from ni?gotintions to the us(,
of at~r~ecl
force gives tile eomnlnt~derlittle or ncj time to exerl l ~ i s
influeltce through the use of the methods mentioned in st~bparagraphs
(2) a n d (3) above.
e. 'I'he strategy of this type of wmfnre mill be strongly inflnenced
by the probable nature of the conte~rnplirtedoperations. I n regulnr
13

fx:rrfarfb tlir rlrrisinn ill Ire pxinrcl IIII I i ~ r r i ~ \ - frrrlrts
~r
and ~ ~ r o b n l , l r
Iirr~it~vi
tlr(~:~t<~rs
of <>[n*n+tirioirsIrar11111Y C ~ I I I R forces
L.
111>ry11i:
\siclr*,lytlispr'rst~clnntl ~~robrttrly\vill 1)e or~tnnrrrln~ri~tl
ilr srrrilrr :rnt:ls
11y tlro lrostilo forct%. 'Slris requires llrrlt tlrr Forcc- In. orprrliztb~lwitli
I i
to 1 1 i 1 i t :LIIII flexibility, r&rr(l that tlrr trno[rs In: Iligltly
t r r i ~ t lirr tlrn IISC of tlteir special \vrk:tprlns :IS n.cll a s 11rolwr
11tiliz:~ti c i t l of t e r n ~ i ~ r .
f . 'I'lrr~stt ~xlioir:r\-t? ~mrticil~ntcd
I I
I n-n1.i :lgrce i11:rt tlrcw*
( q ~ t ~ : r t i ~ *tiricl
l r s $111 ;~[11)roprittt?{II:I<:I%ill tlrr :irt of wirr. l r r t a g ~ l : ~ r
\v:lrf:rr(: Itct\xr1*11twrr at'll-nrtr~ecl iuid 1 1 l i i 1 i 1 forces \vill
0 1 ~ 2 1r l l i ;I lilrper fiisld for silrlrriwr, dccel~tinn.:r~rrl~~~scatIt~s,
etc., t l r i ~ l r
is ~ ~ ~ s s irri l repulnr
~ l i ~ \v:lrf:~rc\.
Nrltional war.----o. III s~~rrrll
\v:irs it car1 l ~ eirspt.ctnl tl1:it
Iio@tilc furcrs irr occupitxl territory will ernploy grierilli~warfar+:
:ra a rrre:rrrs of pairrirrp their end. Accortrlts of rcs.ce+:~rtrf:volt~tiorr:~ry
I I I I I V ~ : I I I C ~ I I1oc:tI
~~,
or pf*~wrsl,irr rixriolli; Iinrts of tlrc n(~rlclinc1ic:ite
tlrirt yo1111gt n ~ ~ofn 18 or 20 years of trgc t:~keac.ti~f.lmrtx as ti11g t?rrgt!t will I)(!
ilcfilus. irlrll o\.(!ry (lt~.t~dtilit:r~l
~ ~
I~nr:~ssctl
irr al.trrcketl. 111 wnrfnrc! of this kirld, ~ I I ~ I I I ~ofX ! ztatirc
fo1.cr.s \%.ill sucldenly lw:c*~~n~t!
illrtoeerlt i~i~ilsi~nt
\r.<~r.kerswhen i t suits
tlrrir f:rrlcg ti1111conver~i~~rrcc.
tlle 1r'crrr.o will be harldiIri :~ tnigtct be plncucl to :.:tin iriforn~rrtion.
I). 111 c!ascs of levees co mtbsse, tho prablerrr bectonles pnrticulurly
tlifficrrlt,. This is espainlly true when tire pezrplo :rro suttported by
it rltlclt~r~ti
rrf discilrlirrecl :ttrd trnincd proft~ssiolrnlsoldiers. %llis ccrmbiarrtion of midier and unned civilitili presents mriotrs opposition

14

SWM 1-9

to every 111o~euttenipted by the Force; even tlre noncombatants conspire f o r the defeat of the Forcc.
c. Opposition beconles Inore fonrri~labl~
~ ~ l r tltc
e ~ rterri~inis difficult., a n d the resistance iucreases as the Force I I I O V ~ ?inland
~
from
its bases. Every native is L: potential clerer opponent ~ l i oknows
the country, its trails, resources, ancl obstncles, : u ~ d3~110 has friends
and syrnpatl1izel.s on every band. T l ~ Force
e
rnay Le obliged to more.
c:~utiously. 0per:~tionsare based on information \vl~icllis at best
unreliable, while the natives errjoy continnons :ind nccurtite information. T h e Force after long and fatiguing mnrclres fails to gain contact mid probably fiuds ouly a deserted camp, ~ v l ~ itheir
l e opponents.
still enjoying the initiative, are able. to witl~draxv or con'entra~te
strong forces at advantageous places f o r the. purpose of attncking lines
of conrmnnicntion, convoys, depots, o r outposts.
d. It will be difficult and hazardous to vage ?Tar stlccessfully under
such circumstances. Undoubtedly i t will require time nnrl adequate.
forces. The occupyirlg force must b e strong enough to hold all t h e
strirtegical points of t h e country, protect its communientions, and at.
the same time furnish an operating force sufficieut to overcome t h e
opposition rrherever i t appettrs. Again a simple display of force
]nay be sufficient to overcome resistance. While curbing the. passions
of the people, courtesy, friendliness, justice, and firnuless should be
exhibited.
c. T h e difficulty is sometimes of a n econoniical, political, or soeiz~l
nature a n d not a military problem in origin. 1x1 one recent campaign
the sit,uation was an internal political problem in origin, but it h a d
developed to such a degree. that foreign national interests vere a f fected; simple orderly processes could no longer be applied when i t
had outgrown the local means of control. 111 another instance t h e
problem was econonlic. and socinl; great tracts of the richest land
mere controlled and owned by foreign interests; this upset the natural order of things; t h e admission of cheap foreign labor with lower
standards of living created a social condition among the people which
should have been remedied by orderly meaus before it reached a
crisis.
f. The application of purely military measures may not, by itself
restore peace and orderly government because the fundamental causes
of the condition of unrest may be economic, political, or social. These
conditions may have originated years ago and in many cases have
been permitted to develop freely without any attempt to apply corrective measures. An acute situation finally develops when condi-

15

STRATEGY

tiom have reaclreil a stage that is beyond contrwl of tlre civil i~uthorities and i t is too litte. for diplomntic >tdjustnrent. T l ~ esolution of
s t ~ c lproblems
~
being basicillly a political a~ljnstment,
military
measures to be applied rrr~ustbe of secondary i~nportanccand slror~ld
he applied only to sucll extent ns to perrrrit the cont inuntion of pcric:eful corrective measures.
q. T h e initial problem is to restore peace. Tlrere luny br! nlany
economic ixnd soci:tl fnctors involrnl, pertilining tt, tlre : t d ~ ~ ~ i ~ r i s t v ~ t i r e ,
executive, and judici:rl functions of t l ~ ngo\Ierr~ment,. Tliese :vitl~out
the knowledge of tlro r~riurdforces; but noL irlfrequently it l ~ a s i t rsery inception
witlrin these forces. Ik(:volnt.ions may take 1)l;ice iri tllr capital, and
by corrtagiou s1ire11d tl~ror~gli
t.11eco~cirtry. 111 o t l ~ e instances
t h e Fen..
r
era1 disaffection of tlre people takes concrete forin in some place renlote
from the capital, a n d ~rlrenit has gxtliered mornentuiil moves on t l ~ e
capital.
d. The rapidity wit11 n-hich a revolution develops is made possible
by moderu conrmunication facilities and publicity methods. Trivial
attendant circumstances often play highly irnportult roles i n contributing to evolution and must be observed closely and given appropriate consideration. The fact is that beside the great events of which
history treats them are the iirnumerable little fact,s of daily life whicli
t.11~c asud observer lnay fail to see. Tliese facts individually may be
insignificai~t. Collect.ivoly, their volume and poTer may threaten the
exi$ence of tlm gox.ernment. The study of the current history of unstable countries should inclucle t h e proper eva1u:ition of all h u n ~ a n
tendencies. Local newspapers and curre~~t.
periodic;ils are probably
the most valuable sources for the study of present psyclrological trends
of various n:ltions. Current writings of many people of different
c1:lasses cotnprise a history of what the people are. t.Ioing and thinking
and t h e motives for their acts. Thus, currei~tperiorlicals, newspapers,
etc., will more accurately portray a cross sect,ion of the c11aract.er of
t11e people. I n studying the politicaland psychical trends of a country, one must ascertain whether o r not all 11e.w~organs are controlled
by one political faction, in order to avoid developing an erroneous
picture of the situation.
e. Goveinments often almost totally fail to sense the ttempero f their
~ p l e .The inability of a go\.ornment to comprelrer~dexisting condi-

20

SWM 1-13
PS\'CIIOI,OGY

tions, couplod witlr i t s blind co~ifi(lcnccirr its orv11 stmt~gtli~
frequt?ntly
rrsults irr rc~nsrkably~vcnkresislanro to attttclt from witlrin.
f . Tlio oat11-8rd ewirts of r~vollrtiolrs:LIE :~ln.:apa C U I ~ ~ ~ ~ I of
I ~ R C
clla~rges,oftrrr unohservcd, n-lriclr llave go~reslo\\-ly fol7vard in ineu's
r i r l s . A I I lwofound
~
~ ~ i i ( I ~ r s t t of
i i r:Ig revoll~tio~r
necc!sSitnt~~
a
Ir~m\\.ledgeof the ~rrentslsoil in \\.liiclr tlie itlcas tlrrt. (lirect its course
lrave t,o germinate. Clmng~~s
in irrentnl r~ttit~rde
arc slow trnd hardly
l)crCept.ible; often tlrey cno he seen orrly by coml>aring tlrr olrnmcter
of tile people at tire beginning and at the. end of a given period.
g. A revolution is rnrely tlie result of a midespreacl conspiracy
n ~ n o n gtlre people. I:snally it is not a nrovement ~rlricl~
enrbraces n
\.my large ~ n u m h eof
~ people or whicl~crlls into play deep eco~romic
or social nrotires. Iterolntiona~yar~niesselclorn reaclr any great size;
tlicy ramlg need to i n order to i;ucceril. 0 1 1 the otlrer lrair~l,tlre military force of tlre goverlrn~c:lrtis gt:lrernlly srnalll ill c!quipl)ecl, :rod
poorly trai~reil;not infrequently :I part, if not arll of itt pro\-es t o he
(lisloynl in 1% political crisis.
h. Tlre majority of tho people, rspccially in tlre rural clistricts, ilislike nncl fear i e v o l o t i ~ n swlric11
~
often irrrolve forced military service
for tlrr!lnselrf!s :rnd destruction of llleir livestock Z R J Itheir
~
f i ~ r ~ n) r ( ~ d rrcc. IIo~vwer,they may be so i~ccustonledto mispovemmerrt :ind
exploitstiorl t h a t concel+,etl effort to clreck disorderly tendencies of
celttlin leaders never occurs to them. It is this m a s ignora~rce.zund
indifference rnther th:in any dispositio~rt.o turbulence in tlie natio~ras
u whole, \\.lliclr has preve~~tecl
tlre establislrn~e~rt
of stable government.
in intiny cast1s.
i. Abr~sesby tho officials irr po\vcr nrid their oppression of follo~vers
of tho party :lot in po1rer, ;ire oftc~rtlre seeds of rrvolution. T l ~ e
spirit \~-lriche:uises tlio revolution rrrouses little onthtrsii~smalnong tlre
Imor natives n l 1:lrge unless tlley are personally i~ffectedby such
(~llprcssiori. 'Yl~erevolution, once started, natrcrally : ~ t t n ~ c1111
t s of tlre
m:tlcontents irnd :id\.entorous elements in the community. Tlre revolr~tioninay inclrrtle many followr!rs, bot its spirit ernn~rtrtesfrom 21 few
lenders. These lei~tlersfurnish t h e spitrk witliout ~ ~ h i ct,l~ere
lr
\vould
hono explosion. Success depends u11on tlrc. entlrusiastic detc:rrninaiion
of tlrose w11o inspire !Ire im~vernent. IJnder effective leadevslrip~tlrc!
mass ~villbe steegecl in revoli~tio~>:~ry
principhts, and iml)~ieI favor, send your servant I\-itli a few American
articles obt:~iniiblr in our con~~uissaries
:uril \~-lrichare corisidered
clelict\cic,s by t h e natives. T i ~ etaolount. slronld be t~bout equal ia
\~t~lue,
locally, t o tlre gift accepted; t~rlrlusually t l ~ e~ ~ a t , i vwill
e feel
tlli~tI I lras
~ uot placed you u ~ i d e ran obligation.
?z. Sonletimes the I~ospitalityof tlre rati ires 111nstbe accepted: ant1
it, is not iirteill. ~ I . < I ; I ~ I I liy 1111~1111s
(tf d c t ~ i ~ i ~ ~ ~ i i .
itrrl~~rs:pf.t-ir~ri:il:tpl.rc:~ls.(I(. :~~lrnotritiot~s.
~tnro~icc~:tI~~il
15ffor1, or atl~ttirristr:~tivc:rorttsol. 1111 rrs~ion.q?' I'ropegtlnda a t Irnnrcr also irlr~ysi t s
ymrt iin tho r~tthiiouttppurt of srr~;tliwuls. htl ort1inzil.y clri~r;tcteristic
trf aritu1L WIIM is thr, rintrgottiiit ic prof"rg"11(1t"t#tiinst llln cnm{taigr~
or operatitn~sio the TJxtittxl Stftt*'~~ W S or
S I(~gi~I~r.tr~ro,
0110
cntrrrcrt
afford i n ignont tlru pwfiibilititsi of pmpngit~rda. Murky autboritirs
tn!fieva tlllrl ths M~rittr?E'crrcsnktnlrlti rt'rtric-C ptrhliaity t r ~rL mit~irrtiim
itl ardor tci pru!verrt tltr sl~restlo f titrfrirolnblu ttnd rtrttnp)nis?ic imp28

FSYCHOI.UGY

aganda a t horne. H o w e ~ e r it
, is heliere(l that ~rlrenre.presentatives
of tlle press demmrd specific information, it sbonld be given to thern,
if it is rlut of a. confide~rtialnature or such as will jeopardize t h e
mission. Soilretimes marines are pressed with tlie question: "Why
are you llere?" The best a~ethod1:o follon \rhen a question of public
policy is inrolred is t o refer the individuitl to appropriate civil
zlutl~orities.
i. There is all axioni in regular warfare to strike t,tle hardest where
the going is tlre easiest. In sr~rallnxrs also, it is r1-ell to strike most
vigorously and rele~xtleiisly\vlien tlre going is the easiest. When t h e
opponaits are on the ruri, pire tlrcli~no peace or rest, or tillre to niake
further phns. llry to avoitl learing a fen straggling Ieallers ill t h e
field :it tlle eucl, ~ r l l o\\.it11 their inc!re.aseil mobility, easier means of
tavasiori, and the cleterrnination to sllow strength, atten~ptto rerive
i~ltelrstb y bold strokes. At this tinlo> ! jnblic opinion draws little
patience i n tlltr e~iterprise,and accepts rs~tliless putienee any esplsnntio~if o r tlie delay necestry to bring the operation to n close.
j. 111 street fighting ttgailist mobs or rioters, the effect of fire is Kenerally riot due to the c:ssoalties but clue. to the fact that it demonstrates t h e tleterniinatio~rof tlie autliorities. U ~ ~ l e the
s s use of fire i s
too lorirr delir~ecl,a. silrgle mond often is all that is necessary to curry
P
eonriction. Xaturally orle attempts t o accomplisl~llis mission sitlrout firing but \vlren a t the critical molnent all such means have Sailed,
then one must fire. One sl~ouldnot make atlireat without the intent,ion
to carry it out. I)o n o t fire without giving specific xrarning. F i r e
without specific \v:rrning is only justified when the mob is actively
etidangeri~rplife or property. I n disturbances or riots when a mob
ltas been orilered to disperse, it. must be feasible for tlie mob to disperse. Military interve~itionsare actually police functions, altl~ough
\\.arlike, operittions often erisue. There is always t h e possibility of
clomestic disturbances getting beyond tho control of local police.
EIeuce t h e necessity of employing regular forces as a iesen7e or met>fomemer~tsfor varying periods after t h e restoration of ~rormalconditions.
k. The pe,rsonal pride, uniform, and bearing of the marines, their
dignity, courtesy, consideration, language, and personality will have
an important effect on the. civilian attitude t o w e d tile forces of mcupation. I n a country, f o r example, where the >rearing of a. coat, like
wearing shoes, is the outu-ard and u~imistukablesi* of a distinct
social classification, it is quite unbecoming for officers urlro accept the
hospitality of the native club for a rlance, xrl~etherlocal ladies a n d
29

SWM 1-15
PdTCLLOI,OCV

gerrtlernen are in e\~e~ringcIotlrrs
or not, to :111pc~ar
ill ilttjir khaki slrirts.
It appears tlri~tthe United St;~tesa r ~ dtlreir representatives have kist
;I ce~<.ain
amount of prestige :evhen tlrey place tlron~sclrt~s
ill tlre elnb;trrassing l~ositionof receiving a courteorrs note f I . ~ I I Iu people ordi~ritrilyconsi(1ere.d backtrsrd, inviting attentioli to this improgriety.
Orr t h e other hand, care slrould be cxercistd not to llun~iliatetile
~r;\tives. They are usually proud anil lruri~iliatitr~r
will cause resent~ r t e ~\vlrich
~ t , will lrilve. an unfavorahla reactiou. Noilritrg s110~1ldbe
said o r done wllicll implies inferiority of tlle status or of tile so17e,reignty of the native people. They should nerer b e treated as a conquered people.
I. Often the military find the~nselrcsill the p~~sition
of arbiters in
differences 11etweenrival political factio~~s.
T l ~ i iss c11111rnon
in serving
on t!loctol;~lnrissio~ts. Tlre indiviilnal of i111yfact,io~iLxlieres lrin~self
in possession of the truth and cannot rcfnrin fro111 aflinxri~~g
that m y one ~ ~ ldoes
r o not agree mitll him is ent,irely ill art.or. Eacl~ ill attest
to tire dishorrest intentions or stupiclitg of the other a11c1will attempt
Iry every posible ~neansto carly his point of view irrespecti~~e
of its
merits. They are excitable heings ancl prone to express their feelings
forcibly. They are i~lfluencedby personal partiality based upon farnily o r political co~mectionsand friendship. Things go by favor.
Tlroug11 they may appear brusque a t times they feel a slight keenly,
and tlrey know Iiow to respect the susceptibilities of their felloxrs.
IIL. 111 sorne ~w~olutions,
particularly of economic origin, the follov..ers may be me.n i n want of food. A lrungry man will not b e inclirretl to listen to reason and will resort to measures n~oredaring and
desperate than nnder normal conditions. This should be given considerat,ionl ~ ~ 1 1tempted
en
to burn o r otherwise clest.rog private property o r stores of the guerrillas.
n. In tire interior t1re.r~are natives ah0 have tlever been 10 miles
from their home, who seldon~see strangers, and much less a white
man o r a fowigrer. They judge tire United States and the ideals and
standards of its people by tile conduct of its representati\ies. It m a j
be no move than a passing patrol whose department or language is
judged, or it may he fairness in t h e purchase of a bunch of bananas.
The policy of the United States is to pay for value received, and
prompt payment of a reasonable price for supplies o r se~vicesrendered
should be made in every instance. Although the natives of the capitals
or towns may have a greater opportunity to see foreigners and the
forces of occupation, the. Marine Corps nevertl~elessrepresents tlre
United States to them also, and it bel~oovcsevery marine to conduct
30

SWM 1-16

..

