Hunting the phoenix: the Chinese Communist Party’s global search for technology and talent
Australian Strategic Policy Institute - International Cyber Policy Centre
Hunting the phoenix
The Chinese Communist Party's global search for technology and talent
Alex Joske
Policy Brief Report No. 35/2020
About the authors
Alex Joske is an Analyst working with the International Cyber Policy Centre.
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Jichang Lulu, Lin Li, Elsa Kania, John Garnaut, Danielle Cave, Fergus Hanson, Michael Shoebridge and Peter Jennings for their support and feedback on this report. Lin Li helped compile the database of talent-recruitment stations. Alexandra Pascoe provided substantial help in researching and writing the case summaries in Appendix 2. Audrey Fritz and Emily Weinstein contributed valuable research on talent-recruitment programs. I would also like to thank anonymous peer reviewers who provided useful feedback on drafts of the report. The US Department of State provided ASPI with US$145.6k in funding, which was used towards this report.
What is ASPI?
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ASPI International Cyber Policy Centre
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First published August 2020.
ISSN 2209-9689 (online) ISSN 2209-9670 (print)
Cover image: Illustration by Badiucao/https://www.badiucao.com.
The US Department of State provided funding which was
used towards this report
Hunting the phoenix
The Chinese Communist Party's global search for technology and talent
Alex Joske
Policy Brief Report No. 35/2020
Contents
What's the problem?
03
What's the solution?
03
Introduction04
The Overseas High-level Talent Recruitment Work Group
06
Features of overseas talent-recruitment stations
06
Why China's talent-recruitment programs raise concerns
08
Talent-recruitment stations
12
Politics and talent recruitment intersecting in Canada
14
Chinese students and scholars associations involved in running talent-recruitment stations
16
Case study: Zhejiang's recruitment work in the United Kingdom
17
Talent recruitment in Japan
19
Case study: The Changzhou UFWD's overseas network
20
Economic espionage
22
Case study: Cao Guangzhi
22
Case study: Yang Chunlai
23
Talent recruitment and the Chinese military
25
Recommendations27
For governments
27
For research institutions
28
Appendix 1: Selected Chinese government talent-recruitment programs
29
Appendix 2: Cases and alleged cases of espionage, fraud and misconduct
38
Notes48
Acronyms and abbreviations
59
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Policy Brief: Hunting the phoenix: the Chinese Communist Party's global search for technology and talent
What's the problem?
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) uses talent-recruitment programs to gain technology from abroad through illegal or non-transparent means. According to official statistics, China's talent-recruitment programs drew in almost 60,000 overseas professionals between 2008 and 2016. These efforts lack transparency; are widely associated with misconduct, intellectual property theft or espionage; contribute to the People's Liberation Army's modernisation; and facilitate human rights abuses. They form a core part of the CCP's efforts to build its own power by leveraging foreign technology and expertise. Over the long term, China's recruitment of overseas talent could shift the balance of power between it and countries such as the US. Talent recruitment isn't inherently problematic, but the scale, organisation and level of misconduct associated with CCP talent-recruitment programs sets them apart from efforts by other countries. These concerns underline the need for governments to do more to recognise and respond to CCP talent-recruitment activities.
The mechanisms of CCP talent recruitment are poorly understood. They're much broader than the Thousand Talents Plan--the best known among more than 200 CCP talent-recruitment programs. Domestically, they involve creating favourable conditions for overseas scientists, regardless of ethnicity, to work in China.1 Those efforts are sometimes described by official sources as `building nests to attract phoenixes'.2
This report focuses on overseas talent-recruitment operations--how the CCP goes abroad to hunt or lure phoenixes. It studies, for the first time, 600 `overseas talent-recruitment stations' that recruit and gather information on scientists. Overseas organisations, often linked to the CCP's united front system and overlapping with its political influence efforts, are paid to run most of the stations.3
What's the solution?
Responses to CCP talent-recruitment programs should increase awareness and the transparency of the programs.
Governments should coordinate with like-minded partners, study CCP talent-recruitment activity, increase transparency on external funding in universities and establish research integrity offices that monitor such activities. They should introduce greater funding to support the retention of talent and technology.
Security agencies should investigate illegal behaviour tied to foreign talent-recruitment activity.
Funding agencies should require grant recipients to fully disclose any participation in foreign talent-recruitment programs, investigate potential grant fraud and ensure compliance with funding agreements.
Research institutions should audit the extent of staff participation in foreign talent-recruitment programs. They should act on cases of misconduct, including undeclared external commitments, grant fraud and violations of intellectual property policies. They should examine and update policies as necessary. University staff should be briefed on foreign talent-recruitment programs and disclosure requirements.
03
Introduction
The party and the state respect the choices of those studying abroad. If you choose to return to China to work, we will open our arms to warmly welcome you. If you stay abroad, we will support you serving the country through various means.
--Xi Jinping, 2013 speech at the 100th anniversary of the founding of the Western Returned Scholars Association, which is run by the United Front Work Department.4
The CCP views technological development as fundamental to its ambitions. Its goal isn't to achieve parity with other countries, but dominance and primacy. In 2018, General Secretary Xi Jinping urged the country's scientists and engineers to `actively seize the commanding heights of technological competition and future development'.5 The Made in China 2025 industrial plan drew attention to the party's long-held aspiration for self-sufficiency and indigenous innovation in core industries, in contrast to the more open and collaborative approach to science practised by democratic nations.6
The CCP treats talent recruitment as a form of technology transfer.7 Its efforts to influence and attract professionals are active globally and cover all developed nations. The Chinese Government claims that its talent-recruitment programs recruited as many as 60,000 overseas scientists and entrepreneurs between 2008 and 2016.8 The Chinese Government runs more than 200 talent-recruitment programs, of which the Thousand Talents Plan is only one (see Appendix 1).
The US is the main country targeted by these efforts and has been described by Chinese state media as `the largest "treasure trove" of technological talent'.9 In addition to the US, it's likely that more than a thousand individuals have been recruited from each of the UK, Germany, Singapore, Canada, Japan, France and Australia since 2008.10
Future ASPI International Cyber Policy Centre research will detail Chinese Government talentrecruitment efforts in Australia. Past reports have identified a handful of Australian participants in China's talent-recruitment programs, including senior and well-funded scientists, and around a dozen CCP-linked organisations promoting talent-recruitment work and technology transfer to China.11 However, the scale of those activities is far greater than has been appreciated in Australia.
China's prodigious recruitment of overseas scientists will be key to its ambition to dominate future technologies and modernise its military. Participants in talent-recruitment programs also appear to be disproportionately represented among overseas scientists collaborating with the Chinese military. Many recruits work on dual-use technologies at Chinese institutions that are closely linked to the People's Liberation Army.
These activities often exploit the high-trust and open scientific communities of developed countries. In 2015, Xi Jinping told a gathering of overseas Chinese scholars that the party would `support you serving the country through various means'.12 As detailed in Bill Hannas, James Mulvenon and Anna Puglisi's 2013 book Chinese industrial espionage, those `various means' have often included theft, espionage, fraud and dishonesty.13 The CCP hasn't attempted to limit those behaviours. In fact, cases of misconduct associated with talent programs have ballooned in recent years. The secrecy of the programs has only been increasing.
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Policy Brief: Hunting the phoenix: the Chinese Communist Party's global search for technology and talent
The CCPs' talent-recruitment efforts cover a spectrum of activity, from legal and overt activity to illegal and covert work (Figure 1). Like other countries, China often recruits scientists through fair means and standard recruitment practices. It gains technology and expertise from abroad through accepted channels such as research collaboration, joint laboratories and overseas training. However, overt forms of exchange may disguise misconduct and illegal activity. Collaboration and joint laboratories can be used to hide undeclared conflicts of commitment, and recruitment programs can encourage misconduct. Participants in talent-recruitment programs may also be obliged to influence engagement between their home institution and China. The Chinese Government appears to have rewarded some scientists caught stealing technology through talent-recruitment programs. In some cases, Chinese intelligence officers may have been involved in talent recruitment. Illustrating the covert side of talent recruitment, this report discusses cases of espionage or misconduct associated with talent recruitment and how the Chinese military benefits from it (Appendix 2).
Figure 1: The spectrum of the CCP's technology transfer efforts
Talent-recruitment work has been emphasised by China's central government since the 1980s and has greatly expanded during the past two decades.14 In 2003, the CCP established central bodies to oversee talent development, including the Central Coordinating Group on Talent Work ( ), which is administered by the Central Committee's Organisation Department and includes representation from roughly two dozen agencies.15 In 2008, the party established the national Overseas High-level Talent Recruitment Work Group () to oversee the Thousand Talents Plan (see box).16 Local governments around China also regularly hold recruitment events at which overseas scientists are signed up to talent-recruitment schemes and funding initiatives.17 This demonstrates how talent-recruitment efforts are a high priority for the CCP, transcending any particular bureaucracy and carried out from the centre down to county governments.
05
The Overseas High-level Talent Recruitment Work Group
The Overseas High-level Talent Recruitment Work Group was established in 2008 to oversee the implementation of the Thousand Talents Plan. It's administered by the Central Committee's Organisation Department, which plays a coordinating role in talent recruitment work carried out by government and party agencies. Its members include the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security, the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Science and Technology, the People's Bank of China, the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission, the Chinese Academy of Sciences, the United Front Work Department (UFWD) of the Central Committee of the CCP, the National Development and Reform Commission, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, the Ministry of Public Security, the Ministry of Finance, the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office (now part of the UFWD), the Chinese Academy of Engineering, the National Natural Science Foundation, the State Administration of Foreign Experts Affairs (now part of the Ministry of Science and Technology), the Communist Youth League of China and the China Association for Science and Technology.18
To illustrate the international reach of CCP talent recruitment, the ASPI International Cyber Policy Centre (ICPC) has created an original database of 600 overseas talent-recruitment stations. The operation of the stations is contracted out to organisations or individuals who are paid to recruit overseas scientists. They might not have a clear physical presence or might be co-located with the organisations contracted to run them (see box). This is a growing part of the CCP's talent-recruitment infrastructure--providing on-the-ground support to the CCP's efforts to identify and recruit experts from abroad--but it has never been analysed in detail before.
Features of overseas talent-recruitment stations
· Overseas organisations or individuals contracted by the CCP to carry out talent-recruitment work
· Often run by overseas united front groups
· Tasked to collect information on and recruit overseas scientists
· Promote scientific collaboration and exchanges with China
· Organise trips by overseas scientists to China
· Present across the developed world
· May receive instructions to target individuals with access to particular technologies
· Paid up to A$30,000 annually, plus bonus payments for each successful recruitment
The database was compiled using open-source online information from Chinese-language websites. Those sources included Chinese Government websites or media pages announcing the establishment of overseas recruitment stations and websites affiliated with overseas organisations running recruitment stations. We carried out keyword searches using various Chinese terms for talent-recruitment stations to identify their presence across the globe. An interactive version of the map of stations is in the online version of this report (Figure 2).
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Policy Brief: Hunting the phoenix: the Chinese Communist Party's global search for technology and talent
Figure 2: Overseas recruitment stations and their links back to China
Using examples and case studies of stations from around the world, this report also reveals the role of the united front system in talent-recruitment work. The united front system is a network of CCP-backed agencies and organisations working to expand the party's United Front--a coalition of groups and individuals working towards the party's goals. Many of those agencies and organisations run overseas recruitment stations. As detailed in the ASPI report The party speaks for you: foreign interference and the Chinese Communist Party, the system is widely known for its involvement in political influence work, but its contributions to technology transfer have attracted little attention.
07
Why China's talent-recruitment programs raise concerns
China's talent-recruitment programs are unlike efforts by Western governments to attract scientific talent. As two scholars involved in advising the CCP on talent recruitment wrote in 2013, `The Chinese government has been the most assertive government in the world in introducing policies targeted at triggering a reverse brain drain.'19 The flow of talent from China is still largely in the direction of the US.20 However, research from the Center for Security and Emerging Technology found that the proportion of Chinese STEM PhD graduates of US universities intending to stay in the US has declined over the past two decades.21 In May 2020, the US Government announced new restrictions on visas for scientists linked to the Chinese military.22
The widespread misconduct associated with CCP talent-recruitment programs sets them apart from efforts by other nations. For example, an investigation by the Texas A&M University system found more than 100 staff linked to China's talent programs, but only five disclosed it despite employees being required to do so.23 That level of misconduct hasn't been reported in other countries' talent-recruitment efforts. The absence of any serious attempt by the Chinese Government or its universities to discourage theft as part of its recruitment programs amounts to a tacit endorsement of the programs' use to facilitate espionage, misconduct and non-transparent technology transfers.
The extent of misconduct by selectees suggests that this is enabled or encouraged by agencies overseeing the programs. Agencies at the centre of China's talent recruitment efforts have themselves been directly involved in illegal activity. For example, an official from China's State Administration of Foreign Experts Affairs was involved in stealing US missile technology through the recruitment of a US scientist (see Noshir Gowadia case in Appendix 2).24
Talent recruitment programs have been used to incentivise and reward economic espionage. For example, in 2013, Zhao Huajun (), was imprisoned in the US after stealing vials of a cancer research compound, which he allegedly used to apply for sponsorship there.25 A month after Zhao was released from prison, he was recruited by the Zhejiang Chinese Medicine University through the Qianjiang Scholars () program.26 In another case, a Coca-Cola scientist allegedly conspired with a Chinese company to secure talent-recruitment program funding on the basis of stolen trade secrets.27
Talent-recruitment programs are also tied to research commercialisation. Applicants to the Thousand Talents Plan have the option to join as `entrepreneurs' rather than as scientists, supporting companies they have established in China.28 The Thousand Talents Plan is supported by the Thousand Talents Plan Venture Capital Center (), which runs competitions to pair participants with start-up funding.29
Commercial activity by talent-recruitment program participants isn't always disclosed, which often breaches university policies on intellectual property and commercialisation. One recruit from an Australian university set up a laboratory and an artificial intelligence (AI) company in China that later received funding linked to the Thousand Talents Plan Venture Capital Center, but reportedly didn't
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Policy Brief: Hunting the phoenix: the Chinese Communist Party's global search for technology and talent
disclose that to his Australian university, against existing university policies. The company later supplied surveillance technology to authorities in Xinjiang.30 US investigations of participants in talent-recruitment programs have led to an increase in the programs' secrecy, rather than reforms to make them more transparent and accountable. In September 2018, the Chinese Government began removing references to the Thousand Talents Plan from the internet and ordering organisations to use more covert methods of recruitment.31 A leaked directive told those carrying out recruitment work for the plan to not use email when inviting potential recruits to China for interviews, and instead make contact by phone or fax under the guise of inviting them to a conference (Figure 3). `Written notices should not contain the words "Thousand Talents Plan"', the document states. In 2018, the official website of the Thousand Talents Plan removed all news articles about the program, before going offline in 2020.32
Figure 3: A leaked notice from September 2018 ordering organisations to use more covert methods of recruiting Thousand Talents Plan participants
Highlighted text: `In order to further improve work guaranteeing the safety of overseas talent, work units should not use emails, and instead use phone or fax, when carrying out the interview process. [Candidates] should be notified under the name of inviting them to return to China to participate in an academic conference or forum. Written notices should not include the words "Thousand Talents Plan".'
Source: ` ' [Targeted by the US, it's rumoured that China will no longer mention the 1,000 Talent Plan], CNA.com, 5 October 2018, online.
09
CCP technology-transfer efforts are often flexible and encourage individuals to find ways to serve from overseas. Participants in the Thousand Talents Plan, for example, have the option to enter a `short-term' version of the program that requires them to spend only two months in China each year.33 Some selectees establish joint laboratories between their home institutions and their Chinese employers, which could be a way to disguise conflicts of commitment where they have agreed to spend time working for both institutions.34 `This enables them to maintain multiple appointments at once, which may not be fully disclosed. This may mean that they're effectively using time, resources and facilities paid for by their home institutions to benefit Chinese institutions.
Without residing in China, scientists can support collaboration with Chinese institutions, receive visiting Chinese scholars and students and align their research with China's priorities. Steven X Ding (), a professor at the University of Duisburg in Germany who has also been affiliated with Tianjin University, was quoted describing this mentality when he worked as vice president of the University of Applied Science Lausitz:35
I manage scientific research at the university, which has more than 100 projects supervised by me--this is a `group advantage'. I can serve as a bridge between China and Germany for technological exchange ... and I can make greater contributions than if I returned to China on my own. Foreign countries aren't just advanced in their technologies, but also their management is more outstanding. Being in Germany I can introduce advanced technologies to China, assist communication, exchange and cooperation, and play a role as a window and a bridge [between China and Germany].36
The CCP's talent-recruitment activities are also notable for their strategic implications. The deepening of `militarycivil fusion' (a CCP policy of leveraging the civilian sector to maximise military power) means that China's research institutes and universities are increasingly involved in classified defence research, including the development of nuclear weapons.37 Chinese companies and universities are also working directly with public security agencies to support the oppression and surveillance of minorities through their development and production of surveillance technologies.38 One Australian participant in the Thousand Talents Plan spoke of his duty to contribute to China's national defence development.39 Participants in talent-recruitment programs also appear to be disproportionately represented among overseas scientists collaborating with the Chinese military.40 Recruitment work by the People's Liberation Army and state-owned defence conglomerates is described later in this report.
These structures behind talent-recruitment activity and their links to national initiatives show how it's backed by the party's leaders and high-level agencies and has clear objectives. This contradicts the theory that China employs a `thousand grains of sand' approach to intelligence gathering or economic espionage, relying on uncoordinated waves of amateur ethnic-Chinese collectors to hoover up technology.41 Indeed, what may be one of the most egregious charges of misconduct related to a talent-recruitment program involves Harvard Professor Charles Lieber, a nanotechnologist with no Chinese heritage, who was arrested in 2020 for allegedly failing to disclose a US$50,000 monthly salary he received from a Chinese university as part of the Thousand Talents Plan.42 As shown by the case of Zheng Xiaoqing, who allegedly stole jet turbine technology from GE Aviation while joining the Thousand Talents Plan as part of a Jiangsu State Security Department operation, talent recruitment can at times involve professional intelligence officers (see Appendix 2).
