Administration Guide

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SafeNet Luna Network HSM 7.0
Administration Guide

Document Information
Product Version

7.0

Document Part Number

007-013576-002

Release Date

05 June 2017

Revision History
Revision

Date

Reason

Rev. A

05 June 2017

Initial release.

Trademarks, Copyrights, and Third-Party Software
Copyright 2001-2017 Gemalto. All rights reserved. Gemalto and the Gemalto logo are trademarks and service marks of
Gemalto and/or its subsidiaries and are registered in certain countries. All other trademarks and service marks, whether
registered or not in specific countries, are the property of their respective owners.
Table 1: Third-party software used in this product
Software

License and copyright

editline

This product incorporates editline licensed under Apache v2.0 Open Software.
Copyright 1992,1993 Simmule Turner and Rich Salz. All rights reserved.
You can obtain the full text of the Apache v2.0 Open Software license at the following
URL:
https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0

libFDT

Dual License Choice of BSD or GPL-2.0
Copyright (C) 2006 David Gibson, IBM Corporation.

libsodium

ISC License (ISCL)
Copyright (C) 2013-2016

Linux Kernel

GPL-2.0

OpenSSH

This product uses a derived version of OpenSSH
Copyright 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland. All rights reserved .
Copyright 1995, 1996 by David Mazieres .
Copyright 1983, 1990, 1992, 1993, 1995 The Regents of the University of California.
All rights reserved
You can obtain the full text of the OpenSSH license at the following URL:
https://www.openbsd.org/policy.html

OpenSSL

SSLeay License
Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
OpenSSL license

SafeNet Luna Network HSM Administration Guide
Rellease 7.0 007-013576-002 Rev. A June 2017 Copyright 2001-2017 Gemalto All rights reserved.

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Software

License and copyright
Copyright (C) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project

Software implementation of
SHA2

Proprietary license

Software implementation of
AES

Proprietary license

Copyright (C) 2002, Dr Brian Gladman, Worcester, UK.

Copyright (C) 2001, Dr Brian Gladman , Worcester, UK.

Disclaimer
All information herein is either public information or is the property of and owned solely by Gemalto and/or its
subsidiaries who shall have and keep the sole right to file patent applications or any other kind of intellectual property
protection in connection with such information.
Nothing herein shall be construed as implying or granting to you any rights, by license, grant or otherwise, under any
intellectual and/or industrial property rights of or concerning any of Gemalto’s information.
This document can be used for informational, non-commercial, internal, and personal use only provided that:
•

The copyright notice, the confidentiality and proprietary legend and this full warning notice appear in all copies.

•

This document shall not be posted on any publicly accessible network computer or broadcast in any media, and no
modification of any part of this document shall be made.

Use for any other purpose is expressly prohibited and may result in severe civil and criminal liabilities.
The information contained in this document is provided “AS IS” without any warranty of any kind. Unless otherwise
expressly agreed in writing, Gemalto makes no warranty as to the value or accuracy of information contained herein.
The document could include technical inaccuracies or typographical errors. Changes are periodically added to the
information herein. Furthermore, Gemalto reserves the right to make any change or improvement in the specifications
data, information, and the like described herein, at any time.
Gemalto hereby disclaims all warranties and conditions with regard to the information contained herein, including all
implied warranties of merchantability, fitness for a particular purpose, title and non-infringement. In no event shall
Gemalto be liable, whether in contract, tort or otherwise, for any indirect, special or consequential damages or any
damages whatsoever including but not limited to damages resulting from loss of use, data, profits, revenues, or
customers, arising out of or in connection with the use or performance of information contained in this document.
Gemalto does not and shall not warrant that this product will be resistant to all possible attacks and shall not incur, and
disclaims, any liability in this respect. Even if each product is compliant with current security standards in force on the
date of their design, security mechanisms' resistance necessarily evolves according to the state of the art in security
and notably under the emergence of new attacks. Under no circumstances, shall Gemalto be held liable for any third
party actions and in particular in case of any successful attack against systems or equipment incorporating Gemalto
products. Gemalto disclaims any liability with respect to security for direct, indirect, incidental or consequential
damages that result from any use of its products. It is further stressed that independent testing and verification by the
person using the product is particularly encouraged, especially in any application in which defective, incorrect or
insecure functioning could result in damage to persons or property, denial of service, or loss of privacy.
All intellectual property is protected by copyright. All trademarks and product names used or referred to are the
copyright of their respective owners. No part of this document may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or
transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, chemical, photocopy, recording or otherwise without
the prior written permission of Gemalto.

SafeNet Luna Network HSM Administration Guide
Rellease 7.0 007-013576-002 Rev. A June 2017 Copyright 2001-2017 Gemalto All rights reserved.

3

Regulatory Compliance
This product complies with the following regulatory regulations. To ensure compliancy, ensure that you install the
products as specified in the installation instructions and use only Gemalto-supplied or approved accessories.

USA, FCC
This equipment has been tested and found to comply with the limits for a “Class B” digital device, pursuant to part 15 of
the FCC rules.

Canada
This class B digital apparatus meets all requirements of the Canadian interference-causing equipment regulations.

Europe
This product is in conformity with the protection requirements of EC Council Directive 2014/30/EU. This product
satisfies the CLASS B limits of EN55032.

SafeNet Luna Network HSM Administration Guide
Rellease 7.0 007-013576-002 Rev. A June 2017 Copyright 2001-2017 Gemalto All rights reserved.

4

CONTENTS
PREFACE

About the Administration Guide

Customer Release Notes
Audience
Document Conventions
Notes
Cautions
Warnings
Command syntax and typeface conventions
Support Contacts

1

Audit Logging

Audit Logging Overview
The Audit Role
Audit Log Records
Audit Log Message Format
Configuring and Using Audit Logging
Configuring Audit Logging
Copying Log Files Off the Appliance
Exporting the Audit Logging Secret and Importing to a Verifying HSM
Deciphering the Audit Log Records
Audit Role Authentication Considerations
Audit Logging General Advice and Recommendations
Audit Log Categories and HSM Events
Remote Audit Logging

2

Backup and Restore HSMs and Partitions

Backup and Restore Overview and Best Practices
Objects are Smaller When Stored on Backup HSM
About the SafeNet Luna Backup HSM
Functionality of the SafeNet Luna Backup HSM
Backup HSM Installation, Storage, and Maintenance
Backup and Restore From the Client to a Local Backup HSM (LunaCM)
Backing Up a Partition to a Locally Connected Backup HSM
Restoring a Partition from a Locally Connected Backup HSM
Backup and Restore From the Client to a Remote Backup HSM (LunaCM, RBS)
Backup and Restore From the Appliance to a Local Backup HSM (LunaSH)
Backing Up a Partition to a Locally Connected Backup HSM
Restoring a Partition from a Locally Connected Backup HSM
Troubleshooting
Warning: This token is not in the factory reset (zeroized) state

3

Capabilities and Policies

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59
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77

79

5

HSM Capabilities and Policies
Partition Capabilities and Policies

79
83

4

Configuration File Summary

89

5

Decommissioning, Zeroizing, or Resetting an HSM to Factory Conditions

98

Decommissioning the HSM Appliance
Disabling Decommissioning
Comparing Zeroize, Decommission, and Factory Reset
Resetting to Factory Condition
End of service and disposal
Comparison of Destruction/Denial Actions
RMA and Shipping Back to Gemalto
Zeroization

6

98
99
99
100
101
102
103
104

High-Availability (HA) Configuration and Operation

105

High Availability (HA) Overview
Load Balancing
Key Replication
Failover
Recovery
Recovery Conditions
Enabling and Configuring Autorecovery
Failure of All Members
Automatic Reintroduction
Synchronization
Effect of PED Operations
Network failures
Performance
Maximizing Performance
HA and FindObjects
Standby Members
Planning Your Deployment
HA Group Members
High Availability Group Sizing
Network Requirements
Upgrading and Redundancy and Rotation
Configuring HA
Create the HA Group
Verification
HA Standby Mode [Optional]
Using HA With Your Applications
HAOnly
Key Generation
Application Object Handles
Adding, Removing, Replacing, or Reconnecting HA Group Members
Adding or Removing an HA Group Member
Reconnecting an Offline Unit
Replacing a Failed SafeNet Luna Network HSM

105
107
108
109
112
113
113
114
114
115
115
115
117
117
118
118
121
121
122
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125
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Replace a SafeNet Luna Network HSM Using the Same IP
Summary
Client-side - Reconfigure HA If a SafeNet Luna Network HSM Must Be Replaced
Replacing the Secondary HA Group Member
Managing and Troubleshooting Your HA Groups
Slot Enumeration
Determining Which Device is in Use
Determining Which Devices are Active
Duplicate Objects
Frequently Asked Questions

7

HSM Initialization

Initializing a New or Factory-reset HSM
Re-initializing an Existing, Non-factory-reset HSM
PED-authenticated HSM Initialization Example
Password-authenticated HSM Initialization Example

133
134
134
138
138
138
139
139
139
139

141
142
144
144
150

8

HSM Status Values

151

9

Partitions

153

About HSM Partitions
Adjusting Default Partition Parameters
Size of Partitions
Separation of HSM Workspaces
Application Partitions
Operation
Key Management Commands
Normal Usage Commands
Unauthenticated Commands
Commands That are Valid Only in a Session, But Require Special Handling
Configured and Registered Client Using an HSM Partition
Activation and Auto-Activation on PED-Authenticated Partitions
Auto-Activation
Security of Your Partition Challenge
Removing Partitions
Frequently Asked Questions

10

PED Authentication

About the Luna PED
Using the PED
Initial Setup
Performing Prompted Actions
Creating New PED Keys
Duplicating Existing PED Keys
Changing Your Authentication Parameters
About Remote PED
Remote PED Architecture
PED Server-Client Communications

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166
166

168
168
174
179
180
180
185
188
193
193
194

7

Remote PED Setup and Configuration
Using Remote PED
Relinquishing Remote PED
Maintaining the Security of Your PED Keys
Version Control
Summary of PED Operations
Troubleshooting
The PedServer and PedClient Utilities
The PedServer Utility
The PedClient Utility
The PedClient Commands
pedclient mode assignid
pedclient mode config
pedclient mode deleteid
pedclient mode releaseid
pedclient mode setid
pedclient mode show
pedclient mode start
pedclient mode stop
pedclient mode testid
The PedServer Commands
pedserver appliance
pedserver appliance deregister
pedserver appliance list
pedserver appliance register
pedserver mode
pedserver mode config
pedserver mode connect
pedserver mode disconnect
pedserver mode show
pedserver mode start
pedserver mode stop
pedserver regen

11

Performance

HSM Information Monitor

12

198
203
209
210
212
213
216
222
222
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224
225
227
228
229
230
231
232
233
234
235
236
237
238
239
240
242
243
244
246
248
249

250
250

Security Effects of Administrative Actions

251

Overt Security Actions
Actions with Security- and Content-Affecting Outcomes
Factory Reset HSM
Zeroize HSM
Change Destructive HSM Policy
Apply Destructive CUF Update
HSM Initialize When Zeroized (hard init)
HSM Initialize From Non-Zeroized State (soft init)
Partition Initialize When Zeroized (hard init)
Partition Initialize From Non-Zeroized State (soft init)
Elsewhere

251
251
251
252
252
253
253
253
254
254
255

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13

Secure Transport Mode
Placing an HSM Into Secure Transport Mode
Recovering an HSM From Secure Transport Mode

14

Secure Trusted Channel (STC)

STC Overview
When to Use: Comparing NTLS and STC
Security features
Client and Partition Identities
Secure Tunnel Creation
Secure Message Transport
Enabling or Disabling STC on the HSM
Enabling STC on the HSM
Disabling STC on the HSM
Enabling or Disabling STC on a Partition
Enabling STC on a Partition
Disabling STC on a Partition
Establishing and Configuring the STC Admin Channel on a SafeNet Luna Network HSM Appliance
Using a Hard Token to Store the STC Client Identity
Configuring the Network and Security Settings for an STC Link
Configurable Options
Managing STC Tokens and Identities
Restoring STC After HSM Zeroization
Troubleshooting
Restoring STC After HSM Zeroization
Restoring STC After Regenerating the HSM Server Certificate on the SafeNet Luna Network HSM
Appliance
SAlogin Error

15

Slot Numbering and Behavior

Order of Occurrence for Different SafeNet Luna HSMs
Settings Affecting Slot Order
Effects of Settings on Slot List
Effects of New Firmware on Slot Login State

16

Software, Firmware, and Capability Upgrades

Software and Firmware Upgrades
Client Software Upgrades
Appliance Software Upgrades
HSM Firmware Upgrades
Rollback Behavior
HSM Capability and Partition Upgrades

17

256
256
257

259
259
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260
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263
263
264
265
265
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268
273
273
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278
278
278
278

279
279
280
280
281

282
282
282
282
284
285
287

SNMP Monitoring

288

Overview and Installation
MIB
SafeNet SNMP Subagent
The SafeNet Chrysalis-UTSP MIB

288
288
289
290

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The SafeNet Luna HSM MIB
hsmPolicyTable
hsmPartitionPolicyTable
hsmClientRegistrationTable
hsmClientPartitionAssignmentTable
SNMP output compared to SafeNet tools output
The SafeNet Appliance MIB
SNMP Operation and Limitations with SafeNet Luna Network HSM
SNMP-Related Commands
Coverage
HSM MIB
MIBS You Need for Network Monitoring of SafeNet Luna Network HSM
MIBS You Need for Monitoring the Status of the HSM
Frequently Asked Questions
We want to use SNMP to remotely monitor and manage our installation – why do you not support such
standard SNMP traps as CPU and Memory exhaustion?

18

Tamper Events
Recovering from a Tamper

19

Troubleshooting

291
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294
295
295
299
299
299
300
300
301
301
301
302

303
304

306

General Troubleshooting Tips
306
System Operational and Error Messages
307
Extra slots that say "token not present"?
307
Error: 'hsm update firmware' failed. (10A0B : LUNA_RET_OPERATION_RESTRICTED) when attempting
to perform hsm update firmware
307
KR_ECC_POINT_INVALID Error when decrypting a file encrypted from BSAFE through ECIES using ECC
key with any of the curves from the x9_t2 section
307
Error during SSL Connect (RC_OPERATION_TIMED_OUT) logged to /var/log/messages by the SafeNet
Luna HSM client
308
Slow/interrupted response from the HSM, and the "hsm show" command shows LUNA_RET_SM_
SESSION_REALLOC_ERROR
308
Low Battery Message
308
Keycard and Token Return Codes
309
Library Codes
324
Vendor-Defined Return Codes
329

20

User and Password Administration

About Changing HSM and Partition Passwords
Failed Logins
Resetting Passwords
HSM

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10

PREFACE
About the Administration Guide

This document describes the operational and administrative tasks you can perform to maintain the functionality and
efficiency of your HSMs. It contains the following chapters:
•

"Audit Logging" on page 15

•

"Backup and Restore HSMs and Partitions" on page 36

•

"Capabilities and Policies" on page 79

•

"Configuration File Summary" on page 89

•

"Decommissioning, Zeroizing, or Resetting an HSM to Factory Conditions" on page 98

•

"High-Availability (HA) Configuration and Operation" on page 105

•

"HSM Initialization" on page 141

•

"HSM Status Values" on page 151

•

"Partitions" on page 153

•

"PED Authentication" on page 168

•

"Performance" on page 250

•

"Security Effects of Administrative Actions" on page 251

•

"Secure Transport Mode" on page 256

•

"Secure Trusted Channel (STC)" on page 259

•

"Slot Numbering and Behavior" on page 279

•

"Software, Firmware, and Capability Upgrades" on page 282

•

"SNMP Monitoring" on page 288

•

"Troubleshooting" on page 306

•

"User and Password Administration" on page 334

This preface also includes the following information about this document:
•

"Customer Release Notes" on the next page

•

"Audience" on the next page

•

"Document Conventions" on the next page

•

"Support Contacts" on page 14

For information regarding the document status and revision history, see "Document Information" on page 2.

SafeNet Luna Network HSM Administration Guide
Release 7.0 007-013576-002Rev. A June 2017 Copyright 2001-2017 Gemalto All rights reserved.

11

PREFACE

About the Administration Guide

Customer Release Notes
The customer release notes (CRN) provide important information about this release that is not included in the customer
documentation. Read the CRN to fully understand the capabilities, limitations, and known issues for this release. You
can view or download the latest version of the CRN from the Technical Support Customer Portal at
https://supportportal.gemalto.com.

Audience
This document is intended for personnel responsible for maintaining your organization's security infrastructure. This
includes SafeNet Luna HSM users and security officers, key manager administrators, and network administrators.
All products manufactured and distributed by Gemalto are designed to be installed, operated, and maintained by
personnel who have the knowledge, training, and qualifications required to safely perform the tasks assigned to them.
The information, processes, and procedures contained in this document are intended for use by trained and qualified
personnel only.
It is assumed that the users of this document are proficient with security concepts.

Document Conventions
This document uses standard conventions for describing the user interface and for alerting you to important information.

Notes
Notes are used to alert you to important or helpful information. They use the following format:
Note: Take note. Contains important or helpful information.

Cautions
Cautions are used to alert you to important information that may help prevent unexpected results or data loss. They use
the following format:
CAUTION: Exercise caution. Contains important information that may help prevent
unexpected results or data loss.

Warnings
Warnings are used to alert you to the potential for catastrophic data loss or personal injury. They use the following
format:
WARNING! Be extremely careful and obey all safety and security measures. In this
situation you might do something that could result in catastrophic data loss or
personal injury.

SafeNet Luna Network HSM Administration Guide
Release 7.0 007-013576-002 Rev. A June 2017 Copyright 2001-2017 Gemalto All rights reserved.

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PREFACE

About the Administration Guide

Command syntax and typeface conventions
Format

Convention

bold

The bold attribute is used to indicate the following:
•

Command-line commands and options (Type dir /p.)

•

Button names (Click Save As.)

•

Check box and radio button names (Select the Print Duplex check box.)

•

Dialog box titles (On the Protect Document dialog box, click Yes.)

•

Field names (User Name: Enter the name of the user.)

•

Menu names (On the File menu, click Save.) (Click Menu > Go To > Folders.)

•

User input (In the Date box, type April 1.)

italics

In type, the italic attribute is used for emphasis or to indicate a related document. (See the
Installation Guide for more information.)



In command descriptions, angle brackets represent variables. You must substitute a value for
command line arguments that are enclosed in angle brackets.

[optional]
[]

Represent optional keywords or  in a command line description. Optionally enter the
keyword or  that is enclosed in square brackets, if it is necessary or desirable to
complete the task.

{a|b|c}
{||}

Represent required alternate keywords or  in a command line description. You must
choose one command line argument enclosed within the braces. Choices are separated by vertical
(OR) bars.

[a|b|c]
[||]

Represent optional alternate keywords or variables in a command line description. Choose one
command line argument enclosed within the braces, if desired. Choices are separated by vertical
(OR) bars.

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PREFACE

About the Administration Guide

Support Contacts
Contact method

Contact

Phone

Global

+1 410-931-7520

Australia

1800.020.183

India

000.800.100.4290

Netherlands

0800.022.2996

New Zealand

0800.440.359

Portugal

800.863.499

Singapore

800.1302.029

Spain

900.938.717

Sweden

020.791.028

Switzerland

0800.564.849

United Kingdom

0800.056.3158

United States

(800) 545-6608

(Subject to change. An up-todate list is maintained on the
Technical Support Customer
Portal)

Web

https://safenet.gemalto.com

Technical Support Customer
Portal

https://supportportal.gemalto.com
Existing customers with a Technical Support Customer Portal account can log in
to manage incidents, get the latest software upgrades, and access the Knowledge
Base. To create a new account, click the Register link at the top of the page. You
will need your Customer Identifier number.

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1
Audit Logging

This chapter describes how to use audit logging to provide security audits of HSM activity. It contains the following
sections:
•

"Audit Logging Overview" below

•

"Configuring and Using Audit Logging" on page 22

•

"Audit Logging General Advice and Recommendations" on page 27

•

"Audit Log Categories and HSM Events" on page 28

•

"Remote Audit Logging" on page 34

Audit Logging Overview
Each event that occurs on the HSM can be recorded in the HSM event log, allowing you to audit your HSM usage. The
HSM event log is viewable and configurable only by the audit user role. This audit role is disabled by default and must
be explicitly enabled.

Types of events included in the logs
The events that are included in the log is configurable by the audit role. The types of events that can be logged include
the following:
•

log access attempts (logins)

•

log HSM management (init/reset/etc)

•

key management events (key create/delete)

•

asymmetric key usage (sig/ver)

•

first asymmetric key usage only (sig/ver)

•

symmetric key usage (enc/dec)

•

first symmetric key usage only (enc/dec)

•

log messages from CA_LogExternal

•

log events relating to log configuration

Each of these events can be logged if they fail, succeed, or both.

Event log storage
When the HSM logs an event, the log is stored on the HSM. The audit user cannot view these log entries. Before a log
can be viewed, it must be rotated. Log rotation saves the log entries on the HSM to the HSM appliance, where they can
be viewed. Log records are HMACed using an audit log secret to ensure their authenticity. The audit log secret is unique
to the HSM where the log was created, and is required to view the HSM event logs. The secret can be exported,
allowing you to view and verify the logs on another HSM.

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1

Audit Logging

Event logging impacts HSM performance
Each audit log record generated requires HSM resources. Configuring event logging to record most, or all, events may
have an impact on HSM performance. You may need to adjust your logging configuration to provide adequate logging
without significantly affecting performance. By default, only critical events are logged, imposing virtually no load on the
HSM.

Audit Logging Features
The following list summarizes the functionality of the audit logging feature:
•

Log entries originate from the SafeNet Luna HSM - the feature is implemented via HSM firmware (rather than in the
library) for maximum security.

•

Log origin is assured.

•

Logs and individual records can be validated by any SafeNet Luna HSM that is a member of the same domain.

•

Audit Logging can be performed on password-authenticated (FIPS 140-2 level 2) and PED-authenticated (FIPS
140-2 level 3) configurations, but these configurations may not validate each other's logs - see the "same domain"
requirement, above.

•

Each entry includes the following:
–

When the event occurred

–

Who initiated the event (the authenticated entity)

–

What the event was

–

The result of the logging event (success, error, etc.)

•

Multiple categories of audit logging are supported, configured by the audit role.

•

Audit management is a separate role - the role creation does not require the presence or co-operation of the SafeNet
Luna HSM SO.

•

The category of audit logging is configurable by (and only by) the audit role.

•

Audit log integrity is ensured against the following:
–

Truncation - erasing part of a log record

–

Modification - modifying a log record

–

Deletion - erasing of the entire log record

–

Addition - writing of a fake log record

•

Log origin is assured.

•

The following critical events are logged unconditionally, regardless of the state of the audit role (initialized or not):
–

Tamper

–

Decommission

–

Zeroization

–

SO creation

–

Audit role creation

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1

Audit Logging

The Audit Role
The audit logging function is controlled by two roles on SafeNet Luna Network HSM, that must be used together:
•

The "audit" appliance account (use SSH or PuTTy to log in as "audit", instead of "admin", or "operator", or
"monitor", etc.)

•

The "audit" HSM account (accessible only if you have logged into the appliance as "audit"; this account must be
initialized)

On SafeNet Luna Network HSM, the audit logging is managed by an audit user (an appliance system role), in
combination with the HSM audit role, through a set of LunaSH commands. The audit user can perform only the auditlogging related tasks and self-related tasks. Other HSM appliance users, such as admin, operator, and monitor, have
no access to the audit logging commands.
A default appliance (LunaSH) audit user is automatically created, but must be enabled. Upon first login, the audit user is
asked to change their password. That appliance audit user would need to initialize the HSM audit role first, before being
able to administer the audit logging. The SafeNet Luna Network HSM admin user can create more audit users when
necessary.
To simplify configuration,
•

The maximum log file size is capped at 4 MB.

•

The log path is kept internal.

•

The rotation offset is set at 0.

Audit User on the Appliance
The appliance audit user is a standard user account on SafeNet Luna Network HSM, with default password
"PASSWORD" (without the quotation marks). By default, the appliance audit user is disabled. Therefore, you must
enable it in LunaSH before it becomes available. See "user enable" on page 1 for the command syntax.

Audit Role on the HSM
A SafeNet Luna HSM Audit role allows complete separation of Audit responsibilities from the Security Officer (SO or
HSM Admin), the Partition User (or Owner), and other HSM roles. If the Audit role is initialized, the HSM and Partition
administrators are prevented from working with the log files, and auditors are unable to perform administrative tasks on
the HSM. As a general rule, the Audit role should be created before the HSM Security Officer role, to ensure that all
important HSM operations (including those that occur during initialization), are captured.
Use the LunaSH command audit init to initialize the audit role, as described in "audit init" on page 1.

Password-authenticated HSMs
For SafeNet Luna HSMs with Password Authentication, the auditor role logs into the HSM to perform their activities
using a password. After initializing the Audit role on a password-authenticated HSM, log in as the Auditor and set the
domain (see "role setdomain" on page 1 for the command syntax). This step is required before setting logging
parameters or the log filepath, or importing/exporting audit logs.

PED-authenticated HSMs
For SafeNet Luna HSMs with PED Authentication, the auditor role logs into the HSM to perform their activities using
the Audit (white) PED key.

Role Initialization
Creating the Audit role (and imprinting the white PED key for PED-authenticated HSMs) does not require the presence
or cooperation of the HSM SO.

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Appliance Audit User Available Commands
The Audit role has a limited set of operations available to it, on the HSM, as reflected in the reduced command set
available to the "audit" user when logged in to the shell (LunaSH).
login as: audit
audit@192.20.11.78's password:
Last login: Fri Mar 31 09:37:53 2017 from 10.124.0.31
Luna SA 7.0.0 Command Line Shell - Copyright (c) 2001-2017 SafeNet, Inc. All rights reserved.
lunash:>help
The following top-level commands are available:
Name
(short)
Description
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------help
he
Get Help
exit
e
Exit Luna Shell
hsm
hs
> Hsm
audit
a
> Audit
my
m
> My
network
n
> Network

Audit Log Secret
The HSM creates a log secret unique to the HSM, computed during the first initialization after manufacture. The log
secret resides in flash memory (permanent, non-volatile memory), and is used to create log records that are sent to a
log file. Later, the log secret is used to prove that a log record originated from a legitimate HSM and has not been
tampered with.

Log Secret and Log Verification
The 256-bit log secret which is used to compute the HMACs is stored in the parameter area on the HSM. It is set the
first time an event is logged. It can be exported from one HSM to another so that a particular sequence of log messages
can be verified by the other HSM. Conversely, it can be imported from other HSMs for verification purpose.
To accomplish cross-HSM verification, the HSM generates a key-cloning vector (KCV, a.k.a. the Domain key) for the
audit role when it is initialized. The KCV can then be used to encrypt the log secret for export to the HOST.
To verify a log that was generated on another HSM, assuming it is in the same domain, we simply import the wrapped
secret, which the HSM subsequently decrypts; any records that are submitted to the host for verification will use this
secret thereafter.
When the HSM exports the secret, it calculates a 32-bit checksum which is appended to the secret before it is
encrypted with the KCV.
When the HSM imports the wrapped secret, it is decrypted, and the 32-bit checksum is calculated over the decrypted
secret. If this doesn’t match the decrypted checksum, then the secret that the HSM is trying to import comes from a
system on a different domain, and an error is returned.
To verify a log generated on another HSM, in the same domain, the host passes to the target HSM the wrapped secret,
which the target HSM subsequently decrypts; any records submitted to the target HSM for verification use this secret
thereafter.
Importing a log secret from another HSM does not overwrite the target log secret because the operation writes the
foreign log secret only to a separate parameter area for the wrapped log secret.

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CAUTION: Once an HSM has imported a wrapped log secret from another HSM, it must
export and then re-import its own log secret in order to verify its own logs again.

Audit Log Records
A log record consists of two fields – the log message and the HMAC for the previous record. When the HSM creates a
log record, it uses the log secret to compute the SHA256-HMAC of all data contained in that log message, plus the
HMAC of the previous log entry. The HMAC is stored in HSM flash memory. The log message is then transmitted,
along with the HMAC of the previous record, to the host. The host has a logging daemon to receive and store the log
data on the host hard drive.
For the first log message ever returned from the HSM to the host there is no previous record and, therefore, no HMAC in
flash. In this case, the previous HMAC is set to zero and the first HMAC is computed over the first log message
concatenated with 32 zero-bytes. The first record in the log file then consists of the first log message plus 32 zerobytes. The second record consists of the second message plus HMAC1 = HMAC (message1 || 0x0000). This results in
the organization shown below.
MSG 1

HMAC 0
...