Itirnself ~ c r ~ ~ r c l i r i g i > I
' .l11.r~.i s I!O sr.rsivr I\-lrich call.; f o r y r w r t e r caerc i ~o! f jr11I~ttr1~111.
~ ) ~ ~ r ~ i ? [~:~(ic,trct,.
~ c ~ ! : r t$ict:
~ - ~ :IIIII rig111~rrilit:&r>
jiistic~~~
tlr~ririrr srn>:ll \vnrs. ::nrl t ~ o \ r . l ~ +i ~s r:ct ~i o~~ to~f tile Irriirt:rnr :uud yvnipaitlrulic 5idn r,f :I rtrilit:rr.v forcv IIPIIIII~IIIC~
t11:11r ill t h i s ~ , v ~ofwOI)CEIliorl.
1.-l(i. Conduct of our troops.-(I. 111 ~ i ~ l c l i ~ ti o rt i l e strir,t.ly t r r i l i trrry pl:~rts :rr111 t ~ r r ~ l t r ~ r n t i oirr.itl:~r~t
~rs
t o t111, ririlit:try rwrlll,;~tiolt c r f a
ftrreiglr r:orrntry. tlr(*rr s I i < ~ r r l dI)? f ( ~ ~ . i : ~ : ~ l i i t:I( ~rd~ r e t l ~ c nr
t ~ i1 ~ 1 l i c y
# ; I tlr:ririi:p t h e pt.ratcwt I*!irc.fit f r o r n [,s,vcl~r~logic:tl1)1-:rc.t icrs i r i tlrtl
firlcl. 'I'II r r r r r l i t ~t h i s c.fTtai.tiv<,. 11c-mor11:rlr j f t l i ~c r , i r r ~ t ~ : ~ ~i:rnst
i r i la
i r r c I c ~ t r i i i : r t ~ *\\-it11
~ l tItv$c~[IP~II<,~[I~I.S, \ V l r i l ~ sit i s II.IIV t11:tt t111, cclrrrIIIIIII~I
w i l l gcatrc-rt11l.v r ~ ~ f ltc
l r c~ :tt t t i t t ~ c l so f tlw C~IIIII:I:III,~I~~,
tlris w i l l
o r clr*.;irc o f 1111. ~II])~CIIIII : r ~ : t l r ~ r i t , vs11~11:111
11t' d i s s ~ r r ~ i r r i ~itlrrorrg
tt~~l tlw
.;r~bor.tlitt:ites of :rll gl;rrlc.s.
' l % c ~i i ~ ~ l ~ ~ e t r i o~ fr ~::I1
r t in~r ~~: kr s~wirlr
r c w l ~ ~tct
i , ll:c ]%011('r n t t i t u c l r I~t\v:rrcl t l t e c i v i l i : ~ ~IO~~III:II~II~
~~
111:ry
1.~8. nccorrrplislrr~ciw : r ~ l i i y11). rr:c~:r~r.:o f :I sckric*n of 1rric.f : t r i c l int~,rt*sti:tg
Itytriros rtrol)irrrcl IIIIII(T
t l ~ erlirc.r.ti~rtr o f thi: rtrilitirry C~IIIIII:~IIIIC
:trr~ i.iii,iitlvr
f r w t t :1c,y >$,<.ti
i:i) .\Itlilⅈ:ii
:iri,. n.t.i?ilii