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Policy Brief: Hunting the phoenix: the Chinese Communist Party's global search for technology and talent
In 2012, Peter Mattis, an expert on CCP intelligence activity, wrote that `The "grains of sand" concept focuses analytic attention on the [counter-intelligence] risk individuals pose rather than on government intelligence services.'43 In the case of talent-recruitment programs, interpreting them through the lens of a `grains of sand' model would place greater emphasis on individuals involved in the programs while neglecting the mechanisms of talent recruitment activity used by the CCP. Talent-recruitment efforts are carried out with heavy involvement from the united front system and dedicated agencies such as the Ministry of Science and Technology's State Administration of Foreign Experts Affairs.44 It isn't an ethnic program with individual actors at its core--it's a CCP program leveraging incentives as well as organised recruitment activity--yet it's often framed by the party as serving the country's ethno-nationalist rejuvenation.45 Recognising these features of CCP technology-transfer activity--such as its central and strategic guidance, implementation across various levels of the Chinese Government, high-rate of misconduct and reliance on overseas recruitment mechanisms--should be fundamental to any responses to the activity.46 Poorly executed, and sometimes misguided, attempts at investigating and prosecuting suspected cases of industrial espionage have helped build an image of both the problem and enforcement actions as being driven by racial factors rather than state direction.47
11
Talent-recruitment stations
Chinese Government and Party agencies from the national to the district level have established hundreds of `overseas talent recruitment workstations' in countries with high-quality talent, cutting-edge industries and advanced technology.48 The stations are established in alignment with central guidance on talent-recruitment work and also adapt to the needs of the various Chinese Government organs establishing them. They're run by overseas organisations, such as community associations, and are a key part of the CCP's little-understood talent-recruitment infrastructure. The stations work on behalf of the Chinese Government to spot and pursue talent abroad. Their importance is reflected in the fact that research for this report has uncovered 600 stations spread across technologically advanced countries (Figure 4).49 The increasingly covert nature of talentrecruitment efforts means on-the-ground measures such as talent-recruitment stations should become more important.
The highest number of stations (146) was found in the United States. However, Germany, Australia, the United Kingdom, Canada, Japan, France and Singapore also each had many stations. This underscores the global reach of China's talent-recruitment efforts and the high level of recruitment activity in those countries.
Figure 4: The top 10 countries hosting identified talent-recruitment stations
The stations often don't have dedicated offices or staff. Instead, they're contracted to local professional, community, student and business organisations, such as the Federation of Chinese Professionals in Europe.50 Such organisations already have established links inside Chinese communities and receive payments in return for spotting and recruiting talent, promoting research collaboration and hosting official delegations from China. The organisations are often linked to the
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Policy Brief: Hunting the phoenix: the Chinese Communist Party's global search for technology and talent
CCP's united front system and may be involved in mobilising their members to serve the party's goals--whether cultural, political or technological. In at least two cases, talent-recruitment stations have been linked to alleged economic espionage. Talent-recruitment stations have been established since at least 2006, and the number has grown substantially since 2015.51 The recent expansion may be related to policies associated with the 13th Five-Year Plan (20162020) that advocated strengthening talent-recruitment work `centred on important national needs'.52 Of the 600 stations identified in this report, more than 115 were established in 2018 alone (Figure 5).53
Figure 5: Talent recruitment stations established each year, 2008 to 2018
Note: Only stations with verified establishment dates are included.
13
Politics and talent recruitment intersecting in Canada
In July 2016, the Fujian Provincial Overseas Chinese Affairs Office, part of the united front system, sent representatives, including its director (pictured first from left in Figure 6), around the world to establish talent-recruitment stations.54 Four were established in Canada. John McCallum, a Canadian politician who resigned as ambassador to China in 2019 after urging the government to release Huawei CFO Meng Wanzhou, was pictured (second from right) at the opening of a station run by the Min Business Association of Canada ().55 The association's chairman, Wei Chengyi (, first from right), is a member of several organisations run by the UFWD in China and has been accused of running a lobbying group for the Chinese Consulate in Toronto.56
Figure 6: The opening ceremony
Source: `Fujian Overseas Chinese Affairs Office's first batch of four overseas talent recruitment sites landed in Canada', fjsen.com, 21 July 2016, online.
We obtained several talent-recruitment station contracts, contract templates and regulations that shine a light on the stations' operations (Figure 7). They reveal that organisations hosting stations are paid an operating fee, receive bonuses for every individual they recruit and are often required to recruit a minimum number of people each year. Those organisations are also collecting data on foreign scientists and research projects. They organise talent-recruitment events, host and arrange visiting Chinese Government delegations and prepare trips to China for prospective recruits.57
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Policy Brief: Hunting the phoenix: the Chinese Communist Party's global search for technology and talent
Figure 7: A talent recruitment contract signed between the Human Resources and Social Security Bureau of Qingrong District in Chengdu and a Sino-German talent-exchange association
Source: `About this overseas talent workstation', German-Chinese Senior Talent Exchange and Economic and Trade Cooperation Promotion Association, 12 July 2017, online.
Organisations running recruitment stations can receive as much as ¥200,000 (A$40,000) for each individual they recruit. In addition, they're paid as much as ¥150,000 (A$30,000) a year for general operating costs.58 CCP talent-recruitment agencies gather large amounts of data on overseas scientists, and overseas talent-recruitment stations may be involved in this information-gathering work. Domestically, the Thousand Talents Think Tank (), which is affiliated with the UFWD, claims to hold data on 12 million overseas scientists, including 2.2 million ethnic Chinese scientists and engineers.59 In 2017, a Chinese think tank produced a database of 6.5 million scientists around the world, including 440,000 AI scientists, as a `treasure map' for China's development of AI technology and a resource for talent recruitment.60 Abroad, recruitment stations set up by Tianjin City are instructed to `grasp information on over 100 high-level talents and an equivalent amount of innovation projects'.61 Qingdao City's overseas stations are required to collect and annually update data on at least 50 individuals at the level of `associate professor, researcher or company manager' or higher.62 The Zhuhai City Association for Science and Technology tasks its overseas stations with `collecting information on overseas science and technology talents, technologies and projects through various channels'.63 Information about overseas technologies and scientists is used for targeted recruitment work that reflects the technological needs of Chinese institutions. For example, Shandong University's overseas recruitment stations recommend experts `on the basis of the university's needs for development, gradually building a talent database and recommending high-level talents or teams to the university
15
in targeted way'.64 The Guangzhou Development Zone `fully takes advantage of talent databases held by their overseas talent workstations ... attracting talents to the zone for innovation and entrepreneurship through exchange events and talks'.65
However, the 600 stations identified in this report are probably only a portion of the total number of stations established by the CCP. The real number may be several hundred greater. For example, we identified 90 stations established by the Jiangsu Provincial Government or local governments in the province, yet in 2017 the province's Overseas Chinese Affairs Office--only one of many agencies in the province establishing overseas recruitment stations--stated that it had already established 121 stations.66
One hundred and seventy-one identified stations were established by united front agencies such as overseas Chinese affairs offices. For many other stations, it's unclear which part of the bureaucracy established them, so the real number of stations established by the united front system is probably much greater. Similarly, the Qingdao UFWD describes how the city's Organisation Department produced regulations on overseas talent-recruitment stations and the UFWD advised on their implementation and encouraged united front system agencies to carry them out.67 Universities, party organisation departments, state human resources and social affairs bureaus, state-backed scientific associations and foreign experts affairs bureaus also establish overseas-recruitment stations. None of them is an intelligence agency, but the networks and collection requirements of stations mean they could benefit China's intelligence agencies.
Overseas talent-recruitment stations are typically run by local organisations, which are contracted to operate them for a period of several years. The local groups include hometown associations, business associations, professional organisations, alumni associations, technology-transfer and education companies and Chinese students and scholars associations (CSSAs) (see box). Local host organisations have often been established with support from, or built close relationships with, agencies such as China's State Administration for Foreign Experts Affairs and the UFWD.68 Overseas operations of Chinese companies reportedly also host talent-recruitment stations.69 In one case, a station was reportedly established in the University College Dublin Confucius Institute.70
Chinese students and scholars associations involved in running talentrecruitment stations
US
Greater New York Fujian Students and Scholars Association, University of
Washington CSSA, North American Chinese Student Association, UC Davis CSSA
Australia
Victoria CSSA, Western Australia CSSA, New South Wales CSSA
UK
United Kingdom CSSA
Switzerland
Geneva CSSA
Italy
Chinese Students and Scholars Union in Italy
Czech Republic Czech CSSA
Ireland
CSSA Ireland
Hungary
All-Hungary CSSA
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Policy Brief: Hunting the phoenix: the Chinese Communist Party's global search for technology and talent
Provincial, municipal and district governments are responsible for most talent recruitment, yet their activities are rarely discussed. Qingdao city alone claims that it recruited 1,500 people through its recruitment stations between 2009 and 2014.71 Out of 600 recruitment stations identified in this research, only 20 were established by national organisations, such as the UFWD's Western Returned Scholars Association (WRSA) and Overseas Chinese Affairs Office.
Similarly, over 80% of talent-recruitment programs are run at the subnational level and may attract as many as seven times as many scientists as the national programs. Between 2008 and 2016, China's Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security determined that roughly 53,900 scholars had been recruited from abroad by local governments. More than 7,000 scholars were recruited through the Thousand Talents Plan and Hundred Talents Plan (another national talent-recruitment program) over the same period.72
Case study: Zhejiang's recruitment work in the United Kingdom
A 2018 CCP report on Zhejiang Province's overseas talent-recruitment work mentioned that it had established 31 overseas recruitment stations. According to the report, Brunel University Professor Zhao Hua () from the UK is one of the scientists recruited through their efforts.73 Zhao is an expert in internal combustion engines who was recruited to Zhejiang Painier Technology ( ), which produces `military and civilian-use high-powered outboard engines'.74 The partnership between Zhao and Zhejiang Painier Technology was formed with the help of a talent-recruitment station and reportedly attracted 300 million (A$60 million) in investment.75 The Zhejiang UK Association () runs as many as four talent-recruitment stations and has recruited more than 100 experts for Zhejiang Province or cities in the province.76 They include a station for Jinhua, the city where Zhejiang Painier Technology is based, so it could have been the organisation that recruited Professor Zhao.77 The Zhejiang UK Association's founding president is Lady Bates (or Li Xuelin, ), the wife of Lord Bates, Minister of State for International Development from 2016 until January 2019.78 Accompanied by her husband, Lady Bates represented the association at the establishment of a recruitment station for Zhejiang Province's Jinhua city in 2013 (Figure 8).79 She was a non-voting delegate to the peak meeting place of the CCP-led United Front--the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC)--and is a member of the UFWD-run China Overseas Friendship Association.80 Continued on next page
17
Figure 8: Lord (first row, second from right) and Lady Bates (first row, centre)
Source: `----' [British Zhejiang Friendship Association joins hands with Zhejiang again--Signed an agreement with Jinhua Municipal Government for the establishment of Jinhua UK Workstation], ZJUKA, no date, online.
Counsellor Li Hui (), a senior united front official from the Chinese Embassy in London, praised the association at the station's founding.81 In particular, he noted Lady Bates's use of her personal connections to arrange for the signing ceremony to be held in the Palace of Westminster.82
Talent-recruitment stations help arrange visits by Chinese delegations. For example, the Australian alumni association of Northwestern Polytechnical University (NWPU) became a recruitment station for the university and Xi'an City, where the university is located, in 2018.83 It arranged meetings between NWPU representatives and leading Australian-Chinese scientists and helped the university sign partnerships with them. Within a month, it claimed to have introduced five professors from universities in Melbourne to NWPU, although it's unclear how many of them were eventually recruited by the university.84 NWPU specialises in aviation, space and naval technology as one of China's `Seven Sons of National Defence'--the country's leading defence universities.85 It's been implicated in an effort to illegally export equipment for antisubmarine warfare from the US.86
Overseas talent-recruitment organisations also run competitions and recruitment events for the Chinese Government. For example, in 2017, the UFWD's WRSA held competitions around the world, including in Paris, Sydney, London and San Francisco, in which scientists pitched projects in the hope of receiving funding from and appointments in China. The events were held with the help of 29 European, Singaporean, Japanese, Australian and North American united front groups for scientists.87 Organisations including the University of Technology Sydney CSSA and the Federation of Chinese Scholars in Australia ()--a peak body for Chinese-Australian professional associations that was set up under the Chinese Embassy's guidance--have partnered with the Chinese Government to hold recruitment competitions tied to the Thousand Talents Plan.88 As described below, CSSAs have run recruitment events for Chinese military institutions and state-owned defence companies.
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Policy Brief: Hunting the phoenix: the Chinese Communist Party's global search for technology and talent
Talent recruitment in Japan
The All-Japan Federation of Overseas Chinese Professionals () is the leading united front group for ethnic Chinese scientists and engineers in Japan. It describes itself as having been established in 1998 under the direction of the UFWD and the UFWD's WRSA, which is a dedicated body used by the department to interact with and influence scholars with overseas connections.89 Every president of the federation has also served as a council member of the WRSA or the China Overseas Friendship Association, which is another UFWD-run body.90 It runs at least eight talent-recruitment stations--organising talent-recruitment events in Japan and bringing scientists to talent-recruitment expos in China--and reportedly recruited 30 scientists for Fujian Province alone.91 Despite its involvement in the CCP's technology-transfer efforts, it has partnered with the Japan Science and Technology Agency to run events.92 Former prime minister Hatoyama Yukio () attended the opening of a WRSA overseas liaison workstation run by the group-- the first established by the WRSA (Figure 9).93
Figure 9: Former Japanese prime minister Hatoyama Yukio at the opening of a WRSA workstation
While raw numbers of recruited scientists are occasionally published, specific examples of scientists recruited by individual stations are difficult to find. In 2018, Weihai, a city in Shandong Province, released the names of 25 scientists recruited through stations in Japan and Eastern Europe.94 Among the recruits were medical researchers and AI specialists, including a Ukrainian scientist specialising in unmanned aerial vehicles who was recruited by Harbin Institute of Technology--one of China's leading defence research universities.95
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Case study: The Changzhou UFWD's overseas network
The UFWD of Changzhou, a city between Shanghai and Nanjing, has established talent-recruitment stations around the world. The UFWD set up the stations alongside its establishment of hometown associations for ethnic Chinese in foreign countries. This illustrates the united front system's integration of technology-transfer efforts and political and community influence work.
In October 2014, a delegation led by the Changzhou UFWD head Zhang Yue () travelled to Birmingham to oversee the founding of the UK Changzhou Association (). Zhang and the president of the UK Promotion of China Re-unification Society () were appointed as the association's honorary presidents.96 A united front official posted to the PRC Embassy in London also attended the event.97
The association immediately became an overseas talent-recruitment station for Changzhou and a branch of the Changzhou Overseas Friendship Association, which is headed by a leader of the Changzhou UFWD.98 According to a CCP media outlet, the association `is a window for external propaganda for Changzhou and a platform for talent recruitment' (Figure 10).99
Figure 10: A plaque awarded by the Changzhou City Talent Work Leading Small Group Office to its `UK talent recruitment and knowledge introduction workstation' in 2014
Three days later, the Changzhou UFWD delegation appeared in Paris for the founding of the France Changzhou Association (). Again, the Changzhou UFWD head was made honorary president and the association became a talent-recruitment station and a branch of the Changzhou Overseas Friendship Association. CCP media described it as `the second overseas work platform established by Changzhou' under the leadership of Changzhou's Overseas Chinese Federation, which is a united front agency.100
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Policy Brief: Hunting the phoenix: the Chinese Communist Party's global search for technology and talent
As detailed in a report published by the province's overseas Chinese federation, these activities were part of the Changzhou united front system's strategy of `actively guiding the construction of foreign overseas Chinese associations'.101 By 2018, when the report was published, the city had established associations in Australia, Canada, Singapore, the US and Hong Kong and was in the middle of establishing one in Macau. The founding of the Australian association was attended by a senior Changzhou UFWD official, Victorian Legislative Assembly member Hong Lim and Australian Chinese-language media mogul Tommy Jiang ().102
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Economic espionage
The following two case studies demonstrate how talent-recruitment stations and their hosting organisations have been implicated in economic espionage and are often closely linked to the CCP's united front system.
Case study: Cao Guangzhi
In March 2019, Tesla sued its former employee Cao Guangzhi (, Figure 11), alleging that he stole source code for its Autopilot features before taking it to a rival start-up, China's Xiaopeng Motors.103 In July, he admitted to uploading the source code to his iCloud account but denies stealing any information.104 Tesla calls Autopilot the `crown jewel' of its intellectual property portfolio and claims to have spent hundreds of millions of dollars over five years to develop it.105 Additional research on the subject of this ongoing legal case shows a pattern of cooperation between Cao and the CCP's united front system on talent-recruitment work dating back to nearly a decade before the lawsuit.
Figure 11: Cao Guangzhi (far left) with other co-founders of the Association of Wenzhou PhDs USA
Source: ` ""···' [The `Hidden Dragon and Crouching Tiger' of the Wenzhou Doctors Association of the US; there are Guggenheim Award winners, Apple Google engineers...], WZRB, 14 April 2017, online.