MSG n-1

HMAC n-2

MSG n

HMAC n-1

...
MSG n+m

HMAC n+m-1

MSG n+m+1

HMAC n+m

...
MSG end

Recent HMAC in NVRAM

HMAC n+m-1

HMAC end

To verify a sequence of m log records which is a subset of the complete log, starting at index n, the host must submit
the data illustrated above. The HSM calculates the HMAC for each record the same way as it did when the record was
originally generated, and compares this HMAC to the value it received. If all of the calculated HMACs match the
received HMACs, then the entire sequence verifies. If an HMAC doesn’t match, then the associated record and all
following records can be considered suspect. Because the HMAC of each message depends on the HMAC of the
previous one, inserting or altering messages would cause the calculated HMAC to be invalid.
The HSM always stores the HMAC of the most-recently generated log message in flash memory. When checking
truncation, the host would send the newest record in its log to the HSM; and, the HSM would compute the HMAC and
compare it to the one in flash. If it does not match, then truncation has occurred.

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Audit Log Message Format
Each message is a fixed-length, comma delimited, and newline-terminated string. The table below shows the width and
meaning of the fields in a message.
Offset

Length (Chars)

Description

0

10

Sequence number

10

1

Comma

11

17

Timestamp

28

1

Comma

29

256

Message text, interpreted from raw data

285

1

Comma

286

64

HMAC of previous record as ASCII-HEX

350

1

Comma

351

96

Data for this record as ASCII-HEX (raw data)

447

1

Newline '\n'

The raw data for the message is stored in ASCII-HEX form, along with a human-readable version. Although this format
makes the messages larger, it simplifies the verification process, as the HSM expects to receive raw data records.

Example
The following example shows a sample log record. It is separated into multiple lines for readability even though it is a
single record. Some white spaces are also omitted.
38,12/08/13 15:30:50,session 1 Access 2147483651:22621 operation LUNA_CREATE_CONTAINER
returned LUNA_RET_SM_UNKNOWN_TOSM_STATE(0x00300014) (using PIN (entry=LUNA_ENTRY_DATA_AREA)),
29C51014B6F131EC67CF48734101BBE301335C25F43EDF8828745C40755ABE25,
2600001003600B00EA552950140030005D580000030000800100000000000000000000000000000000000000

The sequence number is “38”. The time is “12/08/13 15:30:50”.
The log message is “session 1 Access 2147483651:22621 operation LUNA_CREATE_CONTAINER
returned LUNA_RET_SM_UNKNOWN_TOSM_STATE(0x00300014) (using PIN (entry=LUNA_ENTRY_
DATA_AREA))”.
In the message text, the “who” is the session identified by “session 1 Access 2147483651:22621” (the
application is identified by the access ID major = 2147483651, minor = 22621).
The “what” is “LUNA_CREATE_CONTAINER”.
The operation status is “LUNA_RET_SM_UNKNOWN_TOSM_STATE(0x00300014)”.
The HMAC of previous record is
“29C51014B6F131EC67CF48734101BBE301335C25F43EDF8828745C40755ABE25”.
The remainder is the raw data for this record as ASCII-HEX.
•

The “who” is LunaSH session “session 1 Access 2147483651:22621”
(identified by the lunash access ID major = 2147483651, minor = 22621).

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•

The “what” is “LUNA_CREATE_CONTAINER”.

•

The operation status is “LUNA_RET_SM_UNKNOWN_TOSM_STATE(0x00300014)”.

Audit Logging

Note: Log Rotation Categories, Rotation Intervals, and other Configurable Factors are covered
here in the Administration Guide. Command syntax is in the Command Reference Guide.

Timestamping
The HSM has an internal real-time clock (RTC). The RTC does not have a relevant time value until it is synchronized
with the HOST system time. Because the HSM and the host time could drift apart over time, periodic resynchronization is necessary. Only an authenticated Auditor is allowed to synchronize the time.

Time Reported in Log
When you perform audit show, you might see a variance of a few seconds between the reported HSM time and the
Host time. Any difference up to five seconds should be considered normal, as the HSM reads new values from its
internal clock on a five-second interval. So, typically, Host time would show as slightly ahead.

Log Capacity
The log capacity of SafeNet Luna HSMs varies depending upon the physical memory available on the device.
The HSM has approximately 16 MB available for Audit logging (or more than 200,000 records, depending on the
size/content of each record).
The normal function of Audit logging is to export log entries constantly to the file system. Short-term, within-the-HSM
log storage capacity becomes important only in the rare situations where the HSM remains functioning but the file
system is unreachable from the HSM.

Log full condition
In the case of a log full condition on the host, most commands will return CKR_LOG_FULL. There are a few exceptions
to this, as follows:
•

factory reset

•

zeroize

•

login as audit user

•

logout

•

open session

•

close session

•

get audit config

•

set audit config

Since the “log full” condition can make the HSM unusable, these commands are required to be able to login as the audit
user and disable logging, even if logging for those commands is enabled; and the log is full. All other commands will not
execute if their results are supposed to be logged, but can’t be, due to a log full condition.

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Configuration Persists Unless Factory Reset is Performed
Audit logging configuration is not removed or reset upon HSM re-initialization or a tamper event. Factory reset or HSM
decommission will remove the Audit user and configuration. Logs must be cleared by specific command. Therefore, if
your security regime requires decommission at end-of-life, or prior to shipping an HSM, then explicit clearing of HSM
logs should be part of that procedure.
This is by design, as part of separation of roles in the HSM. When the Audit role exists, the SO cannot modify the
logging configuration, and therefore cannot hide any activity from auditors.

Audit Logging Stops Working if the Current Log File is Deleted
As a general rule, you should not delete a file while it is open and in use by an application. In Linux, deletion of a file is
deletion of an inode, but the actual file itself, while now invisible, remains on the file system until the space is cleaned
up or overwritten. If a file is in use by an application - such as audit logging, in this case - the application can continue
using and updating that file, unaware that it is now in deleted status.
If you delete the current audit log file, the audit logging feature does not detect that and does not create a new file, so
you might lose log entries.
The workaround is to restart the pedclient daemon, which creates a new log file.

Example
1. You’ve configured audit logging, and the entire audit path is deleted. In Linux, the file isn’t actually deleted until the
last reference to the file has been destroyed. Since the pedclient has the file open, logging will continue, because
technically the log file still exists. Applications, including the pedclient, will have no idea that anything is wrong.
2. On stopping the pedclient, the log file is deleted. When the pedclient gets started again, the HSM tries to tell the
pedclient to use the old path. This path doesn’t exist anymore, so it will not be able to offload log messages. At this
point, it starts storing log messages internally. With 16 MB of Flash dedicated to this purpose, that works out to
198,120 messages max. This can actually fill up very quickly, in as little as a few minutes under heavy load.
3. At this point the user must set the audit log path to a valid value. and the HSM will offload all stored log messages
to the host. This will take a couple of minutes, during which time the HSM will be unresponsive.
4. Once all messages have been offloaded, normal operation resumes with messages being sent to the host (i.e. not
being stored locally).

Configuring and Using Audit Logging
This section describes the procedures required to enable audit logging, configure it to specify what is logged and how
often the logs are rotated, and how to copy, verify and read the audit logs. It contains the following information:
•

"Configuring Audit Logging" on the next page

•

"Copying Log Files Off the Appliance" on page 25

•

"Exporting the Audit Logging Secret and Importing to a Verifying HSM" on page 25

•

"Deciphering the Audit Log Records" on page 26

•

"Audit Role Authentication Considerations" on page 27

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Configuring Audit Logging
Configure audit logging using the LunaSH audit commands. See "audit" on page 1 in the LunaSH Command Reference
Guide.

Prerequisites (HSM SO)
1. Configure the SafeNet Luna Network HSM appliance to use the network time protocol (NTP). See "Timestamping
– NTP and Clock Drift" on page 1 in the Appliance Administration Guide.
2. Log in to LunaSH as an admin-level user, and enable the audit user. The audit user is necessary to access and
work with logs through the LunaSH interface. It is restricted from administrative functions:
lunash:> user enable -username audit

To configure audit logging (Auditor)
1. Using an SSH connection (or a local serial connection), login to LunaSH on the SafeNet Luna Network HSM
appliance as audit (not as admin), using the password "PASSWORD".
The first time you login as audit, you are prompted to change the password to something more secure. To fulfill the
purpose of the Audit role, keep the audit user's password separate from, and unknown to, the HSM Security
Officer:
The audit user sees a reduced subset of commands suitable to the audit role, only, as follows:
Name
(short)
Description
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------init
i
Initialize the Audit role
changePwd
ch
Change Audit User Password or PED Key
login
logi
Login as the Audit user
logout
logo
Logout the Audit user
config
co
Set Audit Parameters
sync
sy
Synchronize HSM Time to Host Time
show
sh
Display the Audit logging info
log
l
> Manage Audit Log Files
secret
se
> Export/Import Audit Logging Secret
remotehost
r
> Configure Audit Logging Remote Hosts

Note: The audit user's commands are not available to the admin user. The audit user has no
administrative control over the SafeNet Luna Network HSM appliance. This is a first layer in the
separation of roles. This separation allows a user with no administrative control of the appliance
and HSM to have oversight of the HSM logs, while also ensuring that an administrator cannot
clear those logs.
2. Initialize the audit role on the HSM. This enables logging for all subsequent actions performed by the SO and
partition user(s):
lunash:> audit init
–

On password-authenticated HSMs, you are prompted for the password and cloning domain.

–

On PED-authenticated HSMs, you are referred to Luna PED, which prompts you for the domain (red PED key)
and Audit authentication (white PED key).

3. Now that the audit role exists on the HSM, you can configure the auditing function. However, before you can
configure audit logging you must log into the HSM as the audit role:
lunash:> audit login

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–

On password-authenticated HSMs, you are prompted to enter the password for the audit role.

–

On PED-authenticated HSMs, you are referred to Luna PED, which prompts for the white PED key for the
audit role.
Note: You are now logged into the appliance as the audit user and into the HSM (within the
appliance) as the audit role. Both are required. The audit commands, including HSM login as
the audit role do not appear if you are logged in as any other named appliance-level user.

4. Synchronize the HSM’s clock with the host time (which should also be synchronized with the NTP server) so that
all subsequent log records will have a valid and accurate timestamp:
lunash:> audit sync
5. Configure audit logging to specify what you want to log. You can specify the level of audit appropriate for needs of
the organization’s policy and the nature of the application(s) using the HSM:
lunash:> audit config -parameter event -value 
Note: The first time you configure audit logging, we suggest using only the ? option, to see all
the available options in the configuration process. See also "audit config " on page 1 in the
LunaSH Command Reference Guide.
Security audits can generate a very large amount of data, which consumes HSM processing resources, host
storage resources, and makes the job of the Audit Officer quite difficult when it comes time to review the logs. For
this reason, ensure that you configure audit logging such that you capture only relevant data, and no more.
For example, the First Symmetric Key Usage Only or First Asymmetric Key Usage Only category is intended
to assist Audit Officers to capture the relevant data in a space-efficient manner for high processing volume
applications. On the other hand, a top-level Certificate Authority would likely be required, by policy, to capture all
operations performed on the HSM but, since it is typically not an application that would see high volumes,
configuring the HSM to audit all events would not impose a significant space and/or performance premium in that
situation.
As a further example, the command audit config -parameter event -value all will log everything the HSM does.
This might be useful in some circumstances, but will quickly fill up log files.
6. Configure audit logging to specify how often you want to rotate the logs:
lunash:> audit config -parameter rotation -value 
For example, the command audit config -parameter rotate -value hourly would rotate the logs every hour,
cutting down the size of individual log files, even in a situation of high-volume event recording, but would increase
the number of files to be handled.

Log Entries
Log entries are made within the HSM, and are written to the currently active log file on the appliance file system. When
a log file reaches the rotation trigger, it is closed, and a new file gets the next log entry. The number of log files on the
appliance grows according to the logging settings and the rotation schedule that you configured. At any time, you can
copy files to a remote computer and then clear the originals from the HSM, if you wish to free the space.
For SafeNet Luna Network HSM, to simplify configuration within its closed and hardened environment, the following
rules apply:
•

The maximum log file size is capped at 4 MB.

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•

The log path is internal to the SafeNet Luna Network HSM appliance.

•

The rotation offset is set at 0.

Audit Logging

Copying Log Files Off the Appliance
You can copy the log files off of the appliance for viewing and verification.

To copy files off the appliance
1. Create an archive of the logs that are ready to archive:
lunash:> audit log list
lunash:> audit log tarlogs
2. View a list of the log files currently saved on the appliance:
lunash:>my file list
For this example, assume that the list includes a file named audit.tgz.
3. On the computer where you wish to capture and store the log files, use scp (Linux) or pscp (Windows) to transfer
the file from the appliance:
/usr/safenet/lunaclient/logs :> scp audit@myLunaHSM1:audit.tgz mylunsa1_audit_2014-02-28.tgz
Provide the audit user's credentials when prompted. This copies the identified file from the remote SafeNet Luna
Network HSM's file system (in the audit account) and stores the copy on your local computer file system with a
useful name.
4. You can view and parse the plain-text portion of the file.
5. You can verify the authenticity of the retrieved file using a connected HSM to which you have imported the Audit
logging secret from the originating SafeNet Luna Network HSM.

Exporting the Audit Logging Secret and Importing to a Verifying HSM
You can export the audit log secret from one HSM and import it to another to allow the first HSM's logs to be viewed and
verified on the second. The HSMs must share the same authentication method and Audit cloning domain (password
string or red PED key). You can verify logs from a SafeNet Luna PCIe HSM using a SafeNet Luna Network HSM, and
vice-versa.

To export the Audit Logging secret from the HSM and import to the verifying HSM:
1. On the SafeNet Luna Network HSM where HSM audit log files are being created, export the audit logging secret:
lunash:> audit secret export
The filename is displayed when the secret is exported. You can check the filename with my file list.
2. On a computer connected to both HSMs, use scp or pscp to transfer the logging secret from the appliance.
–

If you are planning to verify logs with a SafeNet Luna PCIe HSM, you can use the PCIe HSM's host computer.

–

If you are planning to verify logs with a second SafeNet Luna Network HSM, you must transfer the logging
secret to a client computer, and then to the second appliance.

Linux

:> scp audit@: .
Then, if transferring to a second SafeNet Luna Network HSM:

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:> scp  audit@:
Windows

:> pscp audit@ : .
Then, if transferring to a second SafeNet Luna Network HSM:
:> pscp  audit@:

This copies the identified file from the remote SafeNet Luna Network HSM's file system (in the "audit" account) and
stores the copy on your local computer file system in the directory from which you issued the command. Provide
the audit user's credentials when prompted.
3. Login to the verifying HSM as the audit user. For this example, we will assume that you have already initialized the
HSM audit user role, using the same domain/secret as is associated with the source HSM.
–

If you are using a SafeNet Luna Network HSM, connect via SSH and login to LunaSH as the audit user:
lunash:>audit login

–

If you are using a SafeNet Luna PCIe HSM, open LunaCM and login using the Auditor role:
lunacm:>role login -name au

4. Import the audit logging secret to the HSM.
–

SafeNet Luna Network HSM (LunaSH):
lunash:>audit secret import -serialtarget  -serialsource  -file 

–

SafeNet Luna PCIe HSM (LunaCM):
lunacm:> audit import file 

5. You can now verify audit log files from the source HSM.
–

SafeNet Luna Network HSM (LunaSH):
lunash:>audit log verify -file .log

–

SafeNet Luna PCIe HSM (LunaCM):
lunacm:> audit verify file .log
You might need to provide the full path to the file, depending upon your current environment settings.

Deciphering the Audit Log Records
In general, the audit logs are self-explanatory. Due to limitations in the firmware, however, some audit log records
required further explanation, as detailed in the following sections:

Determining the serial number of a created partition from the audit log
An audit log entry similar to the following is generated when a partition is created on the HSM:
5,12/12/17 16:14:14,S/N 150718 session 1 Access 2147483651:2669 SO container operation LUNA_
CREATE_CONTAINER
returned RC_OK(0x00000000) container=20 (using PIN (entry=LUNA_ENTRY_DATA_AREA))

It is not obvious from this entry what the serial number is for the created partition. This information, however, can be
derived from the log entry, since the partition serial number is simply a concatenation of the HSM serial number and the
partition container number, which are specified in the log entry, as highlighted below:

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5,12/12/17 16:14:14,S/N 150718 session 1 Access 2147483651:2669 SO container operation LUNA_
CREATE_CONTAINER
returned RC_OK(0x00000000) container=20 (using PIN (entry=LUNA_ENTRY_DATA_AREA))

In the example above, the HSM serial number is 150718 and the partition container number is 20. Note that the partition
container number is a three-digit number with leading zeros suppressed, so that the actual partition container number is
020. To determine the partition serial number concatenate the two numbers as follows:
150718020

Use this number to identify the partition in subsequent audit log entries.

Audit Role Authentication Considerations
•

The audit role PED key or password is a critical property to manage the audit logs. If that authentication secret is
lost, the HSM must be factory reset (that is, zeroize the HSM) in order to initialize the audit role again.

•

Multiple bad logins produce different results for the SO and for the audit role, as follows:
–

After 3 bad SO logins, the LUNA_RET_SO_LOGIN_FAILURE_THRESHOLD error is returned and the HSM is
zeroized.

–

After 3 bad audit logins, the LUNA_RET_AUDIT_LOGIN_FAILURE_THRESHOLD error is returned, but the
HSM is unaffected. If a subsequent login attempt is executed within 30 seconds, the LUNA_RET_AUDIT_
LOGIN_TIMEOUT_IN_PROGRESS error is returned. If you wait for more than 30 seconds and try login again
with the correct password, the login is successful.

Audit Logging General Advice and Recommendations
The Security Audit Logging feature can produce a significant volume of data. It is expected, however, that Audit
Officers will configure it properly for their specific operating environments. The data produced when the feature has
been properly configured might be used for a number of reasons, such as:
•

Reconstructing a particular action or set of actions (forensics)

•

Tracing the actions of an application or individual user (accounting)

•

Holding a specific individual accountable for their actions (non-repudiation)

That last bullet point represents the ultimate conclusion of any audit trail – to establish an irrefutable record of the chain
of events leading up to a particular incident for the purpose of identifying and holding accountable the individual
responsible. Not every organization will want to use security audit to meet the strict requirements of establishing such a
chain of events. However, all security audit users will want to have an accurate representation of a particular sequence
of events. To ensure that the audit log does contain an accurate representation of events and that it can be readily
interpreted when it is reviewed, these basic guidelines should be followed after the audit logging feature has been
properly configured:
•

Use a shell script to execute the audit sync command at least once every 24 hours, provided the host has
maintained its connection(s) to its configured NTP server(s).

•

Do not allow synchronization with the host’s clock if the host has lost connectivity to NTP. This ensures that the
HSM’s internal clock is not set to a less accurate time than it has maintained internally. In general, the HSM’s RTC
will drift much less than the host’s RTC and will, therefore, be significantly more accurate than the host in the
absence of NTP.

•

Review logs at least daily and adjust configuration settings if necessary. It is important that any anomalies be
identified as soon as possible and that the logging configuration that has been set is effective. If possible, use the

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remote logging feature to transmit log data to a Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) system to
automatically analyze log data and identify anomalous events.
•

Execute the audit log tarlogs LunaSH command regularly to archive the audit logs and transfer them to a separate
machine for long term storage. Also, execute the audit log clear LunaSH command regularly to free up the audit
log disk space on SafeNet Luna Network HSM.

•

Consider installing and configuring a SafeNet Luna PCIe HSM in (or connected to) the remote log server to act as a
“verification engine” for the remote log server. Ensure that the log secret for the operational HSM(s) has been
shared with the log server verification HSM.
Note: This is not always possible, unless you are physically copying the logs over from the
.tgz archive. Because log records do not necessarily appear on the remote log server
immediately, the HMAC might be incorrect. Also, if more than one SafeNet Luna HSM is
posting log records to a remote server, this could interfere with record counts.

•

The audit log records are comma-delimited. We recommend that full use be made of the CSV formatting to import
records into a database system or spreadsheet tool for analysis, if an SIEM system is not available.

•

The ASCII hex data representing the command and returned values and error code should be examined if an
anomaly is detected in log review/analysis. It may be possible to match this data to the HSM’s dual-port data. The
dual-port, if it is available, will contain additional data that could be helpful in establishing the context surrounding
the anomalous event. For example, if an unexpected error occurs it could be possible to identify the trace through
the firmware subsystems associated with the error condition. This information would be needed to help in
determining if the error was unexpected but legitimate or if it was forced in an attempt to exploit a potential
weakness.

An important element of the security audit logging feature is the ‘Log External’ function. See the SDK Reference Guide
for more information. For applications that cannot add this function call, it is possible to use the LunaCM command-line
function audit log external within a startup script to insert a text record at the time the application is started.

Disk Full
In the event that all the audit disk space is used up, audit logs are written to the HSM's small persistent memory. When
the HSM's persistent memory is full, normal crypto commands will fail with "disk full" error.
To resolve that situation, the audit user must:
•

Archive the audit logs on the host side.

•

Move the audit logs to some other location for safe storage.

•

Clear the audit log directory.

•

Restart the logger daemon.

To prevent the "disk full" situation, we recommend that the audit user should routinely archive the audit logs and clear
the audit log directory.

Audit Log Categories and HSM Events
This section provides a summary of the audit log categories and their associated HSM events.

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HSM Access
HSM Event

Description

LUNA_LOGIN

C_Login.
This event must be allowed to proceed even if the result should be logged but
cannot (for example, due to a log full condition).

LUNA_LOGOUT

C_Logout.
This event must be allowed to proceed even if the result should be logged but
cannot (for example, due to a log full condition).

LUNA_MODIFY_OBJECT

C_SetAttributeValue

LUNA_OPEN_SESSION

C_OpenSession.
This event must be allowed to proceed even if the result should be logged but
cannot (for example, due to a log full condition).

LUNA_CLOSE_ALL_
SESSIONS

C_CloseAllSessions

LUNA_CLOSE_SESSION

C_CloseSession
This event must be allowed to proceed even if the result should be logged but
cannot (for example, due to a log full condition).

LUNA_OPEN_ACCESS

CA_OpenApplicationID

LUNA_CLEAN_ACCESS

CA_Restart, CA_RestartForContainer

LUNA_CLOSE_ACCESS

CA_CloseApplicationID

LUNA_LOAD_CUSTOM_
MODULE

CA_LoadModule

LUNA_LOAD_ENCRYPTED_
CUSTOM_MODULE

CA_LoadEncryptedModule

LUNA_UNLOAD_CUSTOM_
MODULE

CA_UnloadModule

LUNA_EXECUTE_CUSTOM_
COMMAND

CA_PerformModuleCall

LUNA_HA_LOGIN

CA_HAGetLoginChallenge,
CA_HAAnswerLoginChallenge,
CA_HALogin,
CA_HAAnswerMofNChallenge,
HAActivateMofN

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Log External
HSM Event

Description

LUNA_LOG_EXTERNAL

CA_LogExternal

HSM Management
HSM Event

Description

LUNA_ZEROIZE

CA_FactoryReset
This event is logged unconditionally.

LUNA_INIT_TOKEN

C_InitToken
This event is logged unconditionally.

LUNA_SET_PIN

C_SetPIN

LUNA_INIT_PIN

C_InitPIN

LUNA_CREATE_CONTAINER

CA_CreateContainer

LUNA_DELETE_CONTAINER

CA_DeleteContainer, CA_DeleteContainerWithHandle

LUNA_SEED_RANDOM

C_SeedRandom

LUNA_EXTRACT_CONTEXTS

C_GetOperationState

LUNA_INSERT_CONTEXTS

C_SetOperationState

LUNA_SELF_TEST

C_PerformSelfTest

LUNA_LOAD_CERT

CA_SetTokenCertificateSignature

LUNA_HA_INIT

CA_HAInit

LUNA_SET_HSM_POLICY

CA_SetHSMPolicy

LUNA_SET_DESTRUCTIVE_HSM_POLICY

CA_SetDestructiveHSMPolicy

LUNA_SET_CONTAINER_POLICY

CA_SetContainerPolicy

LUNA_SET_CAPABILITY

Internal, for capability update

LUNA_CREATE_LOGIN_CHALLENGE

CA_CreateLoginChallenge

LUNA_REQUEST_CHALLENGE

CA_SIMInsert, CA_SIMMultiSign

LUNA_PED_INIT_RPV

CA_InitializeRemotePEDVector

LUNA_PED_DELETE_RPV

CA_DeleteRemotePEDVector

LUNA_MTK_LOCK

Internal, for manufacturing

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HSM Event

Description

LUNA_MTK_UNLOCK_CHALLENGE

Internal, for manufacturing

LUNA_MTK_UNLOCK_RESPONSE

Internal, for manufacturing

LUNA_MTK_RESTORE

CA_MTKRestore

LUNA_MTK_RESPLIT

CA_MTKResplit

LUNA_MTK_ZEROIZE

CA_MTKZeroize

LUNA_FW_UPGRADE_INIT

CA_FirmwareUpdate

LUNA_FW_UPGRADE_UPDATE

CA_FirmwareUpdate

LUNA_FW_UPGRADE_FINAL

CA_FirmwareUpdate

LUNA_FW_ROLLBACK

CA_FirmwareRollback

LUNA_MTK_SET_STORAGE

CA_MTKSetStorage

LUNA_SET_CONTAINER_SIZE

CA_SetContainerSize

Audit Logging

Key Management
HSM Event

Description

LUNA_CREATE_OBJECT

C_CreateObject

LUNA_COPY_OBJECT

C_CopyObject

LUNA_DESTROY_OBJECT

C_DestroyObject

LUNA_DESTROY_MULTIPLE_OBJECTS

CA_DestroyMultipleObjects

LUNA_GENERATE_KEY

C_GenerateKey

LUNA_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR

C_GenerateKeyPair

LUNA_WRAP_KEY

C_WrapKey

LUNA_UNWRAP_KEY

C_UnwrapKey

LUNA_DERIVE_KEY

C_DeriveKey

LUNA_GET_RANDOM

C_GenerateRandom

LUNA_CLONE_AS_SOURCE, LUNA_REPLICATE_AS_
SOURCE

CA_CloneAsSource

LUNA_CLONE_AS_TARGET_INIT, LUNA_REPLICATE_AS_
TARGET_INIT

CA_CloneAsTargetInit

LUNA_CLONE_AS_TARGET, LUNA_REPLICATE_AS_

CA_CloneAsTarget

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HSM Event

Audit Logging

Description

TARGET
LUNA_GEN_TKN_KEYS

CA_GenerateTokenKeys

LUNA_GEN_KCV

CA_ManualKCV, C_InitPIN, C_InitToken,
CA_InitAudit

LUNA_SET_LKCV

CA_SetLKCV

LUNA_M_OF_N_GENERATE

CA_GenerateMofN_Common, CA_
GenerateMofN

LUNA_M_OF_N_ACTIVATE

CA_ActivateMofN

LUNA_M_OF_N_MODIFY

CA_ActivateMofN

LUNA_EXTRACT

CA_Extract

LUNA_INSERT

CA_Insert

LUNA_LKM_COMMAND

CA_LKMInitiatorChallenge,
CA_LKMReceiverResponse,
CA_LKMInitiatorComplete,
CA_LKMReceiverComplete.

LUNA_MODIFY_USAGE_COUNT

CA_ModifyUsageCount

Key Usage and Key First Usage
HSM Event

Description

LUNA_ENCRYPT_INIT

C_EncryptInit

LUNA_ENCRYPT

C_Encrypt

LUNA_ENCRYPT_END

C_EncryptFinal

LUNA_DECRYPT_INIT

C_DecryptInit

LUNA_DECRYPT

C_Decrypt

LUNA_DECRYPT_END

C_DecryptFinal

LUNA_DIGEST_INIT

C_DigestInit

LUNA_DIGEST

C_Digest

LUNA_DIGEST_KEY

C_DigestKey

LUNA_DIGEST_END

C_DigestFinal

LUNA_SIGN_INIT

C_SignInit

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HSM Event

Description

LUNA_SIGN

C_Sign

LUNA_SIGN_END

C_SignFinal

LUNA_VERIFY_INIT

C_VerifyInit

LUNA_VERIFY

C_Verify

LUNA_VERIFY_END

C_VerifyFinal

LUNA_SIGN_SINGLEPART

C_Sign

LUNA_VERIFY_SINGLEPART

C_Verify

LUNA_WRAP_CSP

CA_CloneMofN_Common

LUNA_M_OF_N_DUPLICATE

CA_DuplicateMofN

LUNA_ENCRYPT_SINGLEPART

C_Encrypt

LUNA_DECRYPT_SINGLEPART

C_Decrypt

Audit Logging

Audit Log Management
HSM Event

Description

LUNA_LOG_SET_TIME

CA_TimeSync

LUNA_LOG_GET_TIME

CA_GetTime

LUNA_LOG_SET_CONFIG

CA_LogSetConfig
This event must be allowed to proceed even if the result should be logged but cannot
(for example, due to a log full condition).