;*i,,,,+~3?!63,$

:kiiy i . . . t l z ~ ~ , ~ t ic~rci,riiii, i-r

nllicr

(ir::l-

,t,t%rt,*'.,,14,!iv,.*.
cliciiiiil

is,

i l i c +~jiini~,:~.*
;il:d

l--

i t t w iltr<%nglb
I Ibv ~ l i p l ~ , r ~ ~ : ~ tvvr&rtIs
t111* r c ~ I : r t i o r r ~ ~ ~ i ~ ~
tlrc~tr!r~trI forces S ~ I I ~ tire ~li~111~11~:1tic
iar:1116.11
t1r;rt ~lt0!11<1t,xi$~I~I>I%V~~.II
O F l i t c ~(+I~TITIIIII~,II~ i s r l t ~ r r l yi ~ ~ ~ l i c b~ yr It (l i ~? ~forcyc~irrg
l
<~rr<~ti~ti~tr!s.
E s l i i ~ r i < - n <11:l
: t.i iltoa-rr tlr:d \vlr~*rt.rt;tval irnrl lrrilitzu.?. artllacrritirs h:~vc*
f c , l l ~ ~ a -ill<~ l l ' % i ) i r i ~ " o f tllt~;t. :trtirlt,i; ill i l ~ c i irr r t ~ r n t l t r * w i t h f n r r t i g t ~
i ~ o ~ r r ~ t r iwht>t
r s . lrtw srrt~lri~rte,rr.<,rrr:s~I
i f 3 1 1 l>yotrr fiarcw inr. ti1 rililtor ~ ~ o ~ r t r ~ ~ vt11v
r ~ r ts\ vi ~t ~i I l~s!&I.
I!:IT?
111c3t 1vit11t11i. : ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ r o. cf ~
cnrr
v : r( ~I O V I ~ ~ I I ~ I I ~ ~ :ti111
II~
i~:&v(\t?rttIe(i
1>1ii1?11
titrrnrd-. <,l<,sc,t- <.inqwri&tii,nwit11 tlre 111rr.tt1nrliltIII?I[J
10 t11e 11iiIit:try
n . ~ ~ ~ ~ k i i l , i ~ ~ voIfc11i1~
a l ppeoliticit1 itrra.lri~tc!rye l tlte crrtttr!r.y
co~irrrr:~rrcl~~r
w n y IW
o f 11 g c ~ r t ~ r ioatltrc!.
ll
It is tlri~rc.for.t!~ i r c ~d ct s i n l b l o tlrnl lrtr
l i ~ ~the
t c ~~l yt i ~ ~ r :ivi~iI11i111?*1fo f 1111, ( q ~ f ~ ~ r t t r nt oi t~y( t r r f v ri ~ x i ~ ~ r ~ ~ cwit11
(*it Still6 1)cl1i1rtrtri~r11r r ~ ~ t r c s c ~ r t i t t i v'I'l~rtrrgh
r~.
tltra lnllc.r, the cirrrlIIIIIII(~IJ IM~~IIIII<~
~ r c ~ ~ ~ ~ 1sitk1
i ~ i rI il tr ~~ ~~ (i Il ~ ~ tI~IV
~ ~~i tIosi iit ~
i c f~sitriz~..
rl
t
i I
I
I
I ~ ~
r l i i ~ Is ~
, Ii fI ~ ~ ~ I I I ~ I I I I II ~ I Itlrr.
~~~II,
strr!trgtlr arlcl c~rgirlri%atiorlr,f Ill*irntivcr rrrilittiry F ~ ~ r ~ c wIre
. w i l l IK~
irbln to Icrrrii tflc. lia!ncs o f t l r t ~por.cr.rrrrrer~tiII f ~ i r ~ c r i ( t r ~ : r ~IIIII
r i i fitlrril.
irrrkc. i l i r r r ~ : l f a i l l r 111tt trttrrlr%.i of tlit: It~ittlingc~lficiill.; arril c i l i m i ~ si t ,
tborrrrra iri ~sllickrliu is to r,pi,r:rlr!.
Throttg11 tho clilrlonrat ic trpn-r~itativn tlto rnilitrrry c<~rrllrrrrntl<*r
rrricy rerrtlily <:ncltrtcbt t h e C:ttit.f ICxr~rtltiva, lnrcooln ira((~rairrtr~clwit11 tlrc p c ~ v t : r ~ ~ t r t ~Iwulirrp
- n t ' ~ cnlIic:iills !rrlco~~rk~Iiwii
tltc couritr.~.

SWM 1-21

SE'TIONV
THE CHAIN OF CObIMAND-NAVY

AND M A R I N E C O R P S
I~v.

Navy

rcg\tlation

Naval officer
Marille officeconrma~tdingasliarc ..........................
Mtlrio-caostnbr~lary..
...............................
Direct control by Navy I)ep~rtn~e~it
.........................

1--2.7
1L26
1--27

1**gc

35
35
36
37
37
39
39

1-91. Navy regulations-a. Article 575. Navy Ilepol:~tions, 1920
st:~tes: "Wl~en serring on shore in cooper~~tion
with vessels of t l ~ e
Wavy, brigade connnanders or the officer co~nnmndingthe det:~chme~:h
of marines sl~allbe sobject to tlv; orders of the Cornni:~nderill Clrief,
or, in his absence, t o tlle orders of the st:nior oliicer in cornmand of
vessels sl)ecii~llydetailed by the Cotnmandrr in Chief on such combilled openltions a, long as sucl~senior officer is ser~iorin rank in the
officer comnlanding t h e brigacle o r the detachment o f marines. When
the. brigade commander or the ofticer commanding tlre detachnient is
senior t o the senior officer in comrnand of the vessels specially detailed
by the Commander i n Cllief on si1c11 combined operations, or wlren,
in the opinion of the Commander ill Chief, it is for any reason deemed
inadvisable to intrrlst such con~binedcomnranil tto the senior officer
afloat, the Commander in Chief ill constitute inde.pndent commands
of the forces ashore a112 afloat, ~ v l ~ i furces
c l ~ will cooperate under the
general orders of the Commander i n Chief."
b. In article 576, i t is provided t h a t : "The brigade commander or
other senior line officer of the Marine Corps present shall co~rrn~and
the whole force of marines in general analogy to t h e duties prescribed
in the Navy Regulations for the senior naval officer p r w n t when t s o
or inore naval vessels arc serving iri company, hot the commander of
well reginlent, separate bntt:lliun, or detachn~ent shall exercise the
functions of command over his regiment, battalion, or detacllment in
like general analogy to the duties o f the comn~tlnderof each naval
vessel."
1-22. Control of joint operations.-111 a situation involving the
utilizat.ion of a lnarirle force in 11 small Tvnr campaign, the directive
$5

SWM 1-23
'TISI.: < ' t { , \ I X

ell ~ ' l l ~ l ~ ~ > \ x l l

for tilr irinrinc fnrcc cr~ttrrri:ti~lcr
11~11ally
riyt.iir~!:Iririt to rt,f)ort to tire
srliior t,tfic,rr[>rc.;i~l~t
i l l t h art%:%
~
o f :r~rticil~;llrci
opt*nrtiolrs, ' r h ~h[:t~(lr
G r ~ ~ r rConr~r~ar~rlnrrt
~tl
earrcis~.; onl!. xd~lrit~ist
r
: rolltrol over the
by tlrt*Cllirf of S:~r.aiOpct.
~rrnrilrcfot.cc; its r ~ p e r a t i t n
~1~.e~coutrollrtl
s
aticr~lu(lirvctly, o r 1111~rupl1
the selrior I I I I V : ~ ~oflircar J > Y ~ * PifI I11e
~ ~1w
1 1 0 opentiio~l
st!riior to tire rntbrine Fcmree cornrnantle*r. ('ol~st~~lnt~ntly.
pl:lli~or i ~ r ~ t r t ~ c t iwit11
o ~ i sit~gtrrdto tit? t:1ctic:11 C I I I [ I I ~ ~ I I I C ! I I ~of the
~ ~ , a r i rforrc
r r o r i g i ~ r ~irr
t etlte t~fficeof tilts XIirjor (;elrt'l.i~iC O I I I ~ ~ I : I I I ~ ~ I I ~ .
I-.?:!. The directive.-rr. 111 .iitrl:rtiorrs calliiiy for the r ~ s evl 11:rval
and ~lr:trilrcft,rcrs i l l olwr:rtio~~.i
il~rolvil~g
[~rotcctiorrr t f life nrrrl prop.
~xrtyi~nrlt l ~ r~~~~t~scrvatitrrr
i n IIIIS~XIIII.e ol~lrtriei,tllo
elf la\^ ~ I I 0rdc1.
I ~
ln~r,lt,rrOS e r ~ l o r r i ~tlrt*
~ y[~olic~ivs
of t11e St:ttv Ih.{~trrtrrrt-~~t
z.t*st$ wit11
t l r c s S:~vy. 'l'ltt. rlrrivi<~~~s
n-it11 rc.g;~rclto tlre f~tscr>s
t c , t~c:~ l a t ~i rd~:r~ry
.sitll:rtiorr arr 111:tdt811). tile: &,ri.t.tn~of t l ~ rN IIYJ
11s tlrc. dirt-ct rcltrt5sc~:ttttirt.o l ti:*. II'reeitlr.l~t. 'I'lrro~~gh
thc* C11it.f of N:Iv:I~Of)clnti(~l~s,
y S : I Yt~s(~rvi.~te
~
t.o~itrolof tltuw* IOI\.I,S.'I'lre diutact lrt. % ~ r r . ~ t :o~f rtllc
t i n , issl~crlto tltt. 1111vnl c o r ~ r ~ ~ t : ~ \vlro
n d i ~ ir s to I.cyrtsit!rlt tlre S:tvy
I)el>>".trlit~~~t
ilk tile tlrt~:~tor
of rtpelatiot~si s ilsunlly very Itrirf, but,
811 tlrr srtllrn tinrc!, clearly indicmtive of tlra g,rrncrnl [w~licirsi.o be foiby 1110 naval cornlnwecl. The resporrsibility f o r cwors ec~nnnittr~l
rrrnntier in interpl-til~g tht?m jx>lici~s:b~rdill ~amyitrpi111t.t h e gerter:&l
orders of the N:%vyh p n r t m c n t iSestswilir s11c11lrsvrtl citnmrandrr.
I,. If, 11s is t h o usual eitrlntion, tbc! ltrrval ronirtln~~rler
i s the sctrior
c&r,ar prrsent in the thentor o f o ~ i ~ r n t ihoi ~s ~sole
~ , dit.ective rlriiy tn?
i ~ tbe
i torl~rof I& tliaprtelt, A typical tlirectiue of this type is set forth
ILR f01101~9:

INTERNAL ITII~~'PICI\I~
HI'PIihTI(IS I N (nirlr~rt,fcOtlnlrr) II;\S ElEQIllRED
SE.:SDIS(J OF FOI,I,OWINO S I \ V ~ \ I . E'Oll?!1I:S (tirrr* lollow liqt of fon.c!s) !PO
(
) ~V~~l'l!;llS
\Vl'l'EI 0ltIJl':IfS 'I'O it1~I'CiIl'~I'O
'
SEN1011 NA\'*\l. OFb'I('XI1 POI( IlllTY F'OI~ICY OP (IOV&;ItN.M~N'['S E W VOIl'PII I N O1'Si\\' IIIX.
I',ZT('BRS i
I ,\st) (
) w t r WII.I. A\XSU>II: ( Y J S I M . \ N I ~
OF AI.I.
NAVAL 160RCF:S I N (
1 ' i ~ h ' lA
'~
S I~
I KP (
1 .*\XI) IN FCX.IJ>X'P

(-00PEIIATION WI'PII ~\>fRttl('AXt\>IICAS0.4TIOIL'\SF) l"ONSIil,l\ll OFPI.
<'ICIlR \Yfi,l. CAItRY 01°F I'?)l.Il'Y O F IIH (tOYK1tNllF:N'I' Hl~4'P FOIll'lI IN
I;MFE:ItFINClnl IIIRE';i'P('EiES.
c. ITtrtl(!r tire provisions of tlrt! foregoing ~liwetirr,n rrnvrrl corntlrurtdor ccjnerrnetl xvotlld In, rI,xr\cs~lirr a position OF psnt responsilrility :trici in nccr~raplishir~g
Itis tank, 11e w o t ~ l ~nncesi;nrily
l
tle~nstrcl
tire 11i$rr.& tlegt.w! of loyiiltp arid ccmperntiur~of rrll those trntlrr his
c:nmrnnrriI. 'rite rtsnitl p~*oc:edlr~a,
:tdo[rted h y the naval cnmrr~ito~lr.r,
would be first to renke u cnrrrful estirnntc of tlte s i t u a t i o ~ ~t h, m
:3y
tlre rraval coiarnirnclrr aflorrt, rrrrrriy rfrrc-stiolrs ivit,lr rogsrrrl to thtr relntionsfrip ixt\vei:rr tho rrrnrirre fcrrcrs uslrorr! aird t l r ~rrnritl forcc.s
nflnnl will presc.nt t,lrro,%:iv~s. 'flicr trrurine fon:e eonnnnrrcler. irt tlrin
sitrr:ition, ylatuld not loser siglrt, of, arrd sl~orrldrrinke cvvry e-ffort trr
intloctrirrnto tlro%>rrrrrler his cornmrrnd with tho itlen that thr tiwk
to 1x3 srcornplislrecl is a ~'Nnqv trrsk"; tlrst the r~r~~orrsilrility
for ir,s
acconr~~lislrrrrttit.
rests primnrily wit11 the iotrnrdiate s ~ r p r i n rtrfloi~t;
rrrbrl tlrrrt vrg~rrcllesso f crr~ynppnrrrrt almrncc of ilircset st~jtrrvisior~
riritl corrtrril 11y R I I C ~ I st~ln~l.io~.,
tlrc pl~trrs11111l p(ili(:ii!s i t f t l ~ f ?I I ~ V ~ I I
~~i~rnrrrttr~~lt!r
:ifloat nlcist i s n~llierr~l
to.
h. 'l'lrr! vr~ssolsof tlrc: rrrrvrrl force oray bo withclrtr~ririlrrrrr t h ~ .trri.
.
mediate tllr:rtc.r of openrti~~ns;
tlra ira%alctrrntrriu~tlvrrrriby iis~~igit
(.~rt:ti~l
V ( ~ R S P I to wttt
~rirtrolI I I ~ S S ~ I J Ialong
~S
Illit coast ; while lir,,
Iiintst:lf, nrny rc.tiira to his rrorrniil st;iliori irrr(l rrrnirttirir~ cclr11trc.t
wit11 tlic niarirre f~rrcc!wncl tlte tft+isl?lniirrd~r.Irk C O I ~ I I T I ~ I I Itly
I ~ radio
or otirer menrm o f eornrr~i~nic:ttior~.
o. 'i:tru clirt!etivt>iss~rrxlto t1w rnirrinc? f~trcc~
r:omrrrirntlvr will ns11;111y
provide tlrut be kac+pin conntnrrt citnrxrltinicutictr~with t11c3 r,ttcnl ccmr.
mancler nflorkt in order tbnt tl~c!Intttrr rriiry a t idl Lirrrcrci t% fr~liyirl-.
ft~rvred of the xit.rrtitit,rr nntiorc!. l')ro cxtrnt to svlticlr tlrtr rrtnrirrl:
force corrrmunilar will IM: retlrrire~l t , ( ~frirrrislt tletitiled irrlr~rr~t~rt.ion
:li

SWM 1-25

to tlle naval comn~ancterwill dcpe~lclon the policy estnhlisl~edby tile
latter. As a general role, the rraval connna~~der
will :lllolv a great
deal of latitnde in t h e strictly irrterx1~1:rd~nirristrationof the marine
force and tho details of the tactical e~nploymentof tl~cvarious units
of t h a t force. H e shor~lil,however, be infonned of 2111 matters relative t o the policy governing such olmrt~tions. I n case the n a ~ a l
comm:nrder does not, tl~rouglitlre ine(Iitnn of rortti~revisits, keep
lii~nselfil~forn~ed
of the tactical disposition of tlre mriotts units of
the marine force, he sllould be furnished v i t h sufficient informntio~~
witll regard tlrert?to as to enablo llinl to n i a i n t ~ i ~:I lcleirr pictiil.e of
the ge~reralsitn.'I t'1011.
d. Usually the naval comma~rder\\.ill he required to strb~nitt o the
Navy Department, periodically, a report embracing all the existing
c?eom)mic,political, uud tircticirl pltases of tlie .iitn:~tion. The nav:~l
c o n i n ~ r ~ ~ ~vill,
d e r in trrn~,call npon tlle inariur force comn~a~rder
for
ally reports of tliose nrtrttcrs n s a r r witl~inthe scope of the t11e:lter
in whicl~the force, is open~ting.
e. Estim:~tesof tlris sort carefnlly prepared will often preclude tlre
necessity of s~ibmittingdetailed mid separate reports on the matters
involved and will g~watlyassist the rinvnl commander in his e~tdearor,
through the coorCination of the other information at his disposal,
to render to the Navy Department a more contprehensive analysis of
the situation confronting him.
f . \Wren questions of major importance arise, either involving a
considerable chi~~rge
of the
i n the tactical clisposit,ion and en~ployme~rt
marine force, or t h e policies outlined by the nikval co~r~mander,
the
latter sllould be informed the~.eof in sufficie~rttirne to allolv h i m to
participirte in any discussion that might. be I I : ~between the political,
diplomatic, and ~nilitiiryautl~oritieswith regarc1 tlrereto. I t sliould
re~nemberedthat in nriiking decisions in mntters of importat~ce,
whether or not tlrese decisions are n ~ a d eupon the advice of our cliplomatic representatives, tlie marine-force ~omir~nniler
is respo~~sible
to
his immediata superior afloat.
g. I11 addit,io~tto tlre principles that ;Ire necessarily r~dl~ered
t o incidebt t o t l ~ "chain
e
of cornnland," a marine-force cornm~nderon foreign
sl~orehabitually t u r ~ l to
s the Navy for assistance i n accornplislring the
innumerable administrative tasks involvecl in tlw small-war situations.
blattem with w a r d to water transportation for evacuation of personnel, matters concer~ringsupply, matters involving intere.ourse wit11
our diplomat,io representatives in countries in the ricir~ityof the
tlleater of operations, mutters relating to assista~lcefrotr~the Army
38

SWM 1-26
'Sili;

('!<,\IS

<'l>l,\Xl~

ill SII~~>I>ii11i1 tr1111~1>t>rtaitit)11,
:11i(1 : i ~ ~
I~IIIIIIN*~
y
o f <>tlt?r[>11aiw$ of &!:I
: r i l ~ i ~ i t r i p t v a t i ri1atrliY
r
I
I I
i
t
i stid ~(.o~~v~:triot~ik?.
I.OIIIIII:III~~~
YI.I(P%%. IIF:IY>~~I.
I ~ : u r ~ l l r ct l l r o u g l ~ttn. ~ r i e t l i u ~nfn Ill?I~:I\-II~
rives :rr~clftlrilitirs am l r i ~ r ~ ~ ~ t r i t11n11
r t c ~IIIIIV~
~
i l k 11-11ivl1
t
III~I?.1x1 soirrr & ~ ~ i t l c
r ~ t i ~ i ~crf
~ l tilt*
w ~llnr!ll
r
scr\.ircb. l n r i r i l t - r t l ~ : ~tlrc~rc
fin tlrt. co111111ctof t i l e r e l ; ~ t i ( ~ l i * lt ~
I i i; l~~t i s t o t-sist. l,ct\vvo~tl~t".r n n r i n e fol.rc. v i ~ t r ~ l r l a ~ l tnlltl
l t . r t i l e 111:u~il1r
ofiiccr i n i.lii~rqe<,I'Illr 1l:rtiv~orgalli.
z ; ~ itcn~.CII(~:II~I~:I~
[ ~ r i l r c i l ~ l cs111111ltl
>i
tw [I)V(IIIIII~~:I~~Y~
iry 111t) & > i t ~ x ~ t n v y
of tllr. NIL\-$.
1-2i. Direct c o n t r o l hy Navy 1)epartment.---1 f tllv c~nr:ilvcs.it.ls
r~~
t11:it r~rrrtiriprrtein flit' i l ~ i t i i l l[I~I:I$+~L; of t11t. 01x?r11tior1 w i t l ~ d r ~en.
i11e ~(>IIII~I:LII~~
YI:
kxf v t * ~ t ~iii
tl
t irc.ly flr,111 tlrt! tl1a111.r of c~li('r:~li(~sts.
t l l r t ~ ~ i ~ r i t ~ ( ~ - (.(IIIIIII:~II~P~O~~II
fori.c
lilt* st>lliox.~~t~v:tlc,Et:r:rn s h o r n \ v i t l r i ~ l
t l ~ pil:t.:~itar. 111 stii.11 <.:IsP, 1 1 1 ~(>llict>r
~
ill ~OIIIICI~III(~
P(I
sl~ort!\%'oII~~
tw
ri~slxfi~sil,lc
( li~.t,ctly l o I I t c . ( ' l ~ i c f o f X:tr:tl O l n ~ r a t i o t ~ u ,
rt5latiorl.
s11i{>1vit11 tilt> C11ief o f X:IV:I
0[1t*r11tic111s\vo~tI(lI+I~,II
i11vo1ve $I Cf the United States.
1-39. Contact with national government ofRciala-a. ITport tlte
arrival of the IJnit,ed St#ttc!sforces nt. tlte main inlint of entry t h coin~
rttanrler tlrercrof sllrruld satlcavor, througtt the rrtc:tliutr~of tlltt IJr~it.t.rl
States dipler~r:~tio
repr-rmrtt~rtivt!,to cortfc~r itti ti t h e Chief Exre:~t.ive
of tho grventerent,, or itis nllth(~rizt'drl~l1rf's6'lltutiv(talld ilil~~llrt
S~JCII
inforrniltion as rrluy 1m re(joircil by tlttr (lirectivt>lte tlrts receiretl. Yucl~
witit tile! g o v ~ ~ r r r ~ r r ~ ~ ~ t ' ~
confr!tr!~lt:s will invariirbly lea11 1 1 , acqr~r~ir~tnttce
lending oficialn m.ith wttorn tlrt. r t r i l i l ~ q~ ( ~ t r r m t t r tnu~y
~ l ~ r1x3 rn.clttinxJ
to dcttl tltrot~gltotit,tho sol~~%lueitt
operttt iolr.
4. Bfeertinp with thc+se.c!~tIivirtln
frt~c~ttt.rrlIy
rtficlt~irncr~nsicternhlntnct.
'rltc,sa oftieials are the drtly c1c:cted or nlqn)itttetl crffi~~iirln
of tttc ~ f r r v ertrtnent, utttl tttcr rrtilitrrry i:ornrnarcclvr- irr Iris irsrrx:iat,iort with t.hont,
rrprsscnt.e the. Prx:sidcnt. of tltu U r ~ i t ~ xBtate8.
l
'I'ltnw src.e.tin@ or
cotiferentm rtsuully tosrrlt itr reinin~iiittgtire nnrrtkr of olficiuls to h
41

MILIT:iRT--CIVIL

IIIIA~TIOSRFIIP

dealt
and the ray is thereby speeded to the early formalatio~~
of plnris of action by the military cornnnnder. \\Tllon tile rnissior~is
one of rendering assistitnce to the recognized governme~lt,the relationship between its officials and t h e military coolnmander should
alnicable. However, i f al~imosityshould be s11owt1 or cooperation 1~
clenied o r nitltdmwn, the militixry wmmimder cannot compel the foreign governn~entoofficialsto act according to his wishes. Ordinarily
nn :\ppe:\f to the Chief Esecutire of the country concerned will effect
t h e desired coope,ration by subordinate officials. Should the. m i l i t i ~ q
c~rmmander'sappeal he unpradnctive, tho lnatter should be proniptly
referred to the navnl superior afloat o r other clesigl~atedsuperior, who
\\.ill in turn transmit the i~~formntion
to the Nary 1)epartment and/or
tlie State Department as the case may be.
c. I n most of the tl~ei~ters
of <~perations,it will be for111(1that the
Chief Esecutive m n i ~ i t a i ~a~closa
s
grip 011 all pl~eaesof the national
government. Tlie execuiive p o ~ e ris vested in this offici:~laucl is
administered through his ci~binet and various other presidential
tippoiutees. Some of these appointed officittls exercise consitterable
power within their respective jurisdictions. both over the people tinrl
t h e minor local officials. Some of t11et11esercise jug
at1 ~ ~ b s o l t nonparlisiun
~te
nttitnde in all their activities.
e. Political affiliation in most countries is :L pnrarnou~ltelrment ill
the lives of all citizens of the count,ry. Politicat ties are taken very
seriously and serve t o influence the att,itudeand action of the irrdividui~l
i i ~a11 his dealings.
f. m e n subordinate military commanilers are assigned independent missions which bring thorn into contact wit11 l(n.111 anti national
governmne&~tal
officials, they should make every effort. to acrj~lailrtthenl42

SWM 1 3 0
3IILITARY-CIVII,

1II~,T,SI'IOSSHIP

selves with the political structure of t h e locality in \~hichthey a r e
to be stationed. The principal guide for the 'onduct of their a s s t ~ i a tions with tlte civil offici~lsvill be, of course, the regulation previously
referred to \vhiclt governs the reli~tionsht~veenrrtembers of the naval
service a n d the agents of foreign goverllments. The a ~ ~ ~ e n i tof
ies
official intercourse sllould be observecl and the conventions of society.
mhe11 and where applicable, slio111d be respected. When assuining
com~~tand
withill n district or ilepnrt~nent,:III officer should l>roml,tl$
pay his respects to the, supretile politic:~l authority i n the area, encteavor to obtain fro111 l l i ~ nthe desired information wit11 regard t o
t l ~ e conomic situation i n that locality and indicate by his conduct ancl
attitude t h a t be is desirous of coo1)er:iting to the extent of his authority
wit11 those responsible f o r the ndrninistratio~~
of the. foreign government's affairs.
g. I n giving the fullest cooperation to the civil authorities, the
military commander should i~tsiston reciprocal actior~on their part,
to\vard the n~ilitaryforces. Interference with the gerfonnance of
the functiot~sof civil officials should be avoided, while noninterference
on the 11i1r.t of those autl~oritieswith tlte adlllinistr:~tionof the military
forces should be de~n:~nded.111 brief, a feeliug of mutual respect and
cooperation betmen n~embersof the military forces a n d civil officials
on a basis of nuutual independence of each other sl~ouldbe cultivatecl.
1-30. Cooperation with law-enforcement agencies-a. t;nited
States forces, other than tltose attached to the military establishment
of the foreign country i n which they a r e operating will not, as a rule,
participate in matters concerning police and otller civil functions.
The rxtilitary forces usually constitute a reserve which is to be made
available only in extreme emergewy to assist, the native constabulary
in the perforn~iulceof its purely police mission.
h. The rnission of our forces usually involves the training of native
officers ancl men in the art of war, assisting in offensive operations
against organized banditry and in such defensive. rneasrtres against
threatened raids of large orgr~nizedbandit groups as are essential t o
the protection of lives a n d property. When the civil police functions
nre vested i n the native military forces of the country, these forces are.
charged with the performance of two definite tasks--a military task involving t h e mtttters outlined above iind R police task involving in general the enforcement of t h e civil and criminal laws. T h e native military forces col~troltlte traffic of arms and t~~nntur~ition;
they see that
the police, traffic, and sanitary regulations are observed; they assnme
the control and adnlinistration of governntent prisons; and they per43

SWM 1 3 1

forin numerous other (lt~tiesthat, by tlreir nat'ure, m:ly obviously,
directly or intlirectly, play an important ]>art in t h e accomplisll~iie~rt
of t h e military mission.
c. It follo\~.s,therefore, tliat by coopenit.ing t o the fullest extent,
of his antl~orily ill^ (lie native forces in the performance of civil
police functions? the military comniander ill, without actually participatii~gin t l i ~ spliase of the picture3ix rendering valuable assistance to\vards t l ~ caccomplisl~nlenr of the ultimate mission assigned
to the combined niilit;~ryforces. Due to the fact. that in ~xiostcases
the individuals ocoupying tire inrportant positions in tliose native.
orga~iizationsperfornring police duties, are Unitecl States officers and
enlisted melt, questions arising \ ~ i t regi~nl
l~
to eooperatiorr and assistance are. easy of solution. Arlherence, on t l ~ epart of our personnel,
to t h e dictates of tlie local l a \ ~ sand regulatio~is,a ~ ~
a dtliorough
knowledge of t l ~ scope
r
of t~utliorityvested in the native police force