When Cao submitted his doctoral thesis to Purdue University in 2009, he and three friends established the Association of Wenzhou PhDs USA ().106 All four hail from Wenzhou, a city south of Shanghai known for the hundreds of renowned mathematicians who were born there.107 From its inception, the association has worked closely with the PRC Government. A report from Wenzhou's local newspaper claims that the Wenzhou Science and Technology Bureau, Overseas Chinese Affairs Office and Overseas Chinese Federation gave the group a list of US-based PhD students and graduates from the town, whom they then recruited as members.108 The head of the Wenzhou UFWD praised the association during a 2010 trip to America as `the first of its kind and highly significant'.109
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Policy Brief: Hunting the phoenix: the Chinese Communist Party's global search for technology and talent
The Association of Wenzhou PhDs USA carries out talent recruitment on behalf of the CCP. The year after its establishment, it signed an agreement with the UFWD of a county in Wenzhou to run a talent-recruitment station that gathers information on overseas scientists and carries out recruitment work.110 That year, it also arranged for 13 of its members to visit Wenzhou for meetings with talent-recruitment officials from organisations such as the local foreign experts affairs bureau111 and with representatives of local companies. Several of the members also brought their research with them, presenting technologies such as a multispectral imaging tool.112
Within a few years of its founding, the association had built up a small but elite group of more than 100 members. By 2017, its members reportedly included Lin Jianhai (), the Wenzhou-born secretary of the International Monetary Fund; engineers from Google, Apple, Amazon, Motorola and IBM; scholars at Harvard and Yale; and six US government employees.113 At least one of its members became a Zhejiang Province Thousand Talents Plan scholar through the group's recommendation.114 It also helped Wenzhou University recruit a materials scientist from the US Government's Argonne National Laboratory.115
Case study: Yang Chunlai
The case of Yang Chunlai () offers a window into the overlap of the united front system and economic espionage. Yang was a computer programmer at CME Group, which manages derivatives and futures exchanges such as the Chicago Mercantile Exchange. Employed at CME Group since 2000, he was arrested by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in July 2011.116 In 2015, he pleaded guilty to trade secrets theft for stealing CME Group source code in a scheme to set up a futures exchange company in China. He was sentenced to four years' probation.117
Before his arrest, Yang played a central role in a united front group that promotes talent recruitment by, and technology transfer to, China: the Association of Chinese-American Scientists and Engineers (ACSE, ). From 2005 to 2007 he was the group's president, and then its chairman to 2009.118
ACSE is one of several hundred groups for ethnic Chinese professionals that are closely linked to the CCP.119 ACSE and its leaders frequently met with PRC officials, particularly those from united front agencies such as the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office (OCAO),120 the CPPCC and the All-Chinese Federation of Returned Overseas Chinese. At one event, the future director of the OCAO, Xu Yousheng (), told ACSE:
There are many ways to serve the nation; you don't have to return to China and start an enterprise. You can also return to China to teach or introduce advanced foreign technology and experience-- this is a very good way to serve China.121
Yang was appointed to the OCAO's expert advisory committee in 2008.122 In 2010, he also spoke about ACSE's close relationship with the UFWD-run WRSA.123
Further illustrating these linkages, Yang visited Beijing for a `young overseas Chinese leaders' training course run by the OCAO in May 2006. Speaking to the People's Daily during the course, Yang said, `It's not that those who stay abroad don't love China; it's the opposite. The longer one stays in foreign
23
lands, the greater one's understanding of the depth of homesickness.'124 Yang also spoke of the sensitivity of source code used by companies, work on which doesn't get outsourced. However, he hinted at his eventual theft of code by saying: `Of course, even with things the way they are, everyone is still looking for suitable entrepreneurial opportunities to return to China'.125
In 2009, an `entrepreneurial opportunity' may have presented itself when ACSE hosted a talent-recruitment event by a delegation from the city of Zhangjiagang ().126 At the event, which Yang attended (Figure 12), ACSE signed a cooperation agreement with Zhangjiagang to `jointly build a Sino-US exchange platform and contribute to the development of the homeland'--potentially indicating the establishment of a talent-recruitment station or a similar arrangement.127
Figure 12: Yang Chunlai (rear, second from right) at the signing ceremony for ACSE's partnership with Zhangjiagang
Yang later wrote a letter to the OCAO proposing the establishment of an electronic trading company led by him in Zhangjiagang and asking for the office's support.128 In mid-2010, he emailed CME Group trade secrets to officials in Zhangjiagang and started setting up a company in China. By December, he began surreptitiously downloading source code from CME Group onto a removable hard drive.129 Yang's relationship with the OCAO probably facilitated and encouraged his attempt to steal trade secrets in order to establish a Chinese company that, according to his plea deal, would have become `a transfer station to China for advanced technologies companies around the world'.130
Yang's activities appeared to go beyond promoting technology transfer; there are indications that he was also involved in political influence work. This reflects the united front system's involvement in both technology transfer and political interference. At a 2007 OCAO-organised conference in Beijing, Yang said that he had been encouraged by CPPCC Vice Chairman and Zhi Gong Party Chairman Luo Haocai to actively participate in politics, which he described as `a whip telling overseas Chinese to integrate into mainstream society'. He added, `I estimate that [ACSE] can influence 500 votes' in the 2008 US presidential election.131 Yang also befriended politicians, including one senator, who wrote a letter to the judge testifying to Yang's good character.132 In his OCAO conference speech, he highlighted the appointment of Elaine Chao as US Secretary of Labor and her attendance at ACSE events.133
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Policy Brief: Hunting the phoenix: the Chinese Communist Party's global search for technology and talent
Talent recruitment and the Chinese military
Talent recruitment is also being directly carried out by the Chinese military. For example, the National University of Defense Technology (NUDT, the People's Liberation Army's premier science and technology university) has recruited at least four professors from abroad, including one University of New South Wales supercomputer expert, using the Thousand Talents Plan.134
Outside of formal talent-recruitment programs, NUDT has given guest professorships to numerous overseas scientists, For instance, Gao Wei (), an expert in materials science at New Zealand's University of Auckland, was awarded a distinguished guest professorship at NUDT in May 2014.135 Gao is closely involved in CCP talent-recruitment efforts. In 2016, he joined Chengdu University as a selectee of the Sichuan Provincial Thousand Talents Plan.136 Just a month before joining NUDT, he signed a partnership with the State Administration of Foreign Experts Affairs as president of the New Zealand Chinese Scientists Association ().137 In 2018, the association agreed to run a talent-recruitment station for an industrial park in Shenzhen.138 He has reportedly served as a member of the overseas expert advisory committee to the united front system's OCAO.139 In 2017, at one of the OCAO's events, Gao expressed his desire to commercialise his research in China and said that `even though our bodies are overseas, we really wish to make our own contributions to [China's] development'.140
The military's recruitment of scientists is supported by the same network of overseas recruitment stations and CCP-linked organisations that are active in talent-recruitment work more generally. Chinese military recruitment delegations have travelled around the world and worked with local united front groups to hold recruitment sessions. In 2014, the New South Wales Chinese Students and Scholars Association (NSW-CSSA, ) held an overseas talent-recruitment event for NUDT and several military-linked civilian universities.141 The NSW-CSSA is a peak body for CSSAs and holds its annual general meetings in the Chinese Consulate in the presence of Chinese diplomats.142 In 2013, NUDT held a recruitment session in Zürich organised by the Chinese Association of Science and Technology in Switzerland ().143 A similar event was held in Madrid in 2016.144
The Chinese Academy of Engineering Physics (CAEP), which runs the military's nuclear weapons program, is particularly active in recruiting overseas experts. By 2014, CAEP had recruited 57 scientists through the Thousand Talents Plan.145 It runs the Center for High Pressure Science and Technology Advanced Research in Beijing in part as a platform for recruiting overseas talent. The institute doesn't mention its affiliation with CAEP on its English-language website, yet it's run by a Taiwanese-American scientist who joined CAEP through the Thousand Talents Plan.146 So many scientists from the US's Los Alamos National Laboratory (a nuclear weapons research facility) have been recruited to Chinese institutions that they're reportedly known as the `Los Alamos club'.147
CAEP also holds overseas recruitment events. At a 2018 event in the UK, a CAEP representative noted the organisation's intention to gain technology through talent recruitment, saying `our academy hopes that overseas students will bring some advanced technologies back, and join us to carry out research projects.'148
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Chinese state-owned defence conglomerates are engaged in the same activities. China Electronics Technology Group Corporation (CETC), which specialises in developing military electronics, has been building its presence in Austria, where it opened the company's European headquarters in 2016 and runs a joint laboratory with Graz University of Technology.149 As part of its expansion, it held a meeting of the European Overseas High-level Talent Association () in 2017 that was attended by dozens of scientists from across Europe. Later that year, CETC reportedly held similar meetings and recruitment sessions in Silicon Valley and Boston.150 In 2013, the head of CETC's 38th Research Institute, which specialises in military-use electronics such as radar systems, visited Australia and met with a local united front group for scientists.151 Several members of the group from the University of Technology Sydney attended the meeting, and two years later the university signed a controversial $10 million partnership with CETC on technologies such as AI and big data.152
The Chinese Government's primary manufacturer of ballistic missiles and satellites, China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation, has held recruitment sessions in the US and UK through the help of local CSSAs.153
In addition to traditional defence institutions (military institutes and defence companies), China's civilian universities are increasingly involved in defence research and have also recruited large numbers of overseas scientists. ASPI ICPC's China Defence Universities Tracker has catalogued and analysed the implementation of militarycivil fusion in the university sector.154 The policy of militarycivil fusion has led to the establishment of more than 160 defence laboratories in Chinese universities, and such defence links are particularly common among leading Chinese universities that attract the greatest share of talent-recruitment program participants.155 Many recruits end up working in defence laboratories or on defence projects.156
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Policy Brief: Hunting the phoenix: the Chinese Communist Party's global search for technology and talent
Recommendations
The CCP's use of talent-recruitment activity as a conduit for non-transparent technology transfer presents a substantial challenge to governments and research institutions. Many of those activities fly under the radar of traditional counterintelligence work, yet they can develop into espionage, interference and illegal or unethical behaviour.
While this phenomenon may still be poorly understood by many governments and universities, it can often be addressed by better enforcement of existing regulations. Much of the misconduct associated with talent-recruitment programs breaches existing laws, contracts and institutional policies. The fact that it nonetheless occurs at high levels points to a failure of compliance and enforcement mechanisms across research institutions and relevant government agencies. Governments and research institutions should therefore emphasise the need to build an understanding of CCP talent-recruitment work. They must also ensure that they enforce existing policies, while updating them as necessary. This report recommends the introduction of new policies to promote transparency and accountability and help manage conflicts of interest.
For governments
We recommend that governments around the world pursue the following measures:
1. Task appropriate agencies to carry out a study of the extent and mechanisms of CCP talent-recruitment work, including any related misconduct, in their country.
2. Ensure that law enforcement and security agencies are resourced and encouraged to investigate and act on related cases of theft, fraud and espionage.
3. Explicitly prohibit government employees from joining foreign talent-recruitment programs.
4. Introduce clear disclosure requirements for foreign funding and appointments of recipients of government-funded grants and assessors of grant applications.
5. Ensure that funding agencies have effective mechanisms and resources to investigate compliance with grant agreements.
6. Ensure that recipients of government research funding are required to disclose relevant staff participation in foreign talent-recruitment programs.
7. Establish a public online database of all external funding received by public universities and their employees and require universities to submit and update data.
8. Establish a national research integrity office that oversees publicly funded research institutions, produces reports for the government and public on research integrity issues, manages the public database of external funding in universities, and carries out investigations into research integrity.
9. Brief universities and other research institutions about CCP talent-recruitment programs and any relevant government policies.
10. Develop recommendations for universities and other research institutions to tackle talent-recruitment activity.
This can draw on the Guidelines to counter foreign interference in the Australian university sector developed by a joint government and university sector taskforce on foreign interference.157
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11. Create an annual meeting of education, science and industry ministers from like-minded countries to deepen research collaboration within alliances, beyond existing military and intelligence research partnerships, and coordinate on issues such as technology and research security.
12. Increase funding for the university sector and priority research areas, such as artificial intelligence, quantum science and energy storage, perhaps as part of the cooperation proposed above.
13. Develop national strategies to commercialise research and build talent.
For research institutions
We recommend that research institutions such as universities pursue the following measures: 1. Carry out a comprehensive and independent audit of participation in CCP talent-recruitment
programs by staff. 2. Ensure that there's sufficient resourcing to implement and ensure compliance with policies on
conflicts of interest, commercialisation, integrity and intellectual property. 3. Fully investigate cases of fraud, misconduct or nondisclosure.
These investigations should determine why existing systems failed to prevent misconduct and then discuss the findings with relevant government agencies. 4. In conjunction with the government, brief staff on relevant policies on and precautions against CCP talent-recruitment programs. 5. Strengthen existing staff travel databases to automatically flag conflicts with grant commitments and contracts. 6. Update policies on intellectual property, commercialisation, research integrity, conflicts of interest and external appointments where necessary. Participants in CCP talent-recruitment programs should be required to submit their contracts with the foreign institution (both English and Chinese versions) and fully disclose any remuneration.
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Policy Brief: Hunting the phoenix: the Chinese Communist Party's global search for technology and talent
Appendix 1: Selected Chinese government talent-recruitment programs
China's State Administration of Foreign Experts Affairs released a bilingual list of nearly 200 recognised talent-recruitment schemes in 2018, which was adapted to create the table below.158 However, the list isn't complete and doesn't include several subnational programs.159 Some programs are also known by several names, which might not be included here. The total number of talent-recruitment programs operated by the Chinese Government over the past two decades probably greatly exceeds 200.
Talent program name (English) The Recruitment Program of Global Experts or Thousand Talents Plan Project for Experts' Return and Settlement in China Funding Scheme for High-Level Overseas Chinese Students' Return Funding Scheme for Outstanding Scientific and Technological Programs by Chinese Students Abroad Supporting Scheme for Returned Overseas Chinese Students' Entrepreneurial Start-ups Project on Postdoctoral International Exchanges Homeland-Serving Action Plan for Overseas Chinese High-End Foreign Experts Project
Chinese Government Friendship Award Program for the Introduction of High-Level Overseas Cultural and Educational Experts Program for the Introduction of Renowned Overseas Professors Network in International Centers for Education in China OEI for Disciplinary Innovation in Universities OEI under `Belt and Road Initiative' in Cultural and Educational Sector Overseas Experts Supporting Programs under National Research Platform Dialogue with Masters Nobel Prize Laureates on Campus
Talent program name (Chinese)
`'
-
Supervising agency Organisation Department
Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security
Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security
Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security State Administration of Foreign Experts Affairs State Administration of Foreign Experts Affairs State Administration of Foreign Experts Affairs
State Administration of Foreign Experts Affairs State Administration of Foreign Experts Affairs State Administration of Foreign Experts Affairs State Administration of Foreign Experts Affairs State Administration of Foreign Experts Affairs
State Administration of Foreign Experts Affairs
29
Talent program name (English)
Talent program name (Chinese)
Supervising agency
Introduction of Overseas Young
State Administration of Foreign
Talents in Cultural and Educational
Experts Affairs
Sector
Special Programs with Universities
State Administration of Foreign
Directly under the Administration of
Experts Affairs
Ministries and Commissions of the
Central Government
Project for Chief Foreign Experts
State Administration of Foreign
Experts Affairs
Project for Young Foreign Experts in
State Administration of Foreign
Economic and Technological Sector
Experts Affairs
Project for Key Foreign Experts in
State Administration of Foreign
Economic and Technological Sector
Experts Affairs
Changjiang Scholars Program
Changjiang Scholars Program
Sino-US Fulbright Program
Ministry of Education
Youth Talent Plan of Huangjiqing
Ministry of Land and Resources
Young Talents Program under the
Ministry of Agriculture
Chinese Academy of Agricultural
Sciences
Recruitment Plan for High-level
Ministry of Culture
Overseas Cultural Talents
`532' Talents Program under the
'532' National Health Commission
China National Center for Food Safety
(formerly National Health and
Risk Assessment
Family Planning Commission)
CAS Hundred Talents Project
Chinese Academy of Sciences
Program for Innovation Teams on
Chinese Academy of Sciences
International Cooperation
Chinese Academy of Sciences
Chinese Academy of Sciences
Program for Overseas Evaluation
Experts
Program for the Introduction of
Chinese Academy of Sciences
Prominent Technical Talents
Project for `Hundred Talents'
China Meteorological
Introduction and `Hundred Talents'
Administration
Selection
Program for Foreign High-Level
State Nuclear Power Technology
Talents Introduction
Corporation
Program for Overseas Talents
Beijing Municipality
Aggregation
Great Minds Gather in Beijing Plan
Beijing Municipality
Tianjin Haihe Friendship Award
Tianjin Municipality
Program for Overseas High-Level
Tianjin Municipality
Talents Introduction
1,000 Foreign Experts Introduction
Tianjin Municipality
Plan
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Policy Brief: Hunting the phoenix: the Chinese Communist Party's global search for technology and talent
Talent program name (English)
Talent program name (Chinese)
Tianjin Municipal Distinguished
Professor
Plan of Supporting Entrepreneurial
Talents Returning from Studying
Overseas
Plan of Funding Outstanding Science and Technology Projects Launched
by Talents Returning from Studying
Overseas
100 Talents Plan of Hebei Province
100 Foreign Experts Introduction Plan
Yanzhao Friendship Award
100 Talents Plan on Overseas
High-Level Talents Introduction
Shanxi Provincial Friendship Award
Shanxi Province Plan of Funding
Outstanding Young Talents
Program for Cultivating Excellent
Entrepreneurs
Program for Grassland Elite
Inner Mongolia Steed Award
Program for High-Level Talents Introduction
10-100-1,000 Program for High-End
Talents Introduction
Friendship Award of Liaoning
Province
Program for Key Foreign Experts
Introduction
Shenyang Rose Award
''
Program for Overseas Research and
Development Team Introduction
High-level Talents Introduction Plan
Plan to Promote and Congregate a
Gathering of Outstanding Overseas
Experts
Overseas High-level Talents
Introduction Plan
Program for High-Level Entrepreneurial and Innovative
Talents Introduction
Changbai Mountain Friendship Award
Supervising agency Tianjin Municipality
Tianjin Municipality
Tianjin Municipality
Hebei Province Hebei Province Hebei Province Shanxi Province
Shanxi Province Shanxi Province
Shanxi Province
Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region Liaoning Province
Liaoning Province
Liaoning Province
Shenyang City Shenyang City
Dalian City Dalian City
Dalian City
Jilin Province
Jilin Province
31
Talent program name (English)
Talent program name (Chinese)
Funding Program for Preferential Returned Scientific Research
Students Innovative and Start-ups
Funding Program for Preferential
Postdoctorate Scientific Research
Friendship Award
Excellent Foreign Experts
`1,000 Talent Plan' of Heilongjiang
Heilongjiang Belt and Road Talent
Introduction Project
Special Supporting Plan for Talents of
Science and Technology
Funding Program for Preferential Postdoctorate Scientific Research