LUNA_LOG_GET_CONFIG

CA_LogGetConfig
This event must be allowed to proceed even if the result should be logged but cannot
(for example, due to a log full condition).

LUNA_LOG_VERIFY

CA_LogVerify

LUNA_CREATE_AUDIT_
CONTAINER **

CA_ InitAudit

LUNA_LOG_IMPORT_
SECRET

CA_LogImportSecret

LUNA_LOG_EXPORT_
SECRET

CA_LogExportSecret

The event is logged unconditionally.

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Remote Audit Logging
With SafeNet Luna Network HSM, the audit logs can be sent to one or more remote logging servers. Either UDP or
TCP protocol can be specified. The default is UDP and port 514.
Note: You or your network administrator will need to adjust your firewall to pass this traffic
(iptables).

UDP Considerations
If you are using the UDP protocol for logging, the following statements are required in the /etc/rsyslog.conf file:
$ModLoad imudp
$InputUDPServerRun (PORT)

Possible approaches include the following:
•

With templates:
$template AuditFile,"/var/log/luna/audit_remote.log"
if $syslogfacility-text == 'local3' then ?AuditFile;AuditFormat

•

Without templates:
local3.* /var/log/audit.log;AuditFormat

•

Dynamic filename:
$template DynFile,"/var/log/luna/%HOSTNAME%.log"
if $syslogfacility-text == 'local3' then ?DynFile;AuditFormat

Note: The important thing to remember is that the incoming logs go to local3, and the
port/protocol that is set on the SafeNet appliance must be the same that is set on the server
running rsyslog.

Example using TCP
The following example illustrates how to setup a remote Linux system to receive the audit logs using TCP:
1. Register the remote Linux system IP address or hostname with the SafeNet Luna Network HSM:
lunash:> audit remotehost add -host 192.20.9.160 -protocol tcp -port 1660

2. Modify the remote Linux system /etc/rsyslog.conf file to receive the audit logs:
$ModLoad imtcp
$InputTCPServerRun 514
$template AuditFormat,"%msg:F,94:2%\n"
#save log messages from SafeNet Luna Network HSM
local3.* /var/log/luna/audit.log;AuditFormat

3. Modify the remote Linux system /etc/sysconfig/rsyslog file to receive the remote logs:
# Enables logging from remote machines. The listener will listen to the specified port.
SYSLOGD_OPTIONS="-r -m 0"

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4. Restart the rsyslog daemon on the remote Linux system:
# service rsyslog restart

5. Monitor the audit logs on the remote Linux system:
# tail -f /var/log/luna/audit.log

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Backup and Restore HSMs and Partitions

SafeNet Luna HSMs secure the creation, storage, and use of cryptographic data (keys and other objects). However, no
device can protect completely against unforeseen damage from various sources, including disaster-scale events.
Therefore, the SafeNet Luna HSM product line provides several ways to protect secure copies of your important
objects and keys at safe locations and to later restore your important data to your production, or primary HSM, in case
of need.
This chapter describes how to backup and restore the contents of your HSMs and HSM partitions. It contains the
following sections:
•

"Backup and Restore Overview and Best Practices" below

•

"About the SafeNet Luna Backup HSM" on page 41

•

"Backup HSM Installation, Storage, and Maintenance" on page 49

•

"Backup and Restore From the Client to a Local Backup HSM (LunaCM)" on page 54

•

"Backup and Restore From the Client to a Remote Backup HSM (LunaCM, RBS)" on page 59

•

"Backup and Restore From the Appliance to a Local Backup HSM (LunaSH)" on page 72

•

"Troubleshooting" on page 77

Backup and Restore Overview and Best Practices
This section provides an overview of the various ways you can backup and restore your HSM partitions, and provides
some guidance for best practices to ensure that your sensitive key material is protected in the event of a failure or other
catastrophic event. It contains the following topics:
•

"Backup and Restore Best Practices" on the next page

•

"Backup and Restore Options" on the next page

•

"How Partition Backup Works" on the next page

•

"Performing a Backup" on page 38

•

"Objects are Smaller When Stored on Backup HSM" on page 39

•

"Comparison of Backup Performance by Medium" on page 39

•

"Compatibility with Other Devices" on page 40

•

"Why is Backup Optional?" on page 40

•

"How Long Does Data Last?" on page 40

•

"Additional Operational Questions" on page 41

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Backup and Restore Best Practices
To ensure that your data is protected in the event of a failure or other catastrophic event, Gemalto recommends that you
use the following best practices as part of a comprehensive backup strategy:
•

Develop and document a backup and recovery plan. This plan should include the following:
–

What is being backed up

–

The backup frequency

–

Where the backups are stored

–

Who is able to perform backup and restore operations

–

Frequency of exercising the recovery test plan

•

Make multiple backups. To ensure that your backups are always available, build redundancy into your backup
procedures.

•

Use off-site storage. In the event of a local catastrophe, such as a flood or fire, you might lose both your working
HSMs and locally stored backup HSMs. To fully protect against such events, always store a copy of your backups
at a remote location. You can automate off-site backups using the remote backup feature, See "Backup and
Restore From the Client to a Remote Backup HSM (LunaCM, RBS)" on page 59 for more information.

•

Regularly exercise your disaster recovery plan. Execute your recovery plan at least semi-annually (every six
months) to ensure that you can fully recover your key material. This involves retrieving your stored Backup HSMs
and restoring their contents to a test partition, to ensure that the data is intact and that your recovery plan works as
documented.
WARNING! Failure to develop and exercise a comprehensive backup and recovery
plan may prevent you from being able to recover from a catastrophic event. Although
Gemalto provides a robust set of backup hardware and utilities, we cannot guarantee
the integrity of your backed-up key material, especially if stored for long periods.
Gemalto strongly recommends that you exercise your recovery plan at least semiannually (every six months) to ensure that you can fully recover your key material.

Backup and Restore Options
The available options for backing up your SafeNet Luna Network HSM partitions include:
•

Local or remote backup to a SafeNet Luna Backup HSM (see "Local Partition Backup and Restore Using the
Backup HSM" on page 1 and "Backup and Restore From the Client to a Remote Backup HSM (LunaCM, RBS)" on
page 59)

•

Key synchronization among two or more SafeNet Luna HSMs in an HA configuration (see "High-Availability (HA)
Configuration and Operation" on page 105)

•

Any combination of the above methods, to suit your needs

The backup operation looks a lot like the restore operation, because they are basically the same event, merely in
different directions.

How Partition Backup Works
HSM partition backup securely clones partition objects from a named HSM partition, to a SafeNet Luna Backup HSM
(supports remote or local backups). This allows you to safely and securely preserve important keys, certificates, etc.,

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away from the primary SafeNet Luna HSM. It also allows you to restore the backup device's contents onto more than
one HSM partition, if you wish to have multiple partitions with identical contents.
To back up a partition, you must own it and be able to see it. You can use LunaSH to back up any partitions you own on
a SafeNet Luna Network HSM appliance, or LunaCM to backup any SafeNet Luna Network HSM partitions that are
visible as slots.
When you backup a partition, the contents of your HSM partition are copied to a matching partition on the SafeNet Luna
Backup HSM. You can add to, or replace, objects in the backup archive, as follows:
•

Partition backups initiated with the add or append option add new or changed objects to the partition archive,
leaving existing objects intact.

•

Partition backups initiated with the replace option replace all existing objects in the partition archive with current
contents of the partition, destroying the existing objects.

The backup operation can go from a source partition on a SafeNet Luna HSM to an existing partition on the Backup
HSM, or if one does not exist, a new partition can be created during the backup. The restore operation, however, cannot
create a target partition on a SafeNet Luna HSM; it must already exist.
You can restore a partition backup to the original source HSM or to a different SafeNet Luna HSM. The HSM you
restore to must already have a suitable partition created for the restored objects. The partition can have any name - it
does not need to match the name of the archive partition on the backup device.

Backup Devices
You can back up all of your partitions to a SafeNet Luna Backup HSM:

SafeNet Luna Backup HSM (Backup HSM)
Note: The word "Remote" in the product name merely indicates that the SafeNet Luna Backup
HSM provides remote backup capability. It also supports local backup and restore. The
SafeNet Luna Backup HSM is commonly referred to as the Backup HSM.
The SafeNet Luna Backup HSM (Backup HSM) is a separately powered unit that you can connect as follows:
•

To the USB port of a a SafeNet Luna Network HSM appliance. This allows a SafeNet Luna Network HSM
administrator to use LunaSH to back up any partitions on the appliance that they own (non-PSO partitions).

•

To the USB port of a local SafeNet Luna HSM client workstation. This allows the workstation administrator to use
LunaCM to back up any SafeNet Luna PCIe HSM devices installed in the workstation or any SafeNet Luna
Network HSM partitions registered to the workstation.

•

To the USB port of a remote SafeNet Luna HSM client workstation running the Remote Backup Service (RBS).
You can then register the Remote Backup HSM with a local SafeNet Luna HSM client workstation so that the it
sees the Remote Backup HSM as a slot in LunaCM. This allows the administrator of the local SafeNet Luna HSM
client workstation to use LunaCM to back up any local slots to the remote Backup HSM.

Performing a Backup
To perform a backup, you identify the partition to be backed up (source), and the partition that will be created (or added
to) on the Backup HSM. You can specify whether to add/append only unique objects (objects that have not previously
been saved onto the target partition), or to replace (overwrite) the objects on the target partition.

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LunaSH
If you are using LunaSH to backup a partition on a SafeNet Luna Network HSM, use:
partition backup -partition  -tokenpar  -serial  [-add] [replace]
More options are available. See "partition backup" on page 1 in the LunaSH Command Reference Guide for full
command syntax.

LunaCM
If you are using LunaCM on a Client workstation, first login to the partition as Crypto Officer.If the backup device is
•

a slot in the current system, use:
partition archive backup -slot  -partition  [-append] [-replace]

•

in a remote workstation, use:
partition archive backup -slot remote-hostname  -port  -partition  [-append] [-replace]

•

a USB-attached HSM, use:
partition archive backup -slot direct -partition  [-append] [-replace]

More options are available. See "partition archive backup" on page 1 in the LunaCM Command Reference Guide for full
command syntax.
LunaCM assumes that the target partition already exists with the appropriate domain, while LunaSH expects you to
provide the domain, or prompts you if it is not provided (for password-authenticated HSMs).

Replacing or Appending
If a matching target partition exists and the source partition is being incrementally backed up, choosing the add/append
option in the command - then the target partition is not erased. Only source objects with unique IDs are copied to the
target (backup) partition, adding them to the objects already there.
If a matching target partition exists and the source partition is being fully backed up, choosing the replace option in the
command. The existing partition is erased and a new one created.

Objects are Smaller When Stored on Backup HSM
Objects stored on the Backup HSM may be smaller than the same objects stored on the SafeNet Luna Network HSM.
For example, symmetric keys are 8 bytes smaller when stored on the Backup HSM. This size difference has no effect
on backup and restore operations.

Comparison of Backup Performance by Medium
For reference, this table shows examples of time required for a backup operation for one partition containing 25 RSA
2048-bit keypairs, or 50 objects in total. The source is a SafeNet Luna Network HSM appliance. The destination backup
devices and paths are listed in the table.

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Backup Destination

Time Required for
Operation

Comment

SafeNet Luna Backup HSM (PW-auth), local

5 seconds

Password is supplied with the
command

SafeNet Luna Backup HSM (PED-auth), local

5 seconds plus...

Add any time required for PED
key operations

Compatibility with Other Devices
Backup can co-exist with PKI Bundle operation. That is, multiple devices can be connected simultaneously to a
SafeNet appliance (three USB connectors). Thus, you could connect a SafeNet Luna Backup HSM, a SafeNet DOCK
2 (with migration-source tokens in its reader slots), and a SafeNet Luna USB HSM to the three available USB
connectors on the SafeNet Luna Network HSM.

Why is Backup Optional?
In general, a SafeNet Luna HSM or HSM partition is capable of being backed up to a SafeNet Luna Backup HSM. The
backup capability is considered a good and desirable and necessary thing for keys that carry a high cost to replace,
such as Certificate Authority root keys and root certificates.
However, backup devices are an optional equipment for SafeNet Luna HSMs. There are at least two reasons for this:
1. Some customers don't care. They may be using (for example) SSL within a controlled boundary like a corporation,
where it is not a problem to simply tell all employees to be prepared to trust a new certificate, in the event that the
previous one is lost or compromised. In fact it might be company policy to periodically jettison old certificates and
distribute fresh ones. Other customers might be using software that manages lost profiles, making it
straightforward to resume work with a new key or cert. The certificate authority that issued the certificates would
need backup, but the individual customers of that certificate authority would not. In summary, it might not be
worthwhile to backup keys that are low-cost (from an implementation point of view) to replace. Keys that carry a
high cost to replace should be backed up.
2. Some countries do not permit copying of private keys. If you are subject to such laws, and wish to store encrypted
material for later retrieval (perhaps archives of highly sensitive files), then you would use symmetric keys, rather
than a private/public keypair, for safe and legal backup.

How Long Does Data Last?
SafeNet Luna HSMs have onboard volatile memory meant for temporary data (disappears when power is removed),
and onboard flash memory, used to store permanent material, like PKI Root keys, and critical key material, and the
firmware that makes the device work.
No electronic storage is forever. If your SafeNet Luna HSM is operated within an ambient temperature range of 0
degrees Celsius to +40 degrees Celsius, or stored between -20 degrees Celsius and +65 degrees Celsius, then
(according to industry-standard testing and estimation methods) your data should be retrievable for twenty years from
the time that the token was shipped from the factory. This is a conservative estimate, based on worst-case
characteristics of the system components.

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Additional Operational Questions
Is SafeNet Luna Backup HSM capable of backing up multiple SafeNet Luna HSMs or is it a
one-to-one relationship?
For example, if we had two SafeNet Luna Network HSM appliances each with two partitions, or if we had four SafeNet
Luna PCIe HSMs, could we backup all four partitions to a single Backup HSM? If yes, do they need to be under the
same domain?

Answer
One SafeNet Luna Backup HSM can back up multiple SafeNet Luna HSMs. The domains on those SafeNet Luna
HSMs do not need to match each other (although they can, if desired), since domains can be partition-specific. The only
domains that must match are those on any given SafeNet Luna HSM partition and its backup partition on the SafeNet
Luna Backup HSM. With that said, the limits on quantity of backup of partitions from multiple appliances or embedded
HSMs is the remaining space available on the Backup HSM, and the remaining number of partitions (base configuration
for SafeNet Luna Backup HSM is 20 partitions - you can purchase additional capability).

Can a SafeNet Luna Backup HSM keep multiple backups of a single partition?
For example, could we perform a backup of an application partition one month and then back it up again next month
without overwriting the previous month?

Answer
Yes, you can do this as long as each successive backup partition (target) is given a unique name.

About the SafeNet Luna Backup HSM
This section describes what you can do with the SafeNet Luna Backup HSM (Backup HSM) and outlines the various
ways, both local and remote, that you can connect the Backup HSM to perform backup and restore operations. It
contains the following topics:
•

"Functionality of the SafeNet Luna Backup HSM" below

•

"Backup and Restore Options and Configurations" on page 43
Note: The word "Remote" in the product name merely indicates that the Backup HSM provides
remote backup capability. You can use the SafeNet Luna Backup HSM to back up the contents
of your HSM to a locally attached Backup HSM, or to a remotely located Backup HSM. The
SafeNet Luna Backup HSM is referred to as the Backup HSM in this section.

Functionality of the SafeNet Luna Backup HSM
You can use the SafeNet Luna Backup HSM to backup multiple partitions from one or more SafeNet Luna Network
HSMs or SafeNet Luna PCIe HSMs. Partition domain and authentication attributes are maintained when you back up a
partition, which impacts how you can use the Backup HSM.

Storage Capacity and Supported Number of Partitions
Backup is performed on a per-partition basis. SafeNet Luna PCIe HSM supports one application partition. The SafeNet
Luna Network HSM supports multiple application partitions. The size of a SafeNet Luna Network HSM partition is

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configurable, but since all partitions share the HSM memory, the more partitions you create, the smaller they must be.
The base configuration for SafeNet Luna Backup HSM is 20 partitions and 15.5 Mb of space, allowing you to backup a
SafeNet Luna Network HSM with up to twenty partitions, or any combination of partitions on individual SafeNet Luna
HSMs, up to the maximum memory available on the Backup HSM. SafeNet Luna Network HSMs can be updated to
support up to 100 partitions. You have the option of purchasing and adding capability upgrades for 50 or 100 partitions to
SafeNet Luna Network HSM, as well as to the SafeNet Luna Backup HSM.
Note: The size of the partition header is different for a SafeNet Luna Network HSM partition
and its equivalent backup partition stored on a SafeNet Luna Backup HSM. As a result, the
value displayed in the Used column in the output of the partition list command (for the backed
up SafeNet Luna Network HSM partition) is different than the value displayed in the Used
column in the output of the token backup partition list command (for the backup partition on
the Backup HSM).

Upgrading the Number of Supported Partitions
The 50 Partitions Capability Upgrade and the 100 Partitions Capability Upgrade are provided in the form of CUFs
(capability update files) that can be applied to a SafeNet Luna Backup HSM connected to your workstation, in the same
fashion as upgrades are applied to an installed SafeNet Luna PCIe HSM or to a USB-connected SafeNet Luna USB
HSM.
The 50 Partitions Capability Upgrade and the 100 Partitions Capability Upgrade are provided in the form of a secure
package (.spkg file) that can be uploaded (via scp or pscp) for processing by SafeNet Luna Network HSM to upgrade
SafeNet Luna Network HSM partition limit, or to upgrade the partition limit of a SafeNet Luna Backup HSM connected
directly to the SafeNet Luna Network HSM appliance for local backup.
When your SafeNet Luna Backup HSM is connected locally to a SafeNet Luna Network HSM appliance, use the
upgrade instructions at "HSM Capability and Partition Upgrades" on page 287 to apply an upgrade to increase the
number of HSM partitions that can be backed up to the device.

Domains and Backups
If the target partition exists on the Backup HSM, then it must already share its partition domain with the source partition.
If the target partition is being created, then it takes the domain of the source partition.
Multiple partitions, with different domains, can exist on a single Backup HSM.
As with backup operations, restore operations can take place only where the source and target partitions have the same
domain.
•

Full/replace backup or restore creates a new target partition with the same domain as the source partition.

•

Partial (additive/incremental) backup or restore requires the existing source and target partitions to have the same
domain before the operation can start.

No cross-domain copying (backup or restore) is possible - there is no way to "mix and match" objects from different
domains.

PED or Password Authentication
The Backup HSM creates a partition with matching authentication type to the SafeNet Luna HSM partition that is being
backed up. That does not work in the opposite direction, however. The Backup HSM can restore a partition (or contents
of a partition) only to a SafeNet Luna HSM of matching authentication type.

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You cannot mix partition authentication types on one backup device. That is, if you have a PED-authenticated HSM
and a password-authenticated HSM, you require two Backup HSMs in order to have a backup of each HSM's
partitions. There is no possibility of backing up data from a higher-security device (Trusted Path, PED-authenticated,
FIPS-3) onto a lower-security device (Password protected, FIPS-2). Normally this is not a concern because a given
installation is likely to employ all SafeNet Luna HSMs of the same authentication type.
However, for HSMs of the same authentication type, you could backup (or restore) partitions from different HSMs onto
a single SafeNet Luna Backup HSM, as long as there is sufficient room. Given that the type matches, the
authentication (domain) is handled at the partition level.

Backup and Restore Options and Configurations
The SafeNet Luna Backup HSM supports local or remote HSM backup. The options for backup of primary/source
SafeNet Luna HSMs are:
•

Local backup of any SafeNet Luna HSM, where all components are co-located. This is a possible scenario with
all SafeNet Luna HSMs, but is more likely with direct-connect, local-to-the-client HSMs such as SafeNet Luna
PCIe HSM. It is unlikely for SafeNet Luna Network HSM, simply because SafeNet Luna Network HSM normally
resides in a server rack, distant from its administrators.

•

Local backup of SafeNet Luna Network HSM, where SafeNet Luna Network HSM is located remotely from a
computer that has the SafeNet Luna Backup HSM. This is one of the likely scenarios with SafeNet Luna Network
HSM, but requires that the administrator performing backup must have client authentication access to all SafeNet
Luna Network HSM partitions.

•

Remote backup of any SafeNet Luna HSM, where the SafeNet Luna HSM is located remotely from the
computer that has the SafeNet Luna Backup HSM. This scenario requires that the administrator of the SafeNet
Luna Backup HSM's host computer must connect (via SSH or RDP) to the clients of each HSM partition that is to
be backed up. The client performs the backup (or restore) under remote direction.

In local mode, you connect the Backup HSM directly, via USB, to a SafeNet Luna Network HSM appliance or SafeNet
Luna PCIe HSM host server. That is, local backup is local to the HSM being backed-up, not necessarily local to the
administrator who is directing the process, who might be far away.
For remote backup, you connect the Backup HSM via USB to a computer running vtl and the driver for the device.
Backup and restore are then performed over the secure network connection. For PED-authenticated HSMs, you must
have a copy of the appropriate red (domain) PED keys to use with the Backup HSM in order to perform the copy/cloning
(backup and restore) operation between the HSMs.

Backing Up a Local HSM to a Directly Connected Backup HSM
The simplest way to backup your SafeNet Luna Network HSM is to connect the Backup HSM directly to the SafeNet
Luna Network HSM appliance. To perform a backup/restore, you open an SSH or serial connection from your
workstation to the appliance, and then launch LunaSH in a terminal session to perform the backup, as illustrated in the
following figure:

The workstation is simply a display terminal for LunaSH running on the appliance. It does not require the SafeNet Luna
Client software.

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The PEDs are required only if the SafeNet Luna Network HSM is PED-authenticated. The appropriate SO (blue),
partition (black) and domain (red) PED keys are required.

Backup to a Backup HSM Connected to a Local Client
The following diagram depicts the elements and connections of the local backup (and restore) operation, where
everything is in one room.

1

LunaCM on the client (host) system sees the primary and backup slots and controls the backup/restore
operation.

2

Backup HSM is a slot visible to the client (host) system when it runs LunaCM.

3

Working HSMs are slots visible to the client (host) system when it runs LunaCM.

4

Every slot on the backup must have same domain (red PED key) as matching slot on the primary HSMs.

The other two backup and restore options, local backup of a distant SafeNet Luna Network HSM and remote backup of
any SafeNet Luna HSM require that PED operations be performed remotely. For that reason, HSMs must be prepared
(locally) in advance by having orange Remote PED keys created and matched with each HSM.

Backing Up a Remote HSM to a Locally-Connected Backup HSM
The diagram below summarizes the elements and setup for backing up partitions of a remote SafeNet Luna Network
HSM to a Backup HSM that is attached to the local host. For this example, the system administrator (admin) for the
SafeNet Luna Network HSM appliance is also the person doing the backup. The local host is configured as follows:
•

The SafeNet Luna HSM client software with the Remote PED options is installed.

•

A Remote Luna PED is connected.

•

The SafeNet Luna Backup HSM is connected.

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Before performing a backup, the admin must open an SSH session to the SafeNet Luna Network HSM appliance and
perform a certificate exchange and registration for each SafeNet Luna Network HSM partition to be backed up to make
the local host a client of the partitions.

1 The admin must have client access to each partition being backed up. In this scenario, the admin must have
black PED keys and passwords for the partitions.
2 The local host is used to control the backup/restore. The SafeNet Luna HSM client vtl software is used to
generate and trade certificates with SafeNet Luna Network HSM, to create an NTLS link. The Luna
PEDServer software running on the local host, in conjunction with the PEDClient software running on the
SafeNet Luna Network HSM, provides remote PED access to the SafeNet Luna Network HSM.
3 The local host can see the SafeNet Luna Network HSM partitions as slots in LunaCM. The Luna PEDClient
software runs on the SafeNet Luna Network HSM when it needs to access the Remote PED via the Luna
PEDServer software running on the local host.
4 Every slot on the Backup HSM must have same domain (red PED key) as the matching slot on the working
HSM. The domain (red) PED keys can be different for each partition or they can share one common domain,
re-used for all partitions. The important consideration is that whatever domain situation exists on the primary
HSM must be matched on the Backup HSM.

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5 The local host can see the Backup HSM as a slot in LunaCM. Because the local host views the
backup/restore operation in this scenario as a local transaction, between two slots visible to LunaCM on the
local host, the remote backup service (RBS) is not needed.
This scenario avoids the complication of an intermediary computer (as would be needed for true remote backup), but at
the cost of giving the authentication keys for all client partitions to an administrator. Your security protocol determines
whether this is acceptable.

Backing Up a Remote HSM to a Remotely-Connected Backup HSM
This section describes how to backup a remote HSM to a Backup HSM that is connected over the network to a remote
host. In this configuration, you require an orange PED key, imprinted with the Remote PED Vector (RPV) for the
HSM you want to back up. To create the orange PED key, you must temporarily connect a PED directly to the
HSM you want to back up, as illustrated in the following figure. The figure shows a local admin session to the HSM.
You could administer remotely, but this operation nevertheless requires a local PED connection to the HSM and
someone there to insert PED keys and press buttons on the PED keypad, so we depict the most likely connection
situation - one person doing all jobs at one location. Once the HSM has been matched to an orange Remote PED key,
all future authentications can be performed with Remote PED, and the HSM can safely be shipped to its distant
location.
Figure 1: Creating an orange PED key imprinted with the remote PED vector (RPV) for the HSM

After you have created the orange (RPV) PED key and have the appropriate red (domain) PED keys for the partitions
you want to back up, you are ready to configure and use your Remote Backup HSM. In this scenario, you could have as
many as three different computers (we depict two for our example) connecting to the SafeNet Luna Network HSM:
•

one to run the ssh administrative connection to the shell (lunash:>) on the SafeNet Luna Network HSM appliance

•

one to run the Remote PED server, with the Luna PED (in remote mode) connected via USB to the computer and
separately connected to the mains electrical power source (see "Changing Modes" on page 176 for instructions on
changing modes on the Luna PED)

•

one to run a client session with vtl and the SafeNet Remote Backup driver, and with the SafeNet Luna Backup
HSM with its own local Luna PED attached

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As noted previously, the orange PED keys contain a Remote PED Vector (RPV) that matches the RPV inside the
SafeNet Luna Network HSM. It is the presence of that RPV at both ends that allows the connection to be made
between the HSM and the Remote PED. At the same time, the SafeNet Luna Network HSM and the SafeNet Luna
Backup HSM must share the same cloning domain, in order for backup and restore (cloning) operations to take place
between the two HSMs. Therefore, red PED keys with that cloning domain must be available.
SafeNet Luna HSMs use Remote Backup Service (RBS) to facilitate Remote Backup.

Required Software
LunaCM is required on both the Client (Host) System and on the System Admin computer, but is run on Client (Host)
System to launch and manage the backup and restore activity. PEDClient is needed on both the Client (Host) System
and the System Admin computer, as well as on any SafeNet Luna Network HSM.
PedClient is needed on any host that must reach out to a pedserver instance and a Remote PED. PedClient instances
can also communicate with each other to facilitate RBS
PedServer must reside (and run, waiting for calls) on any computer connected to a Remote PED.
RBS is required on the computer connected to the SafeNet Luna Backup HSM. RBS is not needed on any other
computer in the scenario.

Example
The following figure provides an example configuration for backing up a remote HSM to a backup HSM connected to a
remote host. This scenario adds an intermediate computer (Client (Host) System) to broker the remote backup of the
HSM partitions. That could be a special-purpose computer, or it could simply mean that the Admin on the computer with
the Remote Backup HSM is given remote access to each client that normally uses a SafeNet Luna HSM partition. The
tradeoff is that those clients already have access to their registered partitions, so there is no need for the Remote
Backup HSM admin to have client access (PED keys) for those partitions. Your security protocol dictates which
scenario is appropriate for you.

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Figure 2: Configuration for backing up a remote HSM to a backup HSM connected to a remote host

1

"Client (Host) System" (1a) is a client of the SafeNet Luna Network HSM being backed up, but "System
Admin" (1b) is not a client of SafeNet Luna Network HSM.

2

LunaCM on "Client (Host) System" (2a) sees the primary (2b) and backup (2c) slots and controls the
backup/restore.

3

Each SafeNet Luna Network HSM (3a) partition is a slot visible to a "Client (Host) System" (3b) when
Client (Host) System runs LunaCM.

4

Every slot on the backup (4a) must have same domain (red PED key) as matching slot on the primary
HSMs (4b).

5

Every primary HSM slot (partition) that is to be backed up or restored must be in login or activated state
(black PED keys (5)), so that the Client (Host) System can access it with LunaCM backup or restore
commands.