is essential to tlie end tlrat \ye do not lraml~erthis folxe in the perfonn:n~t:eof its duty? and to tlre enti tliirt we maintain tlie respect
and confidence of the coirirrru~iitya s a wlrole.
d. Wit11 iwganl t o the c~n~tnct
t l ~ a tis Irad with those oon~rected
with tlie judicii~lbranch of tlie gorerninent, very little need be said.
Tile magistrates and judges of the various courts are usually political
appointees, or are elected to tlre office by tlie national congress. Consequerrtly, they :Ire affiliated politically with t h e party in power,
nat,ion:~lancljor local. 111 most situations, the civil courts will continue to function. Altlionglr tliis procerlure is n o t always conducive
to the. i~estinterests of the niifitary forces, it is a situation that normally exists and must he accepted. The nianner in ~rhichthe judiciary performs its functions may have n profound effect o n the
conduct of a small war campaign. 111 the first place, tlie apprehension and tlelirery of criminals, i~icludingperrillas, by the armed
forces to tlie courts \vill serve no nseful purpose if these courts are
not i n syn~patliywit11 the military authorities; and in tlie second
place, a lack of cooperatiorr on tlie part of the courts, illsofar us the
punishment of outla~vsis concer~~ed,
m;~yhave a tendency t o place
the loeal inhabitants in fear of assisting t,he nlilitttry forces. I n view
of this situation, every encloavor shoulcl be made to generate a
friendly attitude o n tile part of tl~eselaw-enforcement officials in
order that t,heir cooperation may be had.
1-81. Contact with inhabitants--a. Whether a military cornmander he stationed at 11 headquarters in a metropolis or assigned
to the snlallest outpost, he ninst ilecessnrily come into w ~ i t a c t

44

XIILIITARY-CITII.

Iox\-er
i n g in wjme cascw clel~osetlt l ~ eparty in control und
h
carry out
establisl~erla dc f(tc/c.lo or de jurv g o v e r ~ ~ m e~~vl tl ~ i cwonlcl
tlie provisio~rsof the treaty. 'l'l~isoftti~rresulted ill active .r,opposition
by the oustetl lrt~rty: t p ~ i ~ itlre
s t i~~tervnrillg
forces .svl~owere giving
aid, force, anii power t o the new gove~.~~rnc~nt.
(4) It is evident flrml tlre above t l ~ i ~tile
t , internal political orgariizatio~lof the. country coumrned, the strel~gthof the f ~ r ~~vllic11
e s may
ol)l~~sed11c
an(\ the extel.ual obligations of the country
ilit.er\.e~ltio~~,
as :I nlernb~rof the f a ~ r ~ iof
l y nations, sllould be carefully considered
in the estimate of the situntion. 111auntries. l'he latter, in particular, is of great
importance since the friendship aird trade relations of countries xr.liic11
are not sympathetic t o the intervention may be alienated by such
action.
6. Economic statvr, mnd logistic support mailable.-The ability of
a hostile force to oppose the intervening force may be limited by t l ~ e
availability of snbsistence, natural resources, finances, arms, equipment, a n d ammunition. The forces opposing the intervention often
live off the country by forcing cor~tributionsof money, subsistence,
and other snpplies from the peaceful inhabitants, or by donations
from loci11 civilians syn~patheticto their c:luse. Even tltougll tlie
country concerned may be heavily indebted to their own citizeris as
well as to foreign powers, funds are often diverted front the state
treasury or may he received from foreign sources for the purchase
of moclern arms and munitions of mar. As a result, the intervening
force usually finds t,ho forces opposing thsni armed and equipped
with moder11 xr-eapons and capnlrle of sl~stainingtliemselves in the.
field f o r an unlimited period. This is especially true if, as is usually
the case, the hostile forces resort to guerrilla ~ a r f a r e .
c. Geographical feat we.^.-That p a r t of the estimate of the situation which considers t h e geographical features of t h e theater of operations is fully as important in small wars ns in a major war. It
covers t h e general terrain features, t h e geograplticrtl divisions of the

country as fised Ly relief. snitablc (lel~;~rl~atiiio
placc,~,tlle rharacter
c a tdistribution
ic~~~,
of popand suitability of routcn of r o l ~ n ~ ~ r t t ~ ~ it11e
ohtion, the 1oc:ition of l ~ r i n c i ~ ~
cities,
n l t h o political divisions of the
stnte, turd t h e strntcgical a n d t:~ctic;nl :~sl~ects
of tlrc frontiers. 'Uhe
location ttnd cxtrnt of plain, pl:rtt::~n,;rnd ~nount;~in
regions, nartl of
ol)e11, >soorled, 01. jl~nglutnre;ls \\.ill :~ll'c?ctt h o org$rniz:ttion, equi])rnent,
nrld fielil operatior~sof tlrr i n t ~ r r ~ n i nforce.
g
I f :I. state of rcvolution is t11o basic cause of intcn.t.ntion, t l ~ rpolit,ic~lldirisioos x.it1lin
tlro country :ire ~~:~rt,icnl;nrly
iniportal~ta n d nnty in thenr%lves, de
tenni1:e tl~t\str:~tcgic~ ~ l oa fnoperatiolr. Of rl~r!ci:rl sigllificnnce, also,
are t,lnosn :Ireas it, \\-lriclr tlre ~niiljorityof foreign citizens and interthe ("-;li~l~li~llnle(It
of 11~11t.szrl
ZOIICS eratio~~s,
they sllould n o t be
considered a s i~~sonnountable
obstacles.
5. firiformnfion.u.mZ senority ser~icr,
of the onemy.-It
can be stated
as an aecelited premise tln:~t, in s1r1>111
mars, the inte~lligenceservice of
the opposing forces will h8 soperior i~ritia.llyto tlrat of t h e interven~
ttlte
ing force Frorri tllo p d n t . of view of t h e i n t z ~ , v e n i npo\ver,
intc~ventioois nsnally considc?red :I fricntlly effort to assist tlre occupied comntry t r ~vet!sf :iblisll prtlce a r ~ do~.ilerwitlri~rits bo~tndari~q.
From the viewpoint of tlrr rnajority of t,lle citizens of the ~rcupietl
conntry, howevcr, this action Iiy :!In :ilieo pov7er is a n anfri(!ndly one.
Although tl~c?majority of tl~e.;einl~abit:tnt~?
will not actively ol>l~ose
t l ~ eintervention, rrrany of tllcnr r i l l indirectly nssist tlre native f o r c e
witlr informiit,ion relative to t111-~novt!rnentsof tire i n t e r v c n i ~ ~forces.
g
This is especially tlxe of those! cit,izens who hi~verelatives arriorlg
the native form9 operating ~ I It he fit!ld. To off-set this situtition,
recourse must be had to prop$rg:inila clearly stating the definite purpose of the intervening forces in orrf(?rto show the friendly aid that
is being offered to the country. It'riemlsllips shonld be made with
the inhabitants in an honest and faithful endeavor to assist them to
4

SWM 2-6
' T f ~ !1,; F;s'rIlI.:YrE

O P 'FGlE ~I'l'~~>l'I'lOS

2-6. Own courses of action.-'I'hr
intervening force communrler
1n11stclloose tlie best course of tlction t o follolv in order to accomplish
his m i s s i o ~ ~Tlris
.
mill necessarily result in a s c l ~ e ~ aofe maneuver,
either strategical or tactical. To ttwoniplisl~this iuission, it. inay be
necesiry to tilakc. :I slro~vof force ill occupying the Stnte capital, f o r
often t l ~ el~istoryof t h e colintry will indicate that h e who liolds the
capital holds the com~try. Again, h e m:~ybe forced to occupy t,he
principal cities of tlie country, or n certain area, t h e economic resourcrLsof v11icl1are sucli that its possessor coutrols tho lifeblood of
the. country. More freqneutly, i t mill loe uecessary to hitiate active
co~r~l~at.
c)perxtio~isagainst the large groups of o p p o s i ~ ~forces
g
which
areus. The entire schc.11-1eof maneuver rrill frequently
occul~yccrt:li~~
rcts~ilt.in the occupation of the coilstt~larea initially wit11 :L gradual
~:oorditratednioverne~~t
inland, thus iucreasirig tlir territory over x h i c l ~
coiit1.01anil protectio~~
may be establislled. As this territory extends,
it 7 7 8 1 be necessary to crente military areas
it under the control to subordinute commanders. T h e area co~r~n~arrcler
in turn mill
seek to control Iris area by use of srriall detucliments to protect t h e
to\vns a n d to cc~ndnctactive. operations ngairlst irregular groups 1111til
the area becomes completely pi1cific.d.
2-7, T h e decision.-When the force commander l ~ afinally
s
selected
the best course of actioln and determined, in general terms, how
i t may b e executed, h e makes his decisioti, which consists of a statement of his course of action followd by l~owit is t o h carried out,
and why. T l ~ edecision indicates t h e commander's ge~~eral
plan of
action a s expressed in paragraph 2 of an operation order. The basic
principle underlying any decision i n a small-wars operation is t h a t
of initiating immediately eriergetic action to disband or destroy the
hostile forces. This action should hasten the return of normal peace
and goor1 order to the collntry in the sl~ortestpossible time.
2-8. Supporting measures.-After
the basic decision has been
reaclled, the Force Comn~andermust consider carefully the supporting measures which a r e required to p u t it into effect. Ttie mission;
the operations required to carry o u t the scl~emeo f maneuver; the
organization, armament, and leadership of the opposing forces: the
terrain, grogrnpl~y,a n d climate in the theater of operations; the
riatural resources and motes of commtmication within the country to
be occupied; all must be considered and all will affect the formulation of t h e campaign and operation plans. These factors will d e t e ~
mine the size and composition of the commander's staff; the organiza-

SWM 2-9

tion of the force; tlrc type of i11f:tlltry !ve:tpons and the proper
proportion of aircraft, :~rtillrry,a n d otl~ersrrpporting arms and sc.rrices rcqriirecl; and the ad~~ri~ristratire
a ~ i dlogistic details. Wlre~r
tlrese wpport,ing mcwsures httve beert detenniuecl, tlre comrna.xlder
evolves Iris campaign and operatio11 plans.
%9. Campaign and operation plans.-a.
I n rnilitary oper at'lons
of s ~ n n lwars,
l
stratc?gical and ttrcticul 1)rinciples a r e applied tu attail:
the politictll objective of tlre go~~onimeltt.T h e political objccti5-e
i~~dica.tes
the gc11eri~1c l ~ a r a ~ t eofr tlte c:u~~paignwhich the militnry
leacler will ~mclertake. The at~r~ptrign
plan i~ldictttcstlre military
objc?ctive and, in gcnernl tenns, t l ~ cli:tt,ure aucl method of co~iIanual 101-5:
remain funditmentally the same irrespective of the type of operation.
h. The staff', in close cooperation, ~ o r k out
s the plans enunciated
by the co~ninander,fortnulates the orders and instructions for p u t t i ~ ~ g
the pla~rsinto execution, arid by ohserv:~tionand inspection insures
proper execntion. Staff officers nlirst liec?p theinselves irrforined of
tho situation a t all times, a n d be able to place before tlte corr~~uander
h~format,ioni n snCh thoronghly digested. forin as ~ v i l lenable hiin
to come to a sound and prompt. decision witlanit liaving toconsider
:III infinite nmnber of de,tails.
o. Staff conferences, staff visits, staff inspections, incasults to insure adequate liaison, and provision for administrative dct41ils are
the usual methods erirployed by all staff orgnnizations to faoilitate
the proper performance of their specific duties. This procedure unifies t,l~eatforts of the staff i n furtlierilrg the i~ccornplishmeiltof the
will of t,he commander.
d. Acliniuistrative proceclure and the details of the organization and
routiiiu of t h e v;rrious staff offices are largely dependent on the r e
quirements of the psrticular situation. It is importa~ttthat essentiad information be i~nrnediatclyav:rilable and that every item coming under the cognizance of the. staff section or special stnff officer
co~~cerned
receive proper attenti011 and be disseminated to individuals concerned. This entails the formulat.ion of a systematic office
r o ~ ~ t i nand
e proper allocation of duties t o individuals. Executive
stnff sections are not offices of permaiient record. Each of these seotiom keeps a joun~al(Plate 11) which is the daybook of the section.
I t contains briefs of tml~ortantwritten arrd verbal messages, both received and sent, and notations of periodic reports, orders, and similar
matters that pertain to the section. I f a n itan is received or issued
orally, it is e.ntered in detail; if written, the entry may be either a
reference to the file number of the docu~nentor a brief of its contents. A brief iotat ti on is also rr~adeof instructioiis ~ r directions
~ d
pertaining to the section which have been given by t h e commander
or a member of the section to sorneone outside of the section. The
journal is closed when directed by the commander, a t the end of the
day, a phnse, or other period. These journals are the permanelit
records of the activities of t h e sections; combined, they form the reeord of events of the organization. For further details, see FM 101-5.
13

%-l:l.The chief of staff.-a. 111:I force no grrxter thnrl n ~rgirt~rrrit
or 11 ,ri~rfr,rcc~cl
irpinttuit, the i!st)c~tti\.e(lfficcv niny perform all of the
(lltbics of clticf of sttiff. [II lt~rgcrforces, tlr~tohiof of st,itff t ~ ~ l ~ iwill
~lly
I* r u ~rrtlicc!r sltt!eir~llydot.:iilt~,tlfor tllc. 1,urposo. Ilis prinolpi~ldnties
art+to act as rnilitnry xrlvisl?~.to tho coninsunder atid to c.r~or~linute
tho
ucl.ivities of tlit. xtnff. (Stx!. "Wiir L)t:pat%rnsnt Fic;ld Miur~lsl101-4.")
He eondoctx 811 ro~ttirrcItt~sinessi n orilcr to snnblo ttu conlnlander to
tlovoto his tirrln nntl efforts to atore irrl[wrtr~r~l
rrrrrttors. D~lrinpthc
ti!rt~potuvy itbwr~eeof tho c.r>~l~tl!i~r~dor,
tlrc chief of stuff rrrnkes socli
dtxisioos ns t h e sitnation may  I . ~ t l ~ t ~t ttt ,
1i t , I
M
I
I
i f i t I I 1 1 i f ~ o l 1.111'
r t.11irfof

of ~ v w kill orclt.~.11,

111th

SWM 2-13
T l l R STASW I S R\I.LI,l,

\lrA'hll.?

staff must ndjnst tlris :ti once. His iiiplonracy unl t:ict i n rtdjlistillg
snclr situations a t the. start \\.ill h:l\-e IL favorable reactiorl on tile elltirs
comnrand.
c. As tile organization l~rogres4s, it often develops t h a t certairl
cl~itiesshould be sllifted f m m one iurit to tiilotlre~.. Tlre cliief of st:itf
slronld see t,llat suclr clraiigrs a r e made promptly. Tlte Ynnp section of
t h e engineers lras been sllifteil logically, a t times, frnirl that unit. to t l l ~
secoiid su;tion. If :L iriilitary governmerit 11:~snot Ireen established,
civil relations ilmy be sl~iftedfroin the first to the second section.
d. I ) r ~ r i l t~hge colr~irtrationperiod, the chief of staff \\.ill be llarticolarly interested i n tlie plans of the stnff sections :lird their arrangenic!nts for:
(1) Receiving incorning details nlld imIiridu111s.
(2) Prompt issue of eqoipmeirt..
(3) Pronrpt cornplet,ion of irreilicnl ;111ci other ;~iinrinisiratireinspectiola.
(4) Facilities for training.
( 5 ) Coortlination of training of all units.
(6) Orgaiiization of the 111tr:lligcircc Service to incet t h e probable.
reqoirements of the sitoat.ion.
(7) Orgaiiizatioii of the Provost Service to rneet adeq11:tttely the
probable demands that will be made upon it in tlre theater of operations.
e. Tlre chief of stnff should supervise the plans for increasing the
intelligence personnel and for the bstablishment of provost services if
i t can be foresee11 that tlle operat,ions may result in t.l~eoccupation of a
country or a large sectionef it. The forces of occupntiol~have four
menporis wit11 svllich to act,: ( a ) Moral effect of the presence of troops;
(b) intelligence service; ( c ) provost service. (iimluding Esceptionnl
Military Courts) ;and finally (4) offensive action. T h e i~~telligence
a n d provost seruices should be c;iroftilly considered in connection witEi
'peaceful occup;ttiori." 111t h e past, scant attention has been given t o
these services i n tilo prepriratioii of operation plans for small wars
operations. A s a role, they have been established only when t.l~enecwsities of operatioil forcod it upon the higher command. In most, cases
an increase of p,rsoirnel in intelligence units will be required over t h a t
allowed in orgtrnization tables when the operations include the complete occupation of a country or of large areas of it.
f . The provost senrice, including the exceptional militaq-court,
system, represents the military government to the mass of t h e people,
with ~ h o m
it comes in direct contact, axid i s the normal active instru-

16

SWM 2-14

rr~entfor tlrr m::intt~nance of tranquillity, freeing the. natives from
agitation ;LIICIintimi(l:rtio~lby their olvn coontrymen. l'hr provost
servict,, inore tllarr any otlrer e l e l ~ ~ eof
i ~ tthe
. forces except the IntclliCrelrce
Servict.,
sllould
undsrst:~nd
tho
people, their ten~per:~mn~t.,
n
customs, :~cti~itics,
and t l ~ ce,~erpclay~ ~ ~ o r l z of
i n gtire :Lvrmge native
niind. It. warrants :r veil-founrled and complete org;tnization, including provost inarslzrls ancl judges ~ i t hlegal Bno~~ledge,
good a11c1
clerict~lassist:mce t o disr~atchbnsiloynl interpreters, and s~~fficient
ness with justice ancl celerity.
2-14. The first section (personnel)-F-1.-a.
Tllr. tlssistiunt chief
of staff, F-1, eoordi~intesthe activities o f thosr agencies performing
the functions that Ile is ch:~rged with i n tlie "\Trrtr Dep:lrtrnent Field
Blenual 101--5." He, coopemtes rvitll tlle seco~nlssction on matters
pwtaining to ~)risoncrsof war, espionage, etc., :rnd \\.it11 the third and
fonrth atctiorr-: in regard to qr~art,erirkg,priorities of replacerntmt.,
and allotnrenl of tirrle f o r recre;lt,ional 7vorlz. H e is rrspoi~siblef o r
ct,rtain l~rovisio~ls
of t h e administratixw onlor, mld must cooperate
%-it11the fourth section in this matter. Because 11s is charged m
wit11 tlit'.
tlrird sr.ciior~in estiriiat.i~rg,,wellin adv:~nceof :rctri;rl nre(la, clrntrges
in conditions that rill 1.eq111rerc~~lrrc~r~rr~nti.
~ I I ~ I I I C Iion,
I ~ : ~or
~ ~.eductiorr of the Force. Wllelr rel)lncemr.nts or r(~cnforcententsare
recieved, tlicy are distriltuted ill accordance \~irhpriorit,ies fonnnIi~ttulby the third section.
d. F-1, in collahortition witll the Co~irnlnodilrp Oficsr, Specin1
Iroops, in c11:rrgecl with the al1oc:ltion of spare to the virrious headquarters' oftic.es. \\'Iratevrr tlre contenr1tlatr.d ~l~~st~iiorr
of t h e occaprrtinn, force headquariers sl~oulclbe so located iir~dSIIRCC SO allocnted
tlrerent as to facilitate either tlie expnrision or llre redoct,ion of its
activities. I n selecting and :1110c:rting office PI)IICC. the first. ~ ~ c t i o n
confers ~vit,hall nr(mht.rs of tlirr ststt' ~.tlativl.to their needs, ttnd
11articulilrly with tlle fourth scctioil, \rhiclr slil~crvisesreritnls and
pmchnws.
a. TTlrtil l>ersonneI is sl~ccifi~irlly
~ 1 ~ ~ s i g n atot ~take.
: ~ l active cllnrg~
of ~nilitnrygo~ernmerlt,the first sect,iorl prelrnres plans as necesUs~~iilly
sary for its ~~st;~blish~ne~it.
it. will be i~dvisablet o organize
a special staff aeci.ion for this purpose. If tlre n~ilitarygoven~ment
is an inciepe~~dent
orgnnizntion apart from the force, tlie first section acts as t h e liaison trgent betu.een tlre force commander and the.
staff of the military governor. For details, see Chapter XIII, 'Military (>orernment."
f . Since post exchanges are estnblislred f o r the ~relfareand convenience of t h e enlisted men, supervision of this activity comes
under tlie first section. See pnragrr~ph2-36.
g. The first section is clmred ~viththe rendition of reports concerning, and t,he lrnndlin~of, civilinn prisoners or prisoners taken
from hostile forces. If a locnl constnb~~lury
is operating in cooperntion with tho intervening force? sut:li prisoners usually are
turned over to the f o r m ~ rfor triiil by tlre connt:ib~~lary
courts mnrtial or by civil courts; otlrer\vise they ilre Ireld a t tire disposal of
the force commnnde~:
IL. The first section prepares and promulgates rebwlntions governing the conduct of persnnnel in their associi~tions with friendly
natives in an effort to further cordial public relations. Social customs in countries in \vhicli small wars operations nsually occur differ
in many respects from tlrose in the United Stntes. Violdion of
these customs, and tl~ouglitlessdisrespect to local inhlLbitnnt8, tend
to create animosity and distrust which makes orir presence un~velcome
and the task of restoring law and order more dificult.

,.

18

SWM 2-15
TrII4 STAFF I S S3lAI,I, BbItS

i. The first section pre,pares alld t?:~~lhl~lits
to t l ~ efr)urth sectioll
sucl~pnrts of tile force trdministr:rti~t?(?rrlct.s:IS affect tlie activities
military
of the first srction. Ilrese are principally: Rel~l:rce~ne~lts;
police; postal service; care i~nddisposition of ciriliun prisolrers and
prisoners t a h n from the Elostile forces; payment of the colur~naud;
i~ndpost exchange supplies.
j. The records kept i l l ille office of the fir2.t section should be rnilutced
to the mirrirnnin. See pa~,:~g:~ph
%12, (2. The following documents
:Ire needctd in order to flulotion efficiently:
(1) Section journal.
(2) A sospensn file of orclers, rnemor:ulda, and letters of i ~ ~ s t r u c (ions, xv11icl1 later are turned over lo t l ~ eacljutant.
(3) Copies of important colnnl~u~icst,ic~~is
x~hic11affect the force
cont,inuoosly. (Tho originals arc! kc?[lt i n tlli. nII\T.U, \'\TARS

je) Ivrs~intenancrof cordi:~lre.trlations ~ ~ i ttlic
l r local, iimerican? and
foreigir press, : ~ n dcrirsoring of all press releases.
C. I h t i e s pr.iol. to e~~rba,lcution,-(1) I>uring t,he concentrntion
~,h;iseprior to ernbarkation, t h e second section Jvill be prirnnrily concerlrctl n i t h obtirini~lgall av:~ilahleinfonnatioll relative to the count r y in \vhicl~i t is pnrposed to operate. Ilonogra~)l~r;,
in:ips, and other
l>ertinelrt i~rfortnatioir nonnnlly slro~~lcl
lie f u n ~ i s l ~ eby
d the Force