Harbin Talents Aggregation Program
Program for High-Level Overseas
Talents Introduction
1,000 Talents Plan of Shanghai
Shanghai Outstanding Academic
Leaders Plan
Shanghai Magnolia Award
Shanghai Pujiang Program
Shanghai Program for Professor of
Special Appointment Eastern Scholar
at Shanghai Institutions of Higher
Learning
Shanghai Rising-Star Program
Shanghai Excellent Academic/
/
Technology Research Leader Program
Shanghai Financial Talent Project
Program for High-Level Entrepreneurial and Innovative
Talents Introduction
100 Foreign Experts Introduction Plan
Recruitment Program of Returned
Overseas Chinese Scholars
Jiangsu Six Talent Peaks Program
Jiangsu Specially Appointed
Professor Program
Jiangsu Friendship Award
321 Program for Talents Introduction 321
Venture Nanjing Talent Program
Program for High-Level Talent Team
Introduction
Supervising agency Jilin Province
Jilin Province
Changchun City Changchun City Heilongjiang Province
Heilongjiang Province
Heilongjiang Province
Heilongjiang Province
Harbin City Shanghai Municipality
Shanghai Municipality Shanghai Municipality
Shanghai Municipality Shanghai Municipality Shanghai Municipality
Shanghai Municipality Shanghai Municipality
Shanghai Municipality Jiangsu Province
Jiangsu Province Jiangsu Province
Jiangsu Province Jiangsu Province
Jiangsu Province Nanjing City Nanjing City Nanjing City
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Policy Brief: Hunting the phoenix: the Chinese Communist Party's global search for technology and talent
Talent program name (English)
Talent program name (Chinese)
1,000 Talents Plan of Zhejiang
Province
Zhejiang Overseas Engineers Program ''
Zhejiang `West Lake Friendship Award' for Foreign Experts
''
Program of Foreign Expertise
Introduction of Zhejiang Province
College Elites Aggregation Program of '' Zhejiang Province
521 Program for Global Talents
521
Introduction
Hangzhou `115' Overseas Talents Introduction Plan
'115'
Hangzhou `Qianjiang Friendship Award' for Foreign Experts
''
3315 Talents Program
3315
Ningbo Overseas Engineers Experts '' Program
Camellia Prize
100 Talents Plan of Anhui Province
100 Foreign Experts Introduction Plan
Huangshan Friendship Award
Program for High-Level
Entrepreneurial and Innovative
Talents Introduction
100 Talents Plan Foreign Experts
Program
Program for Overseas High-Level
Talents Introduction into Fujian Free
Trade Pilot Zone
Fujian Province Program for
ABC
High-Level Talents Introduction (A, B
and C Class)
Program for High-end Foreign Expert
Groups Introduction
Program for Young Foreign Experts
Introduction
Fujian Friendship Award
Program for Overseas High-Level
Talents Introduction
Xiamen City Program for `ARRIS'
''
Double-Hundred Talents Plan for High-level Talents Introduction
' '
Egret Friendship Award
''
Supervising agency Zhejiang Province Zhejiang Province Zhejiang Province Zhejiang Province Zhejiang Province Hangzhou City Hangzhou City
Hangzhou City Ningbo City Ningbo City Ningbo City Anhui Province Anhui Province Anhui Province Fujian Province
Fujian Province Fujian Province
Fujian Province
Fujian Province Fujian Province Fujian Province Fujian Province Xiamen City Xiamen City Xiamen City
33
Talent program name (English)
Talent program name (Chinese)
Program for Domestic and Overseas
High-level Technical Talents
Introduction
Program for High-end Foreign
Experts and Overseas Engineers in
Short Supply Introduction
Program for Overseas Medical Research Talents Introduction
Lushan Friendship Award
Program for High-level
Entrepreneurial and Innovative
Talents Introduction and High-end
Talents Flexible Introduction
Taishan Scholars Project
Double-Hundred Talent Plan on 100
Foreign Experts and 100 Foreign
Expert Teams Introduction
Shandong Provincial Government
Qilu Friendship Award
5150 Program for Talents Introduction 5150
Quancheng Friendship Award
Quancheng Program for Entrepreneurial and Innovative
`'
Talents Introduction
Quancheng Program for High-end
Foreign Experts Introduction
Program for Entrepreneurial and
Innovative Leading Talents
Incentive Plan for High-end Talents
`Qindao' Award Winner
`'
Aoshan Program for Talents
Introduction
Program for Overseas High-level
Experts Introduction
Program for Overseas High-level
Talents Introduction
100 Talents Plan of Henan Province
Henan Province International Talents
Cooperation Program
Distinguished Professor of Henan
Province
100 Talents Plan on Overseas High-level Talents Introduction
Chime Bell Award by Hubei Provincial '' People's Government
Chu Talents Program
''
Supervising agency Jiangxi Province
Jiangxi Province
Jiangxi Province Jiangxi Province Jiangxi Province
Shandong Province Shandong Province
Shandong Province Jinan City Jinan City Jinan City
Jinan City Qingdao City Qingdao City Qingdao City Qingdao City Qingdao City Henan Province Henan Province Henan Province Henan Province Hubei Province Hubei Province Hubei Province
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Policy Brief: Hunting the phoenix: the Chinese Communist Party's global search for technology and talent
Talent program name (English) Talent Introduction Program on High-Levels, Elites, Top-Leadership, and Urgently Needed People Huanghe Talents Plan Wuhan Yellow Crane Friendship Award Wuhan City Partner Program 3551 Optics Valley Talent Schema 100 Talents Plan on Overseas High-level Talents Introduction Guangdong Friendship Award Program for Innovative Research Teams and Leading Talents Introduction Special Support Plan for High-level Talents Sail Plan for Talents Development Funding Scheme for Short-term Overseas Experts in Guangdong Guangzhou Friendship Award Advanced Foreign Experts Introduction Plan Guangzhou Talents Green Card Overseas Talents Entrepreneurial Encouragement `Kapok Plan' 100 Talents Plan of Entrepreneurial and Innovative Leading Talents Peacock Program for Overseas High-level Talents Introduction Guangxi Talent Highland
Guangxi BaGui Scholars
Guangxi Specially Invited Experts
100 Talents Plan on the Introduction of High-level Overseas Talents for Colleges and Universities in Guangxi Measures of Hainan Province to Introduce High-level Innovative Talents Measures for the Implementation of Scientific and Technological Innovation Teams in Hainan
Talent program name (Chinese)
Supervising agency Hubei Province
Wuhan City Wuhan City
'' 3551
Wuhan City Wuhan City Hunan Province
Guangdong Province Guangdong Province
Guangdong Province
Guangdong Province
Guangdong Province
Guangzhou City Guangzhou City
Guangzhou City
' Guangzhou City '
Guangzhou City
Shenzhen City
Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region
Hainan Province
Hainan Province
35
Talent program name (English)
Talent program name (Chinese)
Supervising agency
Measures for the Implementation of the Introduction of Overseas
Hainan Province
High-level Talents in Hainan
Coconut Island Awards of Hainan
Hainan Province
Province
Program for Hundred Overseas High-level Talents Aggregation
Chongqing Municipality
Chongqing Friendship Award
Chongqing Municipality
Par-Eu Scholars Program
Chongqing Municipality
Chongqing Talents Recruitment
Chongqing Municipality
Hongyan Plan
Sichuan Friendship Award
Sichuan Province
1,000 Talents Plan of Sichuan
Sichuan Province
Province
Tianfu Recruitment Program of
Sichuan Province
High-end Foreign Experts
Jinsha Friendship Award
Chengdu City
Talents Introduction Plan of Chengdu
Chengdu City
100-1,000-10,000 Talents Introduction '' Project
Guizhou Province
The 100 Talents Plan on Overseas High-level Talents Recruitment
' Yunnan Province '
Yunnan Friendship Award
Yunnan Province
Yunnan Provincial High-end Foreign
Yunnan Province
Experts Project
Program for High-end Scientific and Yunnan Province
Technological Talents Recruitment
100 Talents Plan of Shaanxi Province
Shaanxi Province
`Sanqin' Friendship Award
''
Shaanxi Province
Shaanxi Provincial Top Foreign
Shaanxi Province
Experts Project
5211 Program for Talents Introduction 5211
Xi'an City
Xi'an Friendship Award
Xi'an City
Xi'an Excellent Foreign Experts Award
Xi'an City
Program for Overseas High-level
Xi'an City
Talents
Gansu Provincial Government Foreign '' Experts `Dunhuang' Award
Gansu Province
Gansu Important Foreign Experts
Gansu Province
Introduction Program
Gansu Overseas High-level Talents Gansu Province
Introduction Program
Qinghai Provincial High-end and
Qinghai Province
Innovative 1,000 Talents Plan
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Policy Brief: Hunting the phoenix: the Chinese Communist Party's global search for technology and talent
Talent program name (English)
Talent program name (Chinese)
Ningxia Liupan Mountain Friendship
Award
100 Talents Plan for Talents
Introduction
`Tianshan Prize' of People's Government of Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region
' '
High-level Personnel Introducing
Project of Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous
Region
Distinguished Experts of Xinjiang
Production and Construction Corps
Oasis Friendship Award of Xinjiang
Production and Construction Corps
Supervising agency Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region
Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region
Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region
Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region
Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region
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Appendix 2: Cases and alleged cases of espionage, fraud and misconduct
Co-authored with Alexandra Pascoe
Charles Lieber (arrested and charged 2020)
Dr Charles Lieber, chair of the Department of Chemistry and Chemical Biology at Harvard University, was arrested in January 2020 and charged with one count of making a fraudulent statement regarding his participation in China's Thousand Talents Plan.160 The criminal complaint alleges that Lieber was a `Strategic Scientist' at Wuhan University of Technology (WUT) from around 2012 to 2017 and a participant in the Thousand Talents Plan.161 Under Lieber's Thousand Talents Plan contract, WUT paid Lieber US$50,000 per month and living expenses of up to 1 million and awarded him more than $1.5 million to establish the WUTHarvard Joint Nano Key Laboratory at WUT.162 Lieber may have been recruited by Mai Liqiang, a former student, who is a Changjiang Scholar and Director of the Nano Key Lab at WUT.163 While Lieber's Thousand Talents Plan contract and Strategic Scientist agreement officially came to an end in 2015, according to the criminal complaint, it appears that the agreements remained in place until well after that.164 Payment of salary allegedly continued into 2017, and email exchanges indicate that Lieber may have executed a new agreement with WUT at some point in late 2016 or early 2017.165 It's alleged that, in 2018 and 2019, Lieber failed to disclose his involvement in the talent plan and his affiliation with WUT to US law enforcement officials and federal funding agencies.166 Since 2008, Lieber has received more than US$15 million in grant funding from the National Institutes of Health (NIH) and the Department of Defense.167
Hu Anming () (arrested and charged February 2020)
Hu Anming is a Chinese scientist who has been charged by the US Department of Justice with three counts of wire fraud and three counts of making false statements.168 From 2013, he worked as an associate professor at the University of Tennessee, Knoxville (UTK) and received research grants from US Government agencies, including the Department of Energy and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA).169 Since 2013, Hu has also been a faculty member at the Institute of Laser Engineering at the Beijing University of Technology (BJUT).170 In 2012, he was selected for the 7th round of the short-term Beijing Overseas High-Level Talents Plan ( ) and, in 2013 he was chosen for the 9th round of the long-term Beijing Overseas High-Level Talents Plan.171 In 2016, according to the indictment, Hu concealed and falsely represented his affiliation with BJUT to UTK.172 This led UTK to falsely certify to NASA and its contractors that UTK was in compliance with federal law that prohibits NASA from using federally appropriated funds on projects in collaboration with China or Chinese universities.173 Hu is accused of defrauding NASA by hiding his relationship with the Chinese university while receiving funding from NASA.174 If convicted, he faces up to 20 years in federal prison and a fine of up to US$250,000 on each of the wire fraud counts, and up to five years prison on each of the false statement counts.175
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Policy Brief: Hunting the phoenix: the Chinese Communist Party's global search for technology and talent
James Patrick Lewis (pleaded guilty March 2020)
James Patrick Lewis is an American physicist who has pleaded guilty to Federal Program Fraud for defrauding his employer.176 Lewis was a tenured professor in the Physics Department of West Virginia University from 2006 to August 2019.177 In July 2017, he was recruited into China's Thousand Talents Plan, and the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) agreed to employ him for at least three years and provide a living subsidy of ¥1 million (A$245,000), a research subsidy of 4 million (A$980,000) and a salary of ¥600,000 (A$147,000).178 In March 2018, he submitted a fraudulent parental leave request for the autumn semester of 2018 in order to work in China. West Virginia University granted the request, and Lewis was able to work in China for three weeks while receiving his full salary from the university (US$20,189).179 As part of his plea agreement, Lewis has agreed to repay that amount to the university.180 Lewis could face a sentence of up to 10 years in prison and a $250,000 fine.181
Texas A&M University System cases (reported in 2020)
According to a 2020 Wall Street Journal report, officials in the Texas A&M University System discovered that more than 100 staff were tied to PRC talent-recruitment programs, but only five have disclosed their participation.182 A plant pathologist at Texas A&M told officials that they had been offered US$250,000 in compensation and more than $1 million in seed money to start a lab in China though a talent program, but ultimately rejected the offer.183 While the university system hasn't sacked any of the researchers, some agreed to quit talent programs.184
Cao Guangzhi () (sued 2019)
See page 22.
Moffitt Cancer Center dismissals (2019)
Moffitt Cancer Center, a research institution at the University of South Florida, forced six faculty members, including its CEO, to resign in late 2019 over their participation in the Thousand Talents Plan.185 Moffitt alleges that the scientists failed to fully disclose their affiliations with institutions in China and their receipt of personal payments to bank accounts in China under the plan. An unpublished report by Moffitt claims that Dr Sheng Wei () was the centre's first participant in the Thousand Talents Plan and went on to recruit four of his colleagues to Tianjin Medical University, of which he is an alumnus, through the plan.186 A sixth employee joined the Thousand Talents Plan separately. Wei led Moffitt's engagement with Tianjin Medical University, which included the establishment of a collaborative research centre.187
Two of those who resigned have disputed the allegations against them.188 One of them has stated that Wei handled her application to the Thousand Talents Plan, and claims that documents relating to the establishment of a Chinese bank account in her name include a forged signature.189
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Kang Zhang () (resigned 2019)
Kang Zhang is the former chief of eye genetics at Shiley Eye Institute of the University of California San Diego (UCSD).190 Zhang resigned from his position in July 2019 following an investigation into his nondisclosure of a company he owns in China and his participation in a PRC talent-recruitment program.191 Zhang started working at UCSD in 2008. During his time there, he received around US$10 million (A$13.8 million) in NIH grants. In 2010, he accepted a role at Sichuan University as a Thousand Talents Plan professor.192 In 2012, he founded Guangzhou Kangrui Biological Pharmaceutical Technology Co. () in China.193 The focus of the company overlapped with the research Zhang was performing at UCSD.194 While his attorney has stated that Zhang's companies have long been known to UCSD, an investigation by inewssource found that his companies and involvement in the Thousand Talents Plan weren't disclosed to the US Government or UCSD.195 Zhang is currently a professor at Macau University of Science and Technology.196
Xiang Haitao () (arrested and charged 2019)
Xiang Haitao is a Chinese citizen and agricultural scientist charged on one count of conspiracy to commit economic espionage, three counts of economic espionage, one count of conspiracy to commit theft of trade secrets and three counts of theft of trade secrets.197 From 2008 to 2017, Xiang worked at a subsidiary of Monsanto called the Climate Corporation, which develops software platforms to improve agricultural productivity. In April 2016, he travelled to China to meet with recruiters for the Hundred Talents Plan () and to interview for a position at the Nanjing Institute of Soil Science at CAS. According to Xiang's indictment, in his application for the Hundred Talents Plan, he described the skills and work he could offer CAS, which could only be accomplished with the use of a proprietary Monsanto technology called `Nutrient Optimiser'.198 Later that year, Xiang was selected for the Hundred Talents Plan.199 In 2017, he accepted the job at the Nanjing Institute of Soil Science and resigned his position at Monsanto.200 He then bought a one-way ticket to China and was subsequently arrested at O'Hare Airport in Chicago attempting to board a flight to Shanghai.201 His laptop was found to contain proprietary Monsanto files related to the nutrient enhancement program that he was working on.202
You Xiaorong () (charged February 2019)
You Xiaorong, who is a Chinese-born American citizen, was arrested and indicted in February 2019 for allegedly stealing trade secrets from two US companies.203 From 2012 to mid-2017, she was employed as Principal Engineer for Global Research at Coca-Cola in Atlanta, Georgia.204 She then worked as a manager for a company in Tennessee until her arrest in 2018. You allegedly conspired with a Chinese national to steal trade secrets relating to bisphenol-A-free chemical technologies from both companies for use by Chinese company Jinhong Group ().205 In exchange, the company is said to have offered employment at the firm and assistance in obtaining the Thousand Talent annual award and the `Yishi-yiyi' () award from the Shandong Provincial Government.206 In mid-2017, the company sponsored You's application to China's Thousand Talents Program () and, later in 2017, to the Yishi-Yiyi project, in order to receive funding from the Chinese Government to develop the stolen bisphenol-A-free technology to be used by the company.207
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Policy Brief: Hunting the phoenix: the Chinese Communist Party's global search for technology and talent
Turab Lookman (charged 2019; pleaded guilty January 2020)
Turab Lookman is an American physicist and citizen who has pleaded guilty to a charge of making a false statement to a government investigator about his involvement in China's Thousand Talents Program.208 While he was initially indicted on three counts, a plea deal with prosecutors resulted in two of the charges being dropped.209 From 1999, Lookman worked at the Los Alamos National Laboratory (a Department of Energy facility that developed the first atomic bomb). He admitted to lying to a laboratory counterintelligence investigator in 2018 by denying that he'd been recruited and had applied for the Thousand Talents Plan.210 Federal prosecutors deemed Lookman a serious national security threat because his high-level clearance provided him access to critical facilities and US nuclear secrets.211 He's awaiting sentencing and could face up to five years in prison and a US$250,000 fine.
Zhongsan Liu () (arrested and charged September 2019)
Zhongsan Liu is a Chinese Government employee who has been charged with conspiracy to fraudulently obtain US visas for Chinese Government employees.212 Liu heads the New York office of the China Association for International Exchange of Personnel (CAIEP,), which is a proxy for China's State Administration of Foreign Experts Affairs. According to the criminal complaint, from around 2017 to 2019, Liu sought to procure research scholar visas (J1 visas) for CAIEP employees under the false pretence that they were entering the US to conduct research at US universities.213 The real purpose was to carry out full-time talent-recruitment work.214 It's been reported that the University of Georgia and the Confucius Institute at the University of Massachusetts Boston were contacted to sponsor visas.215 In 2018, working with other Chinese Government employees in the US, Liu was able to obtain a J1 visa for one CAIEP employee who worked to recruit scientific experts until at least June 2019.216
`Franklin' Feng Tao () (charged and arrested August 2019)
Franklin Feng Tao is a Chinese-born US permanent resident who has been indicted on three counts of fraud. Tao is a professor at the Center for Environmentally Beneficial Catalysis at the University of Kansas. It's alleged that he signed a five-year, full-time contract with Fuzhou University in May 2018 as part of the Changjiang Scholars program (), which is a talent-recruitment scheme run by China's Ministry of Education.217 He's accused of failing to disclose that to the University of Kansas, as required by its conflict-of-interest policy. He continued to work and conduct research at the university, funded by Department of Energy grants and National Science Foundation grants.218 If convicted of all charges, Tao could face a maximum of 30 years in prison and a fine of up to US$750,000.219
University of Florida resignations (2019)
Four faculty members from the University of Florida left the school following a letter from the NIH alerting the university to potential undisclosed foreign research funding. A report provided by the university details how all four faculty members failed to disclose their participation in Chinese recruitment programs, their work for Chinese research institutions and their acceptance of funding from China.220 The matter is still subject to ongoing federal investigation, and the names of the four haven't been released.
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`Faculty 1' has been identified as Tan Weihong (), who worked as a professor of chemistry at the University of Florida from 1996.221 The report states that he received Chinese Government grants, was the vice president of a Chinese university, ran his own lab and was also affiliated with another Chinese university as the dean of an institute. This matches Tan's CV. He's been employed at Hunan University since 2000, when he was selected as a Changjiang Scholar.222 In 2009, Tan was selected for the Thousand Talents Plan as a distinguished professor at Hunan University.223 In 2017, he was appointed Vice President of Hunan University and he is also the Director of the State Key Laboratory of Chemical Biosensors and Metrology.224 Tan is also the Dean of the Institute of Molecular Medicine at the Shanghai Jiaotong University School of Medicine. The NIH alerted the University of Florida to those activities in January 2019, and `Faculty 1' resigned following an internal investigation.
`Faculty 2' began working at the University of Florida in 2014. The report revealed that he founded, co-owned and served as CEO of a China-based company while working at the university. He was recruited into the Thousand Talents Program in 2017, which may have included an undisclosed financial stipend. `Faculty 2' also resigned following the investigation.