6

Backup HSM (6a) is a slot visible to "Client (Host) System" (6b) when Client (Host) System runs LunaCM.

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Backup HSM Installation, Storage, and Maintenance
This section describes how to install and maintain your SafeNet Luna Backup HSM (Backup HSM), and prepare it for
storage. It contains the following sections:
•

"Connecting a Backup HSM" below

•

"Disconnecting a Backup HSM" on the next page

•

"Installing the Battery" on the next page

•

"Backup HSM Storage and Maintenance" on page 53

Connecting a Backup HSM
For local backup, connect the Backup HSM to a power source, and via USB cable to the SafeNet Luna Network HSM
USB port.
For remote backup, connect the Backup HSM to a power source, and via USB cable to a USB port on your computer.
In both cases, the cable attaches to the port on the back panel of the Backup HSM, which requires a mini-USB at that
end of the cable (similar cable as used to connect computers to cameras, older cellphones, etc.).

PED-authenticated HSMs
At the front panel, connect the SafeNet PED, using the supplied cable between the micro-D subminiature (MDSM)
receptacle on top of the PED, and the matching MDSM receptacle on the front panel of SafeNet Luna Backup HSM (the
receptacle labeled "PED").

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Disconnecting a Backup HSM
The Backup HSM is a USB device. It is not equipped with a power switch. There is no special procedure for
disconnecting or shutting down a SafeNet Luna Backup HSM.
If the Backup HSM is used in remote configuration for SafeNet Luna Network HSM (connected to a workstation acting
as backup server), then your only action is to do the usual dismount of a USB device (for the benefit of your
workstation, not the Backup HSM - “It is now safe to disconnect your USB Device”). Linux and UNIX platforms have
their equivalent unmount actions for USB. Then disconnect the cables.
If the Backup HSM is connected to SafeNet Luna Network HSM for local backup, you have no access to the SafeNet
Luna Network HSM’s internal hardened kernel, so you cannot issue an un-mount instruction. Simply disconnect the
cables and the system figures it out at either end. Both SafeNet Luna Network HSM and the Backup HSM accept this
treatment very robustly.

Installing the Battery
The battery that powers the NVRAM and RTC in the SafeNet Luna Backup HSM is shipped uninstalled, in the
packaging. This preserves the battery in case the unit spends a long time in transit or is stored in your warehouse as a
spare. With the battery not inserted, the real-time clock and NVRAM are not depleting its charge to no purpose. If you
are preparing a fresh-from-the-factory Backup HSM to place it into service, then you must install the battery before
using the device.

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1

Begin by removing the front face-plate. It is held in place by two spring clips. Grasp the face-plate firmly and pull
to disengage the clips. Set the face-plate aside.

2

The battery compartment is to the right as you face the unit. The compartment cover is circular and has both
raised dots and a recessed slot. Use finger-pressure against the dots, or the edge of a coin in the slot, to twist the
battery compartment cover ¼ turn in a counter-clockwise direction. The cover should fall out easily.

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3

Remove the battery from its packaging and align it at the opening of the SafeNet Luna USB HSM (or SafeNet
Luna Backup HSM) battery compartment. The battery has a “+” sign near the end with the raised nub/bump. The
flat end of the battery is the negative pole (-).

4

Insert the battery, negative end first. The positive end (+) should protrude. The compartment is spring-loaded.

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5

Use the battery compartment cover to push the battery into the compartment, against the spring tension.
Maintaining the pressure, align the two tabs on the inside of the cover with the two recessed indentations at the
top and bottom of the compartment opening. With a little jiggling and a few trial pushes, the tabs should settle into
those recesses, allowing the cover to seat flush with the front of the SafeNet Luna Backup HSM.
Maintain the inward pressure and twist the cover ¼ turn clockwise to lock it in place. The battery is installed.
6 Replace the front-panel cover by aligning the clips with their respective posts and pushing until the clips grab the
posts and the cover snaps in place.

Backup HSM Storage and Maintenance
The SafeNet Luna Backup HSM (for backing up and restoring HSM and partition contents) and the SafeNet Luna USB
HSM (for PKI options) can be stored, with valuable contents, when not in use. The battery that powers the NVRAM and
RTC in either device must be installed for use, but some questions commonly arise if the device is to be stored for long
periods.

Should I take the battery out when storing the HSM in a safe?
It is generally good practice to remove batteries when storing electronic devices, to preclude accidental damage from
battery leakage. We use high-quality, industrial-grade batteries, that are unlikely to fail in a damaging fashion, but
prudence suggests removing them, regardless. Also, if the unit is not in use, there is no need to maintain power to the
RTC and NVRAM, so an externally stored battery will last longer.

If the battery is out, what happens?
If main power is not connected, and the battery dies, or is removed, then NVRAM and the system's Real Time Clock
lose power. The working copy of the MTK is lost.

If the battery dies during operation, will I lose my key material? Will corruption occur?
The only key material that is lost is session objects (including working copies of stored keys) that are in use at the time.
If the "originals" of those same objects are stored as HSM/partition objects, then they reside in non-volatile memory,
and those are preserved.
There is no corruption of stored objects.

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Where can I get a spare/replacement battery?
From any supplier that can match the specifications.
Technical Specifications:
•

3.6 V Primary lithium-thionyl chloride (Li-SOCl2)

•

Fast voltage recovery after long term storage and/or usage

•

Low self discharge rate

•

10 years shelf life

•

Operating temperature range -55 ºC to +85 ºC

•

U.L. Component Recognition, MH 12193

Storage Conditions:
Cells should be stored in a clean & dry area (less than 30 % Relative Humidity)
Temperature should not exceed +30 ºC

How do I know if the battery is dead or about to die? Can I check the status of the battery?
There is not a low battery indicator or other provision for checking status.
The battery discharge curve is such that the voltage remains constant until the very end of the battery life, at which
point the discharge is extremely steep.

What must I do to recover function, and access to my key material, after battery
removal/discharge?
Insert the battery, connect the HSM, power it up, and resume using it.
The MTK that was deleted by the tamper event (battery removal/discharge) is reconstituted from stored portions as
soon as you log in. All your stored material is available for use.

Backup and Restore From the Client to a Local Backup
HSM (LunaCM)
This section describes how to use LunaCM to backup and restore a partition from the client to a locally connected
SafeNet Luna Backup HSM (Backup HSM). To perform a local backup, you connect the SafeNet Luna Backup HSM to
a USB port on the SafeNet Luna HSM client workstation and use LunaCM to log in as the Crytpo Officer (CO) and
backup any SafeNet Luna Network HSM or SafeNet Luna PCIe HSM partitions that are visible as slots.
The backup operation can go from a source partition (on a SafeNet Luna Network HSM) to an existing partition on the
Backup HSM, or if one does not exist, a new partition can be created during the backup. The restore operation,
however, cannot create a target partition on a SafeNet Luna Network HSM; it must already exist.
You can restore a partition backup to the source HSM or to a different SafeNet Luna Network HSM. The HSM you
restore to must already have a suitable partition created for the restored objects. The partition can have any name - it
does not need to match the name of the source partition on the backup HSM.
You can connect the Backup HSM to a SafeNet Luna HSM client workstation to backup any SafeNet Luna Network
HSM or SafeNet Luna PCIe HSM partitions that are visible as slots in LunaCM, as illustrated in the following figure:

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Figure 1: Configuration for SafeNet Luna Network HSM/PCIe partition backup/restore using a Backup HSM
connected to a local client workstation

In this configuration, you connect the Backup HSM and SafeNet Remote PED, via USB, to your SafeNet Luna HSM
client workstation. The SafeNet Luna Network HSM appliance is remote to the SafeNet Luna HSM client workstation
and is connected using NTLS. Any installed PCIe devices communicate with the SafeNet Luna HSM client over the
PCI bus.
Any partitions you want to backup must be registered with the SafeNet Luna HSM client workstation, and be visible as
slots in LunaCM. The Backup HSM most also be visible as a slot.
If you are backing up PED-authenticated partitions, you require a PED. If you want to backup SafeNet Luna Network
HSM partitions, the PED must have remote capability (Remote PED). Remote PED uses the pedserver/pedclient
processes running on the SafeNet Luna HSM client workstation and on the SafeNet Luna Network HSM appliance to
provide remote PED services for the network-attached SafeNet Luna Network HSM appliance. The PED provides
authentication for all of the attached HSMs (the USB-connected SafeNet Luna Backup HSM, the NTLS-connected
SafeNet Luna Network HSM, and the PCI bus-connected SafeNet Luna PCIe HSM). Every slot on the backup must
have same domain (red PED key) as the matching slot on the source HSMs.
Note: If you have Private Key Cloning switched off for the current partition, then the backup
operation proceeds, but skips over any private keys, and clones only the permitted objects onto
the Backup HSM. Similarly, if you restore from a token that includes private keys, but the target
partition has Private Key Cloning disallowed, then all other objects are recovered to the
partition, but the private keys are skipped during the operation.

Backing Up a Partition to a Locally Connected Backup HSM
You can backup any slots you can see on the client workstation. You must log in as the Crypto Officer to the partition
you want to backup.

To backup an application partition to a Backup HSM connected to a SafeNet Luna HSM client
workstation:
1. Configure the remote PED, as described in "Using Remote PED" on page 203.
2. Start the LunaCM utility on the SafeNet Luna HSM client workstation.
C:\Program Files\SafeNet\LunaClient>lunacm.exe
LunaCM V7.0 - Copyright (c) 2006-2017 Gemalto, Inc.
Available HSM's:
Slot Id ->

1

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HSM
HSM
HSM
HSM
HSM
HSM

Backup and Restore HSMs and Partitions

Label ->
SA52_P1
Serial Number ->
500409014
Model ->
LunaSA
Firmware Version -> 7.0.1
Configuration ->
Luna User Partition With SO (PED) Signing With Cloning Mode
Status ->
OK

Slot Id ->
2
HSM Label ->
BackupHSM Serial Number ->
700101
HSM Model ->
G5Backup
HSM Firmware Version -> 6.26.0
HSM Configuration ->
Remote Backup HSM (PED) Backup Device
HSM Status ->
OK
Current Slot Id: 1

3. Use the slot set command to go to the slot you want to back up:
lunacm:> slot set slot 1
Current Slot Id: 1

(Luna User Slot 7.0.1 (PED) Signing With Cloning Mode)

Command Result : No Error

4. Establish that the HSM is listening for a SafeNet Remote PED:
lunacm:>ped get
HSM slot 1 listening to local PED (PED id=0).
Command Result : No Error
lunacm:> ped connect ip 192.20.10.190
Command Result : No Error
lunacm:> ped get
HSM slot 1 listening to remote PED (PED id=100).
Command Result : No Error

The SafeNet Luna Network HSM is now listening for PED interaction via the link between PedClient on the
SafeNet Luna Network HSM appliance and PedServer on the workstation, and is not expecting a PED connected
directly at the location of the SafeNet Luna Network HSM.
5. Log in as the Crypto Officer (CO) to the partition in the current slot. This is the partition that you want to back up:
lunacm:> role login -name Crypto Officer
Option -password was not supplied.

It is required.

Enter the password: *******
User is activated, PED is not required.
Command Result : No Error

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6. Disconnect the PED from your source HSM (slot 1 in this example), and connect to the Backup HSM (slot 2 in this
example). The PED remains physically connected by USB cable to the SafeNet Luna HSM client workstation, and
remains in Remote mode - you are merely changing slots that are in conversation with that PED.
a. First, tell the SafeNet Luna Network HSM to disconnect from Remote PED with the command ped
disconnect.
b. Tell the Backup HSM to connect to Remote PED (it makes no difference that the PED and the Remote Backup
HSM are USB-connected to the same workstation/laptop; when use of Remote PED is invoked by command
ped connect and verified by ped get, all HSM-PED interaction takes place between PedClient running on that
workstation and PedServer, also running on that workstation).
lunacm:> ped connect ip 192.20.10.189 -slot 2
Command Result : No Error
lunacm:> ped get -slot 2
HSM slot 2 listening to remote PED (PED id=100).
Command Result : No Error

7. Use the partition archive backup command to perform the backup from the current slot (slot 1 in the example, see
above) to the partition that you designate on the Backup HSM. Now that the Backup HSM is listening correctly for a
PED, the target partition can be created, with PED action for the authentication.
lunacm:> partition archive backup -slot 2 -par SAbck1
Logging in as the SO on slot 2.
Please attend to the PED.
Creating partition SAbck1 on slot 2.
Please attend to the PED.
Logging into the container SAbck1 on slot 2 as the user.
Please attend to the PED.
Creating Domain for the partition SAbck1 on slot 2.
Please attend to the PED.
Verifying that all objects can be backed up...
85 objects will be backed up.
Backing up objects...
Cloned object 99 to partition SAbck1 (new handle 19).
Cloned object 33 to partition SAbck1 (new handle 20).
Cloned object 108 to partition SAbck1 (new handle 23).
Cloned object 134 to partition SAbck1 (new handle 24).
Cloned object 83 to partition SAbck1 (new handle 25).
Cloned object 117 to partition SAbck1 (new handle 26).
Cloned object 126 to partition SAbck1 (new handle 27).
Cloned object 65 to partition SAbck1 (new handle 28).
Cloned object 140 to partition SAbck1 (new handle 29).
Cloned object 131 to partition SAbck1 (new handle 30).
Cloned object 94 to partition SAbck1 (new handle 31).
Cloned object 109 to partition SAbck1 (new handle 35).
Cloned object 66 to partition SAbck1 (new handle 36).
Cloned object 123 to partition SAbck1 (new handle 39).

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Cloned
Cloned
Cloned
Cloned
Cloned
Cloned

object
object
object
object
object
object

Backup and Restore HSMs and Partitions

74 to partition SAbck1 (new handle 40).
50 to partition SAbck1 (new handle 44).
43 to partition SAbck1 (new handle 45).
52 to partition SAbck1 (new handle 46).
124 to partition SAbck1 (new handle 47).
115 to partition SAbck1 (new handle 48).

Backup Complete.
20 objects have been backed up to partition SAbck1
on slot 2.
Command Result : No Error

8. Backup is complete, and can be verified if you like.

Restoring a Partition from a Locally Connected Backup HSM
You can restore a backup to any slot you can see on the client workstation. You must log in as the Crypto Officer to the
partition you want to restore to.

To restore an application partition from a Backup HSM connected to a SafeNet Luna HSM client
workstation:
1. Create a target partition for the restore operation on the HSM you are restoring to, if it does not already exist, and
register the partition with the SafeNet Luna HSM client workstation so that it is visible as a slot in LunaCM.
2. Start the LunaCM utility on the SafeNet Luna HSM client workstation.
LunaCM v7.0.0. Copyright (c) 2006-2017 SafeNet.
Available HSMs:
Slot Id ->
Label ->
Serial Number ->
Model ->
Firmware Version ->
Configuration ->
Slot Description ->

0
par1
154438865288
LunaSA 7.0.0
7.0.1
Luna User Partition With SO (PED) Signing With Cloning Mode
Net Token Slot

Slot Id ->
Label ->
Serial Number ->
Model ->
Firmware Version ->
HSM Configuration ->
HSM Status ->

21
lunabackup
496771
G5Backup
6.26.0
Remote Backup HSM (PED) Backup Device
OK

Current Slot Id: 0

3. Use the slot set command to go to the slot you want to restore to.
lunacm:> slot set slot 0
Current Slot Id: 0

(Luna User Slot 7.0.1 (PED) Signing With Cloning Mode)

Command Result : No Error

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4. Open a remote PED session to the SafeNet Luna Network HSM you are restoring to:
lunacm:> ped connect ip 192.20.10.190
Command Result : No Error
lunacm:> ped get
HSM slot 1 listening to remote PED (PED id=100).
Command Result : No Error

The SafeNet Luna Network HSM is now listening for PED interaction via the link between PEDclient on the
SafeNet Luna Network HSM appliance and PEDserver on the workstation, and is not expecting a PED connected
directly at the location of the SafeNet Luna Network HSM.
5. Log into the partition in the current slot. This is the partition that you want to restore to.
lunacm:> role login -name Crypto Officer
Option -password was not supplied.

It is required.

Enter the password: *******
User is activated, PED is not required.
Command Result : No Error

6. Use the partition archive restore command restore the partition from the Backup HSM to the current slot, adding
to, or replacing, the current partition contents:
partition archive restore -slot  -partition LunaSAPartitionname -password ClientPassword -replace

Note: In the command above, you can use -add instead of -replace. Adding might result in
unwanted behaviors, such as having two keys with the same label, if one existed in the HSM
Partition and one on the backup token. The two would be assigned different handles, however.

Backup and Restore From the Client to a Remote Backup
HSM (LunaCM, RBS)
This section describes how to use LunaCM and the Remote Backup Service (RBS) to backup and restore a partition
from the client to a remotely located SafeNet Luna Backup HSM (Backup HSM). It contains the following sections:
•

"Overview" below

•

"Configuring the Remote Backup Service (RBS)" on page 61

•

"Backing Up an Application Partition to a Remotely Located Backup HSM" on page 63

•

"Restoring an HSM Partition From a Remotely Located Backup HSM" on page 68

Overview
Remote backups are enabled by the SafeNet Remote Backup Service (RBS). RBS is a utility, included with the
SafeNet Luna HSM client software, that runs as a service (Windows) or daemon (Unix/Linux) on a workstation used to

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host one or more remote Backup HSMs.
To use RBS, do the following:
1. Configure it to define which of the Backup HSMs connected to the workstation running RBS that you want to make
available to other SafeNet Luna HSM client workstations or SafeNet Luna Network HSM appliances for performing
remote backups.
2. Register the workstation running RBS with any SafeNet Luna HSM client workstations or SafeNet Luna Network
HSM appliances that you want to be able to use the Remote Backup HSMs.
3. Start the RBS service/daemon.
Once RBS is configured and running, the SafeNet Luna HSM client workstations or SafeNet Luna Network HSM
appliances registered with the workstation running RBS can see its available Backup HSMs as slots in LunaCM
(SafeNet Luna HSM client workstation) or LunaSH (SafeNet Luna Network HSM appliance). To perform backup and
restore operations using the Remote Backup HSMs, you open a LunaCM or LunaSH session, as relevant, on the
SafeNet Luna HSM client workstation or SafeNet Luna Network HSM appliance used to host the slot you want to
backup, and specify the slot for the Remote Backup HSM as the slot to use for the backup/restore operation.
The backup operation can go from a source partition (on a SafeNet Luna HSM) to an existing partition on the SafeNet
Luna Backup HSM, or if one does not exist, a new partition can be created during the backup. The restore operation
cannot create a target partition on a SafeNet Luna Network HSM; it must already exist and have a registered NTLS link.
To back up PED-authenticated partitions, you can connect a remote PED to the Backup HSM host workstation, or you
can use a separate computer to provide PED operations.
Note: Remote PED (PED Server) is supported on Windows only.

Configurations for Remote Backup of a SafeNet Luna Client Workstation Slot
The possible configurations for performing a remote backup of a SafeNet Luna HSM client workstation slot are
illustrated in the following figures. Only PED-authenticated backup configurations are shown.
Figure 1: Configuration for remote backup of a SafeNet Luna HSM client workstation slot with the remote
PED connected to the backup workstation

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Figure 2: Configuration for remote backup of a SafeNet Luna HSM client workstation slot with the remote
PED connected to a separate workstation

Configuring the Remote Backup Service (RBS)
RBS is not a standalone feature. It is a service that facilitates certain scenarios when backing-up HSM partitions or
restoring onto those partitions, using a backup HSM that is distant from the primary HSM and its host or client. RBS is
run on the computer that hosts the SafeNet Luna Backup HSM, only. RBS is a separate option at software installation
time. You do not need it on all client/admin computers, but it doesn't hurt to have it installed. Running RBS also requires
running PED Client on that computer, as well as on the distant primary - the paired instances of PED Client form the
communications link that makes RBS possible.
RBS requires PED Client on both the RBS client and RBS server ends.
The PEDClient is half of the PEDServer/PEDClient duo that enables Remote PED service.
However, PEDClient is also used in the communication component of Remote Backup Service. So, PEDClient should
run on all the platforms that have HSMs - where a SafeNet Luna USB HSM or SafeNet Luna PCIe HSM is installed
(PEDClient is already inside SafeNet Luna Network HSM 5.2 and newer...) - and also on any system with the RBS
application.
The PEDServer is required only on a computer with the SafeNet Remote PED.
If you consolidate your HSM administration (including Remote PED) on the same computer with your SafeNet
Remote Backup HSM, you would have both PEDClient and PEDServer installed there. We observe that a majority of
customers combine administrative functions this way, on a laptop or a workstation that is used to administer one-ormany HSM hosts. The HSM host (with SafeNet Luna USB HSM or SafeNet Luna PCIe HSM) or the SafeNet Luna
Network HSM appliance resides in a physically secure, possibly remote location, while the administrator works from a
laptop in her/his office. Your security policy determines how you do it.

To configure RBS:
1. Install the SafeNet Luna HSM client software on the computer used to manage the HSMs/partitions you want to
back up. If you use PED authentication, ensure that the Remote PED option is installed. You must also install the
SafeNet Luna Network HSM client software in addition to the SafeNet Luna USB HSM or SafeNet Luna PCIe
HSM software, because the SafeNet Luna Network HSM client is the only one that includes the vtl utility, which is

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required to perform the certificate exchange that enables Remote Backup Service.

2. Install the SafeNet Luna HSM client software on the workstation used to host your Backup HSM. Select the
Remote Backup option. If the workstation is running Windows, and will be used to connect a Remote PED, install
the Remote PED option here.

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3. Run rbs --genkey to generate the server.pem to establish the Remote Backup Service between the Backup host
and the host/client for the primary HSM. The location of the server.pem file can be found in the Chrystoki.conf
/crystoki.ini file.
4. Run rbs --config to specify the devices to support.
5. Run rbs --daemon to launch the RBS daemon (Linux and UNIX) or the RBS console application (on Windows, it
closes after every use).
6. Create the client certificate (if not already done) with vtl createCert -n .
7. Use scp (Unix/Linux) or pscp (Windows) to copy the certificate generated earlier (server.pem) to your primary
HSM host computer (or SafeNet Luna Network HSM appliance):
# scp root@192.20.9.253:/usr/safenet/lunaclient/rbs/server/server.pem .
root@192.20.9.253's password: *********
server.pem | 1 kB | 1.2 kB/s | ETA: 00:00:00 | 100%
8. Run vtl on the host computer (or appliance) to add the RBS server to the server list.
vtl add -n 192.20.9.253 -c server.pem
New server 192.20.9.253 successfully added to server list.
vtl list
Server: 192.20.9.82
Server: 192.20.9.253
Note: If you encounter problems, try changing the RBS and PED Client ports from the default
values. Check that your firewall is not blocking ports used by the service. (Refer to the
command syntax pages for default values.)

Backing Up an Application Partition to a Remotely Located Backup HSM
This section describes how to backup an application partition to a remotely located Backup HSM using RBS.

Prerequisites
You will need the following components to perform a remote backup:

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Quantity

Description

1

SafeNet Luna HSM 5.2 or newer

1

Windows computer with SafeNet Luna Network HSM 5.2 (or newer) client software installed

1

SafeNet Luna Backup HSM

1

Set of PED keys imprinted for the source HSM and partitions

1

Luna PED (Remote PED with f/w 2.7.1 or later)*

1

Power cable for Luna PED (Remote)

2

USB to mini USB cable for Luna PED (Remote) and SafeNet Luna Backup HSM

Note: The Luna PED that is connected to the Windows computer, in order to perform Remote
PED operations with the distant SafeNet Luna Network HSM appliance, must be a Luna PED
(remote-capable version) and is used in Remote mode and in Local mode. You also have the
option to connect a second Luna PED, which can be Remote capable or can be a Local-only
version, to the SafeNet Luna Backup HSM. This allows you to leave the Remote capable Luna
PED connected to the workstation in Remote mode.

Assumptions
The following examples assume that you have set up RBS, as described in "Configuring the Remote Backup Service
(RBS)" on page 61, and have prepared for the backup, as follows:
•

The Backup HSM and the HSMs/partitions you want to back up are initialized with appropriate keys (blue SO and
black Partition Owner/User PED keys, which can be the same for both devices, or can be different).

•

Both devices must share the same domain or red PED key value.

•

The workstation (Windows computer) has Remote PED and SafeNet Remote Backup software package installed
including the appropriate driver.

•

For SafeNet Luna Network HSM, NTLS is established between your workstation computer, acting as a SafeNet
Luna Network HSM client, and the distant SafeNet Luna Network HSM - that is, the workstation is registered as a
client with the partition.

•

A Remote PED session key (orange RPV key) has been created and associated with the distant SafeNet Luna
HSM.

To Backup an Application Partition to a Remotely Located Backup HSM:
The following procedure provides an example illustrating how to remotely backup a PED-authenticated application
partition. In this example a single remote PED, attached to the Windows workstation used to host the Backup HSM, is
used.
Set up the remote PED
1. Ensure that your Windows workstation has the PED USB driver (from the /USBDriver folder on the software CD)
installed, and that the PEDServer.exe file (the executable program file that makes Remote PED operation
possible) has been copied to a convenient directory on your hard disk.
2. Connect all of the components as follows:

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From

Using

To

Workstation

USB

Remote PED (Luna PED IIr in Remote
mode)

DC power receptacle on Remote
PED

PED Power Supply

Mains AC power (wall socket)

Workstation

USB

SafeNet Luna Backup HSM

SafeNet Luna Backup HSM

Power Cord

Mains AC power (wall socket)

3. At the Remote Luna PED (Luna PED with remote capability, connected to the USB port of the workstation), do the
following:
–

Press < on the PED keypad to navigate to the main menu.

–

Press 7 to enter Remote mode.

4. Run PedServer to start the Remote PED service on the administrative workstation (Windows) computer, as
follows:
–

In a Command Prompt (DOS) window, change directory to the location of the PEDServer.exe file and run that
file:
C:\>cd \Program Files\LunaCient
C:\Program Files\LunaClient>PEDServer -mode start

5. Open an administrative connection (SSH) to the distant SafeNet Luna HSM (for SafeNet Luna Network HSM
appliance, log in as "admin." For another HSM host, log in with the appropriate ID. Start the PED Client (the
Remote PED enabling process on the appliance):
lunash:> hsm ped connect -ip  -port 1503
or
lunacm:> hsm ped connect -ip  -port 1503

Insert the orange RPV PED key that matches the RPV of the distant SafeNet Luna HSM.
The Remote PED Client in the SafeNet Luna Network HSM appliance or in the SafeNet Luna HSM client
workstation establishes a connection with the listening PedServer on your remote PED workstation.
Backup a slot to the remotely located backup HSM
Note: The following steps apply to LunaCM only. For LunaSH, follow the procedure "To
backup a SafeNet Luna Network HSM partition to a directly connected Backup HSM:" on page
1. Use the token backup list and token backup show commands to ensure that the remote
Backup HSM is visible.
6. Start the LunaCM utility (in Windows, it resides at C:\Program Files\SafeNet\LunaClient - in Linux/UNIX, it
resides at /usr/safenet/lunaclient/bin).
C:\Program Files\SafeNet\LunaClient>lunacm.exe
LunaCM V7.0.0 - Copyright (c) 2006-2017 Gemalto, Inc.
Available HSM's:

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Slot Id ->
1
HSM Label ->
SA82_P1
HSM Serial Number ->
16298193222733
HSM Model ->
LunaSA 7.0.0
HSM Firmware Version -> 7.0.1
HSM Configuration ->
Luna User Partition, With SO (PED) Signing With Cloning Mode
HSM Status ->
OK
Slot Id ->
2
HSM Label ->
G5PKI
HSM Serial Number ->
701968008
HSM Model ->
LunaSA
HSM Firmware Version -> 6.10.1
HSM Configuration ->
SafeNet Luna Network HSM Slot (PED) Signing With Cloning Mode
HSM Status ->
OK
Slot Id ->
3
HSM Label ->
G5backup
HSM Serial Number ->
700101
HSM Model ->
G5Backup
HSM Firmware Version -> 6.26.01
HSM Configuration ->
Luna HSM (PED) Backup Device
HSM Status ->
OK
Current Slot Id: 1

7. If the current slot is not the slot that you wish to backup, use the slot set command to go to the correct slot.
lunacm:> slot set slot 1
Current Slot Id: 1

(Luna User Slot 6.22.0 (PED) Signing With Cloning Mode)

Command Result : No Error

8. Establish that the HSM is listening for the remote Luna PED at the correct location:
Note: The PEDServer must already have been set up at that host.
lunacm:>ped get
HSM slot 1 listening to local PED (PED id=0).
Command Result : No Error
lunacm:> ped connect ip 192.20.10.190
Command Result : No Error
lunacm:> ped get
HSM slot 1 listening to remote PED (PED id=100).
Command Result : No Error

9. Skip this step if your source partition is activated.

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Log into the partition (this takes place at the currently selected slot). This step is needed only if the partition you are
about to backup is not already in the activated state.
lunacm:> role login -name Crypto Officer
Option -password was not supplied.