General Staff. I n no type of \varfnre is the la(est current iilfonnation more vital. Fur this rmsotr the second section sllo~ilclimrnedi:ately est;tblisl~liaisorr mitlr tlle correspondiilg sec.tions of the. nnval
and inilitary services anil ~ ~ i tthe
l r nearest reprcsc~~tatires
of the State
Dep"rtment,
(2) The selection, orgirnizntion, nncl training of the commissii)ned
and enlistcck intellige~lcel~ersoriot~lof botlr tlre headquarters a n d
combat oilits shoulcl be carried on concurrent.ly n.it,h t l ~ F-2
e
estimate
of tlre sitn:ition. (See psiragr.aplr 2-13, 8.) Every effort slruuld be
~ l ~ n ito
l e obtain personnel convursant with t,he langnnge of the conntry. The force of interpreters \rill generally ho augmented by the
employmerrt. of natives. 'Illre second section, in coi~junctionwit11 F4,
should coinpile and obtain approval of :in "A.llo\vance. and Pay Table
f o r Interpreters," based on t h e scale of wages of tlre country concerned, and f u n d s sliould be :~lloc:ited for paynreirt tflereunder prior
t o embarkation.
(3) A r6sum6 of the available information of the. theatre of operations should b e complet.ec1a s soon a s practicable and reproduced and
disseminated throudrout tlre command. T h e fol1owing form is suggested for
this information. Sonie iteins listed the,rein
mny not be applicable in every situatiou, a n d additional items may
be of great value in certain situntions.
A FORM FOR A STUDY OF TKE THEATER OF OPERATIONS

I. l'oU~r~ca~.-n.I Iistoru.
0. S118tom of Uouan~t~ent.
(1) Porrn of government (dictatorslrip, republic,
( 2 ) 0lganis:ltion and rnethod of owration.

(3) I'olitical subdivisions.
c. I%tmaZ politi<:aZ sittcatiotr.
(1) Present government (head of

etc.).

fitate and other political leaders;
personalities).
(2) Politicitl ixsues.
(3) Analysis of parties.
( 4 ) Regional an8 social differences.
(5) The press.

20

THE STAFF Ili S&IAIiIl \MRS
1. I'or,Enca~-n.
Kistor-~~-Co11ti11uP1~.
d. I~cterrtafiol~nl
i)oiifi(!a.
( I ) Hearilig of intt?rl1:111)olitiC:ll sit1l;ltian on intcl,nntional ~r,iicici.
( 2 ) Forrig*, policies.
(3) Poreign r e h Lions.
e. S~,nr~,tutio,~
(Horn does tllis il8r:et tlle conterngli~ledolx:ratiorrs?).
2, ~ c ~ n o ~ r c . - nQot,eral.
.
econo,,bic ~'Rni'nctcristics.
(1) Xatural resources.
(3) 1)egrer of economic deueiopnlent.
( 3 ) Deprndnrcc olr fr?reign trntlc.
b. Nntimzol ~rrodrrctive cal)acitli.
( I ) Agricnltnre.
( 2 ) Mining.
( 3 ) Bh~iofilctnrr.
( 4 ) Shiphllildiny.
c. Co,,l",~crse.
(1) Domcstic truile.
( 2 ) Fareiga tmdt?.
d. Trotrs,)orfolioir.
(1) Rnilro:ids.
( 2 ) Higllmays.
(3) Water.
( 4 ) Air.
e. Contn~zc~!icntioir.
(1) CRbles.
(2) Hndio.
( 3 ) Teleyrnph.
( 4 ) Telephone.
f . liinance (metl~odof finnncing government).
g. Popt'lation (economic nslRets: Dreselrt ~lollnlationanalysis of gop~llntiorr, labor, and social eonditior~s).
it.. Plans for i n d a n t ~ i a lnmbilizetion.
i. Eca+ton8,icpcnetretiom hg foreign interests.
j. h~flzreneaof ecorromic sitflation on foroi.i(/arelat2,fls.
k. General co,~clasioas (referenee to t!corron~ic sclf-suficicme~,enl,rteily
f o r prnduction of w a r supplies ilnd food sxipplies, a n d degree of dependence on maintenance of trade routes).

3.

(PEYsIcA~.).'-a.
f f e ~ ~ e r topograpitu
ul
und hgdrogrupil!~.
b. Rivers and m t e r supoh,.
0. minzrctio conditions.
d. Criti(;aC areas (arens the loss of which vould seriously ilamwr tllt?
country under consideration).
e. Vital ereas (areas evacntiul to the country concerned).
(1) Routes of approach.
( 2 ) Roads, trnila, and railroads.
( 3 ) Harbors a n d beaches near critical areas.

GEoGsapnY

'Lilleh ~wsrnghieniitemaa8 have been eonridcred under political or economic hendlnss
should he omittod.

SWM 2-15

3.

( i m n \ r ~ H Y (PEIYSIC'\L).-a.

(;ciro.id topo!lr-ol,Ny oud itgdr.ogr.nl~k~.-4oolll.
( 4 ) Colt~motli<:nti<'li'.
(5) aeot?rnl terriiin considtmitiuns.
f . Conelssio~,a (tilr efieet of gwtct.al t<,rraiu riirisider;rtiolts UII <~ll*r:ltioos. The most faroriiblr tl!clit~ri,f olrenrtic~nfn91n ;I rtnrldlioilrt of
geogrnl~hy)
~)l~ysieitl

.

4. Psvrlro~rmrcar. Sln.,vrros.'-a.
U~,r!r:rnlr.acin1 cl,ar-sr.trrirtir.3; tUljr:s, ?'aces.
etr.
11, &dlreafio,t.
c. Rrliyion.
d , ilttitadr of initabita,rtr torce,l foreigfters.
e, Baarc],tibilil], to propngands (illflncllcc of church, press, rildio, o r
otllpr nsener)
f , co?ccl8,aiofrs.

.

5, Coxura~H:s~l~ran.--n.Coor~li?irctio,l.or ,ratio,fnZ Uelolae.
(1) Militwry forvcs (govrr~>ai,'ntaurl olgimition).
( 2 ) Supren~r?
com1na1~dt.r(gori.nc~nont;tsd ~,l,lu)sition).
0. l'eraolrwel.
(1) Estimatpd strelrgtil of crnl~lu)nentsof blltll gllvrrotnent nllli hastile forces.
(2) Government forces rrctcl lcii(Iel.8.
( 3 ) Hostile forces nrld lenders.
c. l'rait~iag, eflciwtc~,( L I I ~?IIOTUIC (goverllllie~ltnud hostile forces).
( 1 ) Individual.
(2) Unit and combined tr;tiaing.
(3) Training of reserves.
(4) Systcnr.of ~,rornotinnof oUic?srs.
( 5 ) Efflcielley.
(6) Dlor;~le.
8. Rncrzcltinf, n~nthods.
(1) Goverrlment forces.
( 2 ) Hostile forces.
8. Eqtcipnceat n , J rmpplies availnhle.
(1) T o government forces.
(('1 On hnlld.
( 0 ) Ileplncement posvihilities and sources.
(2) T o hostilu forces.
(a) On hrind.
( b ) Rc'piaeement possibilitira nnil ROarCe3.
f . dirthod of N)!htlcotlng wmliat.

should be given t o all factors and 5nal
udy a s a whole).
fullr elsewhere In the study. Refer to other

SWM 2-15
THl? STAFF IY S ~ I A I I T I\VAIl';

(4) (a) Available nrnps :Ire 11su:illy i1laccnr:rta anrl of small scale;
their procnrcinent is costly and thc supply li!rriterl. 'rileg have often
proved so ilnreliable as to detail as to be valueless except for the pnrpose of correx:tion. I t is often more p r t ~ ~ t i c aaiicl
l economical to
obtain ,lnaI)s only for headquarters and crxec:utive st:itF sections of all
units, providing ineans f o r the reproduction ant1 distribution of corrected sections or of new mnps rrraile after arrival in the theater of
operi~tions. In small-wars oper~tionsl~~hercl
engirrcer troops have. not
been present, map reproduction has been
a responsibility of the
smncl s c ~ t i o n ;in other cases, the map-repmct~~ctionsection of the
engineers has beell transterred to the force liea%-itlr \r.lrotn ti113 nrt2 rontrt\ctcOP~i t r s ~ ~ r r i ~ , ~ t :~vtii-ii~~~~:try
tit* in onlrr to irrsnr~~
tl~(~~n~xsc.lvi-a :ur nrtiar~dfolio\\-ing in tdrr fic*ltl
iit case tlrc intt'rvr~t~tir~rr
sl~nt~l(l
IIC t,r1(11~dn:r(l,lorrly. Stlt.11 :I condition if1crc:lw3s tllcr difficrllt t:l.iii of sr1;rrring a ~ e r d 4who rvill report.
imparti:rlly orr :&I1 ilistllrl~in~
plerrlr~r~ts.
( d ) E:sccllrr~t restllts 1r:tri: Itcc,i~ottt:iined throrrpir tlic! coolrrr:itirrrr of
~ I I S ~ I I I ~t~st11t11isli1111~11t~s
SS
wl1ic11rri:iirrt:rit~ I I ~ I I I < ~ I<~ \Yro t 1 1 1ror~t:rcts
~
thn~~lglrorrt.
tlrc: ~,t.~:lrpir.(l
:~rc-ns. 14'or firrirr~vi:~I
rt3:rsrttrs. tlir. (~t~rrir:~I
c ~ fS II<,II c~~ri<,~~rtrs
I I I I I S ~11:iv~~
1i111rl~
: I I I I ~irr:[~:trti:rl~ < I I < ~ T V I ( : I I ~of
<>
<~lIic(x
a 1 1 1or r
r
i I I ~ ~ O t 1I 1I 1 1 1 1 iI I
I
111 I I I : I I I ~
cctvei: 1Irt.y :rrv (lrl~i~r~~l~~rrt.
I I ~ I ( I I Itlri. irilc~r\-r~lririg
forvch-i f o r ])rt~t(.vti~rr
of lllihir' {I(~~S(IIIIIVI I I I I ~lrrop~~rty,
:III(I it is tli~xir: I I ~ V : I I I ~ : I ~!xior~
1 c 1 1 I I I ~ ~ ~ I II I rS : i l I I i l l . 111iirt!kirrg to ~~t:rltli~.lt
s11c.11
:t a r l r t : l t : t ; (Irc. it~tc:llig'~r<~t:
otticrr shoaltl look for ;L inlsit~c!~~
c>st:~ttI I
I I I I I I I I I i s I I I ~ I S . 1,iiris011s110111d
1 i s i 1 1 r i1 l l I
b!ir~:ri~rtniiircI1Irro11gI1111(~1ithi~1.~
of tho C O I I I I I I ~ ~ IwI ~ I visit,
~ ~ tho
~ bl~sizress II. it1 tlli! ~ I I I I illli<~ly
~II.II
t l ~ nol~l~o~itiotl
blis
Iw!crl bvokt>rtirrtil sr~rtrllgrolr{~s,tllc? lal~sc?of tialc* t.tn!.t.r~g:rirriirg irrforrr~:itioni~rrclt h n srrivrrl c . ~ fIL #roi111~1
r~:tt,rolis t1%11:111.ytoo #,*I.c:I~
~ I I
giw! aff~clirft.
I.PSIII(S.
'I(trt: list5,
I I oI~st!rv:ri
~
io11rrvi:ltior~in CIIISO S1ri1poi.t
of iaf:tr~t.l:y 1):1tr11ls1111ert1lirr:::t~:~ir~st.
s r ~ ~ aliostilo
ll
forct>s is of rlorrblfill vrilt~e. Tlru iiiryrlrurr discltrses tltct presc:llc,cr nrltl I ( ~ l i t t i i ~ l( Il F tilt:
{IIJI.(IIK
t i~idt?i~al~li~ri
tilt? 11ost:ilo~ I Y I ~ I Ito
I Sf i v ~ i d
i lletrt or to CII(K,SC tl10
t i tf i r c
I
r ~ t k i I r I I I ~ . A t ~ y)LIII~I~IS!Ititt~tciirt tn! I I K . : I ~ c ~
f~.c~rri
ttro rtir slrolikl 1.x) ~~ncovt~rotl
ill tlrnple, tinre 11y tlrir i~sr:rrisi:of :i
little c!tr= tog~.nlrhic
inissiuns oftall will ka tttu l ~ f r $ l IIIIIJ irte>iltsfor st:cr~rii~g
stcenr:~teir~fortn:tt.ion of tlro t.c?rvnini l k tltci tlrenter of ot~!n~tions.For frrrtklor datuils,
see Cllaptur IX,uAvi:rbion."
( f ) St~horciittnte1111its
provide the Fotu:c c:c~ttrrnxndt:rwith detiiil~?d
infonr~:rtionon irostil: activilies, 6110 tnrr*z~innntl geography, ned tilo

26

SWM 2-15
I

S

F I

1

\VdltS

political anil eccono~nicsituntiori i n the arcas in n-hich tlley operate.
As co~nbst.intelligt.nc~:for the purllose of gaining contact ~vitlrand
clestroying l~ostilesnned opposition, such infonnzttio~iusr~i~lly
\vill he
of raloe only to the ruiit first g a i ~ r i ~it..
~ g Bnt such information, ~ r l ~ e n
collected frorr~tlre entire theater of oper;itions :ntd trn~lsfomiedinto
mi1it;try intelligence, provides the commander nit11 the infor~nationhe
must have to dispose Iris forces in accori1:uice with the situation i ~ n d
to prepare for eventualities. I?-'-2slloitld coorrlinata the activities of
the intelligence sections of subordinate units. Tho second section of
a snbor(lin:~teorgrtniz:~t,ion,qnarteserl in the. Yanie 'ity or town as force
hendqnarters, should not be used as an appendagr: to the force intelli@nee section, but sl~onldbe pc~lnrittrda~rclsetlirired to function in its
nor~nalnianner. Homerer, F-2 slronld utilize every olqmrtunity to
derelop a close n~iilerstanilingalid persorrtll relationship mitl~sobordinate intelligence officers.
(g) F-2 shor~lil~ilaint:~in
close liaison \vitl~other agei~ciesof onr
government established in tho theater of r)perations. Irlforn~ation
from such a~ry
chart should
be co~npiledindict1,ting the distauces between all points of military
importz~nceand the t,ime. factor involved for each type, of tmnsportation available and for each season of the year.
(d) A record should be kept of nll pronrineirt. citizens in the
locality, whether friendly or hostile t o t h e ii~tervention. Each record
should show: The full name of the individual 21s take11 fmm the baptismal or birth certificate. (buth when these records differ) ;the name
by which t h e person is customarily known; all kilo~v~i
aliases, if any;
and his reputation, character, and activities. Additional information
should be entered on t h e record as it becomes available. Duplicates

SWM 2-15

nrc for~~;u.ilnl
to tire nest. lrighcr ~:cl~elon.It, is only by this means
t,h:~t;lrcul.;~tcand continuous iofonllation c n r ~be ~naiutairlctlox the
i~lhabit:t~rts
of the ~rcnpieclcareas, jrhicll r i l l prove invnl11>1ble\\.he11
for orienting newly arriving offcers, and
q u e s t i o ~?~ iindiridrrals,
n~~
for prepnrlng cl~nrgcs~vhenit is desired t o bring suspects to trial
for tlreir activities.
( e ) 111telligencenctivities are greatly lrandicnpped if t h e officers
ntt:rched ro l~nttnlionsand slnaller units in the field are n o t fnniilii~r
*
is especially true wit11 Bn-2. Enrh
\\-it11 tlie 1oc;tl l:~nguirgc. ,llris
officer slrould entlerrvor to learn tlre li~npuagesufficielrtly x~,ellto ellgilge in social activities and t o dispense with interpreters as soon :IS
possible.
( f ) Outpost. coin~oandrrsniay obtain ioformatio~lby:
Estnlfishing a se:ervice of info~matiorrtlnongb tlre l l m l mayor o r
senior ciril official;
Weeleekly reports Prom tho s f ! ~ l i r ~ t c. iril official in enclr settlenr~nt
within t l ~ subdistrict
r
;
Qoestioniug commerci;~ltravc1rl.s:
Interropt,iilg persons or tlrtr rr,lt~ti~cs
of persous injured or 1110lested by tlre llostile forces;
Close suweillance of relatives of hostile i~tdivirln:~ls;
Eramination of prisoners; anrl
Constant. observation of tlia movements of all nblt.-bodied men in
tho district.
( 9 ) Metliods of e x t ~ ~ c t i ninfonnntion
g
which nrenot countenanced
b y tlre 1:t.v~of war and the customs of humanity canno6 be tolerated.
Such i~ctionstend to produce d y fnlse info~mntionand a r e degrading to the person inflicting them.
d. Zntelliqence recordu.-(1)
Study of the theater of operatior1s.A thorot~pl~
kno\vledge of the theater of operations in small wars is
11ehly important to all officers from the force commander tin the
jumor patrol o r outpost conrmander. Infnrmation compiled prior to
arrival in the thenter must be sopplementecl by reconnaissance and
%15, b.
resalrcli on the pound. Sec pari~grnpl~
(2) Speck2 ntwtica.-From time to time t h e intelligence officer may
be called upon to make special studies of p a r t i c ~ ~ l localities,
ar
situations, or other factors arising (luring the course of the campaign.
(a) The intelliqerrce onma.-A complete intelligence annex may be.
issued a t the beginning of the operations to accompany the campaign
plan. Such an annex is not usually necessary in small wars operations
unless strong, organized resistance to the intervention is anticipated.

!

SWM 2-15

'T11e form f o r tlir intelligence iulnes g i w n i i l i ''W:rr Depnrttnrlit Field
31anu:ll 101-5" mny h e used :rs $1 goicie.
(4) The i?&toZligence~ ~ t i ~ ? b u t e . - (Tile
u ) inlellige~~cc
'rstin1:lte dnri n g the early pllases of iirterveiltioll nl:ly closely l~arallelt h e F-2 estii~lilteof R m a j o r \Y:I~. It i s tllu' i):lI't of t,llt) c ( ~ ~ r i m ~ ~ n dc~stilllilteof
?r's
tlle situation mhicll covers the llostile forces :I~III their probable courst:
of action. T l l e follo\~ingoutline
be used :IS a guide f o r stlcll a11
cstimate :
F-2 ESTIMATE
(Hr;tding)

File So.
3l;lps :
1. 11osr.lm Folw~s:

Ijisgositions; strtmgtil; nhysinll c(lli(iitions; titorule; 1r:tining: coinpositiorr: s u g l ~ l y;tnd rqniyment ; :lrsisltlzirt' to llcr i , x l x ~ t t v lI'rmrl ntilcl. sorrvvcs,
2. I':s~(.\LY'~

C(AI'~\IIILITIEB:

I~:nen1y's UliJsiOn;
1.nnuy.

D ~ ~ I I Inl)t?li
S
(0 eIIClny; :lll;tlpSiS

3. 110~1'1'JWe:Anr.l.. COI;KSI: OF

c l t ' r'illll.s<,s 011e1:

It,

tlli!

I S N E ~ I Y.\CTIOX.

(Signahrrt..)

(b) As t h e inter\!e,ntion contintlcrs a n d t h e hostile forces are clisyersed into small groups, purely ir~ilitaryoperittions llsually lxcome
subordinate to civil problems. T h o f o l l o w i ~ ~forrr~
g
] n a y be used a s
n guide f o r an F-2 estimate of t h e political, economical, :111(1 civil
sitl~ation:
ESTIMATE OF THE POLITICAL, ECONOMICAL, AND CIVIL SITUATION
Fnrm :

To:

Dnh! ar~dh our
Dilte ;lnll hour

Unit
~'I~ICC

Ilatenod iroor
Mie No.
M;III~:
1. OENTBUL. STATE
OP ~ ~ ~ I T OOCCUPIFD:
B Y
State uniler tile appropriate nuluber of a~bparngraphs,n gnlernl sultlmnry
of hostile activities as it exists in enrh subdivision of the atate or territory,
allotting a subparagraph to each geographic s~~bdivision.
2. A m Ow ClV5 POPVL%TION
:
Discuss attitude of the Leaders, whether pnlitic;ll or military. 'Phe fientlrnl
attitude of the pollolation, a3hcther friendly, tolerant, apathetic, or hostile.
Local assistance or obstruction we nlxy expect to our eITorts.

SWM 2-15

3.

D>':cosonrrcSIT(- no^ :
Cl,lrtitioll cnf 1,rlsint'si. I
s i t t i . 1'rL:e of h,odstnlTs. Conditiola of i,l.tllla. Illiillx e r r ollt:lo\v of l:li10re1-2. C:or!ditio~islllllollgst lilllorCI'8.

4. POLI(:E OPEKARON :
i
t
i
. Coiillt~riltioli< I € 1,;itivt. forces ssrl n:!tire Ciril Polire
\vith "IN n\vn. T y l r { a f crinir f l ~ rn-llich most iirrests xrc8 madc, whether
1n;ijor or ~nixlur~RPIIU<,S. A n l ~ n i l titnd rclii~bilityof i~if~rmi!tion
ft~rnish~tl
ily loc;\l fcfrcc, clr lrl,li?r. A1.111~i l l USC by 1<1(.nl 1~llicr.
tyllt: zmd i>llnlber. If
IKtlirr nvr snirjecl t o 1<111.:11 in,litic:tl 1r:zrlcrs for tlwir lobs. Sonrcus of their
1i:kY nltd 81 ( . ~ n ~ ~ i : l s i R f ~ lit
l wit11 ~ t b w
silli!ried ~mitiollsin the locality.
5. >~IIJT.\EY OPER:\nON :
Eillrrr ~.tx.
6. 1'01.1mc~r.
SITu,\nnni :
h  o l i t i r n l~,( . i ) l l O r O i 1111,l
~
ilivil sitllnti~l)
as cloes nut amre bclulrg uitcler tlle pn)ret?diugp;trt~grirr,hs.
(s) A.

&1>1jor

F3

(5) The Joumu1.-See p:rragrapli 2-12, d.
(6) The Irbtclligencc: Repv~.t.--(o) T h e inform:dio~r x~-l~icli
has
been collected and evalut~tedctoriiig a given period is dissemiriated hy
means of an intelligcrrco ieprir:t or an intellige~~ce
memoricndum. The
period of time to be covered b y tbe report is prescribed by higher auby all combnt units
thority, or by the unit c o ~ ~ ~ r r i : ~ ~It
~ dise rissued
.
down to a ~ r dincluditig tlie hattuliori or corresponding cornmand, for
the 1)111\poseof i~ifornti~ig
si~ptlrirll.,adjacent, and subordinate orgunizatiol~sof tlie situutir~~i
confro~rtingtlrc unit prepnring tbe rctport. I t
nlap o r overlay. 111 small wars
rrlay be supplernetrted by a sitr~irtio~l
operations, i t may l ~ oadvisnble to prepare separate reports on the
military, economic, a ~ r dpolitic:tl situ:lt,ions, or, if tliey interlock, a
combined report mny be submitteil. The military report is similar to
thnt given in "War Department Field M:cnrrnl 101-5." Tile following
form may be used ns a guide in preparing a combined report:

THE; STAFF IS SA[AI,L,

\YAKS

PER1OL)IC REPORT OF IXTELLIGEXCE
B'rorn:
l'o :

h l t e ilud 110111.
1);rie mrll lrorlr

File No.
('orrrmr:~~lar.
(1le;irling 1
1. A ~ I T U D O
EF CIVIL
PATION :

~ ' < ~ P c - I . A T I O S 'rO\\'Ak:i8 &~IT.ITAKY (;o\x:I:s>~EN-P <>I< OLCTJ-

Hostile, liclrtrill, or frieoclly; hy suci;!l rlasst's.
2. I'or.mcar. AcnrlTIEs :
Activity of lmlitir:ll il;rrties during ~leriod-dedactions.
3. E c o ~ o x r cCONDITIONS :
C!ot~tlitio!l of CI.UIE. ~ ~ r i r of
e s f ( ~ n d s t ~ ~ if
f f rIon.
, or lticlr, rcnsrtn therrfor,
~ l
i'co~~onii(.
co~)~litioti':
ivhidi
p s t s , cl,irlemics, disnstt'1.s. I:ll~ori i ~ \T:$~cF,
nlay tcnd to ~j~.olost srobilhle f n t n r e trend and course of sctioe, based on n sound
estilliate oaly.
(Sigonture.)

(b) Reports submitted by organizat.ion comrnunders in the field
should be complete and detailed. It is better to send in too much information than too little. A report which is meaningless to the commander of a small detachment xnay be essential to the next higher
echelon when considered with the information received from other
sources. On the other hand, F-2 reports to higher authority may be

irr the fonn of l ~ r i c flirirrrrirrit~i. ori~i~ririg
ill,. III:ISS of 11~tt1ilc < ~ l l t c t t ~ I
k>ytkr? 1;~1~11r~~:tt
~ I I ' ~ ~ I I ~ Z ~ $VIII>~P
~ ~ ~ ~ tI 1I >$ ~i,111~111~1~i:rtt~
trt1llss1lissil~ili ) f
~
r$rf>i~tvl.
( f , ) 'I'lri! rtr~>id~ l i % ~ e ~ n i r ~t t~
f l111i1it;iry
ior,
i r ~ t i ~ l l i g ~to
~ r:\I1
r c ~osgttrliz:ktior~s ~ o r ~ ~ r r r list ~fully
t l as irri~ios1:trrt its tlte (.oII~(.ti~~rr
of f~rigir~t~l
i r f r ~ r ~ : t i rl'lrt:
~ . distritli~tiot~
of i t ~ t ~ . l l i g t ~r lc~~e ~ ~s l~r ~ trt lt dsir~~littlt'
tI%c~ri~;rllust
nxpar:itr (letn~,lrrx~cr~t
in tilt- licltl. 11t~crtt1st.o f tiit, n.itll.
r~
of t r ~ t ~ l pins I I S I I : ~ ~SIII:III x ~ t ~ ~qx~rtrtii~rls.
rs
i~~tt~Iligt!r~ct~
rtAfx,rls rrr.r <,ftcn tire orlly n~+>nrrs
11y wlrirlt :I j>:ttr<~li~~~rrrrrrtr~cIt.r
r:m bl*
kt*ltfilrfol.r~rt'(\I I Iiostilt)
~
i~ctivitiw,or [ ~ I I I I I11iii i ~ ~ ~ ~ r : ~ to
t i ointercc~rt
lr*
~ ~ r ~ l ~ rI-rrtbrrry
r l i l t ~ tr~ovr~rrrt!rrts.
( ( 1 ) 111 vii.a. of tlrp {m:rrli~lr9tt1trrs of o11r f(~r.c<,i
in sr111rI1Ivnrs otter:rtiorrs, irr ivlrir11 t 111-yfrt%jrrerltlyI W I I I I I ~i11v01v~'d
~
for tlrt' s ~ l t !~ I I I ~ [ I O ~ I :
< ~ ~f ~ r ~ ~ rvrilitrtry
~ i ~ l i :rid
~ t gt ~ tltc
, civil p o t ~ <
~>
~)I[r fori>igtt r1>1ti(111i r r
r*t.rlfv to r ~ ~ t o r{,r:lr.i3
t * n-itltirr 1 1 1 I~n ~ r r r i ~ l : ~of
~ . if(l~~ ci.t:rtfS, 111p r r i t t o f
tlrc t ( ~ r 1 1"r~rrc~rrry"
s l ~ o a l be
~ l ar,oitlt.il ill :ill rtv.~irlli,~ P ~ ) I I I , ~: Ls ,I I ~ot111.r
~lttcrrrrr~~nts.
(i)
The. intc.I/i~li~~ii.o
'tooi,k whpct.--As i~ri~,t.tt~;~tinir
is rc*cc~ive work xIt<:rt. S o f1;rr~rtrfur tlri.: is ~ r ~ x c r i i ~blrt
: d , :I
inrtlrocl is t o cl:tssify Lire i~rf~rr.rrration:IS it is r e r t ~ i r c ~ ~ l
convcrrit~r~t.
trrrlr\Z,L WARS

sollie instrr~ctio~is
of this ~l:~tureill assist the commander's immedi:Ire subordinates in the execritiotr of h i s scl~eme of nlnneuvcr and
canrlxiign plnn.
c. Tlir t h i r d section prepares the necessary organizat.ioli, movement,
commtuiications, and tactical plilns. Organization o f the cornb:lt,
llllits inclncies the priority of the assignment. of replacements, arid
recon~~neudatiolls:
for desirable changes i n armament. a n d eqnipment.
l o coiijunctio~~
with F-2, h e estimates the strength, armament, equip~lleiit,:und tactics of the opposing forces, and determines the necessity
for the attached snpporting arms with tE~eForce such as aviation,
:rrtillery, tanks, etc., and the appropriiite streugth thereof. Every
:ivailnble rneans of comrnnnicntion must he utilized; generxlly a d d tion:tl equipnient and personi~e,l~ v i l lb e required as a sl~ortageof
communication material m a y irtflueuce the plan of campaign. T l ~ e
prnn11)t j~reparntion of 1111 air-prolnrd liaisou code is very important.
d. I n conj~u~ction
with t h e special staff ant1 F 4 , the third sectiol~