`Faculty 3' was a postdoctoral associate and student at the University of Florida who worked part time in the College of Medicine from 2012. It was found that he had held a full-time appointment at a Chinese university since at least 2017 and participated in a Chinese recruitment program. He also received at least one grant from the Chinese Government. `Faculty 3' was sacked in December 2019.
The fourth university employee resigned before the university could properly investigate but left amid similar allegations, according to the report.
Li Xiaojiang () (employment terminated May 2019; charged November 2019)
Li Xiaojiang is a Chinese-born US biologist who has been charged with defrauding the US Government by receiving grants from the NIH while also taking an undisclosed salary from a Chinese institution.225 Li and his wife, Li Shihua, worked at Emory University in Atlanta, Georgia, for 23 years before their employment was terminated in May 2019 for failing to `fully disclose foreign sources of research funding and the extent of their work for research institutions and universities in China'.226 Li was selected for the Thousand Talents Plan in 2010 and became a Distinguished Professor of the Institute of Genetics and Developmental Biology at CAS, while also maintaining a full-time role at Emory.227 He received three NIH grants in 2015 while simultaneously receiving an annual salary from CAS in 2015 and 2016, and was allegedly out of the country for most of 2015. Li is charged with defrauding the US Government of US$38,888 in salary and fringe benefits.228 In 2016, he took up a professorship at Jinan University after his affiliation with CAS ended.229
Zheng Xiaoqing () (arrested 2018; charged 2019)
Zheng Xiaoqing is a Chinese-born American citizen and former General Electric employee. He was arrested in 2018 and charged by the US Government with economic espionage and theft of trade secrets in April 2019.230 In 2016, he worked with business partners to establish two aerospace companies in China. Through those companies, he allegedly sought to commercialise trade secrets stolen from General Electric that he encrypted in an image of a sunrise.231
In 2012, Zheng was recruited to a subsidiary of the Aviation Industry Corporation of China, which is a state-owned defence conglomerate, and the Thousand Talents Plan while retaining his position with
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Policy Brief: Hunting the phoenix: the Chinese Communist Party's global search for technology and talent
General Electric.232 Shortly before his arrest, he was also named as a senior member of the Jiangsu Overseas Exchange Association (), which is a united front organisation run by the provincial Overseas Chinese Affairs Office.233
Zheng has been accused by US cybersecurity firm Crowdstrike of being part of a Jiangsu State Security Bureau operation to steal jet turbine technology.234 His arrest happened in the same year that a state security officer, who attempted to steal General Electric technology, and one of his assets were charged by the US Government.235 Zheng also spoke at the Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics College of Energy and Power Engineering in 2016,236 which is a year before the Jiangsu State Security Bureau worked with the college in an attempt to recruit another General Electric engineer.237
University of Texas MD Anderson Cancer Center sackings (2018)
Following an effort launched by the NIH in 2018, the MD Anderson Cancer Center at the University of Texas moved to terminate the employment of three scientists in April 2019 for sharing confidential information and failing to disclose foreign ties.238 Internal investigations have revealed infractions of ethics policies relating to the sharing of confidential information about research grants, as well as failure to disclose foreign interests, collaborations and payments.239 While two of the scientists resigned before they were sacked, the third challenged the proceedings.240 A fourth scientist was reportedly reprimanded, but not terminated, while another MD Anderson researcher, believed to be Xie Keping, is still under investigation.241
Xie Keping () (resigned 2018)
Xie Keping is a Chinese-born oncologist and gastroenterologist currently under investigation for allegedly funnelling advanced research from the Houston University of Texas MD Anderson Cancer Center to the Chinese Government.242 Xie began at the centre in 1990 and stepped down from his position in April 2018.243 He was then hired by the University of Arizona in July 2018 but was placed on administrative leave when he was arrested on allegations of possession of child pornography in August that year. The charges were dismissed in November.244 It's been reported that Xie had been a member of the Thousand Talents Plan; however, the link to his page on the Thousand Talents Plan website no longer works.245 Xie served as the Executive Vice President and President of the China Association of Experts in the US in 200708 and 200809, respectively.246 According to the Chinese Civic Center website, of which Xie had been Deputy CEO since 2009, Xie is a visiting professor at Shanghai Jiaotong University, Shanghai Tongji University, Jiangsu University, Suzhou University, Xi'an Jiaotong University and Harbin Medical University.247 The website also states that, in 1999, he was part of the Chun Hui Plan () of the Ministry of Education for the `returning American medical expert reporting team', and, in 2008, was the head of the Chun Hui Plan `cancer research and clinical expert visiting team'.248
Zhang `Percival' Yiheng () (charged 2017; convicted 2019)
Zhang Yiheng is a Chinese-born American citizen who was arrested by the FBI on 20 September 2017, and was found guilty of committing federal grant fraud, making false statements and obstruction by falsification in September 2019.249 At the time of the offences, Zhang was working for the Virginia
43
Polytechnic Institute and State University (Virginia Tech) and a company he had founded, Cell-Free Bioinnovations (CFB). From 2014, he was also a researcher at the Tianjin Institute of Industrial Biotechnology (TIIB) at CAS. Over the period from 2013 to 2016, Zhang submitted fraudulent grant proposals to the National Science Foundation and the Department of Energy.250 Evidence presented at his trial indicated that the grant proposals were for research that Zhang had already conducted in China.251 Funding was instead funnelled to CFB projects not specified as part of the funding requests, and those projects were completed by Virginia Tech postdoctoral students Zhu Zhiguang () and You Chun (), who were also working at CFB and TIIB.252 In 2015, You was selected for the National Youth Thousand Talents Plan (), which is a component of the Thousand Talents Plan. In 2016, Zhu was recruited into the Hundred Talents Plan of CAS () and in 2017 also joined the Tianjin Youth Thousand Talents Plan (). In 2017, Zhang Yiheng was selected for the Tianjin Thousand Talents Plan ( ) and the Hundred Talents Plan of CAS (). That year, Zhang was also a candidate for the National Thousand Talents Plan ().253
Shi Shan () (arrested 2017; convicted 2019; sentenced 2020)
Shi Shan is a Chinese-born, US citizen who was sentenced to 16 months in prison and ordered to forfeit more than US$330,000 (A$458,000) after being found guilty of conspiracy to steal trade secrets.254 He's the president of CMB International and is a shareholder of its parent company, Taizhou CBM Future New Material Science and Technology Co. Ltd. (CBMF), which is located in Zhejiang Province.255 CBMF agreed to assist him in applying for the Thousand Talents Plan.256 In his application, Shi wrote that he would build `China's first deep sea drilling buoyance material production line' by moving `to digest/ absorb the relevant, critical US technology'. In order to achieve this, he conspired to steal trade secrets by poaching employees from the US subsidiary of Swedish company Trelleborg and enticing them to bring technical data to his company.257 Former and current employees were targeted for hiring for the purpose of advancing CBMF's capability to manufacture syntactic foam. The information taken from Trelleborg was patented and used to create a syntactic-foam manufacturing process in China, then offered in bids to PRC-controlled institutions such as the People's Liberation Army and the Chinese National Offshore Oil Corporation.258 Shi was arrested along with five other individuals in the US after he and CBM International attempted to market related technology in the District of Columbia.259
Wang Chunzai () (arrested and charged 2017; pleaded guilty; sentenced 2019)
Wang Chunzai is a Chinese-born American climate scientist who has been sentenced to a term of time served for knowingly and wilfully receiving a salary from the PRC for work being undertaken in the US.260 He worked at the Atlantic Oceanographic and Meteorological Laboratory of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), which is an agency of the US Department of Commerce, from 2000 to 2016.261 The indictment states that, beginning in 2010, Wang received payments for his work at NOAA from the PRC's Changjiang Scholars program, 973 Plan and Thousand Talents Plan. He was selected as a Changjiang Scholar at Ocean University of China in 2009.262 In 2016, he was also selected for the Hundred Talents Plan of CAS () and returned to China to work at the South China Sea Institute of Oceanology at CAS.263 Following sentencing in the US, Wang returned to China and now works as a researcher at CAS.264
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Policy Brief: Hunting the phoenix: the Chinese Communist Party's global search for technology and talent
Pang Wei () (charged May 2015)
Pang Wei is a Chinese scientist who has been charged by the US Department of Justice with industrial espionage.265 He's one of six Chinese scientists accused of stealing thin-film bulk acoustic resonator (FBAR) radio technology from two US companies to benefit Tianjin University.266 Pang began working at Avago Technologies in Colorado in 2005. According to the indictment, in 2008, Tianjin University allegedly agreed to support Pang and his co-conspirators in establishing an FBAR technology manufacturing facility in China as they continued working for US companies.267 They developed a scheme to obscure the source of trade secrets, and, in mid-2009, Pang resigned from his US company to accept a professorship at Tianjin University.268 He reportedly joined the Thousand Talents Plan in 2014.269 The indictment alleges that Pang and his co-conspirators stole confidential and proprietary information that was shared with Tianjin University, which led to the formation of a joint venture (ROFS Microsystems) that produces FBARs for civilian and military use.270 One co-conspirator, Zhang Hao, was arrested in Los Angeles after arriving on a flight from China in May 2015, while Pang and the other suspects are believed to be in China.271 Pang is currently an expert at the Nanchang Microtechnology Research Institute at Tianjin University.272
Long Yu (arrested 2014; pleaded guilty 2016; convicted 2017)
Long Yu is a Chinese citizen who pleaded guilty to the theft of trade secrets and unlawful export in 2016.273 According to a US Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations report on CCP talent-recruitment programs, he was the target of one of the earliest FBI criminal investigations of Thousand Talents Plan participants.274 Long was an engineer at United Technologies Research Center (UTRC), a US defence company, and worked on engines for the F-22 and F-35 fighter jets. In 2013, he began interacting with CAS's Shenyang Automation Institute (SAI, ) and referenced export-controlled materials and his defence work in his job application to SAI. He joined SAI in 2014 and brought with him a hard drive belonging to UTRC that contained trade secrets and export-controlled technology. He was arrested in November 2014 on his way to China and convicted in 2017 to time served after pleading guilty.275
Zhao Huajun () (arrested and charged March 2013; sentenced August 2013)
Zhao Huajun is a Chinese scientist who was sentenced by a US court to time served for accessing a computer without authorisation. He was hired as a research scientist at the Medical College of Wisconsin Cancer Center in August 2011.276 In 2013, he was charged with economic espionage after a colleague reported that vials of C-25 compound, a potential anti-cancer agent, were missing.277 The criminal complaint alleged that Zhao used his employment and position to illegally acquire patented cancer research material that he planned to pass off as his own and provide to Zhejiang University in China.278 However, the vials were never found, and Zhao pleaded guilty to a reduced charge of illegally downloading research data and obtaining information worth more than US$5,000.279 In September 2013, a month after his sentencing, Zhao was recruited by Zhejiang Chinese Medicine University through the Qianjiang Scholars () program.280 He's currently the director of the university's Institute of Chinese Medicine Pharmacology.281 In 2014, Zhao was also selected as a `first-level trainee' of Zhejiang Province's 151 Talent Plan.282
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Yang Chunlai () (charged 2011; convicted 2015)
See page 22.
Liu Ruopeng () (investigated 2010)
Chinese entrepreneur Liu Ruopeng has been accused by the FBI and his Duke University PhD supervisor of stealing technology.283 Liu's supervisor was Professor David Smith, a world-leading expert on metamaterials that can manipulate electromagnetic radiation.284 Smith's research received funding from the US Department of Defense because of its potential military applications.285
As a student at Smith's laboratory between 2006 and 2009, Liu collaborated with his former teacher, Professor Cui Tiejun of China's Southeast University.286 Cui was in charge of a metamaterials laboratory established under the Chinese Government's Project 111 talent-recruitment scheme.287 Liu encouraged Smith to work with Cui and facilitated their collaboration.288 According to an FBI report, Liu shared information with Cui and invited his team to Smith's laboratory. The visitors recorded details of the laboratory and cloned it in China.289
A former FBI official told NBC News that the technologies Liu took to China were being targeted by the Chinese Government and that `[The FBI] know that certain government officials and operatives met with him while he was in the United States.' An FBI investigation into Liu's conduct started in 2010 but was later closed due to a lack of evidence.290
In 2009, Liu returned to China and established the Shenzhen Dapeng Kuang-Chi Technology Co. Ltd, which develops technologies in areas such as electrical materials, new energy, communication, computer engineering and bioengineering.291 Liu's team, funded by Shenzhen's Peacock Program for Overseas High-Level Talents, was reportedly one of the first research teams recruited from overseas by Guangdong Province.292 A research institute tasked to develop cross-disciplinary advanced technology and applications was also set up, and Liu was appointed as its president.293 By 2016, Liu was worth an estimated US$2.6 billion.294 His company has collaborated with Chinese state-owned defence conglomerates.295 In 2017, Liu said that his company had been a `militarycivil fusion enterprise' from its inception.296 He's now an executive council member of the China Academy for Science and Technology and a member of the National People's Congress and the CCP.297 He also holds senior positions in several united front groups, such as the All-China Federation of Returned Overseas Chinese.298
Noshir Gowadia (arrested October 2005; indicted 2007; convicted 2010; sentenced 2011)
Noshir Gowadia is a US citizen who was sentenced to 32 years in prison for communicating classified national defence information to the PRC, illegally exporting military technical data, money laundering, filing false tax returns and other offences.299 Gowadia worked as part of an ultra-secret special access program for B-2 Spirit bomber developer and manufacturer Northrop Aircraft Inc. from 1968 to 1989.300 He later worked as a contractor involved in classified research for the US Government on missiles and aircraft until 1997, when his security clearance was terminated.301 He also worked at the Los Alamos National Laboratory in the 1990s before establishing his own consulting company.302 From July 2003 to June 2005, Gowadia took six trips to China and revealed classified information when providing design, test support and test data analysis services in order to assist the PRC with its cruise missile system.303
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Policy Brief: Hunting the phoenix: the Chinese Communist Party's global search for technology and talent
His design for the PRC of a low-signature cruise missile exhaust system was capable of rendering a Chinese cruise missile resistant to detection by infrared missile trackers.304 He was paid at least US$110,000 (A$153,000) by the Chinese Government and used three foreign entities he had established to hide, launder and disguise the income he received.305
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Notes
1 Those conditions include lucrative wages, the creation of tailored venture capital firms and dedicated technology parks. For an influential and detailed study of the domestic infrastructure of PRC technology-transfer efforts, as well as much of its overseas activities through the State Administration of Foreign Experts Affairs, in particular, see Bill Hannas, James Mulvenon, Anna Puglisi, Chinese industrial espionage: technology acquisition and military modernisation, Routledge, London and New York, 2013.
2 See, for example, `""' [Zhigong Party Jiangsu Committee's first `Attracting Phoenixes Project' has bountiful results], Jiangsu Committee of the Zhigong Party, 2 January 2011, online; Tang Jingli [], ` ' [Building nests to attract phoenixes and gather talents and knowledge, international collaboration for innovation], Ministry of Education, 5 April 2012, online; `"" ""' [Building nests to attract phoenixes and gather talents, Zhejiang holds the `strong talent enterprises' promotional event], Zhejiang Online, 18 July 2019, online.
3 See Alex Joske, The party speaks for you: foreign interference and the Chinese Communist Party's united front system, ASPI, Canberra, June 2020, online.
4 Xi Jinping [], `100' [Xi Jinping: Speech at the celebration of the 100th anniversary of the founding of the Western Returned Scholars Association], Chinese Communist Party News, 21 October 2013, online.
5 `' [Xi Jinping: Set sights on the cutting-edge of world science and technology and guide the direction of technological development; seize this strategic opportunity and meet the challenge of building a strong country in terms of science and technology], Xinhua, 28 May 2018, online.
6 Elsa Kania, `Made in China 2025, explained', The Diplomat, 2 February 2019, online; PRC State Council, `2025' [Made in China 2025], www.gov.cn, 8 May 2015, online; China's National Medium-Long Term Science and Technology Development Plan (20062020) highlighted the goal of indigenous innovation: online .
7 China's 2017 State Council Plan on Building a National Technology Transfer System describes talent recruitment as a form of technology transfer. See State Council, `' [Plan on Building a National Technology Transfer System], www.gov.cn, 15 September 2017, online.
8 `265.11' [The number of Chinese returning from studying abroad has reached 2,651,100], Economic Daily, 12 April 2017, online.
9 `: ' [PRC overseas mission: amid the flow of tens of thousands of talents returning to China, we do not spare energy in building bridges], www.gov.cn, 4 June 2014, online.
10 These estimates are based on the conservative assumption that 60,000 individuals have been recruited from abroad through CCP talent-recruitment programs since 2008. Data on 3,500 participants in the Thousand Talents Plan was used to estimate the proportion recruited from each country.
11 Clive Hamilton, Alex Joske, `United Front activities in Australia', Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security, 2018, online; Ben Packham, `Security experts warn of military threat from Chinese marine project', The Australian, 10 February 2020, online; Alex Joske, `The company with Aussie roots that's helping build China's surveillance state', The Strategist, 26 August 2019, online; Ben Packham, `Professor, Chinese generals co-authored defence research', The Australian, 31 July 2019, online; Geoff Wade, Twitter, 25 February 2020, online.
12 Xi Jinping [], `100' [Xi Jinping: Speech at the celebration of the 100th anniversary of the founding of the Western Returned Scholars Association].
13 Hannas et al., Chinese industrial espionage: technology acquisition and military modernization.
14 `' [The beginning and end of the Central Leading Small Group for Introducing Foreign Expertise], Baicheng County Party Building Online, 30 September 2019, online.
15 `' [New progress in China's talent work], China Online, 28 June 2005, online.
16 `' [Notice on the CCP General Office circulating `Recommendations of the Central Talent Work Coordination Small Group on implementing the overseas high-level talent recruitment plan'], China Talent Online, 20 June 2012, online.
17 `2003' [Recording the country's talent development since the 2003 National Talent Work Conference], People's Daily. Many of these events, such as Liaoning Province's China Overseas Scholar Innovation Summit ( ) and Guangzhou's Convention on Exchange of Overseas Talents and Guangzhou, were first held before 2003. `2018 ' [2018 Convention on Exchange of Overseas Talents], Western Returned Scholars Association (WRSA), 24 December 2018, online ; ` ' [The Overseas Scholar Entrepreneurship Week has a clear brand effect], Sina, 26 May 2010, online.
18 `' [Interim measures for introducing overseas high-level talent], Ministry of Natural Resources of the PRC, 14 October 2013, online; `Editor's note', online.
19 David Zweig, Wang Huiyao, `Can China bring back the best? The Communist Party organizes China's search for talent', The China Quarterly, 215:590615.
20 `The global AI talent tracker', Macro Polo, Paulson Institute, 2020, online.
21 Remco Zwetsloot, Jacob Feldgoise, James Dunham, Trends in US intention-to-stay rates of international PhD graduates across nationality and STEM fields, Center for Security and Emerging Technology, April 2020, online.