It is required.

Enter the password: *******
User is activated, PED is not required.
Command Result : No Error

10. Disconnect the PED from your source HSM (slot 1 in this example), and connect to the remote Backup HSM (slot 3
in this example):
lunacm:> ped disconnect
Are you sure you wish to disconnect the remote ped?
Type 'proceed' to continue, or 'quit' to quit now -> proceed
Command Result : No Error
lunacm:> ped connect ip 192.20.10.190 -slot 3
Command Result : No Error
lunacm:> ped get -slot 3
HSM slot 3 listening to remote PED (PED id=100).
Command Result : No Error

11. Perform the backup from the current slot to the partition that you designate on the Remote Backup HSM. Now that
the Backup HSM is listening correctly for a PED, the target partition can be created, with PED action for the
authentication.
lunacm:> partition archive backup -slot 3 -par SAbck1
Logging in as the SO on slot 3.
Please attend to the PED.
Creating partition SAbck1 on slot 3.
Please attend to the PED.
Logging into the container SAbck1 on slot 3 as the user.
Please attend to the PED.
Creating Domain for the partition SAbck1 on slot 3.
Please attend to the PED.
Verifying that all objects can be backed up...
85 objects will be backed up.
Backing up objects...
Cloned object 99 to partition SAbck1 (new handle 19).

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Cloned
Cloned
.
.
.
Cloned
Cloned
Cloned

Backup and Restore HSMs and Partitions

object 33 to partition SAbck1 (new handle 20).
object 108 to partition SAbck1 (new handle 23).

object 78 to partition SAbck1 (new handle 128).
object 88 to partition SAbck1 (new handle 129).
object 40 to partition SAbck1 (new handle 130).

Backup Complete.
85 objects have been backed up to partition SAbck1
on slot 3.
Command Result : No Error

12. The backup operation is complete.

Restoring an HSM Partition From a Remotely Located Backup HSM
This section describes how to restore an application partition from a remotely located Backup HSM using RBS.

To restore an application partition from a remotely located backup HSM:
The following procedure provides an example of how to restore a partition from a remotely located Backup HSM. In this
example, the partition is restored to a SafeNet Luna Network HSM partition that is not in the activated state. A single
remote PED is used to authenticate to the remote Backup HSM and the SafeNet Luna Network HSM partition. If your
primary HSM partition (the partition onto which you will restore the backed-up objects) is in the activated state, then
only the Backup HSM needs PED activity for authentication during restore.
Note: The following steps apply to LunaCM only. For LunaSH, follow the procedure "To restore
a SafeNet Luna Network HSM partition from a directly connected Backup HSM:" on page 1.
Use the token backup list and token backup show commands to ensure that the Remote
Backup HSM is visible.
1. In our test setup, we have each of several SafeNet Luna HSM products. An easy way to see an updated summary
of all HSMs and slot assignments is to exit LunaCM and restart the utility.
C:\Program Files\SafeNet\LunaClient>lunacm.exe
LunaCM v7.0.0 - Copyright (c) 2006-2017 Gemalto, Inc.

Available HSMs:
Slot Id ->
Label ->
Serial Number ->
Model ->
Firmware Version ->
Configuration ->
Slot Description ->

0

Slot Id ->
Label ->

1

16298193222733
LunaSA 7.0.0
7.0.1
Luna User Partition With SO (PED) Signing With Cloning Mode
Net Token Slot

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Serial Number ->
Model ->
Firmware Version ->
Configuration ->
Slot Description ->

16298193222735
LunaSA 7.0.0
7.0.1
Luna User Partition With SO (PED) Signing With Cloning Mode
Net Token Slot

Slot Id ->
Label ->
Serial Number ->
Model ->
Firmware Version ->
Configuration ->
Slot Description ->

2
legacypar1
16298193222734
LunaSA
6.22.0
Luna User Partition, No SO (PED) Signing With Cloning Mode
Net Token Slot

Slot Id ->
Label ->
Serial Number ->
Model ->
Firmware Version ->
Configuration ->
Slot Description ->

3
SAbck1
700101
G5Backup
6.26.0
Luna User Partition With SO (PED) Signing With Cloning Mode
User Token Slot

Slot Id ->
Tunnel Slot Id ->
Label ->
Serial Number ->
Model ->
Firmware Version ->
Configuration ->
Slot Description ->

5
7

Slot Id ->
Tunnel Slot Id ->
Label ->
Serial Number ->
Model ->
Firmware Version ->
Configuration ->
Slot Description ->
HSM Configuration ->
HSM Status ->

6
7
mypcie6
150022
K6 Base
6.22.0
Luna HSM Admin Partition (PED) Signing With Cloning Mode
Admin Token Slot
Luna HSM Admin Partition (PED)
OK

349297122734
K6 Base
6.22.0
Luna User Partition With SO (PED) Signing With Cloning Mode
User Token Slot

Slot Id ->
8
HSM Label ->
myG5pw
HSM Serial Number ->
7001312
HSM Model ->
G5Base
HSM Firmware Version -> 6.10.4
HSM Configuration ->
SafeNet Luna USB HSM (PW) Signing With Cloning Mode
HSM Status ->
OK
Current Slot Id: 0

2. Verify which slot is listening for PED and whether it is expecting local or remote.
lunacm:>ped get

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HSM slot 0 listening to local PED (PED id=0).
Command Result : No Error

3. Connect to Remote PED with ped connect.
4. Log into the partition to which you want to restore.
Note: This would not be necessary if the partition was activated - we are demonstrating that if
the partition was not in login state or activated state, it is straightforward to briefly switch the
PED to the primary HSM partition before switching the PED back to the Backup HSM.
lunacm:> role login -n Crypto Officer
enter password: *******
Please attend to the PED.

Command Result : No Error
lunacm:> ped disconnect
Are you sure you wish to disconnect the remote ped?
Type 'proceed' to continue, or 'quit' to quit now -> proceed
Command Result : No Error

(The current selected slot in LunaCM is still slot 0, and having ensured login status on that slot/partition we have just
released the Remote PED connection there. The other end of the Remote PED pair, the PED-connected host computer
running PedServer, is now free to accept a Remote PED link from another PedClient, which will be the host attached to
the SafeNet Luna Backup HSM.)
Note: In this example, the SafeNet Luna Network HSM partition, to which we will restore
objects, is visible in LunaCM at slot 0 because it is linked to this SafeNet Luna HSM client by
NTLS, while this Client is registered to that partition at the SafeNet Luna Network HSM.
The SafeNet Luna Backup HSM is visible in LunaCM, at slot 3 in this case, because it is linked
by the RBS connection that you previously established (see "To Configure RBS" above in this
chapter); that is, PedClient is running on this Client, and PedClient and rbs.exe are running on
the Backup HSM's host, with each other identified as their partner in the RBS link.
5. Connect the Remote PED to the Backup HSM (which, in this example, is slot 3).
lunacm:> ped connect ip 192.20.10.190 slot 3
Command Result : No Error
lunacm:> ped get
HSM slot 0 listening to local PED (PED id=0).

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Command Result : No Error
lunacm:> ped get slot 3
HSM slot 3 listening to remote PED (PED id=100).
Command Result : No Error

The ped connect command specifies the slot (now the SafeNet Luna Backup HSM) that makes a new Remote
PED connection, because that slot indication is part of the command - and ped get verifies the new Remote PEDconnected slot. But the focus of the library/LunaCM has not changed from slot 0; any other LunaCM commands
that act on a slot will act on slot 0 until you change that with slot set. You could verify that current focus, if you
wished, by running slot list again.
6. Restore to the current slot from the slot that corresponds to the Backup HSM.
lunacm:> partition archive restore -slot 3 -par SAbck1
Logging in to partition SAbck1 on slot 3 as the user.
Please attend to the PED.
Verifying that all objects can be restored...
85 objects will be restored.
Restoring objects...
Cloned object 19 from partition SAbck1 (new handle 20).
Cloned object 20 from partition SAbck1 (new handle 21).
Cloned object 23 from partition SAbck1 (new handle 22).
.
.
.
Cloned object 128 from partition SAbck1 (new handle 137).
Cloned object 129 from partition SAbck1 (new handle 138).
Cloned object 130 from partition SAbck1 (new handle 139).
Restore Complete.
85 objects have been restored from partition SAbck1 on slot 3.
Command Result : No Error

Because the LunaCM focus rests with the target partition in slot 0, your partition archive restore command must
explicitly identify the slot from which backup source objects are to be cloned, slot 3 in this example, onto the target
partition, current-slot 0 in this case. You also specified the backup partition name, because a SafeNet Luna Backup
HSM can contain more than one archived partition.
7. Verify that the restored slot now looks like it did just before the backup was originally performed.
lunacm:> partition archive list -slot 3
HSM Storage Information for slot 3:
Total HSM Storage Space:
Used HSM Storage Space:
Free HSM Storage Space:
Number Of Allowed Partitions:

16252928
43616
16209312
20

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Number Of Allowed Partitions: 1
Partition list for slot 3
Number of partition: 1
Name:
Total Storage Size:
Used Storage Size:
Free Storage Size:
Number Of Objects:

SAbck1
41460
41460
0
85

Command Result : No Error
lunacm:>

8. Remote restore from backup, using RBS, is complete.
To restore onto a different remote SafeNet Luna HSM, the same arrangement is required:
•

The remote HSM must already have a suitable partition.

•

If the restore-target HSM is a SafeNet Luna Network HSM, the target partition can have any name - it does not
need to match the name of the source partition on the backup device.

•

Your workstation must be registered as a client to that partition.

Backup and Restore From the Appliance to a Local Backup
HSM (LunaSH)
This section describes how to use LunaSH to backup and restore a partition on the appliance to a locally connected
SafeNet Luna Backup HSM (Backup HSM). To perform a local backup, you connect the SafeNet Luna Backup HSM to
a USB port on the SafeNet Luna Network HSM appliance and use LunaSH to log in as the Crypto Officer (CO) to the
HSM partitions that you want to backup.
The backup operation can go from a source partition (on a SafeNet Luna Network HSM) to an existing partition on the
Backup HSM, or if one does not exist, a new partition can be created during the backup. The restore operation,
however, cannot create a target partition on a SafeNet Luna Network HSM; it must already exist.
You can restore a partition backup to the source HSM or to a different SafeNet Luna Network HSM. The HSM you
restore to must already have a suitable partition created for the restored objects. The partition can have any name - it
does not need to match the name of the source partition on the backup HSM.
You can connect the Backup HSM directly to the SafeNet Luna Network HSM appliance to backup some or all of the
individual partitions it contains, using LunaSH. You require the Partition Crypto Officer (CO) credentials for each
partition you want to backup.
Note: You cannot use this method to backup partitions configured to use STC (see "Secure
Trusted Channel (STC)" on page 259). To backup a partition configured to use STC, you must
use LunaCM, as described in "Backup and Restore From the Appliance to a Local Backup
HSM (LunaSH)" above.

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To perform a backup/restore, you open an SSH or serial connection from your workstation to the appliance, and use
LunaSH to perform a backup to the Backup HSM connected to the appliance, as illustrated in the following figure:
Figure 1: Partition backup/restore using a Backup HSM connected directly to the appliance

Workstation requirements
The workstation is simply a display terminal for LunaSH running on the appliance. It requires an SSH client (ssh on
Linux, PuTTY on Windows). It does not require the SafeNet Luna HSM client software.

PED-authenticated partitions
The PEDs are required only if the SafeNet Luna Network HSM is PED-authenticated. The appropriate SO (blue),
partition (black) and domain (red) PED keys are required. The Backup HSM and SafeNet Luna Network HSM must
share the same domain (red) PED key value.
Although two PEDs are recommended (one connected to the SafeNet Luna Network HSM and one connected to the
Backup HSM) you can use a single PED, if desired. If using a single PED, note that you can connect the PED to only
one HSM at a time. You will need to disconnect it from the source (SafeNet Luna Network HSM) HSM and connect to
the target (SafeNet Luna Backup HSM) when PED operations are needed at those HSMs respectively.

Backing Up a Partition to a Locally Connected Backup HSM
You can backup any partitions you can log in to as the Crypto Officer.

To backup a SafeNet Luna Network HSM partition to a directly connected Backup HSM:
1. Connect all the required components and open a terminal session to the SafeNet Luna Network HSM appliance.
See the following topics for details:
–

"Open a Connection" on page 1 in the Configuration Guide

–

"Backup HSM Installation, Storage, and Maintenance" on page 49

Connect your PED directly to the HSM, and set it to Local PED-USB mode. (For legacy PED-HSM connections
via MDSM cable, set your PED to Local PED-SCP mode.) See "Changing Modes" on page 176 for instructions on
changing modes on the Luna PED.
Connect your Backup HSM to any USB port on the appliance.
2. Open a LunaSH session on the SafeNet Luna Network HSM appliance.
login as: admin
admin@192.20.10.202's password:
Last login: Tue Dec 30 16:03:46 2014 from 192.16.153.111
SafeNet Luna Network HSM 7.0 Command Line Shell - Copyright (c) 2001-2017 Gemalto, Inc. All
rights reserved.
[myluna] lunash:>

3. Use the token backup list and token backup show commands to determine the serial number of the Backup
HSM and to verify its partition and storage configuration:
lunash:>token backup list

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Token Details:
============
Token Label:
Slot:
Serial #:
Firmware:
Hardware Model:

Backup and Restore HSMs and Partitions

BackupHSM
6
7000179
6.26.0
G5 Backup

Command Result : 0 (Success)

lunash:> token backup show -serial 700179
Token Details:
============
Token Label:
Serial #:
Firmware:
Hardware Model:
Authentication Method:
Token Admin login status:
Token Admin login attempts left:
Partition Information:
======================
Partitions licensed on token:
Partitions created on token:
----------------------

BackupHSM
700179
6.22.0
SafeNet Luna USB HSM
PED keys
Logged In
3 before Token zeroization!

20
0

There are no partitions.
Token Storage Information:
==========================
Maximum Token Storage Space (Bytes): 16252928
Space In Use (Bytes):
0
Free Space Left (Bytes):
16252928
License Information:
====================
621010355-000
621000005-001
621000006-001
621000007-001
621000008-001

621-010355-000
621-000005-001
621-000006-001
621-000007-001
621-000008-001

G5 Backup Device Base
Backup Device Partitions 20
Backup Device Storage 15.5 MB
Backup Device Store MTK Split Externally
Backup Device Remote Ped Enable

Command result : 0 (Success)

4. Use the partition backup command to backup a specified partition and provide the PED keys as prompted, for
example:
[myluna] lunash:>par backup -s 7000179 -par p1 -tokenPar bck1
Type 'proceed' to continue the backup, or 'quit'
to abort this operation.
> proceed
Please enter the password for the HSM partition:

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> *******
Warning: You will need to attach Luna PED to the SafeNet Luna Backup HSM
to complete this operation.
You may use the same Luna PED that you used for SafeNet Luna Network HSM.
Please hit  when you are ready to proceed.
Luna PED
Luna PED
key.
Luna PED
PED key.
Luna PED
PED key.

operation required to login to token - use token Security Officer (blue) PED key.
operation required to create a partition - use User or Partition Owner (black) PED
operation required to login to user on token - use User or Partition Owner (black)
operation required to generate cloning domain on the partition - use Domain (red)

Object "1-User DES Key1" (handle 17) cloned to handle 11 on target
Object "1-User DES Key2" (handle 18) cloned to handle 12 on target
Object "1-User Public RSA Key1-512" (handle 19) cloned to handle 13 on target
.
.
.
Object "1-User ARIA Key3" (handle 124) cloned to handle 118 on target
Object "1-User ARIA Key4" (handle 125) cloned to handle 119 on target
Object "1-User ARIA Key5" (handle 126) cloned to handle 120 on target
'partition backup' successful.
Command Result : 0 (Success)

5. Use the token backup show command to verify the backup:
lunash:> token backup show -serial 667788
Token Details:
============
Token Label:
BackupHSM
Serial #:
700179
Firmware:
6.26.0
HSM
Model:
G5Backup
Authentication Method:
PED keys
Token Admin login status:
Logged In
Token Admin login attempts left: 3 before Token zeroization!
Partition Information:
======================
Partitions licensed on token:
Partitions created on token:
---------------------Partition: 7000179008,

20
1
Name: bck1.

Token Storage Information:
==========================
Maximum Token Storage Space (Bytes):
Space In Use (Bytes):
Free Space Left (Bytes):

16252928
43616
16209312

License Information:
====================

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621010355-000
621000005-001
621000006-001
621000007-001
621000008-001

621-010355-000
621-000005-001
621-000006-001
621-000007-001
621-000008-001

Backup and Restore HSMs and Partitions

G5 Backup Device Base
Backup Device Partitions 20
Backup Device Storage 15.5 MB
Backup Device Store MTK Split Externally
Backup Device Remote PED Enable

Command result : 0 (Success)

Restoring a Partition from a Locally Connected Backup HSM
You can backup any partitions you can log in to as the Crypto Officer.

To restore a SafeNet Luna Network HSM partition from a directly connected Backup HSM:
To restore the partition contents from the SafeNet Remote Backup Device to the same local SafeNet Luna Network
HSM, use the same setup described above, but use the partition backup restore command instead.
1. Connect all the required components and open a terminal session to the SafeNet Luna Network HSM appliance.
See the following topics for details:
–

"Open a Connection" on page 1 in the Installation and Configuration Guide

–

"Backup HSM Installation, Storage, and Maintenance" on page 49

Connect your PED directly to the HSM, and set it to Local PED-USB mode. (For legacy PED-HSM connections
via MDSM cable, set your PED to Local PED-SCP mode.) See "Changing Modes" on page 176 for instructions on
changing modes on the Luna PED.
2. Open a LunaSH session on the SafeNet Luna Network HSM appliance.
login as: admin
admin@192.20.10.202's password:
Last login: Tue Feb 28 16:03:46 2012 from 192.16.153.111
SafeNet Luna Network HSM 7.0 Command Line Shell - Copyright (c) 2001-2016 Gemalto, Inc. All
rights reserved.
[myluna] lunash:>

3. Use the partition restore command to restore a partition:
[myluna] lunash:>par restore -s 7000179 -tokenPar bk5 -par p1 -replace
Please enter the password for the HSM partition:
> *******
CAUTION: Are you sure you wish to erase all objects in the
partition named:
p1
Type 'proceed' to continue, or 'quit' to quit now.
> proceed
Warning: You will need to attach Luna PED to the SafeNet Luna Backup HSM to complete this
operation.
You may use the same Luna PED that you used for SafeNet Luna Network HSM.

Please hit  when you are ready to proceed.
Luna PED operation required to login to user on token - use User or Partition Owner (black)
PED key.
Object "1-User DES Key1" (handle 17) cloned to handle 11 on target
Object "1-User DES Key2" (handle 18) cloned to handle 12 on target

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Object "1-User Public RSA Key1-512" (handle 19) cloned to handle 13 on target
.
.
.
Object "1-User ARIA Key3" (handle 124) cloned to handle 118 on target
Object "1-User ARIA Key4" (handle 125) cloned to handle 119 on target
Object "1-User ARIA Key5" (handle 126) cloned to handle 120 on target
'partition restore' successful.
Command Result : 0 (Success)

Troubleshooting
This section provides troubleshooting tips for errors you may encounter when performing a partition backup/restore
operation.

Warning: This token is not in the factory reset (zeroized) state
If you insert a backup token that has previously been used on a password-authenticated SafeNet Luna Network HSM
into a PED-authenticated SafeNet Luna Network HSM, and attempt to initialize it, the system responds with the
message "Warning: This token is not in the factory reset (zeroized) state" as shown in the following example:
lunash:>token backup init -label mylunatoken -serial 1234567 -force

Warning:

This token is not in the factory reset (zeroized) state.
You must present the current Token Admin login credentials
to clear the backup token's contents.

Luna PED operation required to initialize backup token - use
Security Officer (blue) PED key.
Error:

'token init' failed. (300130 : LUNA_RET_INVALID_ENTRY_TYPE)

Command Result : 65535 (Luna Shell execution)

This is a security feature, intended to prevent backup of PED-secured HSM objects onto a less secure Password
Authenticated token. To work around this problem, issue the token factoryreset command, and then initialize the
token, as shown in the following example:
lunash:>token backup factoryreset -serial 1234567
CAUTION: Are you sure you wish to reset this backup token to
factory default settings? All data will be erased.
Type 'proceed' to return the token to factory default, or
'quit' to quit now.
> proceed
token factoryReset' successful.
Command Result : 0 (Success)
lunash:>token backup init -label mylunatoken
-serial 1234567 -force
Luna PED operation required to initialize backup token - use
Security Officer (blue) PED key.
Luna PED operation required to login to backup token - use
Security Officer (blue) PED key.
Luna PED operation required to generate cloning domain on
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backup token - use Domain (red) PED key.
'token init' successful.
Command Result : 0 (Success)

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Capabilities and Policies

HSM capabilities describe the SafeNet Luna Network HSM's configuration, and are displayed using the LunaSH
command hsm showpolicies. They are set at manufacture according to the model you selected at time of purchase.
Capabilities can only be modified by purchase and application of capability updates.
HSM policies correspond to a subset of capabilities that allow you to customize the HSM functions. Policies can be
modified to provide greater security based on your specific needs. For example, you can restrict the HSM to use only
FIPS-approved algorithms by setting HSM policy 12.
Partitions inherit the capabilities and policy settings of the HSM. Partitions also have policies that can be set to
customize the partition functions. Partition policies can never be modified to be less secure than the corresponding
HSM capability/policy. For example, if the HSM's cloning policy is disallowed (see HSM policy 7), partition policies 0
and 4, which allow cloning of private or secret keys, cannot be set.
The following sections list and describe the HSM and partition capabilities and policies:
•

"HSM Capabilities and Policies" below

•

"Partition Capabilities and Policies" on page 83

HSM Capabilities and Policies
HSM capabilities describe the SafeNet Luna Network HSM's configuration. They are set a manufacture according to
the model you selected at time of purchase. Capabilities can only be modified by purchase and application of capability
updates.
HSM policies correspond to a subset of capabilities that allow you to modify the HSM functions. Policies can be
modified to provide greater security based on your specific needs. They can never be modified to be less secure than
the corresponding capability.
To view the HSM capability and policy settings, use the LunaSH command hsm showpolicies.
To modify HSM policies, login as HSM SO and use the LunaSH command hsm changepolicy -policy  value <0/1>.
See "hsm changepolicy" on page 1 in the LunaSH Command Reference Guide for command syntax.
To zeroize the HSM and reset the policies to their default values, use hsm factoryreset.

Destructiveness
In some cases, changing an HSM policy zeroizes all application partitions or the entire HSM as a security measure.
These policies are listed as destructive.

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HSM Capability and Policy Descriptions
The table below summarizes the relationships and provides a brief description of the purpose and operation of each
capability and policy.
#

HSM Capability

HSM Policy

Description

0

Enable PIN-based
authentication

If allowed, the HSM authenticates all users with keyboardentered passwords.

1

Enable PED-based
authentication

If allowed, the HSM authenticates users with secrets stored
on physical PED keys, read by a SafeNet Luna PED. The
Crypto Officer and Crypto User roles may also be configured
with a secondary, keyboard-entered challenge secret.

2

Performance level

Numerical value indicates the performance level of this
HSM, determined by the model you selected at time of
purchase:
•

4: Standard performance

•

8: Enterprise performance

•

15: Maximum performance

4

Enable domestic
mechanisms & key
sizes

Always allowed. All SafeNet Luna HSMs are capable of fullstrength cryptography with no US export restrictions.

6

Enable masking

Always disallowed. SIM has been deprecated on all current
SafeNet Luna Network HSMs.

7

Enable cloning

Allow cloning
Destructive

9

12

Enable full (nonbackup)
functionality

Enable non-FIPS
algorithms

If allowed, the HSM is capable of cloning cryptographic
objects from one partition to another. This policy must be
enabled to backup partitions over a network or create HA
groups. Partition Security Officers may then enable/disable
cloning on individual partitions.
If allowed, the HSM is capable of full cryptographic
functions.
This capability is only disallowed on SafeNet Luna Backup
HSMs.

Allow non-FIPS
algorithms

If allowed, the HSM can use all available cryptographic
algorithms.

Destructive

If disallowed, only algorithms sanctioned by the FIPS 140-2
standard are permitted. The following is displayed in the
output from hsm show in LunaSH:
FIPS 140-2 Operation:
=====================
The HSM is in FIPS 140-2 approved operation mode.

15

Enable SO reset of
partition PIN

SO can reset
partition PIN

If allowed, a Partition SO can reset the password or PED
secret of a Crypto Officer who has been locked out after too

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#

HSM Capability

HSM Policy
Destructive

Capabilities and Policies

Description
many bad login attempts.
If disallowed, the lockout is permanent and the partition
contents are no longer accessible. The partition must be reinitialized, and key material restored from a backup device.
See "Failed Logins" on page 335 for more information.

16

Enable network
replication

Allow network
replication

If allowed, cryptographic object cloning is permitted over a
network. This is required for HA groups, and for partition
backup to a remote or client-connected SafeNet Luna
Backup HSM.
If disallowed, cloning over a network is not permitted.
Partition backup is possible to a locally-connected SafeNet
Luna Backup HSM only. Setting this policy to 0 means that
only the HSM SO can backup partitions.

17

Enable Korean
Algorithms

Allow Korean
algorithms

18

FIPS evaluated

Always disallowed - deprecated policy. All SafeNet Luna
Network HSMs are capable of operating in FIPS Mode.

19

Manufacturing
Token

N/A (SafeNet internal use only)

21

Enable forcing user
PIN change

Force user PIN
change after
set/reset

If allowed, the SafeNet Luna Network HSM can use the
Korean algorithm set. This capability may be purchased as
an upgrade. See "HSM Capability and Partition
Upgrades" on page 287.

If allowed, when a Partition SO initializes the Crypto Officer
role (or resets the password/PED secret), the CO must
change the credential with role changepw before any other
actions are permitted. The same is true when the CO
initializes/resets the Crypto User role. This policy is
intended to enforce the separation of roles on the partition.
If disallowed, the CO/CU may continue to use the credential
assigned by the Partition SO.

22

Enable offboard
storage

Allow off-board
storage
Destructive

23

Enable partition
groups

25

Enable Remote
PED usage

27

HSM non-volatile
storage space

On previous HSMs, this policy allowed or disallowed the use
of the portable SIM key. SIM is not supported on this version
of SafeNet Luna HSM.
Always disallowed - deprecated policy.

Allow Remote PED
usage

Always enabled on PED-authenticated SafeNet Luna
Network HSMs. All PED-authenticated HSMs are capable
of connecting to a local PED or a remotely-located PED
server. The HSM SO may turn this feature on or off.
Displays the non-volatile maximum storage space (in bytes)
on the HSM. This is determined by the model of SafeNet

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#

HSM Capability

HSM Policy

Capabilities and Policies

Description
Luna Network HSM you selected at time of purchase.

30

Enable Unmasking

Allow unmasking

33

Maximum number of
partitions

Displays the maximum number of application partitions that
can be created on the HSM. This number is determined by
the model of SafeNet Luna Network HSM you selected at
time of purchase. On some models, the number of allowable
partitions can be upgraded with a separate purchase. See
"HSM Capability and Partition Upgrades" on page 287 for
more information.

35

Enable Single
Domain

Not applicable to SafeNet Luna Network HSMs.

36

Enable Unified PED
Key

Not applicable to SafeNet Luna Network HSMs.

37

Enable MofN

Allow MofN

If allowed, cryptographic material can be migrated from
legacy SafeNet appliances that used SIM.

If allowed on PED-authenticated SafeNet Luna Network
HSMs, this policy enables you to split a PED secret among
multiple PED keys (see "MofN Split Secret Keys" on page
182).
If disallowed, users will no longer be asked to split a PED
secret (M and N automatically set to 1).
Always disallowed on password-authenticated HSMs.

38

Enable small form
factor
backup/restore

39

Enable Secure
Trusted Channel

Not available in this release.

Allow Secure
Trusted Channel

If allowed, this policy enables the use of Secure Trusted
Channel for partition-client connections (see "Secure
Trusted Channel (STC)" on page 259).
If disallowed, all partition-client connections must use
NTLS.

40

Enable
decommission on
tamper

Decommission on
tamper
Destructive

If allowed, the HSM will be decommissioned if a tamper
event occurs. Decommissioning deletes all partitions and
their contents, the audit role, and the audit configuration. The
HSM policy settings are retained.
See "Tamper Events" on page 303 for more information.
CAUTION: Setting this policy to 0 will zeroize the entire
HSM and it must be re-initialized.