deter~ninesthe number of units of fire of normal and special ammmiition to be carried \\.it11 t h e force initially, and reqnests replace~nents
from the United Stzttes a s necessary.
e. F-3 prepares and issues orders for all troop movenlents. Ho\r.ever, lit+ prescribes only t h e gellorill location snd dispositions of tlre
technical, supply, and administrntive units and the actunl movement
orders for them units a r e issued by the staff section concernecl after
with and approval of F-3. I n considering the comhat
o~issio~is
to be assigned to the various organizations, areas, or districts
in the theater of operations, he makes appropriate redistribution of
personnel or requests replacmments when necessary. Because of the
time factor involved in the. redistribution of men or the arrival of
replacements fron~ the IJr~itecl States, troop n~ovementsmust be
planned fartlier in advance in small w a r s operations t l ~ n nin regular
~~arfnre.
f . I n small wars, the units of the force are generally so aidely distributed throughout the theater of operations that t h e commandev
may hitre difficolty i n keeping abreast of the situations existing in
the various elements. Operations orders should usually he phriised
in general terms and the details of execution delegilted to sulmrdinate commanders This necessary decentralization o f authority is
simplified by partition of the theater a n d the organization of the
command into areas, districts, and subdistricts.
g. By intimate contact with other stnff sections, F-3 keeps informed of a l l pertinent matters affecting the combat e5iciency of the

SWM 2-17
TliI? STAFF I S S3IBI.I.

X-AllS

force. He maintailis close. liaison with the speciz~lstaff officers collcmiing all niat,ters in which their duties, technical k~m\x-le(l#?,and
functions \ d l affect tlre operations. He coordinates the efforts of
subordinate units or the virrious :~re;iorgt~~iizdtions,
the supporting
arms (aviation in particular), and i~rinednative orgtulizations, to
the end t l ~ : ~t th. e greatest comhtt effectivelless is assured.
h.. In itddition to situation i~~irps,
orerlays, and otlier data yer~ilittingx ready gri~spof tlie tactical situation, the third section
keeps a suspense file of all iile~r~oranrla
o r orders e~nnnatingtlierefron~.anil a work sheet. and a section jotcrnnl.
2-17. The f o u r t h section (supply)-F-4-cc.
'I'lie assistallt chief
of staff F--4is cllarged with tile prt!paratio~l of pla~ls,policies, priorities, and tlecisions incurred in the st~pcrl-isio~r
i111rl coordination of
tlie tech~~ical,
supply, and :tdnliliistratire services, in nlatters of sapply, transportatioi~, e v ~ c n a t i o nhospiti~lizatii,~~:
~
and inaintenance.
F 4 iiinst so escrcise 11iss~iperrisionof these services that the troops
will 11ot be inc:~pacitaterlby tlre lack of soffirient clotliing, footl, itncl
ammunition. a n d so as to relieve, their co~nll-~a~cders
of t h e xorry a s
t o ~ ~ l r e t h tllese
er
irrticles \\.ill he forniilre~l. The specific. rll~tiesof t h e
fourtl~ section are outlined in "War L)ep;iitmrnt Field Jlariual
101-5."
b. F-4, in conjunction with the tlrirtl section, reco~n~nends
changes
in types slid amuttnts of individottl, organiziition, colllhat, supplen~ent:iry,t~ntlspecial equip~tient,a ~ i dthe itnits of fire of 11ormal and
special amm~u~ition
to be carried iaiti:~lly. I n cooperation with t h e
first section, F 4 estiniates tlie civilian labor needed and obtainable
in the tlieilter of operations, aiid the nllmnber and con~positionof
speci:!lists units to be attached to tlie force for tho service of supply,
hospitulization, comrnuniattion, iuitl tmnsportatioi~. He determines
the a~iiourltof supplies that can be obtained from local sources atid
p r e p ~ ~ r ae sschedule for sliilnnent of replacements. The amounts and
types of t r a ~ ~ s p ot o~ %
bo talien \vill depend upon the tactical aiid
:tdministrative requirements, tho general natnrc of the terrain in the
tlienter of operations, arid the avui1;rbility and suitability of native
transport. In marly situ:ctions, a large reduction in allo\virnces or a
coi~lpletechange in type from that specifietl in orgnrlization tables,
or both, niay h e required. See Chapter III?"Ix)gistics."
c. The fourth section nomlally coordinates. supervises, and directs
tlie supply eervicw u ~ i t h o t ~int any way operating their specialities.
Ordinarily these services deal directly nlith F4, who set,t.le routine
matters and refers those which involve new policies to t h e chief of
staff' for decision.
34

SWM 2-18
TIrE STAFF I X S>I.iLL \V,iR.;

d. Since o u r relntio~iswith t'll(! local goverlinient in t h e theater of
lnakrs the necessary arrangeopr,~.atiunsis usually friendly,
merits \\-it11 tho castorns officials relative t o the, cleafitixce of s\spp,lies
and n1ntcri:tl for the force.
2-18. The special staff.-a.
The special staff corrsists of all officers,
other than t h e esccntive staff (cl1ic.f of s h f f , F-1, I?-2, EEEZ, ancl F4),
specifically provided for t h e purpose of assisting the co~nnnorderin
exercising his comnland functions. This special group includes t,he
heads of the technical, slipply, and oclrninistrati.i~eservic,es, and certain teclrnical specialists. I n the Force, the exectitive staff and the
special stnff are separate and distinct, mliile in lover units t,hey
usoally nrerge into each other, orle officer frrq~rentlybeing charged
with the duties of one or more special staff officers as well as with
those of :L rnemher of the executive staff. Special staff officers normally assigned to a small mars force of a reinforced brigade or larger
organization ase listed in t h e succeeding paragraphs.
6. Although the special staff' sections iisrrally function under the
coordination of the exe~utivestnff sections (Set, Plate I, paragraph
2-12, :I), such staff officers are not precluded frnrn dealing directly
with the clrief of staff or the forcs cnnimander when necessary. Special staff officers are not 'tundw" any one officer of the executive staff
but functioll with any or a l l of them, and with each other.
2-19. The adjutant.-l'he
functions o f tlle adjutant correspond
with those prescribed for t h e adjutant general in "War Department
Field Manual 101-5." I n lower units, these functions a r e combined
with those of I?-1.
8. (1) The Force postal service is operated, under orders of the
adjutant, by the postal o5cer, or enlisted mail clerk when no postal
oilier is appointed. It is advisable, however, to place an officer in
charge of t h e post office, particnlarly when a large portion of the,
force is in the field, and cash for the purchase and payment of money
orders must be hardled by messenger.
(2) The postmaster at t h e point of concentration o r port of embarkation should be consulted for information on the postal forms
required.
(3) Prior t o sailing, and periodically thereafter as m a y be neeessary, an order should be published giving t h e correct mailing address
of the command, and recommending t h a t o5cers and men advise
their correspondent,^ to send money only by domestic, rather than by
international money orders.
(4) If the prompt and efficient dispatch and distribution of mail
cannot be effected by the authorized postal section complement, the

35

SWM 2-20

adjutant should not lr~sit:~tc
to request tile, temporary 01: pennanmt
assijpriiieut. of ttddit ion:tl l)erso~int!l. Offictxrs a11t1lurn o f the conrniand lnnst be ablc to sen(1 ant1 rcr:ci\.e mail \ ~ i t l if:~cilit.y; v;~luaLles
milst he secure ~rllilein transit rritliin the Force; alrd tire niail clerk
must. receive proml)tly the sigiie~ln:ct!il~to f the nddrcssee for registered and insured articles 011 tbe postal fon~ln 1)roritIed for tllnt
purpose.
c. Combat organizatiolls condocting operations in the field should
be relieTed of as innch routine :~dininistrative\~.orlias possible. (ionipany first sergeants and co1npa111clcrks uray be :rssernhled a t l~attalion
or area headquarters rrhere, under the sul>ervisiol~of 1311-1, they are
resl)tn~sihlefor the preparation of ti~ustt?rn~lls,p a y rolls: service
rea~rd-bookentries, m u t i i ~ ccorreslrondel~ce,etc.
2-20. The inspector.--(I. I u ~ilditiont o tllc fonctions prescribed
in''\Vl';lr Urprirt~rrelrtFieltl hlamlal 101-3." tlie ilrsl)ectclr irr wr~all11.ars
opw:~tionsis i~snnllyrequiretl to invest igrte clai~risfor rrcerned from the locality. T h e i n ~ e s t i ~ tshould
i o ~ ~determine mltetlter
the daninges are tile result of a wilful act., negligence, z~ccident,unintentional injury, or of orcliilary Tear ancl deterioration. Private or
public property occupied o r employed b y our forces should be inspected by t h e local commarlder or his representative a n d the native
inhabitants conce,ri~edarid a record made of all de,ficiencies or irregniarities. Suc,h an inspection is made upon taking possession of and
upon vacating the property.
(4) Prior t o \vithdrawal fro111the theater of operations, the force
commailder inay issue a proclamation iudicat,ing that a l l claims for
damages must be submitted to the designated authority before a given
date. This enables the investigation and adjustment of the claims
before the evacuation of t h e area. It has t h e disadvantage of encouraging a Aoocl of unreasonable claims.
(5) No claims should be allo\ved for damage to property or for
pe~;onal injury which is inciileltt to m i l i t a ~ yoperations or the maintenance of public safety, when no crimin:~I intent or carelessness is
in question.
(6) Eecorcls of all data affecting claims, i n c l t ~ ~ nreceipts
g
and
releases, should be retained with the files of the Force or ot.her~visa
disposed of as directed by higher authority.
2-21. The law officer.-In small wars operations, the lam officer is
the legal adviser to the force oommmder and his staff on questions
of local civil law, in addition to tlie functions prescribed for the
"Judge Advocate" in "War Department Field Manual 101-5."
2-22. The officer in charge of civil affairs.-See
"War Department Field Manual 101-5."

.

37

SWM 2-23
'HIE STAFF IS SAI,\I,L

!!7:\KS

2-23. The chaplain.-See "Wnr Deljnrt~nentField &Manun1101-5."
2-24. The paymaster.-a.
The l.)ily~nast,eris charged wit11 those
dnlies l>rescriberlfor "The Finance Officer" in the "Wnr Depnrtment
Field h h ~ i n n l101-5," \~-hichpertain to the payment of tire command, including mileage a n d tmveling espenses of connnissioned
officers. I n smaH wars ol)e.rations, he must be prepiuecl to advise
the force crnnm;u~derreg:irding the trend of foreign exchan@, especially 11-11etl1e.1. the conni~in~d
sl~nllbe paid in whole o r in part in
I.Jniled Str~lescurrency or 1oc:~lcurrency.
4. Tlre 1)ayrn:rster does not pny travel expenses of enlisted men,
except n.l~entrnrcl by air is involved, nor does 11c h : ~ n d lthe
~ expensee of t.raaisl~ortationof dependents, \vl~ich payments are mado
by tlrr rlisht~rsitlgquart,eumnster. I n tile abst:nee of a disbursing
quw'tnr~n;~stc.r,
the paymaster I I I R ~ lake dishnrse.n~e~~ts
of funds pertilining t~ the &ua~lermnster'sDepxrttnent., clrtlrging such disbursements to the q~~arterrrr~ster's
appro~riationinvolvecl.
"25. The provost marshal.-(I. I n nrldition to t,lie nonn:~lduties
precrik,d f o r the provost marslinl in "Was I>epnrtrnent Field
&Inllo:ll 101-5," in small wars oy~r-ations116 lrns many functions
re.li~tiveto the control of tho local civilian popnlation, soma of which
are listed below:
(1) Contl.ol of circulation of civilian population.
(2) Detention of rurd bringing to justice offenders agtinst the,
Executive Orders t ~ n dthe Proclamation of Intervention.
(3) Repression of clime.
(4) Er~force~nent
of the Executive Orders and execution of the
mandates of t h e militmy authority.
(5) Execution of sentences of military courts.
(6) Arrest and detention of suspects. Investigation of ports
bearing on civilian activities.
(7) Special irrvestigatio~~
of complr~intsmnde by civilians agz~inst
the ~nelnberso f tlra occupation, municipal police, etc.
(8) Obse~-ve civil offici~tlsin performance of their duties ri.~id
report any official viola ti or^ of this trust..
(9) Castody of certain prisons and t,heir inmates; enforce~nent
of prison reylations; and supervision of prison labor.
(10) Issue and cancel firearms permits in nccordanco with Force
Orders.
(11) Control tho storage and reiease of firenrms, ammunition, and
explosives imported into t h e country. T h e sale of ammunition to
persons possessing arms on permits in accordance with Force Orders.

SWM 2-26
T H E S'I'AF'L' I
S SZlhI,i, \.\it8

6. Native prisoners should neser be cnnfinetl wit.11 personnel of the
intervening force; separate ~)risonsshould be rcsed. F-2 is permitted
to have frec access to all ~r:~tive
liriso~iersf o r i~itel~ogatior~
and examination. The first. section is responsible for such action as miy be
necessary concerning prisoners in the 11ands of hostile forces, and
for i~rrlividuals~vhobecome embroiled wit11 (11e frie~rdlyciril population or are i~rrestedby the local authorities.
2-26. The commanding officer of special troops.-The
c~,nimanding officcr of sr~ecialtroops nonnally prsfornrs those, duties prescribed
for tllc "EIe:idquarters Cornlnandant" i n "War Depal-t~nent Field
R.lanoal 101-9." In many cases lic xill also be the provost ~xrarsl~al,
anil clrarged with the duties of that ofic:cr.
2--97. The artillery officer.-The artillery (,nicer lras t h e fouctions
sei ftrrtlr for the "Chief of Artillery" in "TVar I)epart~~r~nt,
Field
Manual 101--5," itnil, ill addition, norurally serves in the clu:~lc:rp:~city
of conrrnan(1er of the a r t i l l e ~ yunits lvitll the force. I f :I lirnding
trgainst oppositim is ant,icipatcd, tlre artillery officer is responsible
for the :rrtillery annexes :~ttaclledto the i~perationsorders.
2-28. The air officer.-See
"War I>epart~nentField Manual
101-5." I n h i s dual capacity of comm:indcr of the force aviation, he
is responsible for the execution of all duties nn(1 operations assigned
to such aviation by the force commander.
2-29. The communications officer.-ir.
General duties.-(1) The
communications officer performs those functions prescribed for the
LISignal Officer'' in "War Department Field Manual 101-5." I n
addition he :
(a) Coordinates communication activities with the U. S. Naval
Forces, native communication agencies, and communication establishments owned by commercial concerns.
( b ) Assumes responsibility for all naval coilcs and ciphers.
( c ) Supervises all encoding and decoding of dispatches.
(2) I f the headquarters of the force is so located t h a t its communication system becomes of primary importance in t h e chain of
Naval Communication and is the principal agency f o r handling
dispatches f o r the State Department, a separate communications
officer with rank corresponding to that of the chiefs of section of
the executive staff should b e assigned to the special staff. This
officer would not necessarily have to he a communications technician.
By virtue of his rank and position he would be able to advise the
force commander relative t o communication matters, a n d in general

SWM 2-30
THE STAFF IS

sar.\r.r, ~ \ ~ n n s

execute tho cornmm~icat~io~i
poliex, leaving the tecl~nicnl details of
t r ~ i r l i ~nnd
~ g o p c r n t i o ~to~ EL tt?clrnical assist:u~to r to the comniamler
of the foxre con~nninicntionunit.
b. Clavses of cum?1&16'1~ictrtio,r.-Tlrt:
cl:~ssesof co~nmunic~ltiollto
be handled a s r\-ire. or railio nressngcLs,;n~clthe c1:isses 10 be 11ancIled
by letter, sl~ouldhe deter~ninedprior to e~obnrkaiion. Authority to
Slandlr. class E (peosonal n~cssagrm)by r i ~ d i oshoald be obt:iined.
e. ildditimral co~r~n~t~rLicativr~
person~ldand ey~ri~~tn.e?~t.-Orgn~iizi~tion tables do not provide sufficient perso~melor mnterii~l,especially
radio equipment? to nieet the. nonnal reqnirenrents of s~nall!Tars
operations. T h e comnlunicatioli officer is responsible for augnlentillg
the trained 1x?13onnel anil obtnining tlre additional eip1i1111lentdcmanded by t h e sitnat,ion.
d. L'o7r~mu~Lication.
policy.-(1) Inespcctire of tlre size o f tile force,
tlrere arc. certain ilrcties rcl;~tireto policy v l l i c l ~f ~ lto
l the co~n~niunic;itiot~soliicer i n srriilll \~:trs. The Irkore cst.emlcd the force, the more
involrcd tlre policy \\.ill be. Part of tlre i1olicy \rill Le dictilied by the
XnmS Com~nonicntionSewice, ;is dcfi~~ed
i n Naval Co~i~n~unication
Instructions, while a pnrt will be i~~citlent
t o the type of i~iterrention.
( 2 ) T l ~ ecoinmnnications officer sl~oold;iscertain ~~41etl1er
tile com~nunicationfacilities of tlie. country concerned are privately or publicly on~nedttild operated, their extent, and t l ~ ceo n ~ ~ n u l t i c : ~agencies
ti~~l
e~nployed. H e slloold determine vbat, if any, commmiieat~ionagencies
are devoted exclusively to military z~ctivities,(~litainingt h e citll signs
and fret~nenciesof the rildio establislrment. Hc sl~ouldalso ascertain
what conmnrnicat.ion fticilitics are owned and operateil by foreign
companies. Upon arrival in the theater of operations, he sliot~ldverify
this inform a t'l on.
2-30. The engineer officer.-See "J3';;r Ilepnrt~nentF ield Mannr~l
101-5."
2-31. The surgeon.-(6. Sce "War 1)c.pnrtmenl Fielil Ua~rual
101-5."
h. 111 slnall wnrsoperations, ~vllenllie forco nlny be widely dispersed,
the force surgeon slloulcl consider:
(1) Tlie ne,cessity for addit ional medical personnel.
(2) Extra supplies of rnedicnl materials, quinine, a n d similar
medicarnents.
(3) Portable ilental outfits.
(4) The preparation of medical supplies f o r airplane drops.

SWM 2-32
TIIZ STAFF IS Sllr\LI, \YAKu

232. The quartermaster.-^^^ atldition to the fo~ictions prescribed in "War Department Field Matrn:~l 101-5," the force qnartermaster is charged with :
a. The operation of szrles stores.
6. The procrrrenient of local transportation, including riding, draft,
and pack ani~nals,either by hire or pnrchse.
c. Reconrmeriding changes in existing system of accountability,
when reqtzired.
d. Making estimates and requests for quartermaster ftuids, and
supervising t h e allotme~ltof fonds as approved by the force commmtder.
e. Custody and disbtrrsement of quarti>rmaster funds, anti funds
from other branches of tlie i~avnlservicel as i~uthorizecl.~
f. Payment for snp~liesa n d services purcliased; am1 for darnagcs
and claims! wlreri authorized."
I/. Payment for labor and tri~nsportatiorih i d 3
2--33. The chemical officer.-See
"War l>epartment Field Mallual
1016."
'244. The t a n k officer.-Tho commanding officer of the, tank unit
attached to t h e force is the technical arrcl tactical advisor t o the force
comrna~ideri n :111 matters pertaini~rgto the use of tsrlks o r urnlored
cars, and to clefcnso against nrecha~iizedforces.
2-35. The munitions officer.-The
munitions officer performs
those fnnctions spec?fied for the "Orc\nance Ollicer" and t h e "Munitions Officer" i n 'FVar Department Field Manual 101-5."
2-36. The post exchange officer.-The
post exchange officer is a
distinct member of the force special staff. H i s duties are:
a. To obt:rin initial funds for esti~blishmentof the exchange.
b. To procure exchange supplies by purchase or on consih~ment.
c. To plan f o r the distribution of post exchange sstoes to outlying
garrisons.
d. To conduct the exchange in accordance ~vitliregulations.
2-37. The amusement and welfare officer.-a. An officer may be
specifically designated as tlie amusement a n d welfare officer and assig~redto the force special staff, or these duties may be delegated to a
staffofficer in addition to his regular duties.
b. His duties are:
7 I1 an oWcer other the force quartermsater is dcslpnnted n.i diehursillg assistant quarterrniiriar, the duties sgceliled under e, f , noa y are performed by that omeer.

41

1

S W M 2-32

(1) To obtain noione~~~ent.
fnnils fro111 proceeds of the post. exfor elllisted men."
ch:i~lge,and f r o m tlle gorerlllllent fund "llecveatio~~
(2) To procure slid ncl~ni~~ister
lied Cn~ssu ~ xavy
~ d relief frutds.
(3) To esti~blislllibraries at, the bases and l~ospitals.
(4j To pnrchi~sennd distribute current. periodicals.
(5) To obtain and dist.rihute atl~leticequipment inld material f o r
other for~rrsof recreation.
o. I n the initial phases of a anall I\-ars olar:~t.ion,tlre cluties of
t h e a n ~ ~ i s e m eand
~ ~ twelfare ofiiccr oftcn mar be assigned to tlia
cl~aplail~.

SWM 2-38

S~cc.rrosIT1

COMPOSITION OF THE FORCE
Far.

Gcncrsl ....
.-.-. . .. .
238
I a t
2-30
Infantry \*-e:q,ous
2-40
a. Gelicrsl.
b. 1'. S. Itiflr, c:~l,.30. M 1903.
s. li. S. Itiilc, eal. .30. hi 1.
(1. 1+1\11, cal. .30,M 1'517.
e. 111211, a d . .30. .
M 1917 (mot!,).
j. TSWC, cel .45, M 1928.
g. V. R. ltiflc grenade, Mk I.
it, (30-IllIll. btart,nr.
i. IIund Grt:nade, fr:~g,BIk 11.
j. Ailto. Pistol, crti. .45, M 1 9 11.
k. Bayriwt, I\1 1905.
1. HMG, enl. .30, M 1917.
m. BBIG, ca1. .50, M 2.
n. 81-mlrl. Mortar, M 1.
a. 37-~nm.Gun, M 4 or BI 1916.
Infalltry indi\.idual ~(uip~nerrt,.
.....
................ .. 2--41
.. .... 2---42
Mounted troops. -........................ ....-.
Engineer8
....... 2-43
Tmrlks and mnnored oars ............. ..................... .. 2--44
1 ransp,rt. . ................ .......... .. .......... ........ -.2--45
Siqnsl troops ....-.... .
-....
..........-2-46
.
............ ..... ........
.. 2--47