22 `Proclamation on the suspension of entry as nonimmigrants of certain students and researchers from the People's Republic of China', The White House, Washington DC, 29 May 2020, online.
23 Aruna Viswanatha, Kate O'Keeffe, `China's funding of US researchers raises red flags', Wall Street Journal, 30 January 2020, online.
24 `Case 1:05-cr-00486-HG-KSC, Document 133, filed in the US District Court, District of Hawaii', Federation of American Scientists, 25 October 2007, online.
25 Dinesh Ramde, `Prosecutor: Researcher stole cancer data for China', Associated Press, 3 April 2013, online; `Foreign economic espionage investigation leads to arrest', press release, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 2 April 2013, online.
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Policy Brief: Hunting the phoenix: the Chinese Communist Party's global search for technology and talent
26 `39""', Zhejiang Provincial People's Government, 22 September 2013, online. Zhao now serves in several Chinese scientific associations and runs a pharmacology institute at Zhejiang Chinese Medicine University: `' [Zhao Huajun], Zhejiang Chinese Medicine University Office of Academic Research, 11 July 2018, online.
27 US Department of Justice (US DoJ), `Order: United States of America v. Xiaorong You aka Shannon You and Liu Xiangchen', US Government, 12 February 2019, online.
28 `Dr Qin Yixuan, Chairman of Ecoronco, selected in the 14th batch of national "Thousand Talents Plan" experts', AcceleCom, 25 June 2018, online; `Introduction to the national "Thousand Talents Plan"', Kota Academic, no date, online.
29 `""' [First Thousand Talents Plan Entrepreneurship Competition Finale held in Suzhou], www.gov.cn, 28 March 2013, online.
30 Ben Packham, `UQ researcher probed over AI Uighur surveil', The Australian, 26 August 2019, online; Joske, `The company with Aussie roots that's helping build China's surveillance state'.
31 `Spy fears prompt China to censor its own recruitment drive', Bloomberg, 20 September 2018, online; ` ' [Targeted by America, China won't mention the Thousand Talents Plan any more for its talent recruitment], CNA, 5 October 2018, online.
32 The earliest articles on the part of the website for articles related to the Thousand Talents Plan come from September 2018--after all earlier articles had been deleted: `||||' [Thousand Talents Plan introduction | news | latest announcement | Overseas high-level talent innovation base | Human resources service center], online.
33 `Thousand Talents Plan recruitment notice', Tsinghua University, no date, online. 34 In some cases, it's possible that this isn't particularly beneficial to the Chinese Government. Some cases of fraud involving the Thousand
Talents Plan have been raised within China. Elsa Kania, pers. comm., 21 April 2020. 35 [Ding Xianchun], Tianjin University, no date, online. 36 Wang Huiyao, Miao Lü, ` | CCG'[Global flows and sharing of talent--CCG research], Center for China and Globalization,
14 October 2019, online. 37 Alex Joske, The China Defence Universities Tracker, ASPI, Canberra, 25 November 2019, online. 38 Danielle Cave, Fergus Ryan, Vicky Xiuzhong Xu, Mapping China's tech giants: AI and surveillance, ASPI, Canberra, 28 November 2019, online. 39 ` ' [Cheng Wenlong, technical director of Kaihui Technology Co. Ltd:
Steady and far-reaching, forge ahead and climb the peak], longvip, 6 August 2017, online. 40 See, for example, Packham, `Professor, Chinese generals co-authored defence research'. For a detailed study of research collaboration with
the PLA, see Alex Joske, Picking flowers, making honey, ASPI, Canberra, 30 October 2018, online. 41 Peter Mattis, `The analytic challenge of understanding Chinese intelligence services', Studies in Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, US
Government, 2012, 56(3):4757, online; Peter Mattis, `China's misunderstood spies', The Diplomat, 31 October 2011, online. 42 Betsy Woodruff Swan, `Grand jury indicts Harvard prof for lying about China funding', Politico, 9 June 2020, online. 43 Mattis, `The analytic challenge of understanding Chinese intelligence services'. 44 For a description of the role of the State Administration of Foreign Experts Affairs in talent recruitment and technology transfer, see Hannas
et al., Chinese industrial espionage. 45 See, for example `""' [Unswervingly push forward the Thousand Talents Plan], People's Daily, 16 March 2015, online. 46 Peter Mattis, Matt Schrader, `America can't beat Beijing's tech theft with racial profiling', War on the Rocks, 23 July 2019, online. 47 Mara Hvistendahl, `The FBI's China obsession', The Intercept, 2 February 2020, online. 48 Zhang Hailei [],'' [Hangzhou: District-level talent workstations successfully recruit talent],
People's Daily (overseas edition), 4 July 2013, online. 49 These stations are known by a variety of names, often depending on which agency in China they report to, but appear to operate in similar
fashion. `Overseas talent workstation' () and `overseas talent recruitment workstation' () are among the most common names. Some are called `overseas talent recruitment liaison stations' (), `overseas talent recruitment liaison points' (), `overseas talent hiring workstations' (), `overseas talent recruitment and knowledge introduction workstations' () or `overseas talent liaison offices' () . 50 `40020...' [Jiangbei has established the first overseas talent attraction station in Europe. More than 400 projects and more than 20 teams have successfully settled down. In the future ...], Xuehua, 27 November 2018, online. 51 `' [Hangzhou: District-level talent recruitment stations successfully recruit talent], People's Daily Overseas Edition, 4 July 2013, online. 52 PRC State Council, `""' [State Council's notice on the issuing of the 13th Five-Year Plan], PRC Government, 28 July 2016, online; `' [CCP Central Committee issues `Thoughts on deepening the talent development system mechanism's reform'], Xinhua, 21 March 2016, online. 53 Some stations may no longer be active, since contracts for them apply to a fixed period and might not always be extended. 54 `' [Fujian Provincial Overseas Chinese Affairs Office establishes first four overseas talent-recruitment and knowledge-introduction locations in Canada], fjsen.com, 21 July 2016, online. 55 Joanna Chiu, `Ambassador John McCallum says it would be "great for Canada" if US drops extradition request for Huawei's Meng Wanzhou', The Star, 25 January 2019, online. 56 `: ' [Canadian Minnanese businessman Wei Chengyi: risk-takers win out, honesty is the foundation], Overseas Chinese Online, 16 March 2020, online; Craig Offman, `The making of Michael Chan', Globe and Mail, 15 May 2018, online; Mike Adler, `Chinese-Canadian organizations demand apologies for stories in Globe and Mail', Toronto.com, 30 June 2015, online.
49
57 For an example of a report on the performance of a station, including names of individuals it recruited and promotional events it held, see `2018' [2018 Weihai City overseas talent-recruitment workstations annual work completion status release], All-Japan Federation of Overseas Chinese Professionals, 24 November 2018, online.
58 `40' [Important! Degree holders under the age of 40 can directly settle in Tianjin], Australia Chinese Cultural Education Exchange Center, online; `2019' [Notice from the City Social Affairs Bureau about developing 2019 financial support application work in 2019 to encourage intermediary organisations to recruit talent projects,' Tianjin Municipal People's Government, 25 October 2019, online; `Fuzhou hires overseas talent ambassadors to provide referral rewards and financial subsidies', 52hrtt.com, online.
59 `' [About us], Thousand Talents Think Tank, online; the reference to the think tank's database has since been removed: `About us', 1000thinktank.com, online.
60 `' [Scientists Online big data charts out a map of talent for Zhejiang's special industries], Sohu, 21 November 2017, online.
61 `""' [Notice about the recommendation of Tianjin City overseas talent workstations], Tianjin Municipal Human Resources and Social Security Bureau, 10 August 2016, online.
62 `' [Qingdao City overseas talent recruitment knowledge introduction workstation temporary management regulations], Golden Career, 2014, online.
63 ("" ' [Zhuhai City management regulations on Haizhi Plan Workstations (trial)], Zhuhai Association for Science and Technology, 2 July 2019, online.
64 `' [Shandong University overseas talent workstation provisional management regulations], Shandong University, 26 June 2018, online.
65 `' [Guangzhou Development Zone established overseas talent workstation], International Investment and Trading Network, online.
66 `2017 work summary of the Provincial Overseas Chinese Affairs Office', Jiangsu Overseas Chinese Exchange Association, Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of Jiangsu Provincial Government, 18 May 2018, online.
67 `' [Qingdao City officially launches provisional management regulations for overseas talent recruitment knowledge introduction workstations], Qingdao United Front, 11 December 2014, online.
68 Hannas et al., Chinese industrial espionage.
69 Regulations on talent recruitment stations published by the government of Haimen City in Hainan Province claim that the Association of Thousand Talents Program (), which is a branch of the UFWD's WRSA, has overseas liaison stations that often host talent-recruitment stations. The regulations also claim that overseas parts of companies host talent-recruitment stations. See ` ' [Notice on the issuing of the Temporary Regulations on Establishment and Management of Haimen City Talent Recruitment Workstations], Haimen City Social Affairs Bureau, 24 August 2018, online.
70 `' [Wuxi City delegation visits and signs up a China (Jiangyin) overseas talent-recruitment knowledge-introduction workstation], University College Dublin Confucius Institute, 14 May 2015, online.
71 `Overseas workstations recruited 1,500 returnees', www.liuxuehr.com, 25 August 2014, online.
72 By 2016, the Thousand Talents Plan had reportedly recruited 6,000 people. See `265.11' [My country's returned overseas students reach 2,651,100], www.gov.cn, 12 December 2017, online. The Hundred Talents Plan is one of China's first major talent recruitment plans and was set up by the Chinese Academy of Sciences in 1994. By 2014, its 20th anniversary, it had recruited more than 2,200 scientists for the academy. Assuming that roughly 100 are recruited each year, approximately 900 scientists would have been recruited between 2008 and 2016, inclusive. See `""` [The Chinese Academy of Sciences kicks off the new Hundred Talents Plan for overseas and domestic talents], People's Daily, 25 November 2014, online.
73 `Practice and thinking on the introduction of high-level overseas talents in Zhejiang Province', Zhejiang Party School, 26 December 2018, online.
74 `About the company', Zhejiang Painier Technology Co. Ltd, no date, online.
75 `Practice and thinking on the introduction of high-level overseas talents in Zhejiang Province'; `Zhejiang Jinhua insists on grasping the "Double Dragon Plan"', Sohu, 24 October 2018, online.
76 `Can't overseas talents come back all at once? The Zhejiang Merchants Conference thought of these methods', Xinlan Net, 1 December 2017, online.
77 `Record of the Chinese New Year Gala of the Year of the Horse', CRI Online, 13 February 2014, online.
78 `Li Xuelin, UK: A Jiangnan woman and her charity dream', Sohu, 14 December 2018, online.
79 `' [British Zhejiang Friendship Association joins hands with Zhejiang again], Zhejiang UK Association, no date, online.
80 `' [List of members of the Fifth Council of the China Overseas Friendship Association], State Administration of Religious Affairs, 18 June 2019, online; ` ' [Overseas Chinese compatriots and the CPPCC: one attendance, one unforgettable experience], Xinhua, 5 March 2016, online; `: ' [Li Xuelin: Walking for love, walking for peace], Zhejiang Provincial Committee of the CPPCC, 9 November 2015, online.
81 Li Hui () became deputy director of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office's International Department after completing his term in the UK. See Lu Yi [], `' [OCAO International Department Deputy Director Li Hui visits Austria for evaluation and exchange], Nouvelles d'Europe, 24 August 2016, online; `' [UK Changzhou Association established in Birmingham], UK Chinese Journal (), 6 November 2014, pg. 13, online.
82 `' [British Zhejiang Friendship Association joins hands with Zhejiang again].
83 `' [NWPU Melbourne Alumni Association helps the university's international collaboration and talent introduction], linstitute, 1 February 2019, online.
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Policy Brief: Hunting the phoenix: the Chinese Communist Party's global search for technology and talent
84 `' [NWPU Melbourne Alumni Association talent-recruitment and knowledge-introduction workstation recruits talents for Xi'an], NWPU Alumni Association, 12 April 2018, online.
85 `Northwestern Polytechnical University', Unitracker, ASPI, Canberra, 2020, online.
86 US DoJ, `Chinese national arrested for conspiring to illegally export US origin goods used in anti-submarine warfare to China', news release, US Government, 21 June 2018, online; US DoJ, `Chinese national allegedly exported devices with military applications to China', news release, US Government, 2 November 2018, online.
87 `()' [The first European and American Students Association (Chinese Overseas Students Association) Overseas Students Innovation and Entrepreneurship Competition], Ausinan Science & Technology Society, 11 March 2017, online.
88 `'[About the organisation], ASUCS, no date, online; `2014 ` [2014 Suzhou Entrepreneurship Competition], University of Technology Sydney Chinese Students & Scholars Association, 2 June 2014, online; Clive Hamilton, Alex Joske `United Front activities in Australia', submission to Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security, 2018, online.
89 All-Japan Federation of Overseas Chinese Professionals, online. 90 `' [Organisational structure], All-Japan Federation of Overseas Chinese Professionals, no date, online. 91 `' [Wang Xianen, President of the Chinese Student Association in Japan:
International students should love their country and their hometowns and promote exchanges], Live Japan, 27 December 2018, online; Homepage, All-Japan Federation of Overseas Chinese Professionals, no date, online; `' [Zhejiang Quzhou City signed talent work station agreement with Japan Federation], liuxuehr, 15 June 2015, online; ` ' [Liaoning Province Panjin City Overseas Talent Recruitment Station], All-Japan Federation of Overseas Chinese Professionals, no date, online; `' [Wang Xianen, President of the Chinese Student Association in Japan: International students should love their country and their hometowns and promote exchanges]; ` ' [The first overseas talent recruitment workstation in Fushan District was established], Yantai Real Estate, 14 September 2019, online; `2018' [Announcement on the completion of the annual work of the Weihai Overseas Talent Attraction Workstation in 2018], All-Japan Federation of Overseas Chinese Professionals, 24 November 2018, online; ` ' [Japan Federation delegation attends first China Ningbo overseas engineers conference], Zhongwen daobao, 24 March 2018, online. 92 `' [Our city holds a forum for talent exchange in Japan], Dazhongwang, 25 August 2017, online; ` ' [The Association of Students Studying in Japan and Chengxintang jointly organized a TCM forum to care about women's health], newsduan, 25 April 2018, online; `' [Students studying in Japan establish artificial intelligence research association], Chubun, July 2017, online. 93 ` ' [All-Japan Federation of Chinese Professionals holds exchange forum; former Japanese prime minister attends], Overseas Chinese Online, 4 August 2014, online. The nature of WRSA overseas stations is unclear. However, they probably carry out similar activities to talent-recruitment stations. 94 2018' [2018 evaluation], Weihai Government, no date, online. 95 `·' [Professor Kortunov Vyacheslav received the Qilu Friendship Award of Shandong Province], Harbin Institute of Technology (HIT), 6 November 2019, online. The scientist, Vyacheslav Kortunov, also works for a unmanned aerial vehicle company established by HIT. The company is associated with a HIT laboratory that carries out both military and civilian work. `Sheet1', Hlkjcs, no date, online; `' [Weihai Tianhang Information Technology Co. Ltd], zsdlw, no date, online. See ASPI ICPC's China Defence Universities Tracker for more details on HIT's defence research; `Harbin Institute of Technology', Unitracker, ASPI, Canberra, 2020, online. 96 `·' [A tale of two cities: A Trip in England and Italy: refusing to walk around and see the flowers, travel back to Victorian London], 163.com, 12 September 2018, online; `'[The Promotion of China Reunification Society in UK], ukpcrs, no date, online. 97 See endnote 81 on Li Hui (). 98 ` ' [The German Changzhou Association is established, serving as an exchange platform for Germans with Changzhou heritage], Sohu, 4 September 2019, online. 99 ` ' [The British Changzhou Friendship Association was established in Birmingham; Liu Weiqun was the first president], www.chinaqw.com, 13 October 2014, online. 100 ` ' [France Changzhou Association founded in Paris; Shi Qiaofang selected as its first president], www.chinaqw.com, 21 October 2014, online. 101 ` ' [Promote and guide the construction of foreign overseas Chinese associations; manifest and raise the results of the Overseas Chinese Federation's work], Jiangsu Provincial Overseas Chinese Federation, 7 March 2018, online. 102 `' [Australian Changzhouese and Wujinese Friendship Association established], 21 March 2016, online.
103 `Tesla sues former employees for allegedly stealing data, Autopilot source code', Reuters, 22 March 2019, online.
104 Sean O'Kane, `Former Tesla employee admits uploading Autopilot source code to his iCloud', The Verge, 10 July 2019, online.
105 `Tesla, Inc., a Delaware corporation, plaintiff, v. Guangzhi Cao, an individual', US District Court, Northern District of California, case 3:19-cv01463-VC, 21 March 2019, online.
106 `Guangzhi Cao', Purdue University, 2019, online; ` ""··' [The `Hidden Dragon and Crouching Tiger' of the Wenzhou Doctors Association of the United States; there are Guggenheim Award winners, Apple Google engineers ...], Wenzhou Daily, 14 April 2017, online.
107 `""' [Scholars study why Wenzhou became the `hometown of mathematicians'], Tech Sina, 23 August 2002, online.
51
108 ` ""··' [The `Hidden Dragon and Crouching Tiger' of the Wenzhou Doctors Association of the United States; there are Guggenheim Award winners, Apple Google engineers ...].
109 Shi Li [], `' [Leader of an American Wenzhou PhDs group], World Wenzhounese, Issue 1, 2012, 35, online. 110 `"" ' [Yueqing City implements `matchmaking' plan and actively introduces high-level
overseas talents], , 30 December 2011, online.
111 This office is a local affiliate of the State Administration of Foreign Expert Affairs. 112 `"" ' [Yueqing City implements `matchmaking' plan and actively introduces high-level
overseas talents]. 113 ` ""··' [The `Hidden Dragon and Crouching Tiger' of the Wenzhou Doctors
Association of the United States; there are Guggenheim Award winners, Apple Google engineers ...]. 114 `""' [Be a good ferryman for Wenzhou-US cooperation], Europe Headlines, 1 November 2017, online. 115 ` ""··' [The `Hidden Dragon and Crouching Tiger' of the Wenzhou Doctors
Association of the United States; there are Guggenheim Award winners, Apple Google engineers ...].
116 FBI, `Libertyville man arrested for theft of trade secrets from CME Group', press release, US Government, 2 July 2011, online.
117 Kim Janssen, `Chinese immigrant spared prison for Chicago Merc trade secrets theft', Chicago Sun Times, 3 March 2015, online.
118 Association of Chinese-American Scientists and Engineers, online.
119 For a study of these organisations see Ryan Fedasiuk and Emily Weinstein, `Overseas Professionals and Technology Transfer to China', CSET, 21 July 2020, online.