42

Enable partition reinitialize

43

Enable low level

Not available in this release.

Allow low level math

This is enabled by default, and must be enabled to provide

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#

HSM Capability
math acceleration

45

Enable Fast-Path

46

Allow Disabling
Decommission

47

Enable Tunnel Slot

48

Enable Controlled
Tamper Recovery

HSM Policy
acceleration

Capabilities and Policies

Description
maximum performance. Do not disable unless instructed to
do so by Gemalto Technical Support.
Not available in this release.

Disable
Decommission

If enabled, the decommission button is disabled, preventing
decommissioning of the HSM.

Destructive

Note: You cannot enable this policy if HSM policy 40:
Decommission on Tamper is enabled.
Not available in this release.

Do Controlled
Tamper Recovery

If allowed, the HSM SO must explicitly clear the tamper
before the HSM can resume normal operations. This is the
default behavior.
If disallowed, the HSM must be restarted before it can
resume normal operations.
See "Tamper Events" on page 303 for more information.

Partition Capabilities and Policies
Partitions inherit the capabilities and policy settings of the HSM. Partitions also have policies that can be set to
customize the partition functions. Partition policies can never be modified to be less secure than the corresponding
HSM capability/policy. For example, if the HSM's cloning policy is disallowed (see HSM policy 7), partition policies 0
and 4, which allow cloning of private or secret keys, cannot be set.
Note: If you are running more than one LunaCM session against the same partition, and
change a partition policy in one LunaCM session, the policy change will be reflected in that
session only. You must exit and restart the other LunaCM sessions to display the changed
policy settings.
To view the partition capabilities and policy settings, use the LunaCM command partition showpolicies.
To modify partition policies, login as Partition SO and use the LunaCM command partition changepolicy -policy
 -value <0/1/value>.
See "partition changepolicy" on page 1 in the LunaCM Command Reference Guide for command syntax.

Destructiveness
In some cases, changing a partition policy forces deletion of all cryptographic objects on the partition as a security
measure. These policies are listed as destructive. Destructive policies are typically those that change the security
level of the objects stored in the partition.
Use the LunaCM command partition showpolicies -verbose to check whether the policy you want to enable/disable
is destructive.

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Capabilities and Policies

Partition Capabilities and Policies List
The table below summarizes the relationships and provides a brief description of the purpose and operation of each
capability and policy.
#

Partition Capability

0

Enable private key
cloning

Partition Policy
Allow private key
cloning
Destructive: ON

1

2

Enable private key
wrapping

Enable private key
unwrapping

Allow private key
wrapping

Description
If enabled, the partition is capable of cloning cryptographic
objects to another partition. This policy must be enabled to
backup partitions or create HA groups.

Destructive: ON

Always disabled for all partitions on a SafeNet Luna Network
HSM. Private keys on the partition may not be wrapped off.
The Partition SO cannot change this policy.

Allow private key
unwrapping

If enabled, private keys may be unwrapped onto the
partition. The Partition SO can turn this feature on or off.
If disabled, private key unwrapping is not available, and the
Partition SO cannot change this.

3

Enable private key
masking

Allow private key
masking
Destructive: ON

4

Enable secret key
cloning

Allow secret key
cloning
Destructive: ON

Always disabled. SIM has been deprecated on all current
SafeNet Luna Network HSMs. The Partition SO cannot
change this policy.
If enabled, secret keys on the partition can be backed up.
The Partition SO can turn this feature on or off. The Partition
SO may wish to turn this feature on immediately before a
scheduled backup, and then turn it off again to prevent
unauthorized backup.
If disabled, secret keys cannot be backed up, and the
Partition SO cannot change this.. Partition backup or
partition network replication is allowed for the SafeNet high
availability feature.

5

Enable secret key
wrapping

Allow secret key
wrapping
Destructive: ON

If enabled, secret keys can be wrapped off the partition. The
Partition SO can turn this feature on or off. The Partition SO
may wish not to allow secret key wrapping, in which case
he/she would turn off this policy.
If disabled, the partition does not support secret key
wrapping, and the Partition SO cannot change this.

6

Enable secret key
unwrapping

Allow secret key
unwrapping

If enabled, secret keys can be unwrapped onto the partition.
The Partition SO can turn this feature on or off.
If disabled, the partition does not support secret key
unwrapping, and the Partition SO cannot change this.

7

10

Enable secret key
masking

Enable multipurpose

Allow secret key
masking
Destructive: ON

Always disabled. SIM has been deprecated on all current
SafeNet Luna Network HSMs. The Partition SO cannot
change this policy.

Allow multipurpose

If enabled, keys for multiple purposes, such as signing and

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#

Partition Capability
keys

Partition Policy
keys
Destructive: ON

Capabilities and Policies

Description
decrypting, may be created on the partition. The Partition SO
can turn this feature on or off.
If disabled, keys created on (or unwrapped onto) the partition
must specify only a single function in the attribute template.

11

Enable changing
key attributes

Allow changing key
attributes
Destructive: ON

If enabled, non-sensitive attributes of the keys on the
partition are modifiable (the user can change the functions
that the key can use).
If disabled, keys created on the partition cannot be modified.
This policy affects the following "key function attributes":
CKA_ENCRYPT
CKA_DECRYPT
CKA_WRAP
CKA_UNWRAP
CKA_SIGN
CKA_SIGN_RECOVER
CKA_VERIFY
CKA_VERIFY_RECOVER
CKA_DERIVE
CKA_EXTRACTABLE

15

Allow failed
challenge responses

Ignore failed
challenge responses

This policy applies to PED-authenticated SafeNet Luna
HSMs only. The Partition SO can turn the feature on or off.

Destructive: ON

If enabled, failed challenge secret login attempts on an
activated partition are not counted towards a partition
lockout. Only failed PED key authentication attempts will
increment the counter.
If disabled, failed login attempts using either a PED key or a
challenge secret will count towards a partition lockout.
See "Activation and Auto-Activation on PED-Authenticated
Partitions" on page 160 and "Failed Logins" on page 335 for
more information.

16

Enable operation
without RSA
blinding

Operate without
RSA blinding
Destructive: ON

If enabled, the partition may run in a mode that does not use
RSA blinding (a technique that introduces random elements
into the signature process to prevent timing attacks on the
RSA private key. Use of this technique may be required by
certain security policies, but it does reduce performance).
The Partition SO can turn this feature on or off.
If disabled, the partition will always run in RSA blinding
mode; performance will be affected.
If the policy is on (set to 1), RSA blinding is not used.

17

Enable signing with
non-local keys

Allow signing with
non-local keys

If a key was generated on an HSM, CKA_LOCAL is set to 1.
With this policy turned off, only keys with CKA_LOCAL=1
can be used to sign data on the HSM.

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#

Partition Capability

Partition Policy

Capabilities and Policies

Description
Keys that are imported (unwrapped) to the HSM have CKA_
LOCAL explicitly set to 0, so they may not be used for
signing. Cloning and SIM maintain the value of CKA_
LOCAL.
With this policy turned on, keys that did not originate on the
HSM (CKA_LOCAL=0) may be used for signing, and their
trust history is not assured.

18

Enable raw RSA
operations

Allow raw RSA
operations
Destructive: ON

If enabled, the partition may allow raw RSA operations
(mechanism CKM_RSA_X_509). This allows weak
signatures and weak encryption. The Partition SO can turn
this feature on or off.
If disabled, the partition will not support raw RSA operations.

20

Max failed user
logins allowed

Max failed user
logins allowed

Displays the maximum number of failed partition login
attempts before the partition is locked out (see "Failed
Logins" on page 335).
The Partition SO can change the number of failed logins to a
value lower than the maximum if desired.

21

Enable high
availability recovery

Allow high
availability recovery

If enabled, partitions in the same HA group may be used to
restore the login state of this partition after power outage or
other deactivation. RecoveryLogin must be configured in
advance (see "role recoveryinit" on page 1 and "role
recoverylogin" on page 1 in the LunaCM Command
Reference Guide for details. The Partition SO can turn this
feature on or off.

22

Enable activation

Allow activation

Applies only to PED-authenticated HSMs.
If enabled, the black and/or gray PED key secrets may be
cached, so that the CO or CU only needs the challenge
secret to login. The Partition SO can turn this feature on or
off.
If disabled (or the policy is turned off), PED keys must be
presented at each login, whether the call is local or from a
client application.
This policy setting is overidden and activation is disabled if a
tamper event occurs, or if an uncleared tamper event is
detected on reboot. See "Tamper Events" on page 303, and
"Activation and Auto-Activation on PED-Authenticated
Partitions" on page 160 for more information.

23

Enable autoactivation

Allow autoactivation

See Capability 22 above for a description of activation.
If enabled, the black or gray PED key secrets may be
encrypted and semi-permanently cached to hard disk, so
that the partition's activation status can be maintained after
a power loss of up to two hours. The Partition SO can turn

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#

Partition Capability

Partition Policy

Capabilities and Policies

Description
this feature on or off.
If disabled, this partition does not support auto-activation.
This policy setting is overidden and auto-activation is
disabled if a tamper event occurs, or if an uncleared tamper
event is detected on reboot. See "Tamper Events" on page
303, and "Activation and Auto-Activation on PEDAuthenticated Partitions" on page 160 for more information.

25

Minimum PIN length
(inverted: 255 - min)

Minimum PIN length
(inverted: 255 - min)

The absolute minimum length for a partition login PIN is 8
characters. This is displayed as a value subtracted from
256. The policy value is determined as follows:
Subtract the desired minimum PIN length from 256 (the
absolute maximum length), and set policy 25 to that value.
256 - (min PIN) = (policy value)
For example, to set the minimum PIN length to 10
characters, the Partition SO should set the value of this
policy to 246:
256 - 10 = 246
The reason for this inversion is that a policy can only be set
to a value equal to or lower than the value set by its
capability. If the absolute minimum PIN length was set to 8,
the Partition SO would be able to set the preferred minimum
to 2, a less-secure policy. The Partition SO may only change
the minimum PIN length to increase security by forcing
stronger passwords.

26

Maximum PIN
length

Maximum PIN
length

The absolute maximum length for a partition login PIN is 255
characters. The effective maximum may be changed by the
Partition SO, and must always be greater than the value of
the minimum PIN length, determined by the formula in the
description of policy 25 (above).

28

Enable Key
Management
Functions

Allow Key
Management
Functions

The Partition SO can disable access to any key
management functions by the user - all users become
Crypto Users (the restricted-capability user) even if logged in
as Crypto Officer.

Destructive: ON
29

Enable RSA signing
without confirmation

Perform RSA
signing without
confirmation
Destructive: ON

The HSM can perform an internal verification (confirmation)
of a signing operation to validate the signature. This
confirmation is disabled by default because it has a
performance impact on signature operations.

31

Enable private key
unmasking

Allow private key
unmasking

Remove encryption with AES 256-bit key from private key

32

Enable secret key
unmasking

Allow secret key
unmasking

Remove encryption with AES 256-bit key from secret key

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#

Partition Capability

33

Enable RSA PKCS
mechanism

Partition Policy

Capabilities and Policies

Description

Allow RSA PKCS
mechanism
Destructive: ON

34

Enable CBC-PAD
(un)wrap keys of
any size

Allow CBC-PAD
(un)wrap keys of
any size
Destructive: ON

35

Enable private key
SFF backup/restore

Allow private key
SFF backup/restore

Not available in this release.

Destructive: ON
36

Enable secret key
SFF backup/restore

Allow secret key
SFF backup/restore

Not available in this release.

Destructive: ON
37

Enable Secure
Trusted Channel

Force Secure
Trusted Channel

If enabled, the Partition SO can turn this policy on to require
Secure Trusted Channel (STC) for partition access.

Destructive: OFF

If disabled, the Client will use NTLS to access the partition.
NOTE: It is not possible for a single Client to access some
partitions on an appliance using STC and others on the same
appliance using NTLS. All connections between a single
client and a single SafeNet Luna Network HSM but be either
STC or NTLS. See "Secure Trusted Channel (STC)" on
page 259 in the Administration Guide for more information.

38

Enable Fast-Path

Not available in this release.

39

Enable Start/End
Date Attributes

Not available in this release.

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Configuration File Summary

Many aspects of SafeNet Luna HSM configuration and operation are controlled or adjusted by the Chrystoki.conf file
(Linux/UNIX) or Crystoki.ini file (Windows). The examples in the table below are from a Windows Chrystoki.ini file.
The configuration file is organized into named sections, under which related configuration-affecting entries might
appear. A basic configuration file is always present in the SafeNet Luna Client folder, installed by the SafeNet Luna
Client installer, with default values assigned to the populated entries. In addition to the most basic sections and entries,
some additional sections and entries can be included at installation time, if you select more than the minimal installation
options for your HSM model(s).
In addition, new entries can be added, or existing entries can be adjusted by actions that you perform in SafeNet tools
like LunaCM and vtl.
Finally, some sections or entries can be added or adjusted by manual editing of the Chrystoki.conf /Crystoki.ini file.
If you install SafeNet Luna Client where a previous version was installed, then the existing configuration file is saved
and the new file adds to the existing content if appropriate. That is, if you have a SafeNet Luna HSM setup, already
configured and tweaked to your satisfaction, those settings are preserved when you update to newer SafeNet Luna
Client.
Note: For SafeNet Luna Network HSM, LunaSH commands use onboard default configuration
settings. Clients that are sent to the HSM via SafeNet Luna HSM Client, making use of the
client library, include the relevant configuration settings from the client-side Chrystoki.conf
/Crystoki.ini configuration file.
The following table lists sections and settings that you are likely to encounter in normal use of SafeNet products. Not all
are applicable to every SafeNet Luna HSM. Each setting is named, with default values, allowed range of values,
description of the item/setting, and remarks about any interactions between the current setting and others that you
might configure.
Where the range is a file path,  specifies the path to your SafeNet Luna HSM client installation.
Setting

Range (Default)

Description

LibNT=

(\cryptoki.dll)

Path to the Chrystoki2 library.

LibNT32=

(\win32\libCryptoki2.dll)

Path to the Chrystoki2 library on 32-bit
Windows systems only.

[Chrystoki2]

[Luna]

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Configuration File Summary

Setting

Range (Default)

Description

PEDTimeout1=

(100000) ms

Specifies the PED timeout time 1 defines how long (in milliseconds) the
HSM tries to detect if it can talk to the
PED before starting the actual
communication with it. If the PED is
unreachable the HSM returns to the host
a result code for the respective HSM
command. The result code indicates
that the PED is not connected. This
timeout is intended to be small so that
the user is informed quickly that the
PED is not connected.

PEDTimeout2=

(200000) ms

Specifies the PED timeout time 2 defines how long (in milliseconds) the
firmware waits for the local PED to
respond to PED commands. PED
commands should not be confused with
PED-related HSM commands. An HSM
sends PED commands to the PED
when processing PED-related HSM
commands, such as LOGIN or PED_
CONNECT. One PED-related HSM
command can involve many PED
commands being sent by the HSM to
the PED (for example, the MofN related
commands). If a local PED does not
respond to the PED commands within
the span of PEDTimeout2 the HSM
returns an appropriate result code (such
as PED_TIMEOUT) for the respective
PED-related HSM command.

PEDTimeout3=

(20000) ms

Specifies the PED timeout time 3 defines additional time (in milliseconds)
the firmware must wait for the remote
PED to respond to PED commands.
That is, the actual time the firmware
waits for a remote PED to respond is
PEDTimeout2 + PEDTimeout3.

DefaultTimeOut=

(500000) ms

Sets the default timeout interval defines how long (in milliseconds) the
HSM driver in the host system waits for
HSM commands to return a result code.
If the result code is not returned in that
time, the driver assumes that the HSM

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Setting

Range (Default)

Configuration File Summary

Description
is stuck and halts it, with the DEVICE_
ERROR returned to all applications that
use the HSM. Most HSM commands
use this timeout. Very few exceptions
exist, when a command's timeout is
hard-coded in the Cryptoki library, or
separate timeouts are specified in the
Chrystoki.conf for certain classes of
HSM commands.

CommandTimeoutPedSet=

(720000) ms

This is an exception to DefaultTimeout
(above). It defines timeout (in
milliseconds) for all PED-related HSM
commands. This class of PED-related
commands can take more time than the
ordinary commands that subscribe to
the DefaultTimeOut value. As a rule of
thumb, CommandTimeOutPedSet =
DefaultTimeOut + PEDTimeout1 +
PEDTimeout2 + PEDTimeout3.

KeypairGenTimeOut=

(2700000) ms

The amount of time (in milliseconds) the
library allows for a Keypair generate
operation to return a value. Due to the
random component, large key sizes can
take an arbitrarily long time to generate,
and this setting keeps the attempts
within reasonable bounds.The default is
calculated as the best balance between
the inconvenience of occasional very
long waits and the inconvenience of
restarting a keygen operation. You can
change it to suit your situation.

CloningCommandTimeout=

(300000) ms

The amount of time (in milliseconds) the
library allows for the HSM to respond to
a cloning command.

DomainParamTimeout=

(5400000) ms

Timeout for Domain Parameter
Generation.

RemoteCommand=

0 = false
(1 = true)

This setting was used when debugging
older SafeNet products. For modern
products it is ignored.

LunaG5Slots=

(3)

Number of SafeNet Luna USB HSM

[CardReader]

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Setting

Range (Default)

Configuration File Summary

Description
slots reserved so that the library will
check for connected devices.
•

Can be set to zero if you have no
SafeNet Luna USB HSMs and wish
to get rid of the reserved spaces in
your slot list.

•

Can be set to any number, but is
effectively limited by the number of
external USB devices your host can
support.

[RBS]
HostName=

Any hostname or IP address
(0.0.0.0)

The hostname or IP address that the
RBS server will listen on. Default is
0.0.0.0 (any IP on the local host).

HostPort=

Any unassigned port
(1792)

The port number used by the RBS
server.

ClientAuthFile=

(\config\clientauth.dat)

The location of the RBS Client
authentication file.

ServerCertFile=

(\cert\server\server.pem)

The location of the RBS Server
certificate file.

ServerPrivKeyFile=

(\cert\server\serverkey.pem)

The location of the RBS Server
certificate private key file.

ServerSSLConfigFile=

(\openssl.cnf)

The location of the OpenSSL
configuration file used by RBS Server or
Client.

CmdProcessor=

(\rbs_processor2.dll)

The location of the RBS library.

NetServer=

0 = false
(1 = true)

If true (default), RBS acts as a Server. If
false, RBS acts as a Client.

SSLConfigFile=

(\openssl.cnf)

Location of the OpenSSL configuration
file.

ReceiveTimeout=

(20000) ms

Time in milliseconds before a receive
timeout

TCPKeepAlive=

0 = false
(1 = true)

TCPKeepAlive

[LunaSA Client]

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Setting

Range (Default)

Configuration File Summary

Description
TCPKeepAlive is a TCP stack option,
available at the LunaClient, and at the
SafeNet Luna Network HSM appliance.
For SafeNet purposes, it is controlled
via an entry in the Chrystoki.conf
/crystoki.ini file on the LunaClient, and
in an equivalent file on SafeNet Luna
Network HSM. For SafeNet Luna HSM
6.1 and newer, a fresh client software
installation includes an entry
"TCPKeepAlive=1" in the "LunaSA
Client" section of the configuration file
Chrystoki.conf (Linux/UNIX) or
crystoki.ini (Windows). Config files and
certificates are normally preserved
through an uninstall, unless you
explicitly delete them.
As such, if you update (install)
LunaClient software where you
previously had an older LunaClient that
did not have a TCPKeepAlive entry, one
is added and set to "1" (enabled), by
default. In the case of update, if
TCPKeepAlive is already defined in the
configuration file, then your existing
setting (enabled or disabled) is
preserved.
On the SafeNet Luna Network HSM
appliance, where you do not have direct
access to the file system, the
TCPKeepAlive= setting is controlled by
the LunaSH command ntls tcp_
keepalive set.
The settings at the appliance and the
client are independent. This allows a
level of assurance, in case (for example)
a firewall setting blocks in one direction.

NetClient=

0 = false
(1 = true)

If true, library will search for network
slots

ServerCAFile=

(\cert\server\CAFile.pem)

Location, on the client, of the server
certificate file (set by vtl or LunaCM
command clientconfig deploy).

ClientCertFile=

(\cert\client\ClientNameCert.pem)

Location of the Client certificate file that
is uploaded to SafeNet Luna Network

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Setting

Range (Default)

Configuration File Summary

Description
HSM for NTLS (set by vtl or LunaCM
command clientconfig deploy).

ClientPrivKeyFile=

(\cert\client\ClientNameKey.pem)

ServerName00=192.20.17.200

Location of the Client private key file
(set by vtl or LunaCM command
clientconfig deploy).
Entries embedded by vtl utility, when
you run the command vtl addserver or
the LunaCM command clientconfig
deploy. Identifies the NTLS-linked
SafeNet Luna Network HSM servers,
and determines the order in which they
are polled to create a slot list.

ServerPort00=1792
ServerName01=
ServerPort01=

NOTE: The Presentation section is not created automatically. To change any of the following values, you must first
create this section in the configuration file.
[Presentation]
ShowUserSlots=
()

Comma-delimited list of 
(), like
ShowUserSlots=1(351970018022),2
(351970018021),3(351970018020),....

Sets the starting slot for the identified
partition. If one partition slot on an HSM
is specified, then any that are not listed
from that HSM are not displayed.

ShowAdminTokens=

0/(1)

Admin partitions of local SafeNet Luna
PCIe HSMs are not visible/(visible) in a
slot listing

ShowEmptySlots=

(0)/1

When the number of partitions on an
HSM is not at the limit, unused slots are
shown/(not shown).

OneBaseSlotId=

(0)/1

Causes basic slot list to start at slot
number 1 instead of (0).

(0)/1

When set to 1, shows only the HA
virtual slot to the client, and hides the
physical partitions/slots that are
members of the virtual slot. Setting
HAOnly helps prevent synchronization
problems among member partitions, by
forcing all client actions to be directed
against the virtual slot, and dealing with
synch transparently. HAOnly also
prevents the shifting of slot numbers in
the slot list that could occur if a visible

[HAConfiguration]
HAOnly=

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Setting

Range (Default)

Configuration File Summary

Description
physical partition were to drop out,
which could disrupt an application that
identifies its client partitions by slot
numbers.

reconnAtt=

(10)

Specifies how many reconnection
attempts will be made, when a member
drops from the group. A value of "-1" is
infinite retries.

AutoReconnectInterval=

(60) s

Specifies the interval (in seconds) at
which the library will attempt to
reconnect with a missing member, until
"reconnAtt" is reached, and attempts
cease. The default value of 60 seconds
is the lowest that is accepted.

ToolsDir=

(\)

The location of the LunaClient tools.

RSAKeyGenMechRemap=

(0)/1

Controls what happens on newer
firmware, when calls are made to
specific older mechanisms that are now
discouraged due to weakness.
When this item is set to 0, no remapping is performed.
When the value is set to 1, the following
re-mapping occurs if the HSM firmware
permits:
•PKCS Key Gen -> 186-3 Prime key gen
•X9.31 Key Gen -> 186-3 Aux Prime key
gen
(see "Mechanism Remap for FIPS
Compliance " on page 1)

RSAPre1863KeyGen
MechRemap=

(0)/1

Controls what happens on older
firmware, when specific newer
mechanisms are called, that are not
supported on the older firmware.
When this item is set to 0, no remapping is performed.
When the value is set to 1, the following
re-mapping occurs if the HSM firmware
permits:
• 186-3 Prime key gen -> PKCS Key
Gen

[Misc]

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Setting

Range (Default)

Configuration File Summary

Description
• 186-3 Aux Prime key gen -> X9.31 Key
Gen
Intended for evaluation purposes, such
as with existing integrations that require
newer mechanisms, before you update
to firmware that actually supports the
more secure mechanisms. Be careful
with this setting, which makes it appear
you are getting a new, secure
mechanism, when really you are getting
an outdated, insecure mechanism.
(see "Mechanism Remap for FIPS
Compliance " on page 1)

[Secure Trusted Channel]
ClientIdentitiesDir=

\data\client_identities

Specifies the directory used to store the
STC client identity

PartitionIdentitiesDir=

\data\partition_
identities

Specifies the directory used to store the
STC partition identities exported using
the LunaCM stcconfig
partitionidexport command

ClientTokenLib=
(for 64-bit Windows systems)

For soft token:
• \softtoken.dll

Specifies the location of the token
library on 64-bit Windows systems. This
value must be correct in order to use a
client token.

For hard token:
•

C:\Windows\System32\etoken.dll

For 32-bit systems, see the
ClientTokenLib32 entry below.
By default, ClientTokenLib points to
the location of the soft token library. If
you are using a hard token, you must
manually change this value to point to
the hard token library for your operating
system. The exact location of the hard
token library may vary depending on
your installer. The location provided here
is the most common location used.
ClientTokenLib32=
(for 32-bit Windows systems)

For soft token:
•

\win32\softtoken.dll

For hard token:
•

C:\Windows\SysWOW64\etoken.dll

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Specifies the location of the token
library on 32-bit Windows systems. This
entry appears on Windows only. For 64bit systems, see the ClientTokenLib
entry above.

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Setting

Range (Default)

Configuration File Summary

Description
By default, ClientTokenLib32 points to
the location of the soft token library. If
you are using a hard token, you must
manually change this value to point to
the hard token library for your operating
system. The exact location of the hard
token library may vary depending on
your installer. The location provided here
is the most common location used.

SoftTokenDir=

\softtoken

Specifies the location where the STC
client soft token (token.db) is stored.
Each client soft token is stored in its
own numbered subdirectory.
Note: In this release there is only one
client token, which is stored in the 001
subdirectory.

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Decommissioning, Zeroizing, or Resetting
an HSM to Factory Conditions

During the lifetime of a SafeNet Luna HSM, you might have cause to take the HSM out of service, and wish to perform
actions to ensure that no trace of your sensitive material remains. Those events might include:
•

Placing the unit into storage, perhaps as a spare

•

Shipping to another location or business unit in your organization

•

Shipping the unit back to Gemalto for repair/re-manufacture

•

Removing the HSM permanently from operational use, for disposal at end-of-life

This chapter describes the available options in the following sections:
•

"Decommissioning the HSM Appliance" below

•

"Comparing Zeroize, Decommission, and Factory Reset" on the next page

•

"Resetting to Factory Condition" on page 100

•

"End of service and disposal" on page 101

•

"Comparison of Destruction/Denial Actions" on page 102

•

"RMA and Shipping Back to Gemalto" on page 103

•

"Zeroization" on page 104

Decommissioning the HSM Appliance
This section describes how to decommission the appliance to remove all current key material and configurations, so
that it can be safely redeployed.

To decommission a SafeNet Luna Network HSM:
For full decommission (removing the unit from service, clearing the HSM of all your material, clearing the appliance of
all identifying information) of a SafeNet Luna Network HSM appliance, and assuming that you can power the appliance
and gain admin access, follow these steps in LunaSH, using a serial connection:
1. Rotate all logs:
lunash:> syslog rotate
2. Delete all files in the SCP directory:
lunash:> my file clear
3. Delete all logs:
lunash:> syslog cleanup
4. Return the appliance to factory-default settings:

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lunash:> sysconf config factoryreset -service all
5. Delete any backups of settings:
lunash:> sysconf config clear
6. Push the decommission button (small red button, inset in the SafeNet Luna Network HSM back panel).

7. Power down the appliance.
8. Power up the appliance. At this point, the HSM internally issues and executes a zeroize command to erase all
partitions and objects. This step takes about five minutes. The KEK is already gone at that point – erased as soon
as the button is pressed – so the step of erasing partitions and objects is for customers subject to especially rigid
decommission protocols.

Disabling Decommissioning
You can disable the decommissioning feature if you have the factory-installed HSM Capability 46: Allow Disable
Decommission (see "HSM Capabilities and Policies" on page 79). The primary reason for disabling decommissioning
is to prevent the HSM from being automatically decommissioned due to loss of battery (see "Tamper Events" on page
303). If decommissioning is disabled, the SafeNet Luna Network HSM has an indefinite shelf life, as far as the battery
is concerned.