Chcnlical troop%. .
Modieal troops.. -. ... ...... .- ........................ . 2-48
Art,illery
2-49
Aviation ..........~ ..
~
...
....
. .-......-.-..-2--50

..

P~PB

43
44
45

40

50
50
50
51
51
58
58
00
04

%-a$. General.-a. I t cult be assnlned t l l t ~ the
t Vleet &Iariite Force
in the Marine lethai: sr~iallivars
operations mill degencrete into guerrill:~xvtrrfare con(l~~cted
hy wnnll
hostile groups in \rootletl, moruit;~inoos tem~iu. I t l-ii~sgenerally
been fotuid that tlie rifle platoon of tlrree squ;~(lsis the 1-~;csieunit bcst
suited to cornbat such tactics. Each platoon sent on a n i~~dopendent.
combat missiol~slioultl 11nve tit least one and profcmbly t x ~ ucoir~nlist irumsioned oficers attxclic!d to it,. I t is desirnble, therefort!, t l ~ tlie
ber of junior officers r~ssigneclto rifle coinl)nnies be ii~measc.tl: L ~ O Vthc
~
nolmal ~ ( ~ i n p l e m e aictlrorized
nt
in tlle tables of orgtlrriiri~tion. Tllc.
number of cooks in a rifle eon~pimyslionlil also he ir~cronsetlto prol y r~iirybe divided into
vide one for each platoon a s the c o n ~ ~ a l ofton
44

SWM 2-40

three scpal.ate comi~:it11:1lrols or oi~tpostdrtnt'hnie~~ts.T h e nttilchinent of a ilos;iiti~Icor.l)s~ixuit o encli iietnellmeii( is esse~ltial.
d. Mon/~i?rcgti:~co,~~./)c~/~ie.s.-'l'lioil i f a l ~ t r ym:kcl~ine~ I I conq1:1lly
~ I
l
111
fulfills it;; ilornlill n~lcsd r ~ r h ~the
g initial operat.iol~sin s n ~ a l\rats.
the Inter phases of guerrill:~w:ir.i'nre a i d lit~cifi'ntio~i,i t \<"illseldom be
used as :i colnplete orgt~riiziitioir. Squstls :nitl sectioii~often \\-ill be
t~ttaclieirso peratinus, varying frrnr~lalidii~gsitgainst orgariiaecl oplx~sition
i n tile irlitiill stages to pairollilig thc rerrioto areas of t h e coulrtry
ag:lirlst. ~-~(]orly
arniecl gilerrillas in the later stages, map mnlI1903 rifle, tlie Browning automatic rifle? or the
Thornpson submacl~inegun. It r:an~~ot
be used to propel rifle, grenades of eitl~erthe V. B. or r d type. Whether or not it entirely
replaws the MI903 rifle, the characteristics of the MI rifle make it
definitely superior to the Broxvning a ~ ~ t o m a trifle
i c M1917, and the
'P'hompson submachine gun f o r small wars operations. A minimum
of two U. S. rifles, caliber .30, MI, should be 11ssigned to every rifle
squad engaged i n small wars operations and, in some situations, it
may be d e ~ i r a b l eto issue them to every member of the squad.
d . The B r m i e g autnm&.c kfle, caliber .%, MI,917.-With
the
advent of the N 1 rifle and the adoption o f the light macl~inegnn
as an accompanying weapon for rifle units, the Browning autoniatic
rifle, ca1ibe.r .30,311917, x-it11 its cumbersorr~elength, weight, and
ammunition supply, should n o longer be seriously wusidered a s a
suitable weapon for small-wars operat'Ions.
e. The &owning autmITS tliitt itt least o n e itl~rtrrr
n. 1.if1e g r ~ l i i l d ~
sllollld be asait:l!.de for 0,-exy rifle oI:I:oI~!~ o r tlii) IT.
slrould be provitled its :t snl~stiinte\\-vr~l!on.
i. TII./: /L.
ft,,/!/i~~letioll
of i l ~ einitii~lpl~:~i-(ds
of th(?intervciitio~~.
241. I n f a n t r y individuai equipment.-a. Infantry units in the
field in snrall \mrs i,peratioils sl~ouldbe ligl~tlyequipped, carrying
:inlg tlleir \veill>ousand essential individual eqril~rnent,.Rations, packs
or rolls, and c x t r ; ~;urn~~uirit.ii~~r
dloold be carried olr pack nnimids or
other snitable tri~nsport.. I f tla: sit:l:~tien requires tlie nien to carry
full l)ncl\-s, ~.ations,n11d extra amir~unilion,their mobility is greatly
reduced :lnd they arc seriotlsly h~~iiclical~ped
in combnt.
b. Enirei~clli~rg
to(11snre sel~lonirequireil iifter tlle orgt~nizedhostile
forces lrare hceir ilispcrscil. 111 sninlssitllafions, they lravc been entirely
dislx:n'ied \\-it11(1111~ing
tlre pc?i.io(lcrf pacilicatioi~~
~ratrolling,annd yuer~,illn\\.art'are i ~ l ~ i cfloi l l o ~ ~
t.llr?
s ilriiir~lope~~ntions.
e. T l ~ ci ~ i ~ i ~ n
ofn:tn~nn~i~ition
t,
caurieil in the br:lt, is nsui~llysi~fficient
for 11 single < : I I ~ ~ C I I I R I I ~ Even
..
\\-it11:L small combnt patrol, the. extra
:~~ir~noilition
sl~r~uid
be t~.ansl)orte~ntity
of annnunition is lost ~ r l ~ i is
c l ge~ir+r:llly
~
snlvaged by hostile troops or their
synll~:~tl~izl!rs.A w~lr~ll
Icatl~orbox, s~lspendedfro111the slioulder and
large e i ~ o ~ i tgol ~
c;~rryo~lvfr~l~li.(l
I~;~ncIolier,
has proved t~ satisfactory
s r ~ b s t i t ~for
~ i r tllc i.egol:ir Ir);~i~(lolicr.
(1. I f fitslcl ol>craiionsc o i l t i ~ r ~for
~ ea consiclevable longtli of time, it
nay Ile necessary to reinforce the cartridge belts, magazine carriers,
and other \ ~ c bequiptnent with leather. This has been clone in the
pnst tby local :trtisnns in the tlirxter of operations.
e. Grenrrdt? ci~rriersof 1er~t.hc.r
or heavy canvas similar in d e s i p to
tile Browning i~uton~atic
rifle bi~ndolier,have been improvised in recent
snlnll wars operations. Another sntisfactory cnrrier \\.as made by
cutting off one of the two rows of five pockets on the regular grenade
f1proil and attz~cl~ing
tlle nr,ccss:~rystraps. En~pty.30 caliber bandoliers are not satisfactory for grenade carriers.
j. Tlr8 agricultl~l.;~l
inac11ct.e is far superior to the issue bolo for
cutting trails, clt3aring fielcls of fire, building shelters in bivouac,
cutting forage and firewood, etc. in tropical countries. The mininnnn issue sl~ouldbe two per squad mgaged in active patrolling in
such terrnin.
g. The horsesl~ueroll m:ty replace the regulation infantry pack
during field operations in slnall mrrrs. It is lighter in weight and
easier to asser~lblethan the regular pack; it can be easily shifted

SWM 2-42
COhIPOSITIOS O F T i I R 1'OlIC;

from place to place or1 llie sl~oultlers,quiclily rliscalrlecl at. halts or
i n combnt, iind readily securetl to tlie riili~igo r pack saddle.
h. I\louritt?d men should not be penl~itted to carry rifles or other
shoolder weapons ill boots ]lor to secure t l ~ c i rarms or iimmunition
t o tla. s:idcllcs while p:issilig through hostile arcas in ~ ~ I i i ccontact
h
is immitre~it.
242. Mounted troops.-Infantry
oolnpauies, Irxstily converted
into inounted organiz:itions, hava l~lnj(!d:in iu~portantrole in nltluy
past opefiitions. Esl~eriencehas den~onstrtltedthat loc:il aliilnnls,
nccustomecl to t h e climatic contlitior~sa r ~ dforage. of tile cotlntry, are
more suitable f o r morrrits t h a n imported animals. Prepamtion for
mounted duty will consist ge~~ernlly
in training for this duty a11d the
provision of necessary eqnipme~it. For furt.l~rrdetriils? see Cliapter
VII, "Mounted Detachments.''
2-13, Engineers.-a. Exlwrience has demol~stratrdthat the construction, inrpro.i~c:t~ier~t,
and rnail~tc.l~aocec ~ froutes of conrmrmication, inclncling railmalls, is one of tilt. niost in~portantfactol.; in a
successful small-w:irs campaign. This is n faiicti(~no f the engineers.
6. The lack of accurate n ~ a p and
s tho lin~itecls1:pply of those available has handicapped all operatious in tlir past. A trained engineer
unit supplemented by the aerial photogruphio facilities of aviation
is indispensable illthough much of the basic g n ~ n n dwork mill be
performed by combnt organizations, the comljletion
of accurate maps must be left t o skilled eugineer
c. With the increased use of explosives in all tr
tions as well a s in military operations, den~oliti
readily available to, and are extensively employed
ii demolition unit is required for our own tactical a
needs, and for. counter-demolition work.
d. Engineers are trained a n d equipped as light i
should not be s o used, except in an emergency, but
tential reserve f o r combat, a n d for guard duty a t bases a n d depots.
a Tlie proportion of engineer troops with the force will depend
largely upon t,he means of communication available in the theater of
operations, and the condition and suitability of the road net for the
contemplated campaign. I n most small-mars situations, t h e necessary n~anuallabor invol~,edcan be obtained locally.
M 4 . Tanks and armored cam--a. The morale effect of tanks
and armored cars is probably greater in small wars operations than
it is in a major war. The nature of the terrain in the theater of

.

SWM 2-45
CO~lPOST'1~'IOS01.'T l l l i I'OPICE

operations \rill determine ~ ~ ~ l l e t hore r tiot they c;111 b e profitably
employecl.
I,. IVIien strong opposition to tlrc initial landings is expected or
encou~~tercd,
the employment of tanks n-ill b e a rriatrrial aid and will
reduce the number of casualties. Tanks a r e l~articolarlyvi~loahlein
assaulting towns ant1 villages, and in controlling tlic inhabita~ltsof
a n occupied llostile city.
c. hr~rioredcars cirri be employed to patrol the streets of occupied
cities, and to mniirtain liaison between out,lying garrisons. With
suitnble ~notorizcdinfantry escorts, they a r e nff'ective i n dispersing
the larger liostilc forces el~co~o~terecl
iin the early phases of the
occupat'ion.
d. Except f o r tho fact. t h a t tanlts and armored cars can be used
more freely i n small mars due to the lack of effective opposition, their
tactics will be basically the same as in a major war. As the hostilcr
forces vitl~draminto the Inore remote parts of t l ~ ecolu~try,\vl~ere
the tprrnin is generally unsuited for nreclrenizecl units? their usefulness in the fiold will rapidly dis:tppenr.
245. Transport.-See Chapter 111, "1,ogisticu."
2-16, Signal troops.-a.
Coieral.-Sigri:ll troops install, maintain! ancl operate ally or all of the following communication agencies:
(1) Messago center; (2) messenger service, including foot messengers,
mounted messengers, motorcycle messengers, arid messengers using
motor vehicles, boats, airplanes, ancl railroads as a means of tmnsportation; (3) radio service; (4) wire service, including telephone
and telegraph services operated both by rnilitary and civilinn personnel; (5) visual service, irrcluding all types of f l i p , lights, and
pyrotechnics; (6) air-ground liaison; (7) pigeon service. Detailed
instri~ctionsgoverning the dut,ies of signal troops mill be found in
'LIVar ~ e p t r t m e n Field
t
Manual 24-5."
6. Z?nportance.-The importance of i r ~ iefficient comm~~nication
system cannot be overestimated. I t is only tlrrough tho communication
system that contact is maintained with detached garrisons and w i t s
operating independently in the field. A l l office,rs and noncommissioned officers should be familiar with the capabilities and lin~itations
of the communication system in order that full use may he made of
it,. I n the smaller units, the commanding officer will act as his own
comrunications officer.
c. C m m c i a l and Governmcmt aervioes.-When commercial radio
and wire service is available, it may be convenient to execute contracts for handling certain o5cial dispatches, particularly in the early

51

SWM 2-46
COIIPORITIOS O F 'PHI:

P'olilx

singes of an o1)eration Liefcrre all tllr com~n~rrsicntin~i
facilities of t,l~e,
force ctnr Ire put into opert~iio~l.E I o ~ ~ ( ~ v~c~r ,: i l i t co~nmunicatioi:
ar~
facilities sl~ouldk
a snbstitutecl tl~erefilvas soon a s practicable. I f the
looal go\7e~~rme~rt.
iind 71-ire service, it is gcai1ol~eratesits 0 ~ ~ 1r:rdio
1
erslly possible to t ~ r r t n ~ gfor
e t r a ~ ~ s n ~ i sofs iufficial
o ~ ~ ilispatclies wiilrorrt cl~:~r@.111 sonle iriala~~c:es.
Ilro occlrpying force \\-ill find t h a t all
tllc estahlisl~~ne~rt
arid operation of
agteernellt o r pmtocol, covori~~g
co~nn~unici~tio~r
age,ncies by thc occnpying forct.., has txcn establislre!l
between our o ~ v ncountry and t l ~ ccolriitry involvecl. Such an agreement usur~llyc o ~ ~ t a i na sclause ststing tlrat limited unoffici:ial traffic
may he t r a ~ i s ~ ~ ~ i over
t t e c ltlre c n ~ ~ r m u n i w t system
i o ~ ~ of the occupyi~~g
force in case of interruption in t h e comnlercial system.
(I. N~~sse*~g~~.~.-TIie
crnplny~nentof rnilittiry rnesseisgers, eitlrer
m o ~ u ~ t cort l dismounted, )Jetn.c%ndetachecl pnrrisons in areas of active
olmratioi~sis 10 bc cor:sidered 2111 cincrgency rnrasurr only, dire t o the,
I~r~zar(lous
nature a n d tlre rlncertai~rtyof this ir~etl~od
of comrnunicat.ion. I11 such itreas, it may he advantageous sorrretilrres to transnrit
nltLssagesby civilian nressengers. Persons 1~11onlake reg~ilartrips
bet\veon tlie place of origin of the message and its destinstion s11ouM
Ix: en~ployod. Written messages eritrr~sted to civiliiia~~inessengers
should he i n code o r cipher.
e. C',y~jtog?.upI~y.-Codlesand ciphers are used by even the smnllest
units in tlre field. It is apparet~t,tlrerefore, t h a t all officers ninst be
tltorounlil familiitr with the syste~nsutilized. I n gener:rl, t h e irse
-. y
of code 1s sinllrler a n d Inore rapid th:n the use of cipher, due t o tlre
ease of ellcoding a n d decoding. Codes and key words and p'rlrases
for ciplier mnessages arc isstred to using nnits to cover definite periods
of time. Tile necessity for cliailging the111 is depenclont upon tl~e
rncmty's estim:~tedability in cryptill~nlysis.
f . W k comnnw/~icafkr~.-(1)I n :nS(!aswllere. tlie civilian population is Ilostile, telephorre and telegraph wires a r e liable to be c u t and
long stretcllos carried :~\v:iay. The enemy is likely to carry o n sucli
operations i~umedititelyprior to llostile activities in a .definite area.
Wire rnay be taker1 by a 1-eside11tcivilin11 sirnply because he ~iceclsit
to fence a field or clesires it for use in building a hut, and r ~ o because
t
11e i s l~ostileto our forces. All ~ v i r elines are subject to being <'tapped1'
by t h e enerny.
(2) If there is i~ co~~lrnercialwire
syst&m avi~ilable,each garrison
teleplione comm~~liicat.ion
system should be connected to the commercial system t l ~ r o n g ltheir
~
switchboards. Provided tlre commercial
systen~is connected with other towns in a large uetwork separated

SWM 2 4 6

units may t,l~usbe p r ~ ti111,o colrr:~rurricnt~io~r
\I-it11 0118 another. Ill
small-~v;~r
ll~eatcrs,t h e conrirrercial wire systenr will often l ) folrll,t
~
to be poixly coustructd with little tit,tent.ion paicl to il~sulntion.
&ills \\-ill cause ir~terr~tption
in service for hours or even days :rt :I
ti~ne,clue to shorted nnd grouniled l i ~ ~ e sOrdi~rarily,
.
the ad~nirristrn.
tion of the co~n~nc.rci:rltolepl~o~re
system is left t o t l ~ ecivilian alerrre~rtnorn~allyi ~ control
r
of the systems, tlro forces of occuliation eo.
ol)watiug to the fullcst extent in tlro repair arid lrrai~rtenancco f tile
systonrs. 111 those cases wlrerc' tlre tc1el~lro:resystenrs are owrred tint1
ol)erated the gort.rnnient of tlre conrrlry corrcerr~e~l~
the. s:urrr coopis esiended.
rr;ltioll in repair n11c1~naintena~rce
(3) C:nirinicrcinl telegrnl~l~
systt?rns n.ill jicnr!mlly be found to 110
ownad and operateit iiy tlre jiorerninent~, Althongll the goner111 condition of illc ecluip~rrelrtand facilities nray not rr~easurt?up tr, tlrc
st:niilards nf a rnorlsrn system, the telegrnpl~service usually will be
forrnd to he very p o d . Most of t h e operators a r e cap~bleIIICII and
:Ire cfuite willirrg to cooperitte wit11 tlre occ~rpyingforcts By judicious cooperation o n the part of the ~rrilitirry i n the sepair and
nizrintr~~ru~ee
of the telegraph system, the coi~fidanc~
and respect of
the personnel opefi\t.io ~ ~ ~ i ~ i ~ : ~ ~ i ! , i ~ t i o ~ l .
( 2 ) R:~diofitr~risliesilrc iiw,st d1~l)ciirl:1trlr:incans of eonirrrur:icatio~i
with t h e contiiientnl TJnitt~clSlates, with nnral radio st,ttio~rsoutside
llie co~itineni:~I
limits of tlie IJ~litetISt;rtes, ancl ~~if.11
ships : ~ sea.
t
Conimerci~rlc:~blcfacilities :111rl ct,inmercial radio st:ltiolis Islay ills0
Le :tvailnble for exteriol. cornmrl~rication,but :Ire eniployecl only in
exceptional cases. Extcriov c o ~ ~ ~ n i ~ r n i c nist iao func~tiorl
~r
of the force
headqtiarters.
(3) Amaricaii o ~ ~ n comnrcrcial
ed
radio stations in tlie tlienter of
ol~eratio~rs
in the past when the
have becr~ntilimil try t~.grce~nent
radio equipment wit11 the. force n7:1s liniitcd. Tliis is especially true
mlien the force: lras fusiiisllcd rnilit:ug l~rotecliunfor tire property
conccrncd.
(4) It. will ofter~hap1><:11
ill SIII:III n.:irs situ;itio~is,that the best
, Force,
lllrtl~odof radio cr~~it.rol
is to rstablislr a single net f o ~ tlie
with all ootlying statiply
designed for tfiu~sportiltionby one nr:rr~. It is issclcd to urlits as
required and is p:lrticolarly useful t o ~rlobileunits, such as patrolJ
and collvoy guarcls.
..........................
I>$ ,r,,tt.
o r
q 1 1 1 1 !
.....
28 :,, a-, s,,<.g2,,.ycIps,
Type of t ~ a 1 1 1 ~ ~ ~ l i i i i O l l - - - - - - - - - . . ......
1L:liiiu trir,pr.al>l*
: ~.;$dic,tr.lr~il~o~~(..
Range :

Rstlio telt.gral,l!.
10 I ~ , I I ~ ~ s .
IUdio tc~lq~lialre
......
5 ,,,iit!s.
(6) T h e dem:~ridfor trained prrs(,n:r~:l\\.ill ~ r o n r ~ i ~r.xu!e~l
llj
the
number r t ~ t r i l l y:rssig~led to co~n~riri~rie:rtio~~
mnits. 'l'l~e ~\,itle
separation of small lnrits in tho usual srrr:~llw:rrs will require the
addition of numen>us sets of radio c>ijoip~ncutto tllose listrtl it1
current equipnrer~tttrbles. T l ~ c11se of tlre oltrn-portt11,In nrdio (?rluipment will also require ndtlitiolr;~loperi~tors. Seo ~ ~ i ~ r a g r n 2--2'3.
plr
(7) T o take care of the ~viilclyst.li;u:~tedrnrlio crpipn~ent,each
platcmrr as :Ln
battaliorl clesigna.tes olio m:~n of t l r ~commt~~ric:~tion
itinerant, rol~nirnran. EIis duties ; ~ r oto mnke rept~irr:in the field
perso~n~el
of t.110 bat,to radio sets ope~rtedby tlro conr~n~ulic:llion
talion. I n areas of active. operations, he joins pat.rols whost> routes
will take tllem to the garrisons \vht.so tile qr~iprr~ent~
is Itxi~teci.
He mt1.y be tl-ansported to outlying skrtions by nix~)laneto ~rrako
emergency repairs, I n m:rny cases, 110 will fil~clit arlri%rblet4i ttlko
an extra set vitlr lrirn to replnce :I set needing 1n:ljor ropt~ils. N o
system f o r making major repairs ctur lot, (1t:finitely laid clotvn ldrtrt
I I : ~ ~ I I I Xof
> the
will apply to all situations. I h ~ et o the te~:lirric:~l
eqnipnlent, it is usually mow cooverlicmt lo havn rill m:~jor rc.[):rir
work accomplished by the cc~rr~munictltio~~
persorr~rol :ltta(:lred to t'he
headqu:lrters .of the Force, thus obviatirrg tlre duplic:ltion of test
equipment as well as the necessity f o r maints~ini~~g
large ~ t o ~ kofs
repair parts at widely e p a n ~ t e dstations.
h. pigeon c~mnication.-Pig~:orrs may be carrirxl by p:rtnlls in
areas. Although patrols t ~ r etrorn~r~lly
cquip~?edwith pol*4lblo
radio =ts, it may be d~qilltbleto maintrtin r:tdio silence escept, in
cases of extreme emergency. I n sue11 cnm3i pigcWrls IIff~Jl'll :1 (ktpendable means of keeping higher authority info~zntd(11 the Pmg55

SWM Z-46

co \ I I'OSWTO\-

(

i

'rii!:
~

I'OILCE:

ress and actions of the 1):rtrol. C'ri~tedpigeons niny be dropped to
patrols ill the field by :~il.cr:~ft.
slnzlll parachutes beir~gused to coshion
the fall. This ~rrctlioclof replenislunent is used whai patrols are
in tho fit:kl longer tlmn 3 days.
i. A i ~ ' - g ~ n limi.son.-(1)
~~~ui
Because of the nature of the terrain
usu:~lly encountered and the operation of nomenus ground units
employed in small-vars operations, air-ground liaison is especially
important. There lrlust be the closest cooperation betTeen aviation
and ground troops. The period of e:~dlcilut:~(:tis limitecl. Panel
crews must be well trained anit gronlid-aslit co~nrn:inde~-s
must confine their panel messages to items of irnport:ulce only.
(2) P:~ni?lswldcli indicatt. t l ~ ocodtr designation of tll6 orgnnizatiou
or patrr~l:Ire clisl)layerl in open s l ~ o t s111)011 tlre i ~ p ~ ~ r o iof
l c hfriendly
aircraft to idelrtify thr: grc-tn~irlniiit. Tlrty also irrdict~teto the airpla~leobserver wliore 11(. nrity i11,op lnea.;;:gcs, aiid ~rllerc1r:ulel messages aiyr displagecl for Irirn. I':ulel strips are use(L in ooslj~~nction
wit21 identificatiori p:il~ols for t l ~ ep~ul)crseof s~11dingprearranged
si,mials. Letter and ~rurr~bcr
1ii:ison colle z~re
groups of the :~ir-gron~ld
formed from tlie iiidi\~idual11ani.l strips, :lnd :ire laid out to llrc Ilgl:t
of tlie clesignation panel as iletermincd by thet direct,io~lof ~nai,c,lr.
Wlieu tlie sig1:ll;tlhas been understood by tho :~irplul~e
observer, it in
nckoomledgeil by a pyrnteclii~icsignal, wing dips, or otlrer prearranged nletl~ocl.
(8) Tlie message-droppilig gronlld sl~oulilbe an open space removed
from higli trees, bodies of water, and xeeds. I f possible, it should
be so lmxted that t.he panels ciiu be seen at wide. angles from the
vertic:rl.
(4) The nie,tliod of message pick-np erl~ployedin air-gromid liaison
is described in dekril in "War Dep:trtment Fielcl klannal 24-5."
Exlje~,irnceIirts indicated that it is p~efe,rableto mnke a complete
loop of the piclr-up cord, securi~lgthe, mess:ige bag at. the bottom of
the loop instead of tlie double loose-end cord described i n tlre abovementioned Field &Ianuz~I.
(5) I n small WLPS situati~ns,t.lre use of pyrotechnics for communicatior~betwwil ground uuits, other thau to ackriowledge lamp sigmals
or flag signals, may be considered exceptionnl. Pyrotechnics are
normally mt~ployedf o r air-gsouucl liaison only. Position lights and
signal projectors rLra pal~icolarlyuseful to mound units mllen heavy
-.
veget,ation makes the employment of panels ~mpracticable. Aviation
employs the Very pistol for sir-grouncl liaison when its use mill speed