120 The OCAO was an administrative office under the PRC State Council (central government) until March 2018, when the government announced that OCAO was to be absorbed under the CPC Central Committee United Front Work Department; ` ' [The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China issued the `Deepening Party and State Institutional Reform Plan'], 21 March 2018, online. The OCAO still exists in name; however, it isn't synonymous with the UFWD's overseas Chinese affairs bureaus.
121 `' [Xu Yousheng attended the banquet hosted by the Chinese-American Scientists, Engineers and Professionals Association], Association of Chinese-American Scientists and Engineers, 3 May 2010, online.
122 `"" [The Association of Chinese-American Scientists and Engineers (ACSE): The 17th Annual Conference: USChina Cooperation for Global Economy Recovery] 10 October 2009, online.
123 Wang Jian, `' [American Chinese Society and other associations warmly welcome the delegation of the WRSA], Chicago Fudan Alumni Association, no date , online.
124 Wang Zhao [] `' [Yang Chunlai: The moon is brighter at home], People's Daily, 13 June 2006, online.
125 Ibid. 126 `' [Zhangjiagang, Jiangsu and professional organisations from the United States jointly
organised a talent recruitment fair in Chicago], www.chinaqw.com, 16 March 2009, online. 127 `' [Zhangjiagang, Jiangsu and professional organizations from the United States jointly
organised a talent-recruitment fair in Chicago].
128 Criminal complaint against Yang (not available online).
129 US DoJ, `Plea agreement: United States of America v. Chunlai Yang', US District Court, Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, 2012, online.
130 US DoJ, `Plea agreement'. 131 Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian, `China built an army of influence agents in the US', Daily Beast, 18 July 2018, online; `
' [Yang Chunlai: Overseas Chinese compatriots should settle and set out roots, actively integrate into mainstream society], Overseas Chinese Online, 21 June 2007, online.
132 Janssen, `Chinese immigrant spared prison for Chicago Merc trade secrets theft'. 133 `""' [Association of Chinese Scientists and
Engineers in the US 14th Annual Conference and Seminar on `China's Economic Hot Spots and Opportunities for Chinese in the US'], 23 September 2006, online; `' [ACSE holds its annual meeting], People's Daily, 13 October 2008, online. For an investigation into Chao's links to China, see Michael Forsythe, Eric Lipton, Keith Bradsher, Sui-Lee Wee, `A "bridge" to China, and her family's business in the Trump cabinet', New York Times, 2 June 2019, online. 134 `' [Thousand talents plan], National University of Defence Technology (NUDT), no date, online. 135 `', [Gao Wei was hired as a distinguished professor of our school], NUDT, 23 May 2014, online; `Professor Wei Gao, ONZM, of Auckland, for services to science and engineering', Office of the Governor-General of New Zealand, 6 October 2016, online. 136 `'[ Gao Wei], Chengdu University, no date online. 137 `' [The Bureau of Foreign Experts and the Association of Chinese Scientists in New Zealand signed a cooperation agreement], Education Office of the Consulate General of the People's Republic of China in Auckland, 6 May 2014, online. 138 ` ' [Overseas (New Zealand) talent work liaison station established in Fuhai's information port, Gao Wei appointed principal scientist], Liuxuehr, 12 April 2018, online. 139 `' [An interview with Taixinao], China Education Press Agency, 18 August 2012, online. 140 `' [Gao Wei: Hope to bring advanced technology back to China and apply it to industrial production], www.chinaqw.com, 21 June 2017, online.
141 Feng Xiaoyang (ed.), Yearbook of Chinese in Australia 2014, 292.
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Policy Brief: Hunting the phoenix: the Chinese Communist Party's global search for technology and talent
142 `' [NSW Student Association's general working meeting held successfully], NSW Chinese Students & Scholars Association, 27 May 2012, online.
143 `'[NUDT attracting overseas talent meeting], Chinese Association of Science and Technology in Switzerland, 11 June 2013, online.
144 `' [NUDT and Madrid Chinese students association holds overseas talent-recruitment workshop], Xinhua Online, 4 May 2016, online.
145 `201417'[In 2014 17 of our academy's overseas high level talents joined the Thousand Taletnts Plan], China Academy of Engineering Physics, 10 June 2015, online.
146 Alex Joske, The China defence universities tracker, ASPI, Canberra, 2020, online. 147 Stephen Chen, `America's hidden role in Chinese weapons research', South China Morning Post, 29 March 2017, online. 148 ` ' [Sichuan provincial comes to the UK to recruit talents, says overseas students are more
focused on the long term], ukchinese.com, 1 June 2018, online. 149 Mapping China's tech giants, ASPI, Canberra, 2020, online. 150 `' [China Electronics Technology organises overseas high-level talents association], `
' [CETC holds overseas high-level talents association], xmluyida, 5 June 2018, online; ` CETC2017' [CETC 2017 USA talent meeting], 38th Research Institute of CETC, 30 October 2017, online. 151 `' [Academician Wu Manqing of the Chinese Academy of Engineering visited Australia], Ausinan Science and Technology Society, 11 January 2013, online; `' [About the company], CETC 38th Research Institute, no date, online. 152 `UTS CETC Review', University of Technology Sydney (UTS), 13 September 2019, online; `New joint IET research centre with CETC', UTS, 26 April 2017, online; Danielle Cave, Brendan Thomas-Noone, `CSIRO cooperation with Chinese defence contractor should raise questions', The Guardian, 3 June 2017, online; `UTS statement to Four Corners', UTS, no date, online. 153 `[] ' [(Recruitment information) China Aerospace Electronics Technology Institute overseas universities recruitment tour], Purdue University Chinese Students and Scholars Association, 25 August 2012, online; ` ' [China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation UK High-end Talent Recruitment Fair], Sina, 5 November 2011, online. 154 China Defence Universities Tracker, ASPI, Canberra, 2020, online. 155 More than 160 defence laboratories in Chinese universities have been identified. See `Defence laboratories', China Defence Universities Tracker, ASPI, Canberra, 2020, online. 156 See, for example, `' [Research on wireless communication signal processing], National Key Laboratory of Science, no date, online; ` `' [College introduction], School of Power and Energy, no date, online. 157 Department of Education, Skills and Employment, Guidelines to counter foreign interference in the Australian university sector, Australian Government, 14 November 2019, online. 158 `()' [ Standards on work categories for foreigners coming to China], State Administration of Foreign Experts Affairs, 2018, online. 159 The Zhigong Party's Attracting Phoenixes Project, for example, isn't included. 160 US DoJ, `Harvard University professor and two Chinese nationals charged in three separate China related cases', news release, US Government, 28 January 2020, online; `Robert Plumb: Affidavit in support of application for criminal complaint', case 1:20-mj-02158-MBB, Court Listener, 27 January 2020, online. 161 `Robert Plumb: Affidavit in support of application for criminal complaint'. 162 `Harvard University professor and two Chinese nationals charged in three separate China related cases'; `The WUTHarvard Joint Nano Key Laboratory officially founded', WUT News, Wuhan University of Technology, no date, online. 163 `Liqiang Mai', Mai Research Group, International School of Materials Science and Engineering, State Key Laboratory of Advanced Technology for Materials Synthesis and Processing, no date, online. Mai's laboratory appears to sit under the State Key Laboratory of Advanced Technology for Materials Synthesis and Processing. The State Key Lab overlaps with WUT's Key Laboratory of Ministry of Education of Special Functional Materials Technology, which is a defence laboratory identified in `Wuhan University of Technology', China Defence Universities Tracker, ASPI, Canberra, 2020, online. ' ' [Zhang Lianmeng], State Key Laboratory of Advanced Technology for Materials Synthesis and Processing, 9 January 2014, online: Professor Jiang Lianmeng is head of both the State Key Lab and the Key Laboratory of Ministry of Education of Special Functional Materials Technology (defence laboratory). He also sits on a Ministry of Education defence technology committee. The overlap between the State Key Lab and the defence lab is a common pattern that may serve as a way for defence scientists to benefit from research collaboration and interactions with foreign researchers. 164 `Robert Plumb: Affidavit in support of application for criminal complaint'. 165 `Robert Plumb: Affidavit in support of application for criminal complaint'. 166 `Robert Plumb: Affidavit in support of application for criminal complaint'; Robert F Service, `Why did a Chinese university hire Charles Lieber to do battery research?', Science Magazine, 4 February 2020, online; `Charles M Lieber' [Statement on the expiration of the cooperation between our laboratory and Professor Charles M. Lieber of Harvard University], Mai Research Group, 3 July 2018, online. WUT also released a statement stating that their association had ended in 2018. 167 `Robert Plumb: Affidavit in support of application for criminal complaint'; Ellen Barry, `US accuses Harvard scientist of concealing Chinese funding', New York Times, 28 January 2020, online. 168 US DoJ, `Researcher at university arrested for wire fraud and making false statements about affiliation with a Chinese university', news release, US Government, 27 February 2020, online. 169 `Indictment: United States of America v. Anming Hu', US District Court, Eastern District of Tennessee at Knoxville, Court Listener, 25 February 2020, online.
53
170 `Indictment: United States of America v. Anming Hu'. 171 `' [Hu Anming], eol, no date, online; `' [Hu Anming], Opticsx, no date, online.
172 US DoJ, `Researcher at University of Tennessee arrested for wire fraud and making false statements about affiliation with a Chinese university', news release, US Government, 27 February 2020, online; `Indictment: United States of America v. Anming Hu'.
173 US DoJ, `Researcher at University of Tennessee arrested for wire fraud and making false statements about affiliation with a Chinese university'.
174 US DoJ, `Researcher at university arrested for wire fraud and making false statements about affiliation with a Chinese university'.
175 US DoJ, `Researcher at University of Tennessee arrested for wire fraud and making false statements about affiliation with a Chinese university'.
176 US DoJ, `Former West Virginia University professor pleads guilty to fraud that enabled him to participate in the People's Republic of China's "Thousand Talents Plan"', news release, US Government, 10 March 2020, online.
177 US DoJ, `Former West Virginia University professor pleads guilty to fraud that enabled him to participate in the People's Republic of China's "Thousand Talents Plan"'.
178 US DoJ, `Former West Virginia University professor pleads guilty to fraud that enabled him to participate in the People's Republic of China's "Thousand Talents Plan"'; `""' [Shanxi Coal Chemical Institute's `Thousand Talents Program' foreign specialist project introduced talents to achieve breakthroughs], CAS Beijing Institute, 29 March 2018, online.
179 Ibid.
180 `Former West Virginia University professor admits to fraud', AP News, 12 March 2020, online.
181 US DoJ, `Former West Virginia University professor pleads guilty to fraud that enabled him to participate in the People's Republic of China's "Thousand Talents Plan"'.
182 Aruna Viswanatha, Kate O'Keeffe, `China's funding of US researchers raises red flags', Wall Street Journal, 30 January 2020, online.
183 Viswanatha & O'Keeffe, `China's funding of US researchers raises red flags'.
184 Viswanatha & O'Keeffe, `China's funding of US researchers raises red flags'.
185 Jeffrey Mervis, `Moffitt Cancer Center details links of fired scientists to Chinese talent programs', Science Magazine, 19 January 2020, online. 186 `' [North American Alumni Association], Tianjin Medical University, no date, online; `""Alan F List
""` [Tumor hospital's Tianjin City Foreign Experts Thousand Talents Plan Professor Alan F List receives the Hai River Friendship Prize], Sohu, 2016, online.
187 Cathy Clark, `Partnering in a free-trade zone', Endeavour, 20 December 2018, online.
188 Veronica Brezina-Smith, `Former Moffitt director files lawsuit against cancer center claiming defamation', Tampa Bay Business Journal, 13 February 2020, online.
189 Jeffrey Mervis, `Fired cancer scientist says "good people are being crushed" by overzealous probes into possible Chinese ties', Science Magazine, 11 March 2020, online.
190 David Armstrong, Annie Waldman, Daniel Golden, `The Trump administration drove him back to China, where he invented a fast coronavirus test', Propublica, 18 March 2020, online.
191 Armstrong et al., `The Trump administration drove him back to China, where he invented a fast coronavirus test'; Brad Racino, Jill Castellano, `UCSD doctor resigns amid questions about undisclosed Chinese businesses', inewsource, 6 July 2019, online.
192 `'[Recruitment for Sichuan University Thousand Talents Plan selectee Professor Zhang Kang's team], Sichuan University West China Hospital, 24 June 2010, online.
193 Racino & Castellano, `UCSD doctor resigns amid questions about undisclosed Chinese businesses'. Around 2010, Zhang also set up a company called CalCyte Therapeutics. The company contracted with UCSD for its research but Zhang didn't mention the company in his conflict-of-interest disclosure with UCSD' Shiley Eye Institute.
194 Racino & Castellano, `UCSD doctor resigns amid questions about undisclosed Chinese businesses'; Armstrong et al., `The Trump administration drove him back to China, where he invented a fast coronavirus test'.
195 Racino & Castellano, `UCSD doctor resigns amid questions about undisclosed Chinese businesses'. 196 `' [Teaching and research team], Macau University of Science and Technology Medical School, no date, online. His CV on the Macau
University of Science and Technology website doesn't mention his participation in the Thousand Talents Plan, online.
197 US DoJ, `Chinese national who worked at Monsanto indicted on economic espionage charges', news release, US Government, 21 November 2019, online.
198 `Indictment: United States of America v. Haitao Xiang', case 4:19-dr-00980-HEA-JMB, US District Court, Eastern District of Missouri, Eastern Division, Court Listener, 21 November 2019, online.
199 `B' [The Chinese Academy of Sciences takes the lead in the publicity of the Hundred Talents Program Technical Talents Category B applicants], woyaoce.cn, 13 June 2016, online.
200 `Indictment: United States of America v. Haitao Xiang'; `' [Researchers], Institute of Soil Science, Chinese Academy of Sciences, no date, online; `' [Postdoctoral recruitment notice for Haitao Xiang's research group], Institute of Soil Science, Chinese Academy of Sciences, 18 September 2017, online.
201 Tim Bross, `Ex-Monsanto researcher accused of taking trade secrets to China', Bloomberg, 21 November 2019, online.
202 Bross, `Ex-Monsanto researcher accused of taking trade secrets to China'; US DoJ, `Chinese national who worked at Monsanto indicted on economic espionage charges'.
203 Matt Kempner, J Scott Trubey, `Coke trade secrets case highlights USChina tension, trade challenge', Atlanta Journal--Constitution, 18 January 2020, online; US DoJ, `Order: United States of America v. Xiaorong You aka Shannon You and Liu Xiangchen'.
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Policy Brief: Hunting the phoenix: the Chinese Communist Party's global search for technology and talent
204 Kate O'Keeffe, `Former Coke scientist accused of stealing trade secrets for Chinese venture', Wall Street Journal, 14 February 2019, online. 205 ` --' [Innovation and change: Take the initiative--look at Jinhong Group for the conversion of
new and old kinetic energy], Weihai International Port Economic and Technological Development District, 20 November 2017, online. 206 US DoJ, `Order: United States of America v. Xiaorong You aka Shannon You and Liu Xiangchen'. 207 US DoJ, `Order', United States of America v. Xiaorong You aka Shannon You and Liu Xiangchen. 208 US DoJ, `Former Los Alamos National Laboratory scientist charged with making false official statements about his contacts and involvement
with a Chinese Government program', US Government, 24 May 2019, online. 209 Scott Wyland, `Ex-LANL scientist pleads guilty to lying to government', Santa Fe New Mexican, 25 January 2020, online. For more information
on other charges, see US DoJ, `Former Los Alamos National Laboratory scientist charged with making false official statements about his contacts and involvement with a Chinese Government program'. 210 US DoJ, `Former Los Alamos National Laboratory scientist charged with making false official statements about his contacts and involvement with a Chinese Government program'; David Malakoff, `Former Los Alamos physicist denies federal charges he lied about China ties', Science Magazine, 28 May 2019, online. Lookman may have been affiliated with Xi'an Jiaotong University. There are pages online advertising an assistant position for `Distinguished Professor' Turab Lookman at the School of Materials at Xi'an Jiaotong University: `"" ' [School of Materials distinguished professor's secretary role recruitment notice], Xi'an Jiaotong University, 24 December 2018, online; `' [Xi'an Jiaotong University School of Materials], 24 December 2018, online. Lookman also co-authored a number of articles with Xue Dezhen, who is affiliated with both the Los Alamos National Laboratory and the State Key Laboratory for Mechanical Behaviour of Materials, Xi'an Jiaotong University; Dezhen Xue, Prasanna V Balachandran, John Hogden, James Theiler, Deqing Xue, Turab Lookman, `Accelerated search for materials with targeted properties by adaptive design', Nature Communications, 2016, 7:11241, online; Dezhen Xue: publication summary', Xi'an Haotong University, no date, online. 211 Wyland, `Ex-LANL scientist pleads guilty to lying to government'. 212 US DoJ, `Chinese Government employee charged in Manhattan Federal Court with participating in conspiracy to fraudulently obtain US visas', US Government, 16 September 2019, online. 213 US DoJ, `Sealed complaint: United States of America v. Zhongsan Liu', 13 September 2019, online. 214 US DoJ, `Chinese Government employee charged in Manhattan Federal Court with participating in conspiracy to fraudulently obtain US visas'. 215 Aruna Viswanatha, Kate O'Keeffe, `Chinese official charged in alleged visa scheme to recruit US science talent', Wall Street Journal, 24 September 2019, online. For contact between Liu and the Confucius Institute at the University of Massachusetts, see US DoJ, `Sealed complaint: United States of America v. Zhongsan Liu'; Deirdre Fernandes, `UMass Boston targeted in Chinese visa fraud scheme', Boston Globe, 25 September 2019, online. 216 Mihir Zaveri, `Chinese Government employee arrested in visa fraud scheme', New York Times, 17 September 2019, online. 217 Ministry of Education, `2017'[2017 Changjiang Scholars Proposed Selectees Notice], ScienceNet, 5 Janaury 2018, online; US DoJ, `University of Kansas researcher indicted for fraud for failing to disclose conflict of interest with Chinese university', US Government, 21 August 2019, online; ` ` [List of teachers], College of Chemistry, Fuzhou University, no date, online. Listed affiliation: Institute of Molecular Catalysis and In Situ/Operando Studies, State Key Laboratory of Photocatalysis on Energy and Environment, and College of Chemistry, Fuzhou University; Yu Tang, Yuechang Wei, Ziyun Wang, Shiran Zhang, Yuting Li et al., `Synergy of single-atom Ni1 and Ru1 sites on CeO2 for dry reforming of CH4', Journal of the American Chemical Society, 2019, 141(18):72837293, online. 218 `Prof. Franklin (Feng) Tao, PhD', Franklin (Feng) Tao Group, no date, online; US DoJ, `University of Kansas Researcher indicted for fraud for failing to disclose conflict of interest with Chinese university'. 219 US DoJ, `New indictment: KU researcher concealed being recruited for Chinese "talent" program', news release, US Government, 15 January 2020, online. 220 Justine Griffin, `Faculty members held jobs in China while working for UF, report says', Tampa Bay Times, 22 January 2020, online. 221 `Weihong Tan', University of Florida, no date, online; Armstrong, `The Trump administration drove him back to China, where he invented a fast coronavirus test'. 222 `' [Overseas Chinese Federation outstanding individual: Tan Weihong], All-China Federation of Returned Overseas Chinese, 28 August 2018, online; `Tan Weihong', Hunan University, 4 January 2018, online. 223 `' [Changjiang Scholars], State Key Laboratory of Chemo/Biosensing and Chemometrics, Hunan University, no date, online. 224 `' [Academician Tan Weihong appointed our school's dean], Zhejiang Cancer Hospital, 17 June 2019, online. 225 According to the criminal complaint, Li received some US$92,000 in salary from three NIH grants in 2015 while simultaneously receiving roughly US$80,000 in annual salary from CAS in 2015 and 2016; Jeffrey Mervis, `Ex-Emory scientist with ties to China charged with fraud', Science Magazine, 5 February 2020, online; `Criminal complaint: United States of America v. Xiaojiang Li', US District Court, Northern District of Georgia, Court Listener, 11 December 2019, online. 226 `Terminated Emory researcher disputes university's allegations', Science Magazine, May 2019, online; ` ' [Newest response from Li Xiaojiang: Did he hold full-time roles in the US and China at the same time?], Zhishi fenzi, 28 May 2019, online. 227 Anderson, `Scrutiny of Chinese American scientists raises fears of ethnic profiling'. 228 Mervis, `Ex-Emory scientist with ties to China charged with fraud'. 229 `5' [Public notice on Li Xiaojiang and four others visiting Kenya for official purposes and related circumstances], Guangdong Hong Kong Macau Institute of CNS Regeneration, 9 March 2018, online; Anderson, `Scrutiny of Chinese American scientists raises fears of ethnic profiling', 230 US DoJ, `Former GE engineer and Chinese businessman charged with economic espionage and theft of GE's trade secrets', news release, US Government, 23 April 2019, online.