To disable decommissioning:
1. Ensure that the Disable Decommissioning capability update (CUF) is installed on the HSM. To verify that the CUF
is installed, enter the following command:
lunash:> hsm showpolicies
If the CUF is installed, HSM Capability 46: Allow Disable Decommission and HSM Policy 46: Disable
Decommission are listed. If they are not, contact technical support to obtain the Disable Decommissioning
capability update (CUF).
2. Enter the following command to enable HSM Policy 46: Disable Decommission
lunash:> hsm changehsmpolicy -policy 46 -value 1

Comparing Zeroize, Decommission, and Factory Reset
You can clear the contents of your HSM on demand, or the HSM may be cleared in response to an event. How this
affects the contents and configuration of your HSM depends on whether the user partitions were deleted or whether the
HSM was zeroized, decommissioned, or factory reset, as detailed below:
Action

Command/Event

Description

Erase User
Partitions

•

Destroy/erase all user partitions, but do not zeroize the HSM. Policy 46 "
Disable Decommission" is the exception in that it zeroizes the HSM and
erases all user partitions if the policy is changed. To bring the HSM back

Enable or disable
a destructive
HSM policy

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Action

Command/Event

Decommissioning, Zeroizing, or Resetting an HSM to Factory Conditions

Description
into service, you need to:
1. Recreate the partitions
2. Reinitialize the partition roles

Zeroize

•

Too many bad
login attempts on
the HSM SO
account

Deletes all partitions and their contents, but retains the HSM configuration
(audit role and configuration, policy settings). To bring the HSM back into
service, you need to:

•

Perform an HSM
firmware rollback

2. Recreate the partitions

•

Run the LunaSH
command hsm
zeroize

Decommission •

Press the
decommission
button on the rear
of the appliance.

Deletes all partitions and their contents, the audit role, and the audit
configuration. Retains the HSM policy settings. To bring the HSM back
into service, you need to:

•

Enable
HSM Policy 40:
Decommission
on Tamper, and
tamper the HSM.

2. Reinitialize the audit role and reconfigure auditing

Factory Reset

Run the LunaSH
command hsm
factoryreset

1. Reinitialize the HSM
3. Reinitialize the partition roles

1. Reinitialize the HSM
3. Recreate the partitions
4. Reinitialize the partition roles

Deletes all partitions and their contents, and resets all roles and policy
configurations to their factory default values. To bring the HSM back into
service, you need to completely reconfigure the HSM as though it were
new from the factory.

Resetting to Factory Condition
These instructions will allow you to restore your SafeNet Luna Network HSM to its original factory configuration. If you
have performed firmware and software updates, those remain in place, and are not affected by this procedure. The reset
commands affect contents and settings of the HSM and appliance. Reverting of software and firmware is outside their
scope. You must access LunaSH via a serial console to execute hsm factoryreset.

To reset the HSM to factory condition:
1. Login as HSM SO.
hsm login
2. Reset the HSM to factory settings.
hsm factoryreset
3. Reset the appliance configuration (network settings, ssh, ntls, etc.) to factory settings.
sysconf config factoryreset -service all
4. Reboot the appliance.

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End of service and disposal
SafeNet Luna HSMs and appliances are deployed into a wide variety of markets and environments. Arranging for the
eventual disposal of a SafeNet Luna HSM or appliance that is no longer needed can be a simple accounting task and a
call to your local computer recycling service, or it can be a complex and rigorous set of procedures intended to protect
very sensitive information.

Needs Can Differ
Some users of SafeNet Luna HSMs employ cryptographic keys and material that have a very short "shelf life". A
relatively short time after the HSM is taken out of service, any objects that it contains are no longer relevant. The HSM
could be disposed of, with no concern about any material that might remain in it.
The majority of our customers are concerned with their keys and objects that are stored on the HSM. It is important to
them that those items never be exposed. The fact is that they are never exposed, but see below for explanations and
actions that address the concerns of auditors who might be more accustomed to other ways of safeguarding HSM
contents.

SafeNet Luna HSM Protects Your Keys and Objects
The design philosophy of our SafeNet Luna HSMs ensures that contents are safe from attackers. Unlike other HSM
products on the market, SafeNet Luna HSMs never store sensitive objects, like cryptographic keys, unencrypted.
Therefore, SafeNet Luna HSMs have no real need - other than perception or "optics" - to perform active erasure of HSM
contents, in case of an attack or tamper event.
Instead, the basic state of a SafeNet Luna HSM is that any stored keys and objects are strongly encrypted. They are
decrypted only for current use, and only into volatile memory within the HSM.
If power is removed from the HSM, or if the current session closes, the temporarily-decrypted objects instantly
evaporate. The encrypted originals remain, but they are unusable by anyone who does not have the correct HSM keys
to decrypt them.

How the HSM encryption keys protect your sensitive objects
In addition to encryption with the user specific access keys or passwords, all objects on the HSM are encrypted by the
HSM's global key encryption key (KEK) and the HSM's unique Master Tamper Key (MTK).
If the HSM experiences a Decommission event (pressing of the small red button on back of SafeNet Luna Network
HSM, or shorting of the pins of the decommission header on the HSM card, or removal of the battery while main power
is not connected to a SafeNet Luna USB HSM) then the KEK is deleted.
If the HSM experiences a tamper event (physical intrusion, environmental excursion), then the MTK is destroyed.
Destruction of either of those keys instantly renders any objects in the HSM unusable by anyone. In the case of a
Decommission event, when the HSM is next powered on, it requires initialization, which wipes even the encrypted
remains of your former keys and objects.
We recognize that some organizations build their protocols around assumptions that apply to other suppliers' HSMs where keys are stored unencrypted and must be actively erased in the event of an attack or removal from service. If
your policies include that assumption, then you can re-initialize after Decommission - which actively erases the
encrypted objects for which no decrypting key existed. For purposes of security, such an action is not required, but it
can satisfy pre-existing protocols that presume a weakness not present in SafeNet Luna HSMs.
Our customers are often very high-security establishments that have rigorous protocols for removing a device from
service. In such circumstances, it is not sufficient to merely ensure that all material is gone from the HSM. It is also

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necessary to clear any possible evidence from the appliance that contains the HSM, such as IP configuration and
addresses, log files, etc.
If you have any concern that simply pressing the Decommission button and running sysconf config factoryreset is not
sufficient destruction of potentially-sensitive information, then please refer to "Decommissioning the HSM
Appliance" on page 98.

Comparison of Destruction/Denial Actions
Various operations on the SafeNet Luna HSM are intended to make HSM contents unavailable to potential intruders.
The effect of those actions are summarized and contrasted in the following table, along with notes on how to recognize
and how to recover from each scenario.
Scenario 1: MTK is destroyed, HSM is unavailable, but use/access can be recovered after reboot (See Note 1)
Scenario 2: KEK is destroyed (Real-Time Clock and NVRAM), HSM contents cannot be recovered without restore
from backup See Note 2)
Scenario 3: Appliance admin password reset
Event

Scen.
1

Scen.
2

Scen.
3

How to discover
(See Note 3)

How to recover

•

Three bad SO
login attempts

NO

YES

NO

•

Syslog entry

•

•

lunash:> hsm
zeroize

"HSM IS ZEROIZED" in HSM
Details (from hsm show command)

Restore HSM
objects from
Backup

•

lunash:> hsm
factoryreset

•

Any change to a
destructive policy

•

Firmware rollback
(See Note 4)

Login to SafeNet Luna
Network HSM
"recover" account
(local serial
connection)

NO

NO

YES

Syslog entry shows login by "recover"

Log into appliance
as admin, using
the reset password
"PASSWORD"
and change to a
secure password

Hardware tamper

YES

NO

NO

Reboot
[See Note 1]

•

Undervoltage or
overvoltage
during operation

Parse Syslog for text like "tamper",
"TVK was corrupted", or "Generating
new TVK", indicating that a tamper
event was logged. Example:

•

Undertemperature or
over-temperature
during operation

RTC: external tamper latched/
MTK: security function was
zeroized on previous tamper
event and has not been
restored yet

•

Chassis
interference (such

Also, keywords in Syslog like: "HSM
internal error", "device error"

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Event

Scen.
1

Scen.
2

Decommissioning, Zeroizing, or Resetting an HSM to Factory Conditions

Scen.
3

as cover, fans,
etc.)

How to discover
(See Note 3)

How to recover

SafeNet Luna Network HSM appliance
front panel flashes error 30.

Software (commandinitiated) tamper
•

lunash:> hsm
stm transport

Decommission
•

NO

YES

Pressing the
Decommission
button on the
back of the
appliance

NO

Look for log entry like:
RTC: tamper 2 signal/Zeroizing HSM
after decommission...LOG(INFO):
POWER-UP LOG DUMP END

Restore HSM
objects from
Backup

Note 1: MTK is an independent layer of encryption on HSM contents, to manage tamper and Secure Transport Mode.
A destroyed MTK is recovered on next reboot. If MTK cannot be recovered, only restoring from backup onto a new or
re-manufactured HSM can retrieve your keys and HSM data.
Note 2: KEK is an HSM-wide encryption layer that encrypts all HSM objects, excluding only MTK, RPK, a wrapping
key, and a couple of keys used for legacy support. A destroyed KEK cannot be recovered. If the KEK is destroyed,
only restoring from backup can retrieve your keys and HSM data.
Note 3: To check the health of a remote HSM, script a frequent login to the HSM host and execution of a subset of
HSM commands. If a command fails, check the logs for an indication of the cause.
Note 4: These actions all create a situation where hsm init is required, or strongly recommended before the HSM is
used again.
In addition, another event/action that has a destructive component is HSM initialization. See "HSM Initialization" on
page 141.

RMA and Shipping Back to Gemalto
Although rare, it could happen that you need to ship a SafeNet appliance back to Gemalto.
Contact your Gemaltorepresentative to obtain the Return Material Authorization (RMA) and instructions for packing and
shipping.
You might wish (or your security policy might require you) to take maximum precaution with any contents in your HSM
before it leaves your possession.
If so, there are two options available to secure the contents of the SafeNet Luna Network HSM before returning it to
Gemalto:
•

Decommission the HSM, forcibly clearing all HSM contents (see "Decommissioning the HSM Appliance" on page
98 for instructions)

•

Set the HSM into Secure Transport Mode (see "Secure Transport Mode" on page 256 for instructions) and provide
the verification string and random user string to your Gemalto representative by secure means. This will allow
Gemalto to know if the HSM is tampered while in transit.

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Zeroization
In the context of HSMs in general, the term "zeroize" means to erase all plaintext keys. Some HSMs keep all keys in
plaintext within the HSM boundary. SafeNet Luna HSMs do not.
In the context of SafeNet Luna HSMs, keys at rest (keys or objects that are stored in the HSM) are encrypted. Keys are
decrypted into a volatile working memory space inside the HSM only while they are being used. Items in volatile
memory disappear when power is removed. The action that we loosely call "zeroizing", or clearing, erases volatile
memory as well as destroying the key that encrypts stored objects.
Any temporarily decrypted keys are destroyed, and all customer keys on the HSM are immediately rendered
inaccessible and unrecoverable whenever you:
•

perform hsm factoryreset

•

make too many bad login attempts on the SO account

•

press the Decommission button on the SafeNet Luna Network HSM back panel

•

set a "destructive" HSM policy

•

perform HSM firmware rollback

The KEK (key encryption key that encrypts all user objects, partition structure, cloning vectors, masking vectors, etc.)
is destroyed by a zeroization (erasure) or decommission event. At that point, any objects or identities in the HSM
become effectively random blobs of bits that can never be decoded.
Note: The next HSM power-up following a KEK zeroization automatically erases the contents
of user storage, which were already an indecipherable blob without the original KEK. That is,
any zeroizing event instantly makes encrypted objects unusable, and as soon as power is reapplied, the HSM immediately erases even the encrypted remains before it allows further use of
the HSM.
The HSM must now be re-initialized in order to use it again, and initialization overwrites the HSM with new user
parameters. Everything is further encrypted with a new KEK unique to that HSM.
Keys not encrypted by the KEK are those that require exemption and are not involved in user identities or user objects:
•

The Master Tamper Key, which enables tamper handling

•

The Remote PED Vector, to allow Remote PED-mediated recovery from tamper or from Secure Transport Mode

•

The hardware origin key that certifies the HSM hardware as having been built by Gemalto

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High-Availability (HA) Configuration and
Operation

This chapter describes how to configure and use SafeNet Luna HSMs to provide load-balancing and redundancy for
mission-critical applications. It contains the following sections:
•

"High Availability (HA) Overview" below

•

"Load Balancing" on page 107

•

"Key Replication" on page 108

•

"Failover" on page 109

•

"Recovery" on page 112

•

"Performance" on page 117

•

"Standby Members" on page 118

•

"Planning Your Deployment" on page 121

•

"Configuring HA" on page 124

•

"Using HA With Your Applications" on page 129

•

"Adding, Removing, Replacing, or Reconnecting HA Group Members" on page 130

•

"Managing and Troubleshooting Your HA Groups" on page 138

High Availability (HA) Overview
You can use the SafeNet Luna HSM client to group multiple devices, or partitions, into a single logical group – known as
an HA (High Availability) group. When you create an HA group, it is listed as a virtual HA slot in the client. Any
applications that use the virtual HA slot can access cryptographic services as long as at least one member of the HA
group remains functional and connected to the application server. In addition, the client performs load balancing among
the HA group members, allowing many cryptographic commands to be automatically distributed across the HA group,
and enabling linear performance gains for many applications.

How HA is Implemented
The HA and load-balancing functionality is implemented in the SafeNet Luna HSM client, and uses the cloning function
to replicate/synchronize content across HA-group members. There is no direct connection between the members of an
HA group, and all communications between the members of an HA group are managed by the client. The HSMs and
appliances are not involved and, except for being instructed to clone objects to certain HSMs during a synchronization
operation, are unaware that they might be configured in an HA group. The advantage of this approach is that it allows
you to configure HA groups on a per-application (or per-slot) basis.

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High-Availability (HA) Configuration and Operation

To create an HA group, you must first register your client with each HSM you want to include in the HA group. You then
use the client-side administration commands to define the HA group and set any desired configuration options. You can
configure several options including:
•

Setting automatic or manual recovery mode

•

Setting some HSMs as standby members

•

Performing various manual synchronization and recovery operations

Once defined, the SafeNet Luna HSM client presents the HA group as a virtual slot, which is a consolidation of all the
physical HSMs in the HA group. Any operations that access the slot are automatically distributed between the group
members, to provide load balancing, and all key material is automatically replicated and synchronized between each
member of the HA group.

Example: Database Encryption
This section walks through a specific sample use case of some of the HA logic with a specific application – namely a
transparent database encryption.

Typical Database Encryption Key Architecture
Database engines typically use a two-layered key architecture. At the top layer is a master encryption key that is the
root of data protection. Losing this key is equivalent to losing the database, so it obviously needs to be highly durable.
At the second layer are table keys used to protect table-spaces and/or columns. These table keys are stored with the
database as blobs encrypted by the master encryption key (MEK). This architecture maps to the following operations
on the HSM:
1. Initial generation of master key for each database.
2. Generation and encryption of table keys with the master key.
3. Decryption of table keys when the database needs to access encrypted elements.
4. Generation of new master keys during a re-key and then re-encrypting all table keys with it.
5. Generation and encryption of new table keys for storage in the database (often done in a software module).

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The HSM is not involved in the use of table keys. Instead it provides the strong protection of the MEK which is used to
protect the table keys. Users must follow backup procedures to ensure their MEK is as durable as the database itself.
Refer to the backup section of this manual for proper backup procedures.

HSM High Availability with Database Encryption
When the HSMs are configured as an HA group, the database’s master key is automatically and transparently
replicated to all the members when the key is created or re-keyed. If an HSM group member was offline or fails during
the replication, it does not immediately receive a copy of the key. Instead the HA group proceeds after replicating to all
of the active members. Once a member is re-joined to the group the HSM client automatically replicates the new master
keys to the recovered member.
With this in mind, before every re-key event the user should ensure the HA group has sufficient redundancy. A re-key
will succeed so long as one HA group member exists, but proceeding with too few HSMs will result in an availability
risk. For example, proceeding with only one HSM means the new master key will be at risk since it exists only on a
single HSM. Even with sufficient redundancy, SafeNet recommends maintaining an offline backup of a database’s
master key.

HSM Load Balancing with Database Encryption
While a database is up and running, the master key exists on all members in the HA group. As such, requests to
encrypt or decrypt table keys are distributed across the entire group. So the load-balancing feature is able to deliver
improved performance and scalability when the database requires a large number of accesses to the table keys. With
that said, most deployments will not need much load-balancing as the typical database deployment results in a small
number of table keys.
While the table keys are re-keyed, new keys are generated in the HSM and encrypted for storage in the database.
Within an HA group, these keys are generated on the primary HSM and then, even though they exist on the HSM for
only a moment, they are replicated to the entire HSM group as part of the availability logic. These events are infrequent
enough that this extra replication has minimal impact.

Conclusion
The SafeNet high availability and load balancing features provide an excellent set of tools to scale applications and
manage availability of cryptographic services without compromising the integrity of cryptographic keys. A broad range
of deployment options are supported that allow solution architects to achieve the availability needed in a manner that
optimizes the cost and performance without compromising the assurance of the solution.

Load Balancing
The default behavior of the client library is to attempt to load-balance the application’s cryptographic requests across
each active member of an HA group. Any standby members in the HA group are not used to perform cryptographic
operations, and are therefore not part of the load-balancing scheme (see "Standby Members" on page 118).
The top-level algorithm is a round-robin scheme that is modified to favor the least busy device in the set. As each new
command is processed, the SafeNet Luna HSM client looks at how many commands it has scheduled on every device
in the group. If all devices have an equal number of outstanding commands, the new command is scheduled on the next
device in the list – creating a round-robin behavior. However, if the devices have a different number of commands
outstanding on them, the new command is scheduled on the device with the fewest commands queued – creating a
least-busy behavior. This modified round-robin has the advantage of biasing load away from any device currently
performing a lengthy command. In addition to this least-busy bias, the type of command also affects the scheduling
algorithm, as follows:

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•

Single-part (stateless) cryptographic operations are load-balanced.

•

Multi-part (stateful) commands that involve cryptographic operations are load-balanced.

•

Multi-part (stateful) commands that involve information retrieval are not load-balanced. Multi-part operations carry
over several individual commands. The cost of distributing the commands to different HA group members is
generally greater than the benefit. For this reason, multi-part commands that involve information retrieval are all
targeted at one member. Multi-part operations are typically not used, or are infrequent actions, so most applications
are not affected by this restriction.

•

Key management commands are not load-balanced. Key management commands affect the state of the keys
stored in the HSM. As such, these commands are targeted at all HSMs in the group. That is, the command is
performed on the primary HSM and then the result is replicated to all members in the HA group. Key management
operations are also an infrequent occurrence for most applications .

It is important to understand that the least-busy algorithm uses the number of commands outstanding on each device
as the indication of its busyness. When an application performs a repeated command set, this method works very well.
When the pattern is interrupted, however, the type of command can have an impact. For example, when the HSM is
performing signing and an atypical asymmetric key generation request is issued, some number of the application’s
signing commands are scheduled on the same device (behind the key generation). Commands queued behind the key
generation therefore have a large latency driven by the key generation. However, the least-busy characteristic
automatically schedules more commands to other devices in the HA group, minimizing the impact of the key
generation.
It is also important to note that the load-balancing algorithm operates independently in each application process.
Multiple processes on the same client or on different clients do not share their “busyness” information while making their
scheduling choice. In most cases this is reasonable, but some mixed use cases might cause certain applications to
hog the HSMs.
Finally, when an HA group is shared across many servers, different initial members can be selected while the HA group
is being defined on each server. The member first assigned to each group becomes the primary. This approach
optimizes an HA group to distribute the key management and/or multi-part cryptographic operation load more equally.
In summary, the load-balancing scheme used by SafeNet is a combination of round-robin and least-busy for most
operations. However, as required, the algorithm adapts to various conditions and use cases so it might not always
emulate a round-robin approach.

Example
When the client makes a request on a virtual HA slot, the request goes to the first member in the HA group, as listed in
the Chrystoki.conf file (Linux/UNIX) or Crystoki.ini file (Windows), unless it is busy. A member is busy if it has not
yet responded to the most recent request that was sent to it. If the primary member is busy, the client sends the request
to the next non-busy member of the HA Group.
If you add network latency, or if you increase the key-size, or if you interleave other crypto operations, then
performance may drop for individual active members as they become busier.
If you have any group members set to "Standby" status, then they do not contribute to group performance, even if the
client can saturate the active members.

Key Replication
Whenever an application creates key material, the HA functionality transparently replicates the key material to all
members of the HA group before reporting back to the application that the new key is ready. The HA library always
starts with what it considers its primary HSM (initially the first member defined in an HA group). Once the key is created

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on the primary it is automatically replicated to each member in the group. If a member fails during this process the key
replication to the failed member is aborted after the fail-over time out. If any member is unavailable during the replication
process (that is, the unit failed before or during the operation), the HA library keeps track of this and automatically
replicates the key when that member rejoins the group . Once the key is replicated on all active members of the HA
group a success code is returned to the application.
Whether automatic or manual, object replication security is based on the use of the SafeNet cloning protocol to provide
mutual authentication, confidentiality and integrity for each object that is copied from one partition to another. When
partition objects are synchronized, the SafeNet Luna HSM client is used as a secure conduit to coordinate the
duplication of these objects across all partitions. An object created on LunaA partition#1A is duplicated on LunaB
Partition#1B using the following process:
1. The object is created on LunaA.
2. The duplicated object is then encrypted using a key derived from common Domain material (Red key) shared by
each SafeNet Luna HSM in the HA group.
3. LunaA transfers the encrypted object to the SafeNet Luna Client utilizing the encrypted NTL connection between
itself and the client (the object is now double encrypted).
4. The client then securely transfers the object to LunaB.
5. LunaB decrypts the object and stores it in the partition
The cloning protocol is such that it must be invoked separately for each object to be cloned and the sequence of calls
required to implement the protocol must be issued by an authorized client library (residing on a client platform that has
been authenticated to each of the SafeNet Luna HSMs involved in the HA group). This ensures that the use of the
cloning function calls is controlled and the protocol cannot be misused to permit the unauthorized transfer of objects to
or from one of the partitions in the HA group.

Manual Synchronization
To manually synchronize the contents of the members of an HA group, use the LunaCM command hagroup
synchronize.

Failover
When an HA group is running normally the client library continues to schedule commands across all members as
described above. The client continuously monitors the health of each member at two different levels:
•

First, the connectivity with the member is monitored at the networking layer. Disruption of the network connection
invokes a fail-over event within a twenty second timeout.

•

Second, every command sent to a device is continuously monitored for completion. Any command that fails to
complete within twenty seconds also invokes a fail-over event. Most commands are completed within
milliseconds. However, some commands can take extended periods to complete – either because the command
itself is time-consuming (for example, key generation), or because the device is under extreme load. To cover these
events the HSM automatically sends “heartbeats” every two seconds for all commands that have not completed
within the first two seconds. The twenty second timer is extended every time one of these heartbeats arrives at the
client, thus preventing false fail-over events.

A failover event involves dropping a device from the available members in the HA group. All commands that were
pending on the failed device are transparently rescheduled on the remaining members of the group. When a failure
occurs, the application experiences a latency stall on some of the commands in process (on the failing unit) but

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otherwise sees no impact on the transaction flow. Note that the least-busy scheduling algorithm automatically
minimizes the number of commands that stall on a failing unit during the twenty second timeout.
If the primary unit fails, clients automatically select the next member in the group as the new primary. Any key
management or single-part cryptographic operations are transparently restarted on a new group member. In the event
that the primary unit fails, any in-progress, multi-part, cryptographic operations must be restarted by the application, as
the operation returns an error code.
As long as one HA group member remains functional, cryptographic service is maintained to an application no matter
how many other group members fail. As discussed in "Failover" on the previous page, members can also be put back
into service without restarting the application.

How Do You (or Software) Know That a Member Has Failed?
When an HA Group member first fails, the HA status for the group shows "device error" for the failed member. All
subsequent calls return "token not present", until the member (HSM Partition or PKI token) is returned to service.

At the library level, what happens when a device fails or doesn’t respond?
The client library drops the member and continues with others. It will try to reconnect that member at a minimum retry
rate of once per minute (configurable) for the number of times specified in the configuration file, and then stop trying that
member. You can specify a number of retries from 3 to an unlimited number.

What happens to an application if a device fails mid-operation? What if it’s a multi-part
operation?
Multi part operations do not fail over. The entire operation returns a failure. Your application deals with the failure in
whatever way it is coded to do so.
Any operation that fails mid-point would need to be re-sent from the calling application. This is more likely to happen in a
multi-part operation because those are longer, but a failure could conceivably happen during a single atomic operation
as well.
With HA, if the library attempts to send a command to an HSM and it is unavailable, it will automatically retry sending
that command to the next HSM in the configuration after the timeout expires.
Multi-part operations would typically be block encryption or decryption, or any other command where the previous state
of the HSM is critical to the processing of the next command. It is understandable that these need to be re-sent since
the HSMs do not synchronize ‘internal memory state,’ only stored key material.

Reaction to Failures
This section looks at possible failures in an overall HA system, and what needs to be done. The assumption is that HA
has been In a complex system, it is possible to come up with any number of failure scenarios, such as this (partial) list
for an HA goup:
•

Failure at the HSM or appliance
–

HSM card failure

–

HSM re-initialization

–

Deactivated partition

–

Power failure of a member

–

Reboot of member

–

NTL failure

–

STC failure

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Failure at the client
–

Power failure of the client

–

Reboot of client

–

Network keepalive failure

Failure between client and group members
–

Network failure near the member appliance
(so only one member might disappear from client's view)

–

Network failure near the client
(client loses contact with all members)

HSM-Side Failures
The categories of failure at the HSM side of an HA arrangement are temporary or permanent.

Temporary
Temporary failures like reboots, or failures of power or network are self-correcting, and as long as you have set HA
autorecovery parameters that are sufficiently lenient, then recovery is automatic, shortly after the HSM partition
becomes visible to the HA client.

Permanent
Permanent failures require overt intervention at the HSM end, including possibly complete physical replacement of the
unit, or at least initialization of the HSM.
All that concerns the HA service is that the particular unit is gone, and isn't coming back. If an entire SafeNet Luna
Network HSM unit is replaced, then you must go through the entire appliance and HSM configuration of a new unit,
before introducing it to the HA group. If a non-appliance HSM (resides in the Client host computer, e.g., SafeNet Luna
PCIe HSM or SafeNet Luna USB HSM) is replaced, then it must be initialized and a new partition created.
Either way, your immediate options are to use a new name for the partition, or to make the HA SafeNet Luna HSM
Client forget the dead member (LunaCM command hagroup removemember) so you can reuse the old name. Then,
you must ensure that automatic synchronization is enabled (LunaCM command hagroup synchronize -enable), and
manually introduce a new member to the group (LunaCM command hagroup addmember). After that, you can carry
on using your application with full HA redundancy.
Because your application should be using only the HA virtual slot (LunaCM command hagroup haonly), your
application should not have noticed that one HA group member went away, or that another one was added and
synchronized. The only visible sign might have been a brief dip in performance, but only if your application was placing
high demand on the HSM(s).

Client-Side Failures
For SafeNet Luna Network HSM, any failure of the client (such as operating system problems), that does not involve
corruption or removal of files on the host, should resolve itself when the host computer is rebooted.
If the host seems to be working fine otherwise, but you have lost visibility of the HSMs in LunaCM or your client, verify
that the SafeNet drivers are running, and retry. If that fails, reboot. If that fails, restore your configuration from backup of
your host computer. If that fails, re-install SafeNet Luna HSM Client, re-perform certificate exchanges, creation of HA
group, adding of members, setting HAOnly, etc.
For SafeNet Luna PCIe HSM and SafeNet Luna USB HSM, the client is the host of the HSMs, so if HA has been
working, then any sudden failure is likely to be OS or driver related (so restart) or corruption of files (so re-install). If a re-

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install is necessary, you will need to recreate the HA group and re-add all members and re-assert all settings (like
HAOnly).

Failures Between the HSM and Client (SafeNet Luna Network HSM only)
The only failure that could likely occur between a SafeNet Luna Network HSM (or multiple HSMs) and a client computer
coordinating an HA group is a network failure. In that case, the salient factor is whether the failure occurred near the
client or near one (or more) of the SafeNet Luna Network HSM appliances.
If the failure occurs near the client, and you have not set up port bonding on the client, then the client would lose sight of
all HA group members, and the client application would fail. The application would resume according to its timeouts and
error-handling capabilities, and HA would resume automatically if the members reappeared within the recovery window
that you had set.
If the failure occurs near a SafeNet Luna Network HSM member of the HA group, then that member might disappear
from the group until the network failure is cleared, but the client would still be able to see other members, and would
carry on normally.
If the recovery window is exceeded, then you must manually restart HA.

Recovery
After a failure, the recovery process is typically straightforward. Depending on the deployment, an automated or manual
recovery process might be appropriate. In either case there is no need to restart an application.