SWM 2-47
COZIl'OS[TIOX

OF TTII: I'OIICI~.

up t h e trnnsmission of s!~ort.messages by :I ~~rcal~laiigcd
code. Tlris
method of c~~in~riunicatio~r
v i t h groniid units is also e~rrployeiln-hi.11
tlre establisli~lientof :I 111ess:rge.-droppii~gg rormtl is l~reventetlby
Irenvy vegetat,iou o r other reason, o r ~vliet~
tho c,lc)so n&~proncll
of the
airplr~neto the groutrd during EL irless:lge :e,lrop ~vonklexpose it to
hostile rifle fire f i i i n ~e~ic~iiy
gnJnps iir tlre vicinity.
247. Chemical troops.--a. I'1-ope~Ig employed, clicn~ic,alagents
sl~oulclbe of corrsicler:rble value i n sirr:rll \~-:lrsol)c~rations. T h e 111ost
ntFective veapons t o q11e,l1civil di.sorilers ill tire larger to~virs:we, tlre
clremiciil 11rr11daird rife grnnxcles :urn\ t,lre. irrit:ri~t cnirdles. Their
eff~~ct~iveness
has been prlrved so rnaiiy times in civil tlisorders in tlre
Urriteil States that they are 11ov itccc.,pt(~d\ve;rpons fur sucli situzltions.
Consiilerntion should tlrert>forc be given to si1r1il;~rc:nrployirinnt of
tllese ~nurritioi~s
ill 11. sirrnli wars tlieater of opt?txt,ioirs. Tt16 burningtype 11a1ldgre~i:&l:rnt?s.Anothor use! of this t,ype of
I!xnd greirade is t.l~eilevelo~~~r~cnt
of sirroke to ~ o i r ~ e atlre
l finnking
action of x 1:lrge groolr iir all attack over upen ground against a
strong3y Ir~lil and clefi~ritely 1oc:~ted hostile position. Advantage
sl~onldbe take,i~oP tlie prevniling wind direction and the greai~desso
fired that the target nrill be covered by the smoke cloud.
b. Ci~ernicalagents have. not been employed, b y the United States
in airy s~nallwrirs operations u p to the present time., as their use in
a fore,igrrcour~tryis clefinitely against the bcqt interests of our foreign
policy. If they are employerl, in soole future small war, the nrmament, equipment,, munitions, and tactics of the chemical troops will
not vary from the nornml cloctri~lo. The strerrgtll of the chemical
units t o be inclucler\ in the force will he decided by the force comtnande,r in accor(1ance. wit11 their plnspective employme.tlt as determined by tlre existing sitoation.
2118. Medical troops.-u. The type of operatiolr, the size o f the
force, the 11;tture of tlle count.ry i n mliich operations will take place,
the heultll conilitioris to be expected, and the estimated casualties
from combat will detern~inethe class or cl:~ssesof field hospitals and
the s t ~ w l g t hof tlie nredicat persomlel that will be attilchd to the
force. I n almost evciry snlall w a r s operation, t h e immber of comrnissioned medical a n d dental officers and enlisted corpsmen mill be
consiclerably i n excess of that recluired for a corresponding force.
in a major war, because of the numerous srnt~llclett~clr~nents
of combat
units scat,tered throughout the entire theater of operations. Speck1
care should be taker1 i n selecti~~g
t h e hospital corpsmen to accompany

SWM 2-48
CO.\TI'OSl'PIOS

01' :I'll?: FOIlCli,

tho force. 111 I I I : I I ~ c a s s , 211 elili?;tcd rorpslllall \\.ill be ~wloiredto
nfilke t h e c1i:ignosis a ~ l d:rdininister tlie medication nonlli~lly p1-rscribed b y a mrilic;ll oficcr.
6. Commaodillg officers of all grailes am req~onsiblefor snnittttiotl
and for tile errforcemel~t.of sanitary r~bg~l:~tions
\vitlrin tl~airorganiz;rtions a n d the buruidaries of tlie areas occopietl b y them. They
~ t i r ~ be
s t thoruoglily corlrersant with the principles of militt~ry11y~iene,,sa~iit:~tior!,anlcl firs?. aid. I'articl~larattelltiotl should be paid
to th(. follon-itlg:
(1) I l ~ s t r u c t i oili~ ~
jirrsonttl Irj~gicnoof the eommn~icl.
( 2 l c l l 1 1 1 ~v:~cliirigof 11:ulils after visiting the head
(hctril~i~)and 'nrforc? e a d ~rrit.;~l.
(3) T h e proper steriliz:~tiollof mess gear.
(4) Vacciliatiorl against. small-pox a n d typhoid femr.
(5) T h e prevention of venereal disease.
(6) T h e proper ventilation of quarters, and provision of uclecluate
space therein.
(7) T h e cnrrying out of alltimosquito measures.
(8) T h e destructiol~of flies, lice, a n d othrr insects.
(9) T h e purificat,io~~
of 11011-port:tble rrat.er supplies
(10) T l i e proper disposal of Imrrisn excreta and manure.
(11) T h e proper dislmsal of garbage.
c. The medical officer, under the direct,iorl of the commanding o f ficer, supervises the hygiene of the command and recommends such
mensures a s he may deern necessary to prevent or diminish disease.
H e should itlvestigute and make recommendations concerning the
following :
(1) Training in matte]% of personal hygiene and military
sanitation.
(2) T h e adequacy o f the ftrcilities for lnairltaining sanitary
conditions.
(3) Insofnr as they have a bearing upon the physical condition
of the troops:
( n ) T h e equipment of organizations and individuals.
(21) The character ancl condition of the buildings or other shelter
occupied b y the troops.
(c) T h e character a n d preparation o f food.
(d) T h e suit:ibility of clothing.
( e ) The presence of rodents, vermin, and disease-bearing insects
and the eradimtion thereof.

SWM 2-49

(I. The me,dical personnel ~rit11the force is one of the. strongest
ele~~rents
for gaining tlie confidence and friendship of t l ~ e11d. t'we
inlritbitants i n tho theater of operations. So long as it can be clone
~vithoutdepleting tlie. stock of medical supplies required for the
intervening troops, they sl~ouldnot hesitate to care f o r sick and
\vounrled civilia~rswho have 110 other source of 111edicnlattention.
0. I f the cilml~ai~m
plun conte~nplatest h e organiziltion of armed
native troops, ilclditional inedicnl personnel will have to b e provided
wit11 the force o r requested from tlie. United States, as is~qttimd.
f. Scc. Cliilpters 12 and 14>Landing Force Manual, United States
Nary, and Field hla~mi~ls
8 4 0 itnd 21-10, IJnited States iirrrry, for
detitiled instructious mgi~rilingrr~ilitaryhygiene, sanitation, and first
:titi.
249. Artillery.-n. The iunomtt of artillery to be included in the
strongtli of :L force :tssigne(L it s ~ r ~ i\wrs
~ l l ~riission rill deqeud npo11
the p11111 for t h e employrtrent of tile fome, the nat.ure of the terraill
in the theater of (~pwations,tlio :tnn>~rnentarid equipment of the
~)roq~ectire
ol>ponents, ant1 the. nature of the opposition expected.
As a geneml rule, some artillery sl~ouldacconipsriy every expedition for possible use against, to~'ns a i ~ dfortified positions, and for
the ciefense. of to~rns,bases, and other permanent establishments.
The nioritle effect of artillery fire Innst always be considered when
planning the orgariiz:ttiol~ and composition of the force. I f the
hostile forces employ modern tactics and artillery, and the terrain
i n the country pennits, tho propoit.ion of artillery to infantry should
be nornlsl.
6. The role of artillery in small \Tars is fundamentally the same
as in regular warf:tre. Its primitry mission is to suppo1-t t h e infantry.
Light artillery is employecl principitlly against personnel, accompallying we:rpons, tanks, a n d those material targets ~ h i c hits fire
is able to destroy. MeZedi~lm artillery rcirrforccs the fire of light
artillery, assists in couriterbattery, irncl undertakes missions beyn~ld
the range of light artillery. Unle,ss information is available that
the host,ile forces have heavy fortifications, or are armed with a
type of i~rti1lc1.y roqniring other tliun light artillery f o r counterbattery work, the necessity for medium artillery will seldom be
apparent. Antiaircraft artillery, while primarily for defense against
air attnck, nlay be used to supplement the fire of light artillery.
c. The artillery must be able to go where the infantry can go. It
must be of a type that cr1.n appmach t h e speed and mobility of
foot troops. The 76-n1ni. bwn arid the 75-mm. pack howitzer ful6ll

SWM 2-49
CORtPOhITIOS OF THE FORCE

these requimnents. Because tile. pack howitzer can be eml>loyect
as pack artillery \\-here a s~tisfnctoryvoad net is lncking in t,l~e
theater o f o p c ~ ~ t i o ~the
l s , pack 11o~vitze.rusi~allywill be preferable
to the y n in sniall wars sitnations, although the latter may be
effectively en~ployedin opeu country.
d. Pack :~ltillerj~
utilizes mules as its 1)rimary means of transport
and has ~rlasolmblyrapid, quiet., tind clependable mol~ilityover all
kinds of terrain; however, i t is inc21pnble of increaser1 gaits. It is
especially suitable for operations in n~om~tains
and ji~ugles. Mules
required for pack pur-pows nolmnlly will be sccured Itxally. Tlie
loads carried by these anirnnls require a nn~ileof n o t less t.llan 950
p o ~ n ~ dweight.
s
for sat,isfactor~tmnsporintion of t,lle eqoipment. I f
n~ulesof this size c:lnnot be obtained, a spare lnule III:I~ be used
for each load and tho load shifted from olre anirnal to the other
after each 3 houvs of rxu~rch. One hundred horses and inules a r e
vccluired for pilcli aud riding purposes with eacll b:~ttery. l'he
approximate road spncos for the battery, plrrtoon, and section, i n
single colrunlr, arc 21s follows:
1'nrd.s

B a t.
. 400
Platoon
150
Section ------.---....---_--------------.---52
Since there is no fifth section in t h e pack battery, the supply of
ammunition available within the battery is limited to about 40
rounds per piece.
e. The separate artilIery battalion is an administrative and tactical
unit. It is responsible for the supply of anlmunition to batteries
so long as tl~eyren~ainunder battalion control. I n e n a bnttery is
detached from the battalion, a section of t.he combat train arid
the necessary personnel f m n the service bnttery should be att
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