55
231 Nanjing Tianyi Avi Tech () and Liaoning Tianyi Aviation Technology (); US DoJ, `Grand jury charges: United States of America v. Zheng Xiaoqing and Zhang Zhaoxi', US District Court for the Northern District of New York, 18 April 2019, online; `Criminal complaint: United States of America v. Xiaoqing Zheng', US District Court for the Northern District of New York, 1 August 2018, online.
232 `Aviation Industry Corporation of China', China Defence Universities Tracker, ASPI, Canberra, 2020, online.
233 ``[Expert committee on smart manufacturing], Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of Jiangsu Provincial Government and Jiangsu Overseas Exchange Association, 29 September 2018, online; `' [Introduction to Jiangsu Overseas Exchange Association], Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of Jiangsu Provincial Government, 12 January 2017, online.
234 Crowdstrike Global Intelligence Team, Huge fan of your work: How Turbine Panda and China's top spies enabled Beijing to cut corners on the C919 passenger jet, Crowdstrike, 2019, online.
235 Gordon Corera, `Looking for China's spies', BBC, 19 December 2018, online.
236 `GE' [American GE expert Zheng Xiaoqing visits our college to give an academic talk], Kaoyan, 7 July 2016, online.
237 US DoJ, `Grand jury charges: United States of America v. Yanjun Xu aka Xu Yanjun aka Qu Hui aka Zhang Hui', case: 1:18-cr-00043-TSB, US District Court, Southern District of Ohio, Western Division, 4 April 2018, online; `Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics', China Defence Universities Tracker, ASPI, Canberra, 2020, online.
238 `MD Anderson addresses national threat of foreign influence', news release,, 19 April 2019, MD Anderson, online; Mara Hvistendahl, `Major US cancer center ousts `Asian' researchers after NIH flags their foreign ties', Science Magazine, 19 April 2019, online.
239 Michael Nedelman, `Scientists with ties to China ousted from US cancer center amid fears of foreign influence', CNN Health, 25 April 2019, online.
240 Nedelman, `Scientists with ties to China ousted from US cancer center amid fears of foreign influence'; Tom Winter, `Texas cancer center ousts 3 scientists over Chinese data theft concerns', NBC News, 23 April 2019, online.
241 Winter, `Texas cancer center ousts 3 scientists over Chinese data theft concerns'.
242 Winter, `Texas cancer center ousts 3 scientists over Chinese data theft concerns'.
243 `State docket sheet: 201985326 Xie, Keping (MD) (PhD) vs. University of Texas MD Anderson Cancer Center', Office of Harris County District Clerk, Court Listener, 27 December 2019, online.
244 Brian Rogers, `MD Anderson cancer researcher cleared of child porn charges brought by hospital', AP News, 29 November 2018, online; Rachel Leingang, `Keping Xie, former UA department chair, cleared of child porn possession charge in Texas', azcentral, 29 November 2018, online.
245 Winter, `Texas cancer center ousts 3 scientists over Chinese data theft concerns'; `FBI ' [FBI strikes Thousand Talents Plan], Boxun.com, 15 September 2018, online.
246 `' [Previous councils], Chinese Association of Professionals in Science and Technology, no date, online; `FBI ' [FBI strikes Thousand Talents Plan]; `' [Chinese Civic Center elects Dr Xie Keping as its new CEO], Chinese Civic Center, no date, online.
247 `' [Chinese Civic Center elects Dr Xie Keping as its new CEO].
248 `' [Chinese Civic Center elects Dr Xie Keping as its new CEO]; `' [Chunhui Project], Education Office, Consulate-General of the People's Republic of China in Sydney, online; ` ' [Oncology expert group from American Anderson Cancer Research Center visited first affiliated hospital], XJTU News, Xi'an Jiaotong University, 11 June 2008, online; `MD' [Professor Huang Suyun and Xie Keping from MD Anderson Cancer Center in the United States came to our school to give lectures], School of Medicine, Jiangsu University, online; ` 2019' [Tongji University 2019 research student supervisor information for doctoral recruitment], Tongji University, October 2018, online.
249 US DoJ, `Former Virginia Tech professor sentenced for grant fraud, false statements, obstruction', news release, US Government, 9 September 2019, online.
250 `Criminal complaint for Yiheng Percival Zhang', Washington Post, no date, online.
251 US DoJ, `Former Virginia Tech professor sentenced for grant fraud, false statements, obstruction'.
252 US DoJ, `Former Virginia Tech professor charged in federal indictment', news release, US Government, 22 November 2017, online; `Criminal complaint for Yiheng Percival Zhang'; ' ' [Zhang Yiehn team], Bureau of Major R&D Programs Chinese Academy of Sciences, no date, online.
253 `' [Recruitment notice for the in vitro synthetic biology research group of Tianjin Institute of Industrial Biology], Chinese Academy of Sciences, 28 August 2014, online.
254 US DoJ, `American businessman who ran Houston-based subsidiary of Chinese company sentenced to prison for theft of trade secrets', news release, US Government, 11 February 2020, online.
255 `Grand jury sworn in on November 3, 2016: United States of America v. Shan Shi, Kui Bo, Gang Liu, Sam Ogoe, Uka Uche, Huang Hui and Johnny Wayne Randall', US District Court for the District of Columbia, Court Listener, 8 June 2017, online; `Sentencing memorandum: United States v. Shi', District Court, District of Columbia, Court Listener, 3 February 2020 online. In March 2014, CBMF agreed to provide 2 million of its shares to the defendant as part of a joint agreement acknowledging their mutual buoyancy material experience. The defendant agreed to actively bring in new technology and high-level talented people; Spencer S Hsu, `Houston businessman convicted of conspiring to steal trade secrets, acquitted of economic espionage for China', Washington Post, 30 June 2019, online. From 2013 until Shi's arrest in May 2017, CBMF transferred US$3.1 million to CMB International in order to maintain its operations. CBM International didn't have significant income from any source other than CBMF. CBMF is partly funded by the Chinese Government's Ministry of Industry and Information Technology.
256 `Sentencing memorandum: United States v. Shi'.
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Policy Brief: Hunting the phoenix: the Chinese Communist Party's global search for technology and talent
257 Shi acted with six other co-conspirators; `Grand jury sworn in on November 3, 2016: United States of America v. Shan Shi, Kui Bo, Gang Liu, Sam Ogoe, Uka Uche, Huang Hui and Johnny Wayne Randall'; US DoJ, `American businessman who ran Houston-based subsidiary of Chinese company sentenced to prison for theft of trade secrets'; Hsu, `Houston businessman convicted of conspiring to steal trade secrets, acquitted of economic espionage for China'.
258 `United States v. Shi: Sentencing memorandum'. CBMF formed an agreement with Harbin Engineering University (HEU) for the development of deep-water buoyancy materials. It received extensive state funding, and its research and development component was dominated by HEU employees, including Shi, who is an Overseas Professor at HEU; `----' [Doctoral supervisor: Shi Shan], College of Shipbuilding Engineering, 27 January 2016, online.
259 US DoJ, `American businessman who ran Houston-based subsidiary of Chinese company sentenced to prison for theft of trade secrets'.
260 US DoJ, `Former research oceanographer sentenced for accepting a salary from the People's Republic of China', news release, US Government, 22 February 2018, online; Thomas Brewster, `Exclusive: The FBI hunts Chinese spies at an elite American children's hospital', Forbes, 16 September 2019, online; Teresa Watanabe, `Is it police work or racial profiling? US crackdown puts Chinese scholars on edge', Los Angeles Times, 22 July 2019, online.
261 US DoJ, `Former research oceanographer sentenced for accepting a salary from the People's Republic of China'; ` ' [Chinese oceanographer Wang Chun is being sentenced. The charge given by the US Department of Justice: received the salary of the Chinese Changjiang Scholar!], Shanghai Observer, 24 February 2018, online.
262 `Indictment: United States of America v. Chunzai Wang', US District Court, Southern District of Florida, US Office of Government Ethics, 29 June 2017, online; [Wang Chunzai], South China Sea Institute of Oceanology, Chinese Academy of Sciences, no date, online; `2009' [2009 Changjiang Scholar Distinguished Professor Selection List], Sciencenet, 25 April 2010, online; Key Laboratory of Physical Oceonography, `Annual Report 2014', Qingdao National Laboratory for Marine Science and Technology, December 2014, online.
263 ` ' [Chinese American scientist Wang Chun is being sentenced for working in China at the same time], Sohu, 24 February 2018, online; `' [Chinese oceanographer Wang Chun is being sentenced. The charge given by the US Department of Justice: received the salary of the Chinese Changjiang Scholar!].
264 Ibid.
265 `Superseding indictment: The United States of America vs. Wei Pang, Huisui Zhang, Jinping Chen, Zhao Gang and Chong Zhou', US District Court, Northern District of California, Court Listener, 1 April 2015, online.
266 US DoJ, `Chinese professors among six defendants charged with economic espionage and theft of trade secrets for benefit of People's Republic of China', news release, US Government, 19 May 2015, online; `Superseding indictment: The United States of America vs. Wei Pang, Huisui Zhang, Jinping Chen, Zhao Gang and Chong Zhou'. FBARs filter incoming and outgoing wireless signals for wireless devices such as mobile phones.
267 US DoJ, `Chinese professors among six defendants charged with economic espionage and theft of trade secrets for benefit of People's Republic of China'; `Superseding indictment: The United States of America vs. Wei Pang, Huisui Zhang, Jinping Chen, Zhao Gang and Chong Zhou'.
268 US DoJ, `Chinese professors among six defendants charged with economic espionage and theft of trade secrets for benefit of People's Republic of China'; `Faculty', TJU School of Precision Instrument and Opto-Electronics Engineering, no date, online.
269 Mu Xiaoyi (), `""', Voice of America, 23 May 2015, online.
270 US DoJ, `Chinese professors among six defendants charged with economic espionage and theft of trade secrets for benefit of People's Republic of China'.
271 `US charges six Chinese nationals with economic espionage for stealing secrets from tech companies', ABC News, 20 May 2015, online. 272 `' [Yi Lianhong, Deputy Secretary of the Jiangxi Provincial
Party Committee and Governor of Jiangxi, and his delegation investigated and inspected Nanchang Institute of Microtechnology, Tianjin University], Tianjin University News, 28 May 2019, online; `Tianjin University and Nanchang City agreement for Micro Technology Research Institute', Tianjin University, no date, online.
273 US DoJ, `Chinese national admits to stealing sensitive military program documents from United Technologies', news release, US Government, 19 December 2016, online.
274 US Senate, Threats to the US research enterprise: China's talent recruitment plans, staff report to Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 18 November 2019, 93, online.
275 Edmund H Mahony, `Ex-UTC scientist sentenced for delivering secrets to China', Hartford Courant, 22 June 2017, online.
276 `Sentencing memorandum: United States of America v. Hua Jun Zhao', US District Court, Eastern District of Wisconsin, Court Listener, 3 July 2013, online.
277 Eliot Marshall, `Chinese researcher in Wisconsin accused of economic espionage', Science Magazine, 2 April 2013, online.
278 Leonard C Peace, `Foreign economic espionage investigation leads to arrest', press release, FBI, 2 April 2013, online.
279 Author, `Title of article' (from immediately previous citation); Bruce Vielmetti, `Researcher in Medical College theft case is sentenced', MilwaukeeWisconsin Journal Sentinel, 6 August 2013, online.
280 Zhejiang Provincial Government General Office, `39"" ', Zhejiang Provincial Government, 22 September 2013, online.
281 `' [Teachers enjoying a special allowance of the State Council], Zhejiang Chinese Medical University, no date, online.
282 `' [Zhao Huajun], Office of Academic Research, Zhejiang Chinese Medicine University, online; `1512011--2020 '[Recommendations on implementing the Zhejiang Province 151 Talent Project (2011-2020)], 2014 Zhejiang province talent introduction program, no date, online.
57
283 Cyntha McFadden, Aliza Nadi, Courtney McGee, `Education or espionage? A Chinese student takes his homework home to China', NBC News, 24 July 2018, online.
284 Alex Knapp, `Duke researchers perfect the original invisibility cloak', Forbes, 14 November 2012, online; see also information about David R Smith on the website of the Center For Metamaterials and Integrated Plasmonics, Duke University, online.
285 Strategic Partnership Unit, `Counterintelligence Strategic Partnership Intelligence Note (SPIN): Chinese talent programs', FBI, September 2015, 4, online.
286 `' [Academic seminar announcement], School of Electronics and Information, Northwestern Polytechnical University, 14 February 2012, online; see also Cui Tiejun's biography supplied for the 2018 Cross Strait Quad-Regional Radio Science and Wireless Technology Conference in Xuzhou, China, online.
287 `' [List of projects to be developed for the Program of Introducing Talents of Discipline to Universities (2nd series)], Ministry of Education, 25 October 2007, online (republished on China Education and Scientific Research Computer Net ().
288 `' [Academic seminar announcement], School of Electronics and Information, Northwestern Polytechnical University, 14 February 2012, online.
289 Strategic Partnership Unit, Counterintelligence Strategic Partnership Intelligence Note (SPIN): Chinese Talent Programs'.
290 McFadden et al., `Education or espionage? A Chinese student takes his homework home to China'. 291 `' [Shenzhen Dapeng Kuang-Chi Technology Co. Ltd], tianyancha.com, online. 292 `""""' [`Magician' Liu Ruopeng makes `invisible cloak' a reality], Dayoo Net, 14 March 2018, online; `
'[Guangdong has started a global hunt to compete for future talent], Xinhua Net, 26 December 2017, online. 293 `' [Information on the Kuang-Chi Institute of Advanced Technology], qixin.com, online; names of president and vice
presidents of the Kuang-Chi Institute listed on its website, online.
294 Kelvin Chan, `China has fewer rich lawmakers but their fortunes have grown', AP News, 2 March 2018, online. 295 Shen Yiran, `' [Unveiling Kuang-Chi: The road map of how a mysterious company entered the
defence industry], [The Economic Observer], 16 December 2018, reposted online. 296 Shen Yiran, `' [Kuang-Chi Liu Ruopeng: Every step of Kuang-Chi's development is
in accordance with the two-sentence instruction of General Secretary Xi Jinping], [The Economic Observer], 28 December 2017, online. 297 `' [List of executive committee members of the 9th council of the China Association for Science and Technology], online.
298 `Liu Ruopeng', speaker's biography on the official website of the Boao Forum, 22 March 2019, online.
299 US DoJ, `Hawaii man sentenced to 32 years in prison for providing defense information and services to People's Republic of China', news release, US Government, 25 January 2011, online.
300 `United States of America vs. Noshir S Gowadia', US District Court for the District of Hawaii, 25 October 2007, online.
301 `China bought bomber secrets', Washington Times, 23 November 2006, online; US DoJ, `Hawaii man sentenced to 32 years in prison for providing defense information and services to People's Republic of China'.
302 Jason Ryan, `Former B-2 bomber engineer accused of more spying', ABC News, 12 November 2006, online.
303 US DoJ, `Hawaii man sentenced to 32 years in prison for providing defense information and services to People's Republic of China'. Gowadia was aided by two unindicted co-conspirators, Tommy Wong from the PRC's State Administration of Foreign Experts Affairs and Henri Nyo; `United States of America vs. Noshir S Gowadia'.
304 US DoJ, `Hawaii man sentenced to 32 years in prison for providing defense information and services to People's Republic of China'.
305 US DoJ, `Hawaii man sentenced to 32 years in prison for providing defense information and services to People's Republic of China'.
58
Policy Brief: Hunting the phoenix: the Chinese Communist Party's global search for technology and talent
Acronyms and abbreviations
ACSE
Association of Chinese-American Scientists and Engineers
AI
artificial intelligence
BJUT
Beijing University of Technology
CAEP
Chinese Academy of Engineering Physics
CAIEP
China Association for International Exchange of Personnel
CAS
Chinese Academy of Sciences
CBMF
Taizhou CBM Future New Material Science and Technology Co. Ltd
CCP
Chinese Communist Party
CETC
China Electronics Technology Group Corporation
CFB
Cell-Free Bioinnovations
CPPCC
Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference
CSSA
Chinese students and scholars association
FBAR
thin-film bulk acoustic resonator
FBI
Federal Bureau of Investigation
ICPC
International Cyber Policy Centre
NASA
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NIH
National Institutes of Health
NOAA
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
NSW-CSSA New South Wales Chinese Students and Scholars Association
NUDT
National University of Defense Technology
NWPU
Northwestern Polytechnical University
OCAO
Overseas Chinese Affairs Office
PRC
People's Republic of China
SAI
Shenyang Automation Institute
STEM
science, technology, engineering and mathematics
TIIB
Tianjin Institute of Industrial Biotechnology
UCSD
University of California San Diego
UFWD
United Front Work Department
UTRC
United Technologies Research Center
UTK
University of Tennessee, Knoxville
WRSA
Western Returned Scholars Association
WUT
Wuhan University of Technology
59
Some previous ICPC publications
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