Automatic recovery
With automatic recovery, the client automatically performs periodic recovery attempts while a member is failed. The
frequency of these checks is adjustable and the number of re-tries can be limited. Each time a reconnection is
attempted, one application command experiences a slight delay while the client attempts to recover. As such, the retry
frequency cannot be set any faster than once per minute. Even if a manual recovery process is selected, the application
does not need to be restarted. Simply run the client recovery command and the recovery logic inside the client makes a
recovery attempt the next time the application uses the HSM. As part of recovery, any key material created while the
member was offline is automatically replicated to the recovered unit.
Automatic recovery is disabled by default. Use the command hagroup retry to turn it on or off. If retry=0, automatic
recovery is disabled. Any other retry value enables automatic recovery.

Failed units
Sometimes a failure of a device is permanent. In this event, the only solution is to deploy a new member to the group. In
this case, you can remove the failed unit from the HA group, add a new device to the group and then start the recovery
process. The running clients automatically resynchronize keys to the new member and start scheduling operations to it.
See "Adding, Removing, Replacing, or Reconnecting HA Group Members" on page 130 for more information.

Manual recovery
Finally, sometimes both an HSM and application fail at the same time. If no new key material was created while an
HSM was offline, the recovery is straightforward: simply return the HSM to service and then restart the application.
However, if new key material was created after an HSM failed but before the application failed, a manual resynchronization (using the hagroup synchronize command) might be required.

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To perform a manual recovery, you confirm which member, or members, have the current key material (normally the
unit that was online at the time the application failed). Put them back in service with the application. Then, for each
member that has stale key material (a copy of an object that was deleted; or an old copy of an object whose attributes
were changed), delete all their key material after making sure they are not part of the HA group. Be particularly careful
that the member is not part of the HA group or the action might destroy active key material by causing an accidental
synchronization during the delete operation. After the HSM is cleared of key material, rejoin it to the group and the
synchronization logic automatically repopulates the device’s key material from the active units.

Usage
When a client is configured to use auto recovery the manual recovery commands must not be used. Invoking them can
cause multiple concurrent recovery processes which result in error codes and possible key corruption .
Most customers should enable auto-recovery in all configurations. We anticipate that the only reason you might wish to
choose manual recovery is if you do not want to change the retry time for periodic transactions. That is, each time a
recovery is attempted a single application thread experiences an increased latency while the library uses that thread to
attempt the re-connection (the latency impact is a few hundred milliseconds).

Recovery Conditions
HA recovery is hands-off resumption by failed HA Group members, or it is manual re-introduction of a failed member, if
autorecovery is not enabled. Some reasons for a member to fail from the group might be:
•

The appliance loses power (but regains power in less than the 2 hours that the HSM preserves its activation state).

•

The network link from the unit is lost and then regained.

HA recovery takes place if the following conditions are true:
•

HA autorecovery is enabled, or if you detect a unit failure and manually re-introduce the unit (or its replacement)

•

HA group has at least 2 nodes

•

HA node is reachable (connected) at client startup

•

HA node recover retry limit is not reached. Otherwise manual recover is the only option to bring back the downed
connection(s)

If all HA nodes fail (no links from client) no recovery is possible.
The HA recovery logic makes its first attempt at recovering a failed member when your application makes a call to its
HSM (the HA group). An idle client does not start the recovery-attempt process. As of release 6.22, if the retry count is
not 0, then recovery is attempted after the configured HA interval expires.
On the other hand, a busy client would notice a slight pause every minute, as the library attempts to recover a dropped
HA group member (or members) until the member has been reinstated or until the timeout has been reached and it stops
trying. Therefore, set the number of retries according to your normal situation (the kinds and durations of network
interruptions you experience, for example).

Enabling and Configuring Autorecovery
In previous releases, autorecovery was not on by default, and needed to be explicitly enabled.
Beginning with SafeNet Luna HSM release 6.0, HA autorecovery is automatically enabled when you set the recovery
retry count using the LunaCM command hagroup retry. Use the command hagroup interval to specify the interval, in
seconds, between each retry attempt. The default is 60 seconds.

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Failure of All Members
If all members of an HA group were to fail, then all logged-in sessions are gone, and operations that were active when
the last group member went down, are terminated. If the client application is able to recover all that state information,
then it is not necessary to restart or re-initialize in order to resume client operations with the SafeNet Luna Network
HSM HA group. All sessions will be restarted without requiring a restart of the client.

Automatic Reintroduction
Automatic reintroduction is supported. A failed (and fixed, or replacement) HSM appliance can be re-introduced if the
application continues without restart. Restarting the application causes it to take a fresh inventory of available HSMs,
and to use only those HSMs within its HA group. You cannot reintroduce a SafeNet Luna Network HSM that was not in
the group when the application started.

Auto-insert
Automatic reintroduction or "auto-insert" is supported. A failed (and fixed, or replacement) HSM appliance can be reintroduced if the application continues without restart. Restarting the application causes it to take a fresh inventory of
available HSMs, and to use only those HSMs within its HA group. You cannot [re]introduce a SafeNet Luna Network
HSM that was not in the group when the application started.
Auto-insert is now the default behavior (from Client 6.2.1 and later). [list below satisfies LHSM-31162]
1. A running client automatically detects SafeNet Luna Network HSM appliance insertion and removal to/from its
configuration.
2. Connection to the new SafeNet Luna Network HSM appliance occurs only if the client HA configuration also has a
new HA member or an HA member gone missing.
3. A running client does not automatically disconnect from the appliance that has been removed from its configuration
until the appliance goes offline (for example, disconnected or powered down).
4. A running client uses the new HA member that is being added to the HA group configuration and does not require
the client to restart to do so.
5. A running client stops attempting to use the removed HA member that is being revoked from the HA configuration
and does not require the client to restart to do so.
6. When a new member is added to the HA group, entries similar to the following appear in the client HA Log:
Mon Feb 1 11:06:55 2016 : [6619] HA group: 11079656446993 detected new member member:
286668019649
Mon Feb 1 11:07:25 2016 : [6619] HA group: 11079656446993 recovery attempt #1 succeeded for
member: 286668019649

7. When a HA member is removed from the HA group, entries similar to the following appear in the client HA Log:
Mon Feb

1 11:07:45 2016 : [6619] HA group: 11079656446993 member: 286668019649 revoked

8. When a new SafeNet Luna Network HSM appliance is registered with a client that has HA configured with “Active
recovery mode”, entries similar to the following appear in the client HA Log:
Sun Jan 31 21:01:52 2016 : [3820] HA subsystem detected new server : 192.20.11.175
Sun Jan 31 21:01:56 2016 : [3820] HA subsystem server 192.20.11.175 connected

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Entries like these appear only if item 3, above, is true. [LHSM-31294]
9. When an existing SafeNet Luna Network HSM appliance is removed from client that has HA configured with
“Active recovery mode”, entries similar to the following appear in the client HA Log:
Tue Feb

2 15:45:12 2016 : [28001] HA subsystem detected removal of server : 192.20.11.86

Synchronization
Synchronization of token objects is a manual process using the hagroup synchronize command. Synchronization
locates any object that exists on any one physical HSM partition (that is a member of the HA group), but not on all
others, and replicates that object to any partitions (among the group) where it did not exist.
This is distinct from the replication that occurs when you create or delete an object on the HA virtual slot. Creation or
deletion against the virtual slot causes that change to be immediately replicated to all connected members (addition or
deletion).

Effect of PED Operations
PED operations block cryptographic operations, so that while a member of an HA group is performing a PED operation,
it will appear to the HA group as a failed member. When the PED operation is complete, failover and recovery HA logic
are invoked to return the member to normal operation.

Network failures
If network connectivity fails to one or more connected SafeNet Luna Network HSM appliances, the HA group will be
restored automatically subject to timeouts and retries, as follows:
•

While the client application is active, and one HA group member is connected and active, other members can
automatically resume in the HA group as long as retries have not stopped.

•

If all members fail or if the client does not have a network connection to at least one group member, then the client
application must be restarted, unless you have recoveryMode activeEnhanced enabled.

Process interaction
Other events and processes interact at different levels and in different situations as described below.
Note: All references to NTLS also apply to STC. Both NTLS and STC provide secure clientappliance connections.
At the lowest communication level, the transport protocol (TCP) is responsible for making and operating the
communication connection between client and appliance (whether HA is involved or not). For SafeNet Luna Network
HSM, the default protocol timeout of 2 hours was much too long, so SafeNet configured that to 3 minutes when HA is
involved. This means that:
•

In a period of no activity by client or appliance, the appliance's TCP will wonder if the client is still there, and will
send a packet after 3 minutes of silence.

•

If that packet is acknowledged, the 3 minute TCP timer restarts, and the cycle repeats indefinitely.

•

If the packet is not acknowledged, then TCP sends another after approximately 45 seconds, and then another after
a further 45 seconds. At the two minute mark, with no response, the connection is considered dead, and higher

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levels are alerted to perform their cleanup.
So altogether, a total of five minutes can elapse since the last time the other participant was heard from. This is at the
transport layer.
Above that level, the NTLS layer provides the connection security and some other housekeeping. Any time a client
sends a request for a cryptographic operation, the HSM on the appliance begins working on that operation.
While the HSM processes the request, appliance-side NTLS sends a "keep-alive PING" every two seconds, until the
HSM returns the answer, which NTLS then conveys across the link to the requesting client. NTLS (nor any layer above)
does not perform any interpretation of the ping.
It simply drops a slow, steady trickle of bytes into the pipe, to keep the TCP layer active. This normally has little effect,
but if your client requests a lengthy operation like an 8192-bit keygen, then the random-number-generation portion of
that operation could take many minutes to complete, during which the HSM would legitimately be sending nothing back
to the client. The NTLS ping ensures that the connection remains alive during long pauses.

Configuration settings
In the SafeNet configuration file, "DefaultTimeout" (default value is 500 seconds) governs how long the client will wait
for a result from an HSM, for a cryptographic call. In the case of SafeNet Luna Network HSM, the copy of the config file
inside the appliance is not accessible externally. The config file in the client installation is accessible to modify, but
"DefaultTimeout" in that file affects only a locally connected HSM (such as might be the case if you had a SafeNet
Luna Backup HSM attached to your client computer). The config file in the client has no effect on the configuration
inside the network-attached SafeNet Luna Network HSM appliance, and thus can have no effect on the interaction
between client and SafeNet Luna Network HSM appliance.
"ReceiveTimeout" is how long the library will wait for a dropped connection to come back.
If "ReceiveTimeout" is tripped, for a given appliance, the HA client stops talking to that appliance and deals with the
remaining members of the HA group to serve your application's crypto requests.
A minute later, the HA client tries to contact the member that failed to reply.
If the connection is successfully re-established, the errant appliance resumes working in the group, being assigned
application calls as needed (governed by application workload and HA logic).
If the connection is not successfully re-established, the client continues working with the remaining group members.
Another minute passes, and the client once again tries the missing appliance to see if it is ready to actively resume
working in the HA group.
The retries continue until the missing member resumes, or until the pre-set (by you) number of retries is reached
(maximum of 500). If the retry count is reached with no success, the client stops trying that member. The failed
appliance is still a member of the group (it is still in the list of HA group members maintained on the client), but the client
no longer tries to send it application calls, and no longer encourages it to establish a connection. You must fix the
appliance (or its network connection) and manually recover it into the group for the client to resume including it in
operations.

Active Autorecovery on a SafeNet Luna Network HSM
Note: All references to NTLS also apply to STC. Both NTLS and STC provide secure clientappliance connections.
Autorecovery uses the HA Active Recovery Thread (ARCT) to manage recovery from a failure. The ARCT sends a
non-session-based message that is processed by NTLS. This allows recovery as soon as a failed member returns.

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Thus, if a failed member returns to duty before an active member fails, then synchronization occurs immediately, and
the secondary member is ready to take over from the active member if that now fails.
Members can reconnect without the need to call finalize/initialize in the client application, which allows for multiple
services that use a single JVM to recover connections independently.
In the event that all HA members fail to respond to the ARCT probing message, the HA slot is deemed to be
unrecoverable.
The recovery mode on a SafeNet Luna Network HSM is the basic active mode. As long as the retry count is not 0,
recovery is active basic be default.
The enhanced active recovery mode is optional, and is controlled by the LunaCM hagroup recoverymode command.

Performance
For repetitive operations, like a high volume of signings using the same key, an HA group can expand SafeNet Luna
Network HSM performance in linear fashion as HA group members are added. HA groups of 16 members have
undergone long-term, full-throttle testing, with excellent results.
Do keep in mind that simply adding more and more SafeNet Luna Network HSM appliances to an HA group is not an
infallible recipe for endless performance improvement. For best overall performance, all HA group members should be
driven near their individual performance "sweet spot", which for SafeNet Luna Network HSM 5.2 and later is around 30
simultaneous threads per HSM. If you assemble an HA group that is considerably larger than your server(s) can drive,
then you might not achieve full performance from all.
The best approach is an HA group balanced in size for the capability of the application servers that will be driving the
group, and the expected loads - with an additional unit to provide capacity for bursts of traffic and for redundancy.

Maximizing Performance
The SafeNet Luna Network HSM used in HA can provide performance improvement for asymmetric single-part
operations. Gigabit Ethernet connections are recommended to maximize performance. For example, we have seen as
much as a doubling of asymmetric single-part operations in a two-member group in a controlled laboratory environment
(without crossing subnet boundaries, without competing traffic or other latency-inducing factors).
Multi-part operations are not load-balanced by the SafeNet HA due to the overhead that would be needed to perform
context replication for each part of a multi-part operation.
Single-part cryptographic operations are load-balanced by the SafeNet HA functionality under most circumstances.
Load-balancing these operations provides both scalability (better net throughput of operations) and redundancy by
supporting transparent fail-over.

Performance is Dependent on the Type of Operation
Performance is also affected by the kind of operation you are performing. HA is better for performance when all HSM
operations are performed on keys and material that reside within the HSM. This changes if part of the operation involves
importing and unwrapping of keys; it can be instructive to consider what happens when such HSM operations are
performed both with and without HA.

With HA
•

One encryption (to wrap the key)

•

One decryption in the HSM (to unwrap the key)

•

Object creation on the HSM (the unwrapped key is created and stored as a key object)

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Key replication happens for HA
–

RSA 4096-bit operation used to derive a shared secret between HSM

–

Encryption of the key on the primary HA member using the shared secret

–

Decryption of the key on the secondary HA member HSM using the shared secret

–

Object creation on the second HA member

One encryption (uses the unwrapped key object to encrypt the data)

Without HA
•

One encryption (to wrap the key)

•

One decryption in the HSM (to unwrap the key)

•

Object creation on the HSM (the unwrapped key is created and stored as a key object)

•

One encryption (uses the unwrapped key object to encrypt the data)

From the above it is apparent that, with HA, many more operations are performed. Most significant in the above case
are the RSA 4096-bit operation and the additional object creation performed. Those two operations are by far the
slowest operations in the list, and so this type of task would have much better performance without HA.
By contrast, if the task had made use of objects already within the HSM, then at most a single synchronization would
have propagated the objects to all HA members, and all subsequent operations would have seen a performance boost
from HA operation. The crucial consideration is whether the objects being manipulated are constant or are constantly
being replaced.

HA and FindObjects
How your application uses the C_FindObjects function to search for objects in a virtual HA slot can have a significant
impact your application performance. See "Application Object Handles" on page 129 for more information.

Standby Members
You can designate some members of an HA group as standby members after you add them to an HA group. Standby
members differ from the default active members in that they do not actively participate in the HA group unless perform
any cryptographic operations
By default, all members in an HA group are treated as active so that they are kept current with key material and are
used to load-balance cryptographic services. In some deployment scenarios, however, it makes sense to define some
members as standby. Standby members are registered just like active members except that they are defined as
“standby” after they are added to the HA group.
As depicted below, applications can be deployed in geographically dispersed locations. In this scenario, you can use
Luna’s standby capability to use the HSMs in the remote data center to cost-effectively improve availability. In this
mode, only the local units (non-standby) are used for active load-balancing. However, as key material is created, it is
automatically replicated to both the active (local) units and standby (remote) unit. In the event of a failure of all local
members, the standby unit is automatically promoted to active status. You can use this feature to reduce costs, while
improving reliability. This approach allows remote HSMs that have high latency to be avoided when not needed.
However, in the worst case scenario where all the local HSMs fail, the remote member automatically activates itself
and keeps the application running.

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Note: In normal operation, the HA standby units do not perform any cryptographic operations.
However, the HA service must log into all units in a group (C_OpenSession/Login is performed
against all members), including standby units. This is necessary because, in the case where
the standby unit is called into action, it must already be up-to-date with respect to key material
that is being used in the group - it cannot synchronize with HSMs that have failed or that have
gone off-line. Therefore, when the HA group consists of PED-authenticated HSMs, they must
all be Activated, including the standby HSM(s).

Standby Behavior
Standby members become active only to keep the group alive. In an HA group that includes more than one standby
member, if all active members go down/off-line, all available standby members become active in the group. Additional
standby members remain on standby until/unless they are needed.
In other words, in an HA group, the load-sharing and redundancy capability is as large as all the active members. If all
active members become unavailable to the application, then the group load-sharing and redundancy falls to all available
standby members.

To set an HSM to standby status:
In "Configuring HA" on page 124, we created an HA group with label "myHAgroup" and group number 1154438865297,
with two active members, serial number 154438865297 and serial number 1238700701520.
1. Create a third member, as previously described, and add it to the HA group by specifying either its slot or serial
number.
hagroup addmember -group  {-slot  | -serialnumber }
For example:
lunacm:> hagroup addmember -group myHAgroup -slot 2
Enter the password: ********
Member 1238700701521 successfully added to group myHAgroup. New group
configuration is:
HA Group Label: myHAgroup
HA Group Number: 1154438865297
HA Group Slot ID: 6
Synchronization: enabled
Group Members: 154438865297, 1238700701520, 1238700701521
Needs sync: no

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Standby Members:
Slot #
======
0
1
2

High-Availability (HA) Configuration and Operation



Member S/N
==========
154438865297
1238700701520
1238700701521

Member Label
============
HApartition00
HApartition01
HApartition02

Status
======
alive
alive
alive

Please use the command "ha synchronize" when you are ready
to replicate data between all members of the HA group.
(If you have additional members to add, you may wish to wait
until you have added them before synchronizing to save time by
avoiding multiple synchronizations.)
Command Result : No Error

2. Set the member to standby status, specifying its slot or serial number.
hagroup addstandby -group  {-slot  | -serialnumber }
For example:
lunacm:> hagroup addstandby -group myHAgroup -serialnumber 1238700701521
The member 1238700701521 was successfully added to the standby list for the HA Group
myHAgroup.
Command Result : No Error

3. If you wish, check the new configuration.
hagroup listgroups
For example:
lunacm:> hagroup listgroups
If you would like to see synchronization data for group myHAgroup,
please enter the password for the group members. Sync info
not available in HA Only mode.
Enter the password: ********
HA auto recovery:
HA recovery mode:
Maximum auto recovery retry:
Auto recovery poll interval:
HA logging:
Only Show HA Slots:

disabled
activeBasic
0
60 seconds
disabled
no

HA Group Label: myHAgroup
HA Group Number: 1154438865297
HA Group Slot ID: 6
Synchronization: enabled
Group Members: 154438865297, 1238700701520, 1238700701521
Needs sync: no
Standby Members: 1238700701521
Slot #
======
0
1
2

Member S/N
==========
154438865297
1238700701520
1238700701521

Member Label
============
HApartition00
HApartition01
HApartition02

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Status
======
alive
alive
alive

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Command Result : No Error

Planning Your Deployment
This section describes the supported configurations and any limitations or constraints to consider when setting up an
HA group.

HA Group Members
It is important that all members in an HA group have the same configuration and version. That means that each HA
group member must use the same authentication method, either PED-authenticated or password-authenticated, and be
at the same software version. Running HA groups with different versions is unsupported. Ensure that HSMs are
configured identically to ensure smooth high availability and load balancing operation. SafeNet Luna HSMs come with
various key management configurations: cloning mode, key-export mode, etc. HA functionality is supported with
cloning, provided all members in the group have the same configuration. Clients automatically and transparently use the
correct secure key replication method based on the group’s configuration.
It is also critical that all members in an HA group share the same Security Domain role (Red PED key for PEDauthenticated devices, or domain password for password-authenticated devices). The Security Domain defines which
HSMs are allowed to share key material. Because HA group members are, by definition, intended to be peers, they
must be in the same Security Domain.
The SafeNet HA and load-balancing feature works on per-client and per-partition bases. This provides a lot of flexibility.
For example, it is possible to define a different sub-set of HSMs in each client and even in each client’s partitions (in the
event that a single client uses multiple partitions). SafeNet recommends to avoid these complex configurations and to
keep the HA topography uniform for an entire HSM. That is, treat HSM members at the HSM level as atomic and whole.
This simplifies the configuration management associated with the HA feature.

Mix and Match Appliance Software is Not Supported
All SafeNet Luna Network HSM appliances in an HA group must be running the same appliance software version.
Before attempting to create an HA group, ensure that all of the appliances used to host the HA members are running the
same appliance software. In addition, it is recommended that your client software is at the same software version as
the appliance.

Mix and Match HSM Firmware, Capabilities, and FIPS Setting is Not Recommended
The HSM firmware, capabilities, and FIPS setting define which mechanisms are available, and how they can be used.
To ensure that all objects in an HA slot can be successfully cloned to all members of the HA group, ensure that all
members of a production HA group are at the same firmware level, have the same set of capabilities installed, and use
the same FIPS setting. If mismatches exist between members, HSM operations or HA synchronization might fail if
your application attempts to use a mechanism or a capability that not all members support.
To ensure minimal disruption during the during firmware or capability updates, your HA group will continue to function if
there are differences in firmware, capabilities, or FIPS setting between the HA group members. Where differences
exist, the capability of the group (in terms of features and available algorithms) is that of the member with the oldest
firmware. It is recommended that you limit periods where mismatches are present to maintenance windows used to
apply firmware of capability upgrades.

Example
Assume you have an HA group that includes HSMs with two different firmware versions,. In this case, certain
capabilities that are part of the newer firmware are unavailable to clients connecting to the HA group. Specifically,

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operations that make use of newer cryptographic mechanisms and algorithms would likely fail. The client's calls might
be initially assigned to a newer-firmware HSM and could therefore appear to work for a time, but if the task is loadbalanced to an HSM that does not support the newer features, it would fail. Similarly, if the newer-firmware HSM
dropped out of the group, operations requiring the newer firmware would fail.

HA Group Members Must Not Be on the Same Appliance
In any one HA group, always ensure that member partitions or member PKI tokens (USB-attached SafeNet Luna USB
HSMs, or SafeNet CA4/PCM token HSMs in a USB-attached SafeNet DOCK2 card reader) are on different / separate
appliances. Do not attempt to include more than one HSM partition or PKI token (nor one of each) from the same
appliance in a single HA group. This is not a supported configuration. Allowing two partitions from one HSM, or a
partition from the HSM and an attached HSM (as for PKI), into a single HA group would defeat the purpose of HA by
making the SafeNet appliance a potential single-point-of-failure.

Running HA on a group of export SafeNet Luna Network HSM appliances
This configuration is supported, although you cannot clone/replicate private keys.

High Availability Group Sizing
As of SafeNet Luna HSM release 6.x, the high availability function supports the grouping of up to thirty-two members.
However, the maximum practical group size for your application is driven by a trade-off between performance and the
cost of replicating key material across the entire group. A common practice is to set the group size to N+1 where N is
defined by the desired performance per application server(s). As depicted below, this solution gives the desired
performance with a single extra HSM providing the availability requirement. The number of HSMs per group of
application servers varies based on the application use case but, as depicted, groups of three are typical.

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As performance needs grow beyond the performance capacity of three HSMs, it often makes sense to define a second
independent group of application servers and HSMs to further isolate applications from any single point of failure. This
has the added advantage of facilitating the distribution of HSM and application sets in different data centers.

Network Requirements
The network topography of the HA group is generally not important to the proper functioning of the group. As long as the
client has a network path to each member the HA logic will function. Keep in mind that having a varying range of
latencies between the client and each HA member causes a command scheduling bias towards the low-latency
members. It also implies that commands scheduled on the long-latency devices have a larger overall latency
associated with each command. In this case, the command latency is a characteristic of the network; to achieve
uniform load distribution ensure that latencies to each device in the group are similar (with the exception of standby
members, who do not contribute to network load). Gigabit Ethernet network connections are recommended.

Upgrading and Redundancy and Rotation
For SafeNet Luna Network HSM HA function we suggest that all SafeNet Luna Network HSM appliances in an HA
group be at the same appliance software and firmware level. The issue is not about firmware level, per se - what might
happen is that a newer firmware could contain newer algorithms that are not supported in the replaced firmware. If your
client is configured to take advantage of newer/better algorithms when they become available, it might do so while one
member of an HA group has new firmware, but another member has not yet been updated, and therefore does not yet
support the requested algorithm. The client might not be able to interpret the resulting imbalance. Therefore, when you
intend to upgrade/update any of the SafeNet Luna Network HSM units in an HA group, or when you intend to
upgrade/update the SafeNet Luna Network HSM Client software, you might schedule some downtime for your
application, if you anticipate a problem.
If the application is so critical that you cannot permit that much scheduled downtime, then you can set up a second
complete set of Client computer and associated HA group. One set can service the application load while the other set

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is being upgraded or otherwise maintained. For such up-time-critical applications, you might already have such a
backup set of Client-plus-HA-group that you would rotate in and out of service during regular maintenance windows.

Configuring HA
To create an HA group, you need at least two SafeNet Luna Network HSMs with PED Authentication, or two with
Password Authentication. You cannot use Password -Authenticated and PED-Authenticated SafeNet Luna Network
HSMs simultaneously in an HA group. This section describes how to set up an HA group with partitions on different
HSMs. It consists of the following major steps:
•

"Prerequisites" below

•

"Create the HA Group" on the next page

•

"Verification" on page 127

•

"HA Standby Mode [Optional]" on page 128

Prerequisites
You must complete these procedures before setting up an HA group. The prerequisite steps are divided into tasks
performed by different roles.

HSM SO Prerequisites
1. Perform the network setup on two or more SafeNet Luna Network HSM appliances (see "Configure the SafeNet
Appliance for Your Network" on page 1 in the Configuration Guide).
2. Ensure that HSM policies 7: Allow Cloning and 16: Allow Network Replication are "on" (see "Set the HSM
Policies" on page 1 in the Configuration Guide). If your HSMs do not have the cloning option, then they will use the
Key Export functionality to backup to (and restore from) a file, rather than a hardware Backup token.
3. Initialize the HSMs (see "HSM Initialization" on page 141 in the Configuration Guide). All HSMs that will host
partitions in the HA group must be initialized with the same cloning domain:
–

PED-authenticated HSMs must share the same red domain PED key

–

Password-authenticated HSMs must share the same domain string

4. Create a partition on each SafeNet Luna Network HSM. They do not need to have the same label.
5. Allow one or more clients to access the partitions using NTLS or STC links (see "Enable the Client to Access a
Partition" on page 1 in the Configuration Guide).

Partition SO Prerequisites
1. Ensure that all the partitions to be included in the HA group are visible in LunaCM (see "Enable the Client to Access
a Partition" on page 1 in the Configuration Guide).
2. Initialize all the partitions to be included in the HA group (see "Configure Application Partitions" on page 1 in the
Configuration Guide). The partitions do not need to have the same label, but they must be initialized with the same
cloning domain:
–

PED-authenticated partitions must share the same red domain PED key

–

Password-authenticated partitions must share the same domain string

In this example, the partitions have been initialized as HApartition00 (SN 154438865297) and HApartition01 (SN
1238700701520).

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3. [OPTIONAL] If you are setting up a PED-authenticated HA group, ensure that each Partition is Activated and
AutoActivated (see "Activation and Auto-Activation on PED-Authenticated Partitions" on page 160), so that it can
retain/resume its "Activate" (persistent login) state through any brief power failure or other interruption.
4. Initialize the Crypto Officer role on all the partitions.
role init -name co

Crypto Officer Prerequisites
1. Login to each partition as Crypto Officer and change the initial primary credential (password or black PED key).
Use the same Crypto Officer credential for each partition to be included in the HA group.
role login -name co
role changepw -name co
2. If you are setting up a PED-authenticated HA group, change the initial secondary credential (challenge password).
Use the same challenge password for each partition to be included in the HA group.
role login -name co
role changepw -name co -oldpw  -newpw 

Create the HA Group
Note: Your LunaCM instance needs to update the Chrystoki.conf (Linux/UNIX) or
crystoki.ini file (Windows) when setting up or reconfiguring HA. Ensure that you have
sufficient privileges.
After satisfying the prerequisites, use LunaCM to create an HA group on your client, and add member partitions. This
procedure is completed by the Crypto Officer.
1. Use the hagroup creategroup command to create a new HA group on the client, which requires:
–

a Label for the group (do NOT call the group just "HA").

–

the Serial number OR the slot number of the primary partition.

–

the Crypto Officer password for the partition.

hagroup creategroup -label 

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